/src/openssl111/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2011-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | #include <string.h> |
11 | | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
12 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
13 | | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
14 | | #include "rand_local.h" |
15 | | #include "internal/thread_once.h" |
16 | | #include "crypto/rand.h" |
17 | | #include "crypto/cryptlib.h" |
18 | | |
19 | | /* |
20 | | * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG |
21 | | * |
22 | | * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview. |
23 | | * |
24 | | * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new |
25 | | * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has |
26 | | * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free |
27 | | * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware |
28 | | * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is |
29 | | * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.) |
30 | | */ |
31 | | |
32 | | /* |
33 | | * The three shared DRBG instances |
34 | | * |
35 | | * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>. |
36 | | */ |
37 | | |
38 | | /* |
39 | | * The <master> DRBG |
40 | | * |
41 | | * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other |
42 | | * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy |
43 | | * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add(). |
44 | | * |
45 | | * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by |
46 | | * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child |
47 | | * DRBG instances during reseeding. |
48 | | */ |
49 | | static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg; |
50 | | /* |
51 | | * The <public> DRBG |
52 | | * |
53 | | * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes(). |
54 | | * |
55 | | * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. |
56 | | */ |
57 | | static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg; |
58 | | /* |
59 | | * The <private> DRBG |
60 | | * |
61 | | * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes() |
62 | | * |
63 | | * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. |
64 | | */ |
65 | | static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; |
66 | | |
67 | | |
68 | | |
69 | | /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */ |
70 | | static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"; |
71 | | |
72 | | static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; |
73 | | |
74 | | |
75 | | |
76 | | static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE; |
77 | | static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS; |
78 | | |
79 | | static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
80 | | static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
81 | | |
82 | | static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; |
83 | | static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; |
84 | | |
85 | | /* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */ |
86 | | static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags = |
87 | | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF; |
88 | | |
89 | | static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent); |
90 | | |
91 | | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, |
92 | | int type, |
93 | | unsigned int flags, |
94 | | RAND_DRBG *parent); |
95 | | |
96 | | /* |
97 | | * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|. |
98 | | * |
99 | | * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults |
100 | | * |
101 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
102 | | */ |
103 | | int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) |
104 | 0 | { |
105 | 0 | int ret = 1; |
106 | |
|
107 | 0 | if (type == 0 && flags == 0) { |
108 | 0 | type = rand_drbg_type; |
109 | 0 | flags = rand_drbg_flags; |
110 | 0 | } |
111 | | |
112 | | /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */ |
113 | 0 | if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) { |
114 | 0 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); |
115 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); |
116 | 0 | drbg->adin_pool = NULL; |
117 | 0 | } |
118 | |
|
119 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED; |
120 | 0 | drbg->flags = flags; |
121 | 0 | drbg->type = type; |
122 | |
|
123 | 0 | switch (type) { |
124 | 0 | default: |
125 | 0 | drbg->type = 0; |
126 | 0 | drbg->flags = 0; |
127 | 0 | drbg->meth = NULL; |
128 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); |
129 | 0 | return 0; |
130 | 0 | case 0: |
131 | | /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */ |
132 | 0 | drbg->meth = NULL; |
133 | 0 | return 1; |
134 | 0 | case NID_aes_128_ctr: |
135 | 0 | case NID_aes_192_ctr: |
136 | 0 | case NID_aes_256_ctr: |
137 | 0 | ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg); |
138 | 0 | break; |
139 | 0 | } |
140 | | |
141 | 0 | if (ret == 0) { |
142 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
143 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); |
144 | 0 | } |
145 | 0 | return ret; |
146 | 0 | } |
147 | | |
148 | | /* |
149 | | * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances. |
150 | | * |
151 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
152 | | */ |
153 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) |
154 | 0 | { |
155 | 0 | int ret = 1; |
156 | |
|
157 | 0 | switch (type) { |
158 | 0 | default: |
159 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); |
160 | 0 | return 0; |
161 | 0 | case NID_aes_128_ctr: |
162 | 0 | case NID_aes_192_ctr: |
163 | 0 | case NID_aes_256_ctr: |
164 | 0 | break; |
165 | 0 | } |
166 | | |
167 | 0 | if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) { |
168 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS); |
169 | 0 | return 0; |
170 | 0 | } |
171 | | |
172 | 0 | rand_drbg_type = type; |
173 | 0 | rand_drbg_flags = flags; |
174 | |
|
175 | 0 | return ret; |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | | |
178 | | |
179 | | /* |
180 | | * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on |
181 | | * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled. |
182 | | * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding. |
183 | | * |
184 | | * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. |
185 | | */ |
186 | | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, |
187 | | int type, |
188 | | unsigned int flags, |
189 | | RAND_DRBG *parent) |
190 | 0 | { |
191 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) |
192 | 0 | : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); |
193 | |
|
194 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) { |
195 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
196 | 0 | return NULL; |
197 | 0 | } |
198 | | |
199 | 0 | drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg); |
200 | 0 | drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); |
201 | 0 | drbg->parent = parent; |
202 | |
|
203 | 0 | if (parent == NULL) { |
204 | 0 | drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; |
205 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; |
206 | 0 | #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE |
207 | 0 | drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce; |
208 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce; |
209 | 0 | #endif |
210 | |
|
211 | 0 | drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval; |
212 | 0 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval; |
213 | 0 | } else { |
214 | 0 | drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; |
215 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; |
216 | | /* |
217 | | * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will |
218 | | * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent. |
219 | | */ |
220 | |
|
221 | 0 | drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval; |
222 | 0 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval; |
223 | 0 | } |
224 | |
|
225 | 0 | if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0) |
226 | 0 | goto err; |
227 | | |
228 | 0 | if (parent != NULL) { |
229 | 0 | rand_drbg_lock(parent); |
230 | 0 | if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) { |
231 | | /* |
232 | | * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C |
233 | | * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source |
234 | | */ |
235 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(parent); |
236 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK); |
237 | 0 | goto err; |
238 | 0 | } |
239 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(parent); |
240 | 0 | } |
241 | | |
242 | 0 | return drbg; |
243 | | |
244 | 0 | err: |
245 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
246 | |
|
247 | 0 | return NULL; |
248 | 0 | } |
249 | | |
250 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) |
251 | 0 | { |
252 | 0 | return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent); |
253 | 0 | } |
254 | | |
255 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) |
256 | 0 | { |
257 | 0 | return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent); |
258 | 0 | } |
259 | | |
260 | | /* |
261 | | * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory. |
262 | | */ |
263 | | void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
264 | 0 | { |
265 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
266 | 0 | return; |
267 | | |
268 | 0 | if (drbg->meth != NULL) |
269 | 0 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); |
270 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); |
271 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); |
272 | 0 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); |
273 | |
|
274 | 0 | if (drbg->secure) |
275 | 0 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); |
276 | 0 | else |
277 | 0 | OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); |
278 | 0 | } |
279 | | |
280 | | /* |
281 | | * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and |
282 | | * |perslen| as prediction-resistance input. |
283 | | * |
284 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
285 | | * |
286 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
287 | | */ |
288 | | int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
289 | | const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen) |
290 | 0 | { |
291 | 0 | unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL; |
292 | 0 | size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0; |
293 | 0 | size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; |
294 | 0 | size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; |
295 | 0 | size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; |
296 | |
|
297 | 0 | if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { |
298 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, |
299 | 0 | RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG); |
300 | 0 | goto end; |
301 | 0 | } |
302 | | |
303 | 0 | if (drbg->meth == NULL) { |
304 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, |
305 | 0 | RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); |
306 | 0 | goto end; |
307 | 0 | } |
308 | | |
309 | 0 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
310 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, |
311 | 0 | drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE |
312 | 0 | : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED); |
313 | 0 | goto end; |
314 | 0 | } |
315 | | |
316 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
317 | | |
318 | | /* |
319 | | * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy |
320 | | * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing |
321 | | * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce. |
322 | | * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. |
323 | | */ |
324 | 0 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { |
325 | 0 | min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; |
326 | 0 | min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; |
327 | 0 | max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; |
328 | 0 | } |
329 | |
|
330 | 0 | if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) |
331 | 0 | entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, |
332 | 0 | min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); |
333 | 0 | if (entropylen < min_entropylen |
334 | 0 | || entropylen > max_entropylen) { |
335 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); |
336 | 0 | goto end; |
337 | 0 | } |
338 | | |
339 | 0 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { |
340 | 0 | noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2, |
341 | 0 | drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen); |
342 | 0 | if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) { |
343 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); |
344 | 0 | goto end; |
345 | 0 | } |
346 | 0 | } |
347 | | |
348 | 0 | if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen, |
349 | 0 | nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) { |
350 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG); |
351 | 0 | goto end; |
352 | 0 | } |
353 | | |
354 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_READY; |
355 | 0 | drbg->generate_counter = 1; |
356 | 0 | drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); |
357 | 0 | if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent == NULL) |
358 | 0 | tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); |
359 | |
|
360 | 0 | end: |
361 | 0 | if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) |
362 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); |
363 | 0 | if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL) |
364 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen); |
365 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) |
366 | 0 | return 1; |
367 | 0 | return 0; |
368 | 0 | } |
369 | | |
370 | | /* |
371 | | * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used. |
372 | | * |
373 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
374 | | * |
375 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
376 | | */ |
377 | | int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
378 | 0 | { |
379 | 0 | if (drbg->meth == NULL) { |
380 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
381 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE, |
382 | 0 | RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); |
383 | 0 | return 0; |
384 | 0 | } |
385 | | |
386 | | /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important |
387 | | * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their |
388 | | * initial values. |
389 | | */ |
390 | 0 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); |
391 | 0 | return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags); |
392 | 0 | } |
393 | | |
394 | | /* |
395 | | * Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data |
396 | | * |
397 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
398 | | * |
399 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
400 | | */ |
401 | | int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
402 | | const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen, |
403 | | int prediction_resistance) |
404 | 0 | { |
405 | 0 | unsigned char *entropy = NULL; |
406 | 0 | size_t entropylen = 0; |
407 | |
|
408 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) { |
409 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); |
410 | 0 | return 0; |
411 | 0 | } |
412 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
413 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED); |
414 | 0 | return 0; |
415 | 0 | } |
416 | | |
417 | 0 | if (adin == NULL) { |
418 | 0 | adinlen = 0; |
419 | 0 | } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { |
420 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
421 | 0 | return 0; |
422 | 0 | } |
423 | | |
424 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
425 | 0 | if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) |
426 | 0 | entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, |
427 | 0 | drbg->min_entropylen, |
428 | 0 | drbg->max_entropylen, |
429 | 0 | prediction_resistance); |
430 | 0 | if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen |
431 | 0 | || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { |
432 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); |
433 | 0 | goto end; |
434 | 0 | } |
435 | | |
436 | 0 | if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen)) |
437 | 0 | goto end; |
438 | | |
439 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_READY; |
440 | 0 | drbg->generate_counter = 1; |
441 | 0 | drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); |
442 | 0 | if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent == NULL) |
443 | 0 | tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); |
444 | |
|
445 | 0 | end: |
446 | 0 | if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) |
447 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); |
448 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) |
449 | 0 | return 1; |
450 | 0 | return 0; |
451 | 0 | } |
452 | | |
453 | | /* |
454 | | * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input |
455 | | * |
456 | | * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means, |
457 | | * regardless of its current state. |
458 | | * |
459 | | * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed, |
460 | | * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy. |
461 | | * |
462 | | * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input. |
463 | | * |
464 | | * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input |
465 | | * |
466 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
467 | | * |
468 | | * This function is used internally only. |
469 | | */ |
470 | | int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
471 | | const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) |
472 | 0 | { |
473 | 0 | int reseeded = 0; |
474 | 0 | const unsigned char *adin = NULL; |
475 | 0 | size_t adinlen = 0; |
476 | |
|
477 | 0 | if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { |
478 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
479 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
480 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); |
481 | 0 | drbg->seed_pool = NULL; |
482 | 0 | return 0; |
483 | 0 | } |
484 | | |
485 | 0 | if (buffer != NULL) { |
486 | 0 | if (entropy > 0) { |
487 | 0 | if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) { |
488 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, |
489 | 0 | RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
490 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
491 | 0 | return 0; |
492 | 0 | } |
493 | | |
494 | 0 | if (entropy > 8 * len) { |
495 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE); |
496 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
497 | 0 | return 0; |
498 | 0 | } |
499 | | |
500 | | /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */ |
501 | 0 | drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy); |
502 | 0 | if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) |
503 | 0 | return 0; |
504 | 0 | } else { |
505 | 0 | if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) { |
506 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, |
507 | 0 | RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
508 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
509 | 0 | return 0; |
510 | 0 | } |
511 | 0 | adin = buffer; |
512 | 0 | adinlen = len; |
513 | 0 | } |
514 | 0 | } |
515 | | |
516 | | /* repair error state */ |
517 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) |
518 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg); |
519 | | |
520 | | /* repair uninitialized state */ |
521 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
522 | | /* reinstantiate drbg */ |
523 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, |
524 | 0 | (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, |
525 | 0 | sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); |
526 | | /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */ |
527 | 0 | reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY); |
528 | 0 | } |
529 | | |
530 | | /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */ |
531 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) { |
532 | 0 | if (adin != NULL) { |
533 | | /* |
534 | | * mix in additional input without reseeding |
535 | | * |
536 | | * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional |
537 | | * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling |
538 | | * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy(). |
539 | | * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A. |
540 | | */ |
541 | 0 | drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0); |
542 | 0 | } else if (reseeded == 0) { |
543 | | /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */ |
544 | 0 | if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0)) { |
545 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); |
546 | 0 | } |
547 | 0 | } |
548 | 0 | } |
549 | |
|
550 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); |
551 | 0 | drbg->seed_pool = NULL; |
552 | |
|
553 | 0 | return drbg->state == DRBG_READY; |
554 | 0 | } |
555 | | |
556 | | /* |
557 | | * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need |
558 | | * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be |
559 | | * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|. |
560 | | * |
561 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
562 | | * |
563 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
564 | | * |
565 | | */ |
566 | | int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, |
567 | | int prediction_resistance, |
568 | | const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) |
569 | 0 | { |
570 | 0 | int fork_id; |
571 | 0 | int reseed_required = 0; |
572 | |
|
573 | 0 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) { |
574 | | /* try to recover from previous errors */ |
575 | 0 | rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); |
576 | |
|
577 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) { |
578 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); |
579 | 0 | return 0; |
580 | 0 | } |
581 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
582 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED); |
583 | 0 | return 0; |
584 | 0 | } |
585 | 0 | } |
586 | | |
587 | 0 | if (outlen > drbg->max_request) { |
588 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG); |
589 | 0 | return 0; |
590 | 0 | } |
591 | 0 | if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { |
592 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
593 | 0 | return 0; |
594 | 0 | } |
595 | | |
596 | 0 | fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); |
597 | |
|
598 | 0 | if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) { |
599 | 0 | drbg->fork_id = fork_id; |
600 | 0 | reseed_required = 1; |
601 | 0 | } |
602 | |
|
603 | 0 | if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) { |
604 | 0 | if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) |
605 | 0 | reseed_required = 1; |
606 | 0 | } |
607 | 0 | if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) { |
608 | 0 | time_t now = time(NULL); |
609 | 0 | if (now < drbg->reseed_time |
610 | 0 | || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval) |
611 | 0 | reseed_required = 1; |
612 | 0 | } |
613 | 0 | if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent != NULL) { |
614 | 0 | if (drbg->reseed_counter != tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)) |
615 | 0 | reseed_required = 1; |
616 | 0 | } |
617 | |
|
618 | 0 | if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) { |
619 | 0 | if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) { |
620 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); |
621 | 0 | return 0; |
622 | 0 | } |
623 | 0 | adin = NULL; |
624 | 0 | adinlen = 0; |
625 | 0 | } |
626 | | |
627 | 0 | if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) { |
628 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
629 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR); |
630 | 0 | return 0; |
631 | 0 | } |
632 | | |
633 | 0 | drbg->generate_counter++; |
634 | |
|
635 | 0 | return 1; |
636 | 0 | } |
637 | | |
638 | | /* |
639 | | * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will |
640 | | * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes. |
641 | | * |
642 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
643 | | * |
644 | | * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. |
645 | | */ |
646 | | int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) |
647 | 0 | { |
648 | 0 | unsigned char *additional = NULL; |
649 | 0 | size_t additional_len; |
650 | 0 | size_t chunk; |
651 | 0 | size_t ret = 0; |
652 | |
|
653 | 0 | if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) { |
654 | 0 | if (drbg->type == 0) |
655 | 0 | goto err; |
656 | 0 | drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen); |
657 | 0 | if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) |
658 | 0 | goto err; |
659 | 0 | } |
660 | | |
661 | 0 | additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, |
662 | 0 | &additional); |
663 | |
|
664 | 0 | for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) { |
665 | 0 | chunk = outlen; |
666 | 0 | if (chunk > drbg->max_request) |
667 | 0 | chunk = drbg->max_request; |
668 | 0 | ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len); |
669 | 0 | if (!ret) |
670 | 0 | goto err; |
671 | 0 | } |
672 | 0 | ret = 1; |
673 | |
|
674 | 0 | err: |
675 | 0 | if (additional != NULL) |
676 | 0 | rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional); |
677 | |
|
678 | 0 | return ret; |
679 | 0 | } |
680 | | |
681 | | /* |
682 | | * Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce. |
683 | | * |
684 | | * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been |
685 | | * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail. |
686 | | * |
687 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
688 | | */ |
689 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
690 | | RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy, |
691 | | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy, |
692 | | RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce, |
693 | | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce) |
694 | 0 | { |
695 | 0 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) |
696 | 0 | return 0; |
697 | 0 | drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy; |
698 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy; |
699 | 0 | drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce; |
700 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce; |
701 | 0 | return 1; |
702 | 0 | } |
703 | | |
704 | | /* |
705 | | * Set the reseed interval. |
706 | | * |
707 | | * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the number of generate |
708 | | * requests exceeds the given reseed interval. If the reseed interval |
709 | | * is 0, then this feature is disabled. |
710 | | * |
711 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
712 | | */ |
713 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval) |
714 | 0 | { |
715 | 0 | if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL) |
716 | 0 | return 0; |
717 | 0 | drbg->reseed_interval = interval; |
718 | 0 | return 1; |
719 | 0 | } |
720 | | |
721 | | /* |
722 | | * Set the reseed time interval. |
723 | | * |
724 | | * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the time elapsed since |
725 | | * the last reseeding exceeds the given reseed time interval. For safety, |
726 | | * a reseeding will also occur if the clock has been reset to a smaller |
727 | | * value. |
728 | | * |
729 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
730 | | */ |
731 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval) |
732 | 0 | { |
733 | 0 | if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL) |
734 | 0 | return 0; |
735 | 0 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval; |
736 | 0 | return 1; |
737 | 0 | } |
738 | | |
739 | | /* |
740 | | * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances |
741 | | * |
742 | | * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances |
743 | | * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent). |
744 | | * |
745 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
746 | | */ |
747 | | |
748 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults( |
749 | | unsigned int _master_reseed_interval, |
750 | | unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval, |
751 | | time_t _master_reseed_time_interval, |
752 | | time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval |
753 | | ) |
754 | 0 | { |
755 | 0 | if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL |
756 | 0 | || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL) |
757 | 0 | return 0; |
758 | | |
759 | 0 | if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL |
760 | 0 | || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL) |
761 | 0 | return 0; |
762 | | |
763 | 0 | master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval; |
764 | 0 | slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval; |
765 | |
|
766 | 0 | master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval; |
767 | 0 | slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval; |
768 | |
|
769 | 0 | return 1; |
770 | 0 | } |
771 | | |
772 | | /* |
773 | | * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking |
774 | | * enabled is considered a successful no-op. |
775 | | * |
776 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
777 | | */ |
778 | | int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
779 | 0 | { |
780 | 0 | if (drbg->lock != NULL) |
781 | 0 | return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); |
782 | | |
783 | 0 | return 1; |
784 | 0 | } |
785 | | |
786 | | /* |
787 | | * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking |
788 | | * enabled is considered a successful no-op. |
789 | | * |
790 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
791 | | */ |
792 | | int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
793 | 0 | { |
794 | 0 | if (drbg->lock != NULL) |
795 | 0 | return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); |
796 | | |
797 | 0 | return 1; |
798 | 0 | } |
799 | | |
800 | | /* |
801 | | * Enables locking for the given drbg |
802 | | * |
803 | | * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator |
804 | | * is in the uninitialized state. |
805 | | * |
806 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
807 | | */ |
808 | | int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
809 | 0 | { |
810 | 0 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
811 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, |
812 | 0 | RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED); |
813 | 0 | return 0; |
814 | 0 | } |
815 | | |
816 | 0 | if (drbg->lock == NULL) { |
817 | 0 | if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) { |
818 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, |
819 | 0 | RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED); |
820 | 0 | return 0; |
821 | 0 | } |
822 | | |
823 | 0 | drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
824 | 0 | if (drbg->lock == NULL) { |
825 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, |
826 | 0 | RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK); |
827 | 0 | return 0; |
828 | 0 | } |
829 | 0 | } |
830 | | |
831 | 0 | return 1; |
832 | 0 | } |
833 | | |
834 | | /* |
835 | | * Get and set the EXDATA |
836 | | */ |
837 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg) |
838 | 0 | { |
839 | 0 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg); |
840 | 0 | } |
841 | | |
842 | | void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx) |
843 | 0 | { |
844 | 0 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx); |
845 | 0 | } |
846 | | |
847 | | |
848 | | /* |
849 | | * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the |
850 | | * global DRBG. They lock. |
851 | | */ |
852 | | |
853 | | /* |
854 | | * Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and |
855 | | * initializes it with default settings. |
856 | | * |
857 | | * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. |
858 | | */ |
859 | | static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent) |
860 | 0 | { |
861 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
862 | |
|
863 | 0 | drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent); |
864 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
865 | 0 | return NULL; |
866 | | |
867 | | /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */ |
868 | 0 | if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0) |
869 | 0 | goto err; |
870 | | |
871 | | /* enable reseed propagation */ |
872 | 0 | drbg->enable_reseed_propagation = 1; |
873 | 0 | drbg->reseed_counter = 1; |
874 | | |
875 | | /* |
876 | | * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation. |
877 | | * |
878 | | * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and |
879 | | * an automatic recovery is attempted. |
880 | | */ |
881 | 0 | (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, |
882 | 0 | (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, |
883 | 0 | sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); |
884 | 0 | return drbg; |
885 | | |
886 | 0 | err: |
887 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
888 | 0 | return NULL; |
889 | 0 | } |
890 | | |
891 | | /* |
892 | | * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use. |
893 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
894 | | */ |
895 | | DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init) |
896 | 0 | { |
897 | | /* |
898 | | * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the |
899 | | * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly |
900 | | */ |
901 | 0 | if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) |
902 | 0 | return 0; |
903 | | |
904 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL)) |
905 | 0 | return 0; |
906 | | |
907 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL)) |
908 | 0 | goto err1; |
909 | | |
910 | 0 | master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL); |
911 | 0 | if (master_drbg == NULL) |
912 | 0 | goto err2; |
913 | | |
914 | 0 | return 1; |
915 | | |
916 | 0 | err2: |
917 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); |
918 | 0 | err1: |
919 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); |
920 | 0 | return 0; |
921 | 0 | } |
922 | | |
923 | | /* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */ |
924 | | void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void) |
925 | 2 | { |
926 | 2 | if (master_drbg != NULL) { |
927 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg); |
928 | 0 | master_drbg = NULL; |
929 | |
|
930 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); |
931 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); |
932 | 0 | } |
933 | 2 | } |
934 | | |
935 | | void drbg_delete_thread_state(void) |
936 | 0 | { |
937 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
938 | |
|
939 | 0 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); |
940 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL); |
941 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
942 | |
|
943 | 0 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); |
944 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL); |
945 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
946 | 0 | } |
947 | | |
948 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */ |
949 | | static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count) |
950 | 0 | { |
951 | 0 | int ret; |
952 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public(); |
953 | |
|
954 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
955 | 0 | return 0; |
956 | | |
957 | 0 | ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count); |
958 | |
|
959 | 0 | return ret; |
960 | 0 | } |
961 | | |
962 | | /* |
963 | | * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer |
964 | | * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG |
965 | | * successfully. |
966 | | */ |
967 | | size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
968 | 0 | { |
969 | | /* |
970 | | * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize) |
971 | | * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies |
972 | | * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations |
973 | | * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). |
974 | | */ |
975 | 0 | size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; |
976 | 0 | size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; |
977 | | |
978 | | /* |
979 | | * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a |
980 | | * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). |
981 | | */ |
982 | 0 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { |
983 | 0 | min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; |
984 | 0 | min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; |
985 | 0 | } |
986 | | |
987 | | /* |
988 | | * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes |
989 | | * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because |
990 | | * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8). |
991 | | */ |
992 | 0 | min_entropy >>= 3; |
993 | | |
994 | | /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */ |
995 | 0 | return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen; |
996 | 0 | } |
997 | | |
998 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */ |
999 | | static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) |
1000 | 0 | { |
1001 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
1002 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); |
1003 | 0 | size_t buflen; |
1004 | 0 | size_t seedlen; |
1005 | |
|
1006 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
1007 | 0 | return 0; |
1008 | | |
1009 | 0 | if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0) |
1010 | 0 | return 0; |
1011 | | |
1012 | 0 | rand_drbg_lock(drbg); |
1013 | 0 | seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg); |
1014 | |
|
1015 | 0 | buflen = (size_t)num; |
1016 | |
|
1017 | 0 | if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) { |
1018 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) |
1019 | | /* |
1020 | | * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail |
1021 | | * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into |
1022 | | * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a |
1023 | | * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. |
1024 | | * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF. |
1025 | | */ |
1026 | | unsigned char dummy[1]; |
1027 | | |
1028 | | ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen); |
1029 | | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); |
1030 | | return ret; |
1031 | | #else |
1032 | | /* |
1033 | | * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content |
1034 | | * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular |
1035 | | * reseeding. |
1036 | | */ |
1037 | 0 | randomness = 0.0; |
1038 | 0 | #endif |
1039 | 0 | } |
1040 | | |
1041 | |
|
1042 | 0 | if (randomness > (double)seedlen) { |
1043 | | /* |
1044 | | * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a |
1045 | | * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer |
1046 | | * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart() |
1047 | | * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes, |
1048 | | * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the |
1049 | | * security strength. |
1050 | | */ |
1051 | 0 | randomness = (double)seedlen; |
1052 | 0 | } |
1053 | |
|
1054 | 0 | ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness)); |
1055 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); |
1056 | |
|
1057 | 0 | return ret; |
1058 | 0 | } |
1059 | | |
1060 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */ |
1061 | | static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num) |
1062 | 0 | { |
1063 | 0 | return drbg_add(buf, num, num); |
1064 | 0 | } |
1065 | | |
1066 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */ |
1067 | | static int drbg_status(void) |
1068 | 0 | { |
1069 | 0 | int ret; |
1070 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); |
1071 | |
|
1072 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
1073 | 0 | return 0; |
1074 | | |
1075 | 0 | rand_drbg_lock(drbg); |
1076 | 0 | ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0; |
1077 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); |
1078 | 0 | return ret; |
1079 | 0 | } |
1080 | | |
1081 | | /* |
1082 | | * Get the master DRBG. |
1083 | | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. |
1084 | | * |
1085 | | */ |
1086 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void) |
1087 | 0 | { |
1088 | 0 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) |
1089 | 0 | return NULL; |
1090 | | |
1091 | 0 | return master_drbg; |
1092 | 0 | } |
1093 | | |
1094 | | /* |
1095 | | * Get the public DRBG. |
1096 | | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. |
1097 | | */ |
1098 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void) |
1099 | 0 | { |
1100 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
1101 | |
|
1102 | 0 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) |
1103 | 0 | return NULL; |
1104 | | |
1105 | 0 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); |
1106 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) { |
1107 | 0 | if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) |
1108 | 0 | return NULL; |
1109 | 0 | drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); |
1110 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg); |
1111 | 0 | } |
1112 | 0 | return drbg; |
1113 | 0 | } |
1114 | | |
1115 | | /* |
1116 | | * Get the private DRBG. |
1117 | | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. |
1118 | | */ |
1119 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void) |
1120 | 0 | { |
1121 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
1122 | |
|
1123 | 0 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) |
1124 | 0 | return NULL; |
1125 | | |
1126 | 0 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); |
1127 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) { |
1128 | 0 | if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) |
1129 | 0 | return NULL; |
1130 | 0 | drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); |
1131 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg); |
1132 | 0 | } |
1133 | 0 | return drbg; |
1134 | 0 | } |
1135 | | |
1136 | | RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { |
1137 | | drbg_seed, |
1138 | | drbg_bytes, |
1139 | | NULL, |
1140 | | drbg_add, |
1141 | | drbg_bytes, |
1142 | | drbg_status |
1143 | | }; |
1144 | | |
1145 | | RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) |
1146 | 0 | { |
1147 | 0 | return &rand_meth; |
1148 | 0 | } |