Coverage Report

Created: 2024-07-27 06:36

/src/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
Line
Count
Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1
/*
2
 * Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3
 *
4
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
5
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
6
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8
 */
9
10
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11
#include "../ssl_local.h"
12
#include "statem_local.h"
13
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
14
15
0
#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION     1
16
17
/*
18
 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19
 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20
 * key_share present flag, 8 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21
 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22
 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
23
 */
24
0
#define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 8 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25
0
                         + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
26
27
/*
28
 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29
 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30
 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31
 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32
 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
33
 */
34
#define MAX_HRR_SIZE    (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35
                         + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
36
                         + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)
37
38
/*
39
 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
40
 */
41
int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
42
                               unsigned int context,
43
                               X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
44
0
{
45
0
    unsigned int ilen;
46
0
    const unsigned char *data;
47
0
    int ok;
48
49
    /* Parse the length byte */
50
0
    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
51
0
        || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
52
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
53
0
        return 0;
54
0
    }
55
56
    /* Check that the extension matches */
57
0
    if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
58
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
59
0
        return 0;
60
0
    }
61
62
0
    ok = memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
63
0
                    s->s3.previous_client_finished_len);
64
0
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
65
0
    if (ok) {
66
0
        if ((data[0] ^ s->s3.previous_client_finished[0]) != 0xFF) {
67
0
            ok = 0;
68
0
        }
69
0
    }
70
0
#endif
71
0
    if (ok) {
72
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
73
0
        return 0;
74
0
    }
75
76
0
    s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
77
78
0
    return 1;
79
0
}
80
81
/*-
82
 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
83
 *
84
 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
85
 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
86
 *   in which case an fatal alert is generated.
87
 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
88
 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
89
 *   to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
90
 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
91
 *   it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
92
 *   Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
93
 *   set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
94
 *   case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
95
 *   a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
96
 *   presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
97
 *   the value of the Host: field.
98
 * - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
99
 *   if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
100
 *   session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
101
 *   extension.
102
 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
103
 */
104
int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
105
                               unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
106
0
{
107
0
    unsigned int servname_type;
108
0
    PACKET sni, hostname;
109
110
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
111
        /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
112
0
        || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
113
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
114
0
        return 0;
115
0
    }
116
117
    /*
118
     * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
119
     * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
120
     * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
121
     * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
122
     * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
123
     * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
124
     *
125
     * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
126
     * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
127
     */
128
0
    if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
129
0
        || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
130
0
        || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
131
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
132
0
        return 0;
133
0
    }
134
135
    /*
136
     * In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3
137
     * we always use the SNI value from the handshake.
138
     */
139
0
    if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
140
0
        if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
141
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
142
0
            return 0;
143
0
        }
144
145
0
        if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
146
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
147
0
            return 0;
148
0
        }
149
150
        /*
151
         * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
152
         * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
153
         */
154
0
        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
155
0
        s->ext.hostname = NULL;
156
0
        if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
157
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
158
0
            return 0;
159
0
        }
160
161
0
        s->servername_done = 1;
162
0
    } else {
163
        /*
164
         * In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between
165
         * the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not
166
         * associated with the session.
167
         */
168
0
        s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
169
0
            && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
170
0
                            strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
171
0
    }
172
173
0
    return 1;
174
0
}
175
176
int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
177
                                  unsigned int context,
178
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
179
0
{
180
0
    unsigned int value;
181
182
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
183
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
184
0
        return 0;
185
0
    }
186
187
    /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
188
0
    if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
189
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
190
0
                 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
191
0
        return 0;
192
0
    }
193
194
    /*
195
     * When doing a full handshake or a renegotiation max_fragment_len_mode will
196
     * be TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_UNSPECIFIED
197
     *
198
     * In case of a resumption max_fragment_len_mode will be one of
199
     *      TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED, TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512,
200
     *      TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_1024, TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_2048.
201
     *      TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096
202
     *
203
     * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
204
     * including session resumptions.
205
     *
206
     * So we only set the value in case it is unspecified.
207
     */
208
0
    if (s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_UNSPECIFIED)
209
        /*
210
         * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
211
         * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
212
         */
213
0
        s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
214
215
0
    return 1;
216
0
}
217
218
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
219
int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
220
                       X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
221
0
{
222
0
    PACKET srp_I;
223
224
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
225
0
            || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
226
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
227
0
        return 0;
228
0
    }
229
230
0
    if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
231
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
232
0
        return 0;
233
0
    }
234
235
0
    return 1;
236
0
}
237
#endif
238
239
int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
240
                                 unsigned int context,
241
                                 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
242
0
{
243
0
    PACKET ec_point_format_list;
244
245
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
246
0
        || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
247
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
248
0
        return 0;
249
0
    }
250
251
0
    if (!s->hit) {
252
0
        if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
253
0
                           &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
254
0
                           &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
255
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
256
0
            return 0;
257
0
        }
258
0
    }
259
260
0
    return 1;
261
0
}
262
263
int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
264
                                  unsigned int context,
265
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
266
0
{
267
0
    if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
268
0
            !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
269
0
                                      PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
270
0
                                      s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
271
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272
0
        return 0;
273
0
    }
274
275
0
    return 1;
276
0
}
277
278
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
279
                                 ossl_unused unsigned int context,
280
                                 ossl_unused X509 *x,
281
                                 ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
282
0
{
283
0
    PACKET supported_sig_algs;
284
285
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
286
0
            || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
287
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
288
0
        return 0;
289
0
    }
290
291
0
    if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
292
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
293
0
        return 0;
294
0
    }
295
296
0
    return 1;
297
0
}
298
299
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
300
                            unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
301
0
{
302
0
    PACKET supported_sig_algs;
303
304
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
305
0
            || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
306
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
307
0
        return 0;
308
0
    }
309
310
0
    if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
311
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
312
0
        return 0;
313
0
    }
314
315
0
    return 1;
316
0
}
317
318
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
319
int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
320
                                  unsigned int context,
321
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
322
0
{
323
0
    PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
324
325
    /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
326
0
    if (s->hit)
327
0
        return 1;
328
329
    /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
330
0
    if (x != NULL)
331
0
        return 1;
332
333
0
    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
334
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
335
0
        return 0;
336
0
    }
337
338
0
    if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
339
        /*
340
         * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
341
         */
342
0
        s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
343
0
        return 1;
344
0
    }
345
346
0
    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
347
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
348
0
        return 0;
349
0
    }
350
351
    /*
352
     * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
353
     * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
354
     */
355
0
    sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
356
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
357
0
        s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
358
0
        if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
359
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
360
0
            return 0;
361
0
        }
362
0
    } else {
363
0
        s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
364
0
    }
365
366
0
    while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
367
0
        OCSP_RESPID *id;
368
0
        PACKET responder_id;
369
0
        const unsigned char *id_data;
370
371
0
        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
372
0
                || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
373
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
374
0
            return 0;
375
0
        }
376
377
0
        id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
378
0
        id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
379
0
                             (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
380
0
        if (id == NULL) {
381
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
382
0
            return 0;
383
0
        }
384
385
0
        if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
386
0
            OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
387
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
388
389
0
            return 0;
390
0
        }
391
392
0
        if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
393
0
            OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
394
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
395
396
0
            return 0;
397
0
        }
398
0
    }
399
400
    /* Read in request_extensions */
401
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
402
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
403
0
        return 0;
404
0
    }
405
406
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
407
0
        const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
408
409
0
        sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
410
0
                                   X509_EXTENSION_free);
411
0
        s->ext.ocsp.exts =
412
0
            d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
413
0
        if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
414
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
415
0
            return 0;
416
0
        }
417
0
    }
418
419
0
    return 1;
420
0
}
421
#endif
422
423
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
424
int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
425
                       X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
426
0
{
427
    /*
428
     * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
429
     * renegotiation.
430
     */
431
0
    if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
432
0
        s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
433
434
0
    return 1;
435
0
}
436
#endif
437
438
/*
439
 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
440
 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
441
 */
442
int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
443
                        X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
444
0
{
445
0
    PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
446
447
0
    if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
448
0
        return 1;
449
450
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
451
0
        || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
452
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
453
0
        return 0;
454
0
    }
455
456
0
    save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
457
0
    do {
458
        /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
459
0
        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
460
0
                || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
461
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
462
0
            return 0;
463
0
        }
464
0
    } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
465
466
0
    OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
467
0
    s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
468
0
    s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
469
0
    if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
470
0
                       &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
471
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
472
0
        return 0;
473
0
    }
474
475
0
    return 1;
476
0
}
477
478
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
479
int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
480
                            unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
481
0
{
482
0
    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
483
0
    unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
484
0
    int i, srtp_pref;
485
0
    PACKET subpkt;
486
0
    SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
487
488
    /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
489
0
    if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl) == NULL)
490
0
        return 1;
491
492
    /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list  and check it is even */
493
0
    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
494
0
            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
495
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
496
0
               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
497
0
        return 0;
498
0
    }
499
500
0
    srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
501
0
    s->srtp_profile = NULL;
502
    /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
503
0
    srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
504
505
0
    while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
506
0
        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
507
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
508
0
                     SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
509
0
            return 0;
510
0
        }
511
512
        /*
513
         * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
514
         * current match.
515
         * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
516
         * does nothing.
517
         */
518
0
        for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
519
0
            SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
520
0
                sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
521
522
0
            if (sprof->id == id) {
523
0
                s->srtp_profile = sprof;
524
0
                srtp_pref = i;
525
0
                break;
526
0
            }
527
0
        }
528
0
    }
529
530
    /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
531
0
    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
532
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
533
0
                 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
534
0
        return 0;
535
0
    }
536
537
0
    if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
538
0
        || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
539
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
540
0
        return 0;
541
0
    }
542
543
0
    return 1;
544
0
}
545
#endif
546
547
int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
548
                       X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
549
0
{
550
0
    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
551
0
        s->ext.use_etm = 1;
552
553
0
    return 1;
554
0
}
555
556
/*
557
 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
558
 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
559
 */
560
int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
561
                                 unsigned int context,
562
                                 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
563
0
{
564
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
565
0
    PACKET psk_kex_modes;
566
0
    unsigned int mode;
567
568
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
569
0
            || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
570
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
571
0
        return 0;
572
0
    }
573
574
0
    while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
575
0
        if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
576
0
            s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
577
0
        else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
578
0
                && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
579
0
            s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
580
0
    }
581
582
0
    if (((s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) != 0)
583
0
            && (s->options & SSL_OP_PREFER_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) {
584
585
        /*
586
         * If NO_DHE is supported and preferred, then we only remember this
587
         * mode. DHE PSK will not be used for sure, because in any case where
588
         * it would be supported (i.e. if a key share is present), NO_DHE would
589
         * be supported as well. As the latter is preferred it would be
590
         * chosen. By removing DHE PSK here, we don't have to deal with the
591
         * SSL_OP_PREFER_NO_DHE_KEX option in any other place.
592
         */
593
0
        s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
594
0
    }
595
596
0
#endif
597
598
0
    return 1;
599
0
}
600
601
/*
602
 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
603
 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
604
 */
605
int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
606
                             unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
607
0
{
608
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
609
0
    unsigned int group_id;
610
0
    PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
611
0
    const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
612
0
    size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
613
0
    int found = 0;
614
615
0
    if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
616
0
        return 1;
617
618
    /* Sanity check */
619
0
    if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
620
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
621
0
        return 0;
622
0
    }
623
624
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
625
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
626
0
        return 0;
627
0
    }
628
629
    /* Get our list of supported groups */
630
0
    tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
631
    /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
632
0
    tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
633
0
    if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
634
        /*
635
         * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
636
         * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
637
         * extension.
638
         */
639
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
640
0
                 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
641
0
        return 0;
642
0
    }
643
644
0
    if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
645
        /*
646
         * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
647
         * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
648
         * error
649
         */
650
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
651
0
        return 0;
652
0
    }
653
654
0
    while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
655
0
        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
656
0
                || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
657
0
                || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
658
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
659
0
            return 0;
660
0
        }
661
662
        /*
663
         * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
664
         * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
665
         */
666
0
        if (found)
667
0
            continue;
668
669
        /*
670
         * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
671
         * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
672
         */
673
0
        if (s->s3.group_id != 0
674
0
                && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
675
0
                    || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
676
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
677
0
            return 0;
678
0
        }
679
680
        /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
681
0
        if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
682
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
683
0
            return 0;
684
0
        }
685
686
        /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
687
0
        if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)
688
0
                || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)
689
                   /*
690
                    * We tolerate but ignore a group id that we don't think is
691
                    * suitable for TLSv1.3
692
                    */
693
0
                || !tls_valid_group(s, group_id, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
694
0
                                    0, NULL)) {
695
            /* Share not suitable */
696
0
            continue;
697
0
        }
698
699
0
        s->s3.group_id = group_id;
700
        /* Cache the selected group ID in the SSL_SESSION */
701
0
        s->session->kex_group = group_id;
702
703
0
        if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, group_id)) == NULL) {
704
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
705
0
                   SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
706
0
            return 0;
707
0
        }
708
709
0
        if (tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
710
0
                                      PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
711
0
                                      PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
712
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
713
0
            return 0;
714
0
        }
715
716
0
        found = 1;
717
0
    }
718
0
#endif
719
720
0
    return 1;
721
0
}
722
723
int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
724
                          X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
725
0
{
726
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
727
0
    unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
728
0
    EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
729
0
    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
730
0
    PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
731
0
    WPACKET hrrpkt;
732
0
    const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
733
0
    unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
734
0
    unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
735
0
    size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
736
0
    uint64_t tm, now;
737
0
    SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
738
0
    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
739
740
    /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
741
0
    if (sctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
742
0
            || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
743
0
        return 1;
744
745
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
746
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
747
0
        return 0;
748
0
    }
749
750
0
    raw = cookie;
751
0
    data = PACKET_data(&raw);
752
0
    rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
753
0
    if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
754
0
            || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
755
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
756
0
        return 0;
757
0
    }
758
0
    mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
759
760
    /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
761
0
    hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
762
0
    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(sctx->libctx, "HMAC",
763
0
                                           sctx->propq,
764
0
                                           s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
765
0
                                           sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key));
766
0
    if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
767
0
        EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
768
0
        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
769
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
770
0
        return 0;
771
0
    }
772
773
0
    hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
774
0
    if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", sctx->libctx,
775
0
                              sctx->propq, pkey, NULL) <= 0
776
0
            || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
777
0
                              rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
778
0
            || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
779
0
        EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
780
0
        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
781
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
782
0
        return 0;
783
0
    }
784
785
0
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
786
0
    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
787
788
0
    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
789
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
790
0
        return 0;
791
0
    }
792
793
0
    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
794
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
795
0
        return 0;
796
0
    }
797
    /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
798
0
    if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
799
0
        return 1;
800
801
    /*
802
     * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
803
     * HMAC above.
804
     */
805
806
    /* Check the version number is sane */
807
0
    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
808
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
809
0
        return 0;
810
0
    }
811
0
    if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
812
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
813
0
                 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
814
0
        return 0;
815
0
    }
816
817
0
    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
818
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
819
0
        return 0;
820
0
    }
821
822
0
    ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
823
0
    if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
824
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
825
0
        return 0;
826
0
    }
827
0
    if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
828
0
            || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
829
0
               != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
830
        /*
831
         * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
832
         * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
833
         */
834
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
835
0
        return 0;
836
0
    }
837
838
0
    if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
839
0
            || !PACKET_get_net_8(&cookie, &tm)
840
0
            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
841
0
            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
842
0
            || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
843
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
844
0
        return 0;
845
0
    }
846
847
    /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
848
0
    now = time(NULL);
849
0
    if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
850
        /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
851
0
        return 1;
852
0
    }
853
854
    /* Verify the app cookie */
855
0
    if (sctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(ssl,
856
0
                                         PACKET_data(&appcookie),
857
0
                                         PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
858
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
859
0
        return 0;
860
0
    }
861
862
    /*
863
     * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
864
     * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
865
     * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
866
     */
867
0
    if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
868
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
869
0
        return 0;
870
0
    }
871
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
872
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
873
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
874
0
            || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
875
0
            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
876
0
                                      s->tmp_session_id_len)
877
0
            || !ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
878
0
                                                &ciphlen)
879
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
880
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
881
0
        WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
882
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
883
0
        return 0;
884
0
    }
885
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
886
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
887
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
888
0
            || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
889
0
        WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
890
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
891
0
        return 0;
892
0
    }
893
0
    if (key_share) {
894
0
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
895
0
                || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
896
0
                || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
897
0
                || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
898
0
            WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
899
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
900
0
            return 0;
901
0
        }
902
0
    }
903
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
904
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
905
0
            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
906
0
            || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
907
0
            || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
908
0
            || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
909
0
            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
910
0
            || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
911
0
        WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
912
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
913
0
        return 0;
914
0
    }
915
916
    /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
917
0
    if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
918
0
                                       PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
919
0
                                       hrrlen)) {
920
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
921
0
        return 0;
922
0
    }
923
924
    /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
925
0
    s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
926
927
0
    s->ext.cookieok = 1;
928
0
#endif
929
930
0
    return 1;
931
0
}
932
933
int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
934
                                    unsigned int context,
935
                                    X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
936
0
{
937
0
    PACKET supported_groups_list;
938
939
    /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
940
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
941
0
            || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
942
0
            || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
943
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
944
0
        return 0;
945
0
    }
946
947
0
    if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
948
0
        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
949
0
        s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
950
0
        s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
951
0
        if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
952
0
                           &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
953
0
                           &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) {
954
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
955
0
            return 0;
956
0
        }
957
0
    }
958
959
0
    return 1;
960
0
}
961
962
int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
963
                       X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
964
0
{
965
    /* The extension must always be empty */
966
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
967
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
968
0
        return 0;
969
0
    }
970
971
0
    if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
972
0
        return 1;
973
974
0
    s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
975
976
0
    return 1;
977
0
}
978
979
980
int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
981
                              X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
982
0
{
983
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
984
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
985
0
        return 0;
986
0
    }
987
988
0
    if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
989
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
990
0
        return 0;
991
0
    }
992
993
0
    return 1;
994
0
}
995
996
static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *tick,
997
                                                 SSL_SESSION **sess)
998
0
{
999
0
    SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1000
1001
0
    s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1002
1003
0
    switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1004
0
        case 0:
1005
0
            return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1006
1007
0
        case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1008
0
            break;
1009
1010
0
        default:
1011
0
            return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1012
0
    }
1013
1014
0
    tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1015
0
                                   SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1016
1017
0
    if (tmpsess == NULL)
1018
0
        return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1019
1020
0
    *sess = tmpsess;
1021
0
    return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1022
0
}
1023
1024
int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1025
                       X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1026
0
{
1027
0
    PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1028
0
    size_t binderoffset;
1029
0
    int hashsize;
1030
0
    SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1031
0
    unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1032
0
    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1033
0
    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1034
0
    SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1035
1036
    /*
1037
     * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1038
     * ignore this extension
1039
     */
1040
0
    if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1041
0
            & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1042
0
        return 1;
1043
1044
0
    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1045
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1046
0
        return 0;
1047
0
    }
1048
1049
0
    s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1050
0
    for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1051
0
        PACKET identity;
1052
0
        unsigned long ticket_agel;
1053
0
        size_t idlen;
1054
1055
0
        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1056
0
                || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1057
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1058
0
            return 0;
1059
0
        }
1060
1061
0
        idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1062
0
        if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1063
0
                && !s->psk_find_session_cb(ssl, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1064
0
                                           &sess)) {
1065
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1066
0
            return 0;
1067
0
        }
1068
1069
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1070
0
        if (sess == NULL
1071
0
                && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1072
0
                && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1073
0
            char *pskid = NULL;
1074
0
            unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1075
0
            unsigned int pskdatalen;
1076
1077
0
            if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1078
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1079
0
                return 0;
1080
0
            }
1081
0
            pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(ssl, pskid, pskdata,
1082
0
                                                sizeof(pskdata));
1083
0
            OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1084
0
            if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1085
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1086
0
                return 0;
1087
0
            } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1088
0
                const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1089
0
                const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1090
1091
                /*
1092
                 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1093
                 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1094
                 */
1095
0
                cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(ssl, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1096
0
                if (cipher == NULL) {
1097
0
                    OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1098
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099
0
                    return 0;
1100
0
                }
1101
1102
0
                sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1103
0
                if (sess == NULL
1104
0
                        || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1105
0
                                                        pskdatalen)
1106
0
                        || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1107
0
                        || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1108
0
                                                             TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1109
0
                    OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1110
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111
0
                    goto err;
1112
0
                }
1113
0
                OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1114
0
            }
1115
0
        }
1116
0
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1117
1118
0
        if (sess != NULL) {
1119
            /* We found a PSK */
1120
0
            SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1121
1122
0
            if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1123
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1124
0
                return 0;
1125
0
            }
1126
0
            SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1127
0
            sess = sesstmp;
1128
1129
            /*
1130
             * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1131
             * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1132
             */
1133
0
            memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1134
0
            sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1135
0
            ext = 1;
1136
0
            if (id == 0)
1137
0
                s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1138
0
            s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1139
0
        } else {
1140
0
            OSSL_TIME t, age, expire;
1141
0
            int ret;
1142
1143
            /*
1144
             * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1145
             * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1146
             * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1147
             */
1148
0
            if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1149
0
                    || (s->max_early_data > 0
1150
0
                        && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1151
0
                ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1152
0
            else
1153
0
                ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1154
0
                                         PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1155
0
                                         &sess);
1156
1157
0
            if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1158
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1159
0
                return 0;
1160
0
            }
1161
1162
0
            if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1163
0
                    || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1164
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165
0
                return 0;
1166
0
            }
1167
0
            if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1168
0
                continue;
1169
1170
            /* Check for replay */
1171
0
            if (s->max_early_data > 0
1172
0
                    && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1173
0
                    && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1174
0
                SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1175
0
                sess = NULL;
1176
0
                continue;
1177
0
            }
1178
1179
0
            age = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_ms2time(ticket_agel),
1180
0
                                     ossl_ms2time(sess->ext.tick_age_add));
1181
0
            t = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_time_now(), sess->time);
1182
1183
            /*
1184
             * Although internally we use OSS_TIME which has ns granularity,
1185
             * when SSL_SESSION structures are serialised/deserialised we use
1186
             * second granularity for the sess->time field. Therefore it could
1187
             * appear that the client's ticket age is longer than ours (our
1188
             * ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
1189
             * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to
1190
             * our age calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
1191
             */
1192
0
            expire = ossl_time_add(t, ossl_ms2time(1000));
1193
1194
0
            if (id == 0
1195
0
                    && ossl_time_compare(sess->timeout, t) >= 0
1196
0
                    && ossl_time_compare(age, expire) <= 0
1197
0
                    && ossl_time_compare(ossl_time_add(age, TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE),
1198
0
                                         expire) >= 0) {
1199
                /*
1200
                 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1201
                 * for early data
1202
                 */
1203
0
                s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1204
0
            }
1205
0
        }
1206
1207
0
        md = ssl_md(sctx, sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1208
0
        if (md == NULL) {
1209
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210
0
            goto err;
1211
0
        }
1212
0
        if (!EVP_MD_is_a(md,
1213
0
                EVP_MD_get0_name(ssl_md(sctx,
1214
0
                                        s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)))) {
1215
            /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1216
0
            SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1217
0
            sess = NULL;
1218
0
            s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1219
0
            s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1220
0
            continue;
1221
0
        }
1222
0
        break;
1223
0
    }
1224
1225
0
    if (sess == NULL)
1226
0
        return 1;
1227
1228
0
    binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1229
0
    hashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
1230
0
    if (hashsize <= 0)
1231
0
        goto err;
1232
1233
0
    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1234
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1235
0
        goto err;
1236
0
    }
1237
1238
0
    for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1239
0
        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1240
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1241
0
            goto err;
1242
0
        }
1243
0
    }
1244
1245
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != (size_t)hashsize) {
1246
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1247
0
        goto err;
1248
0
    }
1249
0
    if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1250
0
                          binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1251
0
                          ext) != 1) {
1252
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1253
0
        goto err;
1254
0
    }
1255
1256
0
    s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1257
1258
0
    SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1259
0
    s->session = sess;
1260
0
    return 1;
1261
0
err:
1262
0
    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1263
0
    return 0;
1264
0
}
1265
1266
int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1267
                                       ossl_unused unsigned int context,
1268
                                       ossl_unused X509 *x,
1269
                                       ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
1270
0
{
1271
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1272
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1273
0
                 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1274
0
        return 0;
1275
0
    }
1276
1277
0
    s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1278
1279
0
    return 1;
1280
0
}
1281
1282
/*
1283
 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1284
 */
1285
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1286
                                          unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1287
                                          size_t chainidx)
1288
0
{
1289
0
    if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
1290
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1291
1292
    /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1293
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1294
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1296
0
            || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1297
0
                               s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1298
0
            || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1299
0
                               s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1300
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1301
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1304
0
    }
1305
1306
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1307
0
}
1308
1309
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1310
                                          unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1311
                                          size_t chainidx)
1312
0
{
1313
0
    if (s->servername_done != 1)
1314
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1315
1316
    /*
1317
     * Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming.
1318
     * We just use the servername from the initial handshake.
1319
     */
1320
0
    if (s->hit && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1321
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1322
1323
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1324
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1325
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1327
0
    }
1328
1329
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1330
0
}
1331
1332
/* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1333
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1334
                                             unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1335
                                             size_t chainidx)
1336
0
{
1337
0
    if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1338
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1339
1340
    /*-
1341
     * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1342
     * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1343
     */
1344
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1345
0
        || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1346
0
        || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1347
0
        || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1348
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1349
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1350
0
    }
1351
1352
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1353
0
}
1354
1355
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1356
                                            unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1357
                                            size_t chainidx)
1358
0
{
1359
0
    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1360
0
    unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1361
0
    int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1362
0
                    && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
1363
0
    const unsigned char *plist;
1364
0
    size_t plistlen;
1365
1366
0
    if (!using_ecc)
1367
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1368
1369
0
    tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1370
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1371
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1372
0
            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1373
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1374
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1376
0
    }
1377
1378
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1379
0
}
1380
1381
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1382
                                               unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1383
                                               size_t chainidx)
1384
0
{
1385
0
    const uint16_t *groups;
1386
0
    size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1387
0
    int version;
1388
1389
    /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1390
0
    if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
1391
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1392
1393
    /* Get our list of supported groups */
1394
0
    tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1395
0
    if (numgroups == 0) {
1396
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1397
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1398
0
    }
1399
1400
    /* Copy group ID if supported */
1401
0
    version = SSL_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
1402
0
    for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1403
0
        uint16_t group = groups[i];
1404
1405
0
        if (tls_valid_group(s, group, version, version, 0, NULL)
1406
0
                && tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1407
0
            if (first) {
1408
                /*
1409
                 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1410
                 * so we don't need to add this extension
1411
                 */
1412
0
                if (s->s3.group_id == group)
1413
0
                    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1414
1415
                /* Add extension header */
1416
0
                if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1417
                           /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1418
0
                        || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1419
0
                        || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1420
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421
0
                    return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1422
0
                }
1423
1424
0
                first = 0;
1425
0
            }
1426
0
            if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1427
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1428
0
                    return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1429
0
                }
1430
0
        }
1431
0
    }
1432
1433
0
    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1434
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1435
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1436
0
    }
1437
1438
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1439
0
}
1440
1441
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1442
                                             unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1443
                                             size_t chainidx)
1444
0
{
1445
0
    if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1446
0
        s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1447
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1448
0
    }
1449
1450
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1451
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1452
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1454
0
    }
1455
1456
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1457
0
}
1458
1459
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1460
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1461
                                             unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1462
                                             size_t chainidx)
1463
0
{
1464
    /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
1465
0
    if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
1466
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1467
1468
0
    if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1469
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1470
1471
0
    if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1472
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1473
1474
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1475
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1476
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1477
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1478
0
    }
1479
1480
    /*
1481
     * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1482
     * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1483
     * separate message
1484
     */
1485
0
    if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1486
       /* SSLfatal() already called */
1487
0
       return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1488
0
    }
1489
0
    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1490
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1491
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1492
0
    }
1493
1494
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1495
0
}
1496
#endif
1497
1498
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1499
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1500
                                             unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1501
                                             size_t chainidx)
1502
0
{
1503
0
    const unsigned char *npa;
1504
0
    unsigned int npalen;
1505
0
    int ret;
1506
0
    int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
1507
0
    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1508
1509
0
    s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
1510
0
    if (!npn_seen || sctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1511
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1512
1513
0
    ret = sctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), &npa, &npalen,
1514
0
                                      sctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1515
0
    if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1516
0
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1517
0
                || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1518
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1520
0
        }
1521
0
        s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
1522
0
        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1523
0
    }
1524
1525
0
    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1526
0
}
1527
#endif
1528
1529
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1530
                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1531
0
{
1532
0
    if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
1533
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1534
1535
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1536
0
                TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1537
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1538
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1539
0
            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
1540
0
                                      s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
1541
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1542
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1543
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1545
0
    }
1546
1547
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1548
0
}
1549
1550
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1551
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1552
                                       unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1553
                                       size_t chainidx)
1554
0
{
1555
0
    if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1556
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1557
1558
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1559
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1560
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1561
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1562
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1563
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1564
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1565
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1566
0
    }
1567
1568
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1569
0
}
1570
#endif
1571
1572
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1573
                                  unsigned int context,
1574
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1575
0
{
1576
0
    if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1577
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1578
1579
    /*
1580
     * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1581
     * for other cases too.
1582
     */
1583
0
    if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1584
0
        || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1585
0
        || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1586
0
        || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
1587
0
        || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_MAGMA
1588
0
        || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_KUZNYECHIK) {
1589
0
        s->ext.use_etm = 0;
1590
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1591
0
    }
1592
1593
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1594
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1595
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1597
0
    }
1598
1599
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1600
0
}
1601
1602
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1603
                                  unsigned int context,
1604
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1605
0
{
1606
0
    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1607
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1608
1609
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1610
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1611
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1612
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1613
0
    }
1614
1615
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1616
0
}
1617
1618
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1619
                                                 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1620
                                                 size_t chainidx)
1621
0
{
1622
0
    if (!ossl_assert(SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1623
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1625
0
    }
1626
1627
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1628
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1629
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1630
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1631
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1633
0
    }
1634
1635
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1636
0
}
1637
1638
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1639
                                        unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1640
                                        size_t chainidx)
1641
0
{
1642
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1643
0
    unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1644
0
    size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1645
0
    EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1646
0
    const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
1647
1648
0
    if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1649
0
        if (ckey != NULL) {
1650
            /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1651
0
            return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1652
0
        }
1653
0
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1654
0
                || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1655
0
                || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1656
0
                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1657
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1658
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1659
0
        }
1660
1661
0
        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1662
0
    }
1663
1664
0
    if (ckey == NULL) {
1665
        /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1666
0
        if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1667
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1668
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1669
0
        }
1670
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1671
0
    }
1672
1673
0
    if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) {
1674
        /*
1675
         * PSK ('hit') and explicitly not doing DHE. If the client sent the
1676
         * DHE option, we take it by default, except if non-DHE would be
1677
         * preferred by config, but this case would have been handled in
1678
         * tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes().
1679
         */
1680
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1681
0
    }
1682
1683
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1684
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1685
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
1686
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1688
0
    }
1689
1690
0
    if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
1691
0
                                     s->s3.group_id)) == NULL) {
1692
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1693
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1694
0
    }
1695
1696
0
    if (!ginf->is_kem) {
1697
        /* Regular KEX */
1698
0
        skey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, ckey);
1699
0
        if (skey == NULL) {
1700
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
1701
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1702
0
        }
1703
1704
        /* Generate encoding of server key */
1705
0
        encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(skey, &encodedPoint);
1706
0
        if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1707
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1708
0
            EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1709
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1710
0
        }
1711
1712
0
        if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1713
0
                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1714
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1715
0
            EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1716
0
            OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1717
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1718
0
        }
1719
0
        OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1720
1721
        /*
1722
         * This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys
1723
         */
1724
0
        s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
1725
0
        if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1726
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
1727
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1728
0
        }
1729
0
    } else {
1730
        /* KEM mode */
1731
0
        unsigned char *ct = NULL;
1732
0
        size_t ctlen = 0;
1733
1734
        /*
1735
         * This does not update the crypto state.
1736
         *
1737
         * The generated pms is stored in `s->s3.tmp.pms` to be later used via
1738
         * ssl_gensecret().
1739
         */
1740
0
        if (ssl_encapsulate(s, ckey, &ct, &ctlen, 0) == 0) {
1741
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
1742
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1743
0
        }
1744
1745
0
        if (ctlen == 0) {
1746
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1747
0
            OPENSSL_free(ct);
1748
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1749
0
        }
1750
1751
0
        if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, ct, ctlen)
1752
0
                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1753
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754
0
            OPENSSL_free(ct);
1755
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1756
0
        }
1757
0
        OPENSSL_free(ct);
1758
1759
        /*
1760
         * This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the generated pms
1761
         */
1762
0
        if (ssl_gensecret(s, s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen) == 0) {
1763
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
1764
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1765
0
        }
1766
0
    }
1767
0
    s->s3.did_kex = 1;
1768
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1769
#else
1770
    return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1771
#endif
1772
0
}
1773
1774
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1775
                                     unsigned int context,
1776
                                     X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1777
0
{
1778
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1779
0
    unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1780
0
    unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1781
0
    size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1782
0
    EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
1783
0
    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1784
0
    int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1785
0
    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1786
0
    SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1787
1788
0
    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1789
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1790
1791
0
    if (sctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1792
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1793
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1794
0
    }
1795
1796
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1797
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1798
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1799
0
            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1800
0
            || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1801
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1802
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1803
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1804
0
            || !ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1805
0
                                                &ciphlen)
1806
               /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1807
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
1808
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u64(pkt, time(NULL))
1809
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1810
0
            || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1811
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1812
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1813
0
    }
1814
1815
    /*
1816
     * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1817
     * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1818
     * subsequently allocate them (below)
1819
     */
1820
0
    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1821
0
            || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1822
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1823
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1824
0
    }
1825
1826
0
    if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1827
0
            || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1828
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1829
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1830
0
            || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1831
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1832
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1833
0
    }
1834
1835
    /* Generate the application cookie */
1836
0
    if (sctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(ssl, appcookie1,
1837
0
                                      &appcookielen) == 0) {
1838
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1839
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1840
0
    }
1841
1842
0
    if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1843
0
            || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1844
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1845
0
            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1846
0
            || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1847
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1848
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1849
0
    }
1850
0
    hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1851
1852
0
    totcookielen -= startlen;
1853
0
    if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1854
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1855
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1856
0
    }
1857
1858
    /* HMAC the cookie */
1859
0
    hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1860
0
    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(sctx->libctx, "HMAC",
1861
0
                                           sctx->propq,
1862
0
                                           s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1863
0
                                           sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key));
1864
0
    if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1865
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1866
0
        goto err;
1867
0
    }
1868
1869
0
    if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", sctx->libctx,
1870
0
                              sctx->propq, pkey, NULL) <= 0
1871
0
            || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1872
0
                              totcookielen) <= 0) {
1873
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1874
0
        goto err;
1875
0
    }
1876
1877
0
    if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1878
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1879
0
        goto err;
1880
0
    }
1881
1882
0
    if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1883
0
            || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1884
0
            || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1885
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1886
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1887
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1888
0
        goto err;
1889
0
    }
1890
1891
0
    ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1892
1893
0
 err:
1894
0
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1895
0
    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1896
0
    return ret;
1897
#else
1898
    return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1899
#endif
1900
0
}
1901
1902
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1903
                                            unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1904
                                            size_t chainidx)
1905
0
{
1906
0
    const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1907
0
        0xfd, 0xe8,         /* 65000 */
1908
0
        0x00, 0x20,         /* 32 bytes length */
1909
0
        0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1910
0
        0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1911
0
        0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1912
0
        0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1913
0
    };
1914
1915
0
    if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1916
0
         && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1917
0
            || (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s))
1918
0
                & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1919
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1920
1921
0
    if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1922
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1923
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1924
0
    }
1925
1926
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1927
0
}
1928
1929
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1930
                                         unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1931
                                         size_t chainidx)
1932
0
{
1933
0
    if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1934
0
        if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1935
0
            return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1936
1937
0
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1938
0
                || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1939
0
                || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1940
0
                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1941
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1942
0
            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1943
0
        }
1944
1945
0
        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1946
0
    }
1947
1948
0
    if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1949
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1950
1951
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1952
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1953
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1954
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1955
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1956
0
    }
1957
1958
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1959
0
}
1960
1961
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1962
                                  unsigned int context,
1963
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1964
0
{
1965
0
    if (!s->hit)
1966
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1967
1968
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1969
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1970
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1971
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1972
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1973
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1974
0
    }
1975
1976
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1977
0
}
1978
1979
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
1980
                                               unsigned int context,
1981
                                               X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1982
0
{
1983
0
    if (sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR
1984
0
        && (send_certificate_request(sc)
1985
0
            || sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED)) {
1986
        /* Did not receive an acceptable cert type - and doing client auth */
1987
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1988
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1989
0
    }
1990
1991
0
    if (sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
1992
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
1993
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1994
0
    }
1995
1996
    /*
1997
     * Note: only supposed to send this if we are going to do a cert request,
1998
     * but TLSv1.3 could do a PHA request if the client supports it
1999
     */
2000
0
    if ((!send_certificate_request(sc) && sc->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED)
2001
0
            || sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos != OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD
2002
0
            || sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
2003
        /* if we don't send it, reset to TLSEXT_cert_type_x509 */
2004
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2005
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
2006
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2007
0
    }
2008
2009
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_client_cert_type)
2010
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2011
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sc->ext.client_cert_type)
2012
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2013
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2014
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2015
0
    }
2016
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
2017
0
}
2018
2019
/* One of |pref|, |other| is configured and the values are sanitized */
2020
static int reconcile_cert_type(const unsigned char *pref, size_t pref_len,
2021
                               const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
2022
                               uint8_t *chosen_cert_type)
2023
0
{
2024
0
    size_t i;
2025
2026
0
    for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) {
2027
0
        if (memchr(other, pref[i], other_len) != NULL) {
2028
0
            *chosen_cert_type = pref[i];
2029
0
            return OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
2030
0
        }
2031
0
    }
2032
0
    return OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
2033
0
}
2034
2035
int tls_parse_ctos_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
2036
                                    unsigned int context,
2037
                                    X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2038
0
{
2039
0
    PACKET supported_cert_types;
2040
0
    const unsigned char *data;
2041
0
    size_t len;
2042
2043
    /* Ignore the extension */
2044
0
    if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
2045
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2046
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
2047
0
        return 1;
2048
0
    }
2049
2050
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &supported_cert_types)) {
2051
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
2052
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2053
0
        return 0;
2054
0
    }
2055
0
    if ((len = PACKET_remaining(&supported_cert_types)) == 0) {
2056
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
2057
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2058
0
        return 0;
2059
0
    }
2060
0
    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&supported_cert_types, &data, len)) {
2061
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
2062
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2063
0
        return 0;
2064
0
    }
2065
    /* client_cert_type: client (peer) has priority */
2066
0
    sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = reconcile_cert_type(data, len,
2067
0
                                                        sc->client_cert_type, sc->client_cert_type_len,
2068
0
                                                        &sc->ext.client_cert_type);
2069
2070
    /* Ignore the error until sending - so we can check cert auth*/
2071
0
    return 1;
2072
0
}
2073
2074
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
2075
                                               unsigned int context,
2076
                                               X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2077
0
{
2078
0
    if (sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
2079
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2080
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2081
0
    }
2082
0
    if (sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos != OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD
2083
0
            || sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
2084
        /* if we don't send it, reset to TLSEXT_cert_type_x509 */
2085
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2086
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
2087
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2088
0
    }
2089
2090
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_cert_type)
2091
0
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2092
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sc->ext.server_cert_type)
2093
0
            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2094
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2095
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2096
0
    }
2097
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
2098
0
}
2099
2100
int tls_parse_ctos_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
2101
                                    unsigned int context,
2102
                                    X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2103
0
{
2104
0
    PACKET supported_cert_types;
2105
0
    const unsigned char *data;
2106
0
    size_t len;
2107
2108
    /* Ignore the extension */
2109
0
    if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
2110
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2111
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
2112
0
        return 1;
2113
0
    }
2114
2115
0
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &supported_cert_types)) {
2116
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2117
0
        return 0;
2118
0
    }
2119
2120
0
    if ((len = PACKET_remaining(&supported_cert_types)) == 0) {
2121
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2122
0
        return 0;
2123
0
    }
2124
0
    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&supported_cert_types, &data, len)) {
2125
0
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2126
0
        return 0;
2127
0
    }
2128
    /* server_cert_type: server (this) has priority */
2129
0
    sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = reconcile_cert_type(sc->server_cert_type, sc->server_cert_type_len,
2130
0
                                                        data, len,
2131
0
                                                        &sc->ext.server_cert_type);
2132
0
    if (sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)
2133
0
        return 1;
2134
2135
    /* Did not receive an acceptable cert type */
2136
0
    SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2137
0
    return 0;
2138
0
}