/*

 * Copyright 2018-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.

 *

 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 */

#include <openssl/err.h>

#include <openssl/bn.h>

#include <openssl/core.h>

#include <openssl/evp.h>

#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include "crypto/bn.h"

#include "crypto/security_bits.h"

#include "rsa_local.h"

#define RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_KEYSIZE 2048

#define RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_STRENGTH 112

/*

 * Generate probable primes 'p' & 'q'. See FIPS 186-4 Section B.3.6

 * "Generation of Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary Probable

 * Primes".

 *

 * Params:

 *     rsa  Object used to store primes p & q.

 *     test Object used for CAVS testing only.that contains..

 *       p1, p2 The returned auxiliary primes for p.

 *              If NULL they are not returned.

 *       Xpout An optionally returned random number used during generation of p.

 *       Xp An optional passed in value (that is random number used during

 *          generation of p).

 *       Xp1, Xp2 Optionally passed in randomly generated numbers from which

 *                auxiliary primes p1 & p2 are calculated. If NULL these values

 *                are generated internally.

 *       q1, q2 The returned auxiliary primes for q.

 *              If NULL they are not returned.

 *       Xqout An optionally returned random number used during generation of q.

 *       Xq An optional passed in value (that is random number used during

 *          generation of q).

 *       Xq1, Xq2 Optionally passed in randomly generated numbers from which

 *                auxiliary primes q1 & q2 are calculated. If NULL these values

 *                are generated internally.

 *     nbits The key size in bits (The size of the modulus n).

 *     e The public exponent.

 *     ctx A BN_CTX object.

 *     cb An optional BIGNUM callback.

 * Returns: 1 if successful, or  0 otherwise.

 * Notes:

 *     p1, p2, q1, q2, Xpout, Xqout are returned if they are not NULL.

 *     Xp, Xp1, Xp2, Xq, Xq1, Xq2 are optionally passed in.

 *     (Required for CAVS testing).

 */

int ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(RSA *rsa, RSA_ACVP_TEST *test,

                                       int nbits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,

                                       BN_GENCB *cb)

{

    int ret = 0, ok;

    /* Temp allocated BIGNUMS */

    BIGNUM *Xpo = NULL, *Xqo = NULL, *tmp = NULL;

    /* Intermediate BIGNUMS that can be returned for testing */

    BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;

    BIGNUM *q1 = NULL, *q2 = NULL;

    /* Intermediate BIGNUMS that can be input for testing */

    BIGNUM *Xpout = NULL, *Xqout = NULL;

    BIGNUM *Xp = NULL, *Xp1 = NULL, *Xp2 = NULL;

    BIGNUM *Xq = NULL, *Xq1 = NULL, *Xq2 = NULL;

#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)

    if (test != NULL) {

        Xp1 = test->Xp1;

        Xp2 = test->Xp2;

        Xq1 = test->Xq1;

        Xq2 = test->Xq2;

        Xp = test->Xp;

        Xq = test->Xq;

        p1 = test->p1;

        p2 = test->p2;

        q1 = test->q1;

        q2 = test->q2;

    }

#endif

    /* (Step 1) Check key length

     * NOTE: SP800-131A Rev1 Disallows key lengths of < 2048 bits for RSA

     * Signature Generation and Key Agree/Transport.

     */

    if (nbits < RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_KEYSIZE) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);

        return 0;

    }

    if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(e)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);

        return 0;

    }

    /* (Step 3) Determine strength and check rand generator strength is ok -

     * this step is redundant because the generator always returns a higher

     * strength than is required.

     */

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    Xpo = (Xpout != NULL) ? Xpout : BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    Xqo = (Xqout != NULL) ? Xqout : BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (tmp == NULL || Xpo == NULL || Xqo == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(Xpo, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    BN_set_flags(Xqo, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    if (rsa->p == NULL)

        rsa->p = BN_secure_new();

    if (rsa->q == NULL)

        rsa->q = BN_secure_new();

    if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    /* (Step 4) Generate p, Xp */

    if (!ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa->p, Xpo, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2,

                                               nbits, e, ctx, cb))

        goto err;

    for(;;) {

        /* (Step 5) Generate q, Xq*/

        if (!ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa->q, Xqo, q1, q2, Xq, Xq1,

                                                   Xq2, nbits, e, ctx, cb))

            goto err;

        /* (Step 6) |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbitlen/2 - 100) */

        ok = ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(tmp, Xpo, Xqo, nbits);

        if (ok < 0)

            goto err;

        if (ok == 0)

            continue;

        /* (Step 6) |p - q| > 2^(nbitlen/2 - 100) */

        ok = ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(tmp, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits);

        if (ok < 0)

            goto err;

        if (ok == 0)

            continue;

        break; /* successfully finished */

    }

    rsa->dirty_cnt++;

    ret = 1;

err:

    /* Zeroize any internally generated values that are not returned */

    if (Xpo != Xpout)

        BN_clear(Xpo);

    if (Xqo != Xqout)

        BN_clear(Xqo);

    BN_clear(tmp);

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * Validates the RSA key size based on the target strength.

 * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.1 (Steps 1a-1b)

 *

 * Params:

 *     nbits The key size in bits.

 *     strength The target strength in bits. -1 means the target

 *              strength is unknown.

 * Returns: 1 if the key size matches the target strength, or 0 otherwise.

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(int nbits, int strength)

{

    int s = (int)ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(nbits);

#ifdef FIPS_MODULE

    if (s < RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_STRENGTH) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);

        return 0;

    }

#endif

    if (strength != -1 && s != strength) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_STRENGTH);

        return 0;

    }

    return 1;

}

/*

 * Validate that the random bit generator is of sufficient strength to generate

 * a key of the specified length.

 */

static int rsa_validate_rng_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *rng, int nbits)

{

    if (rng == NULL)

        return 0;

#ifdef FIPS_MODULE

    /*

     * This should become mainstream once similar tests are added to the other

     * key generations and once there is a way to disable these checks.

     */

    if (EVP_RAND_get_strength(rng) < ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(nbits)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA,

                  RSA_R_RANDOMNESS_SOURCE_STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT);

        return 0;

    }

#endif

    return 1;

}

/*

 *

 * Using p & q, calculate other required parameters such as n, d.

 * as well as the CRT parameters dP, dQ, qInv.

 *

 * See SP800-56Br1

 *   6.3.1.1 rsakpg1 - basic (Steps 3-4)

 *   6.3.1.3 rsakpg1 - crt   (Step 5)

 *

 * Params:

 *     rsa An rsa object.

 *     nbits The key size.

 *     e The public exponent.

 *     ctx A BN_CTX object.

 * Notes:

 *   There is a small chance that the generated d will be too small.

 * Returns: -1 = error,

 *           0 = d is too small,

 *           1 = success.

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,

                                             const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int ret = -1;

    BIGNUM *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    lcm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    p1q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (gcd == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    BN_set_flags(q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    BN_set_flags(lcm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    BN_set_flags(p1q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    BN_set_flags(gcd, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    /* LCM((p-1, q-1)) */

    if (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) != 1)

        goto err;

    /* copy e */

    BN_free(rsa->e);

    rsa->e = BN_dup(e);

    if (rsa->e == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_clear_free(rsa->d);

    /* (Step 3) d = (e^-1) mod (LCM(p-1, q-1)) */

    rsa->d = BN_secure_new();

    if (rsa->d == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, e, lcm, ctx) == NULL)

        goto err;

    /* (Step 3) return an error if d is too small */

    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) <= (nbits >> 1)) {

        ret = 0;

        goto err;

    }

    /* (Step 4) n = pq */

    if (rsa->n == NULL)

        rsa->n = BN_new();

    if (rsa->n == NULL || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))

        goto err;

    /* (Step 5a) dP = d mod (p-1) */

    if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)

        rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new();

    if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, p1, ctx))

        goto err;

    /* (Step 5b) dQ = d mod (q-1) */

    if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL)

        rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new();

    if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, q1, ctx))

        goto err;

    /* (Step 5c) qInv = (inverse of q) mod p */

    BN_free(rsa->iqmp);

    rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new();

    if (rsa->iqmp == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(rsa->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx) == NULL)

        goto err;

    rsa->dirty_cnt++;

    ret = 1;

err:

    if (ret != 1) {

        BN_free(rsa->e);

        rsa->e = NULL;

        BN_free(rsa->d);

        rsa->d = NULL;

        BN_free(rsa->n);

        rsa->n = NULL;

        BN_free(rsa->iqmp);

        rsa->iqmp = NULL;

        BN_free(rsa->dmq1);

        rsa->dmq1 = NULL;

        BN_free(rsa->dmp1);

        rsa->dmp1 = NULL;

    }

    BN_clear(p1);

    BN_clear(q1);

    BN_clear(lcm);

    BN_clear(p1q1);

    BN_clear(gcd);

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * Generate a SP800-56B RSA key.

 *

 * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1 "RSA Key-Pair Generation with a Fixed Public Exponent"

 *    6.3.1.1 rsakpg1 - basic

 *    6.3.1.3 rsakpg1 - crt

 *

 * See also FIPS 186-4 Section B.3.6

 * "Generation of Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary

 * Probable Primes."

 *

 * Params:

 *     rsa The rsa object.

 *     nbits The intended key size in bits.

 *     efixed The public exponent. If NULL a default of 65537 is used.

 *     cb An optional BIGNUM callback.

 * Returns: 1 if successfully generated otherwise it returns 0.

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(RSA *rsa, int nbits, const BIGNUM *efixed,

                                    BN_GENCB *cb)

{

    int ret = 0;

    int ok;

    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    BIGNUM *e = NULL;

    RSA_ACVP_TEST *info = NULL;

    BIGNUM *tmp;

#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)

    info = rsa->acvp_test;

#endif

    /* (Steps 1a-1b) : Currently ignores the strength check */

    if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1))

        return 0;

    /* Check that the RNG is capable of generating a key this large */

   if (!rsa_validate_rng_strength(RAND_get0_private(rsa->libctx), nbits))

        return 0;

    ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);

    if (ctx == NULL)

        return 0;

    /* Set default if e is not passed in */

    if (efixed == NULL) {

        e = BN_new();

        if (e == NULL || !BN_set_word(e, 65537))

            goto err;

    } else {

        e = (BIGNUM *)efixed;

    }

    /* (Step 1c) fixed exponent is checked later .*/

    for (;;) {

        /* (Step 2) Generate prime factors */

        if (!ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa, info, nbits, e, ctx, cb))

            goto err;

        /* p>q check and skipping in case of acvp test */

        if (info == NULL && BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {

            tmp = rsa->p;

            rsa->p = rsa->q;

            rsa->q = tmp;

        }

        /* (Steps 3-5) Compute params d, n, dP, dQ, qInv */

        ok = ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa, nbits, e, ctx);

        if (ok < 0)

            goto err;

        if (ok > 0)

            break;

        /* Gets here if computed d is too small - so try again */

    }

    /* (Step 6) Do pairwise test - optional validity test has been omitted */

    ret = ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(rsa, ctx);

err:

    if (efixed == NULL)

        BN_free(e);

    BN_CTX_free(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.3 (Step 6) Perform a pair-wise consistency test by

 * verifying that: k = (k^e)^d mod n for some integer k where 1 < k < n-1.

 *

 * Returns 1 if the RSA key passes the pairwise test or 0 it it fails.

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int ret = 0;

    BIGNUM *k, *tmp;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (k == NULL)

        goto err;

    BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    ret = (BN_set_word(k, 2)

           && BN_mod_exp(tmp, k, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx)

           && BN_mod_exp(tmp, tmp, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx)

           && BN_cmp(k, tmp) == 0);

    if (ret == 0)

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PAIRWISE_TEST_FAILURE);

err:

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}