/src/openssl30/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2013-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * Low level key APIs (DH etc) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
12 | | * internal use. |
13 | | */ |
14 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
15 | | |
16 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17 | | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/pem.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
20 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
21 | | #include <openssl/cms.h> |
22 | | #include <openssl/aes.h> |
23 | | #include "cms_local.h" |
24 | | #include "crypto/asn1.h" |
25 | | |
26 | | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ |
27 | | |
28 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
29 | | X509_ALGOR **palg, |
30 | | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) |
31 | 0 | { |
32 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
33 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
34 | 0 | return 0; |
35 | 0 | } |
36 | 0 | if (palg) |
37 | 0 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; |
38 | 0 | if (pukm) |
39 | 0 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; |
40 | 0 | return 1; |
41 | 0 | } |
42 | | |
43 | | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ |
44 | | |
45 | | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) |
46 | | *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
47 | 0 | { |
48 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
49 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
50 | 0 | return NULL; |
51 | 0 | } |
52 | 0 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; |
53 | 0 | } |
54 | | |
55 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
56 | | X509_ALGOR **pubalg, |
57 | | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, |
58 | | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
59 | | X509_NAME **issuer, |
60 | | ASN1_INTEGER **sno) |
61 | 0 | { |
62 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; |
63 | |
|
64 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
65 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
66 | 0 | return 0; |
67 | 0 | } |
68 | 0 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
69 | 0 | if (issuer) |
70 | 0 | *issuer = NULL; |
71 | 0 | if (sno) |
72 | 0 | *sno = NULL; |
73 | 0 | if (keyid) |
74 | 0 | *keyid = NULL; |
75 | 0 | if (pubalg) |
76 | 0 | *pubalg = NULL; |
77 | 0 | if (pubkey) |
78 | 0 | *pubkey = NULL; |
79 | 0 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { |
80 | 0 | if (issuer) |
81 | 0 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; |
82 | 0 | if (sno) |
83 | 0 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; |
84 | 0 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { |
85 | 0 | if (keyid) |
86 | 0 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; |
87 | 0 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { |
88 | 0 | if (pubalg) |
89 | 0 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; |
90 | 0 | if (pubkey) |
91 | 0 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; |
92 | 0 | } else |
93 | 0 | return 0; |
94 | 0 | return 1; |
95 | 0 | } |
96 | | |
97 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) |
98 | 0 | { |
99 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; |
100 | |
|
101 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
102 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
103 | 0 | return -2; |
104 | 0 | } |
105 | 0 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
106 | 0 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) |
107 | 0 | return ossl_cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); |
108 | 0 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) |
109 | 0 | return ossl_cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); |
110 | 0 | return -1; |
111 | 0 | } |
112 | | |
113 | | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, |
114 | | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
115 | | ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, |
116 | | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, |
117 | | X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) |
118 | 0 | { |
119 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; |
120 | |
|
121 | 0 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { |
122 | 0 | if (issuer) |
123 | 0 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; |
124 | 0 | if (sno) |
125 | 0 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; |
126 | 0 | if (keyid) |
127 | 0 | *keyid = NULL; |
128 | 0 | if (tm) |
129 | 0 | *tm = NULL; |
130 | 0 | if (other) |
131 | 0 | *other = NULL; |
132 | 0 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { |
133 | 0 | if (keyid) |
134 | 0 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; |
135 | 0 | if (tm) |
136 | 0 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; |
137 | 0 | if (other) |
138 | 0 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; |
139 | 0 | if (issuer) |
140 | 0 | *issuer = NULL; |
141 | 0 | if (sno) |
142 | 0 | *sno = NULL; |
143 | 0 | } else |
144 | 0 | return 0; |
145 | 0 | return 1; |
146 | 0 | } |
147 | | |
148 | | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, |
149 | | X509 *cert) |
150 | 0 | { |
151 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; |
152 | |
|
153 | 0 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) |
154 | 0 | return ossl_cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); |
155 | 0 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) |
156 | 0 | return ossl_cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, |
157 | 0 | cert); |
158 | 0 | else |
159 | 0 | return -1; |
160 | 0 | } |
161 | | |
162 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
163 | | EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *peer) |
164 | 0 | { |
165 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; |
166 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; |
167 | |
|
168 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); |
169 | 0 | kari->pctx = NULL; |
170 | 0 | if (pk == NULL) |
171 | 0 | return 1; |
172 | | |
173 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(kari->cms_ctx), |
174 | 0 | pk, |
175 | 0 | ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(kari->cms_ctx)); |
176 | 0 | if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) |
177 | 0 | goto err; |
178 | | |
179 | 0 | if (peer != NULL) { |
180 | 0 | EVP_PKEY *pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); |
181 | |
|
182 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pub_pkey) <= 0) |
183 | 0 | goto err; |
184 | 0 | } |
185 | | |
186 | 0 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
187 | 0 | return 1; |
188 | 0 | err: |
189 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
190 | 0 | return 0; |
191 | 0 | } |
192 | | |
193 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) |
194 | 0 | { |
195 | 0 | return CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(ri, pk, NULL); |
196 | 0 | } |
197 | | |
198 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
199 | 0 | { |
200 | 0 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) |
201 | 0 | return ri->d.kari->ctx; |
202 | 0 | return NULL; |
203 | 0 | } |
204 | | |
205 | | /* |
206 | | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK |
207 | | * or the encrypted CEK. |
208 | | */ |
209 | | |
210 | | static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, |
211 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, |
212 | | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) |
213 | 0 | { |
214 | | /* Key encryption key */ |
215 | 0 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
216 | 0 | size_t keklen; |
217 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
218 | 0 | unsigned char *out = NULL; |
219 | 0 | int outlen; |
220 | |
|
221 | 0 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(kari->ctx); |
222 | 0 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) |
223 | 0 | return 0; |
224 | | /* Derive KEK */ |
225 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) |
226 | 0 | goto err; |
227 | | /* Set KEK in context */ |
228 | 0 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) |
229 | 0 | goto err; |
230 | | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ |
231 | 0 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) |
232 | 0 | goto err; |
233 | 0 | out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); |
234 | 0 | if (out == NULL) |
235 | 0 | goto err; |
236 | 0 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) |
237 | 0 | goto err; |
238 | 0 | *pout = out; |
239 | 0 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; |
240 | 0 | rv = 1; |
241 | |
|
242 | 0 | err: |
243 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen); |
244 | 0 | if (!rv) |
245 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(out); |
246 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx); |
247 | | /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */ |
248 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); |
249 | 0 | kari->pctx = NULL; |
250 | 0 | return rv; |
251 | 0 | } |
252 | | |
253 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
254 | | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
255 | | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) |
256 | 0 | { |
257 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
258 | 0 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; |
259 | 0 | size_t enckeylen; |
260 | 0 | size_t ceklen; |
261 | 0 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; |
262 | |
|
263 | 0 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; |
264 | 0 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; |
265 | | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ |
266 | 0 | if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) |
267 | 0 | goto err; |
268 | | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ |
269 | 0 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) |
270 | 0 | goto err; |
271 | 0 | ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms); |
272 | 0 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); |
273 | 0 | ec->key = cek; |
274 | 0 | ec->keylen = ceklen; |
275 | 0 | cek = NULL; |
276 | 0 | rv = 1; |
277 | 0 | err: |
278 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(cek); |
279 | 0 | return rv; |
280 | 0 | } |
281 | | |
282 | | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ |
283 | | static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
284 | | EVP_PKEY *pk) |
285 | 0 | { |
286 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
287 | 0 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; |
288 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
289 | 0 | const CMS_CTX *ctx = kari->cms_ctx; |
290 | 0 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx); |
291 | 0 | const char *propq = ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(ctx); |
292 | |
|
293 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pk, propq); |
294 | 0 | if (pctx == NULL) |
295 | 0 | goto err; |
296 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) |
297 | 0 | goto err; |
298 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) |
299 | 0 | goto err; |
300 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
301 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, ekey, propq); |
302 | 0 | if (pctx == NULL) |
303 | 0 | goto err; |
304 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) |
305 | 0 | goto err; |
306 | 0 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
307 | 0 | rv = 1; |
308 | 0 | err: |
309 | 0 | if (!rv) |
310 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
311 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); |
312 | 0 | return rv; |
313 | 0 | } |
314 | | |
315 | | /* Set originator private key and initialise context based on it */ |
316 | | static int cms_kari_set_originator_private_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
317 | | EVP_PKEY *originatorPrivKey ) |
318 | 0 | { |
319 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
320 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
321 | 0 | const CMS_CTX *ctx = kari->cms_ctx; |
322 | |
|
323 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx), |
324 | 0 | originatorPrivKey, |
325 | 0 | ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(ctx)); |
326 | 0 | if (pctx == NULL) |
327 | 0 | goto err; |
328 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) |
329 | 0 | goto err; |
330 | | |
331 | 0 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
332 | 0 | rv = 1; |
333 | 0 | err: |
334 | 0 | if (rv == 0) |
335 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
336 | 0 | return rv; |
337 | 0 | } |
338 | | |
339 | | /* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */ |
340 | | |
341 | | int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, |
342 | | EVP_PKEY *recipPubKey, X509 *originator, |
343 | | EVP_PKEY *originatorPrivKey, |
344 | | unsigned int flags, const CMS_CTX *ctx) |
345 | 0 | { |
346 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; |
347 | 0 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; |
348 | |
|
349 | 0 | ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo); |
350 | 0 | if (ri->d.kari == NULL) |
351 | 0 | return 0; |
352 | 0 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; |
353 | |
|
354 | 0 | kari = ri->d.kari; |
355 | 0 | kari->version = 3; |
356 | 0 | kari->cms_ctx = ctx; |
357 | |
|
358 | 0 | rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); |
359 | 0 | if (rek == NULL) |
360 | 0 | return 0; |
361 | | |
362 | 0 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { |
363 | 0 | M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); |
364 | 0 | return 0; |
365 | 0 | } |
366 | | |
367 | 0 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { |
368 | 0 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; |
369 | 0 | rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier); |
370 | 0 | if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL) |
371 | 0 | return 0; |
372 | 0 | if (!ossl_cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) |
373 | 0 | return 0; |
374 | 0 | } else { |
375 | 0 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; |
376 | 0 | if (!ossl_cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) |
377 | 0 | return 0; |
378 | 0 | } |
379 | | |
380 | 0 | if (originatorPrivKey == NULL && originator == NULL) { |
381 | | /* Create ephemeral key */ |
382 | 0 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, recipPubKey)) |
383 | 0 | return 0; |
384 | 0 | } else { |
385 | | /* Use originator key */ |
386 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
387 | |
|
388 | 0 | if (originatorPrivKey == NULL || originator == NULL) |
389 | 0 | return 0; |
390 | | |
391 | 0 | if (flags & CMS_USE_ORIGINATOR_KEYID) { |
392 | 0 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER; |
393 | 0 | oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); |
394 | 0 | if (oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier == NULL) |
395 | 0 | return 0; |
396 | 0 | if (!ossl_cms_set1_keyid(&oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, originator)) |
397 | 0 | return 0; |
398 | 0 | } else { |
399 | 0 | oik->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; |
400 | 0 | if (!ossl_cms_set1_ias(&oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, originator)) |
401 | 0 | return 0; |
402 | 0 | } |
403 | | |
404 | 0 | if (!cms_kari_set_originator_private_key(kari, originatorPrivKey)) |
405 | 0 | return 0; |
406 | 0 | } |
407 | | |
408 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(recipPubKey); |
409 | 0 | rek->pkey = recipPubKey; |
410 | 0 | return 1; |
411 | 0 | } |
412 | | |
413 | | static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
414 | | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) |
415 | 0 | { |
416 | 0 | const CMS_CTX *cms_ctx = kari->cms_ctx; |
417 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx; |
418 | 0 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; |
419 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER *fetched_kekcipher; |
420 | 0 | const char *kekcipher_name; |
421 | 0 | int keylen; |
422 | 0 | int ret; |
423 | | |
424 | | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ |
425 | 0 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx); |
426 | 0 | if (kekcipher != NULL) { |
427 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) |
428 | 0 | return 0; |
429 | 0 | return 1; |
430 | 0 | } |
431 | 0 | if (cipher == NULL) |
432 | 0 | return 0; |
433 | 0 | keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cipher); |
434 | 0 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_GET_WRAP_CIPHER) != 0) { |
435 | 0 | ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)(NULL, EVP_CTRL_GET_WRAP_CIPHER, |
436 | 0 | 0, &kekcipher); |
437 | 0 | if (ret <= 0) |
438 | 0 | return 0; |
439 | | |
440 | 0 | if (kekcipher != NULL) { |
441 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) |
442 | 0 | return 0; |
443 | 0 | kekcipher_name = EVP_CIPHER_get0_name(kekcipher); |
444 | 0 | goto enc; |
445 | 0 | } |
446 | 0 | } |
447 | | |
448 | | /* |
449 | | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use |
450 | | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. |
451 | | */ |
452 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES |
453 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_get_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) |
454 | 0 | kekcipher_name = SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap; |
455 | 0 | else |
456 | 0 | #endif |
457 | 0 | if (keylen <= 16) |
458 | 0 | kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes128_wrap; |
459 | 0 | else if (keylen <= 24) |
460 | 0 | kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes192_wrap; |
461 | 0 | else |
462 | 0 | kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes256_wrap; |
463 | 0 | enc: |
464 | 0 | fetched_kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(cms_ctx), |
465 | 0 | kekcipher_name, |
466 | 0 | ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(cms_ctx)); |
467 | 0 | if (fetched_kekcipher == NULL) |
468 | 0 | return 0; |
469 | 0 | ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, fetched_kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
470 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_free(fetched_kekcipher); |
471 | 0 | return ret; |
472 | 0 | } |
473 | | |
474 | | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ |
475 | | |
476 | | int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
477 | | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
478 | 0 | { |
479 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; |
480 | 0 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; |
481 | 0 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; |
482 | 0 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; |
483 | 0 | int i; |
484 | |
|
485 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
486 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
487 | 0 | return 0; |
488 | 0 | } |
489 | 0 | kari = ri->d.kari; |
490 | 0 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; |
491 | 0 | ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms); |
492 | | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ |
493 | 0 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) |
494 | 0 | return 0; |
495 | | /* |
496 | | * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key |
497 | | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. |
498 | | */ |
499 | 0 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) { |
500 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; |
501 | 0 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; |
502 | 0 | oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey); |
503 | 0 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey) |
504 | 0 | return 0; |
505 | 0 | } else { |
506 | | /* |
507 | | * Currently it is not possible to get public key as it is not stored |
508 | | * during kari initialization. |
509 | | */ |
510 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_STATIC_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
511 | 0 | return 0; |
512 | 0 | } |
513 | | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ |
514 | 0 | if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) |
515 | 0 | return 0; |
516 | | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ |
517 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { |
518 | 0 | unsigned char *enckey; |
519 | 0 | size_t enckeylen; |
520 | 0 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); |
521 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) |
522 | 0 | return 0; |
523 | 0 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, |
524 | 0 | kari, 1)) |
525 | 0 | return 0; |
526 | 0 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); |
527 | 0 | } |
528 | | |
529 | 0 | return 1; |
530 | 0 | } |