/src/openssl30/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
4 | | * |
5 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
8 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
9 | | */ |
10 | | |
11 | | /* |
12 | | * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
13 | | * internal use. |
14 | | */ |
15 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
16 | | |
17 | | #include <string.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
19 | | |
20 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
21 | | #include "crypto/bn.h" |
22 | | #include "ec_local.h" |
23 | | #include "internal/refcount.h" |
24 | | |
25 | | /* |
26 | | * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method |
27 | | * Formerly at: |
28 | | * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp |
29 | | * You might now find it here: |
30 | | * http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13 |
31 | | * http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf |
32 | | * For multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting, formerly at: |
33 | | * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp |
34 | | */ |
35 | | |
36 | | /* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ |
37 | | struct ec_pre_comp_st { |
38 | | const EC_GROUP *group; /* parent EC_GROUP object */ |
39 | | size_t blocksize; /* block size for wNAF splitting */ |
40 | | size_t numblocks; /* max. number of blocks for which we have |
41 | | * precomputation */ |
42 | | size_t w; /* window size */ |
43 | | EC_POINT **points; /* array with pre-calculated multiples of |
44 | | * generator: 'num' pointers to EC_POINT |
45 | | * objects followed by a NULL */ |
46 | | size_t num; /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */ |
47 | | CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; |
48 | | CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; |
49 | | }; |
50 | | |
51 | | static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) |
52 | 0 | { |
53 | 0 | EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; |
54 | |
|
55 | 0 | if (!group) |
56 | 0 | return NULL; |
57 | | |
58 | 0 | ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
59 | 0 | if (ret == NULL) { |
60 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
61 | 0 | return ret; |
62 | 0 | } |
63 | | |
64 | 0 | ret->group = group; |
65 | 0 | ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */ |
66 | 0 | ret->w = 4; /* default */ |
67 | 0 | ret->references = 1; |
68 | |
|
69 | 0 | ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
70 | 0 | if (ret->lock == NULL) { |
71 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
72 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(ret); |
73 | 0 | return NULL; |
74 | 0 | } |
75 | 0 | return ret; |
76 | 0 | } |
77 | | |
78 | | EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) |
79 | 0 | { |
80 | 0 | int i; |
81 | 0 | if (pre != NULL) |
82 | 0 | CRYPTO_UP_REF(&pre->references, &i, pre->lock); |
83 | 0 | return pre; |
84 | 0 | } |
85 | | |
86 | | void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) |
87 | 0 | { |
88 | 0 | int i; |
89 | |
|
90 | 0 | if (pre == NULL) |
91 | 0 | return; |
92 | | |
93 | 0 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&pre->references, &i, pre->lock); |
94 | 0 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_ec", pre); |
95 | 0 | if (i > 0) |
96 | 0 | return; |
97 | 0 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
98 | |
|
99 | 0 | if (pre->points != NULL) { |
100 | 0 | EC_POINT **pts; |
101 | |
|
102 | 0 | for (pts = pre->points; *pts != NULL; pts++) |
103 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(*pts); |
104 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(pre->points); |
105 | 0 | } |
106 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock); |
107 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(pre); |
108 | 0 | } |
109 | | |
110 | 29.2k | #define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) do { \ |
111 | 29.2k | BN_set_flags((P)->X, (flags)); \ |
112 | 29.2k | BN_set_flags((P)->Y, (flags)); \ |
113 | 29.2k | BN_set_flags((P)->Z, (flags)); \ |
114 | 29.2k | } while(0) |
115 | | |
116 | | /*- |
117 | | * This functions computes a single point multiplication over the EC group, |
118 | | * using, at a high level, a Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps, with |
119 | | * various timing attack defenses. |
120 | | * |
121 | | * It performs either a fixed point multiplication |
122 | | * (scalar * generator) |
123 | | * when point is NULL, or a variable point multiplication |
124 | | * (scalar * point) |
125 | | * when point is not NULL. |
126 | | * |
127 | | * `scalar` cannot be NULL and should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all |
128 | | * constant time bets are off (where n is the cardinality of the EC group). |
129 | | * |
130 | | * This function expects `group->order` and `group->cardinality` to be well |
131 | | * defined and non-zero: it fails with an error code otherwise. |
132 | | * |
133 | | * NB: This says nothing about the constant-timeness of the ladder step |
134 | | * implementation (i.e., the default implementation is based on EC_POINT_add and |
135 | | * EC_POINT_dbl, which of course are not constant time themselves) or the |
136 | | * underlying multiprecision arithmetic. |
137 | | * |
138 | | * The product is stored in `r`. |
139 | | * |
140 | | * This is an internal function: callers are in charge of ensuring that the |
141 | | * input parameters `group`, `r`, `scalar` and `ctx` are not NULL. |
142 | | * |
143 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
144 | | */ |
145 | | int ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, |
146 | | const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, |
147 | | BN_CTX *ctx) |
148 | 9.75k | { |
149 | 9.75k | int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one; |
150 | 9.75k | EC_POINT *p = NULL; |
151 | 9.75k | EC_POINT *s = NULL; |
152 | 9.75k | BIGNUM *k = NULL; |
153 | 9.75k | BIGNUM *lambda = NULL; |
154 | 9.75k | BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL; |
155 | 9.75k | int ret = 0; |
156 | | |
157 | | /* early exit if the input point is the point at infinity */ |
158 | 9.75k | if (point != NULL && EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) |
159 | 0 | return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); |
160 | | |
161 | 9.75k | if (BN_is_zero(group->order)) { |
162 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); |
163 | 0 | return 0; |
164 | 0 | } |
165 | 9.75k | if (BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) { |
166 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR); |
167 | 0 | return 0; |
168 | 0 | } |
169 | | |
170 | 9.75k | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
171 | | |
172 | 9.75k | if (((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) |
173 | 9.75k | || ((s = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)) { |
174 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
175 | 0 | goto err; |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | | |
178 | 9.75k | if (point == NULL) { |
179 | 7.97k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, group->generator)) { |
180 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
181 | 0 | goto err; |
182 | 0 | } |
183 | 7.97k | } else { |
184 | 1.78k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, point)) { |
185 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
186 | 0 | goto err; |
187 | 0 | } |
188 | 1.78k | } |
189 | | |
190 | 9.75k | EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
191 | 9.75k | EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
192 | 9.75k | EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
193 | | |
194 | 9.75k | cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
195 | 9.75k | lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
196 | 9.75k | k = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
197 | 9.75k | if (k == NULL) { |
198 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
199 | 0 | goto err; |
200 | 0 | } |
201 | | |
202 | 9.75k | if (!BN_mul(cardinality, group->order, group->cofactor, ctx)) { |
203 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
204 | 0 | goto err; |
205 | 0 | } |
206 | | |
207 | | /* |
208 | | * Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary. |
209 | | * So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might |
210 | | * pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries. |
211 | | * So expand ahead of time. |
212 | | */ |
213 | 9.75k | cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); |
214 | 9.75k | group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality); |
215 | 9.75k | if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL) |
216 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) { |
217 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
218 | 0 | goto err; |
219 | 0 | } |
220 | | |
221 | 9.75k | if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) { |
222 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
223 | 0 | goto err; |
224 | 0 | } |
225 | | |
226 | 9.75k | BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
227 | | |
228 | 9.75k | if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) { |
229 | | /*- |
230 | | * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee |
231 | | * constant-timeness |
232 | | */ |
233 | 1.91k | if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx)) { |
234 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
235 | 0 | goto err; |
236 | 0 | } |
237 | 1.91k | } |
238 | | |
239 | 9.75k | if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality)) { |
240 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
241 | 0 | goto err; |
242 | 0 | } |
243 | 9.75k | BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
244 | 9.75k | if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality)) { |
245 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
246 | 0 | goto err; |
247 | 0 | } |
248 | | /* |
249 | | * lambda := scalar + cardinality |
250 | | * k := scalar + 2*cardinality |
251 | | */ |
252 | 9.75k | kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); |
253 | 9.75k | BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2); |
254 | | |
255 | 9.75k | group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); |
256 | 9.75k | if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL) |
257 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(s->Y, group_top) == NULL) |
258 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(s->Z, group_top) == NULL) |
259 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(r->X, group_top) == NULL) |
260 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(r->Y, group_top) == NULL) |
261 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(r->Z, group_top) == NULL) |
262 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(p->X, group_top) == NULL) |
263 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(p->Y, group_top) == NULL) |
264 | 9.75k | || (bn_wexpand(p->Z, group_top) == NULL)) { |
265 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
266 | 0 | goto err; |
267 | 0 | } |
268 | | |
269 | | /* ensure input point is in affine coords for ladder step efficiency */ |
270 | 9.75k | if (!p->Z_is_one && (group->meth->make_affine == NULL |
271 | 0 | || !group->meth->make_affine(group, p, ctx))) { |
272 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
273 | 0 | goto err; |
274 | 0 | } |
275 | | |
276 | | /* Initialize the Montgomery ladder */ |
277 | 9.75k | if (!ec_point_ladder_pre(group, r, s, p, ctx)) { |
278 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE); |
279 | 0 | goto err; |
280 | 0 | } |
281 | | |
282 | | /* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */ |
283 | 9.75k | pbit = 1; |
284 | | |
285 | 3.12M | #define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) do { \ |
286 | 3.12M | BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->X, (b)->X, w); \ |
287 | 3.12M | BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Y, (b)->Y, w); \ |
288 | 3.12M | BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Z, (b)->Z, w); \ |
289 | 3.12M | t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \ |
290 | 3.12M | (a)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \ |
291 | 3.12M | (b)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \ |
292 | 3.12M | } while(0) |
293 | | |
294 | | /*- |
295 | | * The ladder step, with branches, is |
296 | | * |
297 | | * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R) |
298 | | * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S) |
299 | | * |
300 | | * Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state |
301 | | * |
302 | | * k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S |
303 | | * k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R |
304 | | * |
305 | | * Then perform the ECC ops. |
306 | | * |
307 | | * U = add(T, U) |
308 | | * T = dbl(T) |
309 | | * |
310 | | * Which leaves you with state |
311 | | * |
312 | | * k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R) |
313 | | * k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S) |
314 | | * |
315 | | * Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state |
316 | | * |
317 | | * k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U |
318 | | * k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T |
319 | | * |
320 | | * Which leaves you with state |
321 | | * |
322 | | * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R) |
323 | | * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S) |
324 | | * |
325 | | * So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a |
326 | | * conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap. |
327 | | * |
328 | | * Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like |
329 | | * |
330 | | * ... |
331 | | * CSWAP(k[i], R, S) |
332 | | * ECC |
333 | | * CSWAP(k[i], R, S) |
334 | | * (next iteration) |
335 | | * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S) |
336 | | * ECC |
337 | | * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S) |
338 | | * ... |
339 | | * |
340 | | * So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition |
341 | | * bits and do a single swap. |
342 | | * |
343 | | * k[i] k[i-1] Outcome |
344 | | * 0 0 No Swap |
345 | | * 0 1 Swap |
346 | | * 1 0 Swap |
347 | | * 1 1 No Swap |
348 | | * |
349 | | * This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k. |
350 | | */ |
351 | | |
352 | 3.12M | for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
353 | 3.11M | kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit; |
354 | 3.11M | EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one); |
355 | | |
356 | | /* Perform a single step of the Montgomery ladder */ |
357 | 3.11M | if (!ec_point_ladder_step(group, r, s, p, ctx)) { |
358 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE); |
359 | 0 | goto err; |
360 | 0 | } |
361 | | /* |
362 | | * pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the |
363 | | * next iteration |
364 | | */ |
365 | 3.11M | pbit ^= kbit; |
366 | 3.11M | } |
367 | | /* one final cswap to move the right value into r */ |
368 | 9.75k | EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one); |
369 | 9.75k | #undef EC_POINT_CSWAP |
370 | | |
371 | | /* Finalize ladder (and recover full point coordinates) */ |
372 | 9.75k | if (!ec_point_ladder_post(group, r, s, p, ctx)) { |
373 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE); |
374 | 0 | goto err; |
375 | 0 | } |
376 | | |
377 | 9.75k | ret = 1; |
378 | | |
379 | 9.75k | err: |
380 | 9.75k | EC_POINT_free(p); |
381 | 9.75k | EC_POINT_clear_free(s); |
382 | 9.75k | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
383 | | |
384 | 9.75k | return ret; |
385 | 9.75k | } |
386 | | |
387 | | #undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags |
388 | | |
389 | | /* |
390 | | * Table could be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation, |
391 | | * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the |
392 | | * boundaries should be increased) |
393 | | */ |
394 | | #define EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(b) \ |
395 | 3.35k | ((size_t) \ |
396 | 3.35k | ((b) >= 2000 ? 6 : \ |
397 | 3.35k | (b) >= 800 ? 5 : \ |
398 | 3.32k | (b) >= 300 ? 4 : \ |
399 | 3.26k | (b) >= 70 ? 3 : \ |
400 | 2.39k | (b) >= 20 ? 2 : \ |
401 | 1.06k | 1)) |
402 | | |
403 | | /*- |
404 | | * Compute |
405 | | * \sum scalars[i]*points[i], |
406 | | * also including |
407 | | * scalar*generator |
408 | | * in the addition if scalar != NULL |
409 | | */ |
410 | | int ossl_ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, |
411 | | size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], |
412 | | const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) |
413 | 7.18k | { |
414 | 7.18k | const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; |
415 | 7.18k | EC_POINT *tmp = NULL; |
416 | 7.18k | size_t totalnum; |
417 | 7.18k | size_t blocksize = 0, numblocks = 0; /* for wNAF splitting */ |
418 | 7.18k | size_t pre_points_per_block = 0; |
419 | 7.18k | size_t i, j; |
420 | 7.18k | int k; |
421 | 7.18k | int r_is_inverted = 0; |
422 | 7.18k | int r_is_at_infinity = 1; |
423 | 7.18k | size_t *wsize = NULL; /* individual window sizes */ |
424 | 7.18k | signed char **wNAF = NULL; /* individual wNAFs */ |
425 | 7.18k | size_t *wNAF_len = NULL; |
426 | 7.18k | size_t max_len = 0; |
427 | 7.18k | size_t num_val; |
428 | 7.18k | EC_POINT **val = NULL; /* precomputation */ |
429 | 7.18k | EC_POINT **v; |
430 | 7.18k | EC_POINT ***val_sub = NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' or |
431 | | * 'pre_comp->points' */ |
432 | 7.18k | const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; |
433 | 7.18k | int num_scalar = 0; /* flag: will be set to 1 if 'scalar' must be |
434 | | * treated like other scalars, i.e. |
435 | | * precomputation is not available */ |
436 | 7.18k | int ret = 0; |
437 | | |
438 | 7.18k | if (!BN_is_zero(group->order) && !BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) { |
439 | | /*- |
440 | | * Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a |
441 | | * scalar multiplication implementation based on a Montgomery ladder, |
442 | | * with various timing attack defenses. |
443 | | */ |
444 | 5.90k | if ((scalar != group->order) && (scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) { |
445 | | /*- |
446 | | * In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint: this |
447 | | * codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key |
448 | | * generation of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup, |
449 | | * ECDH keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret. This |
450 | | * is why we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we |
451 | | * always call the ladder version. |
452 | | */ |
453 | 3.47k | return ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx); |
454 | 3.47k | } |
455 | 2.43k | if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1) && (scalars[0] != group->order)) { |
456 | | /*- |
457 | | * In this case we want to compute scalar * VariablePoint: this |
458 | | * codepath is reached most prominently by the second half of ECDH, |
459 | | * where the secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public point. |
460 | | * To protect the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is |
461 | | * actually set and we always call the ladder version. |
462 | | */ |
463 | 540 | return ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], |
464 | 540 | ctx); |
465 | 540 | } |
466 | 2.43k | } |
467 | | |
468 | 3.17k | if (scalar != NULL) { |
469 | 1.82k | generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); |
470 | 1.82k | if (generator == NULL) { |
471 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); |
472 | 0 | goto err; |
473 | 0 | } |
474 | | |
475 | | /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ |
476 | | |
477 | 1.82k | pre_comp = group->pre_comp.ec; |
478 | 1.82k | if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks |
479 | 1.82k | && (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) == |
480 | 0 | 0)) { |
481 | 0 | blocksize = pre_comp->blocksize; |
482 | | |
483 | | /* |
484 | | * determine maximum number of blocks that wNAF splitting may |
485 | | * yield (NB: maximum wNAF length is bit length plus one) |
486 | | */ |
487 | 0 | numblocks = (BN_num_bits(scalar) / blocksize) + 1; |
488 | | |
489 | | /* |
490 | | * we cannot use more blocks than we have precomputation for |
491 | | */ |
492 | 0 | if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) |
493 | 0 | numblocks = pre_comp->numblocks; |
494 | |
|
495 | 0 | pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (pre_comp->w - 1); |
496 | | |
497 | | /* check that pre_comp looks sane */ |
498 | 0 | if (pre_comp->num != (pre_comp->numblocks * pre_points_per_block)) { |
499 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
500 | 0 | goto err; |
501 | 0 | } |
502 | 1.82k | } else { |
503 | | /* can't use precomputation */ |
504 | 1.82k | pre_comp = NULL; |
505 | 1.82k | numblocks = 1; |
506 | 1.82k | num_scalar = 1; /* treat 'scalar' like 'num'-th element of |
507 | | * 'scalars' */ |
508 | 1.82k | } |
509 | 1.82k | } |
510 | | |
511 | 3.17k | totalnum = num + numblocks; |
512 | | |
513 | 3.17k | wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wsize[0])); |
514 | 3.17k | wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wNAF_len[0])); |
515 | | /* include space for pivot */ |
516 | 3.17k | wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof(wNAF[0])); |
517 | 3.17k | val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(val_sub[0])); |
518 | | |
519 | | /* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */ |
520 | 3.17k | if (wNAF != NULL) |
521 | 3.17k | wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */ |
522 | | |
523 | 3.17k | if (wsize == NULL || wNAF_len == NULL || wNAF == NULL || val_sub == NULL) { |
524 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
525 | 0 | goto err; |
526 | 0 | } |
527 | | |
528 | | /* |
529 | | * num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points |
530 | | */ |
531 | 3.17k | num_val = 0; |
532 | | |
533 | 6.52k | for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { |
534 | 3.35k | size_t bits; |
535 | | |
536 | 3.35k | bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(scalar); |
537 | 3.35k | wsize[i] = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); |
538 | 3.35k | num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1); |
539 | 3.35k | wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; /* make sure we always have a pivot */ |
540 | 3.35k | wNAF[i] = |
541 | 3.35k | bn_compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : scalar), wsize[i], |
542 | 3.35k | &wNAF_len[i]); |
543 | 3.35k | if (wNAF[i] == NULL) |
544 | 0 | goto err; |
545 | 3.35k | if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) |
546 | 3.28k | max_len = wNAF_len[i]; |
547 | 3.35k | } |
548 | | |
549 | 3.17k | if (numblocks) { |
550 | | /* we go here iff scalar != NULL */ |
551 | | |
552 | 1.82k | if (pre_comp == NULL) { |
553 | 1.82k | if (num_scalar != 1) { |
554 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
555 | 0 | goto err; |
556 | 0 | } |
557 | | /* we have already generated a wNAF for 'scalar' */ |
558 | 1.82k | } else { |
559 | 0 | signed char *tmp_wNAF = NULL; |
560 | 0 | size_t tmp_len = 0; |
561 | |
|
562 | 0 | if (num_scalar != 0) { |
563 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
564 | 0 | goto err; |
565 | 0 | } |
566 | | |
567 | | /* |
568 | | * use the window size for which we have precomputation |
569 | | */ |
570 | 0 | wsize[num] = pre_comp->w; |
571 | 0 | tmp_wNAF = bn_compute_wNAF(scalar, wsize[num], &tmp_len); |
572 | 0 | if (!tmp_wNAF) |
573 | 0 | goto err; |
574 | | |
575 | 0 | if (tmp_len <= max_len) { |
576 | | /* |
577 | | * One of the other wNAFs is at least as long as the wNAF |
578 | | * belonging to the generator, so wNAF splitting will not buy |
579 | | * us anything. |
580 | | */ |
581 | |
|
582 | 0 | numblocks = 1; |
583 | 0 | totalnum = num + 1; /* don't use wNAF splitting */ |
584 | 0 | wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF; |
585 | 0 | wNAF[num + 1] = NULL; |
586 | 0 | wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len; |
587 | | /* |
588 | | * pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here: |
589 | | */ |
590 | 0 | val_sub[num] = pre_comp->points; |
591 | 0 | } else { |
592 | | /* |
593 | | * don't include tmp_wNAF directly into wNAF array - use wNAF |
594 | | * splitting and include the blocks |
595 | | */ |
596 | |
|
597 | 0 | signed char *pp; |
598 | 0 | EC_POINT **tmp_points; |
599 | |
|
600 | 0 | if (tmp_len < numblocks * blocksize) { |
601 | | /* |
602 | | * possibly we can do with fewer blocks than estimated |
603 | | */ |
604 | 0 | numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; |
605 | 0 | if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) { |
606 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
607 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
608 | 0 | goto err; |
609 | 0 | } |
610 | 0 | totalnum = num + numblocks; |
611 | 0 | } |
612 | | |
613 | | /* split wNAF in 'numblocks' parts */ |
614 | 0 | pp = tmp_wNAF; |
615 | 0 | tmp_points = pre_comp->points; |
616 | |
|
617 | 0 | for (i = num; i < totalnum; i++) { |
618 | 0 | if (i < totalnum - 1) { |
619 | 0 | wNAF_len[i] = blocksize; |
620 | 0 | if (tmp_len < blocksize) { |
621 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
622 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
623 | 0 | goto err; |
624 | 0 | } |
625 | 0 | tmp_len -= blocksize; |
626 | 0 | } else |
627 | | /* |
628 | | * last block gets whatever is left (this could be |
629 | | * more or less than 'blocksize'!) |
630 | | */ |
631 | 0 | wNAF_len[i] = tmp_len; |
632 | | |
633 | 0 | wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; |
634 | 0 | wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]); |
635 | 0 | if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { |
636 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
637 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
638 | 0 | goto err; |
639 | 0 | } |
640 | 0 | memcpy(wNAF[i], pp, wNAF_len[i]); |
641 | 0 | if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) |
642 | 0 | max_len = wNAF_len[i]; |
643 | |
|
644 | 0 | if (*tmp_points == NULL) { |
645 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
646 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
647 | 0 | goto err; |
648 | 0 | } |
649 | 0 | val_sub[i] = tmp_points; |
650 | 0 | tmp_points += pre_points_per_block; |
651 | 0 | pp += blocksize; |
652 | 0 | } |
653 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
654 | 0 | } |
655 | 0 | } |
656 | 1.82k | } |
657 | | |
658 | | /* |
659 | | * All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'. |
660 | | * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a |
661 | | * subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation. |
662 | | */ |
663 | 3.17k | val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof(val[0])); |
664 | 3.17k | if (val == NULL) { |
665 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
666 | 0 | goto err; |
667 | 0 | } |
668 | 3.17k | val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */ |
669 | | |
670 | | /* allocate points for precomputation */ |
671 | 3.17k | v = val; |
672 | 6.52k | for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { |
673 | 3.35k | val_sub[i] = v; |
674 | 18.8k | for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { |
675 | 15.5k | *v = EC_POINT_new(group); |
676 | 15.5k | if (*v == NULL) |
677 | 0 | goto err; |
678 | 15.5k | v++; |
679 | 15.5k | } |
680 | 3.35k | } |
681 | 3.17k | if (!(v == val + num_val)) { |
682 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
683 | 0 | goto err; |
684 | 0 | } |
685 | | |
686 | 3.17k | if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) |
687 | 0 | goto err; |
688 | | |
689 | | /*- |
690 | | * prepare precomputed values: |
691 | | * val_sub[i][0] := points[i] |
692 | | * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i] |
693 | | * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i] |
694 | | * ... |
695 | | */ |
696 | 6.52k | for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { |
697 | 3.35k | if (i < num) { |
698 | 1.52k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i])) |
699 | 0 | goto err; |
700 | 1.82k | } else { |
701 | 1.82k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator)) |
702 | 0 | goto err; |
703 | 1.82k | } |
704 | | |
705 | 3.35k | if (wsize[i] > 1) { |
706 | 2.63k | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx)) |
707 | 0 | goto err; |
708 | 14.8k | for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { |
709 | 12.1k | if (!EC_POINT_add |
710 | 12.1k | (group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx)) |
711 | 0 | goto err; |
712 | 12.1k | } |
713 | 2.63k | } |
714 | 3.35k | } |
715 | | |
716 | 3.17k | if (group->meth->points_make_affine == NULL |
717 | 3.17k | || !group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx)) |
718 | 0 | goto err; |
719 | | |
720 | 3.17k | r_is_at_infinity = 1; |
721 | | |
722 | 639k | for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) { |
723 | 636k | if (!r_is_at_infinity) { |
724 | 633k | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) |
725 | 0 | goto err; |
726 | 633k | } |
727 | | |
728 | 1.33M | for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) { |
729 | 696k | if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) { |
730 | 675k | int digit = wNAF[i][k]; |
731 | 675k | int is_neg; |
732 | | |
733 | 675k | if (digit) { |
734 | 87.5k | is_neg = digit < 0; |
735 | | |
736 | 87.5k | if (is_neg) |
737 | 41.4k | digit = -digit; |
738 | | |
739 | 87.5k | if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) { |
740 | 42.0k | if (!r_is_at_infinity) { |
741 | 42.0k | if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) |
742 | 0 | goto err; |
743 | 42.0k | } |
744 | 42.0k | r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted; |
745 | 42.0k | } |
746 | | |
747 | | /* digit > 0 */ |
748 | | |
749 | 87.5k | if (r_is_at_infinity) { |
750 | 3.12k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) |
751 | 0 | goto err; |
752 | | |
753 | | /*- |
754 | | * Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT. |
755 | | * |
756 | | * The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function: |
757 | | * ossl_ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on |
758 | | * success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this |
759 | | * group. |
760 | | */ |
761 | 3.12k | if (!ossl_ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, r, ctx)) { |
762 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE); |
763 | 0 | goto err; |
764 | 0 | } |
765 | | |
766 | 3.12k | r_is_at_infinity = 0; |
767 | 84.4k | } else { |
768 | 84.4k | if (!EC_POINT_add |
769 | 84.4k | (group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx)) |
770 | 0 | goto err; |
771 | 84.4k | } |
772 | 87.5k | } |
773 | 675k | } |
774 | 696k | } |
775 | 636k | } |
776 | | |
777 | 3.17k | if (r_is_at_infinity) { |
778 | 50 | if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) |
779 | 0 | goto err; |
780 | 3.12k | } else { |
781 | 3.12k | if (r_is_inverted) |
782 | 1.50k | if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) |
783 | 0 | goto err; |
784 | 3.12k | } |
785 | | |
786 | 3.17k | ret = 1; |
787 | | |
788 | 3.17k | err: |
789 | 3.17k | EC_POINT_free(tmp); |
790 | 3.17k | OPENSSL_free(wsize); |
791 | 3.17k | OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len); |
792 | 3.17k | if (wNAF != NULL) { |
793 | 3.17k | signed char **w; |
794 | | |
795 | 6.52k | for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++) |
796 | 3.35k | OPENSSL_free(*w); |
797 | | |
798 | 3.17k | OPENSSL_free(wNAF); |
799 | 3.17k | } |
800 | 3.17k | if (val != NULL) { |
801 | 18.7k | for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++) |
802 | 15.5k | EC_POINT_clear_free(*v); |
803 | | |
804 | 3.17k | OPENSSL_free(val); |
805 | 3.17k | } |
806 | 3.17k | OPENSSL_free(val_sub); |
807 | 3.17k | return ret; |
808 | 3.17k | } |
809 | | |
810 | | /*- |
811 | | * ossl_ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() |
812 | | * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator |
813 | | * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ossl_ec_wNAF_mul(). |
814 | | * |
815 | | * 'pre_comp->points' is an array of multiples of the generator |
816 | | * of the following form: |
817 | | * points[0] = generator; |
818 | | * points[1] = 3 * generator; |
819 | | * ... |
820 | | * points[2^(w-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)-1) * generator; |
821 | | * points[2^(w-1)] = 2^blocksize * generator; |
822 | | * points[2^(w-1)+1] = 3 * 2^blocksize * generator; |
823 | | * ... |
824 | | * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-2)) * generator |
825 | | * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)] = 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator |
826 | | * ... |
827 | | * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator |
828 | | * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks] = NULL |
829 | | */ |
830 | | int ossl_ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) |
831 | 0 | { |
832 | 0 | const EC_POINT *generator; |
833 | 0 | EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var; |
834 | 0 | const BIGNUM *order; |
835 | 0 | size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num; |
836 | 0 | EC_POINT **points = NULL; |
837 | 0 | EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; |
838 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
839 | 0 | int used_ctx = 0; |
840 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
841 | 0 | BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; |
842 | 0 | #endif |
843 | | |
844 | | /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ |
845 | 0 | EC_pre_comp_free(group); |
846 | 0 | if ((pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL) |
847 | 0 | return 0; |
848 | | |
849 | 0 | generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); |
850 | 0 | if (generator == NULL) { |
851 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); |
852 | 0 | goto err; |
853 | 0 | } |
854 | | |
855 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
856 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
857 | 0 | ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
858 | 0 | #endif |
859 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
860 | 0 | goto err; |
861 | | |
862 | 0 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
863 | 0 | used_ctx = 1; |
864 | |
|
865 | 0 | order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); |
866 | 0 | if (order == NULL) |
867 | 0 | goto err; |
868 | 0 | if (BN_is_zero(order)) { |
869 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); |
870 | 0 | goto err; |
871 | 0 | } |
872 | | |
873 | 0 | bits = BN_num_bits(order); |
874 | | /* |
875 | | * The following parameters mean we precompute (approximately) one point |
876 | | * per bit. TBD: The combination 8, 4 is perfect for 160 bits; for other |
877 | | * bit lengths, other parameter combinations might provide better |
878 | | * efficiency. |
879 | | */ |
880 | 0 | blocksize = 8; |
881 | 0 | w = 4; |
882 | 0 | if (EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits) > w) { |
883 | | /* let's not make the window too small ... */ |
884 | 0 | w = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); |
885 | 0 | } |
886 | |
|
887 | 0 | numblocks = (bits + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; /* max. number of blocks |
888 | | * to use for wNAF |
889 | | * splitting */ |
890 | |
|
891 | 0 | pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (w - 1); |
892 | 0 | num = pre_points_per_block * numblocks; /* number of points to compute |
893 | | * and store */ |
894 | |
|
895 | 0 | points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*points) * (num + 1)); |
896 | 0 | if (points == NULL) { |
897 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
898 | 0 | goto err; |
899 | 0 | } |
900 | | |
901 | 0 | var = points; |
902 | 0 | var[num] = NULL; /* pivot */ |
903 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
904 | 0 | if ((var[i] = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { |
905 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
906 | 0 | goto err; |
907 | 0 | } |
908 | 0 | } |
909 | | |
910 | 0 | if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL |
911 | 0 | || (base = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { |
912 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
913 | 0 | goto err; |
914 | 0 | } |
915 | | |
916 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_copy(base, generator)) |
917 | 0 | goto err; |
918 | | |
919 | | /* do the precomputation */ |
920 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < numblocks; i++) { |
921 | 0 | size_t j; |
922 | |
|
923 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp_point, base, ctx)) |
924 | 0 | goto err; |
925 | | |
926 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_copy(*var++, base)) |
927 | 0 | goto err; |
928 | | |
929 | 0 | for (j = 1; j < pre_points_per_block; j++, var++) { |
930 | | /* |
931 | | * calculate odd multiples of the current base point |
932 | | */ |
933 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_add(group, *var, tmp_point, *(var - 1), ctx)) |
934 | 0 | goto err; |
935 | 0 | } |
936 | | |
937 | 0 | if (i < numblocks - 1) { |
938 | | /* |
939 | | * get the next base (multiply current one by 2^blocksize) |
940 | | */ |
941 | 0 | size_t k; |
942 | |
|
943 | 0 | if (blocksize <= 2) { |
944 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
945 | 0 | goto err; |
946 | 0 | } |
947 | | |
948 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, tmp_point, ctx)) |
949 | 0 | goto err; |
950 | 0 | for (k = 2; k < blocksize; k++) { |
951 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, base, ctx)) |
952 | 0 | goto err; |
953 | 0 | } |
954 | 0 | } |
955 | 0 | } |
956 | | |
957 | 0 | if (group->meth->points_make_affine == NULL |
958 | 0 | || !group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx)) |
959 | 0 | goto err; |
960 | | |
961 | 0 | pre_comp->group = group; |
962 | 0 | pre_comp->blocksize = blocksize; |
963 | 0 | pre_comp->numblocks = numblocks; |
964 | 0 | pre_comp->w = w; |
965 | 0 | pre_comp->points = points; |
966 | 0 | points = NULL; |
967 | 0 | pre_comp->num = num; |
968 | 0 | SETPRECOMP(group, ec, pre_comp); |
969 | 0 | pre_comp = NULL; |
970 | 0 | ret = 1; |
971 | |
|
972 | 0 | err: |
973 | 0 | if (used_ctx) |
974 | 0 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
975 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
976 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); |
977 | 0 | #endif |
978 | 0 | EC_ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); |
979 | 0 | if (points) { |
980 | 0 | EC_POINT **p; |
981 | |
|
982 | 0 | for (p = points; *p != NULL; p++) |
983 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(*p); |
984 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(points); |
985 | 0 | } |
986 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); |
987 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(base); |
988 | 0 | return ret; |
989 | 0 | } |
990 | | |
991 | | int ossl_ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) |
992 | 0 | { |
993 | 0 | return HAVEPRECOMP(group, ec); |
994 | 0 | } |