/src/openssl30/providers/implementations/keymgmt/kdf_legacy_kmgmt.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * This implemments a dummy key manager for legacy KDFs that still support the |
12 | | * old way of performing a KDF via EVP_PKEY_derive(). New KDFs should not be |
13 | | * implemented this way. In reality there is no key data for such KDFs, so this |
14 | | * key manager does very little. |
15 | | */ |
16 | | |
17 | | #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
20 | | #include "prov/implementations.h" |
21 | | #include "prov/providercommon.h" |
22 | | #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" |
23 | | #include "prov/kdfexchange.h" |
24 | | |
25 | | static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_new_fn kdf_newdata; |
26 | | static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_free_fn kdf_freedata; |
27 | | static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn kdf_has; |
28 | | |
29 | | KDF_DATA *ossl_kdf_data_new(void *provctx) |
30 | 0 | { |
31 | 0 | KDF_DATA *kdfdata; |
32 | |
|
33 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
34 | 0 | return NULL; |
35 | | |
36 | 0 | kdfdata = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kdfdata)); |
37 | 0 | if (kdfdata == NULL) |
38 | 0 | return NULL; |
39 | | |
40 | 0 | kdfdata->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
41 | 0 | if (kdfdata->lock == NULL) { |
42 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(kdfdata); |
43 | 0 | return NULL; |
44 | 0 | } |
45 | 0 | kdfdata->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx); |
46 | 0 | kdfdata->refcnt = 1; |
47 | |
|
48 | 0 | return kdfdata; |
49 | 0 | } |
50 | | |
51 | | void ossl_kdf_data_free(KDF_DATA *kdfdata) |
52 | 0 | { |
53 | 0 | int ref = 0; |
54 | |
|
55 | 0 | if (kdfdata == NULL) |
56 | 0 | return; |
57 | | |
58 | 0 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&kdfdata->refcnt, &ref, kdfdata->lock); |
59 | 0 | if (ref > 0) |
60 | 0 | return; |
61 | | |
62 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(kdfdata->lock); |
63 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(kdfdata); |
64 | 0 | } |
65 | | |
66 | | int ossl_kdf_data_up_ref(KDF_DATA *kdfdata) |
67 | 0 | { |
68 | 0 | int ref = 0; |
69 | | |
70 | | /* This is effectively doing a new operation on the KDF_DATA and should be |
71 | | * adequately guarded again modules' error states. However, both current |
72 | | * calls here are guarded propery in exchange/kdf_exch.c. Thus, it |
73 | | * could be removed here. The concern is that something in the future |
74 | | * might call this function without adequate guards. It's a cheap call, |
75 | | * it seems best to leave it even though it is currently redundant. |
76 | | */ |
77 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
78 | 0 | return 0; |
79 | | |
80 | 0 | CRYPTO_UP_REF(&kdfdata->refcnt, &ref, kdfdata->lock); |
81 | 0 | return 1; |
82 | 0 | } |
83 | | |
84 | | static void *kdf_newdata(void *provctx) |
85 | 0 | { |
86 | 0 | return ossl_kdf_data_new(provctx); |
87 | 0 | } |
88 | | |
89 | | static void kdf_freedata(void *kdfdata) |
90 | 0 | { |
91 | 0 | ossl_kdf_data_free(kdfdata); |
92 | 0 | } |
93 | | |
94 | | static int kdf_has(const void *keydata, int selection) |
95 | 0 | { |
96 | 0 | return 1; /* nothing is missing */ |
97 | 0 | } |
98 | | |
99 | | const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions[] = { |
100 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_NEW, (void (*)(void))kdf_newdata }, |
101 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_FREE, (void (*)(void))kdf_freedata }, |
102 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_HAS, (void (*)(void))kdf_has }, |
103 | | { 0, NULL } |
104 | | }; |