/src/openssl30/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c

Source (jump to first uncovered line)
/*
 * Copyright 2011-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "drbg_local.h"

static OSSL_FUNC_rand_newctx_fn drbg_hmac_new_wrapper;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_freectx_fn drbg_hmac_free;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_instantiate_fn drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_uninstantiate_fn drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_generate_fn drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_reseed_fn drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_set_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_get_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_rand_verify_zeroization_fn drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization;

typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx;            /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
    PROV_DIGEST digest;          /* H(x) = hash(x) */
    size_t blocklen;
    unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
} PROV_DRBG_HMAC;

/*
 * Called twice by SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process.
 *
 * hmac is an object that holds the input/output Key and Value (K and V).
 * inbyte is 0x00 on the first call and 0x01 on the second call.
 * in1, in2, in3 are optional inputs that can be NULL.
 * in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers.
 *
 * The returned K,V is:
 *   hmac->K = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3])
 *   hmac->V = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V)
 *
 * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
 */
static int do_hmac(PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte,
                   const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
                   const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                   const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
{
    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;

    if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, NULL)
            /* K = HMAC(K, V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) */
            || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
            || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &inbyte, 1)
            || !(in1 == NULL || in1len == 0 || EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in1, in1len))
            || !(in2 == NULL || in2len == 0 || EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in2, in2len))
            || !(in3 == NULL || in3len == 0 || EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in3, in3len))
            || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL, sizeof(hmac->K)))
        return 0;

   /* V = HMAC(K, V) */
    return EVP_MAC_init(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, NULL)
           && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
           && EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL, sizeof(hmac->V));
}

/*
 * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process
 *
 *
 * Updates the drbg objects Key(K) and Value(V) using the following algorithm:
 *   K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 0, in1, in2, in3)
 *   if (any input is not NULL)
 *     K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 1, in1, in2, in3)
 *
 * where in1, in2, in3 are optional input buffers that can be NULL.
 *       in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers.
 *
 * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
 */
static int drbg_hmac_update(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                            const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
                            const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
                            const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
{
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;

    /* (Steps 1-2) K = HMAC(K, V||0x00||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
    if (!do_hmac(hmac, 0x00, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len))
        return 0;
    /* (Step 3) If provided_data == NULL then return (K,V) */
    if (in1len == 0 && in2len == 0 && in3len == 0)
        return 1;
    /* (Steps 4-5) K = HMAC(K, V||0x01||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
    return do_hmac(hmac, 0x01, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len);
}

/*
 * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.3 HMAC_DRBG_Instantiate_Process:
 *
 * This sets the drbg Key (K) to all zeros, and Value (V) to all 1's.
 * and then calls (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with input parameters:
 *   ent = entropy data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len.
 *   nonce = nonce data (Can be NULL) of length nonce_len.
 *   pstr = personalization data (Can be NULL) of length pstr_len.
 *
 * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
 */
static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                                 const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                                 const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
                                 const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
{
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;

    if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC);
        return 0;
    }

    /* (Step 2) Key = 0x00 00...00 */
    memset(hmac->K, 0x00, hmac->blocklen);
    /* (Step 3) V = 0x01 01...01 */
    memset(hmac->V, 0x01, hmac->blocklen);
    /* (Step 4) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||nonce||pers string, K, V) */
    return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr,
                            pstr_len);
}

static int drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg, unsigned int strength,
                                         int prediction_resistance,
                                         const unsigned char *pstr,
                                         size_t pstr_len,
                                         const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;

    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params(drbg, params))
        return 0;
    return ossl_prov_drbg_instantiate(drbg, strength, prediction_resistance,
                                      pstr, pstr_len);
}

/*
 * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.4 HMAC_DRBG_Reseed_Process:
 *
 * Reseeds the drbg's Key (K) and Value (V) by calling
 * (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with the following input parameters:
 *   ent = entropy input data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len.
 *   adin = additional input data (Can be NULL) of length adin_len.
 *
 * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
 */
static int drbg_hmac_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                            const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                            const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
{
    /* (Step 2) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||additional_input, K, V) */
    return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0);
}

static int drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper(void *vdrbg, int prediction_resistance,
                                    const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
                                    const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
{
    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;

    return ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, ent, ent_len,
                                 adin, adin_len);
}

/*
 * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.5 HMAC_DRBG_Generate_Process:
 *
 * Generates pseudo random bytes and updates the internal K,V for the drbg.
 * out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data.
 * adin is an additional_input string of size adin_len that may be NULL.
 *
 * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
 */
static int drbg_hmac_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
                              unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
                              const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
{
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
    const unsigned char *temp = hmac->V;

    /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
    if (adin != NULL
            && adin_len > 0
            && !drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
        return 0;

    /*
     * (Steps 3-5) temp = NULL
     *             while (len(temp) < outlen) {
     *                 V = HMAC(K, V)
     *                 temp = temp || V
     *             }
     */
    for (;;) {
        if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, NULL)
            || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen))
            return 0;

        if (outlen > hmac->blocklen) {
            if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, outlen))
                return 0;
            temp = out;
        } else {
            if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL, sizeof(hmac->V)))
                return 0;
            memcpy(out, hmac->V, outlen);
            break;
        }
        out += hmac->blocklen;
        outlen -= hmac->blocklen;
    }
    /* (Step 6) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
    if (!drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
        return 0;

    return 1;
}

static int drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper
    (void *vdrbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned int strength,
     int prediction_resistance, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
{
    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;

    return ossl_prov_drbg_generate(drbg, out, outlen, strength,
                                   prediction_resistance, adin, adin_len);
}

static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
{
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;

    OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac->K, sizeof(hmac->K));
    OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac->V, sizeof(hmac->V));
    return ossl_prov_drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
}

static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg)
{
    return drbg_hmac_uninstantiate((PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg);
}

static int drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
{
    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;

    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hmac->K);
    PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hmac->V);
    return 1;
}

static int drbg_hmac_new(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
{
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac;

    hmac = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*hmac));
    if (hmac == NULL) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        return 0;
    }

    drbg->data = hmac;
    /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
    drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
    drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
    drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
    drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;

    /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19  = 2^16 bytes */
    drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
    return 1;
}

static void *drbg_hmac_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
                                   const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
{
    return ossl_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch,
                              &drbg_hmac_new, &drbg_hmac_free,
                              &drbg_hmac_instantiate, &drbg_hmac_uninstantiate,
                              &drbg_hmac_reseed, &drbg_hmac_generate);
}

static void drbg_hmac_free(void *vdrbg)
{
    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac;

    if (drbg != NULL && (hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data) != NULL) {
        EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hmac->ctx);
        ossl_prov_digest_reset(&hmac->digest);
        OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(hmac, sizeof(*hmac));
    }
    ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
}

static int drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
    PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data;
    const char *name;
    const EVP_MD *md;
    OSSL_PARAM *p;

    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC);
    if (p != NULL) {
        if (hmac->ctx == NULL)
            return 0;
        name = EVP_MAC_get0_name(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(hmac->ctx));
        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, name))
            return 0;
    }

    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST);
    if (p != NULL) {
        md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&hmac->digest);
        if (md == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, EVP_MD_get0_name(md)))
            return 0;
    }

    return ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
}

static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx,
                                                       ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
{
    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETTABLE_CTX_COMMON,
        OSSL_PARAM_END
    };
    return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}

static int drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
    PROV_DRBG *ctx = (PROV_DRBG *)vctx;
    PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)ctx->data;
    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
    const EVP_MD *md;

    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&hmac->digest, params, libctx))
        return 0;

    /*
     * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF
     * (such as SHAKE).  In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved
     * digests.
     */
    md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&hmac->digest);
    if (md != NULL && (EVP_MD_get_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XOF_DIGESTS_NOT_ALLOWED);
        return 0;
    }

    if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&hmac->ctx, params,
                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx))
        return 0;

    if (hmac->ctx != NULL) {
        /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
        hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
        /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
        ctx->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3);
        if (ctx->strength > 256)
            ctx->strength = 256;
        ctx->seedlen = hmac->blocklen;
        ctx->min_entropylen = ctx->strength / 8;
        ctx->min_noncelen = ctx->min_entropylen / 2;
    }

    return ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
}

static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx,
                                                       ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
{
    static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
        OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETTABLE_CTX_COMMON,
        OSSL_PARAM_END
    };
    return known_settable_ctx_params;
}

const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_drbg_ossl_hmac_functions[] = {
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_new_wrapper },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_free },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_INSTANTIATE,
      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNINSTANTIATE,
      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_enable_locking },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_lock },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_unlock },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_VERIFY_ZEROIZATION,
      (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_SEED, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_get_seed },
    { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_CLEAR_SEED, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_clear_seed },
    { 0, NULL }
};

Coverage Report

Created: 2025-06-13 06:58

Line	Count	Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1		/*
2		* Copyright 2011-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3		*
4		* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5		* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6		* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7		* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8		*/
9
10		#include <stdlib.h>
11		#include <string.h>
12		#include <openssl/crypto.h>
13		#include <openssl/err.h>
14		#include <openssl/rand.h>
15		#include <openssl/proverr.h>
16		#include "prov/provider_util.h"
17		#include "internal/thread_once.h"
18		#include "prov/providercommon.h"
19		#include "prov/implementations.h"
20		#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
21		#include "drbg_local.h"
22
23		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_newctx_fn drbg_hmac_new_wrapper;
24		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_freectx_fn drbg_hmac_free;
25		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_instantiate_fn drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper;
26		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_uninstantiate_fn drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper;
27		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_generate_fn drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper;
28		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_reseed_fn drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper;
29		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params;
30		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_set_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params;
31		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params;
32		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_get_ctx_params_fn drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params;
33		static OSSL_FUNC_rand_verify_zeroization_fn drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization;
34
35		typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
36		EVP_MAC_CTX ctx; / H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
37		PROV_DIGEST digest; /* H(x) = hash(x) */
38		size_t blocklen;
39		unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
40		unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
41		} PROV_DRBG_HMAC;
42
43		/*
44		* Called twice by SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process.
45		*
46		* hmac is an object that holds the input/output Key and Value (K and V).
47		* inbyte is 0x00 on the first call and 0x01 on the second call.
48		* in1, in2, in3 are optional inputs that can be NULL.
49		* in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers.
50		*
51		* The returned K,V is:
52		* hmac->K = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V \|\| inbyte \|\| [in1] \|\| [in2] \|\| [in3])
53		* hmac->V = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V)
54		*
55		* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
56		*/
57		static int do_hmac(PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte,
58		const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
59		const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
60		const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
61	596	{
62	596	EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
63
64	596	if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, NULL)
65		/* K = HMAC(K, V \|\| inbyte \|\| [in1] \|\| [in2] \|\| [in3]) */
66	596	\|\| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
67	596	\|\| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &inbyte, 1)
68	596	\|\| !(in1 == NULL \|\| in1len == 0 \|\| EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in1, in1len))
69	596	\|\| !(in2 == NULL \|\| in2len == 0 \|\| EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in2, in2len))
70	596	\|\| !(in3 == NULL \|\| in3len == 0 \|\| EVP_MAC_update(ctx, in3, in3len))
71	596	\|\| !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL, sizeof(hmac->K)))
72	4	return 0;
73
74		/* V = HMAC(K, V) */
75	592	return EVP_MAC_init(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, NULL)
76	592	&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
77	592	&& EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL, sizeof(hmac->V));
78	596	}
79
80		/*
81		* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process
82		*
83		*
84		* Updates the drbg objects Key(K) and Value(V) using the following algorithm:
85		* K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 0, in1, in2, in3)
86		* if (any input is not NULL)
87		* K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 1, in1, in2, in3)
88		*
89		* where in1, in2, in3 are optional input buffers that can be NULL.
90		* in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers.
91		*
92		* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
93		*/
94		static int drbg_hmac_update(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
95		const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
96		const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
97		const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
98	380	{
99	380	PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )drbg->data;
100
101		/* (Steps 1-2) K = HMAC(K, V\|\|0x00\|\|provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
102	380	if (!do_hmac(hmac, 0x00, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len))
103	4	return 0;
104		/* (Step 3) If provided_data == NULL then return (K,V) */
105	376	if (in1len == 0 && in2len == 0 && in3len == 0)
106	160	return 1;
107		/* (Steps 4-5) K = HMAC(K, V\|\|0x01\|\|provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
108	216	return do_hmac(hmac, 0x01, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len);
109	376	}
110
111		/*
112		* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.3 HMAC_DRBG_Instantiate_Process:
113		*
114		* This sets the drbg Key (K) to all zeros, and Value (V) to all 1's.
115		* and then calls (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with input parameters:
116		* ent = entropy data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len.
117		* nonce = nonce data (Can be NULL) of length nonce_len.
118		* pstr = personalization data (Can be NULL) of length pstr_len.
119		*
120		* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
121		*/
122		static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
123		const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
124		const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
125		const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
126		{
127		PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )drbg->data;
128
129		if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
130		ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC);
131		return 0;
132		}
133
134		/* (Step 2) Key = 0x00 00...00 */
135		memset(hmac->K, 0x00, hmac->blocklen);
136		/* (Step 3) V = 0x01 01...01 */
137		memset(hmac->V, 0x01, hmac->blocklen);
138		/* (Step 4) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy\|\|nonce\|\|pers string, K, V) */
139		return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr,
140		pstr_len);
141		}
142
143		static int drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg, unsigned int strength,
144		int prediction_resistance,
145		const unsigned char *pstr,
146		size_t pstr_len,
147		const OSSL_PARAM params[])
148	0	{
149	0	PROV_DRBG drbg = (PROV_DRBG )vdrbg;
150
151	0	if (!ossl_prov_is_running() \|\| !drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params(drbg, params))
152	0	return 0;
153	0	return ossl_prov_drbg_instantiate(drbg, strength, prediction_resistance,
154	0	pstr, pstr_len);
155	0	}
156
157		/*
158		* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.4 HMAC_DRBG_Reseed_Process:
159		*
160		* Reseeds the drbg's Key (K) and Value (V) by calling
161		* (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with the following input parameters:
162		* ent = entropy input data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len.
163		* adin = additional input data (Can be NULL) of length adin_len.
164		*
165		* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
166		*/
167		static int drbg_hmac_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
168		const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
169		const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
170	49	{
171		/* (Step 2) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy\|\|additional_input, K, V) */
172	49	return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0);
173	49	}
174
175		static int drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper(void *vdrbg, int prediction_resistance,
176		const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
177		const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
178	37	{
179	37	PROV_DRBG drbg = (PROV_DRBG )vdrbg;
180
181	37	return ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, ent, ent_len,
182	37	adin, adin_len);
183	37	}
184
185		/*
186		* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.5 HMAC_DRBG_Generate_Process:
187		*
188		* Generates pseudo random bytes and updates the internal K,V for the drbg.
189		* out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data.
190		* adin is an additional_input string of size adin_len that may be NULL.
191		*
192		* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
193		*/
194		static int drbg_hmac_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
195		unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
196		const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
197	0	{
198	0	PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )drbg->data;
199	0	EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
200	0	const unsigned char *temp = hmac->V;
201
202		/* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
203	0	if (adin != NULL
204	0	&& adin_len > 0
205	0	&& !drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
206	0	return 0;
207
208		/*
209		* (Steps 3-5) temp = NULL
210		* while (len(temp) < outlen) {
211		* V = HMAC(K, V)
212		* temp = temp \|\| V
213		* }
214		*/
215	0	for (;;) {
216	0	if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, NULL)
217	0	\|\| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen))
218	0	return 0;
219
220	0	if (outlen > hmac->blocklen) {
221	0	if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, outlen))
222	0	return 0;
223	0	temp = out;
224	0	} else {
225	0	if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL, sizeof(hmac->V)))
226	0	return 0;
227	0	memcpy(out, hmac->V, outlen);
228	0	break;
229	0	}
230	0	out += hmac->blocklen;
231	0	outlen -= hmac->blocklen;
232	0	}
233		/* (Step 6) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
234	0	if (!drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
235	0	return 0;
236
237	0	return 1;
238	0	}
239
240		static int drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper
241		(void vdrbg, unsigned char out, size_t outlen, unsigned int strength,
242		int prediction_resistance, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
243	48	{
244	48	PROV_DRBG drbg = (PROV_DRBG )vdrbg;
245
246	48	return ossl_prov_drbg_generate(drbg, out, outlen, strength,
247	48	prediction_resistance, adin, adin_len);
248	48	}
249
250		static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
251	0	{
252	0	PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )drbg->data;
253
254	0	OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac->K, sizeof(hmac->K));
255	0	OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac->V, sizeof(hmac->V));
256	0	return ossl_prov_drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
257	0	}
258
259		static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper(void *vdrbg)
260	0	{
261	0	return drbg_hmac_uninstantiate((PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg);
262	0	}
263
264		static int drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
265	0	{
266	0	PROV_DRBG drbg = (PROV_DRBG )vdrbg;
267	0	PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )drbg->data;
268
269	0	PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hmac->K);
270	0	PROV_DRBG_VERYIFY_ZEROIZATION(hmac->V);
271	0	return 1;
272	0	}
273
274		static int drbg_hmac_new(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
275	64	{
276	64	PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac;
277
278	64	hmac = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*hmac));
279	64	if (hmac == NULL) {
280	0	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281	0	return 0;
282	0	}
283
284	64	drbg->data = hmac;
285		/* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
286	64	drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
287	64	drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
288	64	drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
289	64	drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
290
291		/* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes */
292	64	drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
293	64	return 1;
294	64	}
295
296		static void drbg_hmac_new_wrapper(void provctx, void *parent,
297		const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
298	64	{
299	64	return ossl_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch,
300	64	&drbg_hmac_new, &drbg_hmac_free,
301	64	&drbg_hmac_instantiate, &drbg_hmac_uninstantiate,
302	64	&drbg_hmac_reseed, &drbg_hmac_generate);
303	64	}
304
305		static void drbg_hmac_free(void *vdrbg)
306	64	{
307	64	PROV_DRBG drbg = (PROV_DRBG )vdrbg;
308	64	PROV_DRBG_HMAC *hmac;
309
310	64	if (drbg != NULL && (hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC *)drbg->data) != NULL) {
311	64	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hmac->ctx);
312	64	ossl_prov_digest_reset(&hmac->digest);
313	64	OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(hmac, sizeof(*hmac));
314	64	}
315	64	ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
316	64	}
317
318		static int drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
319		{
320		PROV_DRBG drbg = (PROV_DRBG )vdrbg;
321		PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )drbg->data;
322		const char *name;
323		const EVP_MD *md;
324		OSSL_PARAM *p;
325
326		p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC);
327		if (p != NULL) {
328		if (hmac->ctx == NULL)
329		return 0;
330		name = EVP_MAC_get0_name(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(hmac->ctx));
331		if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, name))
332		return 0;
333		}
334
335		p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST);
336		if (p != NULL) {
337		md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&hmac->digest);
338		if (md == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, EVP_MD_get0_name(md)))
339		return 0;
340		}
341
342		return ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
343		}
344
345		static const OSSL_PARAM drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void vctx,
346		ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
347	0	{
348	0	static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
349	0	OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
350	0	OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
351	0	OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETTABLE_CTX_COMMON,
352	0	OSSL_PARAM_END
353	0	};
354	0	return known_gettable_ctx_params;
355	0	}
356
357		static int drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
358		{
359		PROV_DRBG ctx = (PROV_DRBG )vctx;
360		PROV_DRBG_HMAC hmac = (PROV_DRBG_HMAC )ctx->data;
361		OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
362		const EVP_MD *md;
363
364		if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&hmac->digest, params, libctx))
365		return 0;
366
367		/*
368		* Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF
369		* (such as SHAKE). In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved
370		* digests.
371		*/
372		md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&hmac->digest);
373		if (md != NULL && (EVP_MD_get_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) {
374		ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XOF_DIGESTS_NOT_ALLOWED);
375		return 0;
376		}
377
378		if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&hmac->ctx, params,
379		NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx))
380		return 0;
381
382		if (hmac->ctx != NULL) {
383		/* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
384		hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
385		/* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
386		ctx->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3);
387		if (ctx->strength > 256)
388		ctx->strength = 256;
389		ctx->seedlen = hmac->blocklen;
390		ctx->min_entropylen = ctx->strength / 8;
391		ctx->min_noncelen = ctx->min_entropylen / 2;
392		}
393
394		return ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
395		}
396
397		static const OSSL_PARAM drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void vctx,
398		ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
399	64	{
400	64	static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
401	64	OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
402	64	OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
403	64	OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
404	64	OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETTABLE_CTX_COMMON,
405	64	OSSL_PARAM_END
406	64	};
407	64	return known_settable_ctx_params;
408	64	}
409
410		const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_drbg_ossl_hmac_functions[] = {
411		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_new_wrapper },
412		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_free },
413		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_INSTANTIATE,
414		(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_instantiate_wrapper },
415		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNINSTANTIATE,
416		(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper },
417		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper },
418		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper },
419		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_enable_locking },
420		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_lock },
421		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_unlock },
422		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
423		(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params },
424		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params },
425		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
426		(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params },
427		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params },
428		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_VERIFY_ZEROIZATION,
429		(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_verify_zeroization },
430		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GET_SEED, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_get_seed },
431		{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_CLEAR_SEED, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_clear_seed },
432		{ 0, NULL }
433		};