/src/openssl30/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
4 | | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
5 | | * |
6 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
7 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
8 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
9 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
10 | | */ |
11 | | |
12 | | #include <stdio.h> |
13 | | #include <ctype.h> |
14 | | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
15 | | #include <openssl/comp.h> |
16 | | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
17 | | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/conf.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
20 | | #include "internal/nelem.h" |
21 | | #include "ssl_local.h" |
22 | | #include "internal/thread_once.h" |
23 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
24 | | |
25 | | /* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ |
26 | | |
27 | | typedef struct { |
28 | | uint32_t mask; |
29 | | int nid; |
30 | | } ssl_cipher_table; |
31 | | |
32 | | /* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ |
33 | | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { |
34 | | {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ |
35 | | {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ |
36 | | {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ |
37 | | {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ |
38 | | {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ |
39 | | {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ |
40 | | {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ |
41 | | {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ |
42 | | {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ |
43 | | {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ |
44 | | {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ |
45 | | {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ |
46 | | {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ |
47 | | {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ |
48 | | {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ |
49 | | {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ |
50 | | {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ |
51 | | {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ |
52 | | {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 */ |
53 | | {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, /* SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 */ |
54 | | {SSL_ARIA128GCM, NID_aria_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 */ |
55 | | {SSL_ARIA256GCM, NID_aria_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 */ |
56 | | {SSL_MAGMA, NID_magma_ctr_acpkm}, /* SSL_ENC_MAGMA_IDX */ |
57 | | {SSL_KUZNYECHIK, NID_kuznyechik_ctr_acpkm}, /* SSL_ENC_KUZNYECHIK_IDX */ |
58 | | }; |
59 | | |
60 | | #define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 |
61 | 0 | #define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 |
62 | | #define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 |
63 | | |
64 | | static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; |
65 | | |
66 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
67 | | static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; |
68 | | #endif |
69 | | |
70 | | /* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ |
71 | | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { |
72 | | {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ |
73 | | {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ |
74 | | {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ |
75 | | {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ |
76 | | {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ |
77 | | {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ |
78 | | {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ |
79 | | {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ |
80 | | {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ |
81 | | {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ |
82 | | {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ |
83 | | {0, NID_sha512}, /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ |
84 | | {SSL_MAGMAOMAC, NID_magma_mac}, /* sSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX */ |
85 | | {SSL_KUZNYECHIKOMAC, NID_kuznyechik_mac} /* SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX */ |
86 | | }; |
87 | | |
88 | | /* *INDENT-OFF* */ |
89 | | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { |
90 | | {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, |
91 | | {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, |
92 | | {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, |
93 | | {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, |
94 | | {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, |
95 | | {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, |
96 | | {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, |
97 | | {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, |
98 | | {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost}, |
99 | | {SSL_kGOST18, NID_kx_gost18}, |
100 | | {SSL_kANY, NID_kx_any} |
101 | | }; |
102 | | |
103 | | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { |
104 | | {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, |
105 | | {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, |
106 | | {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, |
107 | | {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, |
108 | | {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, |
109 | | {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, |
110 | | {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, |
111 | | {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null}, |
112 | | {SSL_aANY, NID_auth_any} |
113 | | }; |
114 | | /* *INDENT-ON* */ |
115 | | |
116 | | /* Utility function for table lookup */ |
117 | | static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, |
118 | | size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) |
119 | 48.4k | { |
120 | 48.4k | size_t i; |
121 | 543k | for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { |
122 | 527k | if (table->mask == mask) |
123 | 33.0k | return (int)i; |
124 | 527k | } |
125 | 15.4k | return -1; |
126 | 48.4k | } |
127 | | |
128 | | #define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ |
129 | 38.0k | ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) |
130 | | |
131 | | /* |
132 | | * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation |
133 | | * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is |
134 | | * found |
135 | | */ |
136 | | static const int default_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { |
137 | | /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ |
138 | | EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, |
139 | | /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ |
140 | | EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, |
141 | | /* GOST2012_512 */ |
142 | | EVP_PKEY_HMAC, |
143 | | /* MD5/SHA1, SHA224, SHA512, MAGMAOMAC, KUZNYECHIKOMAC */ |
144 | | NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef |
145 | | }; |
146 | | |
147 | 138M | #define CIPHER_ADD 1 |
148 | 6.45M | #define CIPHER_KILL 2 |
149 | 64.9M | #define CIPHER_DEL 3 |
150 | 84.7M | #define CIPHER_ORD 4 |
151 | 317k | #define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 |
152 | | /* |
153 | | * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. |
154 | | * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. |
155 | | */ |
156 | 38.3M | #define CIPHER_BUMP 6 |
157 | | |
158 | | typedef struct cipher_order_st { |
159 | | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
160 | | int active; |
161 | | int dead; |
162 | | struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; |
163 | | } CIPHER_ORDER; |
164 | | |
165 | | static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { |
166 | | /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ |
167 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, |
168 | | /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ |
169 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, |
170 | | |
171 | | /* |
172 | | * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in |
173 | | * ALL!) |
174 | | */ |
175 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, |
176 | | |
177 | | /* |
178 | | * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here |
179 | | * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE |
180 | | * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) |
181 | | */ |
182 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA}, |
183 | | |
184 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, |
185 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, |
186 | | {0, SSL_TXT_DH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, |
187 | | |
188 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, |
189 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, |
190 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, |
191 | | |
192 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kPSK}, |
193 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, |
194 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, |
195 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, |
196 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, |
197 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST}, |
198 | | {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST18, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST18}, |
199 | | |
200 | | /* server authentication aliases */ |
201 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, |
202 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, |
203 | | {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, |
204 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, |
205 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, |
206 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, |
207 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, |
208 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, |
209 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, |
210 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, |
211 | | {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, |
212 | | |
213 | | /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ |
214 | | {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, |
215 | | {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, |
216 | | {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, |
217 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, |
218 | | {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, |
219 | | {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, |
220 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, |
221 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, |
222 | | {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, NULL, 0, SSL_PSK}, |
223 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, |
224 | | |
225 | | /* symmetric encryption aliases */ |
226 | | {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, |
227 | | {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, |
228 | | {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, |
229 | | {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, |
230 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, |
231 | | {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, |
232 | | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, NULL, 0, 0, 0, |
233 | | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 | SSL_MAGMA | SSL_KUZNYECHIK}, |
234 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, |
235 | | SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, |
236 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, |
237 | | SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, |
238 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, |
239 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, |
240 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, |
241 | | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, |
242 | | {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, |
243 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, |
244 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, |
245 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, |
246 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, |
247 | | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST2012_GOST8912_GOST8912, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, |
248 | | |
249 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA}, |
250 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM}, |
251 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM}, |
252 | | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA256GCM}, |
253 | | {0, SSL_TXT_CBC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CBC}, |
254 | | |
255 | | /* MAC aliases */ |
256 | | {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, |
257 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, |
258 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, |
259 | | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, |
260 | | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, |
261 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, |
262 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, |
263 | | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, |
264 | | |
265 | | /* protocol version aliases */ |
266 | | {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, |
267 | | {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, |
268 | | {0, "TLSv1.0", NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, |
269 | | {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, |
270 | | |
271 | | /* strength classes */ |
272 | | {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, |
273 | | {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, |
274 | | {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, |
275 | | /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ |
276 | | {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, |
277 | | |
278 | | /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ |
279 | | {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, |
280 | | SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, |
281 | | {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, |
282 | | SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, |
283 | | |
284 | | }; |
285 | | |
286 | | /* |
287 | | * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if |
288 | | * it is available. Otherwise return 0 |
289 | | */ |
290 | | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
291 | | |
292 | | static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) |
293 | | { |
294 | | const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; |
295 | | int pkey_id = 0; |
296 | | ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); |
297 | | if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, |
298 | | ameth) > 0) |
299 | | return pkey_id; |
300 | | return 0; |
301 | | } |
302 | | |
303 | | #else |
304 | | |
305 | | static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) |
306 | 555k | { |
307 | 555k | const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; |
308 | 555k | ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; |
309 | 555k | int pkey_id = 0; |
310 | 555k | ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); |
311 | 555k | if (ameth) { |
312 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, |
313 | 0 | ameth) <= 0) |
314 | 0 | pkey_id = 0; |
315 | 0 | } |
316 | 555k | tls_engine_finish(tmpeng); |
317 | 555k | return pkey_id; |
318 | 555k | } |
319 | | |
320 | | #endif |
321 | | |
322 | | int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
323 | 48.2k | { |
324 | 48.2k | size_t i; |
325 | 48.2k | const ssl_cipher_table *t; |
326 | 48.2k | EVP_KEYEXCH *kex = NULL; |
327 | 48.2k | EVP_SIGNATURE *sig = NULL; |
328 | | |
329 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_enc_mask = 0; |
330 | 1.20M | for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { |
331 | 1.15M | if (t->nid != NID_undef) { |
332 | 1.11M | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher |
333 | 1.11M | = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, t->nid, ctx->propq); |
334 | | |
335 | 1.11M | ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; |
336 | 1.11M | if (cipher == NULL) |
337 | 434k | ctx->disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; |
338 | 1.11M | } |
339 | 1.15M | } |
340 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mac_mask = 0; |
341 | 724k | for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { |
342 | 675k | const EVP_MD *md |
343 | 675k | = ssl_evp_md_fetch(ctx->libctx, t->nid, ctx->propq); |
344 | | |
345 | 675k | ctx->ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; |
346 | 675k | if (md == NULL) { |
347 | 337k | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; |
348 | 337k | } else { |
349 | 337k | int tmpsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md); |
350 | 337k | if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize >= 0)) |
351 | 0 | return 0; |
352 | 337k | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize; |
353 | 337k | } |
354 | 675k | } |
355 | | |
356 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0; |
357 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0; |
358 | | |
359 | | /* |
360 | | * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail |
361 | | * if theose algorithms are not available. |
362 | | */ |
363 | 48.2k | ERR_set_mark(); |
364 | 48.2k | sig = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, "DSA", ctx->propq); |
365 | 48.2k | if (sig == NULL) |
366 | 0 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; |
367 | 48.2k | else |
368 | 48.2k | EVP_SIGNATURE_free(sig); |
369 | 48.2k | kex = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(ctx->libctx, "DH", ctx->propq); |
370 | 48.2k | if (kex == NULL) |
371 | 0 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; |
372 | 48.2k | else |
373 | 48.2k | EVP_KEYEXCH_free(kex); |
374 | 48.2k | kex = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(ctx->libctx, "ECDH", ctx->propq); |
375 | 48.2k | if (kex == NULL) |
376 | 0 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK; |
377 | 48.2k | else |
378 | 48.2k | EVP_KEYEXCH_free(kex); |
379 | 48.2k | sig = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, "ECDSA", ctx->propq); |
380 | 48.2k | if (sig == NULL) |
381 | 0 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; |
382 | 48.2k | else |
383 | 48.2k | EVP_SIGNATURE_free(sig); |
384 | 48.2k | ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
385 | | |
386 | | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
387 | | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; |
388 | | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; |
389 | | #endif |
390 | | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
391 | | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; |
392 | | #endif |
393 | | |
394 | | /* |
395 | | * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not |
396 | | * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange |
397 | | */ |
398 | 48.2k | memcpy(ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id, default_mac_pkey_id, |
399 | 48.2k | sizeof(ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id)); |
400 | | |
401 | 48.2k | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = |
402 | 48.2k | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC); |
403 | 48.2k | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) |
404 | 0 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; |
405 | 48.2k | else |
406 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; |
407 | | |
408 | 48.2k | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = |
409 | 48.2k | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_gost_mac_12); |
410 | 48.2k | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) |
411 | 0 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; |
412 | 48.2k | else |
413 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; |
414 | | |
415 | 48.2k | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX] = |
416 | 48.2k | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_magma_mac); |
417 | 48.2k | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX]) |
418 | 0 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX] = 32; |
419 | 48.2k | else |
420 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_MAGMAOMAC; |
421 | | |
422 | 48.2k | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX] = |
423 | 48.2k | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_kuznyechik_mac); |
424 | 48.2k | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX]) |
425 | 0 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX] = 32; |
426 | 48.2k | else |
427 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_KUZNYECHIKOMAC; |
428 | | |
429 | 48.2k | if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2001)) |
430 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; |
431 | 48.2k | if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) |
432 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; |
433 | 48.2k | if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2012_512)) |
434 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; |
435 | | /* |
436 | | * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * |
437 | | */ |
438 | 48.2k | if ((ctx->disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == |
439 | 48.2k | (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) |
440 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; |
441 | | |
442 | 48.2k | if ((ctx->disabled_auth_mask & SSL_aGOST12) == SSL_aGOST12) |
443 | 48.2k | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST18; |
444 | | |
445 | 48.2k | return 1; |
446 | 48.2k | } |
447 | | |
448 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
449 | | |
450 | | static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) |
451 | 0 | { |
452 | 0 | return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); |
453 | 0 | } |
454 | | |
455 | | DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions) |
456 | 20 | { |
457 | 20 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; |
458 | 20 | COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib(); |
459 | | |
460 | 20 | ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); |
461 | | |
462 | 20 | if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { |
463 | 0 | comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); |
464 | 0 | if (comp != NULL) { |
465 | 0 | comp->method = method; |
466 | 0 | comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; |
467 | 0 | comp->name = COMP_get_name(method); |
468 | 0 | if (!sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) |
469 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(comp); |
470 | 0 | sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); |
471 | 0 | } |
472 | 0 | } |
473 | 20 | return 1; |
474 | 20 | } |
475 | | |
476 | | static int load_builtin_compressions(void) |
477 | 54.9k | { |
478 | 54.9k | return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions); |
479 | 54.9k | } |
480 | | #endif |
481 | | |
482 | | int ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_CIPHER *sslc, |
483 | | const EVP_CIPHER **enc) |
484 | 24.2k | { |
485 | 24.2k | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, sslc->algorithm_enc); |
486 | | |
487 | 24.2k | if (i == -1) { |
488 | 0 | *enc = NULL; |
489 | 24.2k | } else { |
490 | 24.2k | if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) { |
491 | | /* |
492 | | * We assume we don't care about this coming from an ENGINE so |
493 | | * just do a normal EVP_CIPHER_fetch instead of |
494 | | * ssl_evp_cipher_fetch() |
495 | | */ |
496 | 3.56k | *enc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ctx->libctx, "NULL", ctx->propq); |
497 | 3.56k | if (*enc == NULL) |
498 | 0 | return 0; |
499 | 20.6k | } else { |
500 | 20.6k | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i]; |
501 | | |
502 | 20.6k | if (cipher == NULL |
503 | 20.6k | || !ssl_evp_cipher_up_ref(cipher)) |
504 | 0 | return 0; |
505 | 20.6k | *enc = ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i]; |
506 | 20.6k | } |
507 | 24.2k | } |
508 | 24.2k | return 1; |
509 | 24.2k | } |
510 | | |
511 | | int ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_SESSION *s, |
512 | | const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, |
513 | | int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size, |
514 | | SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) |
515 | 13.7k | { |
516 | 13.7k | int i; |
517 | 13.7k | const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
518 | | |
519 | 13.7k | c = s->cipher; |
520 | 13.7k | if (c == NULL) |
521 | 0 | return 0; |
522 | 13.7k | if (comp != NULL) { |
523 | 6.60k | SSL_COMP ctmp; |
524 | 6.60k | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
525 | 6.60k | if (!load_builtin_compressions()) { |
526 | | /* |
527 | | * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that |
528 | | * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK |
529 | | */ |
530 | 0 | } |
531 | 6.60k | #endif |
532 | 6.60k | *comp = NULL; |
533 | 6.60k | ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; |
534 | 6.60k | if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { |
535 | 6.60k | i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); |
536 | 6.60k | if (i >= 0) |
537 | 0 | *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); |
538 | 6.60k | } |
539 | | /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ |
540 | 6.60k | if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) |
541 | 6 | return 1; |
542 | 6.60k | } |
543 | | |
544 | 13.7k | if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) |
545 | 0 | return 0; |
546 | | |
547 | 13.7k | if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(ctx, c, enc)) |
548 | 0 | return 0; |
549 | | |
550 | 13.7k | i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); |
551 | 13.7k | if (i == -1) { |
552 | 8.59k | *md = NULL; |
553 | 8.59k | if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) |
554 | 1.43k | *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; |
555 | 8.59k | if (mac_secret_size != NULL) |
556 | 1.43k | *mac_secret_size = 0; |
557 | 8.59k | if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) |
558 | 8.59k | mac_pkey_type = NULL; |
559 | 8.59k | } else { |
560 | 5.15k | const EVP_MD *digest = ctx->ssl_digest_methods[i]; |
561 | | |
562 | 5.15k | if (digest == NULL |
563 | 5.15k | || !ssl_evp_md_up_ref(digest)) { |
564 | 0 | ssl_evp_cipher_free(*enc); |
565 | 0 | return 0; |
566 | 0 | } |
567 | 5.15k | *md = digest; |
568 | 5.15k | if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) |
569 | 3.97k | *mac_pkey_type = ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; |
570 | 5.15k | if (mac_secret_size != NULL) |
571 | 3.97k | *mac_secret_size = ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; |
572 | 5.15k | } |
573 | | |
574 | 13.7k | if ((*enc != NULL) |
575 | 13.7k | && (*md != NULL |
576 | 13.7k | || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) |
577 | 13.7k | && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { |
578 | 13.7k | const EVP_CIPHER *evp = NULL; |
579 | | |
580 | 13.7k | if (use_etm |
581 | 13.7k | || s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR |
582 | 13.7k | || s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) |
583 | 1.60k | return 1; |
584 | | |
585 | 12.1k | if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 |
586 | 12.1k | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5) |
587 | 0 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, NID_rc4_hmac_md5, |
588 | 0 | ctx->propq); |
589 | 12.1k | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 |
590 | 12.1k | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) |
591 | 142 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, |
592 | 142 | NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, |
593 | 142 | ctx->propq); |
594 | 12.0k | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 |
595 | 12.0k | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) |
596 | 491 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, |
597 | 491 | NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1, |
598 | 491 | ctx->propq); |
599 | 11.5k | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 |
600 | 11.5k | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) |
601 | 824 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, |
602 | 824 | NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256, |
603 | 824 | ctx->propq); |
604 | 10.6k | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 |
605 | 10.6k | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) |
606 | 127 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, |
607 | 127 | NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256, |
608 | 127 | ctx->propq); |
609 | | |
610 | 12.1k | if (evp != NULL) { |
611 | 1.58k | ssl_evp_cipher_free(*enc); |
612 | 1.58k | ssl_evp_md_free(*md); |
613 | 1.58k | *enc = evp; |
614 | 1.58k | *md = NULL; |
615 | 1.58k | } |
616 | 12.1k | return 1; |
617 | 13.7k | } |
618 | | |
619 | 0 | return 0; |
620 | 13.7k | } |
621 | | |
622 | | const EVP_MD *ssl_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
623 | 1.99M | { |
624 | 1.99M | idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; |
625 | 1.99M | if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) |
626 | 0 | return NULL; |
627 | 1.99M | return ctx->ssl_digest_methods[idx]; |
628 | 1.99M | } |
629 | | |
630 | | const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s) |
631 | 186k | { |
632 | 186k | return ssl_md(s->ctx, ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); |
633 | 186k | } |
634 | | |
635 | | const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s) |
636 | 27.5k | { |
637 | 27.5k | return ssl_md(s->ctx, ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); |
638 | 27.5k | } |
639 | | |
640 | | #define ITEM_SEP(a) \ |
641 | 244k | (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) |
642 | | |
643 | | static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, |
644 | | CIPHER_ORDER **tail) |
645 | 67.1M | { |
646 | 67.1M | if (curr == *tail) |
647 | 114k | return; |
648 | 66.9M | if (curr == *head) |
649 | 23.1M | *head = curr->next; |
650 | 66.9M | if (curr->prev != NULL) |
651 | 43.8M | curr->prev->next = curr->next; |
652 | 66.9M | if (curr->next != NULL) |
653 | 66.9M | curr->next->prev = curr->prev; |
654 | 66.9M | (*tail)->next = curr; |
655 | 66.9M | curr->prev = *tail; |
656 | 66.9M | curr->next = NULL; |
657 | 66.9M | *tail = curr; |
658 | 66.9M | } |
659 | | |
660 | | static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, |
661 | | CIPHER_ORDER **tail) |
662 | 52.0M | { |
663 | 52.0M | if (curr == *head) |
664 | 0 | return; |
665 | 52.0M | if (curr == *tail) |
666 | 23.2M | *tail = curr->prev; |
667 | 52.0M | if (curr->next != NULL) |
668 | 28.8M | curr->next->prev = curr->prev; |
669 | 52.0M | if (curr->prev != NULL) |
670 | 52.0M | curr->prev->next = curr->next; |
671 | 52.0M | (*head)->prev = curr; |
672 | 52.0M | curr->next = *head; |
673 | 52.0M | curr->prev = NULL; |
674 | 52.0M | *head = curr; |
675 | 52.0M | } |
676 | | |
677 | | static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, |
678 | | int num_of_ciphers, |
679 | | uint32_t disabled_mkey, |
680 | | uint32_t disabled_auth, |
681 | | uint32_t disabled_enc, |
682 | | uint32_t disabled_mac, |
683 | | CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, |
684 | | CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, |
685 | | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) |
686 | 136k | { |
687 | 136k | int i, co_list_num; |
688 | 136k | const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
689 | | |
690 | | /* |
691 | | * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the |
692 | | * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). |
693 | | * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num |
694 | | * entries. |
695 | | */ |
696 | | |
697 | | /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ |
698 | 136k | co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ |
699 | 21.9M | for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { |
700 | 21.8M | c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); |
701 | | /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ |
702 | 21.8M | if (c == NULL || !c->valid) |
703 | 0 | continue; |
704 | 21.8M | if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || |
705 | 21.8M | (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || |
706 | 21.8M | (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || |
707 | 21.8M | (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) |
708 | 2.51M | continue; |
709 | 19.3M | if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && |
710 | 19.3M | c->min_tls == 0) |
711 | 0 | continue; |
712 | 19.3M | if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && |
713 | 19.3M | c->min_dtls == 0) |
714 | 0 | continue; |
715 | | |
716 | 19.3M | co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; |
717 | 19.3M | co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; |
718 | 19.3M | co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; |
719 | 19.3M | co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; |
720 | 19.3M | co_list_num++; |
721 | 19.3M | } |
722 | | |
723 | | /* |
724 | | * Prepare linked list from list entries |
725 | | */ |
726 | 136k | if (co_list_num > 0) { |
727 | 114k | co_list[0].prev = NULL; |
728 | | |
729 | 114k | if (co_list_num > 1) { |
730 | 114k | co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; |
731 | | |
732 | 19.2M | for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { |
733 | 19.0M | co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; |
734 | 19.0M | co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; |
735 | 19.0M | } |
736 | | |
737 | 114k | co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; |
738 | 114k | } |
739 | | |
740 | 114k | co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; |
741 | | |
742 | 114k | *head_p = &co_list[0]; |
743 | 114k | *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; |
744 | 114k | } |
745 | 136k | } |
746 | | |
747 | | static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, |
748 | | int num_of_group_aliases, |
749 | | uint32_t disabled_mkey, |
750 | | uint32_t disabled_auth, |
751 | | uint32_t disabled_enc, |
752 | | uint32_t disabled_mac, |
753 | | CIPHER_ORDER *head) |
754 | 136k | { |
755 | 136k | CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; |
756 | 136k | const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; |
757 | 136k | int i; |
758 | 136k | uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; |
759 | 136k | uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; |
760 | 136k | uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; |
761 | 136k | uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; |
762 | | |
763 | | /* |
764 | | * First, add the real ciphers as already collected |
765 | | */ |
766 | 136k | ciph_curr = head; |
767 | 136k | ca_curr = ca_list; |
768 | 19.4M | while (ciph_curr != NULL) { |
769 | 19.3M | *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; |
770 | 19.3M | ca_curr++; |
771 | 19.3M | ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; |
772 | 19.3M | } |
773 | | |
774 | | /* |
775 | | * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. |
776 | | * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which |
777 | | * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), |
778 | | * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). |
779 | | */ |
780 | 10.9M | for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { |
781 | 10.7M | uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; |
782 | 10.7M | uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; |
783 | 10.7M | uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; |
784 | 10.7M | uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; |
785 | | |
786 | 10.7M | if (algorithm_mkey) |
787 | 3.41M | if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) |
788 | 273k | continue; |
789 | | |
790 | 10.5M | if (algorithm_auth) |
791 | 2.73M | if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) |
792 | 409k | continue; |
793 | | |
794 | 10.1M | if (algorithm_enc) |
795 | 3.95M | if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) |
796 | 819k | continue; |
797 | | |
798 | 9.28M | if (algorithm_mac) |
799 | 1.36M | if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) |
800 | 409k | continue; |
801 | | |
802 | 8.87M | *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); |
803 | 8.87M | ca_curr++; |
804 | 8.87M | } |
805 | | |
806 | 136k | *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ |
807 | 136k | } |
808 | | |
809 | | static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, |
810 | | uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, |
811 | | uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, |
812 | | uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, |
813 | | int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, |
814 | | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) |
815 | 3.19M | { |
816 | 3.19M | CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; |
817 | 3.19M | const SSL_CIPHER *cp; |
818 | 3.19M | int reverse = 0; |
819 | | |
820 | 3.19M | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER){ |
821 | 0 | BIO_printf(trc_out, |
822 | 0 | "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", |
823 | 0 | rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, |
824 | 0 | algo_strength, strength_bits); |
825 | 0 | } |
826 | | |
827 | 3.19M | if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) |
828 | 819k | reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently |
829 | | * deleted ciphers */ |
830 | | |
831 | 3.19M | head = *head_p; |
832 | 3.19M | tail = *tail_p; |
833 | | |
834 | 3.19M | if (reverse) { |
835 | 819k | next = tail; |
836 | 819k | last = head; |
837 | 2.37M | } else { |
838 | 2.37M | next = head; |
839 | 2.37M | last = tail; |
840 | 2.37M | } |
841 | | |
842 | 3.19M | curr = NULL; |
843 | 462M | for (;;) { |
844 | 462M | if (curr == last) |
845 | 3.19M | break; |
846 | | |
847 | 459M | curr = next; |
848 | | |
849 | 459M | if (curr == NULL) |
850 | 0 | break; |
851 | | |
852 | 459M | next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; |
853 | | |
854 | 459M | cp = curr->cipher; |
855 | | |
856 | | /* |
857 | | * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits |
858 | | * or the algorithms used. |
859 | | */ |
860 | 459M | if (strength_bits >= 0) { |
861 | 88.3M | if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) |
862 | 69.0M | continue; |
863 | 371M | } else { |
864 | 371M | if (trc_out != NULL) { |
865 | 0 | BIO_printf(trc_out, |
866 | 0 | "\nName: %s:" |
867 | 0 | "\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", |
868 | 0 | cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, |
869 | 0 | cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls, |
870 | 0 | cp->algo_strength); |
871 | 0 | } |
872 | 371M | if (cipher_id != 0 && (cipher_id != cp->id)) |
873 | 0 | continue; |
874 | 371M | if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) |
875 | 101M | continue; |
876 | 269M | if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) |
877 | 19.5M | continue; |
878 | 250M | if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) |
879 | 80.5M | continue; |
880 | 169M | if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) |
881 | 36.9M | continue; |
882 | 132M | if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) |
883 | 9.48M | continue; |
884 | 123M | if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) |
885 | 123M | && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) |
886 | 0 | continue; |
887 | 123M | if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) |
888 | 123M | && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) |
889 | 4.28M | continue; |
890 | 123M | } |
891 | | |
892 | 138M | if (trc_out != NULL) |
893 | 0 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "Action = %d\n", rule); |
894 | | |
895 | | /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ |
896 | 138M | if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { |
897 | | /* reverse == 0 */ |
898 | 54.0M | if (!curr->active) { |
899 | 41.5M | ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); |
900 | 41.5M | curr->active = 1; |
901 | 41.5M | } |
902 | 54.0M | } |
903 | | /* Move the added cipher to this location */ |
904 | 84.0M | else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { |
905 | | /* reverse == 0 */ |
906 | 25.6M | if (curr->active) { |
907 | 25.6M | ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); |
908 | 25.6M | } |
909 | 58.4M | } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { |
910 | | /* reverse == 1 */ |
911 | 23.2M | if (curr->active) { |
912 | | /* |
913 | | * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for |
914 | | * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works |
915 | | * in reverse to maintain the order) |
916 | | */ |
917 | 23.2M | ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); |
918 | 23.2M | curr->active = 0; |
919 | 23.2M | } |
920 | 35.2M | } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { |
921 | 28.8M | if (curr->active) |
922 | 28.8M | ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); |
923 | 28.8M | } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { |
924 | | /* reverse == 0 */ |
925 | 6.40M | if (head == curr) |
926 | 1.02M | head = curr->next; |
927 | 5.37M | else |
928 | 5.37M | curr->prev->next = curr->next; |
929 | 6.40M | if (tail == curr) |
930 | 57.1k | tail = curr->prev; |
931 | 6.40M | curr->active = 0; |
932 | 6.40M | if (curr->next != NULL) |
933 | 6.34M | curr->next->prev = curr->prev; |
934 | 6.40M | if (curr->prev != NULL) |
935 | 5.37M | curr->prev->next = curr->next; |
936 | 6.40M | curr->next = NULL; |
937 | 6.40M | curr->prev = NULL; |
938 | 6.40M | } |
939 | 138M | } |
940 | | |
941 | 3.19M | *head_p = head; |
942 | 3.19M | *tail_p = tail; |
943 | | |
944 | 3.19M | OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); |
945 | 3.19M | } |
946 | | |
947 | | static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, |
948 | | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) |
949 | 136k | { |
950 | 136k | int32_t max_strength_bits; |
951 | 136k | int i, *number_uses; |
952 | 136k | CIPHER_ORDER *curr; |
953 | | |
954 | | /* |
955 | | * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting |
956 | | * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting |
957 | | * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. |
958 | | */ |
959 | 136k | max_strength_bits = 0; |
960 | 136k | curr = *head_p; |
961 | 19.4M | while (curr != NULL) { |
962 | 19.3M | if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) |
963 | 114k | max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; |
964 | 19.3M | curr = curr->next; |
965 | 19.3M | } |
966 | | |
967 | 136k | number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); |
968 | 136k | if (number_uses == NULL) { |
969 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
970 | 0 | return 0; |
971 | 0 | } |
972 | | |
973 | | /* |
974 | | * Now find the strength_bits values actually used |
975 | | */ |
976 | 136k | curr = *head_p; |
977 | 19.4M | while (curr != NULL) { |
978 | 19.3M | if (curr->active) |
979 | 19.3M | number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; |
980 | 19.3M | curr = curr->next; |
981 | 19.3M | } |
982 | | /* |
983 | | * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending |
984 | | * order. |
985 | | */ |
986 | 29.5M | for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) |
987 | 29.4M | if (number_uses[i] > 0) |
988 | 522k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, |
989 | 522k | tail_p); |
990 | | |
991 | 136k | OPENSSL_free(number_uses); |
992 | 136k | return 1; |
993 | 136k | } |
994 | | |
995 | | static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, |
996 | | CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, |
997 | | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, |
998 | | const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) |
999 | 48.9k | { |
1000 | 48.9k | uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; |
1001 | 48.9k | int min_tls; |
1002 | 48.9k | const char *l, *buf; |
1003 | 48.9k | int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; |
1004 | 48.9k | uint32_t cipher_id = 0; |
1005 | 48.9k | char ch; |
1006 | | |
1007 | 48.9k | retval = 1; |
1008 | 48.9k | l = rule_str; |
1009 | 244k | for ( ; ; ) { |
1010 | 244k | ch = *l; |
1011 | | |
1012 | 244k | if (ch == '\0') |
1013 | 0 | break; /* done */ |
1014 | 244k | if (ch == '-') { |
1015 | 0 | rule = CIPHER_DEL; |
1016 | 0 | l++; |
1017 | 244k | } else if (ch == '+') { |
1018 | 0 | rule = CIPHER_ORD; |
1019 | 0 | l++; |
1020 | 244k | } else if (ch == '!') { |
1021 | 48.9k | rule = CIPHER_KILL; |
1022 | 48.9k | l++; |
1023 | 195k | } else if (ch == '@') { |
1024 | 24.4k | rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; |
1025 | 24.4k | l++; |
1026 | 171k | } else { |
1027 | 171k | rule = CIPHER_ADD; |
1028 | 171k | } |
1029 | | |
1030 | 244k | if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { |
1031 | 97.8k | l++; |
1032 | 97.8k | continue; |
1033 | 97.8k | } |
1034 | | |
1035 | 146k | alg_mkey = 0; |
1036 | 146k | alg_auth = 0; |
1037 | 146k | alg_enc = 0; |
1038 | 146k | alg_mac = 0; |
1039 | 146k | min_tls = 0; |
1040 | 146k | algo_strength = 0; |
1041 | | |
1042 | 146k | for (;;) { |
1043 | 146k | ch = *l; |
1044 | 146k | buf = l; |
1045 | 146k | buflen = 0; |
1046 | 146k | #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
1047 | 1.24M | while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || |
1048 | 1.24M | ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || |
1049 | 1.24M | ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || |
1050 | 1.24M | (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) |
1051 | | #else |
1052 | | while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') |
1053 | | || (ch == '=')) |
1054 | | #endif |
1055 | 1.10M | { |
1056 | 1.10M | ch = *(++l); |
1057 | 1.10M | buflen++; |
1058 | 1.10M | } |
1059 | | |
1060 | 146k | if (buflen == 0) { |
1061 | | /* |
1062 | | * We hit something we cannot deal with, |
1063 | | * it is no command or separator nor |
1064 | | * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. |
1065 | | */ |
1066 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); |
1067 | 0 | return 0; |
1068 | 0 | } |
1069 | | |
1070 | 146k | if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { |
1071 | 24.4k | found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ |
1072 | 24.4k | break; /* special treatment */ |
1073 | 24.4k | } |
1074 | | |
1075 | | /* check for multi-part specification */ |
1076 | 122k | if (ch == '+') { |
1077 | 0 | multi = 1; |
1078 | 0 | l++; |
1079 | 122k | } else { |
1080 | 122k | multi = 0; |
1081 | 122k | } |
1082 | | |
1083 | | /* |
1084 | | * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful |
1085 | | * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation |
1086 | | * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher |
1087 | | * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. |
1088 | | * So additionally check whether the cipher name found |
1089 | | * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: |
1090 | | * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is |
1091 | | * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot |
1092 | | * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) |
1093 | | */ |
1094 | 122k | j = found = 0; |
1095 | 122k | cipher_id = 0; |
1096 | 22.4M | while (ca_list[j]) { |
1097 | 22.4M | if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 |
1098 | 22.4M | && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { |
1099 | 122k | found = 1; |
1100 | 122k | break; |
1101 | 122k | } else |
1102 | 22.3M | j++; |
1103 | 22.4M | } |
1104 | | |
1105 | 122k | if (!found) |
1106 | 0 | break; /* ignore this entry */ |
1107 | | |
1108 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { |
1109 | 0 | if (alg_mkey) { |
1110 | 0 | alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; |
1111 | 0 | if (!alg_mkey) { |
1112 | 0 | found = 0; |
1113 | 0 | break; |
1114 | 0 | } |
1115 | 0 | } else { |
1116 | 0 | alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; |
1117 | 0 | } |
1118 | 0 | } |
1119 | | |
1120 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { |
1121 | 0 | if (alg_auth) { |
1122 | 0 | alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; |
1123 | 0 | if (!alg_auth) { |
1124 | 0 | found = 0; |
1125 | 0 | break; |
1126 | 0 | } |
1127 | 0 | } else { |
1128 | 0 | alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; |
1129 | 0 | } |
1130 | 0 | } |
1131 | | |
1132 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { |
1133 | 97.8k | if (alg_enc) { |
1134 | 0 | alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; |
1135 | 0 | if (!alg_enc) { |
1136 | 0 | found = 0; |
1137 | 0 | break; |
1138 | 0 | } |
1139 | 97.8k | } else { |
1140 | 97.8k | alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; |
1141 | 97.8k | } |
1142 | 97.8k | } |
1143 | | |
1144 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { |
1145 | 0 | if (alg_mac) { |
1146 | 0 | alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; |
1147 | 0 | if (!alg_mac) { |
1148 | 0 | found = 0; |
1149 | 0 | break; |
1150 | 0 | } |
1151 | 0 | } else { |
1152 | 0 | alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; |
1153 | 0 | } |
1154 | 0 | } |
1155 | | |
1156 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { |
1157 | 0 | if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { |
1158 | 0 | algo_strength &= |
1159 | 0 | (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | |
1160 | 0 | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; |
1161 | 0 | if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { |
1162 | 0 | found = 0; |
1163 | 0 | break; |
1164 | 0 | } |
1165 | 0 | } else { |
1166 | 0 | algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; |
1167 | 0 | } |
1168 | 0 | } |
1169 | | |
1170 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { |
1171 | 24.4k | if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { |
1172 | 0 | algo_strength &= |
1173 | 0 | (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | |
1174 | 0 | ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; |
1175 | 0 | if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { |
1176 | 0 | found = 0; |
1177 | 0 | break; |
1178 | 0 | } |
1179 | 24.4k | } else { |
1180 | 24.4k | algo_strength |= |
1181 | 24.4k | ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; |
1182 | 24.4k | } |
1183 | 24.4k | } |
1184 | | |
1185 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->valid) { |
1186 | | /* |
1187 | | * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not |
1188 | | * become part of the search pattern! |
1189 | | */ |
1190 | |
|
1191 | 0 | cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; |
1192 | 122k | } else { |
1193 | | /* |
1194 | | * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the |
1195 | | * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern |
1196 | | */ |
1197 | | |
1198 | 122k | if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { |
1199 | 0 | if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { |
1200 | 0 | found = 0; |
1201 | 0 | break; |
1202 | 0 | } else { |
1203 | 0 | min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; |
1204 | 0 | } |
1205 | 0 | } |
1206 | 122k | } |
1207 | | |
1208 | 122k | if (!multi) |
1209 | 122k | break; |
1210 | 122k | } |
1211 | | |
1212 | | /* |
1213 | | * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it |
1214 | | */ |
1215 | 146k | if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ |
1216 | 24.4k | ok = 0; |
1217 | 24.4k | if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0) { |
1218 | 0 | ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); |
1219 | 24.4k | } else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) { |
1220 | 24.4k | int level = buf[9] - '0'; |
1221 | 24.4k | if (level < 0 || level > 5) { |
1222 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); |
1223 | 24.4k | } else { |
1224 | 24.4k | c->sec_level = level; |
1225 | 24.4k | ok = 1; |
1226 | 24.4k | } |
1227 | 24.4k | } else { |
1228 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); |
1229 | 0 | } |
1230 | 24.4k | if (ok == 0) |
1231 | 0 | retval = 0; |
1232 | | /* |
1233 | | * We do not support any "multi" options |
1234 | | * together with "@", so throw away the |
1235 | | * rest of the command, if any left, until |
1236 | | * end or ':' is found. |
1237 | | */ |
1238 | 24.4k | while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) |
1239 | 0 | l++; |
1240 | 122k | } else if (found) { |
1241 | 122k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, |
1242 | 122k | alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, |
1243 | 122k | min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, |
1244 | 122k | tail_p); |
1245 | 122k | } else { |
1246 | 0 | while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) |
1247 | 0 | l++; |
1248 | 0 | } |
1249 | 146k | if (*l == '\0') |
1250 | 48.9k | break; /* done */ |
1251 | 146k | } |
1252 | | |
1253 | 48.9k | return retval; |
1254 | 48.9k | } |
1255 | | |
1256 | | static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, |
1257 | | const char **prule_str) |
1258 | 136k | { |
1259 | 136k | unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; |
1260 | 136k | if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { |
1261 | 0 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; |
1262 | 136k | } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { |
1263 | 0 | suiteb_comb2 = 1; |
1264 | 0 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; |
1265 | 136k | } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { |
1266 | 0 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; |
1267 | 136k | } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { |
1268 | 0 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; |
1269 | 0 | } |
1270 | | |
1271 | 136k | if (suiteb_flags) { |
1272 | 0 | c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; |
1273 | 0 | c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; |
1274 | 136k | } else { |
1275 | 136k | suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; |
1276 | 136k | } |
1277 | | |
1278 | 136k | if (!suiteb_flags) |
1279 | 136k | return 1; |
1280 | | /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ |
1281 | | |
1282 | 0 | if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { |
1283 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); |
1284 | 0 | return 0; |
1285 | 0 | } |
1286 | | |
1287 | 0 | switch (suiteb_flags) { |
1288 | 0 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: |
1289 | 0 | if (suiteb_comb2) |
1290 | 0 | *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; |
1291 | 0 | else |
1292 | 0 | *prule_str = |
1293 | 0 | "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; |
1294 | 0 | break; |
1295 | 0 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: |
1296 | 0 | *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; |
1297 | 0 | break; |
1298 | 0 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: |
1299 | 0 | *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; |
1300 | 0 | break; |
1301 | 0 | } |
1302 | 0 | return 1; |
1303 | 0 | } |
1304 | | |
1305 | | static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) |
1306 | 238k | { |
1307 | 238k | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg; |
1308 | 238k | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
1309 | | /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */ |
1310 | 238k | char name[80]; |
1311 | | |
1312 | 238k | if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1)) |
1313 | | /* Anyway return 1 so we can parse rest of the list */ |
1314 | 0 | return 1; |
1315 | | |
1316 | 238k | memcpy(name, elem, len); |
1317 | 238k | name[len] = '\0'; |
1318 | | |
1319 | 238k | cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name); |
1320 | 238k | if (cipher == NULL) |
1321 | | /* Ciphersuite not found but return 1 to parse rest of the list */ |
1322 | 0 | return 1; |
1323 | | |
1324 | 238k | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) { |
1325 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1326 | 0 | return 0; |
1327 | 0 | } |
1328 | | |
1329 | 238k | return 1; |
1330 | 238k | } |
1331 | | |
1332 | | static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str) |
1333 | 79.3k | { |
1334 | 79.3k | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); |
1335 | | |
1336 | 79.3k | if (newciphers == NULL) |
1337 | 0 | return 0; |
1338 | | |
1339 | | /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */ |
1340 | 79.3k | if (*str != '\0' |
1341 | 79.3k | && (CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers) <= 0 |
1342 | 79.3k | || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(newciphers) == 0)) { |
1343 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
1344 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers); |
1345 | 0 | return 0; |
1346 | 0 | } |
1347 | 79.3k | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers); |
1348 | 79.3k | *currciphers = newciphers; |
1349 | | |
1350 | 79.3k | return 1; |
1351 | 79.3k | } |
1352 | | |
1353 | | static int update_cipher_list_by_id(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, |
1354 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack) |
1355 | 136k | { |
1356 | 136k | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); |
1357 | | |
1358 | 136k | if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { |
1359 | 0 | return 0; |
1360 | 0 | } |
1361 | | |
1362 | 136k | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); |
1363 | 136k | *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; |
1364 | | |
1365 | 136k | (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); |
1366 | 136k | sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); |
1367 | | |
1368 | 136k | return 1; |
1369 | 136k | } |
1370 | | |
1371 | | static int update_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
1372 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, |
1373 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, |
1374 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites) |
1375 | 0 | { |
1376 | 0 | int i; |
1377 | 0 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(*cipher_list); |
1378 | |
|
1379 | 0 | if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) |
1380 | 0 | return 0; |
1381 | | |
1382 | | /* |
1383 | | * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the |
1384 | | * list. |
1385 | | */ |
1386 | 0 | while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tmp_cipher_list) > 0 |
1387 | 0 | && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tmp_cipher_list, 0)->min_tls |
1388 | 0 | == TLS1_3_VERSION) |
1389 | 0 | (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tmp_cipher_list, 0); |
1390 | | |
1391 | | /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */ |
1392 | 0 | for (i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
1393 | 0 | const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i); |
1394 | | |
1395 | | /* Don't include any TLSv1.3 ciphersuites that are disabled */ |
1396 | 0 | if ((sslc->algorithm_enc & ctx->disabled_enc_mask) == 0 |
1397 | 0 | && (ssl_cipher_table_mac[sslc->algorithm2 |
1398 | 0 | & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK].mask |
1399 | 0 | & ctx->disabled_mac_mask) == 0) { |
1400 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_unshift(tmp_cipher_list, sslc); |
1401 | 0 | } |
1402 | 0 | } |
1403 | |
|
1404 | 0 | if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, tmp_cipher_list)) { |
1405 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list); |
1406 | 0 | return 0; |
1407 | 0 | } |
1408 | | |
1409 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); |
1410 | 0 | *cipher_list = tmp_cipher_list; |
1411 | |
|
1412 | 0 | return 1; |
1413 | 0 | } |
1414 | | |
1415 | | int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) |
1416 | 79.3k | { |
1417 | 79.3k | int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str); |
1418 | | |
1419 | 79.3k | if (ret && ctx->cipher_list != NULL) |
1420 | 0 | return update_cipher_list(ctx, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, |
1421 | 0 | ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); |
1422 | | |
1423 | 79.3k | return ret; |
1424 | 79.3k | } |
1425 | | |
1426 | | int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str) |
1427 | 0 | { |
1428 | 0 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; |
1429 | 0 | int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(s->tls13_ciphersuites), str); |
1430 | |
|
1431 | 0 | if (s->cipher_list == NULL) { |
1432 | 0 | if ((cipher_list = SSL_get_ciphers(s)) != NULL) |
1433 | 0 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list); |
1434 | 0 | } |
1435 | 0 | if (ret && s->cipher_list != NULL) |
1436 | 0 | return update_cipher_list(s->ctx, &s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, |
1437 | 0 | s->tls13_ciphersuites); |
1438 | | |
1439 | 0 | return ret; |
1440 | 0 | } |
1441 | | |
1442 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
1443 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites, |
1444 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, |
1445 | | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, |
1446 | | const char *rule_str, |
1447 | | CERT *c) |
1448 | 48.9k | { |
1449 | 48.9k | int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases, i; |
1450 | 48.9k | uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; |
1451 | 48.9k | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack; |
1452 | 48.9k | const char *rule_p; |
1453 | 48.9k | CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; |
1454 | 48.9k | const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; |
1455 | 48.9k | const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = ctx->method; |
1456 | | |
1457 | | /* |
1458 | | * Return with error if nothing to do. |
1459 | | */ |
1460 | 48.9k | if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) |
1461 | 0 | return NULL; |
1462 | | |
1463 | 48.9k | if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) |
1464 | 0 | return NULL; |
1465 | | |
1466 | | /* |
1467 | | * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled |
1468 | | * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. |
1469 | | */ |
1470 | | |
1471 | 48.9k | disabled_mkey = ctx->disabled_mkey_mask; |
1472 | 48.9k | disabled_auth = ctx->disabled_auth_mask; |
1473 | 48.9k | disabled_enc = ctx->disabled_enc_mask; |
1474 | 48.9k | disabled_mac = ctx->disabled_mac_mask; |
1475 | | |
1476 | | /* |
1477 | | * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled |
1478 | | * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so |
1479 | | * it is used for allocation. |
1480 | | */ |
1481 | 48.9k | num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); |
1482 | | |
1483 | 48.9k | co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); |
1484 | 48.9k | if (co_list == NULL) { |
1485 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1486 | 0 | return NULL; /* Failure */ |
1487 | 0 | } |
1488 | | |
1489 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, |
1490 | 48.9k | disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, |
1491 | 48.9k | disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); |
1492 | | |
1493 | | /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ |
1494 | | |
1495 | | /* |
1496 | | * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key |
1497 | | * exchange mechanisms. |
1498 | | * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the |
1499 | | * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client |
1500 | | * preference). |
1501 | | */ |
1502 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, |
1503 | 48.9k | -1, &head, &tail); |
1504 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, |
1505 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1506 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, |
1507 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1508 | | |
1509 | | /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ |
1510 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, |
1511 | 48.9k | &head, &tail); |
1512 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, |
1513 | 48.9k | &head, &tail); |
1514 | | |
1515 | | /* |
1516 | | * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. |
1517 | | * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by |
1518 | | * strength. |
1519 | | */ |
1520 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, |
1521 | 48.9k | -1, &head, &tail); |
1522 | | |
1523 | | /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ |
1524 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); |
1525 | | |
1526 | | /* Low priority for MD5 */ |
1527 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, |
1528 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1529 | | |
1530 | | /* |
1531 | | * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain |
1532 | | * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but |
1533 | | * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) |
1534 | | */ |
1535 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, |
1536 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1537 | | |
1538 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, |
1539 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1540 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, |
1541 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1542 | | |
1543 | | /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move to the end */ |
1544 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, |
1545 | 48.9k | &tail); |
1546 | | |
1547 | | /* |
1548 | | * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains |
1549 | | * in force within each class |
1550 | | */ |
1551 | 48.9k | if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { |
1552 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); |
1553 | 0 | return NULL; |
1554 | 0 | } |
1555 | | |
1556 | | /* |
1557 | | * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. |
1558 | | */ |
1559 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, |
1560 | 48.9k | &head, &tail); |
1561 | | |
1562 | | /* |
1563 | | * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: |
1564 | | * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. |
1565 | | * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous |
1566 | | * preference, i.e., |
1567 | | * 1) ECDHE > DHE |
1568 | | * 2) GCM > CHACHA |
1569 | | * 3) AES > rest |
1570 | | * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy |
1571 | | * |
1572 | | * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in |
1573 | | * reverse order of preference. |
1574 | | */ |
1575 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, |
1576 | 48.9k | &head, &tail); |
1577 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, |
1578 | 48.9k | CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); |
1579 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, |
1580 | 48.9k | CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); |
1581 | | |
1582 | | /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ |
1583 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); |
1584 | | |
1585 | | /* |
1586 | | * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. |
1587 | | * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names |
1588 | | * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. |
1589 | | * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher |
1590 | | * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise |
1591 | | * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). |
1592 | | */ |
1593 | 48.9k | num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); |
1594 | 48.9k | num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; |
1595 | 48.9k | ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); |
1596 | 48.9k | if (ca_list == NULL) { |
1597 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); |
1598 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1599 | 0 | return NULL; /* Failure */ |
1600 | 0 | } |
1601 | 48.9k | ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, |
1602 | 48.9k | disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, |
1603 | 48.9k | disabled_mac, head); |
1604 | | |
1605 | | /* |
1606 | | * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule |
1607 | | * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. |
1608 | | */ |
1609 | 48.9k | ok = 1; |
1610 | 48.9k | rule_p = rule_str; |
1611 | 48.9k | if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { |
1612 | 0 | ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(OSSL_default_cipher_list(), |
1613 | 0 | &head, &tail, ca_list, c); |
1614 | 0 | rule_p += 7; |
1615 | 0 | if (*rule_p == ':') |
1616 | 0 | rule_p++; |
1617 | 0 | } |
1618 | | |
1619 | 48.9k | if (ok && (rule_p[0] != '\0')) |
1620 | 48.9k | ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); |
1621 | | |
1622 | 48.9k | OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ |
1623 | | |
1624 | 48.9k | if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ |
1625 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); |
1626 | 0 | return NULL; |
1627 | 0 | } |
1628 | | |
1629 | | /* |
1630 | | * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error |
1631 | | * if we cannot get one. |
1632 | | */ |
1633 | 48.9k | if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { |
1634 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); |
1635 | 0 | return NULL; |
1636 | 0 | } |
1637 | | |
1638 | | /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */ |
1639 | 195k | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) { |
1640 | 146k | const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i); |
1641 | | |
1642 | | /* Don't include any TLSv1.3 ciphers that are disabled */ |
1643 | 146k | if ((sslc->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) != 0 |
1644 | 146k | || (ssl_cipher_table_mac[sslc->algorithm2 |
1645 | 146k | & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK].mask |
1646 | 146k | & ctx->disabled_mac_mask) != 0) { |
1647 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tls13_ciphersuites, i); |
1648 | 0 | i--; |
1649 | 0 | continue; |
1650 | 0 | } |
1651 | | |
1652 | 146k | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, sslc)) { |
1653 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); |
1654 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); |
1655 | 0 | return NULL; |
1656 | 0 | } |
1657 | 146k | } |
1658 | | |
1659 | 48.9k | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) { |
1660 | 0 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "cipher selection:\n"); |
1661 | 0 | } |
1662 | | /* |
1663 | | * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added |
1664 | | * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). |
1665 | | */ |
1666 | 5.57M | for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { |
1667 | 5.52M | if (curr->active) { |
1668 | 5.52M | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { |
1669 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); |
1670 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); |
1671 | 0 | OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER); |
1672 | 0 | return NULL; |
1673 | 0 | } |
1674 | 5.52M | if (trc_out != NULL) |
1675 | 0 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); |
1676 | 5.52M | } |
1677 | 5.52M | } |
1678 | 48.9k | OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ |
1679 | 48.9k | OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); |
1680 | | |
1681 | 48.9k | if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, cipherstack)) { |
1682 | 0 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); |
1683 | 0 | return NULL; |
1684 | 0 | } |
1685 | 48.9k | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); |
1686 | 48.9k | *cipher_list = cipherstack; |
1687 | | |
1688 | 48.9k | return cipherstack; |
1689 | 48.9k | } |
1690 | | |
1691 | | char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) |
1692 | 0 | { |
1693 | 0 | const char *ver; |
1694 | 0 | const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; |
1695 | 0 | uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; |
1696 | 0 | static const char *format = "%-30s %-7s Kx=%-8s Au=%-5s Enc=%-22s Mac=%-4s\n"; |
1697 | |
|
1698 | 0 | if (buf == NULL) { |
1699 | 0 | len = 128; |
1700 | 0 | if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { |
1701 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1702 | 0 | return NULL; |
1703 | 0 | } |
1704 | 0 | } else if (len < 128) { |
1705 | 0 | return NULL; |
1706 | 0 | } |
1707 | | |
1708 | 0 | alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
1709 | 0 | alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; |
1710 | 0 | alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; |
1711 | 0 | alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; |
1712 | |
|
1713 | 0 | ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); |
1714 | |
|
1715 | 0 | switch (alg_mkey) { |
1716 | 0 | case SSL_kRSA: |
1717 | 0 | kx = "RSA"; |
1718 | 0 | break; |
1719 | 0 | case SSL_kDHE: |
1720 | 0 | kx = "DH"; |
1721 | 0 | break; |
1722 | 0 | case SSL_kECDHE: |
1723 | 0 | kx = "ECDH"; |
1724 | 0 | break; |
1725 | 0 | case SSL_kPSK: |
1726 | 0 | kx = "PSK"; |
1727 | 0 | break; |
1728 | 0 | case SSL_kRSAPSK: |
1729 | 0 | kx = "RSAPSK"; |
1730 | 0 | break; |
1731 | 0 | case SSL_kECDHEPSK: |
1732 | 0 | kx = "ECDHEPSK"; |
1733 | 0 | break; |
1734 | 0 | case SSL_kDHEPSK: |
1735 | 0 | kx = "DHEPSK"; |
1736 | 0 | break; |
1737 | 0 | case SSL_kSRP: |
1738 | 0 | kx = "SRP"; |
1739 | 0 | break; |
1740 | 0 | case SSL_kGOST: |
1741 | 0 | kx = "GOST"; |
1742 | 0 | break; |
1743 | 0 | case SSL_kGOST18: |
1744 | 0 | kx = "GOST18"; |
1745 | 0 | break; |
1746 | 0 | case SSL_kANY: |
1747 | 0 | kx = "any"; |
1748 | 0 | break; |
1749 | 0 | default: |
1750 | 0 | kx = "unknown"; |
1751 | 0 | } |
1752 | | |
1753 | 0 | switch (alg_auth) { |
1754 | 0 | case SSL_aRSA: |
1755 | 0 | au = "RSA"; |
1756 | 0 | break; |
1757 | 0 | case SSL_aDSS: |
1758 | 0 | au = "DSS"; |
1759 | 0 | break; |
1760 | 0 | case SSL_aNULL: |
1761 | 0 | au = "None"; |
1762 | 0 | break; |
1763 | 0 | case SSL_aECDSA: |
1764 | 0 | au = "ECDSA"; |
1765 | 0 | break; |
1766 | 0 | case SSL_aPSK: |
1767 | 0 | au = "PSK"; |
1768 | 0 | break; |
1769 | 0 | case SSL_aSRP: |
1770 | 0 | au = "SRP"; |
1771 | 0 | break; |
1772 | 0 | case SSL_aGOST01: |
1773 | 0 | au = "GOST01"; |
1774 | 0 | break; |
1775 | | /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ |
1776 | 0 | case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): |
1777 | 0 | au = "GOST12"; |
1778 | 0 | break; |
1779 | 0 | case SSL_aANY: |
1780 | 0 | au = "any"; |
1781 | 0 | break; |
1782 | 0 | default: |
1783 | 0 | au = "unknown"; |
1784 | 0 | break; |
1785 | 0 | } |
1786 | | |
1787 | 0 | switch (alg_enc) { |
1788 | 0 | case SSL_DES: |
1789 | 0 | enc = "DES(56)"; |
1790 | 0 | break; |
1791 | 0 | case SSL_3DES: |
1792 | 0 | enc = "3DES(168)"; |
1793 | 0 | break; |
1794 | 0 | case SSL_RC4: |
1795 | 0 | enc = "RC4(128)"; |
1796 | 0 | break; |
1797 | 0 | case SSL_RC2: |
1798 | 0 | enc = "RC2(128)"; |
1799 | 0 | break; |
1800 | 0 | case SSL_IDEA: |
1801 | 0 | enc = "IDEA(128)"; |
1802 | 0 | break; |
1803 | 0 | case SSL_eNULL: |
1804 | 0 | enc = "None"; |
1805 | 0 | break; |
1806 | 0 | case SSL_AES128: |
1807 | 0 | enc = "AES(128)"; |
1808 | 0 | break; |
1809 | 0 | case SSL_AES256: |
1810 | 0 | enc = "AES(256)"; |
1811 | 0 | break; |
1812 | 0 | case SSL_AES128GCM: |
1813 | 0 | enc = "AESGCM(128)"; |
1814 | 0 | break; |
1815 | 0 | case SSL_AES256GCM: |
1816 | 0 | enc = "AESGCM(256)"; |
1817 | 0 | break; |
1818 | 0 | case SSL_AES128CCM: |
1819 | 0 | enc = "AESCCM(128)"; |
1820 | 0 | break; |
1821 | 0 | case SSL_AES256CCM: |
1822 | 0 | enc = "AESCCM(256)"; |
1823 | 0 | break; |
1824 | 0 | case SSL_AES128CCM8: |
1825 | 0 | enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; |
1826 | 0 | break; |
1827 | 0 | case SSL_AES256CCM8: |
1828 | 0 | enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; |
1829 | 0 | break; |
1830 | 0 | case SSL_CAMELLIA128: |
1831 | 0 | enc = "Camellia(128)"; |
1832 | 0 | break; |
1833 | 0 | case SSL_CAMELLIA256: |
1834 | 0 | enc = "Camellia(256)"; |
1835 | 0 | break; |
1836 | 0 | case SSL_ARIA128GCM: |
1837 | 0 | enc = "ARIAGCM(128)"; |
1838 | 0 | break; |
1839 | 0 | case SSL_ARIA256GCM: |
1840 | 0 | enc = "ARIAGCM(256)"; |
1841 | 0 | break; |
1842 | 0 | case SSL_SEED: |
1843 | 0 | enc = "SEED(128)"; |
1844 | 0 | break; |
1845 | 0 | case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: |
1846 | 0 | case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: |
1847 | 0 | enc = "GOST89(256)"; |
1848 | 0 | break; |
1849 | 0 | case SSL_MAGMA: |
1850 | 0 | enc = "MAGMA"; |
1851 | 0 | break; |
1852 | 0 | case SSL_KUZNYECHIK: |
1853 | 0 | enc = "KUZNYECHIK"; |
1854 | 0 | break; |
1855 | 0 | case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: |
1856 | 0 | enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; |
1857 | 0 | break; |
1858 | 0 | default: |
1859 | 0 | enc = "unknown"; |
1860 | 0 | break; |
1861 | 0 | } |
1862 | | |
1863 | 0 | switch (alg_mac) { |
1864 | 0 | case SSL_MD5: |
1865 | 0 | mac = "MD5"; |
1866 | 0 | break; |
1867 | 0 | case SSL_SHA1: |
1868 | 0 | mac = "SHA1"; |
1869 | 0 | break; |
1870 | 0 | case SSL_SHA256: |
1871 | 0 | mac = "SHA256"; |
1872 | 0 | break; |
1873 | 0 | case SSL_SHA384: |
1874 | 0 | mac = "SHA384"; |
1875 | 0 | break; |
1876 | 0 | case SSL_AEAD: |
1877 | 0 | mac = "AEAD"; |
1878 | 0 | break; |
1879 | 0 | case SSL_GOST89MAC: |
1880 | 0 | case SSL_GOST89MAC12: |
1881 | 0 | mac = "GOST89"; |
1882 | 0 | break; |
1883 | 0 | case SSL_GOST94: |
1884 | 0 | mac = "GOST94"; |
1885 | 0 | break; |
1886 | 0 | case SSL_GOST12_256: |
1887 | 0 | case SSL_GOST12_512: |
1888 | 0 | mac = "GOST2012"; |
1889 | 0 | break; |
1890 | 0 | default: |
1891 | 0 | mac = "unknown"; |
1892 | 0 | break; |
1893 | 0 | } |
1894 | | |
1895 | 0 | BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); |
1896 | |
|
1897 | 0 | return buf; |
1898 | 0 | } |
1899 | | |
1900 | | const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
1901 | 0 | { |
1902 | 0 | if (c == NULL) |
1903 | 0 | return "(NONE)"; |
1904 | | |
1905 | | /* |
1906 | | * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS |
1907 | | * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". |
1908 | | */ |
1909 | 0 | if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) |
1910 | 0 | return "TLSv1.0"; |
1911 | 0 | return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); |
1912 | 0 | } |
1913 | | |
1914 | | /* return the actual cipher being used */ |
1915 | | const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
1916 | 0 | { |
1917 | 0 | if (c != NULL) |
1918 | 0 | return c->name; |
1919 | 0 | return "(NONE)"; |
1920 | 0 | } |
1921 | | |
1922 | | /* return the actual cipher being used in RFC standard name */ |
1923 | | const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
1924 | 0 | { |
1925 | 0 | if (c != NULL) |
1926 | 0 | return c->stdname; |
1927 | 0 | return "(NONE)"; |
1928 | 0 | } |
1929 | | |
1930 | | /* return the OpenSSL name based on given RFC standard name */ |
1931 | | const char *OPENSSL_cipher_name(const char *stdname) |
1932 | 0 | { |
1933 | 0 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
1934 | |
|
1935 | 0 | if (stdname == NULL) |
1936 | 0 | return "(NONE)"; |
1937 | 0 | c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(stdname); |
1938 | 0 | return SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); |
1939 | 0 | } |
1940 | | |
1941 | | /* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ |
1942 | | int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) |
1943 | 0 | { |
1944 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
1945 | |
|
1946 | 0 | if (c != NULL) { |
1947 | 0 | if (alg_bits != NULL) |
1948 | 0 | *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; |
1949 | 0 | ret = (int)c->strength_bits; |
1950 | 0 | } |
1951 | 0 | return ret; |
1952 | 0 | } |
1953 | | |
1954 | | uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
1955 | 241k | { |
1956 | 241k | return c->id; |
1957 | 241k | } |
1958 | | |
1959 | | uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
1960 | 0 | { |
1961 | 0 | return c->id & 0xFFFF; |
1962 | 0 | } |
1963 | | |
1964 | | SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) |
1965 | 0 | { |
1966 | 0 | SSL_COMP *ctmp; |
1967 | 0 | int i, nn; |
1968 | |
|
1969 | 0 | if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) |
1970 | 0 | return NULL; |
1971 | 0 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); |
1972 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { |
1973 | 0 | ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); |
1974 | 0 | if (ctmp->id == n) |
1975 | 0 | return ctmp; |
1976 | 0 | } |
1977 | 0 | return NULL; |
1978 | 0 | } |
1979 | | |
1980 | | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1981 | | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) |
1982 | | { |
1983 | | return NULL; |
1984 | | } |
1985 | | |
1986 | | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) |
1987 | | *meths) |
1988 | | { |
1989 | | return meths; |
1990 | | } |
1991 | | |
1992 | | int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) |
1993 | | { |
1994 | | return 1; |
1995 | | } |
1996 | | |
1997 | | #else |
1998 | | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) |
1999 | 48.3k | { |
2000 | 48.3k | load_builtin_compressions(); |
2001 | 48.3k | return ssl_comp_methods; |
2002 | 48.3k | } |
2003 | | |
2004 | | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) |
2005 | | *meths) |
2006 | 0 | { |
2007 | 0 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; |
2008 | 0 | ssl_comp_methods = meths; |
2009 | 0 | return old_meths; |
2010 | 0 | } |
2011 | | |
2012 | | static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) |
2013 | 0 | { |
2014 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(cm); |
2015 | 0 | } |
2016 | | |
2017 | | void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void) |
2018 | 20 | { |
2019 | 20 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; |
2020 | 20 | ssl_comp_methods = NULL; |
2021 | 20 | sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); |
2022 | 20 | } |
2023 | | |
2024 | | int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) |
2025 | 0 | { |
2026 | 0 | SSL_COMP *comp; |
2027 | |
|
2028 | 0 | if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) |
2029 | 0 | return 1; |
2030 | | |
2031 | | /*- |
2032 | | * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the |
2033 | | * compression number ranges should be the following: |
2034 | | * |
2035 | | * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF |
2036 | | * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA |
2037 | | * 193 to 255: reserved for private use |
2038 | | */ |
2039 | 0 | if (id < 193 || id > 255) { |
2040 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); |
2041 | 0 | return 1; |
2042 | 0 | } |
2043 | | |
2044 | 0 | comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); |
2045 | 0 | if (comp == NULL) { |
2046 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2047 | 0 | return 1; |
2048 | 0 | } |
2049 | | |
2050 | 0 | comp->id = id; |
2051 | 0 | comp->method = cm; |
2052 | 0 | load_builtin_compressions(); |
2053 | 0 | if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { |
2054 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(comp); |
2055 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); |
2056 | 0 | return 1; |
2057 | 0 | } |
2058 | 0 | if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { |
2059 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(comp); |
2060 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2061 | 0 | return 1; |
2062 | 0 | } |
2063 | 0 | return 0; |
2064 | 0 | } |
2065 | | #endif |
2066 | | |
2067 | | const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) |
2068 | 0 | { |
2069 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
2070 | 0 | return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; |
2071 | | #else |
2072 | | return NULL; |
2073 | | #endif |
2074 | 0 | } |
2075 | | |
2076 | | const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) |
2077 | 0 | { |
2078 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
2079 | 0 | return comp->name; |
2080 | | #else |
2081 | | return NULL; |
2082 | | #endif |
2083 | 0 | } |
2084 | | |
2085 | | int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) |
2086 | 0 | { |
2087 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
2088 | 0 | return comp->id; |
2089 | | #else |
2090 | | return -1; |
2091 | | #endif |
2092 | 0 | } |
2093 | | |
2094 | | const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr, |
2095 | | int all) |
2096 | 371k | { |
2097 | 371k | const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); |
2098 | | |
2099 | 371k | if (c == NULL || (!all && c->valid == 0)) |
2100 | 206k | return NULL; |
2101 | 165k | return c; |
2102 | 371k | } |
2103 | | |
2104 | | const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) |
2105 | 0 | { |
2106 | 0 | return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); |
2107 | 0 | } |
2108 | | |
2109 | | int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
2110 | 0 | { |
2111 | 0 | int i; |
2112 | 0 | if (c == NULL) |
2113 | 0 | return NID_undef; |
2114 | 0 | i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); |
2115 | 0 | if (i == -1) |
2116 | 0 | return NID_undef; |
2117 | 0 | return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; |
2118 | 0 | } |
2119 | | |
2120 | | int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
2121 | 0 | { |
2122 | 0 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); |
2123 | |
|
2124 | 0 | if (i == -1) |
2125 | 0 | return NID_undef; |
2126 | 0 | return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; |
2127 | 0 | } |
2128 | | |
2129 | | int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
2130 | 0 | { |
2131 | 0 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); |
2132 | |
|
2133 | 0 | if (i == -1) |
2134 | 0 | return NID_undef; |
2135 | 0 | return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; |
2136 | 0 | } |
2137 | | |
2138 | | int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
2139 | 0 | { |
2140 | 0 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); |
2141 | |
|
2142 | 0 | if (i == -1) |
2143 | 0 | return NID_undef; |
2144 | 0 | return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; |
2145 | 0 | } |
2146 | | |
2147 | | const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
2148 | 0 | { |
2149 | 0 | int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; |
2150 | |
|
2151 | 0 | if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) |
2152 | 0 | return NULL; |
2153 | 0 | return EVP_get_digestbynid(ssl_cipher_table_mac[idx].nid); |
2154 | 0 | } |
2155 | | |
2156 | | int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) |
2157 | 0 | { |
2158 | 0 | return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; |
2159 | 0 | } |
2160 | | |
2161 | | int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead, |
2162 | | size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize, |
2163 | | size_t *ext_overhead) |
2164 | 0 | { |
2165 | 0 | size_t mac = 0, in = 0, blk = 0, out = 0; |
2166 | | |
2167 | | /* Some hard-coded numbers for the CCM/Poly1305 MAC overhead |
2168 | | * because there are no handy #defines for those. */ |
2169 | 0 | if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AESGCM | SSL_ARIAGCM)) { |
2170 | 0 | out = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
2171 | 0 | } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM)) { |
2172 | 0 | out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 16; |
2173 | 0 | } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) { |
2174 | 0 | out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 8; |
2175 | 0 | } else if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { |
2176 | 0 | out = 16; |
2177 | 0 | } else if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) { |
2178 | | /* We're supposed to have handled all the AEAD modes above */ |
2179 | 0 | return 0; |
2180 | 0 | } else { |
2181 | | /* Non-AEAD modes. Calculate MAC/cipher overhead separately */ |
2182 | 0 | int digest_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(c); |
2183 | 0 | const EVP_MD *e_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid); |
2184 | |
|
2185 | 0 | if (e_md == NULL) |
2186 | 0 | return 0; |
2187 | | |
2188 | 0 | mac = EVP_MD_get_size(e_md); |
2189 | 0 | if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL) { |
2190 | 0 | int cipher_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(c); |
2191 | 0 | const EVP_CIPHER *e_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid); |
2192 | | |
2193 | | /* If it wasn't AEAD or SSL_eNULL, we expect it to be a |
2194 | | known CBC cipher. */ |
2195 | 0 | if (e_ciph == NULL || |
2196 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(e_ciph) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
2197 | 0 | return 0; |
2198 | | |
2199 | 0 | in = 1; /* padding length byte */ |
2200 | 0 | out = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(e_ciph); |
2201 | 0 | blk = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(e_ciph); |
2202 | 0 | } |
2203 | 0 | } |
2204 | | |
2205 | 0 | *mac_overhead = mac; |
2206 | 0 | *int_overhead = in; |
2207 | 0 | *blocksize = blk; |
2208 | 0 | *ext_overhead = out; |
2209 | |
|
2210 | 0 | return 1; |
2211 | 0 | } |
2212 | | |
2213 | | int ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t idx) |
2214 | 552k | { |
2215 | 552k | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *cl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(idx); |
2216 | | |
2217 | 552k | if (cl == NULL || (cl->amask & ctx->disabled_auth_mask) != 0) |
2218 | 0 | return 1; |
2219 | 552k | return 0; |
2220 | 552k | } |
2221 | | |
2222 | | /* |
2223 | | * Default list of TLSv1.2 (and earlier) ciphers |
2224 | | * SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST deprecated in 3.0.0 |
2225 | | * Update both macro and function simultaneously |
2226 | | */ |
2227 | | const char *OSSL_default_cipher_list(void) |
2228 | 79.3k | { |
2229 | 79.3k | return "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL"; |
2230 | 79.3k | } |
2231 | | |
2232 | | /* |
2233 | | * Default list of TLSv1.3 (and later) ciphers |
2234 | | * TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES deprecated in 3.0.0 |
2235 | | * Update both macro and function simultaneously |
2236 | | */ |
2237 | | const char *OSSL_default_ciphersuites(void) |
2238 | 79.3k | { |
2239 | 79.3k | return "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:" |
2240 | 79.3k | "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:" |
2241 | 79.3k | "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"; |
2242 | 79.3k | } |