/src/openssl31/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
12 | | * internal use. |
13 | | */ |
14 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
15 | | |
16 | | #include <string.h> |
17 | | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/params.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
20 | | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
21 | | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
22 | | # include <openssl/x509.h> |
23 | | # include "crypto/asn1.h" |
24 | | #endif |
25 | | #include "internal/sizes.h" |
26 | | #include "internal/param_build_set.h" |
27 | | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
28 | | #include "rsa_local.h" |
29 | | |
30 | | /* |
31 | | * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support |
32 | | * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider |
33 | | * implementations alike. |
34 | | */ |
35 | | |
36 | | DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) |
37 | | |
38 | | static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers, |
39 | | const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[]) |
40 | 89.9k | { |
41 | 89.9k | const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL; |
42 | 89.9k | int i; |
43 | | |
44 | 89.9k | if (numbers == NULL) |
45 | 0 | return 0; |
46 | | |
47 | 959k | for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++){ |
48 | 869k | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]); |
49 | 869k | if (p != NULL) { |
50 | 149k | BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; |
51 | | |
52 | 149k | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp)) |
53 | 0 | return 0; |
54 | 149k | if (sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) { |
55 | 0 | BN_clear_free(tmp); |
56 | 0 | return 0; |
57 | 0 | } |
58 | 149k | } |
59 | 869k | } |
60 | | |
61 | 89.9k | return 1; |
62 | 89.9k | } |
63 | | |
64 | | int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private) |
65 | 15.4k | { |
66 | 15.4k | const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL; |
67 | 15.4k | BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL; |
68 | 15.4k | STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL; |
69 | 15.4k | int is_private = 0; |
70 | | |
71 | 15.4k | if (rsa == NULL) |
72 | 0 | return 0; |
73 | | |
74 | 15.4k | param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N); |
75 | 15.4k | param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E); |
76 | 15.4k | if (include_private) |
77 | 15.4k | param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D); |
78 | | |
79 | 15.4k | if ((param_n != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n)) |
80 | 15.4k | || (param_e != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e)) |
81 | 15.4k | || (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d))) |
82 | 0 | goto err; |
83 | | |
84 | 15.4k | is_private = (d != NULL); |
85 | | |
86 | 15.4k | if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)) |
87 | 0 | goto err; |
88 | 15.4k | n = e = d = NULL; |
89 | | |
90 | 15.4k | if (is_private) { |
91 | 15.4k | if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
92 | 15.4k | ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names) |
93 | 15.4k | || !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
94 | 15.4k | ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names) |
95 | 15.4k | || !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
96 | 15.4k | ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names)) |
97 | 0 | goto err; |
98 | | |
99 | | /* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d */ |
100 | 15.4k | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 |
101 | 15.4k | && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) |
102 | 0 | goto err; |
103 | 15.4k | } |
104 | | |
105 | | |
106 | 15.4k | sk_BIGNUM_free(factors); |
107 | 15.4k | sk_BIGNUM_free(exps); |
108 | 15.4k | sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs); |
109 | 15.4k | return 1; |
110 | | |
111 | 0 | err: |
112 | 0 | BN_free(n); |
113 | 0 | BN_free(e); |
114 | 0 | BN_free(d); |
115 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_free); |
116 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_free); |
117 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_free); |
118 | 0 | return 0; |
119 | 15.4k | } |
120 | | |
121 | | DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) |
122 | | |
123 | | int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[], |
124 | | int include_private) |
125 | 135k | { |
126 | 135k | int ret = 0; |
127 | 135k | const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; |
128 | 135k | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
129 | 135k | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
130 | 135k | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
131 | | |
132 | 135k | if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) |
133 | 0 | goto err; |
134 | | |
135 | 135k | RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); |
136 | 135k | ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs); |
137 | | |
138 | 135k | if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n) |
139 | 135k | || !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e)) |
140 | 0 | goto err; |
141 | | |
142 | | /* Check private key data integrity */ |
143 | 135k | if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) { |
144 | | |
145 | 37.0k | if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, |
146 | 37.0k | rsa_d) |
147 | 37.0k | || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
148 | 37.0k | ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names, |
149 | 37.0k | factors) |
150 | 37.0k | || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
151 | 37.0k | ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps) |
152 | 37.0k | || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
153 | 37.0k | ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names, |
154 | 37.0k | coeffs)) |
155 | 0 | goto err; |
156 | 37.0k | } |
157 | | |
158 | | #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) |
159 | | /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */ |
160 | | if (bld == NULL) |
161 | | ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params); |
162 | | #endif |
163 | 135k | ret = 1; |
164 | 135k | err: |
165 | 135k | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors); |
166 | 135k | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps); |
167 | 135k | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs); |
168 | 135k | return ret; |
169 | 135k | } |
170 | | |
171 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, |
172 | | OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
173 | 39.6k | { |
174 | 39.6k | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { |
175 | 22.9k | int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); |
176 | 22.9k | int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss); |
177 | 22.9k | int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); |
178 | 22.9k | int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); |
179 | 22.9k | int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL); |
180 | 22.9k | int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
181 | 22.9k | int default_maskgenhashalg_nid = |
182 | 22.9k | ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL); |
183 | 22.9k | const char *mdname = |
184 | 22.9k | (hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid |
185 | 22.9k | ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid)); |
186 | 22.9k | const char *mgfname = |
187 | 22.9k | (maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid |
188 | 22.9k | ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid)); |
189 | 22.9k | const char *mgf1mdname = |
190 | 22.9k | (maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid |
191 | 22.9k | ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid)); |
192 | 22.9k | const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST; |
193 | 22.9k | const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC; |
194 | 22.9k | const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST; |
195 | 22.9k | const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN; |
196 | | |
197 | | /* |
198 | | * To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient, |
199 | | * we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even |
200 | | * if it has a default value; saltlen. |
201 | | */ |
202 | 22.9k | if ((mdname != NULL |
203 | 22.9k | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname)) |
204 | 22.9k | || (mgfname != NULL |
205 | 22.9k | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, |
206 | 0 | key_mgf, mgfname)) |
207 | 22.9k | || (mgf1mdname != NULL |
208 | 22.9k | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, |
209 | 0 | key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname)) |
210 | 22.9k | || (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen))) |
211 | 0 | return 0; |
212 | 22.9k | } |
213 | 39.6k | return 1; |
214 | 39.6k | } |
215 | | |
216 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params, |
217 | | int *defaults_set, |
218 | | const OSSL_PARAM params[], |
219 | | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
220 | 4.54k | { |
221 | 4.54k | const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen; |
222 | 4.54k | const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq; |
223 | 4.54k | const char *propq = NULL; |
224 | 4.54k | EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
225 | 4.54k | int saltlen; |
226 | 4.54k | int ret = 0; |
227 | | |
228 | 4.54k | if (pss_params == NULL) |
229 | 0 | return 0; |
230 | 4.54k | param_propq = |
231 | 4.54k | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS); |
232 | 4.54k | param_md = |
233 | 4.54k | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST); |
234 | 4.54k | param_mgf = |
235 | 4.54k | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC); |
236 | 4.54k | param_mgf1md = |
237 | 4.54k | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST); |
238 | 4.54k | param_saltlen = |
239 | 4.54k | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN); |
240 | | |
241 | 4.54k | if (param_propq != NULL) { |
242 | 0 | if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
243 | 0 | propq = param_propq->data; |
244 | 0 | } |
245 | | /* |
246 | | * If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some |
247 | | * restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each |
248 | | * parameter override their specific restriction data. |
249 | | */ |
250 | 4.54k | if (!*defaults_set |
251 | 4.54k | && (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL |
252 | 4.54k | || param_saltlen != NULL)) { |
253 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params)) |
254 | 0 | return 0; |
255 | 0 | *defaults_set = 1; |
256 | 0 | } |
257 | | |
258 | 4.54k | if (param_mgf != NULL) { |
259 | 0 | int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
260 | 0 | const char *mgfname = NULL; |
261 | |
|
262 | 0 | if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
263 | 0 | mgfname = param_mgf->data; |
264 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname)) |
265 | 0 | return 0; |
266 | | |
267 | 0 | if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(param_mgf->data, |
268 | 0 | ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0) |
269 | 0 | return 0; |
270 | 0 | } |
271 | | |
272 | | /* |
273 | | * We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the |
274 | | * exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below. |
275 | | */ |
276 | | |
277 | 4.54k | if (param_md != NULL) { |
278 | 0 | const char *mdname = NULL; |
279 | |
|
280 | 0 | if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
281 | 0 | mdname = param_md->data; |
282 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname)) |
283 | 0 | goto err; |
284 | | |
285 | 0 | if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL |
286 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params, |
287 | 0 | ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md))) |
288 | 0 | goto err; |
289 | 0 | } |
290 | | |
291 | 4.54k | if (param_mgf1md != NULL) { |
292 | 0 | const char *mgf1mdname = NULL; |
293 | |
|
294 | 0 | if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
295 | 0 | mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data; |
296 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname)) |
297 | 0 | goto err; |
298 | | |
299 | 0 | if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL |
300 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg( |
301 | 0 | pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md))) |
302 | 0 | goto err; |
303 | 0 | } |
304 | | |
305 | 4.54k | if (param_saltlen != NULL) { |
306 | 0 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen) |
307 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen)) |
308 | 0 | goto err; |
309 | 0 | } |
310 | | |
311 | 4.54k | ret = 1; |
312 | | |
313 | 4.54k | err: |
314 | 4.54k | EVP_MD_free(md); |
315 | 4.54k | EVP_MD_free(mgf1md); |
316 | 4.54k | return ret; |
317 | 4.54k | } |
318 | | |
319 | | int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa) |
320 | 128k | { |
321 | 128k | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
322 | 128k | if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) |
323 | 0 | return 1; |
324 | 128k | #endif |
325 | 128k | return 0; |
326 | 128k | } |
327 | | |
328 | | static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f) |
329 | 95.9k | { |
330 | 95.9k | if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL) |
331 | 0 | return 0; |
332 | 95.9k | return 1; |
333 | 95.9k | } |
334 | | |
335 | | RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection) |
336 | 1.33k | { |
337 | 1.33k | RSA *dupkey = NULL; |
338 | 1.33k | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
339 | 1.33k | int pnum, i; |
340 | 1.33k | #endif |
341 | | |
342 | | /* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */ |
343 | 1.33k | if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa)) |
344 | 0 | return NULL; |
345 | | |
346 | 1.33k | if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL) |
347 | 0 | return NULL; |
348 | | |
349 | | /* public key */ |
350 | 1.33k | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) { |
351 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n)) |
352 | 0 | goto err; |
353 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e)) |
354 | 0 | goto err; |
355 | 1.33k | } |
356 | | |
357 | 1.33k | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) { |
358 | | |
359 | | /* private key */ |
360 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d)) |
361 | 0 | goto err; |
362 | | |
363 | | /* factors and crt params */ |
364 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p)) |
365 | 0 | goto err; |
366 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q)) |
367 | 0 | goto err; |
368 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1)) |
369 | 0 | goto err; |
370 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1)) |
371 | 0 | goto err; |
372 | 1.33k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp)) |
373 | 0 | goto err; |
374 | 1.33k | } |
375 | | |
376 | 1.33k | dupkey->version = rsa->version; |
377 | 1.33k | dupkey->flags = rsa->flags; |
378 | | /* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */ |
379 | 1.33k | dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params; |
380 | | |
381 | 1.33k | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
382 | | /* multiprime */ |
383 | 1.33k | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0 |
384 | 1.33k | && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) { |
385 | 198 | dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
386 | 198 | if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL) |
387 | 0 | goto err; |
388 | 28.6k | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
389 | 28.4k | const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; |
390 | 28.4k | RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL; |
391 | | |
392 | 28.4k | if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL) { |
393 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
394 | 0 | goto err; |
395 | 0 | } |
396 | | /* push first so cleanup in error case works */ |
397 | 28.4k | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo); |
398 | | |
399 | 28.4k | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i); |
400 | 28.4k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r)) |
401 | 0 | goto err; |
402 | 28.4k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d)) |
403 | 0 | goto err; |
404 | 28.4k | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t)) |
405 | 0 | goto err; |
406 | 28.4k | } |
407 | 198 | if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey)) |
408 | 0 | goto err; |
409 | 198 | } |
410 | | |
411 | 1.33k | if (rsa->pss != NULL) { |
412 | 4 | dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss); |
413 | 4 | if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL |
414 | 4 | && dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) { |
415 | 0 | dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm); |
416 | 0 | if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL) |
417 | 0 | goto err; |
418 | 0 | } |
419 | 4 | } |
420 | 1.33k | if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, |
421 | 1.33k | &dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data)) |
422 | 0 | goto err; |
423 | 1.33k | #endif |
424 | | |
425 | 1.33k | return dupkey; |
426 | | |
427 | 0 | err: |
428 | 0 | RSA_free(dupkey); |
429 | 0 | return NULL; |
430 | 1.33k | } |
431 | | |
432 | | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
433 | | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg) |
434 | 31.6k | { |
435 | 31.6k | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; |
436 | | |
437 | 31.6k | pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), |
438 | 31.6k | alg->parameter); |
439 | | |
440 | 31.6k | if (pss == NULL) |
441 | 3.26k | return NULL; |
442 | | |
443 | 28.3k | if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) { |
444 | 532 | pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); |
445 | 532 | if (pss->maskHash == NULL) { |
446 | 167 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); |
447 | 167 | return NULL; |
448 | 167 | } |
449 | 532 | } |
450 | | |
451 | 28.2k | return pss; |
452 | 28.3k | } |
453 | | |
454 | | static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa) |
455 | 22.9k | { |
456 | 22.9k | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL; |
457 | 22.9k | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL; |
458 | | |
459 | 22.9k | if (rsa != NULL |
460 | 22.9k | && (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL |
461 | 22.9k | && (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) { |
462 | 22.9k | const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
463 | 22.9k | int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField; |
464 | 22.9k | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
465 | | |
466 | | /* |
467 | | * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just |
468 | | * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible |
469 | | * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test |
470 | | * a bad situation. |
471 | | * |
472 | | * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will |
473 | | * be checked, eventually. |
474 | | */ |
475 | 22.9k | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md, |
476 | 22.9k | &saltlen, &trailerField)) |
477 | 0 | return 0; |
478 | 22.9k | md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); |
479 | 22.9k | mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md); |
480 | 22.9k | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params) |
481 | 22.9k | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid) |
482 | 22.9k | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, |
483 | 22.9k | mgf1md_nid) |
484 | 22.9k | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen) |
485 | 22.9k | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params, |
486 | 22.9k | trailerField)) |
487 | 0 | return 0; |
488 | 22.9k | *pss = pss_params; |
489 | 22.9k | } |
490 | 22.9k | return 1; |
491 | 22.9k | } |
492 | | |
493 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, |
494 | | const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, |
495 | | int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField) |
496 | 28.0k | { |
497 | 28.0k | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
498 | | |
499 | | /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */ |
500 | 28.0k | (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params); |
501 | | |
502 | 28.0k | if (pss == NULL) |
503 | 804 | return 0; |
504 | 27.2k | *pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); |
505 | 27.2k | if (*pmd == NULL) |
506 | 10 | return 0; |
507 | 27.2k | *pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash); |
508 | 27.2k | if (*pmgf1md == NULL) |
509 | 8 | return 0; |
510 | 27.2k | if (pss->saltLength) |
511 | 37 | *psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); |
512 | 27.2k | else |
513 | 27.2k | *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params); |
514 | 27.2k | if (pss->trailerField) |
515 | 7 | *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField); |
516 | 27.2k | else |
517 | 27.2k | *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);; |
518 | | |
519 | 27.2k | return 1; |
520 | 27.2k | } |
521 | | |
522 | | int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg) |
523 | 104k | { |
524 | 104k | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; |
525 | 104k | const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; |
526 | 104k | const void *algp; |
527 | 104k | int algptype; |
528 | | |
529 | 104k | X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg); |
530 | 104k | if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
531 | 61.8k | return 1; |
532 | 42.7k | if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) |
533 | 16.7k | return 1; |
534 | 25.9k | if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { |
535 | 2.58k | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); |
536 | 2.58k | return 0; |
537 | 2.58k | } |
538 | 23.3k | if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL |
539 | 23.3k | || !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) { |
540 | 456 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); |
541 | 456 | return 0; |
542 | 456 | } |
543 | 22.9k | if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa)) |
544 | 0 | return 0; |
545 | 22.9k | return 1; |
546 | 22.9k | } |
547 | | |
548 | | RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, |
549 | | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) |
550 | 4.63k | { |
551 | 4.63k | const unsigned char *p; |
552 | 4.63k | RSA *rsa; |
553 | 4.63k | int pklen; |
554 | 4.63k | const X509_ALGOR *alg; |
555 | | |
556 | 4.63k | if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf)) |
557 | 0 | return 0; |
558 | 4.63k | rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen); |
559 | 4.63k | if (rsa == NULL) { |
560 | 51 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
561 | 51 | return NULL; |
562 | 51 | } |
563 | 4.58k | if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { |
564 | 15 | RSA_free(rsa); |
565 | 15 | return NULL; |
566 | 15 | } |
567 | | |
568 | 4.56k | RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK); |
569 | 4.56k | switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) { |
570 | 4.55k | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
571 | 4.55k | RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA); |
572 | 4.55k | break; |
573 | 12 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS: |
574 | 12 | RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS); |
575 | 12 | break; |
576 | 0 | default: |
577 | | /* Leave the type bits zero */ |
578 | 0 | break; |
579 | 4.56k | } |
580 | | |
581 | 4.56k | return rsa; |
582 | 4.56k | } |
583 | | #endif |