/*-

 * Copyright 2007-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019

 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019

 *

 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 *

 * CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb.

 */

#include "crmf_local.h"

#include <openssl/rand.h> /* for RAND_bytes_ex() */

#include "internal/sizes.h" /* for OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE */

#include <openssl/err.h>

/*-

 * creates and initializes OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER (section 4.4)

 * |slen| SHOULD be at least 8 (16 is common)

 * |owfnid| e.g., NID_sha256

 * |itercnt| MUST be >= 100 (e.g., 500) and <= OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT

 * |macnid| e.g., NID_hmac_sha1

 * returns pointer to OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER on success, NULL on error

 */

OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, size_t slen,

                                           int owfnid, size_t itercnt,

                                           int macnid)

{

    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;

    unsigned char *salt = NULL;

    if ((pbm = OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_new()) == NULL)

        goto err;

    /*

     * salt contains a randomly generated value used in computing the key

     * of the MAC process.  The salt SHOULD be at least 8 octets (64

     * bits) long.

     */

    if ((salt = OPENSSL_malloc(slen)) == NULL)

        goto err;

    if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, salt, slen, 0) <= 0) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM);

        goto err;

    }

    if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pbm->salt, salt, (int)slen))

        goto err;

    /*

     * owf identifies the hash algorithm and associated parameters used to

     * compute the key used in the MAC process.  All implementations MUST

     * support SHA-1.

     */

    if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pbm->owf, OBJ_nid2obj(owfnid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_SETTING_OWF_ALGOR_FAILURE);

        goto err;

    }

    /*

     * iterationCount identifies the number of times the hash is applied

     * during the key computation process.  The iterationCount MUST be a

     * minimum of 100. Many people suggest using values as high as 1000

     * iterations as the minimum value.  The trade off here is between

     * protection of the password from attacks and the time spent by the

     * server processing all of the different iterations in deriving

     * passwords.  Hashing is generally considered a cheap operation but

     * this may not be true with all hash functions in the future.

     */

    if (itercnt < 100) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_ITERATIONCOUNT_BELOW_100);

        goto err;

    }

    if (itercnt > OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_BAD_PBM_ITERATIONCOUNT);

        goto err;

    }

    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pbm->iterationCount, (long)itercnt)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_CRMFERROR);

        goto err;

    }

    /*

     * mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC

     * function to be used.  All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC].

     * All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11].

     */

    if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pbm->mac, OBJ_nid2obj(macnid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_SETTING_MAC_ALGOR_FAILURE);

        goto err;

    }

    OPENSSL_free(salt);

    return pbm;

 err:

    OPENSSL_free(salt);

    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);

    return NULL;

}

/*-

 * calculates the PBM based on the settings of the given OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER

 * |pbmp| identifies the algorithms, salt to use

 * |msg| message to apply the PBM for

 * |msglen| length of the message

 * |sec| key to use

 * |seclen| length of the key

 * |out| pointer to the computed mac, will be set on success

 * |outlen| if not NULL, will set variable to the length of the mac on success

 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error

 */

/* could be combined with other MAC calculations in the library */

int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,

                      const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp,

                      const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen,

                      const unsigned char *sec, size_t seclen,

                      unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)

{

    int mac_nid, hmac_md_nid = NID_undef;

    char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];

    char hmac_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];

    EVP_MD *owf = NULL;

    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    unsigned char basekey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    unsigned int bklen = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;

    int64_t iterations;

    unsigned char *mac_res = 0;

    int ok = 0;

    if (out == NULL || pbmp == NULL || pbmp->mac == NULL

            || pbmp->mac->algorithm == NULL || msg == NULL || sec == NULL) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);

        goto err;

    }

    if ((mac_res = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) == NULL)

        goto err;

    /*

     * owf identifies the hash algorithm and associated parameters used to

     * compute the key used in the MAC process.  All implementations MUST

     * support SHA-1.

     */

    OBJ_obj2txt(mdname, sizeof(mdname), pbmp->owf->algorithm, 0);

    if ((owf = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);

        goto err;

    }

    if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)

        goto err;

    /* compute the basekey of the salted secret */

    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, owf, NULL))

        goto err;

    /* first the secret */

    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sec, seclen))

        goto err;

    /* then the salt */

    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pbmp->salt->data, pbmp->salt->length))

        goto err;

    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, basekey, &bklen))

        goto err;

    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&iterations, pbmp->iterationCount)

            || iterations < 100 /* min from RFC */

            || iterations > OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_BAD_PBM_ITERATIONCOUNT);

        goto err;

    }

    /* the first iteration was already done above */

    while (--iterations > 0) {

        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, owf, NULL))

            goto err;

        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, basekey, bklen))

            goto err;

        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, basekey, &bklen))

            goto err;

    }

    /*

     * mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC

     * function to be used.  All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC].

     * All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11].

     */

    mac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(pbmp->mac->algorithm);

    if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, mac_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, NULL)

        || OBJ_obj2txt(hmac_mdname, sizeof(hmac_mdname),

                       OBJ_nid2obj(hmac_md_nid), 0) <= 0) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);

        goto err;

    }

    /* could be generalized to allow non-HMAC: */

    if (EVP_Q_mac(libctx, "HMAC", propq, hmac_mdname, NULL, basekey, bklen,

                  msg, msglen, mac_res, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, outlen) == NULL)

        goto err;

    ok = 1;

 err:

    OPENSSL_cleanse(basekey, bklen);

    EVP_MD_free(owf);

    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);

    if (ok == 1) {

        *out = mac_res;

        return 1;

    }

    OPENSSL_free(mac_res);

    if (pbmp != NULL && pbmp->mac != NULL) {

        char buf[128];

        if (OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), pbmp->mac->algorithm, 0))

            ERR_add_error_data(1, buf);

    }

    return 0;

}