/src/openssl30/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2001-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * This file uses the low level AES functions (which are deprecated for |
12 | | * non-internal use) in order to implement the EVP AES ciphers. |
13 | | */ |
14 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
15 | | |
16 | | #include <string.h> |
17 | | #include <assert.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
20 | | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
21 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
22 | | #include <openssl/aes.h> |
23 | | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
24 | | #include <openssl/cmac.h> |
25 | | #include "crypto/evp.h" |
26 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
27 | | #include "crypto/modes.h" |
28 | | #include "crypto/siv.h" |
29 | | #include "crypto/aes_platform.h" |
30 | | #include "evp_local.h" |
31 | | |
32 | | typedef struct { |
33 | | union { |
34 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
35 | | AES_KEY ks; |
36 | | } ks; |
37 | | block128_f block; |
38 | | union { |
39 | | cbc128_f cbc; |
40 | | ctr128_f ctr; |
41 | | } stream; |
42 | | } EVP_AES_KEY; |
43 | | |
44 | | typedef struct { |
45 | | union { |
46 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
47 | | AES_KEY ks; |
48 | | } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ |
49 | | int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ |
50 | | int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ |
51 | | GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; |
52 | | unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ |
53 | | int ivlen; /* IV length */ |
54 | | int taglen; |
55 | | int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */ |
56 | | int iv_gen_rand; /* No IV was specified, so generate a rand IV */ |
57 | | int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ |
58 | | uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */ |
59 | | ctr128_f ctr; |
60 | | } EVP_AES_GCM_CTX; |
61 | | |
62 | | typedef struct { |
63 | | union { |
64 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
65 | | AES_KEY ks; |
66 | | } ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */ |
67 | | XTS128_CONTEXT xts; |
68 | | void (*stream)(const unsigned char *in, |
69 | | unsigned char *out, size_t length, |
70 | | const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, |
71 | | const unsigned char iv[16]); |
72 | | } EVP_AES_XTS_CTX; |
73 | | |
74 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
75 | | static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 0; |
76 | | #else |
77 | | static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 1; |
78 | | #endif |
79 | | |
80 | | typedef struct { |
81 | | union { |
82 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
83 | | AES_KEY ks; |
84 | | } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ |
85 | | int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ |
86 | | int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ |
87 | | int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */ |
88 | | int len_set; /* Set if message length set */ |
89 | | int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */ |
90 | | int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ |
91 | | CCM128_CONTEXT ccm; |
92 | | ccm128_f str; |
93 | | } EVP_AES_CCM_CTX; |
94 | | |
95 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
96 | | typedef struct { |
97 | | union { |
98 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
99 | | AES_KEY ks; |
100 | | } ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */ |
101 | | union { |
102 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
103 | | AES_KEY ks; |
104 | | } ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */ |
105 | | int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ |
106 | | int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ |
107 | | OCB128_CONTEXT ocb; |
108 | | unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ |
109 | | unsigned char tag[16]; |
110 | | unsigned char data_buf[16]; /* Store partial data blocks */ |
111 | | unsigned char aad_buf[16]; /* Store partial AAD blocks */ |
112 | | int data_buf_len; |
113 | | int aad_buf_len; |
114 | | int ivlen; /* IV length */ |
115 | | int taglen; |
116 | | } EVP_AES_OCB_CTX; |
117 | | #endif |
118 | | |
119 | 0 | #define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 4)) |
120 | | |
121 | | /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ |
122 | | static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) |
123 | 0 | { |
124 | 0 | int n = 8; |
125 | 0 | unsigned char c; |
126 | |
|
127 | 0 | do { |
128 | 0 | --n; |
129 | 0 | c = counter[n]; |
130 | 0 | ++c; |
131 | 0 | counter[n] = c; |
132 | 0 | if (c) |
133 | 0 | return; |
134 | 0 | } while (n); |
135 | 0 | } |
136 | | |
137 | | #if defined(AESNI_CAPABLE) |
138 | | #if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) |
139 | | #define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block == (block128_f)aesni_encrypt && gctx->gcm.ghash == gcm_ghash_avx) |
140 | | #undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */ |
141 | | #endif |
142 | | |
143 | | static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
144 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
145 | 0 | { |
146 | 0 | int ret, mode; |
147 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
148 | |
|
149 | 0 | mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); |
150 | 0 | if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
151 | 0 | && !enc) { |
152 | 0 | ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, |
153 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
154 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
155 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)aesni_decrypt; |
156 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
157 | 0 | } else { |
158 | 0 | ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, |
159 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
160 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
161 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)aesni_encrypt; |
162 | 0 | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
163 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aesni_cbc_encrypt; |
164 | 0 | else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
165 | 0 | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
166 | 0 | else |
167 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
168 | 0 | } |
169 | |
|
170 | 0 | if (ret < 0) { |
171 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); |
172 | 0 | return 0; |
173 | 0 | } |
174 | | |
175 | 0 | return 1; |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | | |
178 | | static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
179 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
180 | 0 | { |
181 | 0 | aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx)->ks.ks, |
182 | 0 | ctx->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); |
183 | |
|
184 | 0 | return 1; |
185 | 0 | } |
186 | | |
187 | | static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
188 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
189 | 0 | { |
190 | 0 | size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx); |
191 | |
|
192 | 0 | if (len < bl) |
193 | 0 | return 1; |
194 | | |
195 | 0 | aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx)->ks.ks, |
196 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); |
197 | |
|
198 | 0 | return 1; |
199 | 0 | } |
200 | | |
201 | | #define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher |
202 | | static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
203 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
204 | | |
205 | | #define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher |
206 | | static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
207 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
208 | | |
209 | | #define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher |
210 | | static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
211 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
212 | | |
213 | | #define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher |
214 | | static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
215 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
216 | | |
217 | | #define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher |
218 | | static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
219 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
220 | | |
221 | | static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
222 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
223 | 0 | { |
224 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
225 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
226 | 0 | return 1; |
227 | 0 | if (key) { |
228 | 0 | aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
229 | 0 | &gctx->ks.ks); |
230 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt); |
231 | 0 | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
232 | | /* |
233 | | * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
234 | | */ |
235 | 0 | if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
236 | 0 | iv = gctx->iv; |
237 | 0 | if (iv) { |
238 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
239 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
240 | 0 | } |
241 | 0 | gctx->key_set = 1; |
242 | 0 | } else { |
243 | | /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
244 | 0 | if (gctx->key_set) |
245 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
246 | 0 | else |
247 | 0 | memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
248 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
249 | 0 | gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
250 | 0 | } |
251 | 0 | return 1; |
252 | 0 | } |
253 | | |
254 | | #define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher |
255 | | static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
256 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
257 | | |
258 | | static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
259 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
260 | 0 | { |
261 | 0 | EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); |
262 | |
|
263 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
264 | 0 | return 1; |
265 | | |
266 | 0 | if (key) { |
267 | | /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ |
268 | 0 | const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) / 2; |
269 | 0 | const int bits = bytes * 8; |
270 | | |
271 | | /* |
272 | | * Verify that the two keys are different. |
273 | | * |
274 | | * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. |
275 | | * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. |
276 | | */ |
277 | 0 | if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) |
278 | 0 | && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { |
279 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); |
280 | 0 | return 0; |
281 | 0 | } |
282 | | |
283 | | /* key_len is two AES keys */ |
284 | 0 | if (enc) { |
285 | 0 | aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
286 | 0 | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aesni_encrypt; |
287 | 0 | xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt; |
288 | 0 | } else { |
289 | 0 | aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
290 | 0 | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aesni_decrypt; |
291 | 0 | xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt; |
292 | 0 | } |
293 | |
|
294 | 0 | aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
295 | 0 | xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)aesni_encrypt; |
296 | |
|
297 | 0 | xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
298 | 0 | } |
299 | | |
300 | 0 | if (iv) { |
301 | 0 | xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; |
302 | 0 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); |
303 | 0 | } |
304 | |
|
305 | 0 | return 1; |
306 | 0 | } |
307 | | |
308 | | #define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher |
309 | | static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
310 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
311 | | |
312 | | static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
313 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
314 | 0 | { |
315 | 0 | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
316 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
317 | 0 | return 1; |
318 | 0 | if (key) { |
319 | 0 | aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
320 | 0 | &cctx->ks.ks); |
321 | 0 | CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
322 | 0 | &cctx->ks, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt); |
323 | 0 | cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f)aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks : (ccm128_f)aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks; |
324 | 0 | cctx->key_set = 1; |
325 | 0 | } |
326 | 0 | if (iv) { |
327 | 0 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); |
328 | 0 | cctx->iv_set = 1; |
329 | 0 | } |
330 | 0 | return 1; |
331 | 0 | } |
332 | | |
333 | | #define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher |
334 | | static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
335 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
336 | | |
337 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
338 | | static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
339 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
340 | 0 | { |
341 | 0 | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); |
342 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
343 | 0 | return 1; |
344 | 0 | if (key) { |
345 | 0 | do { |
346 | | /* |
347 | | * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt |
348 | | * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the |
349 | | * decrypt for an encryption operation. |
350 | | */ |
351 | 0 | aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
352 | 0 | &octx->ksenc.ks); |
353 | 0 | aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
354 | 0 | &octx->ksdec.ks); |
355 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
356 | 0 | &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
357 | 0 | (block128_f)aesni_encrypt, |
358 | 0 | (block128_f)aesni_decrypt, |
359 | 0 | enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt |
360 | 0 | : aesni_ocb_decrypt)) |
361 | 0 | return 0; |
362 | 0 | } while (0); |
363 | | |
364 | | /* |
365 | | * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
366 | | */ |
367 | 0 | if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) |
368 | 0 | iv = octx->iv; |
369 | 0 | if (iv) { |
370 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) |
371 | 0 | != 1) |
372 | 0 | return 0; |
373 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 1; |
374 | 0 | } |
375 | 0 | octx->key_set = 1; |
376 | 0 | } else { |
377 | | /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
378 | 0 | if (octx->key_set) |
379 | 0 | CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); |
380 | 0 | else |
381 | 0 | memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); |
382 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 1; |
383 | 0 | } |
384 | 0 | return 1; |
385 | 0 | } |
386 | | |
387 | | #define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher |
388 | | static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
389 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
390 | | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ |
391 | | |
392 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
393 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
394 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, keylen / 8, ivlen, \ |
395 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
396 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
397 | | aesni_init_key, \ |
398 | | aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ |
399 | | NULL, \ |
400 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
401 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ |
402 | | }; \ |
403 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
404 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, \ |
405 | | keylen / 8, ivlen, \ |
406 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
407 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
408 | | aes_init_key, \ |
409 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
410 | | NULL, \ |
411 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
412 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ |
413 | | }; \ |
414 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
415 | 3.44k | { \ |
416 | 3.44k | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
417 | 3.44k | } Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 415 | 164 | { \ | 416 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 417 | 164 | } |
|
418 | | |
419 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
420 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
421 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ |
422 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
423 | | ivlen, \ |
424 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
425 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
426 | | aesni_##mode##_init_key, \ |
427 | | aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ |
428 | | aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
429 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
430 | | NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ |
431 | | }; \ |
432 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
433 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ |
434 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
435 | | ivlen, \ |
436 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
437 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
438 | | aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
439 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
440 | | aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
441 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
442 | | NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ |
443 | | }; \ |
444 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
445 | 1.80k | { \ |
446 | 1.80k | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
447 | 1.80k | } Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
Line | Count | Source | 445 | 164 | { \ | 446 | 164 | return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ | 447 | 164 | } |
|
448 | | |
449 | | #elif defined(SPARC_AES_CAPABLE) |
450 | | |
451 | | static int aes_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
452 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
453 | | { |
454 | | int ret, mode, bits; |
455 | | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
456 | | |
457 | | mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); |
458 | | bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
459 | | if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
460 | | && !enc) { |
461 | | ret = 0; |
462 | | aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); |
463 | | dat->block = (block128_f)aes_t4_decrypt; |
464 | | switch (bits) { |
465 | | case 128: |
466 | | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; |
467 | | break; |
468 | | case 192: |
469 | | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; |
470 | | break; |
471 | | case 256: |
472 | | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; |
473 | | break; |
474 | | default: |
475 | | ret = -1; |
476 | | } |
477 | | } else { |
478 | | ret = 0; |
479 | | aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); |
480 | | dat->block = (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt; |
481 | | switch (bits) { |
482 | | case 128: |
483 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
484 | | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt; |
485 | | else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
486 | | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
487 | | else |
488 | | dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
489 | | break; |
490 | | case 192: |
491 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
492 | | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt; |
493 | | else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
494 | | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
495 | | else |
496 | | dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
497 | | break; |
498 | | case 256: |
499 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
500 | | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt; |
501 | | else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
502 | | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
503 | | else |
504 | | dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
505 | | break; |
506 | | default: |
507 | | ret = -1; |
508 | | } |
509 | | } |
510 | | |
511 | | if (ret < 0) { |
512 | | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); |
513 | | return 0; |
514 | | } |
515 | | |
516 | | return 1; |
517 | | } |
518 | | |
519 | | #define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher |
520 | | static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
521 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
522 | | |
523 | | #define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher |
524 | | static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
525 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
526 | | |
527 | | #define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher |
528 | | static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
529 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
530 | | |
531 | | #define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher |
532 | | static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
533 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
534 | | |
535 | | #define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher |
536 | | static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
537 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
538 | | |
539 | | #define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher |
540 | | static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
541 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
542 | | |
543 | | #define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher |
544 | | static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
545 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
546 | | |
547 | | static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
548 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
549 | | { |
550 | | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
551 | | if (!iv && !key) |
552 | | return 1; |
553 | | if (key) { |
554 | | int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
555 | | aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks); |
556 | | CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
557 | | (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt); |
558 | | switch (bits) { |
559 | | case 128: |
560 | | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
561 | | break; |
562 | | case 192: |
563 | | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
564 | | break; |
565 | | case 256: |
566 | | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
567 | | break; |
568 | | default: |
569 | | return 0; |
570 | | } |
571 | | /* |
572 | | * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
573 | | */ |
574 | | if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
575 | | iv = gctx->iv; |
576 | | if (iv) { |
577 | | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
578 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
579 | | } |
580 | | gctx->key_set = 1; |
581 | | } else { |
582 | | /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
583 | | if (gctx->key_set) |
584 | | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
585 | | else |
586 | | memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
587 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
588 | | gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
589 | | } |
590 | | return 1; |
591 | | } |
592 | | |
593 | | #define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher |
594 | | static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
595 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
596 | | |
597 | | static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
598 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
599 | | { |
600 | | EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); |
601 | | |
602 | | if (!iv && !key) |
603 | | return 1; |
604 | | |
605 | | if (key) { |
606 | | /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ |
607 | | const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) / 2; |
608 | | const int bits = bytes * 8; |
609 | | |
610 | | /* |
611 | | * Verify that the two keys are different. |
612 | | * |
613 | | * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. |
614 | | * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. |
615 | | */ |
616 | | if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) |
617 | | && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { |
618 | | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); |
619 | | return 0; |
620 | | } |
621 | | |
622 | | xctx->stream = NULL; |
623 | | /* key_len is two AES keys */ |
624 | | if (enc) { |
625 | | aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
626 | | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt; |
627 | | switch (bits) { |
628 | | case 128: |
629 | | xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_encrypt; |
630 | | break; |
631 | | case 256: |
632 | | xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_encrypt; |
633 | | break; |
634 | | default: |
635 | | return 0; |
636 | | } |
637 | | } else { |
638 | | aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
639 | | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aes_t4_decrypt; |
640 | | switch (bits) { |
641 | | case 128: |
642 | | xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_decrypt; |
643 | | break; |
644 | | case 256: |
645 | | xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_decrypt; |
646 | | break; |
647 | | default: |
648 | | return 0; |
649 | | } |
650 | | } |
651 | | |
652 | | aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
653 | | xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt; |
654 | | |
655 | | xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
656 | | } |
657 | | |
658 | | if (iv) { |
659 | | xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; |
660 | | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); |
661 | | } |
662 | | |
663 | | return 1; |
664 | | } |
665 | | |
666 | | #define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher |
667 | | static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
668 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
669 | | |
670 | | static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
671 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
672 | | { |
673 | | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
674 | | if (!iv && !key) |
675 | | return 1; |
676 | | if (key) { |
677 | | int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
678 | | aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks); |
679 | | CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
680 | | &cctx->ks, (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt); |
681 | | cctx->str = NULL; |
682 | | cctx->key_set = 1; |
683 | | } |
684 | | if (iv) { |
685 | | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); |
686 | | cctx->iv_set = 1; |
687 | | } |
688 | | return 1; |
689 | | } |
690 | | |
691 | | #define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher |
692 | | static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
693 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
694 | | |
695 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
696 | | static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
697 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
698 | | { |
699 | | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); |
700 | | if (!iv && !key) |
701 | | return 1; |
702 | | if (key) { |
703 | | do { |
704 | | /* |
705 | | * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt |
706 | | * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the |
707 | | * decrypt for an encryption operation. |
708 | | */ |
709 | | aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
710 | | &octx->ksenc.ks); |
711 | | aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
712 | | &octx->ksdec.ks); |
713 | | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
714 | | &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
715 | | (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt, |
716 | | (block128_f)aes_t4_decrypt, |
717 | | NULL)) |
718 | | return 0; |
719 | | } while (0); |
720 | | |
721 | | /* |
722 | | * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
723 | | */ |
724 | | if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) |
725 | | iv = octx->iv; |
726 | | if (iv) { |
727 | | if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) |
728 | | != 1) |
729 | | return 0; |
730 | | octx->iv_set = 1; |
731 | | } |
732 | | octx->key_set = 1; |
733 | | } else { |
734 | | /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
735 | | if (octx->key_set) |
736 | | CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); |
737 | | else |
738 | | memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); |
739 | | octx->iv_set = 1; |
740 | | } |
741 | | return 1; |
742 | | } |
743 | | |
744 | | #define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher |
745 | | static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
746 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
747 | | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ |
748 | | |
749 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV |
750 | | #define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key |
751 | | #define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher |
752 | | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */ |
753 | | |
754 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
755 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
756 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, keylen / 8, ivlen, \ |
757 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
758 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
759 | | aes_t4_init_key, \ |
760 | | aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ |
761 | | NULL, \ |
762 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
763 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ |
764 | | }; \ |
765 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
766 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, \ |
767 | | keylen / 8, ivlen, \ |
768 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
769 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
770 | | aes_init_key, \ |
771 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
772 | | NULL, \ |
773 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
774 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ |
775 | | }; \ |
776 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
777 | | { \ |
778 | | return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE ? &aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
779 | | } |
780 | | |
781 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
782 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
783 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ |
784 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
785 | | ivlen, \ |
786 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
787 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
788 | | aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \ |
789 | | aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ |
790 | | aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
791 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
792 | | NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ |
793 | | }; \ |
794 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
795 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ |
796 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
797 | | ivlen, \ |
798 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
799 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
800 | | aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
801 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
802 | | aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
803 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
804 | | NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ |
805 | | }; \ |
806 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
807 | | { \ |
808 | | return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE ? &aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
809 | | } |
810 | | |
811 | | #elif defined(S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE) |
812 | | /* IBM S390X support */ |
813 | | typedef struct { |
814 | | union { |
815 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
816 | | /*- |
817 | | * KM-AES parameter block - begin |
818 | | * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06) |
819 | | */ |
820 | | struct { |
821 | | unsigned char k[32]; |
822 | | } param; |
823 | | /* KM-AES parameter block - end */ |
824 | | } km; |
825 | | unsigned int fc; |
826 | | } S390X_AES_ECB_CTX; |
827 | | |
828 | | typedef struct { |
829 | | union { |
830 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
831 | | /*- |
832 | | * KMO-AES parameter block - begin |
833 | | * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) |
834 | | */ |
835 | | struct { |
836 | | unsigned char cv[16]; |
837 | | unsigned char k[32]; |
838 | | } param; |
839 | | /* KMO-AES parameter block - end */ |
840 | | } kmo; |
841 | | unsigned int fc; |
842 | | } S390X_AES_OFB_CTX; |
843 | | |
844 | | typedef struct { |
845 | | union { |
846 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
847 | | /*- |
848 | | * KMF-AES parameter block - begin |
849 | | * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) |
850 | | */ |
851 | | struct { |
852 | | unsigned char cv[16]; |
853 | | unsigned char k[32]; |
854 | | } param; |
855 | | /* KMF-AES parameter block - end */ |
856 | | } kmf; |
857 | | unsigned int fc; |
858 | | } S390X_AES_CFB_CTX; |
859 | | |
860 | | typedef struct { |
861 | | union { |
862 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
863 | | /*- |
864 | | * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin |
865 | | * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11) |
866 | | */ |
867 | | struct { |
868 | | unsigned char reserved[12]; |
869 | | union { |
870 | | unsigned int w; |
871 | | unsigned char b[4]; |
872 | | } cv; |
873 | | union { |
874 | | unsigned long long g[2]; |
875 | | unsigned char b[16]; |
876 | | } t; |
877 | | unsigned char h[16]; |
878 | | unsigned long long taadl; |
879 | | unsigned long long tpcl; |
880 | | union { |
881 | | unsigned long long g[2]; |
882 | | unsigned int w[4]; |
883 | | } j0; |
884 | | unsigned char k[32]; |
885 | | } param; |
886 | | /* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */ |
887 | | } kma; |
888 | | unsigned int fc; |
889 | | int key_set; |
890 | | |
891 | | unsigned char *iv; |
892 | | int ivlen; |
893 | | int iv_set; |
894 | | int iv_gen; |
895 | | |
896 | | int taglen; |
897 | | |
898 | | unsigned char ares[16]; |
899 | | unsigned char mres[16]; |
900 | | unsigned char kres[16]; |
901 | | int areslen; |
902 | | int mreslen; |
903 | | int kreslen; |
904 | | |
905 | | int tls_aad_len; |
906 | | uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */ |
907 | | } S390X_AES_GCM_CTX; |
908 | | |
909 | | typedef struct { |
910 | | union { |
911 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
912 | | /*- |
913 | | * Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and |
914 | | * ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's |
915 | | * rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key |
916 | | * schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected). |
917 | | */ |
918 | | struct { |
919 | | unsigned char pad[16]; |
920 | | AES_KEY k; |
921 | | } key; |
922 | | |
923 | | struct { |
924 | | /*- |
925 | | * KMAC-AES parameter block - begin |
926 | | * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) |
927 | | */ |
928 | | struct { |
929 | | union { |
930 | | unsigned long long g[2]; |
931 | | unsigned char b[16]; |
932 | | } icv; |
933 | | unsigned char k[32]; |
934 | | } kmac_param; |
935 | | /* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */ |
936 | | |
937 | | union { |
938 | | unsigned long long g[2]; |
939 | | unsigned char b[16]; |
940 | | } nonce; |
941 | | union { |
942 | | unsigned long long g[2]; |
943 | | unsigned char b[16]; |
944 | | } buf; |
945 | | |
946 | | unsigned long long blocks; |
947 | | int l; |
948 | | int m; |
949 | | int tls_aad_len; |
950 | | int iv_set; |
951 | | int tag_set; |
952 | | int len_set; |
953 | | int key_set; |
954 | | |
955 | | unsigned char pad[140]; |
956 | | unsigned int fc; |
957 | | } ccm; |
958 | | } aes; |
959 | | } S390X_AES_CCM_CTX; |
960 | | |
961 | | #define s390x_aes_init_key aes_init_key |
962 | | static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
963 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc); |
964 | | |
965 | | #define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX EVP_AES_KEY |
966 | | |
967 | | #define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key |
968 | | |
969 | | #define s390x_aes_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher |
970 | | static int s390x_aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
971 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
972 | | |
973 | | static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
974 | | const unsigned char *key, |
975 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
976 | | { |
977 | | S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx); |
978 | | const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
979 | | |
980 | | cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
981 | | if (!enc) |
982 | | cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
983 | | |
984 | | memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen); |
985 | | return 1; |
986 | | } |
987 | | |
988 | | static int s390x_aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
989 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
990 | | { |
991 | | S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx); |
992 | | |
993 | | s390x_km(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->km.param); |
994 | | return 1; |
995 | | } |
996 | | |
997 | | static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
998 | | const unsigned char *key, |
999 | | const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) |
1000 | | { |
1001 | | S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx); |
1002 | | const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; |
1003 | | const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
1004 | | const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
1005 | | |
1006 | | memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
1007 | | memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen); |
1008 | | cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
1009 | | return 1; |
1010 | | } |
1011 | | |
1012 | | static int s390x_aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1013 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1014 | | { |
1015 | | S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx); |
1016 | | const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
1017 | | unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); |
1018 | | int n = ctx->num; |
1019 | | int rem; |
1020 | | |
1021 | | memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
1022 | | while (n && len) { |
1023 | | *out = *in ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n]; |
1024 | | n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
1025 | | --len; |
1026 | | ++in; |
1027 | | ++out; |
1028 | | } |
1029 | | |
1030 | | rem = len & 0xf; |
1031 | | |
1032 | | len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
1033 | | if (len) { |
1034 | | s390x_kmo(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmo.param); |
1035 | | |
1036 | | out += len; |
1037 | | in += len; |
1038 | | } |
1039 | | |
1040 | | if (rem) { |
1041 | | s390x_km(cctx->kmo.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmo.param.cv, cctx->fc, |
1042 | | cctx->kmo.param.k); |
1043 | | |
1044 | | while (rem--) { |
1045 | | out[n] = in[n] ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n]; |
1046 | | ++n; |
1047 | | } |
1048 | | } |
1049 | | |
1050 | | memcpy(iv, cctx->kmo.param.cv, ivlen); |
1051 | | ctx->num = n; |
1052 | | return 1; |
1053 | | } |
1054 | | |
1055 | | static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
1056 | | const unsigned char *key, |
1057 | | const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) |
1058 | | { |
1059 | | S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
1060 | | const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; |
1061 | | const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
1062 | | const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
1063 | | |
1064 | | cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
1065 | | cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */ |
1066 | | if (!enc) |
1067 | | cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
1068 | | |
1069 | | memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
1070 | | memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen); |
1071 | | return 1; |
1072 | | } |
1073 | | |
1074 | | static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1075 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1076 | | { |
1077 | | S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
1078 | | const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
1079 | | const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
1080 | | const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
1081 | | unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); |
1082 | | int n = ctx->num; |
1083 | | int rem; |
1084 | | unsigned char tmp; |
1085 | | |
1086 | | memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
1087 | | while (n && len) { |
1088 | | tmp = *in; |
1089 | | *out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp; |
1090 | | cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp; |
1091 | | n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
1092 | | --len; |
1093 | | ++in; |
1094 | | ++out; |
1095 | | } |
1096 | | |
1097 | | rem = len & 0xf; |
1098 | | |
1099 | | len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
1100 | | if (len) { |
1101 | | s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param); |
1102 | | |
1103 | | out += len; |
1104 | | in += len; |
1105 | | } |
1106 | | |
1107 | | if (rem) { |
1108 | | s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv, |
1109 | | S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k); |
1110 | | |
1111 | | while (rem--) { |
1112 | | tmp = in[n]; |
1113 | | out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp; |
1114 | | cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp; |
1115 | | ++n; |
1116 | | } |
1117 | | } |
1118 | | |
1119 | | memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen); |
1120 | | ctx->num = n; |
1121 | | return 1; |
1122 | | } |
1123 | | |
1124 | | static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
1125 | | const unsigned char *key, |
1126 | | const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) |
1127 | | { |
1128 | | S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
1129 | | const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; |
1130 | | const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
1131 | | const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
1132 | | |
1133 | | cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
1134 | | cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */ |
1135 | | if (!enc) |
1136 | | cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
1137 | | |
1138 | | memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
1139 | | memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen); |
1140 | | return 1; |
1141 | | } |
1142 | | |
1143 | | static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1144 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1145 | | { |
1146 | | S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
1147 | | const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
1148 | | unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); |
1149 | | |
1150 | | memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
1151 | | s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param); |
1152 | | memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen); |
1153 | | return 1; |
1154 | | } |
1155 | | |
1156 | | #define s390x_aes_cfb1_init_key aes_init_key |
1157 | | |
1158 | | #define s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher |
1159 | | static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1160 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
1161 | | |
1162 | | #define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX EVP_AES_KEY |
1163 | | |
1164 | | #define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key |
1165 | | |
1166 | | #define s390x_aes_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher |
1167 | | static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1168 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
1169 | | |
1170 | | /* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */ |
1171 | | #define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16) |
1172 | | |
1173 | | /*- |
1174 | | * Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is |
1175 | | * big-endian. |
1176 | | */ |
1177 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, |
1178 | | size_t len) |
1179 | | { |
1180 | | unsigned long long alen; |
1181 | | int n, rem; |
1182 | | |
1183 | | if (ctx->kma.param.tpcl) |
1184 | | return -2; |
1185 | | |
1186 | | alen = ctx->kma.param.taadl + len; |
1187 | | if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len)) |
1188 | | return -1; |
1189 | | ctx->kma.param.taadl = alen; |
1190 | | |
1191 | | n = ctx->areslen; |
1192 | | if (n) { |
1193 | | while (n && len) { |
1194 | | ctx->ares[n] = *aad; |
1195 | | n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
1196 | | ++aad; |
1197 | | --len; |
1198 | | } |
1199 | | /* ctx->ares contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */ |
1200 | | if (!n) { |
1201 | | s390x_kma(ctx->ares, 16, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); |
1202 | | ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
1203 | | } |
1204 | | ctx->areslen = n; |
1205 | | } |
1206 | | |
1207 | | rem = len & 0xf; |
1208 | | |
1209 | | len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
1210 | | if (len) { |
1211 | | s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); |
1212 | | aad += len; |
1213 | | ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
1214 | | } |
1215 | | |
1216 | | if (rem) { |
1217 | | ctx->areslen = rem; |
1218 | | |
1219 | | do { |
1220 | | --rem; |
1221 | | ctx->ares[rem] = aad[rem]; |
1222 | | } while (rem); |
1223 | | } |
1224 | | return 0; |
1225 | | } |
1226 | | |
1227 | | /*- |
1228 | | * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for |
1229 | | * success. Code is big-endian. |
1230 | | */ |
1231 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, |
1232 | | unsigned char *out, size_t len) |
1233 | | { |
1234 | | const unsigned char *inptr; |
1235 | | unsigned long long mlen; |
1236 | | union { |
1237 | | unsigned int w[4]; |
1238 | | unsigned char b[16]; |
1239 | | } buf; |
1240 | | size_t inlen; |
1241 | | int n, rem, i; |
1242 | | |
1243 | | mlen = ctx->kma.param.tpcl + len; |
1244 | | if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) |
1245 | | return -1; |
1246 | | ctx->kma.param.tpcl = mlen; |
1247 | | |
1248 | | n = ctx->mreslen; |
1249 | | if (n) { |
1250 | | inptr = in; |
1251 | | inlen = len; |
1252 | | while (n && inlen) { |
1253 | | ctx->mres[n] = *inptr; |
1254 | | n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
1255 | | ++inptr; |
1256 | | --inlen; |
1257 | | } |
1258 | | /* ctx->mres contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */ |
1259 | | if (!n) { |
1260 | | s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, ctx->mres, 16, buf.b, |
1261 | | ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param); |
1262 | | ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
1263 | | ctx->areslen = 0; |
1264 | | |
1265 | | /* previous call already encrypted/decrypted its remainder, |
1266 | | * see comment below */ |
1267 | | n = ctx->mreslen; |
1268 | | while (n) { |
1269 | | *out = buf.b[n]; |
1270 | | n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
1271 | | ++out; |
1272 | | ++in; |
1273 | | --len; |
1274 | | } |
1275 | | ctx->mreslen = 0; |
1276 | | } |
1277 | | } |
1278 | | |
1279 | | rem = len & 0xf; |
1280 | | |
1281 | | len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
1282 | | if (len) { |
1283 | | s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out, |
1284 | | ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param); |
1285 | | in += len; |
1286 | | out += len; |
1287 | | ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
1288 | | ctx->areslen = 0; |
1289 | | } |
1290 | | |
1291 | | /*- |
1292 | | * If there is a remainder, it has to be saved such that it can be |
1293 | | * processed by kma later. However, we also have to do the for-now |
1294 | | * unauthenticated encryption/decryption part here and now... |
1295 | | */ |
1296 | | if (rem) { |
1297 | | if (!ctx->mreslen) { |
1298 | | buf.w[0] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[0]; |
1299 | | buf.w[1] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[1]; |
1300 | | buf.w[2] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[2]; |
1301 | | buf.w[3] = ctx->kma.param.cv.w + 1; |
1302 | | s390x_km(buf.b, 16, ctx->kres, ctx->fc & 0x1f, &ctx->kma.param.k); |
1303 | | } |
1304 | | |
1305 | | n = ctx->mreslen; |
1306 | | for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) { |
1307 | | ctx->mres[n + i] = in[i]; |
1308 | | out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->kres[n + i]; |
1309 | | } |
1310 | | |
1311 | | ctx->mreslen += rem; |
1312 | | } |
1313 | | return 0; |
1314 | | } |
1315 | | |
1316 | | /*- |
1317 | | * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian. |
1318 | | */ |
1319 | | static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, |
1320 | | const unsigned char *iv) |
1321 | | { |
1322 | | ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0; |
1323 | | ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0; |
1324 | | ctx->kma.param.tpcl = 0; |
1325 | | ctx->kma.param.taadl = 0; |
1326 | | ctx->mreslen = 0; |
1327 | | ctx->areslen = 0; |
1328 | | ctx->kreslen = 0; |
1329 | | |
1330 | | if (ctx->ivlen == 12) { |
1331 | | memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, iv, ctx->ivlen); |
1332 | | ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3] = 1; |
1333 | | ctx->kma.param.cv.w = 1; |
1334 | | } else { |
1335 | | /* ctx->iv has the right size and is already padded. */ |
1336 | | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); |
1337 | | s390x_kma(ctx->iv, S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(ctx->ivlen), NULL, 0, NULL, |
1338 | | ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); |
1339 | | ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
1340 | | |
1341 | | ctx->kma.param.j0.g[0] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[0]; |
1342 | | ctx->kma.param.j0.g[1] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[1]; |
1343 | | ctx->kma.param.cv.w = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3]; |
1344 | | ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0; |
1345 | | ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0; |
1346 | | } |
1347 | | } |
1348 | | |
1349 | | /*- |
1350 | | * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control |
1351 | | * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. |
1352 | | * Code is big-endian. |
1353 | | */ |
1354 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
1355 | | { |
1356 | | S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c); |
1357 | | S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out; |
1358 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out; |
1359 | | unsigned char *buf; |
1360 | | int ivlen, enc, len; |
1361 | | |
1362 | | switch (type) { |
1363 | | case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
1364 | | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); |
1365 | | gctx->key_set = 0; |
1366 | | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
1367 | | gctx->ivlen = ivlen; |
1368 | | gctx->iv = c->iv; |
1369 | | gctx->taglen = -1; |
1370 | | gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
1371 | | gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
1372 | | return 1; |
1373 | | |
1374 | | case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
1375 | | *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; |
1376 | | return 1; |
1377 | | |
1378 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
1379 | | if (arg <= 0) |
1380 | | return 0; |
1381 | | |
1382 | | if (arg != 12) { |
1383 | | len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(arg); |
1384 | | |
1385 | | /* Allocate memory for iv if needed. */ |
1386 | | if (gctx->ivlen == 12 || len > S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen)) { |
1387 | | if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
1388 | | OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
1389 | | |
1390 | | if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { |
1391 | | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1392 | | return 0; |
1393 | | } |
1394 | | } |
1395 | | /* Add padding. */ |
1396 | | memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8); |
1397 | | *((unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + len - 8)) = arg << 3; |
1398 | | } |
1399 | | gctx->ivlen = arg; |
1400 | | return 1; |
1401 | | |
1402 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
1403 | | buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
1404 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
1405 | | if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || enc) |
1406 | | return 0; |
1407 | | |
1408 | | memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
1409 | | gctx->taglen = arg; |
1410 | | return 1; |
1411 | | |
1412 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
1413 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
1414 | | if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !enc || gctx->taglen < 0) |
1415 | | return 0; |
1416 | | |
1417 | | memcpy(ptr, gctx->kma.param.t.b, arg); |
1418 | | return 1; |
1419 | | |
1420 | | case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
1421 | | /* Special case: -1 length restores whole iv */ |
1422 | | if (arg == -1) { |
1423 | | memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); |
1424 | | gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
1425 | | return 1; |
1426 | | } |
1427 | | /* |
1428 | | * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least |
1429 | | * 8. |
1430 | | */ |
1431 | | if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) |
1432 | | return 0; |
1433 | | |
1434 | | if (arg) |
1435 | | memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); |
1436 | | |
1437 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
1438 | | if (enc && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) |
1439 | | return 0; |
1440 | | |
1441 | | gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
1442 | | return 1; |
1443 | | |
1444 | | case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: |
1445 | | if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) |
1446 | | return 0; |
1447 | | |
1448 | | s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv); |
1449 | | |
1450 | | if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) |
1451 | | arg = gctx->ivlen; |
1452 | | |
1453 | | memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); |
1454 | | /* |
1455 | | * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need |
1456 | | * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. |
1457 | | */ |
1458 | | ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); |
1459 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
1460 | | return 1; |
1461 | | |
1462 | | case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: |
1463 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
1464 | | if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || enc) |
1465 | | return 0; |
1466 | | |
1467 | | memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); |
1468 | | s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv); |
1469 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
1470 | | return 1; |
1471 | | |
1472 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
1473 | | /* Save the aad for later use. */ |
1474 | | if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
1475 | | return 0; |
1476 | | |
1477 | | buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
1478 | | memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
1479 | | gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; |
1480 | | gctx->tls_enc_records = 0; |
1481 | | |
1482 | | len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1]; |
1483 | | /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ |
1484 | | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
1485 | | return 0; |
1486 | | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1487 | | |
1488 | | /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ |
1489 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
1490 | | if (!enc) { |
1491 | | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) |
1492 | | return 0; |
1493 | | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
1494 | | } |
1495 | | buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
1496 | | buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
1497 | | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ |
1498 | | return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
1499 | | |
1500 | | case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
1501 | | out = ptr; |
1502 | | gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, out); |
1503 | | |
1504 | | if (gctx->iv == c->iv) { |
1505 | | gctx_out->iv = out->iv; |
1506 | | } else { |
1507 | | len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen); |
1508 | | |
1509 | | if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { |
1510 | | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1511 | | return 0; |
1512 | | } |
1513 | | |
1514 | | memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len); |
1515 | | } |
1516 | | return 1; |
1517 | | |
1518 | | default: |
1519 | | return -1; |
1520 | | } |
1521 | | } |
1522 | | |
1523 | | /*- |
1524 | | * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned. |
1525 | | */ |
1526 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
1527 | | const unsigned char *key, |
1528 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
1529 | | { |
1530 | | S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
1531 | | int keylen; |
1532 | | |
1533 | | if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
1534 | | return 1; |
1535 | | |
1536 | | if (key != NULL) { |
1537 | | keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
1538 | | memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen); |
1539 | | |
1540 | | gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
1541 | | if (!enc) |
1542 | | gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
1543 | | |
1544 | | if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
1545 | | iv = gctx->iv; |
1546 | | |
1547 | | if (iv != NULL) { |
1548 | | s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv); |
1549 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
1550 | | } |
1551 | | gctx->key_set = 1; |
1552 | | } else { |
1553 | | if (gctx->key_set) |
1554 | | s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv); |
1555 | | else |
1556 | | memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
1557 | | |
1558 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
1559 | | gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
1560 | | } |
1561 | | return 1; |
1562 | | } |
1563 | | |
1564 | | /*- |
1565 | | * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written |
1566 | | * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian. |
1567 | | */ |
1568 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1569 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1570 | | { |
1571 | | S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
1572 | | const unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
1573 | | const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
1574 | | int rv = -1; |
1575 | | |
1576 | | if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) |
1577 | | return -1; |
1578 | | |
1579 | | /* |
1580 | | * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness |
1581 | | * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the |
1582 | | * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting |
1583 | | * side only. |
1584 | | */ |
1585 | | if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { |
1586 | | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
1587 | | goto err; |
1588 | | } |
1589 | | |
1590 | | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, |
1591 | | EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) |
1592 | | <= 0) |
1593 | | goto err; |
1594 | | |
1595 | | in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1596 | | out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1597 | | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
1598 | | |
1599 | | gctx->kma.param.taadl = gctx->tls_aad_len << 3; |
1600 | | gctx->kma.param.tpcl = len << 3; |
1601 | | s390x_kma(buf, gctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, |
1602 | | gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param); |
1603 | | |
1604 | | if (enc) { |
1605 | | memcpy(out + len, gctx->kma.param.t.b, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); |
1606 | | rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
1607 | | } else { |
1608 | | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(gctx->kma.param.t.b, in + len, |
1609 | | EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { |
1610 | | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
1611 | | goto err; |
1612 | | } |
1613 | | rv = len; |
1614 | | } |
1615 | | err: |
1616 | | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
1617 | | gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
1618 | | return rv; |
1619 | | } |
1620 | | |
1621 | | /*- |
1622 | | * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional |
1623 | | * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate |
1624 | | * ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes |
1625 | | * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian. |
1626 | | */ |
1627 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1628 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1629 | | { |
1630 | | S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
1631 | | unsigned char *buf, tmp[16]; |
1632 | | int enc; |
1633 | | |
1634 | | if (!gctx->key_set) |
1635 | | return -1; |
1636 | | |
1637 | | if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) |
1638 | | return s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
1639 | | |
1640 | | if (!gctx->iv_set) |
1641 | | return -1; |
1642 | | |
1643 | | if (in != NULL) { |
1644 | | if (out == NULL) { |
1645 | | if (s390x_aes_gcm_aad(gctx, in, len)) |
1646 | | return -1; |
1647 | | } else { |
1648 | | if (s390x_aes_gcm(gctx, in, out, len)) |
1649 | | return -1; |
1650 | | } |
1651 | | return len; |
1652 | | } else { |
1653 | | gctx->kma.param.taadl <<= 3; |
1654 | | gctx->kma.param.tpcl <<= 3; |
1655 | | s390x_kma(gctx->ares, gctx->areslen, gctx->mres, gctx->mreslen, tmp, |
1656 | | gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param); |
1657 | | /* recall that we already did en-/decrypt gctx->mres |
1658 | | * and returned it to caller... */ |
1659 | | OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, gctx->mreslen); |
1660 | | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
1661 | | |
1662 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
1663 | | if (enc) { |
1664 | | gctx->taglen = 16; |
1665 | | } else { |
1666 | | if (gctx->taglen < 0) |
1667 | | return -1; |
1668 | | |
1669 | | buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
1670 | | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, gctx->kma.param.t.b, gctx->taglen)) |
1671 | | return -1; |
1672 | | } |
1673 | | return 0; |
1674 | | } |
1675 | | } |
1676 | | |
1677 | | static int s390x_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) |
1678 | | { |
1679 | | S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c); |
1680 | | |
1681 | | if (gctx == NULL) |
1682 | | return 0; |
1683 | | |
1684 | | if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
1685 | | OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
1686 | | |
1687 | | OPENSSL_cleanse(gctx, sizeof(*gctx)); |
1688 | | return 1; |
1689 | | } |
1690 | | |
1691 | | #define S390X_AES_XTS_CTX EVP_AES_XTS_CTX |
1692 | | |
1693 | | #define s390x_aes_xts_init_key aes_xts_init_key |
1694 | | static int s390x_aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
1695 | | const unsigned char *key, |
1696 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc); |
1697 | | #define s390x_aes_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher |
1698 | | static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1699 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
1700 | | #define s390x_aes_xts_ctrl aes_xts_ctrl |
1701 | | static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); |
1702 | | #define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup |
1703 | | |
1704 | | /*- |
1705 | | * Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian. |
1706 | | */ |
1707 | | static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, |
1708 | | const unsigned char *nonce, |
1709 | | size_t mlen) |
1710 | | { |
1711 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; |
1712 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen; |
1713 | | memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l); |
1714 | | } |
1715 | | |
1716 | | /*- |
1717 | | * Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian. |
1718 | | */ |
1719 | | static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, |
1720 | | size_t alen) |
1721 | | { |
1722 | | unsigned char *ptr; |
1723 | | int i, rem; |
1724 | | |
1725 | | if (!alen) |
1726 | | return; |
1727 | | |
1728 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; |
1729 | | |
1730 | | /* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */ |
1731 | | ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b; |
1732 | | |
1733 | | if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) { |
1734 | | *(uint16_t *)ptr = alen; |
1735 | | i = 2; |
1736 | | } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8 |
1737 | | && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) { |
1738 | | *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff; |
1739 | | *(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; |
1740 | | i = 10; |
1741 | | } else { |
1742 | | *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe; |
1743 | | *(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; |
1744 | | i = 6; |
1745 | | } |
1746 | | |
1747 | | while (i < 16 && alen) { |
1748 | | ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad; |
1749 | | ++aad; |
1750 | | --alen; |
1751 | | ++i; |
1752 | | } |
1753 | | while (i < 16) { |
1754 | | ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0; |
1755 | | ++i; |
1756 | | } |
1757 | | |
1758 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0; |
1759 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0; |
1760 | | s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
1761 | | &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
1762 | | ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2; |
1763 | | |
1764 | | rem = alen & 0xf; |
1765 | | alen &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
1766 | | if (alen) { |
1767 | | s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
1768 | | ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4; |
1769 | | aad += alen; |
1770 | | } |
1771 | | if (rem) { |
1772 | | for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) |
1773 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i]; |
1774 | | |
1775 | | s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, |
1776 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
1777 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
1778 | | ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; |
1779 | | } |
1780 | | } |
1781 | | |
1782 | | /*- |
1783 | | * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for |
1784 | | * success. |
1785 | | */ |
1786 | | static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, |
1787 | | unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc) |
1788 | | { |
1789 | | size_t n, rem; |
1790 | | unsigned int i, l, num; |
1791 | | unsigned char flags; |
1792 | | |
1793 | | flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0]; |
1794 | | if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) { |
1795 | | s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, |
1796 | | ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
1797 | | ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; |
1798 | | } |
1799 | | l = flags & 0x7; |
1800 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l; |
1801 | | |
1802 | | /*- |
1803 | | * Reconstruct length from encoded length field |
1804 | | * and initialize it with counter value. |
1805 | | */ |
1806 | | n = 0; |
1807 | | for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) { |
1808 | | n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i]; |
1809 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; |
1810 | | n <<= 8; |
1811 | | } |
1812 | | n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15]; |
1813 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1; |
1814 | | |
1815 | | if (n != len) |
1816 | | return -1; /* length mismatch */ |
1817 | | |
1818 | | if (enc) { |
1819 | | /* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */ |
1820 | | ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1; |
1821 | | if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61)) |
1822 | | return -2; /* too much data */ |
1823 | | } |
1824 | | |
1825 | | num = 0; |
1826 | | rem = len & 0xf; |
1827 | | len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
1828 | | |
1829 | | if (enc) { |
1830 | | /* mac-then-encrypt */ |
1831 | | if (len) |
1832 | | s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
1833 | | if (rem) { |
1834 | | for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) |
1835 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i]; |
1836 | | |
1837 | | s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, |
1838 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
1839 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
1840 | | } |
1841 | | |
1842 | | CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, |
1843 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, |
1844 | | &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); |
1845 | | } else { |
1846 | | /* decrypt-then-mac */ |
1847 | | CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, |
1848 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, |
1849 | | &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); |
1850 | | |
1851 | | if (len) |
1852 | | s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
1853 | | if (rem) { |
1854 | | for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) |
1855 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i]; |
1856 | | |
1857 | | s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, |
1858 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
1859 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
1860 | | } |
1861 | | } |
1862 | | /* encrypt tag */ |
1863 | | for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++) |
1864 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; |
1865 | | |
1866 | | s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
1867 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
1868 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0]; |
1869 | | ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1]; |
1870 | | |
1871 | | ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */ |
1872 | | return 0; |
1873 | | } |
1874 | | |
1875 | | /*- |
1876 | | * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written |
1877 | | * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. |
1878 | | */ |
1879 | | static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1880 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1881 | | { |
1882 | | S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
1883 | | unsigned char *ivec = ctx->iv; |
1884 | | unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
1885 | | const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
1886 | | |
1887 | | if (out != in |
1888 | | || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m)) |
1889 | | return -1; |
1890 | | |
1891 | | if (enc) { |
1892 | | /* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */ |
1893 | | memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
1894 | | } |
1895 | | |
1896 | | len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
1897 | | /*- |
1898 | | * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv |
1899 | | * (server/client_write_iv) here. |
1900 | | */ |
1901 | | memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
1902 | | s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len); |
1903 | | |
1904 | | /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */ |
1905 | | s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len); |
1906 | | |
1907 | | in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1908 | | out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1909 | | |
1910 | | if (enc) { |
1911 | | if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) |
1912 | | return -1; |
1913 | | |
1914 | | memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); |
1915 | | return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
1916 | | } else { |
1917 | | if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { |
1918 | | if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len, |
1919 | | cctx->aes.ccm.m)) |
1920 | | return len; |
1921 | | } |
1922 | | |
1923 | | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
1924 | | return -1; |
1925 | | } |
1926 | | } |
1927 | | |
1928 | | /*- |
1929 | | * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is |
1930 | | * returned. |
1931 | | */ |
1932 | | static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
1933 | | const unsigned char *key, |
1934 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
1935 | | { |
1936 | | S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
1937 | | int keylen; |
1938 | | |
1939 | | if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
1940 | | return 1; |
1941 | | |
1942 | | if (key != NULL) { |
1943 | | keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
1944 | | cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
1945 | | memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen); |
1946 | | |
1947 | | /* Store encoded m and l. */ |
1948 | | cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7) |
1949 | | | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3; |
1950 | | memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0, |
1951 | | sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b)); |
1952 | | cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0; |
1953 | | |
1954 | | cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1; |
1955 | | } |
1956 | | |
1957 | | if (iv != NULL) { |
1958 | | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l); |
1959 | | |
1960 | | cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1; |
1961 | | } |
1962 | | |
1963 | | return 1; |
1964 | | } |
1965 | | |
1966 | | /*- |
1967 | | * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional |
1968 | | * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate |
1969 | | * plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes |
1970 | | * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. |
1971 | | */ |
1972 | | static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
1973 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
1974 | | { |
1975 | | S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
1976 | | const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
1977 | | int rv; |
1978 | | unsigned char *buf; |
1979 | | |
1980 | | if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set) |
1981 | | return -1; |
1982 | | |
1983 | | if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0) |
1984 | | return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
1985 | | |
1986 | | /*- |
1987 | | * Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt |
1988 | | * so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before |
1989 | | * potentially corrupted data is output. |
1990 | | */ |
1991 | | if (in == NULL && out != NULL) |
1992 | | return 0; |
1993 | | |
1994 | | if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set) |
1995 | | return -1; |
1996 | | |
1997 | | if (out == NULL) { |
1998 | | /* Update(): Pass message length. */ |
1999 | | if (in == NULL) { |
2000 | | s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len); |
2001 | | |
2002 | | cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; |
2003 | | return len; |
2004 | | } |
2005 | | |
2006 | | /* Update(): Process aad. */ |
2007 | | if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len) |
2008 | | return -1; |
2009 | | |
2010 | | s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len); |
2011 | | return len; |
2012 | | } |
2013 | | |
2014 | | /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ |
2015 | | if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) |
2016 | | return -1; |
2017 | | |
2018 | | /* Update(): Process message. */ |
2019 | | |
2020 | | if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) { |
2021 | | /*- |
2022 | | * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via |
2023 | | * Update(), set it now. |
2024 | | */ |
2025 | | s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len); |
2026 | | |
2027 | | cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; |
2028 | | } |
2029 | | |
2030 | | if (enc) { |
2031 | | if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) |
2032 | | return -1; |
2033 | | |
2034 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; |
2035 | | return len; |
2036 | | } else { |
2037 | | rv = -1; |
2038 | | |
2039 | | if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { |
2040 | | buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
2041 | | if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf, |
2042 | | cctx->aes.ccm.m)) |
2043 | | rv = len; |
2044 | | } |
2045 | | |
2046 | | if (rv == -1) |
2047 | | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
2048 | | |
2049 | | cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; |
2050 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; |
2051 | | cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; |
2052 | | return rv; |
2053 | | } |
2054 | | } |
2055 | | |
2056 | | /*- |
2057 | | * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control |
2058 | | * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. |
2059 | | * Code is big-endian. |
2060 | | */ |
2061 | | static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
2062 | | { |
2063 | | S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c); |
2064 | | unsigned char *buf; |
2065 | | int enc, len; |
2066 | | |
2067 | | switch (type) { |
2068 | | case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
2069 | | cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0; |
2070 | | cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; |
2071 | | cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8; |
2072 | | cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12; |
2073 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; |
2074 | | cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; |
2075 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1; |
2076 | | return 1; |
2077 | | |
2078 | | case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
2079 | | *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l; |
2080 | | return 1; |
2081 | | |
2082 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
2083 | | if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
2084 | | return 0; |
2085 | | |
2086 | | /* Save the aad for later use. */ |
2087 | | buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
2088 | | memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
2089 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg; |
2090 | | |
2091 | | len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1]; |
2092 | | if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
2093 | | return 0; |
2094 | | |
2095 | | /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ |
2096 | | len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
2097 | | |
2098 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
2099 | | if (!enc) { |
2100 | | if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m) |
2101 | | return 0; |
2102 | | |
2103 | | /* Correct length for tag. */ |
2104 | | len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
2105 | | } |
2106 | | |
2107 | | buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
2108 | | buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
2109 | | |
2110 | | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ |
2111 | | return cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
2112 | | |
2113 | | case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
2114 | | if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) |
2115 | | return 0; |
2116 | | |
2117 | | /* Copy to first part of the iv. */ |
2118 | | memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg); |
2119 | | return 1; |
2120 | | |
2121 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
2122 | | arg = 15 - arg; |
2123 | | /* fall-through */ |
2124 | | |
2125 | | case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: |
2126 | | if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) |
2127 | | return 0; |
2128 | | |
2129 | | cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg; |
2130 | | return 1; |
2131 | | |
2132 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
2133 | | if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) |
2134 | | return 0; |
2135 | | |
2136 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
2137 | | if (enc && ptr) |
2138 | | return 0; |
2139 | | |
2140 | | if (ptr) { |
2141 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; |
2142 | | buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
2143 | | memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
2144 | | } |
2145 | | |
2146 | | cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg; |
2147 | | return 1; |
2148 | | |
2149 | | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
2150 | | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
2151 | | if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) |
2152 | | return 0; |
2153 | | |
2154 | | if (arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m) |
2155 | | return 0; |
2156 | | |
2157 | | memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); |
2158 | | cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; |
2159 | | cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; |
2160 | | cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; |
2161 | | return 1; |
2162 | | |
2163 | | case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
2164 | | return 1; |
2165 | | |
2166 | | default: |
2167 | | return -1; |
2168 | | } |
2169 | | } |
2170 | | |
2171 | | #define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup |
2172 | | |
2173 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
2174 | | #define S390X_AES_OCB_CTX EVP_AES_OCB_CTX |
2175 | | |
2176 | | #define s390x_aes_ocb_init_key aes_ocb_init_key |
2177 | | static int s390x_aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
2178 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc); |
2179 | | #define s390x_aes_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher |
2180 | | static int s390x_aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2181 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
2182 | | #define s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup aes_ocb_cleanup |
2183 | | static int s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); |
2184 | | #define s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl aes_ocb_ctrl |
2185 | | static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); |
2186 | | #endif |
2187 | | |
2188 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV |
2189 | | #define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX |
2190 | | |
2191 | | #define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key |
2192 | | #define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher |
2193 | | #define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup |
2194 | | #define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl |
2195 | | #endif |
2196 | | |
2197 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, \ |
2198 | | MODE, flags) \ |
2199 | | static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
2200 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, \ |
2201 | | keylen / 8, \ |
2202 | | ivlen, \ |
2203 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
2204 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
2205 | | s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
2206 | | s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
2207 | | NULL, \ |
2208 | | sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
2209 | | NULL, \ |
2210 | | NULL, \ |
2211 | | NULL, \ |
2212 | | NULL \ |
2213 | | }; \ |
2214 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
2215 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, \ |
2216 | | blocksize, \ |
2217 | | keylen / 8, \ |
2218 | | ivlen, \ |
2219 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
2220 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
2221 | | aes_init_key, \ |
2222 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
2223 | | NULL, \ |
2224 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
2225 | | NULL, \ |
2226 | | NULL, \ |
2227 | | NULL, \ |
2228 | | NULL \ |
2229 | | }; \ |
2230 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
2231 | | { \ |
2232 | | return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
2233 | | } |
2234 | | |
2235 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
2236 | | static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
2237 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \ |
2238 | | blocksize, \ |
2239 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
2240 | | ivlen, \ |
2241 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
2242 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
2243 | | s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
2244 | | s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
2245 | | s390x_aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
2246 | | sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
2247 | | NULL, \ |
2248 | | NULL, \ |
2249 | | s390x_aes_##mode##_ctrl, \ |
2250 | | NULL \ |
2251 | | }; \ |
2252 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
2253 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ |
2254 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
2255 | | ivlen, \ |
2256 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
2257 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
2258 | | aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
2259 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
2260 | | aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
2261 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
2262 | | NULL, \ |
2263 | | NULL, \ |
2264 | | aes_##mode##_ctrl, \ |
2265 | | NULL \ |
2266 | | }; \ |
2267 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
2268 | | { \ |
2269 | | return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
2270 | | } |
2271 | | |
2272 | | #else |
2273 | | |
2274 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
2275 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
2276 | | nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, keylen / 8, ivlen, \ |
2277 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
2278 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
2279 | | aes_init_key, \ |
2280 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
2281 | | NULL, \ |
2282 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
2283 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ |
2284 | | }; \ |
2285 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
2286 | | { \ |
2287 | | return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
2288 | | } |
2289 | | |
2290 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ |
2291 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
2292 | | nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ |
2293 | | (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
2294 | | ivlen, \ |
2295 | | flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
2296 | | EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
2297 | | aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
2298 | | aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
2299 | | aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
2300 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
2301 | | NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ |
2302 | | }; \ |
2303 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
2304 | | { \ |
2305 | | return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
2306 | | } |
2307 | | |
2308 | | #endif |
2309 | | |
2310 | | #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid, keylen, flags) \ |
2311 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 16, 16, cbc, cbc, CBC, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
2312 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 16, 0, ecb, ecb, ECB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
2313 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ofb128, ofb, OFB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
2314 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb128, cfb, CFB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
2315 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb1, cfb1, CFB, flags) \ |
2316 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb8, cfb8, CFB, flags) \ |
2317 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ctr, ctr, CTR, flags) |
2318 | | |
2319 | | static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
2320 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
2321 | 0 | { |
2322 | 0 | int ret, mode; |
2323 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2324 | |
|
2325 | 0 | mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); |
2326 | 0 | if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
2327 | 0 | && !enc) { |
2328 | | #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
2329 | | if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
2330 | | ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, |
2331 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2332 | | &dat->ks.ks); |
2333 | | dat->block = (block128_f)HWAES_decrypt; |
2334 | | dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
2335 | | #ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt |
2336 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
2337 | | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)HWAES_cbc_encrypt; |
2338 | | #endif |
2339 | | } else |
2340 | | #endif |
2341 | 0 | #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
2342 | 0 | if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
2343 | 0 | ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, |
2344 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2345 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
2346 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)AES_decrypt; |
2347 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)ossl_bsaes_cbc_encrypt; |
2348 | 0 | } else |
2349 | 0 | #endif |
2350 | 0 | #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
2351 | 0 | if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
2352 | 0 | ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, |
2353 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2354 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
2355 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt; |
2356 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
2357 | 0 | } else |
2358 | 0 | #endif |
2359 | 0 | { |
2360 | 0 | ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, |
2361 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2362 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
2363 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)AES_decrypt; |
2364 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
2365 | 0 | } |
2366 | 0 | } else |
2367 | | #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
2368 | | if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
2369 | | ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, |
2370 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2371 | | &dat->ks.ks); |
2372 | | dat->block = (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt; |
2373 | | dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
2374 | | #ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt |
2375 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
2376 | | dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)HWAES_cbc_encrypt; |
2377 | | else |
2378 | | #endif |
2379 | | #ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks |
2380 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
2381 | | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
2382 | | else |
2383 | | #endif |
2384 | | (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ |
2385 | | } else |
2386 | | #endif |
2387 | 0 | #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
2388 | 0 | if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { |
2389 | 0 | ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2390 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
2391 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; |
2392 | 0 | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
2393 | 0 | } else |
2394 | 0 | #endif |
2395 | 0 | #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
2396 | 0 | if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
2397 | 0 | ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, |
2398 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2399 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
2400 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt; |
2401 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
2402 | 0 | } else |
2403 | 0 | #endif |
2404 | 0 | { |
2405 | 0 | ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
2406 | 0 | &dat->ks.ks); |
2407 | 0 | dat->block = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; |
2408 | 0 | dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
2409 | | #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM |
2410 | | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
2411 | | dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; |
2412 | | #endif |
2413 | 0 | } |
2414 | |
|
2415 | 0 | if (ret < 0) { |
2416 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); |
2417 | 0 | return 0; |
2418 | 0 | } |
2419 | | |
2420 | 0 | return 1; |
2421 | 0 | } |
2422 | | |
2423 | | static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2424 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2425 | 0 | { |
2426 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2427 | |
|
2428 | 0 | if (dat->stream.cbc) |
2429 | 0 | (*dat->stream.cbc)(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, |
2430 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); |
2431 | 0 | else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
2432 | 0 | CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, |
2433 | 0 | dat->block); |
2434 | 0 | else |
2435 | 0 | CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2436 | 0 | ctx->iv, dat->block); |
2437 | |
|
2438 | 0 | return 1; |
2439 | 0 | } |
2440 | | |
2441 | | static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2442 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2443 | 0 | { |
2444 | 0 | size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx); |
2445 | 0 | size_t i; |
2446 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2447 | |
|
2448 | 0 | if (len < bl) |
2449 | 0 | return 1; |
2450 | | |
2451 | 0 | for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl) |
2452 | 0 | (*dat->block)(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks); |
2453 | |
|
2454 | 0 | return 1; |
2455 | 0 | } |
2456 | | |
2457 | | static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2458 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2459 | 0 | { |
2460 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2461 | |
|
2462 | 0 | int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2463 | 0 | CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2464 | 0 | ctx->iv, &num, dat->block); |
2465 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2466 | 0 | return 1; |
2467 | 0 | } |
2468 | | |
2469 | | static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2470 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2471 | 0 | { |
2472 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2473 | |
|
2474 | 0 | int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2475 | 0 | CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2476 | 0 | ctx->iv, &num, |
2477 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
2478 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2479 | 0 | return 1; |
2480 | 0 | } |
2481 | | |
2482 | | static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2483 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2484 | 0 | { |
2485 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2486 | |
|
2487 | 0 | int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2488 | 0 | CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2489 | 0 | ctx->iv, &num, |
2490 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
2491 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2492 | 0 | return 1; |
2493 | 0 | } |
2494 | | |
2495 | | static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2496 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2497 | 0 | { |
2498 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2499 | |
|
2500 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) { |
2501 | 0 | int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2502 | 0 | CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2503 | 0 | ctx->iv, &num, |
2504 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
2505 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2506 | 0 | return 1; |
2507 | 0 | } |
2508 | | |
2509 | 0 | while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) { |
2510 | 0 | int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2511 | 0 | CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks, |
2512 | 0 | ctx->iv, &num, |
2513 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
2514 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2515 | 0 | len -= MAXBITCHUNK; |
2516 | 0 | out += MAXBITCHUNK; |
2517 | 0 | in += MAXBITCHUNK; |
2518 | 0 | } |
2519 | 0 | if (len) { |
2520 | 0 | int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2521 | 0 | CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks, |
2522 | 0 | ctx->iv, &num, |
2523 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
2524 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2525 | 0 | } |
2526 | |
|
2527 | 0 | return 1; |
2528 | 0 | } |
2529 | | |
2530 | | static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2531 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2532 | 0 | { |
2533 | 0 | int n = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
2534 | 0 | unsigned int num; |
2535 | 0 | EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); |
2536 | |
|
2537 | 0 | if (n < 0) |
2538 | 0 | return 0; |
2539 | 0 | num = (unsigned int)n; |
2540 | |
|
2541 | 0 | if (dat->stream.ctr) |
2542 | 0 | CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2543 | 0 | ctx->iv, |
2544 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
2545 | 0 | &num, dat->stream.ctr); |
2546 | 0 | else |
2547 | 0 | CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
2548 | 0 | ctx->iv, |
2549 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, |
2550 | 0 | dat->block); |
2551 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
2552 | 0 | return 1; |
2553 | 0 | } |
2554 | | |
2555 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, 0) |
2556 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0) |
2557 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0) |
2558 | | |
2559 | | static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) |
2560 | 0 | { |
2561 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, c); |
2562 | 0 | if (gctx == NULL) |
2563 | 0 | return 0; |
2564 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm)); |
2565 | 0 | if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
2566 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
2567 | 0 | return 1; |
2568 | 0 | } |
2569 | | |
2570 | | static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
2571 | 0 | { |
2572 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, c); |
2573 | 0 | switch (type) { |
2574 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
2575 | 0 | gctx->key_set = 0; |
2576 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
2577 | 0 | gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); |
2578 | 0 | gctx->iv = c->iv; |
2579 | 0 | gctx->taglen = -1; |
2580 | 0 | gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
2581 | 0 | gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
2582 | 0 | return 1; |
2583 | | |
2584 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
2585 | 0 | *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; |
2586 | 0 | return 1; |
2587 | | |
2588 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
2589 | 0 | if (arg <= 0) |
2590 | 0 | return 0; |
2591 | | /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */ |
2592 | 0 | if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) { |
2593 | 0 | if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
2594 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
2595 | 0 | if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) { |
2596 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2597 | 0 | return 0; |
2598 | 0 | } |
2599 | 0 | } |
2600 | 0 | gctx->ivlen = arg; |
2601 | 0 | return 1; |
2602 | | |
2603 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
2604 | 0 | if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt) |
2605 | 0 | return 0; |
2606 | 0 | memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); |
2607 | 0 | gctx->taglen = arg; |
2608 | 0 | return 1; |
2609 | | |
2610 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
2611 | 0 | if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt |
2612 | 0 | || gctx->taglen < 0) |
2613 | 0 | return 0; |
2614 | 0 | memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg); |
2615 | 0 | return 1; |
2616 | | |
2617 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
2618 | | /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ |
2619 | 0 | if (arg == -1) { |
2620 | 0 | memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); |
2621 | 0 | gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
2622 | 0 | return 1; |
2623 | 0 | } |
2624 | | /* |
2625 | | * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least |
2626 | | * 8. |
2627 | | */ |
2628 | 0 | if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) |
2629 | 0 | return 0; |
2630 | 0 | if (arg) |
2631 | 0 | memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); |
2632 | 0 | if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) |
2633 | 0 | return 0; |
2634 | 0 | gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
2635 | 0 | return 1; |
2636 | | |
2637 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: |
2638 | 0 | if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) |
2639 | 0 | return 0; |
2640 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2641 | 0 | if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) |
2642 | 0 | arg = gctx->ivlen; |
2643 | 0 | memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); |
2644 | | /* |
2645 | | * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need |
2646 | | * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. |
2647 | | */ |
2648 | 0 | ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); |
2649 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
2650 | 0 | return 1; |
2651 | | |
2652 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: |
2653 | 0 | if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt) |
2654 | 0 | return 0; |
2655 | 0 | memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); |
2656 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2657 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
2658 | 0 | return 1; |
2659 | | |
2660 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
2661 | | /* Save the AAD for later use */ |
2662 | 0 | if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
2663 | 0 | return 0; |
2664 | 0 | memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); |
2665 | 0 | gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; |
2666 | 0 | gctx->tls_enc_records = 0; |
2667 | 0 | { |
2668 | 0 | unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1]; |
2669 | | /* Correct length for explicit IV */ |
2670 | 0 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
2671 | 0 | return 0; |
2672 | 0 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
2673 | | /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ |
2674 | 0 | if (!c->encrypt) { |
2675 | 0 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) |
2676 | 0 | return 0; |
2677 | 0 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
2678 | 0 | } |
2679 | 0 | c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
2680 | 0 | c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
2681 | 0 | } |
2682 | | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ |
2683 | 0 | return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
2684 | | |
2685 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { |
2686 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; |
2687 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, out); |
2688 | 0 | if (gctx->gcm.key) { |
2689 | 0 | if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks) |
2690 | 0 | return 0; |
2691 | 0 | gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks; |
2692 | 0 | } |
2693 | 0 | if (gctx->iv == c->iv) |
2694 | 0 | gctx_out->iv = out->iv; |
2695 | 0 | else { |
2696 | 0 | if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) { |
2697 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2698 | 0 | return 0; |
2699 | 0 | } |
2700 | 0 | memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2701 | 0 | } |
2702 | 0 | return 1; |
2703 | 0 | } |
2704 | | |
2705 | 0 | default: |
2706 | 0 | return -1; |
2707 | 0 | } |
2708 | 0 | } |
2709 | | |
2710 | | static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
2711 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
2712 | 0 | { |
2713 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
2714 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
2715 | 0 | return 1; |
2716 | 0 | if (key) { |
2717 | 0 | do { |
2718 | | #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
2719 | | if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
2720 | | HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); |
2721 | | CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
2722 | | (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt); |
2723 | | #ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks |
2724 | | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
2725 | | #else |
2726 | | gctx->ctr = NULL; |
2727 | | #endif |
2728 | | break; |
2729 | | } else |
2730 | | #endif |
2731 | 0 | #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
2732 | 0 | if (BSAES_CAPABLE) { |
2733 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); |
2734 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
2735 | 0 | (block128_f)AES_encrypt); |
2736 | 0 | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
2737 | 0 | break; |
2738 | 0 | } else |
2739 | 0 | #endif |
2740 | 0 | #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
2741 | 0 | if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
2742 | 0 | vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); |
2743 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
2744 | 0 | (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt); |
2745 | 0 | gctx->ctr = NULL; |
2746 | 0 | break; |
2747 | 0 | } else |
2748 | 0 | #endif |
2749 | 0 | (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ |
2750 | | |
2751 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); |
2752 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
2753 | 0 | (block128_f)AES_encrypt); |
2754 | | #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM |
2755 | | gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; |
2756 | | #else |
2757 | 0 | gctx->ctr = NULL; |
2758 | 0 | #endif |
2759 | 0 | } while (0); |
2760 | | |
2761 | | /* |
2762 | | * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
2763 | | */ |
2764 | 0 | if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
2765 | 0 | iv = gctx->iv; |
2766 | 0 | if (iv) { |
2767 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2768 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
2769 | 0 | } |
2770 | 0 | gctx->key_set = 1; |
2771 | 0 | } else { |
2772 | | /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
2773 | 0 | if (gctx->key_set) |
2774 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2775 | 0 | else |
2776 | 0 | memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2777 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
2778 | 0 | gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
2779 | 0 | } |
2780 | 0 | return 1; |
2781 | 0 | } |
2782 | | |
2783 | | /* |
2784 | | * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV |
2785 | | * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, |
2786 | | * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload |
2787 | | * and verify tag. |
2788 | | */ |
2789 | | |
2790 | | static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2791 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2792 | 0 | { |
2793 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
2794 | 0 | int rv = -1; |
2795 | | /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ |
2796 | 0 | if (out != in |
2797 | 0 | || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) |
2798 | 0 | return -1; |
2799 | | |
2800 | | /* |
2801 | | * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness |
2802 | | * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the |
2803 | | * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting |
2804 | | * side only. |
2805 | | */ |
2806 | 0 | if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { |
2807 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
2808 | 0 | goto err; |
2809 | 0 | } |
2810 | | |
2811 | | /* |
2812 | | * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of |
2813 | | * buffer. |
2814 | | */ |
2815 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, |
2816 | 0 | EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) |
2817 | 0 | <= 0) |
2818 | 0 | goto err; |
2819 | | /* Use saved AAD */ |
2820 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len)) |
2821 | 0 | goto err; |
2822 | | /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ |
2823 | 0 | in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
2824 | 0 | out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
2825 | 0 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
2826 | 0 | if (ctx->encrypt) { |
2827 | | /* Encrypt payload */ |
2828 | 0 | if (gctx->ctr) { |
2829 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
2830 | 0 | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
2831 | 0 | if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
2832 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
2833 | 0 | return -1; |
2834 | | |
2835 | 0 | bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, |
2836 | 0 | gctx->gcm.key, |
2837 | 0 | gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
2838 | 0 | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
2839 | 0 | } |
2840 | 0 | #endif |
2841 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
2842 | 0 | in + bulk, |
2843 | 0 | out + bulk, |
2844 | 0 | len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
2845 | 0 | goto err; |
2846 | 0 | } else { |
2847 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
2848 | | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
2849 | | if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
2850 | | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
2851 | | return -1; |
2852 | | |
2853 | | bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, |
2854 | | gctx->gcm.key, |
2855 | | gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
2856 | | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
2857 | | } |
2858 | | #endif |
2859 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
2860 | 0 | in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
2861 | 0 | goto err; |
2862 | 0 | } |
2863 | 0 | out += len; |
2864 | | /* Finally write tag */ |
2865 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); |
2866 | 0 | rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
2867 | 0 | } else { |
2868 | | /* Decrypt */ |
2869 | 0 | if (gctx->ctr) { |
2870 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
2871 | 0 | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
2872 | 0 | if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
2873 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
2874 | 0 | return -1; |
2875 | | |
2876 | 0 | bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, |
2877 | 0 | gctx->gcm.key, |
2878 | 0 | gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
2879 | 0 | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
2880 | 0 | } |
2881 | 0 | #endif |
2882 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
2883 | 0 | in + bulk, |
2884 | 0 | out + bulk, |
2885 | 0 | len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
2886 | 0 | goto err; |
2887 | 0 | } else { |
2888 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
2889 | | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
2890 | | if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
2891 | | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
2892 | | return -1; |
2893 | | |
2894 | | bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, |
2895 | | gctx->gcm.key, |
2896 | | gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
2897 | | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
2898 | | } |
2899 | | #endif |
2900 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
2901 | 0 | in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
2902 | 0 | goto err; |
2903 | 0 | } |
2904 | | /* Retrieve tag */ |
2905 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); |
2906 | | /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */ |
2907 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { |
2908 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
2909 | 0 | goto err; |
2910 | 0 | } |
2911 | 0 | rv = len; |
2912 | 0 | } |
2913 | | |
2914 | 0 | err: |
2915 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
2916 | 0 | gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
2917 | 0 | return rv; |
2918 | 0 | } |
2919 | | |
2920 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
2921 | | /* |
2922 | | * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" |
2923 | | * |
2924 | | * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. |
2925 | | * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a |
2926 | | * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of |
2927 | | * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). |
2928 | | */ |
2929 | | static int aes_gcm_iv_generate(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx, int offset) |
2930 | | { |
2931 | | int sz = gctx->ivlen - offset; |
2932 | | |
2933 | | /* Must be at least 96 bits */ |
2934 | | if (sz <= 0 || gctx->ivlen < 12) |
2935 | | return 0; |
2936 | | |
2937 | | /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ |
2938 | | if (RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0) |
2939 | | return 0; |
2940 | | return 1; |
2941 | | } |
2942 | | #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |
2943 | | |
2944 | | static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
2945 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
2946 | 0 | { |
2947 | 0 | EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
2948 | | |
2949 | | /* If not set up, return error */ |
2950 | 0 | if (!gctx->key_set) |
2951 | 0 | return -1; |
2952 | | |
2953 | 0 | if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) |
2954 | 0 | return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
2955 | | |
2956 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
2957 | | /* |
2958 | | * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. |
2959 | | * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that |
2960 | | * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications |
2961 | | * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. |
2962 | | */ |
2963 | | if (!gctx->iv_set) { |
2964 | | if (!ctx->encrypt || !aes_gcm_iv_generate(gctx, 0)) |
2965 | | return -1; |
2966 | | CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
2967 | | gctx->iv_set = 1; |
2968 | | gctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; |
2969 | | } |
2970 | | #else |
2971 | 0 | if (!gctx->iv_set) |
2972 | 0 | return -1; |
2973 | 0 | #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |
2974 | | |
2975 | 0 | if (in) { |
2976 | 0 | if (out == NULL) { |
2977 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) |
2978 | 0 | return -1; |
2979 | 0 | } else if (ctx->encrypt) { |
2980 | 0 | if (gctx->ctr) { |
2981 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
2982 | 0 | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
2983 | 0 | if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
2984 | 0 | size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
2985 | |
|
2986 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
2987 | 0 | return -1; |
2988 | | |
2989 | 0 | bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, |
2990 | 0 | out + res, len - res, |
2991 | 0 | gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, |
2992 | 0 | gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
2993 | 0 | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
2994 | 0 | bulk += res; |
2995 | 0 | } |
2996 | 0 | #endif |
2997 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
2998 | 0 | in + bulk, |
2999 | 0 | out + bulk, |
3000 | 0 | len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
3001 | 0 | return -1; |
3002 | 0 | } else { |
3003 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
3004 | | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
3005 | | if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
3006 | | size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
3007 | | |
3008 | | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
3009 | | return -1; |
3010 | | |
3011 | | bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, |
3012 | | out + res, len - res, |
3013 | | gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, |
3014 | | gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
3015 | | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
3016 | | bulk += res; |
3017 | | } |
3018 | | #endif |
3019 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
3020 | 0 | in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
3021 | 0 | return -1; |
3022 | 0 | } |
3023 | 0 | } else { |
3024 | 0 | if (gctx->ctr) { |
3025 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
3026 | 0 | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
3027 | 0 | if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
3028 | 0 | size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
3029 | |
|
3030 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
3031 | 0 | return -1; |
3032 | | |
3033 | 0 | bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, |
3034 | 0 | out + res, len - res, |
3035 | 0 | gctx->gcm.key, |
3036 | 0 | gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
3037 | 0 | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
3038 | 0 | bulk += res; |
3039 | 0 | } |
3040 | 0 | #endif |
3041 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
3042 | 0 | in + bulk, |
3043 | 0 | out + bulk, |
3044 | 0 | len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
3045 | 0 | return -1; |
3046 | 0 | } else { |
3047 | 0 | size_t bulk = 0; |
3048 | | #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
3049 | | if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
3050 | | size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
3051 | | |
3052 | | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
3053 | | return -1; |
3054 | | |
3055 | | bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, |
3056 | | out + res, len - res, |
3057 | | gctx->gcm.key, |
3058 | | gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
3059 | | gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
3060 | | bulk += res; |
3061 | | } |
3062 | | #endif |
3063 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
3064 | 0 | in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
3065 | 0 | return -1; |
3066 | 0 | } |
3067 | 0 | } |
3068 | 0 | return len; |
3069 | 0 | } else { |
3070 | 0 | if (!ctx->encrypt) { |
3071 | 0 | if (gctx->taglen < 0) |
3072 | 0 | return -1; |
3073 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0) |
3074 | 0 | return -1; |
3075 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
3076 | 0 | return 0; |
3077 | 0 | } |
3078 | 0 | CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16); |
3079 | 0 | gctx->taglen = 16; |
3080 | | /* Don't reuse the IV */ |
3081 | 0 | gctx->iv_set = 0; |
3082 | 0 | return 0; |
3083 | 0 | } |
3084 | 0 | } |
3085 | | |
3086 | | #define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \ |
3087 | | | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ |
3088 | | | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ |
3089 | | | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV_LENGTH) |
3090 | | |
3091 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, |
3092 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
3093 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, |
3094 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
3095 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, |
3096 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
3097 | | |
3098 | | static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
3099 | 0 | { |
3100 | 0 | EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c); |
3101 | |
|
3102 | 0 | if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) { |
3103 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; |
3104 | 0 | EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, out); |
3105 | |
|
3106 | 0 | if (xctx->xts.key1) { |
3107 | 0 | if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1) |
3108 | 0 | return 0; |
3109 | 0 | xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1; |
3110 | 0 | } |
3111 | 0 | if (xctx->xts.key2) { |
3112 | 0 | if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2) |
3113 | 0 | return 0; |
3114 | 0 | xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2; |
3115 | 0 | } |
3116 | 0 | return 1; |
3117 | 0 | } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT) |
3118 | 0 | return -1; |
3119 | | /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */ |
3120 | 0 | xctx->xts.key1 = NULL; |
3121 | 0 | xctx->xts.key2 = NULL; |
3122 | 0 | return 1; |
3123 | 0 | } |
3124 | | |
3125 | | static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
3126 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
3127 | 0 | { |
3128 | 0 | EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); |
3129 | |
|
3130 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
3131 | 0 | return 1; |
3132 | | |
3133 | 0 | if (key) { |
3134 | 0 | do { |
3135 | | /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ |
3136 | 0 | const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) / 2; |
3137 | 0 | const int bits = bytes * 8; |
3138 | | |
3139 | | /* |
3140 | | * Verify that the two keys are different. |
3141 | | * |
3142 | | * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's |
3143 | | * September 2004 paper: |
3144 | | * |
3145 | | * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and |
3146 | | * Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC". |
3147 | | * (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf) |
3148 | | * |
3149 | | * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states |
3150 | | * that: |
3151 | | * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place |
3152 | | * BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process |
3153 | | * data with them." |
3154 | | */ |
3155 | 0 | if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) |
3156 | 0 | && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { |
3157 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); |
3158 | 0 | return 0; |
3159 | 0 | } |
3160 | | |
3161 | | #ifdef AES_XTS_ASM |
3162 | | xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt; |
3163 | | #else |
3164 | 0 | xctx->stream = NULL; |
3165 | 0 | #endif |
3166 | | /* key_len is two AES keys */ |
3167 | | #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
3168 | | if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
3169 | | if (enc) { |
3170 | | HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
3171 | | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt; |
3172 | | #ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt |
3173 | | xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt; |
3174 | | #endif |
3175 | | } else { |
3176 | | HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
3177 | | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)HWAES_decrypt; |
3178 | | #ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt |
3179 | | xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt; |
3180 | | #endif |
3181 | | } |
3182 | | |
3183 | | HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
3184 | | xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt; |
3185 | | |
3186 | | xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
3187 | | break; |
3188 | | } else |
3189 | | #endif |
3190 | 0 | #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
3191 | 0 | if (BSAES_CAPABLE) |
3192 | 0 | xctx->stream = enc ? ossl_bsaes_xts_encrypt : ossl_bsaes_xts_decrypt; |
3193 | 0 | else |
3194 | 0 | #endif |
3195 | 0 | #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
3196 | 0 | if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
3197 | 0 | if (enc) { |
3198 | 0 | vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
3199 | 0 | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt; |
3200 | 0 | } else { |
3201 | 0 | vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
3202 | 0 | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt; |
3203 | 0 | } |
3204 | |
|
3205 | 0 | vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
3206 | 0 | xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt; |
3207 | |
|
3208 | 0 | xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
3209 | 0 | break; |
3210 | 0 | } else |
3211 | 0 | #endif |
3212 | 0 | (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ |
3213 | | |
3214 | 0 | if (enc) { |
3215 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
3216 | 0 | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; |
3217 | 0 | } else { |
3218 | 0 | AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
3219 | 0 | xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)AES_decrypt; |
3220 | 0 | } |
3221 | |
|
3222 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
3223 | 0 | xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; |
3224 | |
|
3225 | 0 | xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
3226 | 0 | } while (0); |
3227 | 0 | } |
3228 | | |
3229 | 0 | if (iv) { |
3230 | 0 | xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; |
3231 | 0 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); |
3232 | 0 | } |
3233 | |
|
3234 | 0 | return 1; |
3235 | 0 | } |
3236 | | |
3237 | | static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
3238 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
3239 | 0 | { |
3240 | 0 | EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); |
3241 | |
|
3242 | 0 | if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL |
3243 | 0 | || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL |
3244 | 0 | || out == NULL |
3245 | 0 | || in == NULL |
3246 | 0 | || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) |
3247 | 0 | return 0; |
3248 | | |
3249 | | /* |
3250 | | * Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specified by |
3251 | | * IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007 |
3252 | | * indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT. |
3253 | | * NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit. |
3254 | | */ |
3255 | 0 | if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { |
3256 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE); |
3257 | 0 | return 0; |
3258 | 0 | } |
3259 | | |
3260 | 0 | if (xctx->stream) |
3261 | 0 | (*xctx->stream)(in, out, len, |
3262 | 0 | xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, |
3263 | 0 | ctx->iv); |
3264 | 0 | else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len, |
3265 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))) |
3266 | 0 | return 0; |
3267 | 0 | return 1; |
3268 | 0 | } |
3269 | | |
3270 | | #define aes_xts_cleanup NULL |
3271 | | |
3272 | | #define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \ |
3273 | | | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ |
3274 | | | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) |
3275 | | |
3276 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) |
3277 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) |
3278 | | |
3279 | | static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
3280 | 0 | { |
3281 | 0 | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, c); |
3282 | 0 | switch (type) { |
3283 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
3284 | 0 | cctx->key_set = 0; |
3285 | 0 | cctx->iv_set = 0; |
3286 | 0 | cctx->L = 8; |
3287 | 0 | cctx->M = 12; |
3288 | 0 | cctx->tag_set = 0; |
3289 | 0 | cctx->len_set = 0; |
3290 | 0 | cctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
3291 | 0 | return 1; |
3292 | | |
3293 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
3294 | 0 | *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L; |
3295 | 0 | return 1; |
3296 | | |
3297 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
3298 | | /* Save the AAD for later use */ |
3299 | 0 | if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
3300 | 0 | return 0; |
3301 | 0 | memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); |
3302 | 0 | cctx->tls_aad_len = arg; |
3303 | 0 | { |
3304 | 0 | uint16_t len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8 |
3305 | 0 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1]; |
3306 | | /* Correct length for explicit IV */ |
3307 | 0 | if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
3308 | 0 | return 0; |
3309 | 0 | len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
3310 | | /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ |
3311 | 0 | if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) { |
3312 | 0 | if (len < cctx->M) |
3313 | 0 | return 0; |
3314 | 0 | len -= cctx->M; |
3315 | 0 | } |
3316 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
3317 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
3318 | 0 | } |
3319 | | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ |
3320 | 0 | return cctx->M; |
3321 | | |
3322 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
3323 | | /* Sanity check length */ |
3324 | 0 | if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) |
3325 | 0 | return 0; |
3326 | | /* Just copy to first part of IV */ |
3327 | 0 | memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg); |
3328 | 0 | return 1; |
3329 | | |
3330 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
3331 | 0 | arg = 15 - arg; |
3332 | | /* fall thru */ |
3333 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: |
3334 | 0 | if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) |
3335 | 0 | return 0; |
3336 | 0 | cctx->L = arg; |
3337 | 0 | return 1; |
3338 | | |
3339 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
3340 | 0 | if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) |
3341 | 0 | return 0; |
3342 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) && ptr) |
3343 | 0 | return 0; |
3344 | 0 | if (ptr) { |
3345 | 0 | cctx->tag_set = 1; |
3346 | 0 | memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); |
3347 | 0 | } |
3348 | 0 | cctx->M = arg; |
3349 | 0 | return 1; |
3350 | | |
3351 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
3352 | 0 | if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set) |
3353 | 0 | return 0; |
3354 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg)) |
3355 | 0 | return 0; |
3356 | 0 | cctx->tag_set = 0; |
3357 | 0 | cctx->iv_set = 0; |
3358 | 0 | cctx->len_set = 0; |
3359 | 0 | return 1; |
3360 | | |
3361 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { |
3362 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; |
3363 | 0 | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, out); |
3364 | 0 | if (cctx->ccm.key) { |
3365 | 0 | if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks) |
3366 | 0 | return 0; |
3367 | 0 | cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks; |
3368 | 0 | } |
3369 | 0 | return 1; |
3370 | 0 | } |
3371 | | |
3372 | 0 | default: |
3373 | 0 | return -1; |
3374 | 0 | } |
3375 | 0 | } |
3376 | | |
3377 | | static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
3378 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
3379 | 0 | { |
3380 | 0 | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
3381 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
3382 | 0 | return 1; |
3383 | 0 | if (key) |
3384 | 0 | do { |
3385 | | #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
3386 | | if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
3387 | | HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, |
3388 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3389 | | &cctx->ks.ks); |
3390 | | |
3391 | | CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
3392 | | &cctx->ks, (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt); |
3393 | | cctx->str = NULL; |
3394 | | cctx->key_set = 1; |
3395 | | break; |
3396 | | } else |
3397 | | #endif |
3398 | 0 | #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
3399 | 0 | if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
3400 | 0 | vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, |
3401 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3402 | 0 | &cctx->ks.ks); |
3403 | 0 | CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
3404 | 0 | &cctx->ks, (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt); |
3405 | 0 | cctx->str = NULL; |
3406 | 0 | cctx->key_set = 1; |
3407 | 0 | break; |
3408 | 0 | } |
3409 | 0 | #endif |
3410 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3411 | 0 | &cctx->ks.ks); |
3412 | 0 | CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
3413 | 0 | &cctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); |
3414 | 0 | cctx->str = NULL; |
3415 | 0 | cctx->key_set = 1; |
3416 | 0 | } while (0); |
3417 | 0 | if (iv) { |
3418 | 0 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); |
3419 | 0 | cctx->iv_set = 1; |
3420 | 0 | } |
3421 | 0 | return 1; |
3422 | 0 | } |
3423 | | |
3424 | | static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
3425 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
3426 | 0 | { |
3427 | 0 | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
3428 | 0 | CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; |
3429 | | /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ |
3430 | 0 | if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M)) |
3431 | 0 | return -1; |
3432 | | /* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */ |
3433 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
3434 | 0 | memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
3435 | 0 | EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
3436 | | /* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */ |
3437 | 0 | memcpy(ctx->iv + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, |
3438 | 0 | EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
3439 | | /* Correct length value */ |
3440 | 0 | len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; |
3441 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, |
3442 | 0 | len)) |
3443 | 0 | return -1; |
3444 | | /* Use saved AAD */ |
3445 | 0 | CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
3446 | 0 | cctx->tls_aad_len); |
3447 | | /* Fix buffer to point to payload */ |
3448 | 0 | in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
3449 | 0 | out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
3450 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
3451 | 0 | if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
3452 | 0 | cctx->str) |
3453 | 0 | : CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) |
3454 | 0 | return -1; |
3455 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, out + len, cctx->M)) |
3456 | 0 | return -1; |
3457 | 0 | return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; |
3458 | 0 | } else { |
3459 | 0 | if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
3460 | 0 | cctx->str) |
3461 | 0 | : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { |
3462 | 0 | unsigned char tag[16]; |
3463 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { |
3464 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + len, cctx->M)) |
3465 | 0 | return len; |
3466 | 0 | } |
3467 | 0 | } |
3468 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
3469 | 0 | return -1; |
3470 | 0 | } |
3471 | 0 | } |
3472 | | |
3473 | | static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
3474 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
3475 | 0 | { |
3476 | 0 | EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
3477 | 0 | CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; |
3478 | | /* If not set up, return error */ |
3479 | 0 | if (!cctx->key_set) |
3480 | 0 | return -1; |
3481 | | |
3482 | 0 | if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) |
3483 | 0 | return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
3484 | | |
3485 | | /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */ |
3486 | 0 | if (in == NULL && out != NULL) |
3487 | 0 | return 0; |
3488 | | |
3489 | 0 | if (!cctx->iv_set) |
3490 | 0 | return -1; |
3491 | | |
3492 | 0 | if (!out) { |
3493 | 0 | if (!in) { |
3494 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, |
3495 | 0 | 15 - cctx->L, len)) |
3496 | 0 | return -1; |
3497 | 0 | cctx->len_set = 1; |
3498 | 0 | return len; |
3499 | 0 | } |
3500 | | /* If have AAD need message length */ |
3501 | 0 | if (!cctx->len_set && len) |
3502 | 0 | return -1; |
3503 | 0 | CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len); |
3504 | 0 | return len; |
3505 | 0 | } |
3506 | | |
3507 | | /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ |
3508 | 0 | if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set) |
3509 | 0 | return -1; |
3510 | | |
3511 | | /* If not set length yet do it */ |
3512 | 0 | if (!cctx->len_set) { |
3513 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len)) |
3514 | 0 | return -1; |
3515 | 0 | cctx->len_set = 1; |
3516 | 0 | } |
3517 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
3518 | 0 | if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
3519 | 0 | cctx->str) |
3520 | 0 | : CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) |
3521 | 0 | return -1; |
3522 | 0 | cctx->tag_set = 1; |
3523 | 0 | return len; |
3524 | 0 | } else { |
3525 | 0 | int rv = -1; |
3526 | 0 | if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
3527 | 0 | cctx->str) |
3528 | 0 | : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { |
3529 | 0 | unsigned char tag[16]; |
3530 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { |
3531 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
3532 | 0 | cctx->M)) |
3533 | 0 | rv = len; |
3534 | 0 | } |
3535 | 0 | } |
3536 | 0 | if (rv == -1) |
3537 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
3538 | 0 | cctx->iv_set = 0; |
3539 | 0 | cctx->tag_set = 0; |
3540 | 0 | cctx->len_set = 0; |
3541 | 0 | return rv; |
3542 | 0 | } |
3543 | 0 | } |
3544 | | |
3545 | | #define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL |
3546 | | |
3547 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, |
3548 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
3549 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, |
3550 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
3551 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, |
3552 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
3553 | | |
3554 | | typedef struct { |
3555 | | union { |
3556 | | OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
3557 | | AES_KEY ks; |
3558 | | } ks; |
3559 | | /* Indicates if IV has been set */ |
3560 | | unsigned char *iv; |
3561 | | } EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX; |
3562 | | |
3563 | | static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
3564 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
3565 | 0 | { |
3566 | 0 | int len; |
3567 | 0 | EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX, ctx); |
3568 | |
|
3569 | 0 | if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
3570 | 0 | return 1; |
3571 | 0 | if (key != NULL) { |
3572 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
3573 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3574 | 0 | &wctx->ks.ks); |
3575 | 0 | else |
3576 | 0 | AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3577 | 0 | &wctx->ks.ks); |
3578 | 0 | if (iv == NULL) |
3579 | 0 | wctx->iv = NULL; |
3580 | 0 | } |
3581 | 0 | if (iv != NULL) { |
3582 | 0 | if ((len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx)) < 0) |
3583 | 0 | return 0; |
3584 | 0 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); |
3585 | 0 | wctx->iv = ctx->iv; |
3586 | 0 | } |
3587 | 0 | return 1; |
3588 | 0 | } |
3589 | | |
3590 | | static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
3591 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) |
3592 | 0 | { |
3593 | 0 | EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX, ctx); |
3594 | 0 | size_t rv; |
3595 | | /* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */ |
3596 | 0 | int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) == 4; |
3597 | | /* No final operation so always return zero length */ |
3598 | 0 | if (!in) |
3599 | 0 | return 0; |
3600 | | /* Input length must always be non-zero */ |
3601 | 0 | if (!inlen) |
3602 | 0 | return -1; |
3603 | | /* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */ |
3604 | 0 | if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7)) |
3605 | 0 | return -1; |
3606 | | /* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */ |
3607 | 0 | if (!pad && inlen & 0x7) |
3608 | 0 | return -1; |
3609 | 0 | if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inlen)) { |
3610 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); |
3611 | 0 | return 0; |
3612 | 0 | } |
3613 | 0 | if (!out) { |
3614 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
3615 | | /* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */ |
3616 | 0 | if (pad) |
3617 | 0 | inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8; |
3618 | | /* 8 byte prefix */ |
3619 | 0 | return inlen + 8; |
3620 | 0 | } else { |
3621 | | /* |
3622 | | * If not padding output will be exactly 8 bytes smaller than |
3623 | | * input. If padding it will be at least 8 bytes smaller but we |
3624 | | * don't know how much. |
3625 | | */ |
3626 | 0 | return inlen - 8; |
3627 | 0 | } |
3628 | 0 | } |
3629 | 0 | if (pad) { |
3630 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
3631 | 0 | rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
3632 | 0 | out, in, inlen, |
3633 | 0 | (block128_f)AES_encrypt); |
3634 | 0 | else |
3635 | 0 | rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
3636 | 0 | out, in, inlen, |
3637 | 0 | (block128_f)AES_decrypt); |
3638 | 0 | } else { |
3639 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
3640 | 0 | rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
3641 | 0 | out, in, inlen, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); |
3642 | 0 | else |
3643 | 0 | rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
3644 | 0 | out, in, inlen, (block128_f)AES_decrypt); |
3645 | 0 | } |
3646 | 0 | return rv ? (int)rv : -1; |
3647 | 0 | } |
3648 | | |
3649 | | #define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \ |
3650 | | | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ |
3651 | | | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) |
3652 | | |
3653 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap = { |
3654 | | NID_id_aes128_wrap, |
3655 | | 8, 16, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
3656 | | aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
3657 | | NULL, |
3658 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
3659 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
3660 | | }; |
3661 | | |
3662 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void) |
3663 | 164 | { |
3664 | 164 | return &aes_128_wrap; |
3665 | 164 | } |
3666 | | |
3667 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap = { |
3668 | | NID_id_aes192_wrap, |
3669 | | 8, 24, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
3670 | | aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
3671 | | NULL, |
3672 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
3673 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
3674 | | }; |
3675 | | |
3676 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void) |
3677 | 164 | { |
3678 | 164 | return &aes_192_wrap; |
3679 | 164 | } |
3680 | | |
3681 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap = { |
3682 | | NID_id_aes256_wrap, |
3683 | | 8, 32, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
3684 | | aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
3685 | | NULL, |
3686 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
3687 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
3688 | | }; |
3689 | | |
3690 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void) |
3691 | 164 | { |
3692 | 164 | return &aes_256_wrap; |
3693 | 164 | } |
3694 | | |
3695 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap_pad = { |
3696 | | NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, |
3697 | | 8, 16, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
3698 | | aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
3699 | | NULL, |
3700 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
3701 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
3702 | | }; |
3703 | | |
3704 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void) |
3705 | 164 | { |
3706 | 164 | return &aes_128_wrap_pad; |
3707 | 164 | } |
3708 | | |
3709 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap_pad = { |
3710 | | NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, |
3711 | | 8, 24, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
3712 | | aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
3713 | | NULL, |
3714 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
3715 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
3716 | | }; |
3717 | | |
3718 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void) |
3719 | 164 | { |
3720 | 164 | return &aes_192_wrap_pad; |
3721 | 164 | } |
3722 | | |
3723 | | static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap_pad = { |
3724 | | NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, |
3725 | | 8, 32, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
3726 | | aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
3727 | | NULL, |
3728 | | sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
3729 | | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
3730 | | }; |
3731 | | |
3732 | | const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void) |
3733 | 164 | { |
3734 | 164 | return &aes_256_wrap_pad; |
3735 | 164 | } |
3736 | | |
3737 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
3738 | | static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
3739 | 0 | { |
3740 | 0 | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, c); |
3741 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc; |
3742 | 0 | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx; |
3743 | |
|
3744 | 0 | switch (type) { |
3745 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
3746 | 0 | octx->key_set = 0; |
3747 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 0; |
3748 | 0 | octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); |
3749 | 0 | octx->iv = c->iv; |
3750 | 0 | octx->taglen = 16; |
3751 | 0 | octx->data_buf_len = 0; |
3752 | 0 | octx->aad_buf_len = 0; |
3753 | 0 | return 1; |
3754 | | |
3755 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
3756 | 0 | *(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen; |
3757 | 0 | return 1; |
3758 | | |
3759 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
3760 | | /* IV len must be 1 to 15 */ |
3761 | 0 | if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15) |
3762 | 0 | return 0; |
3763 | | |
3764 | 0 | octx->ivlen = arg; |
3765 | 0 | return 1; |
3766 | | |
3767 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
3768 | 0 | if (ptr == NULL) { |
3769 | | /* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */ |
3770 | 0 | if (arg < 0 || arg > 16) |
3771 | 0 | return 0; |
3772 | | |
3773 | 0 | octx->taglen = arg; |
3774 | 0 | return 1; |
3775 | 0 | } |
3776 | 0 | if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) |
3777 | 0 | return 0; |
3778 | 0 | memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg); |
3779 | 0 | return 1; |
3780 | | |
3781 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
3782 | 0 | if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) |
3783 | 0 | return 0; |
3784 | | |
3785 | 0 | memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg); |
3786 | 0 | return 1; |
3787 | | |
3788 | 0 | case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
3789 | 0 | newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr; |
3790 | 0 | new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, newc); |
3791 | 0 | return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb, |
3792 | 0 | &new_octx->ksenc.ks, |
3793 | 0 | &new_octx->ksdec.ks); |
3794 | | |
3795 | 0 | default: |
3796 | 0 | return -1; |
3797 | 0 | } |
3798 | 0 | } |
3799 | | |
3800 | | static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
3801 | | const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
3802 | 0 | { |
3803 | 0 | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); |
3804 | 0 | if (!iv && !key) |
3805 | 0 | return 1; |
3806 | 0 | if (key) { |
3807 | 0 | do { |
3808 | | /* |
3809 | | * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt |
3810 | | * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the |
3811 | | * decrypt for an encryption operation. |
3812 | | */ |
3813 | | #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
3814 | | if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
3815 | | HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3816 | | &octx->ksenc.ks); |
3817 | | HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3818 | | &octx->ksdec.ks); |
3819 | | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
3820 | | &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
3821 | | (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt, |
3822 | | (block128_f)HWAES_decrypt, |
3823 | | enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt |
3824 | | : HWAES_ocb_decrypt)) |
3825 | | return 0; |
3826 | | break; |
3827 | | } |
3828 | | #endif |
3829 | 0 | #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
3830 | 0 | if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
3831 | 0 | vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, |
3832 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3833 | 0 | &octx->ksenc.ks); |
3834 | 0 | vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, |
3835 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3836 | 0 | &octx->ksdec.ks); |
3837 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
3838 | 0 | &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
3839 | 0 | (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt, |
3840 | 0 | (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt, |
3841 | 0 | NULL)) |
3842 | 0 | return 0; |
3843 | 0 | break; |
3844 | 0 | } |
3845 | 0 | #endif |
3846 | 0 | AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3847 | 0 | &octx->ksenc.ks); |
3848 | 0 | AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8, |
3849 | 0 | &octx->ksdec.ks); |
3850 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
3851 | 0 | &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
3852 | 0 | (block128_f)AES_encrypt, |
3853 | 0 | (block128_f)AES_decrypt, |
3854 | 0 | NULL)) |
3855 | 0 | return 0; |
3856 | 0 | } while (0); |
3857 | | |
3858 | | /* |
3859 | | * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
3860 | | */ |
3861 | 0 | if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) |
3862 | 0 | iv = octx->iv; |
3863 | 0 | if (iv) { |
3864 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) |
3865 | 0 | != 1) |
3866 | 0 | return 0; |
3867 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 1; |
3868 | 0 | } |
3869 | 0 | octx->key_set = 1; |
3870 | 0 | } else { |
3871 | | /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
3872 | 0 | if (octx->key_set) |
3873 | 0 | CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); |
3874 | 0 | else |
3875 | 0 | memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); |
3876 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 1; |
3877 | 0 | } |
3878 | 0 | return 1; |
3879 | 0 | } |
3880 | | |
3881 | | static int aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
3882 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
3883 | 0 | { |
3884 | 0 | unsigned char *buf; |
3885 | 0 | int *buf_len; |
3886 | 0 | int written_len = 0; |
3887 | 0 | size_t trailing_len; |
3888 | 0 | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); |
3889 | | |
3890 | | /* If IV or Key not set then return error */ |
3891 | 0 | if (!octx->iv_set) |
3892 | 0 | return -1; |
3893 | | |
3894 | 0 | if (!octx->key_set) |
3895 | 0 | return -1; |
3896 | | |
3897 | 0 | if (in != NULL) { |
3898 | | /* |
3899 | | * Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low level OCB |
3900 | | * routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/ |
3901 | | * EVP_DecryptUpdate because we need to pass full blocks of AAD too |
3902 | | * and those routines don't support that |
3903 | | */ |
3904 | | |
3905 | | /* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */ |
3906 | 0 | if (out == NULL) { |
3907 | 0 | buf = octx->aad_buf; |
3908 | 0 | buf_len = &(octx->aad_buf_len); |
3909 | 0 | } else { |
3910 | 0 | buf = octx->data_buf; |
3911 | 0 | buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len); |
3912 | |
|
3913 | 0 | if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, len)) { |
3914 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); |
3915 | 0 | return 0; |
3916 | 0 | } |
3917 | 0 | } |
3918 | | |
3919 | | /* |
3920 | | * If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then |
3921 | | * use that data first |
3922 | | */ |
3923 | 0 | if (*buf_len > 0) { |
3924 | 0 | unsigned int remaining; |
3925 | |
|
3926 | 0 | remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len); |
3927 | 0 | if (remaining > len) { |
3928 | 0 | memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len); |
3929 | 0 | *(buf_len) += len; |
3930 | 0 | return 0; |
3931 | 0 | } |
3932 | 0 | memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, remaining); |
3933 | | |
3934 | | /* |
3935 | | * If we get here we've filled the buffer, so process it |
3936 | | */ |
3937 | 0 | len -= remaining; |
3938 | 0 | in += remaining; |
3939 | 0 | if (out == NULL) { |
3940 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
3941 | 0 | return -1; |
3942 | 0 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
3943 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, |
3944 | 0 | AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
3945 | 0 | return -1; |
3946 | 0 | } else { |
3947 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, |
3948 | 0 | AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
3949 | 0 | return -1; |
3950 | 0 | } |
3951 | 0 | written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
3952 | 0 | *buf_len = 0; |
3953 | 0 | if (out != NULL) |
3954 | 0 | out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
3955 | 0 | } |
3956 | | |
3957 | | /* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */ |
3958 | 0 | trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
3959 | | |
3960 | | /* |
3961 | | * If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first |
3962 | | */ |
3963 | 0 | if (len != trailing_len) { |
3964 | 0 | if (out == NULL) { |
3965 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len)) |
3966 | 0 | return -1; |
3967 | 0 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
3968 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) |
3969 | 0 | return -1; |
3970 | 0 | } else { |
3971 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) |
3972 | 0 | return -1; |
3973 | 0 | } |
3974 | 0 | written_len += len - trailing_len; |
3975 | 0 | in += len - trailing_len; |
3976 | 0 | } |
3977 | | |
3978 | | /* Handle any trailing partial block */ |
3979 | 0 | if (trailing_len > 0) { |
3980 | 0 | memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len); |
3981 | 0 | *buf_len = trailing_len; |
3982 | 0 | } |
3983 | |
|
3984 | 0 | return written_len; |
3985 | 0 | } else { |
3986 | | /* |
3987 | | * First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might |
3988 | | * have been provided - both for data and AAD |
3989 | | */ |
3990 | 0 | if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) { |
3991 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
3992 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, |
3993 | 0 | octx->data_buf_len)) |
3994 | 0 | return -1; |
3995 | 0 | } else { |
3996 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, |
3997 | 0 | octx->data_buf_len)) |
3998 | 0 | return -1; |
3999 | 0 | } |
4000 | 0 | written_len = octx->data_buf_len; |
4001 | 0 | octx->data_buf_len = 0; |
4002 | 0 | } |
4003 | 0 | if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) { |
4004 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len)) |
4005 | 0 | return -1; |
4006 | 0 | octx->aad_buf_len = 0; |
4007 | 0 | } |
4008 | | /* If decrypting then verify */ |
4009 | 0 | if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
4010 | 0 | if (octx->taglen < 0) |
4011 | 0 | return -1; |
4012 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb, |
4013 | 0 | octx->tag, octx->taglen) |
4014 | 0 | != 0) |
4015 | 0 | return -1; |
4016 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 0; |
4017 | 0 | return written_len; |
4018 | 0 | } |
4019 | | /* If encrypting then just get the tag */ |
4020 | 0 | if (CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, 16) != 1) |
4021 | 0 | return -1; |
4022 | | /* Don't reuse the IV */ |
4023 | 0 | octx->iv_set = 0; |
4024 | 0 | return written_len; |
4025 | 0 | } |
4026 | 0 | } |
4027 | | |
4028 | | static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) |
4029 | 0 | { |
4030 | 0 | EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, c); |
4031 | 0 | CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb); |
4032 | 0 | return 1; |
4033 | 0 | } |
4034 | | |
4035 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, |
4036 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
4037 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, |
4038 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
4039 | | BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, |
4040 | | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
4041 | | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ |