/*

 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.

 *

 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 */

#include <stdio.h>

#include "ssl_local.h"

#include "record/record_local.h"

#include "internal/ktls.h"

#include "internal/cryptlib.h"

#include <openssl/comp.h>

#include <openssl/evp.h>

#include <openssl/kdf.h>

#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>

#include <openssl/core_names.h>

#include <openssl/trace.h>

/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */

static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,

    const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,

    const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,

    const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,

    const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,

    const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,

    const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,

    unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)

{

    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);

    EVP_KDF *kdf;

    EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;

    OSSL_PARAM params[8], *p = params;

    const char *mdname;

    if (md == NULL) {

        /* Should never happen */

        if (fatal)

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        else

            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        return 0;

    }

    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, s->ctx->propq);

    if (kdf == NULL)

        goto err;

    kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);

    EVP_KDF_free(kdf);

    if (kctx == NULL)

        goto err;

    mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,

        (char *)mdname, 0);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET,

        (unsigned char *)sec,

        (size_t)slen);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,

        (void *)seed1, (size_t)seed1_len);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,

        (void *)seed2, (size_t)seed2_len);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,

        (void *)seed3, (size_t)seed3_len);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,

        (void *)seed4, (size_t)seed4_len);

    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,

        (void *)seed5, (size_t)seed5_len);

    *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();

    if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen, params)) {

        EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);

        return 1;

    }

err:

    if (fatal)

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

    else

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);

    return 0;

}

static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)

{

    int ret;

    /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */

    ret = tls1_PRF(s,

        TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,

        TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3.server_random,

        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,

        NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,

        s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);

    return ret;

}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS

/*

 * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.

 *

 * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the

 * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this

 * function will fail.

 */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX

static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)

{

    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);

    PACKET pkt, subpkt;

    int count = 0;

    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))

        return -1;

    while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {

        /* Skip record type and version */

        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))

            return -1;

        /* Read until next record */

        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))

            return -1;

        count += 1;

    }

    return count;

}

#endif

#endif

int tls_provider_set_tls_params(SSL *s, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,

    const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,

    const EVP_MD *md)

{

    /*

     * Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider

     * side so we need to tell the ctx about our TLS version and mac size

     */

    OSSL_PARAM params[3], *pprm = params;

    size_t macsize = 0;

    int imacsize = -1;

    if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0

        /*

         * We look at s->ext.use_etm instead of SSL_READ_ETM() or

         * SSL_WRITE_ETM() because this test applies to both reading

         * and writing.

         */

        && !s->ext.use_etm)

        imacsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md);

    if (imacsize >= 0)

        macsize = (size_t)imacsize;

    *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_VERSION,

        &s->version);

    *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC_SIZE,

        &macsize);

    *pprm = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();

    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        return 0;

    }

    return 1;

}

static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c)

{

    /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */

    if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)

        return EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;

    else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)

        return EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;

    else

        return EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c);

}

int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)

{

    unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;

    unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;

    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;

    const EVP_CIPHER *c;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

    const SSL_COMP *comp;

#endif

    const EVP_MD *m;

    int mac_type;

    size_t *mac_secret_size;

    EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;

    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;

    size_t n, i, j, k, cl;

    int reuse_dd = 0;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS

    ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;

    unsigned char *rec_seq;

    void *rl_sequence;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX

    int count_unprocessed;

    int bit;

#endif

    BIO *bio;

#endif

    c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;

    m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;

    mac_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

    comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression;

#endif

    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {

        if (s->ext.use_etm)

            s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;

        else

            s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;

        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)

            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;

        else

            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;

        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)

            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;

        else

            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;

        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {

            reuse_dd = 1;

        } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

            goto err;

        } else {

            /*

             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error

             */

            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);

        }

        dd = s->enc_read_ctx;

        mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);

        if (mac_ctx == NULL) {

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

            goto err;

        }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);

        s->expand = NULL;

        if (comp != NULL) {

            s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);

            if (s->expand == NULL) {

                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,

                    SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);

                goto err;

            }

        }

#endif

        /*

         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS

         */

        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))

            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);

        mac_secret = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);

        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret_size);

    } else {

        s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;

        if (s->ext.use_etm)

            s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;

        else

            s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;

        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)

            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;

        else

            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;

        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)

            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;

        else

            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;

        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {

            reuse_dd = 1;

        } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

            goto err;

        }

        dd = s->enc_write_ctx;

        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {

            mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {

                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

                goto err;

            }

            s->write_hash = mac_ctx;

        } else {

            mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);

            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {

                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

                goto err;

            }

        }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);

        s->compress = NULL;

        if (comp != NULL) {

            s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);

            if (s->compress == NULL) {

                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,

                    SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);

                goto err;

            }

        }

#endif

        /*

         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS

         */

        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))

            RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);

        mac_secret = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);

        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret_size);

    }

    if (reuse_dd)

        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);

    p = s->s3.tmp.key_block;

    i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;

    cl = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c);

    j = cl;

    k = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c);

    if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {

        ms = &(p[0]);

        n = i + i;

        key = &(p[n]);

        n += j + j;

        iv = &(p[n]);

        n += k + k;

    } else {

        n = i;

        ms = &(p[n]);

        n += i + j;

        key = &(p[n]);

        n += j + k;

        iv = &(p[n]);

        n += k;

    }

    if (n > s->s3.tmp.key_block_length) {

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        goto err;

    }

    memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);

    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {

        if (mac_type == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {

            mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC",

                s->ctx->propq, mac_secret,

                *mac_secret_size);

        } else {

            /*

             * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are

             * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating

             * a MAC key.

             */

            mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,

                (int)*mac_secret_size);

        }

        if (mac_key == NULL

            || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mac_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(m),

                   s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, mac_key,

                   NULL)

                <= 0) {

            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

            goto err;

        }

        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)

    {

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, mac key:\n", which);

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, ms, i, 4);

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);

    if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {

        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))

            || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,

                   iv)

                <= 0) {

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

            goto err;

        }

    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {

        int taglen;

        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))

            taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;

        else

            taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;

        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))

            || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL) <= 0)

            || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL) <= 0)

            || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv) <= 0)

            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

            goto err;

        }

    } else {

        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {

            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

            goto err;

        }

    }

    /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */

    if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)

        && *mac_secret_size

        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,

               (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)

            <= 0) {

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        goto err;

    }

    /*

     * The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be

     * different to that in c if we have an ENGINE in use

     */

    if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(dd)) != NULL

        && !tls_provider_set_tls_params(s, dd, c, m)) {

        /* SSLfatal already called */

        goto err;

    }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS

    if (s->compress || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)

        goto skip_ktls;

    /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */

    if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)

        goto skip_ktls;

    /* check that cipher is supported */

    if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, c, dd))

        goto skip_ktls;

    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)

        bio = s->wbio;

    else

        bio = s->rbio;

    if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        goto err;

    }

    /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */

    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {

        if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)

            goto skip_ktls;

    }

    /* ktls doesn't support renegotiation */

    if ((BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        goto err;

    }

    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)

        rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);

    else

        rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);

    if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, c, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info, &rec_seq,

            iv, key, ms, *mac_secret_size))

        goto skip_ktls;

    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX

        count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);

        if (count_unprocessed < 0)

            goto skip_ktls;

        /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */

        while (count_unprocessed) {

            for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */

                ++rec_seq[bit];

                if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)

                    break;

            }

            count_unprocessed--;

        }

#else

        goto skip_ktls;

#endif

    }

    /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */

    if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {

        if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)

            ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);

        SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);

    }

skip_ktls:

#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */

    s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;

    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)

    {

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which);

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c), 4);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "iv:\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, iv, k, 4);

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);

    return 1;

err:

    return 0;

}

int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)

{

    unsigned char *p;

    const EVP_CIPHER *c;

    const EVP_MD *hash;

    SSL_COMP *comp;

    int mac_type = NID_undef;

    size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;

    int ret = 0;

    if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0)

        return 1;

    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type,

            &mac_secret_size, &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {

        /* Error is already recorded */

        SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);

        return 0;

    }

    ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);

    s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;

    ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);

    s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;

    s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;

    s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;

    num = mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c)

        + tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c);

    num *= 2;

    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {

        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

        goto err;

    }

    s->s3.tmp.key_block_length = num;

    s->s3.tmp.key_block = p;

    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)

    {

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block length: %zu\n", num);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "client random\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "server random\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "master key\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,

            s->session->master_key,

            s->session->master_key_length, 4);

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);

    if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {

        /* SSLfatal() already called */

        goto err;

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)

    {

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4);

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);

    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)

        && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {

        /*

         * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV

         * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)

         */

        s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 1;

        if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {

            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)

                s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;

            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)

                s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;

        }

    }

    ret = 1;

err:

    return ret;

}

size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,

    unsigned char *out)

{

    size_t hashlen;

    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    size_t finished_size = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;

    if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST18)

        finished_size = 32;

    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {

        /* SSLfatal() already called */

        return 0;

    }

    if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {

        /* SSLfatal() already called */

        return 0;

    }

    if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,

            s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,

            out, finished_size, 1)) {

        /* SSLfatal() already called */

        return 0;

    }

    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);

    return finished_size;

}

int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,

    size_t len, size_t *secret_size)

{

    if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {

        unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];

        size_t hashlen;

        /*

         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't

         * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same

         * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)

         */

        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)

            || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {

            /* SSLfatal() already called */

            return 0;

        }

        OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)

        {

            BIO_printf(trc_out, "Handshake hashes:\n");

            BIO_dump(trc_out, (char *)hash, hashlen);

        }

        OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);

        if (!tls1_PRF(s,

                TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,

                TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,

                hash, hashlen,

                NULL, 0,

                NULL, 0,

                NULL, 0, p, len, out,

                SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {

            /* SSLfatal() already called */

            return 0;

        }

        OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);

    } else {

        if (!tls1_PRF(s,

                TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,

                TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,

                s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,

                NULL, 0,

                s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,

                NULL, 0, p, len, out,

                SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {

            /* SSLfatal() already called */

            return 0;

        }

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)

    {

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Premaster Secret:\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, len, 4);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Client Random:\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Server Random:\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);

        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Master Secret:\n");

        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,

            s->session->master_key,

            SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 4);

    }

    OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);

    *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;

    return 1;

}

int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,

    const char *label, size_t llen,

    const unsigned char *context,

    size_t contextlen, int use_context)

{

    unsigned char *val = NULL;

    size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;

    int rv;

    /*

     * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather

     * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the

     * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.

     */

    vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;

    if (use_context) {

        vallen += 2 + contextlen;

    }

    val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);

    if (val == NULL)

        goto err2;

    currentvalpos = 0;

    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);

    currentvalpos += llen;

    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

    if (use_context) {

        val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;

        currentvalpos++;

        val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;

        currentvalpos++;

        if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {

            memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);

        }

    }

    /*

     * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited

     * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and

     * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow

     */

    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,

            TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE)

        == 0)

        goto err1;

    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,

            TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE)

        == 0)

        goto err1;

    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,

            TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE)

        == 0)

        goto err1;

    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,

            TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE)

        == 0)

        goto err1;

    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,

            TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE)

        == 0)

        goto err1;

    rv = tls1_PRF(s,

        val, vallen,

        NULL, 0,

        NULL, 0,

        NULL, 0,

        NULL, 0,

        s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,

        out, olen, 0);

    goto ret;

err1:

    ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);

    rv = 0;

    goto ret;

err2:

    ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

    rv = 0;

ret:

    OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);

    return rv;

}

int tls1_alert_code(int code)

{

    switch (code) {

    case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:

        return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;

    case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:

        return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

    case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:

        return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;

    case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:

        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;

    case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:

        return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

    case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:

        return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;

    case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:

        return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

    case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:

        return -1;

    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:

        return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;

    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:

        return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;

    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:

        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;

    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:

        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;

    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:

        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;

    case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:

        return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:

        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;

    case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:

        return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;

    case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:

        return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

    case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:

        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

    case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:

        return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;

    case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:

        return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

    case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:

        return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;

    case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:

        return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

    case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:

        return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;

    case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:

        return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;

    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:

        return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;

    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:

        return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;

    case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:

        return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;

    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:

        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;

    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:

        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;

    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:

        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;

    case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:

        return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;

    case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:

        return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;

    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:

        return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

    case TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION:

        return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

    default:

        return -1;

    }

}