Coverage Report

Created: 2026-02-14 07:20

next uncovered line (L), next uncovered region (R), next uncovered branch (B)
/src/openssl33/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
Line
Count
Source
1
/*
2
 * Copyright 2005-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3
 *
4
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
5
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
6
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8
 */
9
10
/*
11
 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12
 * internal use.
13
 */
14
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16
#include <stdio.h>
17
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
18
#include <openssl/bn.h>
19
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
20
#include <openssl/evp.h>
21
#include <openssl/rand.h>
22
#include <openssl/sha.h>
23
#include "rsa_local.h"
24
25
static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
26
27
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
28
#pragma optimize("g", off)
29
#endif
30
31
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
32
    const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
33
    int sLen)
34
0
{
35
0
    return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
36
0
}
37
38
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
39
    const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
40
    const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
41
3.54k
{
42
3.54k
    int i;
43
3.54k
    int ret = 0;
44
3.54k
    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
45
3.54k
    const unsigned char *H;
46
3.54k
    unsigned char *DB = NULL;
47
3.54k
    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
48
3.54k
    unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
49
50
3.54k
    if (ctx == NULL)
51
0
        goto err;
52
53
3.54k
    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
54
0
        mgf1Hash = Hash;
55
56
3.54k
    hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
57
3.54k
    if (hLen < 0)
58
0
        goto err;
59
    /*-
60
     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
61
     *      -1      sLen == hLen
62
     *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
63
     *      -3      salt length is maximized
64
     *      -4      salt length is autorecovered from signature
65
     *      -N      reserved
66
     */
67
3.54k
    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
68
2.54k
        sLen = hLen;
69
2.54k
    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
70
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
71
0
        goto err;
72
0
    }
73
74
3.54k
    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
75
3.54k
    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
76
3.54k
    if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
77
973
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
78
973
        goto err;
79
973
    }
80
2.57k
    if (MSBits == 0) {
81
696
        EM++;
82
696
        emLen--;
83
696
    }
84
2.57k
    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
85
29
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
86
29
        goto err;
87
29
    }
88
2.54k
    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
89
0
        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
90
2.54k
    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
91
12
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
92
12
        goto err;
93
12
    }
94
2.53k
    if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
95
2.40k
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
96
2.40k
        goto err;
97
2.40k
    }
98
126
    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
99
126
    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
100
126
    DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
101
126
    if (DB == NULL)
102
0
        goto err;
103
126
    if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
104
0
        goto err;
105
25.7k
    for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
106
25.6k
        DB[i] ^= EM[i];
107
126
    if (MSBits)
108
98
        DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
109
2.66k
    for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++)
110
2.54k
        ;
111
126
    if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
112
99
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
113
99
        goto err;
114
99
    }
115
27
    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
116
27
        && sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX
117
27
        && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
118
10
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED,
119
10
            "expected: %d retrieved: %d", sLen,
120
10
            maskedDBLen - i);
121
10
        goto err;
122
10
    }
123
17
    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
124
17
        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
125
17
        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
126
0
        goto err;
127
17
    if (maskedDBLen - i) {
128
17
        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
129
0
            goto err;
130
17
    }
131
17
    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H_, NULL))
132
0
        goto err;
133
17
    if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
134
16
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
135
16
        ret = 0;
136
16
    } else {
137
1
        ret = 1;
138
1
    }
139
140
3.54k
err:
141
3.54k
    OPENSSL_free(DB);
142
3.54k
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
143
144
3.54k
    return ret;
145
17
}
146
147
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
148
    const unsigned char *mHash,
149
    const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
150
0
{
151
0
    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
152
0
}
153
154
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
155
    const unsigned char *mHash,
156
    const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
157
    int sLen)
158
160
{
159
160
    int i;
160
160
    int ret = 0;
161
160
    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
162
160
    unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
163
160
    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
164
160
    int sLenMax = -1;
165
166
160
    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
167
0
        mgf1Hash = Hash;
168
169
160
    hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
170
160
    if (hLen < 0)
171
0
        goto err;
172
    /*-
173
     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
174
     *      -1      sLen == hLen
175
     *      -2      salt length is maximized
176
     *      -3      same as above (on signing)
177
     *      -4      salt length is min(hLen, maximum salt length)
178
     *      -N      reserved
179
     */
180
    /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
181
     * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
182
     * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
183
     * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
184
     *
185
     * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
186
     * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
187
160
    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
188
160
        sLen = hLen;
189
160
    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN
190
0
        || sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
191
0
        sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
192
0
    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
193
0
        sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
194
0
        sLenMax = hLen;
195
0
    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
196
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
197
0
        goto err;
198
0
    }
199
200
160
    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
201
160
    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
202
160
    if (MSBits == 0) {
203
0
        *EM++ = 0;
204
0
        emLen--;
205
0
    }
206
160
    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
207
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
208
0
        goto err;
209
0
    }
210
160
    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
211
0
        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
212
0
        if (sLenMax >= 0 && sLen > sLenMax)
213
0
            sLen = sLenMax;
214
160
    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
215
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
216
0
        goto err;
217
0
    }
218
160
    if (sLen > 0) {
219
160
        salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
220
160
        if (salt == NULL)
221
0
            goto err;
222
160
        if (RAND_bytes_ex(rsa->libctx, salt, sLen, 0) <= 0)
223
0
            goto err;
224
160
    }
225
160
    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
226
160
    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
227
160
    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
228
160
    if (ctx == NULL)
229
0
        goto err;
230
160
    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
231
160
        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
232
160
        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
233
0
        goto err;
234
160
    if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, sLen))
235
0
        goto err;
236
160
    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H, NULL))
237
0
        goto err;
238
239
    /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
240
160
    if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
241
0
        goto err;
242
243
160
    p = EM;
244
245
    /*
246
     * Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer.
247
     * Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative.
248
     */
249
160
    p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
250
160
    *p++ ^= 0x1;
251
160
    if (sLen > 0) {
252
7.40k
        for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
253
7.24k
            *p++ ^= salt[i];
254
160
    }
255
160
    if (MSBits)
256
160
        EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
257
258
    /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
259
260
160
    EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
261
262
160
    ret = 1;
263
264
160
err:
265
160
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
266
160
    OPENSSL_clear_free(salt, (size_t)sLen); /* salt != NULL implies sLen > 0 */
267
268
160
    return ret;
269
160
}
270
271
/*
272
 * The defaults for PSS restrictions are defined in RFC 8017, A.2.3 RSASSA-PSS
273
 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#appendix-A.2.3):
274
 *
275
 * If the default values of the hashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm, and
276
 * trailerField fields of RSASSA-PSS-params are used, then the algorithm
277
 * identifier will have the following value:
278
 *
279
 *     rSASSA-PSS-Default-Identifier    RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
280
 *         algorithm   id-RSASSA-PSS,
281
 *         parameters  RSASSA-PSS-params : {
282
 *             hashAlgorithm       sha1,
283
 *             maskGenAlgorithm    mgf1SHA1,
284
 *             saltLength          20,
285
 *             trailerField        trailerFieldBC
286
 *         }
287
 *     }
288
 *
289
 *     RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
290
 *         {PKCS1Algorithms}
291
 *     }
292
 */
293
static const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 default_RSASSA_PSS_params = {
294
    NID_sha1, /* default hashAlgorithm */
295
    {
296
        NID_mgf1, /* default maskGenAlgorithm */
297
        NID_sha1 /* default MGF1 hash */
298
    },
299
    20, /* default saltLength */
300
    1 /* default trailerField (0xBC) */
301
};
302
303
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
304
26.4k
{
305
26.4k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
306
0
        return 0;
307
26.4k
    *rsa_pss_params = default_RSASSA_PSS_params;
308
26.4k
    return 1;
309
26.4k
}
310
311
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
312
81.6k
{
313
81.6k
    static RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params_cmp = {
314
81.6k
        0,
315
81.6k
    };
316
317
81.6k
    return rsa_pss_params == NULL
318
81.6k
        || memcmp(rsa_pss_params, &pss_params_cmp,
319
81.6k
               sizeof(*rsa_pss_params))
320
81.6k
        == 0;
321
81.6k
}
322
323
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_copy(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *to,
324
    const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *from)
325
0
{
326
0
    memcpy(to, from, sizeof(*to));
327
0
    return 1;
328
0
}
329
330
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
331
    int hashalg_nid)
332
9.51k
{
333
9.51k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
334
0
        return 0;
335
9.51k
    rsa_pss_params->hash_algorithm_nid = hashalg_nid;
336
9.51k
    return 1;
337
9.51k
}
338
339
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
340
    int maskgenhashalg_nid)
341
9.51k
{
342
9.51k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
343
0
        return 0;
344
9.51k
    rsa_pss_params->mask_gen.hash_algorithm_nid = maskgenhashalg_nid;
345
9.51k
    return 1;
346
9.51k
}
347
348
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
349
    int saltlen)
350
9.51k
{
351
9.51k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
352
0
        return 0;
353
9.51k
    rsa_pss_params->salt_len = saltlen;
354
9.51k
    return 1;
355
9.51k
}
356
357
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
358
    int trailerfield)
359
9.51k
{
360
9.51k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
361
0
        return 0;
362
9.51k
    rsa_pss_params->trailer_field = trailerfield;
363
9.51k
    return 1;
364
9.51k
}
365
366
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
367
19.6k
{
368
19.6k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
369
9.50k
        return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.hash_algorithm_nid;
370
10.1k
    return rsa_pss_params->hash_algorithm_nid;
371
19.6k
}
372
373
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
374
19.1k
{
375
19.1k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
376
9.48k
        return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.mask_gen.algorithm_nid;
377
9.66k
    return rsa_pss_params->mask_gen.algorithm_nid;
378
19.1k
}
379
380
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
381
19.6k
{
382
19.6k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
383
9.48k
        return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.hash_algorithm_nid;
384
10.1k
    return rsa_pss_params->mask_gen.hash_algorithm_nid;
385
19.6k
}
386
387
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
388
25.6k
{
389
25.6k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
390
14
        return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.salt_len;
391
25.5k
    return rsa_pss_params->salt_len;
392
25.6k
}
393
394
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
395
15.6k
{
396
15.6k
    if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
397
14
        return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.trailer_field;
398
15.6k
    return rsa_pss_params->trailer_field;
399
15.6k
}
400
401
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
402
#pragma optimize("", on)
403
#endif