/src/openssl34/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2001-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
4 | | * |
5 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
8 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
9 | | */ |
10 | | |
11 | | /* |
12 | | * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
13 | | * internal use. |
14 | | */ |
15 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
16 | | |
17 | | #include <string.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
19 | | |
20 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
21 | | #include "crypto/bn.h" |
22 | | #include "ec_local.h" |
23 | | #include "internal/refcount.h" |
24 | | |
25 | | /* |
26 | | * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method |
27 | | * Formerly at: |
28 | | * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp |
29 | | * You might now find it here: |
30 | | * http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13 |
31 | | * http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf |
32 | | * For multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting, formerly at: |
33 | | * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp |
34 | | */ |
35 | | |
36 | | /* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ |
37 | | struct ec_pre_comp_st { |
38 | | const EC_GROUP *group; /* parent EC_GROUP object */ |
39 | | size_t blocksize; /* block size for wNAF splitting */ |
40 | | size_t numblocks; /* max. number of blocks for which we have |
41 | | * precomputation */ |
42 | | size_t w; /* window size */ |
43 | | EC_POINT **points; /* array with pre-calculated multiples of |
44 | | * generator: 'num' pointers to EC_POINT |
45 | | * objects followed by a NULL */ |
46 | | size_t num; /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */ |
47 | | CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; |
48 | | }; |
49 | | |
50 | | static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) |
51 | 0 | { |
52 | 0 | EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; |
53 | |
|
54 | 0 | if (!group) |
55 | 0 | return NULL; |
56 | | |
57 | 0 | ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
58 | 0 | if (ret == NULL) |
59 | 0 | return ret; |
60 | | |
61 | 0 | ret->group = group; |
62 | 0 | ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */ |
63 | 0 | ret->w = 4; /* default */ |
64 | |
|
65 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) { |
66 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(ret); |
67 | 0 | return NULL; |
68 | 0 | } |
69 | 0 | return ret; |
70 | 0 | } |
71 | | |
72 | | EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) |
73 | 0 | { |
74 | 0 | int i; |
75 | 0 | if (pre != NULL) |
76 | 0 | CRYPTO_UP_REF(&pre->references, &i); |
77 | 0 | return pre; |
78 | 0 | } |
79 | | |
80 | | void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) |
81 | 0 | { |
82 | 0 | int i; |
83 | |
|
84 | 0 | if (pre == NULL) |
85 | 0 | return; |
86 | | |
87 | 0 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&pre->references, &i); |
88 | 0 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_ec", i, pre); |
89 | 0 | if (i > 0) |
90 | 0 | return; |
91 | 0 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
92 | |
|
93 | 0 | if (pre->points != NULL) { |
94 | 0 | EC_POINT **pts; |
95 | |
|
96 | 0 | for (pts = pre->points; *pts != NULL; pts++) |
97 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(*pts); |
98 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(pre->points); |
99 | 0 | } |
100 | 0 | CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&pre->references); |
101 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(pre); |
102 | 0 | } |
103 | | |
104 | | #define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) \ |
105 | 33.8k | do { \ |
106 | 33.8k | BN_set_flags((P)->X, (flags)); \ |
107 | 33.8k | BN_set_flags((P)->Y, (flags)); \ |
108 | 33.8k | BN_set_flags((P)->Z, (flags)); \ |
109 | 33.8k | } while (0) |
110 | | |
111 | | /*- |
112 | | * This functions computes a single point multiplication over the EC group, |
113 | | * using, at a high level, a Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps, with |
114 | | * various timing attack defenses. |
115 | | * |
116 | | * It performs either a fixed point multiplication |
117 | | * (scalar * generator) |
118 | | * when point is NULL, or a variable point multiplication |
119 | | * (scalar * point) |
120 | | * when point is not NULL. |
121 | | * |
122 | | * `scalar` cannot be NULL and should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all |
123 | | * constant time bets are off (where n is the cardinality of the EC group). |
124 | | * |
125 | | * This function expects `group->order` and `group->cardinality` to be well |
126 | | * defined and non-zero: it fails with an error code otherwise. |
127 | | * |
128 | | * NB: This says nothing about the constant-timeness of the ladder step |
129 | | * implementation (i.e., the default implementation is based on EC_POINT_add and |
130 | | * EC_POINT_dbl, which of course are not constant time themselves) or the |
131 | | * underlying multiprecision arithmetic. |
132 | | * |
133 | | * The product is stored in `r`. |
134 | | * |
135 | | * This is an internal function: callers are in charge of ensuring that the |
136 | | * input parameters `group`, `r`, `scalar` and `ctx` are not NULL. |
137 | | * |
138 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
139 | | */ |
140 | | int ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, |
141 | | const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, |
142 | | BN_CTX *ctx) |
143 | 11.2k | { |
144 | 11.2k | int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one; |
145 | 11.2k | EC_POINT *p = NULL; |
146 | 11.2k | EC_POINT *s = NULL; |
147 | 11.2k | BIGNUM *k = NULL; |
148 | 11.2k | BIGNUM *lambda = NULL; |
149 | 11.2k | BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL; |
150 | 11.2k | int ret = 0; |
151 | | |
152 | | /* early exit if the input point is the point at infinity */ |
153 | 11.2k | if (point != NULL && EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) |
154 | 0 | return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); |
155 | | |
156 | 11.2k | if (BN_is_zero(group->order)) { |
157 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); |
158 | 0 | return 0; |
159 | 0 | } |
160 | 11.2k | if (BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) { |
161 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR); |
162 | 0 | return 0; |
163 | 0 | } |
164 | | |
165 | 11.2k | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
166 | | |
167 | 11.2k | if (((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) |
168 | 11.2k | || ((s = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)) { |
169 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
170 | 0 | goto err; |
171 | 0 | } |
172 | | |
173 | 11.2k | if (point == NULL) { |
174 | 9.11k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, group->generator)) { |
175 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
176 | 0 | goto err; |
177 | 0 | } |
178 | 9.11k | } else { |
179 | 2.17k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, point)) { |
180 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
181 | 0 | goto err; |
182 | 0 | } |
183 | 2.17k | } |
184 | | |
185 | 11.2k | EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
186 | 11.2k | EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
187 | 11.2k | EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
188 | | |
189 | 11.2k | cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
190 | 11.2k | lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
191 | 11.2k | k = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
192 | 11.2k | if (k == NULL) { |
193 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
194 | 0 | goto err; |
195 | 0 | } |
196 | | |
197 | 11.2k | if (!BN_mul(cardinality, group->order, group->cofactor, ctx)) { |
198 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
199 | 0 | goto err; |
200 | 0 | } |
201 | | |
202 | | /* |
203 | | * Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary. |
204 | | * So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might |
205 | | * pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries. |
206 | | * So expand ahead of time. |
207 | | */ |
208 | 11.2k | cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); |
209 | 11.2k | group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality); |
210 | 11.2k | if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL) |
211 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) { |
212 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
213 | 0 | goto err; |
214 | 0 | } |
215 | | |
216 | | /* |
217 | | * Constant-timeness of this copy depends on the caller: BN_copy() moves |
218 | | * scalar->top words unless |scalar| is flagged BN_FLG_CONSTTIME (in which |
219 | | * case scalar->dmax words are moved). Secret scalars are therefore |
220 | | * expected to arrive either BN_FLG_CONSTTIME or fixed-top, so that their |
221 | | * top is a public, value-independent width and the copy length does not |
222 | | * leak their magnitude. ECDSA satisfies this via |
223 | | * ossl_bn_priv_rand_range_fixed_top(). The fixed-top pinning below makes |
224 | | * the subsequent arithmetic constant time regardless, but cannot |
225 | | * retroactively fix the copy length here. |
226 | | */ |
227 | 11.2k | if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) { |
228 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
229 | 0 | goto err; |
230 | 0 | } |
231 | | |
232 | 11.2k | BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
233 | | |
234 | 11.2k | if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) { |
235 | | /*- |
236 | | * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee |
237 | | * constant-timeness |
238 | | */ |
239 | 1.94k | if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx)) { |
240 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
241 | 0 | goto err; |
242 | 0 | } |
243 | 1.94k | } |
244 | | |
245 | | /* |
246 | | * |k| may still carry a top that depends on the value of the secret |
247 | | * scalar: callers pass either a fixed-top BIGNUM (e.g. the ECDSA nonce) |
248 | | * or a minimal-top one (e.g. SM2), and BN_copy() above preserves that |
249 | | * top. Pin |k| to a fixed number of words (matching the group |
250 | | * cardinality) so that the additions below run in constant time, |
251 | | * independently of the bit length of the scalar. Otherwise the work |
252 | | * done by BN_add()/BN_uadd() depends on the operand tops and leaks the |
253 | | * magnitude of the secret scalar. |
254 | | */ |
255 | 11.2k | if (!bn_set_top_fixed(k, group_top)) { |
256 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
257 | 0 | goto err; |
258 | 0 | } |
259 | | |
260 | 11.2k | if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality)) { |
261 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
262 | 0 | goto err; |
263 | 0 | } |
264 | | /* |
265 | | * |lambda| = scalar + cardinality may or may not have produced a carry |
266 | | * into an extra word depending on the secret scalar. Pin its top to one |
267 | | * word above the group top so that the second addition, which consumes |
268 | | * |lambda|, is likewise constant time and so that the BN_is_bit_set() |
269 | | * below always inspects a defined word. |
270 | | */ |
271 | 11.2k | if (!bn_set_top_fixed(lambda, group_top + 1)) { |
272 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
273 | 0 | goto err; |
274 | 0 | } |
275 | 11.2k | BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
276 | 11.2k | if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality)) { |
277 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
278 | 0 | goto err; |
279 | 0 | } |
280 | | /* |
281 | | * lambda := scalar + cardinality |
282 | | * k := scalar + 2*cardinality |
283 | | */ |
284 | 11.2k | kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); |
285 | 11.2k | BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2); |
286 | | |
287 | 11.2k | group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); |
288 | 11.2k | if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL) |
289 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(s->Y, group_top) == NULL) |
290 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(s->Z, group_top) == NULL) |
291 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(r->X, group_top) == NULL) |
292 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(r->Y, group_top) == NULL) |
293 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(r->Z, group_top) == NULL) |
294 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(p->X, group_top) == NULL) |
295 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(p->Y, group_top) == NULL) |
296 | 11.2k | || (bn_wexpand(p->Z, group_top) == NULL)) { |
297 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
298 | 0 | goto err; |
299 | 0 | } |
300 | | |
301 | | /* ensure input point is in affine coords for ladder step efficiency */ |
302 | 11.2k | if (!p->Z_is_one && (group->meth->make_affine == NULL || !group->meth->make_affine(group, p, ctx))) { |
303 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
304 | 0 | goto err; |
305 | 0 | } |
306 | | |
307 | | /* Initialize the Montgomery ladder */ |
308 | 11.2k | if (!ec_point_ladder_pre(group, r, s, p, ctx)) { |
309 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE); |
310 | 0 | goto err; |
311 | 0 | } |
312 | | |
313 | | /* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */ |
314 | 11.2k | pbit = 1; |
315 | | |
316 | 11.2k | #define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) \ |
317 | 3.14M | do { \ |
318 | 3.14M | BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->X, (b)->X, w); \ |
319 | 3.14M | BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Y, (b)->Y, w); \ |
320 | 3.14M | BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Z, (b)->Z, w); \ |
321 | 3.14M | t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \ |
322 | 3.14M | (a)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \ |
323 | 3.14M | (b)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \ |
324 | 3.14M | } while (0) |
325 | | |
326 | | /*- |
327 | | * The ladder step, with branches, is |
328 | | * |
329 | | * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R) |
330 | | * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S) |
331 | | * |
332 | | * Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state |
333 | | * |
334 | | * k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S |
335 | | * k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R |
336 | | * |
337 | | * Then perform the ECC ops. |
338 | | * |
339 | | * U = add(T, U) |
340 | | * T = dbl(T) |
341 | | * |
342 | | * Which leaves you with state |
343 | | * |
344 | | * k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R) |
345 | | * k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S) |
346 | | * |
347 | | * Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state |
348 | | * |
349 | | * k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U |
350 | | * k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T |
351 | | * |
352 | | * Which leaves you with state |
353 | | * |
354 | | * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R) |
355 | | * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S) |
356 | | * |
357 | | * So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a |
358 | | * conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap. |
359 | | * |
360 | | * Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like |
361 | | * |
362 | | * ... |
363 | | * CSWAP(k[i], R, S) |
364 | | * ECC |
365 | | * CSWAP(k[i], R, S) |
366 | | * (next iteration) |
367 | | * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S) |
368 | | * ECC |
369 | | * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S) |
370 | | * ... |
371 | | * |
372 | | * So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition |
373 | | * bits and do a single swap. |
374 | | * |
375 | | * k[i] k[i-1] Outcome |
376 | | * 0 0 No Swap |
377 | | * 0 1 Swap |
378 | | * 1 0 Swap |
379 | | * 1 1 No Swap |
380 | | * |
381 | | * This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k. |
382 | | */ |
383 | | |
384 | 3.14M | for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
385 | 3.13M | kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit; |
386 | 3.13M | EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one); |
387 | | |
388 | | /* Perform a single step of the Montgomery ladder */ |
389 | 3.13M | if (!ec_point_ladder_step(group, r, s, p, ctx)) { |
390 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE); |
391 | 0 | goto err; |
392 | 0 | } |
393 | | /* |
394 | | * pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the |
395 | | * next iteration |
396 | | */ |
397 | 3.13M | pbit ^= kbit; |
398 | 3.13M | } |
399 | | /* one final cswap to move the right value into r */ |
400 | 11.2k | EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one); |
401 | 11.2k | #undef EC_POINT_CSWAP |
402 | | |
403 | | /* Finalize ladder (and recover full point coordinates) */ |
404 | 11.2k | if (!ec_point_ladder_post(group, r, s, p, ctx)) { |
405 | 5 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE); |
406 | 5 | goto err; |
407 | 5 | } |
408 | | |
409 | 11.2k | ret = 1; |
410 | | |
411 | 11.2k | err: |
412 | 11.2k | EC_POINT_free(p); |
413 | 11.2k | EC_POINT_clear_free(s); |
414 | 11.2k | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
415 | | |
416 | 11.2k | return ret; |
417 | 11.2k | } |
418 | | |
419 | | #undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags |
420 | | |
421 | | /* |
422 | | * Table could be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation, |
423 | | * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the |
424 | | * boundaries should be increased) |
425 | | */ |
426 | | #define EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(b) \ |
427 | 1.99k | ((size_t)((b) >= 2000 ? 6 : (b) >= 800 ? 5 \ |
428 | 1.97k | : (b) >= 300 ? 4 \ |
429 | 1.91k | : (b) >= 70 ? 3 \ |
430 | 1.75k | : (b) >= 20 ? 2 \ |
431 | 887 | : 1)) |
432 | | |
433 | | /*- |
434 | | * Compute |
435 | | * \sum scalars[i]*points[i], |
436 | | * also including |
437 | | * scalar*generator |
438 | | * in the addition if scalar != NULL |
439 | | */ |
440 | | int ossl_ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, |
441 | | size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], |
442 | | const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) |
443 | 3.86k | { |
444 | 3.86k | const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; |
445 | 3.86k | EC_POINT *tmp = NULL; |
446 | 3.86k | size_t totalnum; |
447 | 3.86k | size_t blocksize = 0, numblocks = 0; /* for wNAF splitting */ |
448 | 3.86k | size_t pre_points_per_block = 0; |
449 | 3.86k | size_t i, j; |
450 | 3.86k | int k; |
451 | 3.86k | int r_is_inverted = 0; |
452 | 3.86k | int r_is_at_infinity = 1; |
453 | 3.86k | size_t *wsize = NULL; /* individual window sizes */ |
454 | 3.86k | signed char **wNAF = NULL; /* individual wNAFs */ |
455 | 3.86k | size_t *wNAF_len = NULL; |
456 | 3.86k | size_t max_len = 0; |
457 | 3.86k | size_t num_val; |
458 | 3.86k | EC_POINT **val = NULL; /* precomputation */ |
459 | 3.86k | EC_POINT **v; |
460 | 3.86k | EC_POINT ***val_sub = NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' or |
461 | | * 'pre_comp->points' */ |
462 | 3.86k | const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; |
463 | 3.86k | int num_scalar = 0; /* flag: will be set to 1 if 'scalar' must be |
464 | | * treated like other scalars, i.e. |
465 | | * precomputation is not available */ |
466 | 3.86k | int ret = 0; |
467 | | |
468 | 3.86k | if (!BN_is_zero(group->order) && !BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) { |
469 | | /*- |
470 | | * Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a |
471 | | * scalar multiplication implementation based on a Montgomery ladder, |
472 | | * with various timing attack defenses. |
473 | | */ |
474 | 2.70k | if ((scalar != group->order) && (scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) { |
475 | | /*- |
476 | | * In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint: this |
477 | | * codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key |
478 | | * generation of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup, |
479 | | * ECDH keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret. This |
480 | | * is why we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we |
481 | | * always call the ladder version. |
482 | | */ |
483 | 1.86k | return ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx); |
484 | 1.86k | } |
485 | 836 | if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1) && (scalars[0] != group->order)) { |
486 | | /*- |
487 | | * In this case we want to compute scalar * VariablePoint: this |
488 | | * codepath is reached most prominently by the second half of ECDH, |
489 | | * where the secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public point. |
490 | | * To protect the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is |
491 | | * actually set and we always call the ladder version. |
492 | | */ |
493 | 0 | return ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], |
494 | 0 | ctx); |
495 | 0 | } |
496 | 836 | } |
497 | | |
498 | 1.99k | if (scalar != NULL) { |
499 | 1.46k | generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); |
500 | 1.46k | if (generator == NULL) { |
501 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); |
502 | 0 | goto err; |
503 | 0 | } |
504 | | |
505 | | /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ |
506 | | |
507 | 1.46k | pre_comp = group->pre_comp.ec; |
508 | 1.46k | if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks |
509 | 0 | && (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) == 0)) { |
510 | 0 | blocksize = pre_comp->blocksize; |
511 | | |
512 | | /* |
513 | | * determine maximum number of blocks that wNAF splitting may |
514 | | * yield (NB: maximum wNAF length is bit length plus one) |
515 | | */ |
516 | 0 | numblocks = (BN_num_bits(scalar) / blocksize) + 1; |
517 | | |
518 | | /* |
519 | | * we cannot use more blocks than we have precomputation for |
520 | | */ |
521 | 0 | if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) |
522 | 0 | numblocks = pre_comp->numblocks; |
523 | |
|
524 | 0 | pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (pre_comp->w - 1); |
525 | | |
526 | | /* check that pre_comp looks sane */ |
527 | 0 | if (pre_comp->num != (pre_comp->numblocks * pre_points_per_block)) { |
528 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
529 | 0 | goto err; |
530 | 0 | } |
531 | 1.46k | } else { |
532 | | /* can't use precomputation */ |
533 | 1.46k | pre_comp = NULL; |
534 | 1.46k | numblocks = 1; |
535 | 1.46k | num_scalar = 1; /* treat 'scalar' like 'num'-th element of |
536 | | * 'scalars' */ |
537 | 1.46k | } |
538 | 1.46k | } |
539 | | |
540 | 1.99k | totalnum = num + numblocks; |
541 | | |
542 | 1.99k | wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wsize[0])); |
543 | 1.99k | wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wNAF_len[0])); |
544 | | /* include space for pivot */ |
545 | 1.99k | wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof(wNAF[0])); |
546 | 1.99k | val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(val_sub[0])); |
547 | | |
548 | | /* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */ |
549 | 1.99k | if (wNAF != NULL) |
550 | 1.99k | wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */ |
551 | | |
552 | 1.99k | if (wsize == NULL || wNAF_len == NULL || wNAF == NULL || val_sub == NULL) |
553 | 0 | goto err; |
554 | | |
555 | | /* |
556 | | * num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points |
557 | | */ |
558 | 1.99k | num_val = 0; |
559 | | |
560 | 3.98k | for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { |
561 | 1.99k | size_t bits; |
562 | | |
563 | 1.99k | bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(scalar); |
564 | 1.99k | wsize[i] = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); |
565 | 1.99k | num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1); |
566 | 1.99k | wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; /* make sure we always have a pivot */ |
567 | 1.99k | wNAF[i] = bn_compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : scalar), wsize[i], |
568 | 1.99k | &wNAF_len[i]); |
569 | 1.99k | if (wNAF[i] == NULL) |
570 | 0 | goto err; |
571 | 1.99k | if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) |
572 | 1.99k | max_len = wNAF_len[i]; |
573 | 1.99k | } |
574 | | |
575 | 1.99k | if (numblocks) { |
576 | | /* we go here iff scalar != NULL */ |
577 | | |
578 | 1.46k | if (pre_comp == NULL) { |
579 | 1.46k | if (num_scalar != 1) { |
580 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
581 | 0 | goto err; |
582 | 0 | } |
583 | | /* we have already generated a wNAF for 'scalar' */ |
584 | 1.46k | } else { |
585 | 0 | signed char *tmp_wNAF = NULL; |
586 | 0 | size_t tmp_len = 0; |
587 | |
|
588 | 0 | if (num_scalar != 0) { |
589 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
590 | 0 | goto err; |
591 | 0 | } |
592 | | |
593 | | /* |
594 | | * use the window size for which we have precomputation |
595 | | */ |
596 | 0 | wsize[num] = pre_comp->w; |
597 | 0 | tmp_wNAF = bn_compute_wNAF(scalar, wsize[num], &tmp_len); |
598 | 0 | if (!tmp_wNAF) |
599 | 0 | goto err; |
600 | | |
601 | 0 | if (tmp_len <= max_len) { |
602 | | /* |
603 | | * One of the other wNAFs is at least as long as the wNAF |
604 | | * belonging to the generator, so wNAF splitting will not buy |
605 | | * us anything. |
606 | | */ |
607 | |
|
608 | 0 | numblocks = 1; |
609 | 0 | totalnum = num + 1; /* don't use wNAF splitting */ |
610 | 0 | wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF; |
611 | 0 | wNAF[num + 1] = NULL; |
612 | 0 | wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len; |
613 | | /* |
614 | | * pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here: |
615 | | */ |
616 | 0 | val_sub[num] = pre_comp->points; |
617 | 0 | } else { |
618 | | /* |
619 | | * don't include tmp_wNAF directly into wNAF array - use wNAF |
620 | | * splitting and include the blocks |
621 | | */ |
622 | |
|
623 | 0 | signed char *pp; |
624 | 0 | EC_POINT **tmp_points; |
625 | |
|
626 | 0 | if (tmp_len < numblocks * blocksize) { |
627 | | /* |
628 | | * possibly we can do with fewer blocks than estimated |
629 | | */ |
630 | 0 | numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; |
631 | 0 | if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) { |
632 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
633 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
634 | 0 | goto err; |
635 | 0 | } |
636 | 0 | totalnum = num + numblocks; |
637 | 0 | } |
638 | | |
639 | | /* split wNAF in 'numblocks' parts */ |
640 | 0 | pp = tmp_wNAF; |
641 | 0 | tmp_points = pre_comp->points; |
642 | |
|
643 | 0 | for (i = num; i < totalnum; i++) { |
644 | 0 | if (i < totalnum - 1) { |
645 | 0 | wNAF_len[i] = blocksize; |
646 | 0 | if (tmp_len < blocksize) { |
647 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
648 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
649 | 0 | goto err; |
650 | 0 | } |
651 | 0 | tmp_len -= blocksize; |
652 | 0 | } else |
653 | | /* |
654 | | * last block gets whatever is left (this could be |
655 | | * more or less than 'blocksize'!) |
656 | | */ |
657 | 0 | wNAF_len[i] = tmp_len; |
658 | | |
659 | 0 | wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; |
660 | 0 | wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]); |
661 | 0 | if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { |
662 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
663 | 0 | goto err; |
664 | 0 | } |
665 | 0 | memcpy(wNAF[i], pp, wNAF_len[i]); |
666 | 0 | if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) |
667 | 0 | max_len = wNAF_len[i]; |
668 | |
|
669 | 0 | if (*tmp_points == NULL) { |
670 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
671 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
672 | 0 | goto err; |
673 | 0 | } |
674 | 0 | val_sub[i] = tmp_points; |
675 | 0 | tmp_points += pre_points_per_block; |
676 | 0 | pp += blocksize; |
677 | 0 | } |
678 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); |
679 | 0 | } |
680 | 0 | } |
681 | 1.46k | } |
682 | | |
683 | | /* |
684 | | * All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'. |
685 | | * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a |
686 | | * subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation. |
687 | | */ |
688 | 1.99k | val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof(val[0])); |
689 | 1.99k | if (val == NULL) |
690 | 0 | goto err; |
691 | 1.99k | val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */ |
692 | | |
693 | | /* allocate points for precomputation */ |
694 | 1.99k | v = val; |
695 | 3.98k | for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { |
696 | 1.99k | val_sub[i] = v; |
697 | 9.50k | for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { |
698 | 7.51k | *v = EC_POINT_new(group); |
699 | 7.51k | if (*v == NULL) |
700 | 0 | goto err; |
701 | 7.51k | v++; |
702 | 7.51k | } |
703 | 1.99k | } |
704 | 1.99k | if (!(v == val + num_val)) { |
705 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
706 | 0 | goto err; |
707 | 0 | } |
708 | | |
709 | 1.99k | if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) |
710 | 0 | goto err; |
711 | | |
712 | | /*- |
713 | | * prepare precomputed values: |
714 | | * val_sub[i][0] := points[i] |
715 | | * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i] |
716 | | * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i] |
717 | | * ... |
718 | | */ |
719 | 3.98k | for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { |
720 | 1.99k | if (i < num) { |
721 | 532 | if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i])) |
722 | 0 | goto err; |
723 | 1.46k | } else { |
724 | 1.46k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator)) |
725 | 0 | goto err; |
726 | 1.46k | } |
727 | | |
728 | 1.99k | if (wsize[i] > 1) { |
729 | 1.46k | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx)) |
730 | 0 | goto err; |
731 | 6.98k | for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { |
732 | 5.51k | if (!EC_POINT_add(group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx)) |
733 | 0 | goto err; |
734 | 5.51k | } |
735 | 1.46k | } |
736 | 1.99k | } |
737 | | |
738 | 1.99k | if (group->meth->points_make_affine == NULL |
739 | 1.99k | || !group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx)) |
740 | 5 | goto err; |
741 | | |
742 | 1.98k | r_is_at_infinity = 1; |
743 | | |
744 | 313k | for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) { |
745 | 311k | if (!r_is_at_infinity) { |
746 | 309k | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) |
747 | 0 | goto err; |
748 | 309k | } |
749 | | |
750 | 622k | for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) { |
751 | 311k | if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) { |
752 | 311k | int digit = wNAF[i][k]; |
753 | 311k | int is_neg; |
754 | | |
755 | 311k | if (digit) { |
756 | 42.6k | is_neg = digit < 0; |
757 | | |
758 | 42.6k | if (is_neg) |
759 | 18.2k | digit = -digit; |
760 | | |
761 | 42.6k | if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) { |
762 | 18.5k | if (!r_is_at_infinity) { |
763 | 18.5k | if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) |
764 | 0 | goto err; |
765 | 18.5k | } |
766 | 18.5k | r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted; |
767 | 18.5k | } |
768 | | |
769 | | /* digit > 0 */ |
770 | | |
771 | 42.6k | if (r_is_at_infinity) { |
772 | 1.94k | if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) |
773 | 0 | goto err; |
774 | | |
775 | | /*- |
776 | | * Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT. |
777 | | * |
778 | | * The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function: |
779 | | * ossl_ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on |
780 | | * success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this |
781 | | * group. |
782 | | */ |
783 | 1.94k | if (!ossl_ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, r, ctx)) { |
784 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE); |
785 | 0 | goto err; |
786 | 0 | } |
787 | | |
788 | 1.94k | r_is_at_infinity = 0; |
789 | 40.7k | } else { |
790 | 40.7k | if (!EC_POINT_add(group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx)) |
791 | 0 | goto err; |
792 | 40.7k | } |
793 | 42.6k | } |
794 | 311k | } |
795 | 311k | } |
796 | 311k | } |
797 | | |
798 | 1.98k | if (r_is_at_infinity) { |
799 | 45 | if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) |
800 | 0 | goto err; |
801 | 1.94k | } else { |
802 | 1.94k | if (r_is_inverted) |
803 | 866 | if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) |
804 | 0 | goto err; |
805 | 1.94k | } |
806 | | |
807 | 1.98k | ret = 1; |
808 | | |
809 | 1.99k | err: |
810 | 1.99k | EC_POINT_free(tmp); |
811 | 1.99k | OPENSSL_free(wsize); |
812 | 1.99k | OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len); |
813 | 1.99k | if (wNAF != NULL) { |
814 | 1.99k | signed char **w; |
815 | | |
816 | 3.98k | for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++) |
817 | 1.99k | OPENSSL_free(*w); |
818 | | |
819 | 1.99k | OPENSSL_free(wNAF); |
820 | 1.99k | } |
821 | 1.99k | if (val != NULL) { |
822 | 9.50k | for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++) |
823 | 7.51k | EC_POINT_clear_free(*v); |
824 | | |
825 | 1.99k | OPENSSL_free(val); |
826 | 1.99k | } |
827 | 1.99k | OPENSSL_free(val_sub); |
828 | 1.99k | return ret; |
829 | 1.98k | } |
830 | | |
831 | | /*- |
832 | | * ossl_ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() |
833 | | * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator |
834 | | * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ossl_ec_wNAF_mul(). |
835 | | * |
836 | | * 'pre_comp->points' is an array of multiples of the generator |
837 | | * of the following form: |
838 | | * points[0] = generator; |
839 | | * points[1] = 3 * generator; |
840 | | * ... |
841 | | * points[2^(w-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)-1) * generator; |
842 | | * points[2^(w-1)] = 2^blocksize * generator; |
843 | | * points[2^(w-1)+1] = 3 * 2^blocksize * generator; |
844 | | * ... |
845 | | * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-2)) * generator |
846 | | * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)] = 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator |
847 | | * ... |
848 | | * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator |
849 | | * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks] = NULL |
850 | | */ |
851 | | int ossl_ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) |
852 | 0 | { |
853 | 0 | const EC_POINT *generator; |
854 | 0 | EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var; |
855 | 0 | const BIGNUM *order; |
856 | 0 | size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num; |
857 | 0 | EC_POINT **points = NULL; |
858 | 0 | EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; |
859 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
860 | 0 | int used_ctx = 0; |
861 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
862 | 0 | BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; |
863 | 0 | #endif |
864 | | |
865 | | /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ |
866 | 0 | EC_pre_comp_free(group); |
867 | 0 | if ((pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL) |
868 | 0 | return 0; |
869 | | |
870 | 0 | generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); |
871 | 0 | if (generator == NULL) { |
872 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); |
873 | 0 | goto err; |
874 | 0 | } |
875 | | |
876 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
877 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
878 | 0 | ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
879 | 0 | #endif |
880 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
881 | 0 | goto err; |
882 | | |
883 | 0 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
884 | 0 | used_ctx = 1; |
885 | |
|
886 | 0 | order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); |
887 | 0 | if (order == NULL) |
888 | 0 | goto err; |
889 | 0 | if (BN_is_zero(order)) { |
890 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); |
891 | 0 | goto err; |
892 | 0 | } |
893 | | |
894 | 0 | bits = BN_num_bits(order); |
895 | | /* |
896 | | * The following parameters mean we precompute (approximately) one point |
897 | | * per bit. TBD: The combination 8, 4 is perfect for 160 bits; for other |
898 | | * bit lengths, other parameter combinations might provide better |
899 | | * efficiency. |
900 | | */ |
901 | 0 | blocksize = 8; |
902 | 0 | w = 4; |
903 | 0 | if (EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits) > w) { |
904 | | /* let's not make the window too small ... */ |
905 | 0 | w = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); |
906 | 0 | } |
907 | |
|
908 | 0 | numblocks = (bits + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; /* max. number of blocks |
909 | | * to use for wNAF |
910 | | * splitting */ |
911 | |
|
912 | 0 | pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (w - 1); |
913 | 0 | num = pre_points_per_block * numblocks; /* number of points to compute |
914 | | * and store */ |
915 | |
|
916 | 0 | points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*points) * (num + 1)); |
917 | 0 | if (points == NULL) |
918 | 0 | goto err; |
919 | | |
920 | 0 | var = points; |
921 | 0 | var[num] = NULL; /* pivot */ |
922 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
923 | 0 | if ((var[i] = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { |
924 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
925 | 0 | goto err; |
926 | 0 | } |
927 | 0 | } |
928 | | |
929 | 0 | if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL |
930 | 0 | || (base = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { |
931 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
932 | 0 | goto err; |
933 | 0 | } |
934 | | |
935 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_copy(base, generator)) |
936 | 0 | goto err; |
937 | | |
938 | | /* do the precomputation */ |
939 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < numblocks; i++) { |
940 | 0 | size_t j; |
941 | |
|
942 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp_point, base, ctx)) |
943 | 0 | goto err; |
944 | | |
945 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_copy(*var++, base)) |
946 | 0 | goto err; |
947 | | |
948 | 0 | for (j = 1; j < pre_points_per_block; j++, var++) { |
949 | | /* |
950 | | * calculate odd multiples of the current base point |
951 | | */ |
952 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_add(group, *var, tmp_point, *(var - 1), ctx)) |
953 | 0 | goto err; |
954 | 0 | } |
955 | | |
956 | 0 | if (i < numblocks - 1) { |
957 | | /* |
958 | | * get the next base (multiply current one by 2^blocksize) |
959 | | */ |
960 | 0 | size_t k; |
961 | |
|
962 | 0 | if (blocksize <= 2) { |
963 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
964 | 0 | goto err; |
965 | 0 | } |
966 | | |
967 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, tmp_point, ctx)) |
968 | 0 | goto err; |
969 | 0 | for (k = 2; k < blocksize; k++) { |
970 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, base, ctx)) |
971 | 0 | goto err; |
972 | 0 | } |
973 | 0 | } |
974 | 0 | } |
975 | | |
976 | 0 | if (group->meth->points_make_affine == NULL |
977 | 0 | || !group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx)) |
978 | 0 | goto err; |
979 | | |
980 | 0 | pre_comp->group = group; |
981 | 0 | pre_comp->blocksize = blocksize; |
982 | 0 | pre_comp->numblocks = numblocks; |
983 | 0 | pre_comp->w = w; |
984 | 0 | pre_comp->points = points; |
985 | 0 | points = NULL; |
986 | 0 | pre_comp->num = num; |
987 | 0 | SETPRECOMP(group, ec, pre_comp); |
988 | 0 | pre_comp = NULL; |
989 | 0 | ret = 1; |
990 | |
|
991 | 0 | err: |
992 | 0 | if (used_ctx) |
993 | 0 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
994 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
995 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); |
996 | 0 | #endif |
997 | 0 | EC_ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); |
998 | 0 | if (points) { |
999 | 0 | EC_POINT **p; |
1000 | |
|
1001 | 0 | for (p = points; *p != NULL; p++) |
1002 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(*p); |
1003 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(points); |
1004 | 0 | } |
1005 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); |
1006 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(base); |
1007 | 0 | return ret; |
1008 | 0 | } |
1009 | | |
1010 | | int ossl_ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) |
1011 | 0 | { |
1012 | | return HAVEPRECOMP(group, ec); |
1013 | 0 | } |