/src/postgres/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c

Source
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 *
 * auth-scram.c
 *    Server-side implementation of the SASL SCRAM-SHA-256 mechanism.
 *
 * See the following RFCs for more details:
 * - RFC 5802: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
 * - RFC 5803: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5803
 * - RFC 7677: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7677
 *
 * Here are some differences:
 *
 * - Username from the authentication exchange is not used. The client
 *   should send an empty string as the username.
 *
 * - If the password isn't valid UTF-8, or contains characters prohibited
 *   by the SASLprep profile, we skip the SASLprep pre-processing and use
 *   the raw bytes in calculating the hash.
 *
 * - If channel binding is used, the channel binding type is always
 *   "tls-server-end-point".  The spec says the default is "tls-unique"
 *   (RFC 5802, section 6.1. Default Channel Binding), but there are some
 *   problems with that.  Firstly, not all SSL libraries provide an API to
 *   get the TLS Finished message, required to use "tls-unique".  Secondly,
 *   "tls-unique" is not specified for TLS v1.3, and as of this writing,
 *   it's not clear if there will be a replacement.  We could support both
 *   "tls-server-end-point" and "tls-unique", but for our use case,
 *   "tls-unique" doesn't really have any advantages.  The main advantage
 *   of "tls-unique" would be that it works even if the server doesn't
 *   have a certificate, but PostgreSQL requires a server certificate
 *   whenever SSL is used, anyway.
 *
 *
 * The password stored in pg_authid consists of the iteration count, salt,
 * StoredKey and ServerKey.
 *
 * SASLprep usage
 * --------------
 *
 * One notable difference to the SCRAM specification is that while the
 * specification dictates that the password is in UTF-8, and prohibits
 * certain characters, we are more lenient.  If the password isn't a valid
 * UTF-8 string, or contains prohibited characters, the raw bytes are used
 * to calculate the hash instead, without SASLprep processing.  This is
 * because PostgreSQL supports other encodings too, and the encoding being
 * used during authentication is undefined (client_encoding isn't set until
 * after authentication).  In effect, we try to interpret the password as
 * UTF-8 and apply SASLprep processing, but if it looks invalid, we assume
 * that it's in some other encoding.
 *
 * In the worst case, we misinterpret a password that's in a different
 * encoding as being Unicode, because it happens to consists entirely of
 * valid UTF-8 bytes, and we apply Unicode normalization to it.  As long
 * as we do that consistently, that will not lead to failed logins.
 * Fortunately, the UTF-8 byte sequences that are ignored by SASLprep
 * don't correspond to any commonly used characters in any of the other
 * supported encodings, so it should not lead to any significant loss in
 * entropy, even if the normalization is incorrectly applied to a
 * non-UTF-8 password.
 *
 * Error handling
 * --------------
 *
 * Don't reveal user information to an unauthenticated client.  We don't
 * want an attacker to be able to probe whether a particular username is
 * valid.  In SCRAM, the server has to read the salt and iteration count
 * from the user's stored secret, and send it to the client.  To avoid
 * revealing whether a user exists, when the client tries to authenticate
 * with a username that doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid SCRAM
 * secret in pg_authid, we create a fake salt and iteration count
 * on-the-fly, and proceed with the authentication with that.  In the end,
 * we'll reject the attempt, as if an incorrect password was given.  When
 * we are performing a "mock" authentication, the 'doomed' flag in
 * scram_state is set.
 *
 * In the error messages, avoid printing strings from the client, unless
 * you check that they are pure ASCII.  We don't want an unauthenticated
 * attacker to be able to spam the logs with characters that are not valid
 * to the encoding being used, whatever that is.  We cannot avoid that in
 * general, after logging in, but let's do what we can here.
 *
 *
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2026, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
 *
 * src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
 *
 *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#include "postgres.h"

#include <unistd.h>

#include "access/xlog.h"
#include "catalog/pg_control.h"
#include "common/base64.h"
#include "common/hmac.h"
#include "common/saslprep.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "common/sha2.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/sasl.h"
#include "libpq/scram.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"

static void scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf);
static void *scram_init(Port *port, const char *selected_mech,
            const char *shadow_pass);
static int  scram_exchange(void *opaq, const char *input, int inputlen,
               char **output, int *outputlen,
               const char **logdetail);

/* Mechanism declaration */
const pg_be_sasl_mech pg_be_scram_mech = {
  scram_get_mechanisms,
  scram_init,
  scram_exchange,

  PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH
};

/*
 * Status data for a SCRAM authentication exchange.  This should be kept
 * internal to this file.
 */
typedef enum
{
  SCRAM_AUTH_INIT,
  SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT,
  SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED,
} scram_state_enum;

typedef struct
{
  scram_state_enum state;

  Port     *port;
  bool    channel_binding_in_use;

  /* State data depending on the hash type */
  pg_cryptohash_type hash_type;
  int     key_length;

  int     iterations;
  char     *salt;     /* base64-encoded */
  uint8   ClientKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  uint8   StoredKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  uint8   ServerKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];

  /* Fields of the first message from client */
  char    cbind_flag;
  char     *client_first_message_bare;
  char     *client_username;
  char     *client_nonce;

  /* Fields from the last message from client */
  char     *client_final_message_without_proof;
  char     *client_final_nonce;
  uint8   ClientProof[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];

  /* Fields generated in the server */
  char     *server_first_message;
  char     *server_nonce;

  /*
   * If something goes wrong during the authentication, or we are performing
   * a "mock" authentication (see comments at top of file), the 'doomed'
   * flag is set.  A reason for the failure, for the server log, is put in
   * 'logdetail'.
   */
  bool    doomed;
  char     *logdetail;
} scram_state;

static void read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input);
static void read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input);
static char *build_server_first_message(scram_state *state);
static char *build_server_final_message(scram_state *state);
static bool verify_client_proof(scram_state *state);
static bool verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state);
static void mock_scram_secret(const char *username, pg_cryptohash_type *hash_type,
                int *iterations, int *key_length, char **salt,
                uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key);
static bool is_scram_printable(char *p);
static char *sanitize_char(char c);
static char *sanitize_str(const char *s);
static uint8 *scram_mock_salt(const char *username,
                pg_cryptohash_type hash_type,
                int key_length);

/*
 * The number of iterations to use when generating new secrets.
 */
int     scram_sha_256_iterations = SCRAM_SHA_256_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;

/*
 * Get a list of SASL mechanisms that this module supports.
 *
 * For the convenience of building the FE/BE packet that lists the
 * mechanisms, the names are appended to the given StringInfo buffer,
 * separated by '\0' bytes.
 */
static void
scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf)
{
  /*
   * Advertise the mechanisms in decreasing order of importance.  So the
   * channel-binding variants go first, if they are supported.  Channel
   * binding is only supported with SSL.
   */
#ifdef USE_SSL
  if (port->ssl_in_use)
  {
    appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME);
    appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
  }
#endif
  appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME);
  appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
}

/*
 * Initialize a new SCRAM authentication exchange status tracker.  This
 * needs to be called before doing any exchange.  It will be filled later
 * after the beginning of the exchange with authentication information.
 *
 * 'selected_mech' identifies the SASL mechanism that the client selected.
 * It should be one of the mechanisms that we support, as returned by
 * scram_get_mechanisms().
 *
 * 'shadow_pass' is the role's stored secret, from pg_authid.rolpassword.
 * The username was provided by the client in the startup message, and is
 * available in port->user_name.  If 'shadow_pass' is NULL, we still perform
 * an authentication exchange, but it will fail, as if an incorrect password
 * was given.
 */
static void *
scram_init(Port *port, const char *selected_mech, const char *shadow_pass)
{
  scram_state *state;
  bool    got_secret;

  state = palloc0_object(scram_state);
  state->port = port;
  state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_INIT;

  /*
   * Parse the selected mechanism.
   *
   * Note that if we don't support channel binding, or if we're not using
   * SSL at all, we would not have advertised the PLUS variant in the first
   * place.  If the client nevertheless tries to select it, it's a protocol
   * violation like selecting any other SASL mechanism we don't support.
   */
#ifdef USE_SSL
  if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0 && port->ssl_in_use)
    state->channel_binding_in_use = true;
  else
#endif
  if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME) == 0)
    state->channel_binding_in_use = false;
  else
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("client selected an invalid SASL authentication mechanism")));

  /*
   * Parse the stored secret.
   */
  if (shadow_pass)
  {
    int     password_type = get_password_type(shadow_pass);

    if (password_type == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256)
    {
      if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &state->iterations,
                   &state->hash_type, &state->key_length,
                   &state->salt,
                   state->StoredKey,
                   state->ServerKey))
        got_secret = true;
      else
      {
        /*
         * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be
         * parsed.
         */
        ereport(LOG,
            (errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"",
                state->port->user_name)));
        got_secret = false;
      }
    }
    else
    {
      /*
       * The user doesn't have SCRAM secret. (You cannot do SCRAM
       * authentication with an MD5 hash.)
       */
      state->logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" does not have a valid SCRAM secret."),
                    state->port->user_name);
      got_secret = false;
    }
  }
  else
  {
    /*
     * The caller requested us to perform a dummy authentication.  This is
     * considered normal, since the caller requested it, so don't set log
     * detail.
     */
    got_secret = false;
  }

  /*
   * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM secret, we still go through the
   * motions with a mock one, and fail as if the client supplied an
   * incorrect password.  This is to avoid revealing information to an
   * attacker.
   */
  if (!got_secret)
  {
    mock_scram_secret(state->port->user_name, &state->hash_type,
              &state->iterations, &state->key_length,
              &state->salt,
              state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey);
    state->doomed = true;
  }

  return state;
}

/*
 * Continue a SCRAM authentication exchange.
 *
 * 'input' is the SCRAM payload sent by the client.  On the first call,
 * 'input' contains the "Initial Client Response" that the client sent as
 * part of the SASLInitialResponse message, or NULL if no Initial Client
 * Response was given.  (The SASL specification distinguishes between an
 * empty response and non-existing one.)  On subsequent calls, 'input'
 * cannot be NULL.  For convenience in this function, the caller must
 * ensure that there is a null terminator at input[inputlen].
 *
 * The next message to send to client is saved in 'output', for a length
 * of 'outputlen'.  In the case of an error, optionally store a palloc'd
 * string at *logdetail that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not
 * the client).
 */
static int
scram_exchange(void *opaq, const char *input, int inputlen,
         char **output, int *outputlen, const char **logdetail)
{
  scram_state *state = (scram_state *) opaq;
  int     result;

  *output = NULL;

  /*
   * If the client didn't include an "Initial Client Response" in the
   * SASLInitialResponse message, send an empty challenge, to which the
   * client will respond with the same data that usually comes in the
   * Initial Client Response.
   */
  if (input == NULL)
  {
    Assert(state->state == SCRAM_AUTH_INIT);

    *output = pstrdup("");
    *outputlen = 0;
    return PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE;
  }

  /*
   * Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input.
   * We can ignore inputlen after this.
   */
  if (inputlen == 0)
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("The message is empty.")));
  if (inputlen != strlen(input))
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Message length does not match input length.")));

  switch (state->state)
  {
    case SCRAM_AUTH_INIT:

      /*
       * Initialization phase.  Receive the first message from client
       * and be sure that it parsed correctly.  Then send the challenge
       * to the client.
       */
      read_client_first_message(state, input);

      /* prepare message to send challenge */
      *output = build_server_first_message(state);

      state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT;
      result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE;
      break;

    case SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT:

      /*
       * Final phase for the server.  Receive the response to the
       * challenge previously sent, verify, and let the client know that
       * everything went well (or not).
       */
      read_client_final_message(state, input);

      if (!verify_final_nonce(state))
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("invalid SCRAM response"),
             errdetail("Nonce does not match.")));

      /*
       * Now check the final nonce and the client proof.
       *
       * If we performed a "mock" authentication that we knew would fail
       * from the get go, this is where we fail.
       *
       * The SCRAM specification includes an error code,
       * "invalid-proof", for authentication failure, but it also allows
       * erroring out in an application-specific way.  We choose to do
       * the latter, so that the error message for invalid password is
       * the same for all authentication methods.  The caller will call
       * ereport(), when we return PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE with no
       * output.
       *
       * NB: the order of these checks is intentional.  We calculate the
       * client proof even in a mock authentication, even though it's
       * bound to fail, to thwart timing attacks to determine if a role
       * with the given name exists or not.
       */
      if (!verify_client_proof(state) || state->doomed)
      {
        result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
        break;
      }

      /* Build final message for client */
      *output = build_server_final_message(state);

      /* Success! */
      result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS;
      state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED;
      break;

    default:
      elog(ERROR, "invalid SCRAM exchange state");
      result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
  }

  if (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE && state->logdetail && logdetail)
    *logdetail = state->logdetail;

  if (*output)
    *outputlen = strlen(*output);

  if (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS && state->state == SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED)
  {
    memcpy(MyProcPort->scram_ClientKey, state->ClientKey, sizeof(MyProcPort->scram_ClientKey));
    memcpy(MyProcPort->scram_ServerKey, state->ServerKey, sizeof(MyProcPort->scram_ServerKey));
    MyProcPort->has_scram_keys = true;
  }

  return result;
}

/*
 * Construct a SCRAM secret, for storing in pg_authid.rolpassword.
 *
 * The result is palloc'd, so caller is responsible for freeing it.
 */
char *
pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password)
{
  char     *prep_password;
  pg_saslprep_rc rc;
  uint8   saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN];
  char     *result;
  const char *errstr = NULL;

  /*
   * Normalize the password with SASLprep.  If that doesn't work, because
   * the password isn't valid UTF-8 or contains prohibited characters, just
   * proceed with the original password.  (See comments at top of file.)
   */
  rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
  if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
    password = (const char *) prep_password;

  /* Generate random salt */
  if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN))
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
         errmsg("could not generate random salt")));

  result = scram_build_secret(PG_SHA256, SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN,
                saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
                scram_sha_256_iterations, password,
                &errstr);

  if (prep_password)
    pfree(prep_password);

  return result;
}

/*
 * Verify a plaintext password against a SCRAM secret.  This is used when
 * performing plaintext password authentication for a user that has a SCRAM
 * secret stored in pg_authid.
 */
bool
scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password,
              const char *secret)
{
  char     *encoded_salt;
  uint8    *salt;
  int     saltlen;
  int     iterations;
  int     key_length = 0;
  pg_cryptohash_type hash_type;
  uint8   salted_password[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  uint8   stored_key[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  uint8   server_key[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  uint8   computed_key[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  char     *prep_password;
  pg_saslprep_rc rc;
  const char *errstr = NULL;

  if (!parse_scram_secret(secret, &iterations, &hash_type, &key_length,
              &encoded_salt, stored_key, server_key))
  {
    /*
     * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be parsed.
     */
    ereport(LOG,
        (errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username)));
    return false;
  }

  saltlen = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt));
  salt = palloc(saltlen);
  saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt, strlen(encoded_salt), salt,
              saltlen);
  if (saltlen < 0)
  {
    ereport(LOG,
        (errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username)));
    return false;
  }

  /* Normalize the password */
  rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
  if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
    password = prep_password;

  /* Compute Server Key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */
  if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, hash_type, key_length,
               salt, saltlen, iterations,
               salted_password, &errstr) < 0 ||
    scram_ServerKey(salted_password, hash_type, key_length,
            computed_key, &errstr) < 0)
  {
    elog(ERROR, "could not compute server key: %s", errstr);
  }

  if (prep_password)
    pfree(prep_password);

  /*
   * Compare the secret's Server Key with the one computed from the
   * user-supplied password.
   */
  return timingsafe_bcmp(computed_key, server_key, key_length) == 0;
}


/*
 * Parse and validate format of given SCRAM secret.
 *
 * On success, the iteration count, salt, stored key, and server key are
 * extracted from the secret, and returned to the caller.  For 'stored_key'
 * and 'server_key', the caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size
 * SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN.  Salt is returned as a base64-encoded, null-terminated
 * string.  The buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function.
 *
 * Returns true if the SCRAM secret has been parsed, and false otherwise.
 */
bool
parse_scram_secret(const char *secret, int *iterations,
           pg_cryptohash_type *hash_type, int *key_length,
           char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key)
{
  char     *v;
  char     *p;
  char     *scheme_str;
  char     *salt_str;
  char     *iterations_str;
  char     *storedkey_str;
  char     *serverkey_str;
  int     decoded_len;
  uint8    *decoded_salt_buf;
  uint8    *decoded_stored_buf;
  uint8    *decoded_server_buf;

  /*
   * The secret is of form:
   *
   * SCRAM-SHA-256$<iterations>:<salt>$<storedkey>:<serverkey>
   */
  v = pstrdup(secret);
  scheme_str = strsep(&v, "$");
  if (v == NULL)
    goto invalid_secret;
  iterations_str = strsep(&v, ":");
  if (v == NULL)
    goto invalid_secret;
  salt_str = strsep(&v, "$");
  if (v == NULL)
    goto invalid_secret;
  storedkey_str = strsep(&v, ":");
  if (v == NULL)
    goto invalid_secret;
  serverkey_str = v;

  /* Parse the fields */
  if (strcmp(scheme_str, "SCRAM-SHA-256") != 0)
    goto invalid_secret;
  *hash_type = PG_SHA256;
  *key_length = SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN;

  errno = 0;
  *iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &p, 10);
  if (*p || errno != 0)
    goto invalid_secret;

  /*
   * Verify that the salt is in Base64-encoded format, by decoding it,
   * although we return the encoded version to the caller.
   */
  decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(salt_str));
  decoded_salt_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
  decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(salt_str, strlen(salt_str),
                decoded_salt_buf, decoded_len);
  if (decoded_len < 0)
    goto invalid_secret;
  *salt = pstrdup(salt_str);

  /*
   * Decode StoredKey and ServerKey.
   */
  decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(storedkey_str));
  decoded_stored_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
  decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(storedkey_str, strlen(storedkey_str),
                decoded_stored_buf, decoded_len);
  if (decoded_len != *key_length)
    goto invalid_secret;
  memcpy(stored_key, decoded_stored_buf, *key_length);

  decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(serverkey_str));
  decoded_server_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
  decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(serverkey_str, strlen(serverkey_str),
                decoded_server_buf, decoded_len);
  if (decoded_len != *key_length)
    goto invalid_secret;
  memcpy(server_key, decoded_server_buf, *key_length);

  return true;

invalid_secret:
  *salt = NULL;
  return false;
}

/*
 * Generate plausible SCRAM secret parameters for mock authentication.
 *
 * In a normal authentication, these are extracted from the secret
 * stored in the server.  This function generates values that look
 * realistic, for when there is no stored secret, using SCRAM-SHA-256.
 *
 * Like in parse_scram_secret(), for 'stored_key' and 'server_key', the
 * caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN, and
 * the buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function.
 */
static void
mock_scram_secret(const char *username, pg_cryptohash_type *hash_type,
          int *iterations, int *key_length, char **salt,
          uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key)
{
  uint8    *raw_salt;
  char     *encoded_salt;
  int     encoded_len;

  /* Enforce the use of SHA-256, which would be realistic enough */
  *hash_type = PG_SHA256;
  *key_length = SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN;

  /*
   * Generate deterministic salt.
   *
   * Note that we cannot reveal any information to an attacker here so the
   * error messages need to remain generic.  This should never fail anyway
   * as the salt generated for mock authentication uses the cluster's nonce
   * value.
   */
  raw_salt = scram_mock_salt(username, *hash_type, *key_length);
  if (raw_salt == NULL)
    elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt");

  encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN);
  /* don't forget the zero-terminator */
  encoded_salt = (char *) palloc(encoded_len + 1);
  encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_salt, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt,
                encoded_len);

  if (encoded_len < 0)
    elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt");
  encoded_salt[encoded_len] = '\0';

  *salt = encoded_salt;
  *iterations = scram_sha_256_iterations;

  /* StoredKey and ServerKey are not used in a doomed authentication */
  memset(stored_key, 0, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN);
  memset(server_key, 0, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN);
}

/*
 * Read the value in a given SCRAM exchange message for given attribute.
 */
static char *
read_attr_value(char **input, char attr)
{
  char     *begin = *input;
  char     *end;

  if (*begin != attr)
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Expected attribute \"%c\" but found \"%s\".",
               attr, sanitize_char(*begin))));
  begin++;

  if (*begin != '=')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\".", attr)));
  begin++;

  end = begin;
  while (*end && *end != ',')
    end++;

  if (*end)
  {
    *end = '\0';
    *input = end + 1;
  }
  else
    *input = end;

  return begin;
}

static bool
is_scram_printable(char *p)
{
  /*------
   * Printable characters, as defined by SCRAM spec: (RFC 5802)
   *
   *  printable   = %x21-2B / %x2D-7E
   *            ;; Printable ASCII except ",".
   *            ;; Note that any "printable" is also
   *            ;; a valid "value".
   *------
   */
  for (; *p; p++)
  {
    if (*p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7E || *p == 0x2C /* comma */ )
      return false;
  }
  return true;
}

/*
 * Convert an arbitrary byte to printable form.  For error messages.
 *
 * If it's a printable ASCII character, print it as a single character.
 * otherwise, print it in hex.
 *
 * The returned pointer points to a static buffer.
 */
static char *
sanitize_char(char c)
{
  static char buf[5];

  if (c >= 0x21 && c <= 0x7E)
    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "'%c'", c);
  else
    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0x%02x", (unsigned char) c);
  return buf;
}

/*
 * Convert an arbitrary string to printable form, for error messages.
 *
 * Anything that's not a printable ASCII character is replaced with
 * '?', and the string is truncated at 30 characters.
 *
 * The returned pointer points to a static buffer.
 */
static char *
sanitize_str(const char *s)
{
  static char buf[30 + 1];
  int     i;

  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++)
  {
    char    c = s[i];

    if (c == '\0')
      break;

    if (c >= 0x21 && c <= 0x7E)
      buf[i] = c;
    else
      buf[i] = '?';
  }
  buf[i] = '\0';
  return buf;
}

/*
 * Read the next attribute and value in a SCRAM exchange message.
 *
 * The attribute character is set in *attr_p, the attribute value is the
 * return value.
 */
static char *
read_any_attr(char **input, char *attr_p)
{
  char     *begin = *input;
  char     *end;
  char    attr = *begin;

  if (attr == '\0')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Attribute expected, but found end of string.")));

  /*------
   * attr-val      = ALPHA "=" value
   *           ;; Generic syntax of any attribute sent
   *           ;; by server or client
   *------
   */
  if (!((attr >= 'A' && attr <= 'Z') ||
      (attr >= 'a' && attr <= 'z')))
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Attribute expected, but found invalid character \"%s\".",
               sanitize_char(attr))));
  if (attr_p)
    *attr_p = attr;
  begin++;

  if (*begin != '=')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\".", attr)));
  begin++;

  end = begin;
  while (*end && *end != ',')
    end++;

  if (*end)
  {
    *end = '\0';
    *input = end + 1;
  }
  else
    *input = end;

  return begin;
}

/*
 * Read and parse the first message from client in the context of a SCRAM
 * authentication exchange message.
 *
 * At this stage, any errors will be reported directly with ereport(ERROR).
 */
static void
read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
{
  char     *p = pstrdup(input);
  char     *channel_binding_type;


  /*------
   * The syntax for the client-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
   *
   * saslname      = 1*(value-safe-char / "=2C" / "=3D")
   *           ;; Conforms to <value>.
   *
   * authzid       = "a=" saslname
   *           ;; Protocol specific.
   *
   * cb-name       = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-")
   *            ;; See RFC 5056, Section 7.
   *            ;; E.g., "tls-server-end-point" or
   *            ;; "tls-unique".
   *
   * gs2-cbind-flag  = ("p=" cb-name) / "n" / "y"
   *           ;; "n" -> client doesn't support channel binding.
   *           ;; "y" -> client does support channel binding
   *           ;;      but thinks the server does not.
   *           ;; "p" -> client requires channel binding.
   *           ;; The selected channel binding follows "p=".
   *
   * gs2-header    = gs2-cbind-flag "," [ authzid ] ","
   *           ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
   *           ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
   *           ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
   *           ;; "standard", but since SCRAM is "standard", we
   *           ;; don't include that flag).
   *
   * username      = "n=" saslname
   *           ;; Usernames are prepared using SASLprep.
   *
   * reserved-mext  = "m=" 1*(value-char)
   *           ;; Reserved for signaling mandatory extensions.
   *           ;; The exact syntax will be defined in
   *           ;; the future.
   *
   * nonce       = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
   *           ;; Second part provided by server.
   *
   * c-nonce       = printable
   *
   * client-first-message-bare =
   *           [reserved-mext ","]
   *           username "," nonce ["," extensions]
   *
   * client-first-message =
   *           gs2-header client-first-message-bare
   *
   * For example:
   * n,,n=user,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL
   *
   * The "n,," in the beginning means that the client doesn't support
   * channel binding, and no authzid is given.  "n=user" is the username.
   * However, in PostgreSQL the username is sent in the startup packet, and
   * the username in the SCRAM exchange is ignored.  libpq always sends it
   * as an empty string.  The last part, "r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL" is
   * the client nonce.
   *------
   */

  /*
   * Read gs2-cbind-flag.  (For details see also RFC 5802 Section 6 "Channel
   * Binding".)
   */
  state->cbind_flag = *p;
  switch (*p)
  {
    case 'n':

      /*
       * The client does not support channel binding or has simply
       * decided to not use it.  In that case just let it go.
       */
      if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
             errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));

      p++;
      if (*p != ',')
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
             errdetail("Comma expected, but found character \"%s\".",
                   sanitize_char(*p))));
      p++;
      break;
    case 'y':

      /*
       * The client supports channel binding and thinks that the server
       * does not.  In this case, the server must fail authentication if
       * it supports channel binding.
       */
      if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
             errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));

#ifdef USE_SSL
      if (state->port->ssl_in_use)
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
             errmsg("SCRAM channel binding negotiation error"),
             errdetail("The client supports SCRAM channel binding but thinks the server does not.  "
                   "However, this server does support channel binding.")));
#endif
      p++;
      if (*p != ',')
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
             errdetail("Comma expected, but found character \"%s\".",
                   sanitize_char(*p))));
      p++;
      break;
    case 'p':

      /*
       * The client requires channel binding.  Channel binding type
       * follows, e.g., "p=tls-server-end-point".
       */
      if (!state->channel_binding_in_use)
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
             errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding, but the SCRAM message includes channel binding data.")));

      channel_binding_type = read_attr_value(&p, 'p');

      /*
       * The only channel binding type we support is
       * tls-server-end-point.
       */
      if (strcmp(channel_binding_type, "tls-server-end-point") != 0)
        ereport(ERROR,
            (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
             errmsg("unsupported SCRAM channel-binding type \"%s\"",
                sanitize_str(channel_binding_type))));
      break;
    default:
      ereport(ERROR,
          (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
           errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
           errdetail("Unexpected channel-binding flag \"%s\".",
                 sanitize_char(*p))));
  }

  /*
   * Forbid optional authzid (authorization identity).  We don't support it.
   */
  if (*p == 'a')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
         errmsg("client uses authorization identity, but it is not supported")));
  if (*p != ',')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Unexpected attribute \"%s\" in client-first-message.",
               sanitize_char(*p))));
  p++;

  state->client_first_message_bare = pstrdup(p);

  /*
   * Any mandatory extensions would go here.  We don't support any.
   *
   * RFC 5802 specifies error code "e=extensions-not-supported" for this,
   * but it can only be sent in the server-final message.  We prefer to fail
   * immediately (which the RFC also allows).
   */
  if (*p == 'm')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
         errmsg("client requires an unsupported SCRAM extension")));

  /*
   * Read username.  Note: this is ignored.  We use the username from the
   * startup message instead, still it is kept around if provided as it
   * proves to be useful for debugging purposes.
   */
  state->client_username = read_attr_value(&p, 'n');

  /* read nonce and check that it is made of only printable characters */
  state->client_nonce = read_attr_value(&p, 'r');
  if (!is_scram_printable(state->client_nonce))
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("non-printable characters in SCRAM nonce")));

  /*
   * There can be any number of optional extensions after this.  We don't
   * support any extensions, so ignore them.
   */
  while (*p != '\0')
    read_any_attr(&p, NULL);

  /* success! */
}

/*
 * Verify the final nonce contained in the last message received from
 * client in an exchange.
 */
static bool
verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state)
{
  int     client_nonce_len = strlen(state->client_nonce);
  int     server_nonce_len = strlen(state->server_nonce);
  int     final_nonce_len = strlen(state->client_final_nonce);

  if (final_nonce_len != client_nonce_len + server_nonce_len)
    return false;
  if (timingsafe_bcmp(state->client_final_nonce, state->client_nonce, client_nonce_len) != 0)
    return false;
  if (timingsafe_bcmp(state->client_final_nonce + client_nonce_len, state->server_nonce, server_nonce_len) != 0)
    return false;

  return true;
}

/*
 * Verify the client proof contained in the last message received from
 * client in an exchange.  Returns true if the verification is a success,
 * or false for a failure.
 */
static bool
verify_client_proof(scram_state *state)
{
  uint8   ClientSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  uint8   client_StoredKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type);
  int     i;
  const char *errstr = NULL;

  /*
   * Calculate ClientSignature.  Note that we don't log directly a failure
   * here even when processing the calculations as this could involve a mock
   * authentication.
   */
  if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, state->StoredKey, state->key_length) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx,
             (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare,
             strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx,
             (uint8 *) state->server_first_message,
             strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx,
             (uint8 *) state->client_final_message_without_proof,
             strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_final(ctx, ClientSignature, state->key_length) < 0)
  {
    elog(ERROR, "could not calculate client signature: %s",
       pg_hmac_error(ctx));
  }

  pg_hmac_free(ctx);

  /* Extract the ClientKey that the client calculated from the proof */
  for (i = 0; i < state->key_length; i++)
    state->ClientKey[i] = state->ClientProof[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];

  /* Hash it one more time, and compare with StoredKey */
  if (scram_H(state->ClientKey, state->hash_type, state->key_length,
        client_StoredKey, &errstr) < 0)
    elog(ERROR, "could not hash stored key: %s", errstr);

  if (timingsafe_bcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, state->key_length) != 0)
    return false;

  return true;
}

/*
 * Build the first server-side message sent to the client in a SCRAM
 * communication exchange.
 */
static char *
build_server_first_message(scram_state *state)
{
  /*------
   * The syntax for the server-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
   *
   * server-first-message =
   *           [reserved-mext ","] nonce "," salt ","
   *           iteration-count ["," extensions]
   *
   * nonce       = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
   *           ;; Second part provided by server.
   *
   * c-nonce       = printable
   *
   * s-nonce       = printable
   *
   * salt        = "s=" base64
   *
   * iteration-count = "i=" posit-number
   *           ;; A positive number.
   *
   * Example:
   *
   * r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,s=QSXCR+Q6sek8bf92,i=4096
   *------
   */

  /*
   * Per the spec, the nonce may consist of any printable ASCII characters.
   * For convenience, however, we don't use the whole range available,
   * rather, we generate some random bytes, and base64 encode them.
   */
  uint8   raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN];
  int     encoded_len;

  if (!pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN))
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
         errmsg("could not generate random nonce")));

  encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN);
  /* don't forget the zero-terminator */
  state->server_nonce = palloc(encoded_len + 1);
  encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN,
                state->server_nonce, encoded_len);
  if (encoded_len < 0)
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
         errmsg("could not encode random nonce")));
  state->server_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0';

  state->server_first_message =
    psprintf("r=%s%s,s=%s,i=%d",
         state->client_nonce, state->server_nonce,
         state->salt, state->iterations);

  return pstrdup(state->server_first_message);
}


/*
 * Read and parse the final message received from client.
 */
static void
read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
{
  char    attr;
  char     *channel_binding;
  char     *value;
  char     *begin,
         *proof;
  char     *p;
  uint8    *client_proof;
  int     client_proof_len;

  begin = p = pstrdup(input);

  /*------
   * The syntax for the server-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
   *
   * gs2-header    = gs2-cbind-flag "," [ authzid ] ","
   *           ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
   *           ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
   *           ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
   *           ;; "standard", but since SCRAM is "standard", we
   *           ;; don't include that flag).
   *
   * cbind-input   = gs2-header [ cbind-data ]
   *           ;; cbind-data MUST be present for
   *           ;; gs2-cbind-flag of "p" and MUST be absent
   *           ;; for "y" or "n".
   *
   * channel-binding = "c=" base64
   *           ;; base64 encoding of cbind-input.
   *
   * proof       = "p=" base64
   *
   * client-final-message-without-proof =
   *           channel-binding "," nonce [","
   *           extensions]
   *
   * client-final-message =
   *           client-final-message-without-proof "," proof
   *------
   */

  /*
   * Read channel binding.  This repeats the channel-binding flags and is
   * then followed by the actual binding data depending on the type.
   */
  channel_binding = read_attr_value(&p, 'c');
  if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
  {
#ifdef USE_SSL
    const char *cbind_data = NULL;
    size_t    cbind_data_len = 0;
    size_t    cbind_header_len;
    char     *cbind_input;
    size_t    cbind_input_len;
    char     *b64_message;
    int     b64_message_len;

    Assert(state->cbind_flag == 'p');

    /* Fetch hash data of server's SSL certificate */
    cbind_data = be_tls_get_certificate_hash(state->port,
                         &cbind_data_len);

    /* should not happen */
    if (cbind_data == NULL || cbind_data_len == 0)
      elog(ERROR, "could not get server certificate hash");

    cbind_header_len = strlen("p=tls-server-end-point,,");  /* p=type,, */
    cbind_input_len = cbind_header_len + cbind_data_len;
    cbind_input = palloc(cbind_input_len);
    snprintf(cbind_input, cbind_input_len, "p=tls-server-end-point,,");
    memcpy(cbind_input + cbind_header_len, cbind_data, cbind_data_len);

    b64_message_len = pg_b64_enc_len(cbind_input_len);
    /* don't forget the zero-terminator */
    b64_message = palloc(b64_message_len + 1);
    b64_message_len = pg_b64_encode((uint8 *) cbind_input, cbind_input_len,
                    b64_message, b64_message_len);
    if (b64_message_len < 0)
      elog(ERROR, "could not encode channel binding data");
    b64_message[b64_message_len] = '\0';

    /*
     * Compare the value sent by the client with the value expected by the
     * server.
     */
    if (strcmp(channel_binding, b64_message) != 0)
      ereport(ERROR,
          (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
           errmsg("SCRAM channel binding check failed")));
#else
    /* shouldn't happen, because we checked this earlier already */
    elog(ERROR, "channel binding not supported by this build");
#endif
  }
  else
  {
    /*
     * If we are not using channel binding, the binding data is expected
     * to always be "biws", which is "n,," base64-encoded, or "eSws",
     * which is "y,,".  We also have to check whether the flag is the same
     * one that the client originally sent.
     */
    if (!(strcmp(channel_binding, "biws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'n') &&
      !(strcmp(channel_binding, "eSws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'y'))
      ereport(ERROR,
          (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
           errmsg("unexpected SCRAM channel-binding attribute in client-final-message")));
  }

  state->client_final_nonce = read_attr_value(&p, 'r');

  /* ignore optional extensions, read until we find "p" attribute */
  do
  {
    proof = p - 1;
    value = read_any_attr(&p, &attr);
  } while (attr != 'p');

  client_proof_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(value));
  client_proof = palloc(client_proof_len);
  if (pg_b64_decode(value, strlen(value), client_proof,
            client_proof_len) != state->key_length)
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Malformed proof in client-final-message.")));
  memcpy(state->ClientProof, client_proof, state->key_length);
  pfree(client_proof);

  if (*p != '\0')
    ereport(ERROR,
        (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
         errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
         errdetail("Garbage found at the end of client-final-message.")));

  state->client_final_message_without_proof = palloc(proof - begin + 1);
  memcpy(state->client_final_message_without_proof, input, proof - begin);
  state->client_final_message_without_proof[proof - begin] = '\0';
}

/*
 * Build the final server-side message of an exchange.
 */
static char *
build_server_final_message(scram_state *state)
{
  uint8   ServerSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  char     *server_signature_base64;
  int     siglen;
  pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type);

  /* calculate ServerSignature */
  if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, state->ServerKey, state->key_length) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx,
             (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare,
             strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx,
             (uint8 *) state->server_first_message,
             strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_update(ctx,
             (uint8 *) state->client_final_message_without_proof,
             strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
    pg_hmac_final(ctx, ServerSignature, state->key_length) < 0)
  {
    elog(ERROR, "could not calculate server signature: %s",
       pg_hmac_error(ctx));
  }

  pg_hmac_free(ctx);

  siglen = pg_b64_enc_len(state->key_length);
  /* don't forget the zero-terminator */
  server_signature_base64 = palloc(siglen + 1);
  siglen = pg_b64_encode(ServerSignature,
               state->key_length, server_signature_base64,
               siglen);
  if (siglen < 0)
    elog(ERROR, "could not encode server signature");
  server_signature_base64[siglen] = '\0';

  /*------
   * The syntax for the server-final-message is: (RFC 5802)
   *
   * verifier      = "v=" base64
   *           ;; base-64 encoded ServerSignature.
   *
   * server-final-message = (server-error / verifier)
   *           ["," extensions]
   *
   *------
   */
  return psprintf("v=%s", server_signature_base64);
}


/*
 * Deterministically generate salt for mock authentication, using a SHA256
 * hash based on the username and a cluster-level secret key.  Returns a
 * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, or NULL.
 */
static uint8 *
scram_mock_salt(const char *username, pg_cryptohash_type hash_type,
        int key_length)
{
  pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
  static uint8 sha_digest[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
  char     *mock_auth_nonce = GetMockAuthenticationNonce();

  /*
   * Generate salt using a SHA256 hash of the username and the cluster's
   * mock authentication nonce.  (This works as long as the salt length is
   * not larger than the SHA256 digest length.  If the salt is smaller, the
   * caller will just ignore the extra data.)
   */
  StaticAssertDecl(PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH >= SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
           "salt length greater than SHA256 digest length");

  /*
   * This may be worth refreshing if support for more hash methods is\
   * added.
   */
  Assert(hash_type == PG_SHA256);

  ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(hash_type);
  if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx) < 0 ||
    pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, (const uint8 *) username, strlen(username)) < 0 ||
    pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, (const uint8 *) mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0 ||
    pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, sha_digest, key_length) < 0)
  {
    pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
    return NULL;
  }
  pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);

  return sha_digest;
}

Coverage Report

Created: 2026-08-14 06:37