/work/mbedtls-2.28.8/library/rsa_internal.c

Source
/*
 *  Helper functions for the RSA module
 *
 *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
 *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
 *
 */

#include "common.h"

#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)

#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h"

/*
 * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents
 *
 * Summary of algorithm:
 * Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows:
 *
 * (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2)
 *     is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the
 *     square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four
 *     possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1)
 *     or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime
 *     factors of N.
 *
 * (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same
 *     construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of
 *     roots of 1 in Z/NZ.
 *
 * The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse
 * bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e.
 * if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L.
 * Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have
 *
 *   DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K,
 *
 * so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers
 *
 *   (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord
 *
 * where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1).
 * We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction
 * of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N.
 *
 */
int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(mbedtls_mpi const *N,
                              mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D,
                              mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q)
{
    int ret = 0;

    uint16_t attempt;  /* Number of current attempt  */
    uint16_t iter;     /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */

    uint16_t order;    /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */

    mbedtls_mpi T;  /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1     */
    mbedtls_mpi K;  /* Temporary holding the current candidate */

    const unsigned char primes[] = { 2,
                                     3,    5,    7,   11,   13,   17,   19,   23,
                                     29,   31,   37,   41,   43,   47,   53,   59,
                                     61,   67,   71,   73,   79,   83,   89,   97,
                                     101,  103,  107,  109,  113,  127,  131,  137,
                                     139,  149,  151,  157,  163,  167,  173,  179,
                                     181,  191,  193,  197,  199,  211,  223,  227,
                                     229,  233,  239,  241,  251 };

    const size_t num_primes = sizeof(primes) / sizeof(*primes);

    if (P == NULL || Q == NULL || P->p != NULL || Q->p != NULL) {
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
    }

    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 ||
        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 ||
        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 ||
        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 ||
        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) {
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
    }

    /*
     * Initializations and temporary changes
     */

    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);

    /* T := DE - 1 */
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, D,  E));
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&T, &T, 1));

    if ((order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&T)) == 0) {
        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
        goto cleanup;
    }

    /* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&T, order));

    /*
     * Actual work
     */

    /* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */
    attempt = 0;
    if (N->p[0] % 8 == 1) {
        attempt = 1;
    }

    for (; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt) {
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&K, primes[attempt]));

        /* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N));
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) != 0) {
            continue;
        }

        /* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ...
         * and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &K, &T, N,
                                            Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery
                                               * multiplication helper values */));

        for (iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter) {
            /* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point
             * in continuing to square K */
            if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) == 0) {
                break;
            }

            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&K, &K, 1));
            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N));

            if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) ==  1 &&
                mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(P, N) == -1) {
                /*
                 * Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N.
                 * Set Q := N / P.
                 */

                MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(Q, NULL, N, P));
                goto cleanup;
            }

            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &K));
            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, N));
        }

        /*
         * If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because
         * we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must
         * be 1 if D,E,N were consistent.
         * Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long,
         * yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane.
         */
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) != 0) {
            break;
        }
    }

    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;

cleanup:

    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
    return ret;
}

/*
 * Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D.
 * This is essentially a modular inversion.
 */
int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P,
                                        mbedtls_mpi const *Q,
                                        mbedtls_mpi const *E,
                                        mbedtls_mpi *D)
{
    int ret = 0;
    mbedtls_mpi K, L;

    if (D == NULL || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 0) != 0) {
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
    }

    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 ||
        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0 ||
        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) == 0) {
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
    }

    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);

    /* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1));

    /* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(D, &K, &L));

    /* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&K, NULL, &K, D));

    /* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */
    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(D, E, &K));

cleanup:

    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);

    return ret;
}

/*
 * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters.
 */
int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P,  const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
                             const mbedtls_mpi *D,  const mbedtls_mpi *DP,
                             const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP)
{
    int ret = 0;

    mbedtls_mpi K, L;
    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);

    /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */
    if (DP != NULL) {
        if (P == NULL) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
            goto cleanup;
        }

        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K));

        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

    /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */
    if (DQ != NULL) {
        if (Q == NULL) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
            goto cleanup;
        }

        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K));

        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

    /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */
    if (QP != NULL) {
        if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
            goto cleanup;
        }

        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P));
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

cleanup:

    /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */
    if (ret != 0 &&
        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED &&
        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) {
        ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
    }

    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);

    return ret;
}

/*
 * Check that core RSA parameters are sane.
 */
int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P,
                                const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D,
                                const mbedtls_mpi *E,
                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                                void *p_rng)
{
    int ret = 0;
    mbedtls_mpi K, L;

    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);

    /*
     * Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime
     */

#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
    /*
     * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error
     * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as
     * well.
     */
    if (f_rng != NULL && P != NULL &&
        (ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(P, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
        goto cleanup;
    }

    if (f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL &&
        (ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
        goto cleanup;
    }
#else
    ((void) f_rng);
    ((void) p_rng);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */

    /*
     * Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q
     */

    if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, P, Q));
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1)  <= 0 ||
            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&K, N) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

    /*
     * Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present.
     */

    if (N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) {
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 ||
            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 ||
            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 ||
            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

    /*
     * Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1
     */

    if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) {
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 ||
            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }

        /* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, P, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }

        /* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

cleanup:

    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);

    /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */
    if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) {
        ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
    }

    return ret;
}

int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
                           const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP,
                           mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP)
{
    int ret = 0;
    mbedtls_mpi K;
    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);

    /* DP = D mod P-1 */
    if (DP != NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K));
    }

    /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */
    if (DQ != NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1));
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K));
    }

    /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */
    if (QP != NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P));
    }

cleanup:
    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);

    return ret;
}

#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */

Coverage Report

Created: 2025-10-28 06:49

Line	Count	Source
1		/*
2		* Helper functions for the RSA module
3		*
4		* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
5		* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
6		*
7		*/
8
9		#include "common.h"
10
11		#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
12
13		#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
14		#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
15		#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h"
16
17		/*
18		* Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents
19		*
20		* Summary of algorithm:
21		* Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows:
22		*
23		* (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2)
24		* is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the
25		* square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four
26		* possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1)
27		* or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime
28		* factors of N.
29		*
30		* (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same
31		* construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of
32		* roots of 1 in Z/NZ.
33		*
34		* The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse
35		* bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e.
36		* if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L.
37		* Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have
38		*
39		* DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K,
40		*
41		* so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers
42		*
43		* (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord
44		*
45		* where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1).
46		* We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction
47		* of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N.
48		*
49		*/
50		int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(mbedtls_mpi const *N,
51		mbedtls_mpi const E, mbedtls_mpi const D,
52		mbedtls_mpi P, mbedtls_mpi Q)
53	0	{
54	0	int ret = 0;
55
56	0	uint16_t attempt; /* Number of current attempt */
57	0	uint16_t iter; /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */
58
59	0	uint16_t order; /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */
60
61	0	mbedtls_mpi T; /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1 */
62	0	mbedtls_mpi K; /* Temporary holding the current candidate */
63
64	0	const unsigned char primes[] = { 2,
65	0	3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23,
66	0	29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59,
67	0	61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97,
68	0	101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137,
69	0	139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179,
70	0	181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227,
71	0	229, 233, 239, 241, 251 };
72
73	0	const size_t num_primes = sizeof(primes) / sizeof(*primes);
74
75	0	if (P == NULL \|\| Q == NULL \|\| P->p != NULL \|\| Q->p != NULL) {
76	0	return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
77	0	}
78
79	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 \|\|
80	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 \|\|
81	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 \|\|
82	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 \|\|
83	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) {
84	0	return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
85	0	}
86
87		/*
88		* Initializations and temporary changes
89		*/
90
91	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
92	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
93
94		/* T := DE - 1 */
95	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, D, E));
96	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&T, &T, 1));
97
98	0	if ((order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&T)) == 0) {
99	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
100	0	goto cleanup;
101	0	}
102
103		/* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */
104	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&T, order));
105
106		/*
107		* Actual work
108		*/
109
110		/* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */
111	0	attempt = 0;
112	0	if (N->p[0] % 8 == 1) {
113	0	attempt = 1;
114	0	}
115
116	0	for (; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt) {
117	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&K, primes[attempt]));
118
119		/* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */
120	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N));
121	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) != 0) {
122	0	continue;
123	0	}
124
125		/* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ...
126		* and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */
127	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &K, &T, N,
128	0	Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery
129	0	* multiplication helper values */));
130
131	0	for (iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter) {
132		/* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point
133		* in continuing to square K */
134	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) == 0) {
135	0	break;
136	0	}
137
138	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&K, &K, 1));
139	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N));
140
141	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) == 1 &&
142	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(P, N) == -1) {
143		/*
144		* Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N.
145		* Set Q := N / P.
146		*/
147
148	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(Q, NULL, N, P));
149	0	goto cleanup;
150	0	}
151
152	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
153	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &K));
154	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, N));
155	0	}
156
157		/*
158		* If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because
159		* we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must
160		* be 1 if D,E,N were consistent.
161		* Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long,
162		* yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane.
163		*/
164	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) != 0) {
165	0	break;
166	0	}
167	0	}
168
169	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
170
171	0	cleanup:
172
173	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
174	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
175	0	return ret;
176	0	}
177
178		/*
179		* Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D.
180		* This is essentially a modular inversion.
181		*/
182		int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P,
183		mbedtls_mpi const *Q,
184		mbedtls_mpi const *E,
185		mbedtls_mpi *D)
186	0	{
187	0	int ret = 0;
188	0	mbedtls_mpi K, L;
189
190	0	if (D == NULL \|\| mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 0) != 0) {
191	0	return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
192	0	}
193
194	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 \|\|
195	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0 \|\|
196	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) == 0) {
197	0	return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
198	0	}
199
200	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
201	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
202
203		/* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */
204	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
205	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1));
206
207		/* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */
208	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(D, &K, &L));
209
210		/* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */
211	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
212	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&K, NULL, &K, D));
213
214		/* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */
215	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(D, E, &K));
216
217	0	cleanup:
218
219	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
220	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
221
222	0	return ret;
223	0	}
224
225		/*
226		* Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters.
227		*/
228		int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi P, const mbedtls_mpi Q,
229		const mbedtls_mpi D, const mbedtls_mpi DP,
230		const mbedtls_mpi DQ, const mbedtls_mpi QP)
231	0	{
232	0	int ret = 0;
233
234	0	mbedtls_mpi K, L;
235	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
236	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
237
238		/* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */
239	0	if (DP != NULL) {
240	0	if (P == NULL) {
241	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
242	0	goto cleanup;
243	0	}
244
245	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
246	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D));
247	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K));
248
249	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) {
250	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
251	0	goto cleanup;
252	0	}
253	0	}
254
255		/* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */
256	0	if (DQ != NULL) {
257	0	if (Q == NULL) {
258	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
259	0	goto cleanup;
260	0	}
261
262	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1));
263	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D));
264	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K));
265
266	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) {
267	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
268	0	goto cleanup;
269	0	}
270	0	}
271
272		/* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */
273	0	if (QP != NULL) {
274	0	if (P == NULL \|\| Q == NULL) {
275	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
276	0	goto cleanup;
277	0	}
278
279	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q));
280	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
281	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P));
282	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
283	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
284	0	goto cleanup;
285	0	}
286	0	}
287
288	0	cleanup:
289
290		/* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */
291	0	if (ret != 0 &&
292	0	ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED &&
293	0	ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) {
294	0	ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
295	0	}
296
297	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
298	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
299
300	0	return ret;
301	0	}
302
303		/*
304		* Check that core RSA parameters are sane.
305		*/
306		int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi N, const mbedtls_mpi P,
307		const mbedtls_mpi Q, const mbedtls_mpi D,
308		const mbedtls_mpi *E,
309		int (f_rng)(void , unsigned char *, size_t),
310		void *p_rng)
311	0	{
312	0	int ret = 0;
313	0	mbedtls_mpi K, L;
314
315	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
316	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
317
318		/*
319		* Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime
320		*/
321
322	0	#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
323		/*
324		* When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error
325		* rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as
326		* well.
327		*/
328	0	if (f_rng != NULL && P != NULL &&
329	0	(ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(P, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
330	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
331	0	goto cleanup;
332	0	}
333
334	0	if (f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL &&
335	0	(ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
336	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
337	0	goto cleanup;
338	0	}
339		#else
340		((void) f_rng);
341		((void) p_rng);
342		#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
343
344		/*
345		* Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q
346		*/
347
348	0	if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL) {
349	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, P, Q));
350	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0 \|\|
351	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&K, N) != 0) {
352	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
353	0	goto cleanup;
354	0	}
355	0	}
356
357		/*
358		* Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present.
359		*/
360
361	0	if (N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) {
362	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 \|\|
363	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 \|\|
364	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 \|\|
365	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) {
366	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
367	0	goto cleanup;
368	0	}
369	0	}
370
371		/*
372		* Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1
373		*/
374
375	0	if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) {
376	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 \|\|
377	0	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0) {
378	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
379	0	goto cleanup;
380	0	}
381
382		/* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */
383	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E));
384	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
385	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, P, 1));
386	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
387	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
388	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
389	0	goto cleanup;
390	0	}
391
392		/* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */
393	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E));
394	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
395	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1));
396	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
397	0	if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
398	0	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
399	0	goto cleanup;
400	0	}
401	0	}
402
403	0	cleanup:
404
405	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
406	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
407
408		/* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */
409	0	if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) {
410	0	ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
411	0	}
412
413	0	return ret;
414	0	}
415
416		int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi P, const mbedtls_mpi Q,
417		const mbedtls_mpi D, mbedtls_mpi DP,
418		mbedtls_mpi DQ, mbedtls_mpi QP)
419	0	{
420	0	int ret = 0;
421	0	mbedtls_mpi K;
422	0	mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
423
424		/* DP = D mod P-1 */
425	0	if (DP != NULL) {
426	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
427	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K));
428	0	}
429
430		/* DQ = D mod Q-1 */
431	0	if (DQ != NULL) {
432	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1));
433	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K));
434	0	}
435
436		/* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */
437	0	if (QP != NULL) {
438	0	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P));
439	0	}
440
441	0	cleanup:
442	0	mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
443
444	0	return ret;
445	0	}
446
447		#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */