/src/samba/libcli/security/access_check.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. |
3 | | |
4 | | Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004 |
5 | | Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2005 |
6 | | Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2007 |
7 | | Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2008 |
8 | | Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2010 |
9 | | |
10 | | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
11 | | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
12 | | the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or |
13 | | (at your option) any later version. |
14 | | |
15 | | This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
16 | | but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
17 | | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
18 | | GNU General Public License for more details. |
19 | | |
20 | | You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
21 | | along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. |
22 | | */ |
23 | | |
24 | | #include "replace.h" |
25 | | #include "lib/util/debug.h" |
26 | | #include "libcli/security/security.h" |
27 | | #include "librpc/gen_ndr/conditional_ace.h" |
28 | | #include "libcli/security/conditional_ace.h" |
29 | | |
30 | | /* Map generic access rights to object specific rights. This technique is |
31 | | used to give meaning to assigning read, write, execute and all access to |
32 | | objects. Each type of object has its own mapping of generic to object |
33 | | specific access rights. */ |
34 | | |
35 | | void se_map_generic(uint32_t *access_mask, const struct generic_mapping *mapping) |
36 | 0 | { |
37 | 0 | uint32_t old_mask = *access_mask; |
38 | |
|
39 | 0 | if (*access_mask & GENERIC_READ_ACCESS) { |
40 | 0 | *access_mask &= ~GENERIC_READ_ACCESS; |
41 | 0 | *access_mask |= mapping->generic_read; |
42 | 0 | } |
43 | |
|
44 | 0 | if (*access_mask & GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS) { |
45 | 0 | *access_mask &= ~GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS; |
46 | 0 | *access_mask |= mapping->generic_write; |
47 | 0 | } |
48 | |
|
49 | 0 | if (*access_mask & GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS) { |
50 | 0 | *access_mask &= ~GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS; |
51 | 0 | *access_mask |= mapping->generic_execute; |
52 | 0 | } |
53 | |
|
54 | 0 | if (*access_mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS) { |
55 | 0 | *access_mask &= ~GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS; |
56 | 0 | *access_mask |= mapping->generic_all; |
57 | 0 | } |
58 | |
|
59 | 0 | if (old_mask != *access_mask) { |
60 | 0 | DEBUG(10, ("se_map_generic(): mapped mask 0x%08x to 0x%08x\n", |
61 | 0 | old_mask, *access_mask)); |
62 | 0 | } |
63 | 0 | } |
64 | | |
65 | | /* Map generic access rights to object specific rights for all the ACE's |
66 | | * in a security_acl. |
67 | | */ |
68 | | |
69 | | void security_acl_map_generic(struct security_acl *sa, |
70 | | const struct generic_mapping *mapping) |
71 | 0 | { |
72 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
73 | |
|
74 | 0 | if (!sa) { |
75 | 0 | return; |
76 | 0 | } |
77 | | |
78 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sa->num_aces; i++) { |
79 | 0 | se_map_generic(&sa->aces[i].access_mask, mapping); |
80 | 0 | } |
81 | 0 | } |
82 | | |
83 | | /* Map standard access rights to object specific rights. This technique is |
84 | | used to give meaning to assigning read, write, execute and all access to |
85 | | objects. Each type of object has its own mapping of standard to object |
86 | | specific access rights. */ |
87 | | |
88 | | void se_map_standard(uint32_t *access_mask, const struct standard_mapping *mapping) |
89 | 0 | { |
90 | 0 | uint32_t old_mask = *access_mask; |
91 | |
|
92 | 0 | if (*access_mask & SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL) { |
93 | 0 | *access_mask &= ~SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; |
94 | 0 | *access_mask |= mapping->std_read; |
95 | 0 | } |
96 | |
|
97 | 0 | if (*access_mask & (SEC_STD_DELETE|SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER|SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE)) { |
98 | 0 | *access_mask &= ~(SEC_STD_DELETE|SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER|SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE); |
99 | 0 | *access_mask |= mapping->std_all; |
100 | 0 | } |
101 | |
|
102 | 0 | if (old_mask != *access_mask) { |
103 | 0 | DEBUG(10, ("se_map_standard(): mapped mask 0x%08x to 0x%08x\n", |
104 | 0 | old_mask, *access_mask)); |
105 | 0 | } |
106 | 0 | } |
107 | | |
108 | | enum ace_callback_result { |
109 | | ACE_CALLBACK_DENY, |
110 | | ACE_CALLBACK_ALLOW, |
111 | | ACE_CALLBACK_SKIP, /* do not apply this ACE */ |
112 | | ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID /* we don't want to process the conditional ACE */ |
113 | | }; |
114 | | |
115 | | |
116 | | static enum ace_callback_result check_callback_ace_allow( |
117 | | const struct security_ace *ace, |
118 | | const struct security_token *token, |
119 | | const struct security_descriptor *sd) |
120 | 9.47k | { |
121 | 9.47k | bool ok; |
122 | 9.47k | int result; |
123 | | |
124 | 9.47k | switch (token->evaluate_claims) { |
125 | 9.01k | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_ALWAYS: |
126 | 9.01k | break; |
127 | | |
128 | 13 | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE: |
129 | 13 | DBG_WARNING("Refusing to evaluate ACL with " |
130 | 13 | "conditional ACE against security " |
131 | 13 | "token with CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE\n"); |
132 | 13 | return ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID; |
133 | 4 | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_NEVER: |
134 | 441 | default: |
135 | | /* |
136 | | * We are asked to pretend we never understood this |
137 | | * ACE type. |
138 | | * |
139 | | * By returning SKIP, this ACE will not adjust any |
140 | | * permission bits making it an effective no-op, which |
141 | | * was the default behaviour up to Samba 4.19. |
142 | | */ |
143 | 441 | return ACE_CALLBACK_SKIP; |
144 | 9.47k | } |
145 | | |
146 | 9.01k | if (ace->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK && |
147 | 9.01k | ace->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK_OBJECT) { |
148 | | /* This indicates a programming error */ |
149 | 0 | DBG_ERR("bad conditional allow ACE type: %u\n", ace->type); |
150 | 0 | return ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID; |
151 | 0 | } |
152 | | |
153 | | /* |
154 | | * Until we discover otherwise, we assume all callback ACEs |
155 | | * are conditional ACEs. |
156 | | */ |
157 | 9.01k | ok = access_check_conditional_ace(ace, token, sd, &result); |
158 | 9.01k | if (!ok) { |
159 | | /* |
160 | | * An error in processing the conditional ACE is |
161 | | * treated as UNKNOWN, which amounts to a DENY/SKIP |
162 | | * result. |
163 | | * |
164 | | * This is different from the INVALID result which |
165 | | * means we should not be thinking about conditional |
166 | | * ACES at all, and will abort the whole access check. |
167 | | */ |
168 | 4.41k | DBG_WARNING("callback ACE was not a valid conditional ACE\n"); |
169 | 4.41k | return ACE_CALLBACK_SKIP; |
170 | 4.41k | } |
171 | 4.60k | if (result == ACE_CONDITION_TRUE) { |
172 | 456 | return ACE_CALLBACK_ALLOW; |
173 | 456 | } |
174 | | /* UNKNOWN means do not allow */ |
175 | 4.14k | return ACE_CALLBACK_SKIP; |
176 | 4.60k | } |
177 | | |
178 | | |
179 | | static enum ace_callback_result check_callback_ace_deny( |
180 | | const struct security_ace *ace, |
181 | | const struct security_token *token, |
182 | | const struct security_descriptor *sd) |
183 | 32.8k | { |
184 | 32.8k | bool ok; |
185 | 32.8k | int result; |
186 | | |
187 | 32.8k | switch (token->evaluate_claims) { |
188 | 31.1k | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_ALWAYS: |
189 | 31.1k | break; |
190 | | |
191 | 13 | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE: |
192 | 13 | DBG_WARNING("Refusing to evaluate ACL with " |
193 | 13 | "conditional ACE against security " |
194 | 13 | "token with CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE\n"); |
195 | 13 | return ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID; |
196 | 44 | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_NEVER: |
197 | 1.66k | default: |
198 | | /* |
199 | | * We are asked to pretend we never understood this |
200 | | * ACE type. |
201 | | */ |
202 | 1.66k | return ACE_CALLBACK_SKIP; |
203 | 32.8k | } |
204 | | |
205 | 31.1k | if (ace->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK && |
206 | 31.1k | ace->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK_OBJECT) { |
207 | 0 | DBG_ERR("bad conditional deny ACE type: %u\n", ace->type); |
208 | 0 | return ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID; |
209 | 0 | } |
210 | | |
211 | | /* |
212 | | * Until we discover otherwise, we assume all callback ACEs |
213 | | * are conditional ACEs. |
214 | | */ |
215 | 31.1k | ok = access_check_conditional_ace(ace, token, sd, &result); |
216 | 31.1k | if (!ok) { |
217 | | /* |
218 | | * An error in processing the conditional ACE is |
219 | | * treated as UNKNOWN, which means DENY. |
220 | | */ |
221 | 14.4k | DBG_WARNING("callback ACE was not a valid conditional ACE\n"); |
222 | 14.4k | return ACE_CALLBACK_DENY; |
223 | 14.4k | } |
224 | 16.7k | if (result != ACE_CONDITION_FALSE) { |
225 | | /* UNKNOWN means deny */ |
226 | 15.1k | return ACE_CALLBACK_DENY; |
227 | 15.1k | } |
228 | 1.64k | return ACE_CALLBACK_SKIP; |
229 | 16.7k | } |
230 | | |
231 | | |
232 | | /* |
233 | | perform a SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED access check |
234 | | */ |
235 | | static uint32_t access_check_max_allowed(const struct security_descriptor *sd, |
236 | | const struct security_token *token, |
237 | | enum implicit_owner_rights implicit_owner_rights) |
238 | 5.60k | { |
239 | 5.60k | uint32_t denied = 0, granted = 0; |
240 | 5.60k | bool am_owner = false; |
241 | 5.60k | bool have_owner_rights_ace = false; |
242 | 5.60k | unsigned i; |
243 | | |
244 | 5.60k | if (sd->dacl == NULL) { |
245 | 130 | if (security_token_has_sid(token, sd->owner_sid)) { |
246 | 9 | switch (implicit_owner_rights) { |
247 | 2 | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS: |
248 | 2 | granted |= (SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | |
249 | 2 | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC); |
250 | 2 | break; |
251 | 7 | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_RIGHTS: |
252 | 7 | granted |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; |
253 | 7 | break; |
254 | 9 | } |
255 | 9 | } |
256 | 130 | return granted; |
257 | 130 | } |
258 | | |
259 | 5.47k | if (security_token_has_sid(token, sd->owner_sid)) { |
260 | | /* |
261 | | * Check for explicit owner rights: if there are none, we remove |
262 | | * the default owner right SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
263 | | * from remaining_access. Otherwise we just process the |
264 | | * explicitly granted rights when processing the ACEs. |
265 | | */ |
266 | 2.16k | am_owner = true; |
267 | | |
268 | 83.3k | for (i=0; i < sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { |
269 | 81.1k | struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; |
270 | | |
271 | 81.1k | if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { |
272 | 4.31k | continue; |
273 | 4.31k | } |
274 | | |
275 | 76.8k | have_owner_rights_ace = dom_sid_equal( |
276 | 76.8k | &ace->trustee, &global_sid_Owner_Rights); |
277 | 76.8k | if (have_owner_rights_ace) { |
278 | 13 | break; |
279 | 13 | } |
280 | 76.8k | } |
281 | 2.16k | } |
282 | | |
283 | 5.47k | if (am_owner && !have_owner_rights_ace) { |
284 | 2.15k | switch (implicit_owner_rights) { |
285 | 1.81k | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS: |
286 | 1.81k | granted |= (SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC); |
287 | 1.81k | break; |
288 | 340 | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_RIGHTS: |
289 | 340 | granted |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; |
290 | 340 | break; |
291 | 2.15k | } |
292 | 2.15k | } |
293 | | |
294 | 176k | for (i = 0;i<sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { |
295 | 170k | struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; |
296 | 170k | bool is_owner_rights_ace = false; |
297 | | |
298 | 170k | if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { |
299 | 6.75k | continue; |
300 | 6.75k | } |
301 | | |
302 | 163k | if (am_owner) { |
303 | 76.8k | is_owner_rights_ace = dom_sid_equal( |
304 | 76.8k | &ace->trustee, &global_sid_Owner_Rights); |
305 | 76.8k | } |
306 | | |
307 | 163k | if (!is_owner_rights_ace && |
308 | 163k | !security_token_has_sid(token, &ace->trustee)) |
309 | 95.3k | { |
310 | 95.3k | continue; |
311 | 95.3k | } |
312 | | |
313 | 68.4k | switch (ace->type) { |
314 | 33.4k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: |
315 | 33.4k | granted |= ace->access_mask; |
316 | 33.4k | break; |
317 | 4.85k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: |
318 | 5.60k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT: |
319 | 5.60k | denied |= ~granted & ace->access_mask; |
320 | 5.60k | break; |
321 | | |
322 | 2.01k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK: |
323 | 2.01k | { |
324 | 2.01k | enum ace_callback_result allow = |
325 | 2.01k | check_callback_ace_allow(ace, token, sd); |
326 | 2.01k | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
327 | 3 | return 0; |
328 | 3 | } |
329 | 2.01k | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_ALLOW) { |
330 | 180 | granted |= ace->access_mask; |
331 | 180 | } |
332 | 2.01k | break; |
333 | 2.01k | } |
334 | | |
335 | 14.8k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK: |
336 | 14.8k | { |
337 | 14.8k | enum ace_callback_result deny = |
338 | 14.8k | check_callback_ace_deny(ace, token, sd); |
339 | 14.8k | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
340 | 6 | return 0; |
341 | 6 | } |
342 | 14.8k | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_DENY) { |
343 | 13.3k | denied |= ~granted & ace->access_mask; |
344 | 13.3k | } |
345 | 14.8k | break; |
346 | 14.8k | } |
347 | | |
348 | 12.4k | default: /* Other ACE types not handled/supported */ |
349 | 12.4k | break; |
350 | 68.4k | } |
351 | 68.4k | } |
352 | | |
353 | 5.46k | return granted & ~denied; |
354 | 5.47k | } |
355 | | |
356 | | |
357 | | |
358 | | static NTSTATUS se_access_check_implicit_owner(const struct security_descriptor *sd, |
359 | | const struct security_token *token, |
360 | | uint32_t access_desired, |
361 | | uint32_t *access_granted, |
362 | | enum implicit_owner_rights implicit_owner_rights) |
363 | 5.55k | { |
364 | 5.55k | uint32_t i; |
365 | 5.55k | uint32_t bits_remaining; |
366 | 5.55k | uint32_t explicitly_denied_bits = 0; |
367 | 5.55k | bool am_owner = false; |
368 | 5.55k | bool have_owner_rights_ace = false; |
369 | | |
370 | 5.55k | switch (token->evaluate_claims) { |
371 | 714 | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE: |
372 | 714 | if (token->num_local_claims > 0 || |
373 | 714 | token->num_user_claims > 0 || |
374 | 714 | token->num_device_claims > 0 || |
375 | 714 | token->num_device_sids > 0) { |
376 | 589 | DBG_WARNING("Refusing to evaluate token with claims or device SIDs but also " |
377 | 589 | "with CLAIMS_EVALUATION_INVALID_STATE\n"); |
378 | 589 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_TOKEN; |
379 | 589 | } |
380 | 125 | break; |
381 | 4.53k | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_ALWAYS: |
382 | 4.54k | case CLAIMS_EVALUATION_NEVER: |
383 | 4.54k | break; |
384 | 5.55k | } |
385 | | |
386 | 4.96k | *access_granted = access_desired; |
387 | 4.96k | bits_remaining = access_desired; |
388 | | |
389 | | /* handle the maximum allowed flag */ |
390 | 4.96k | if (access_desired & SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) { |
391 | 3.28k | uint32_t orig_access_desired = access_desired; |
392 | | |
393 | 3.28k | access_desired |= access_check_max_allowed(sd, token, implicit_owner_rights); |
394 | 3.28k | access_desired &= ~SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; |
395 | 3.28k | *access_granted = access_desired; |
396 | 3.28k | bits_remaining = access_desired; |
397 | | |
398 | 3.28k | DEBUG(10,("se_access_check: MAX desired = 0x%x, granted = 0x%x, remaining = 0x%x\n", |
399 | 3.28k | orig_access_desired, |
400 | 3.28k | *access_granted, |
401 | 3.28k | bits_remaining)); |
402 | 3.28k | } |
403 | | |
404 | | /* a NULL dacl allows access */ |
405 | 4.96k | if ((sd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT) && sd->dacl == NULL) { |
406 | 5 | *access_granted = access_desired; |
407 | 5 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
408 | 5 | } |
409 | | |
410 | 4.96k | if (sd->dacl == NULL) { |
411 | 114 | goto done; |
412 | 114 | } |
413 | | |
414 | 4.84k | if (security_token_has_sid(token, sd->owner_sid)) { |
415 | | /* |
416 | | * Check for explicit owner rights: if there are none, we remove |
417 | | * the default owner right SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
418 | | * from remaining_access. Otherwise we just process the |
419 | | * explicitly granted rights when processing the ACEs. |
420 | | */ |
421 | 2.60k | am_owner = true; |
422 | | |
423 | 61.7k | for (i=0; i < sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { |
424 | 59.1k | struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; |
425 | | |
426 | 59.1k | if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { |
427 | 3.41k | continue; |
428 | 3.41k | } |
429 | | |
430 | 55.7k | have_owner_rights_ace = dom_sid_equal( |
431 | 55.7k | &ace->trustee, &global_sid_Owner_Rights); |
432 | 55.7k | if (have_owner_rights_ace) { |
433 | 4 | break; |
434 | 4 | } |
435 | 55.7k | } |
436 | 2.60k | } |
437 | 4.84k | if (am_owner && !have_owner_rights_ace) { |
438 | 2.59k | switch (implicit_owner_rights) { |
439 | 2.59k | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS: |
440 | 2.59k | bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | |
441 | 2.59k | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL); |
442 | 2.59k | break; |
443 | 0 | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_RIGHTS: |
444 | 0 | bits_remaining &= ~SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; |
445 | 0 | break; |
446 | 2.59k | } |
447 | 2.59k | } |
448 | | |
449 | | /* check each ace in turn. */ |
450 | 90.0k | for (i=0; bits_remaining && i < sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { |
451 | 85.1k | struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; |
452 | 85.1k | bool is_owner_rights_ace = false; |
453 | | |
454 | 85.1k | if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { |
455 | 3.93k | continue; |
456 | 3.93k | } |
457 | | |
458 | 81.2k | if (am_owner) { |
459 | 51.8k | is_owner_rights_ace = dom_sid_equal( |
460 | 51.8k | &ace->trustee, &global_sid_Owner_Rights); |
461 | 51.8k | } |
462 | | |
463 | 81.2k | if (!is_owner_rights_ace && |
464 | 81.2k | !security_token_has_sid(token, &ace->trustee)) |
465 | 46.9k | { |
466 | 46.9k | continue; |
467 | 46.9k | } |
468 | | |
469 | 34.3k | switch (ace->type) { |
470 | 15.3k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: |
471 | 15.3k | bits_remaining &= ~ace->access_mask; |
472 | 15.3k | break; |
473 | 808 | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: |
474 | 990 | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT: |
475 | 990 | explicitly_denied_bits |= (bits_remaining & ace->access_mask); |
476 | 990 | break; |
477 | | |
478 | 877 | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK: |
479 | 877 | { |
480 | 877 | enum ace_callback_result allow = |
481 | 877 | check_callback_ace_allow(ace, token, sd); |
482 | 877 | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
483 | 2 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACE_CONDITION; |
484 | 2 | } |
485 | 875 | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_ALLOW) { |
486 | 91 | bits_remaining &= ~ace->access_mask; |
487 | 91 | } |
488 | 875 | break; |
489 | 877 | } |
490 | | |
491 | 8.88k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK: |
492 | 9.15k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK_OBJECT: |
493 | 9.15k | { |
494 | 9.15k | enum ace_callback_result deny = |
495 | 9.15k | check_callback_ace_deny(ace, token, sd); |
496 | 9.15k | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
497 | 3 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACE_CONDITION; |
498 | 3 | } |
499 | 9.15k | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_DENY) { |
500 | 8.22k | explicitly_denied_bits |= (bits_remaining & ace->access_mask); |
501 | 8.22k | } |
502 | 9.15k | break; |
503 | 9.15k | } |
504 | | |
505 | 7.97k | default: /* Other ACE types not handled/supported */ |
506 | 7.97k | break; |
507 | 34.3k | } |
508 | 34.3k | } |
509 | | |
510 | | /* Explicitly denied bits always override */ |
511 | 4.84k | bits_remaining |= explicitly_denied_bits; |
512 | | |
513 | | /* |
514 | | * We check privileges here because they override even DENY entries. |
515 | | */ |
516 | | |
517 | | /* Does the user have the privilege to gain SEC_PRIV_SECURITY? */ |
518 | 4.84k | if (bits_remaining & SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY) { |
519 | 1.19k | if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_SECURITY)) { |
520 | 230 | bits_remaining &= ~SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY; |
521 | 963 | } else { |
522 | 963 | return NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD; |
523 | 963 | } |
524 | 1.19k | } |
525 | | |
526 | 3.87k | if ((bits_remaining & SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER) && |
527 | 3.87k | security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)) { |
528 | 191 | bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER); |
529 | 191 | } |
530 | | |
531 | 3.99k | done: |
532 | 3.99k | if (bits_remaining != 0) { |
533 | 3.35k | *access_granted = bits_remaining; |
534 | 3.35k | return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; |
535 | 3.35k | } |
536 | | |
537 | 637 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
538 | 3.99k | } |
539 | | |
540 | | /* |
541 | | The main entry point for access checking. If returning ACCESS_DENIED |
542 | | this function returns the denied bits in the uint32_t pointed |
543 | | to by the access_granted pointer. |
544 | | */ |
545 | | NTSTATUS se_access_check(const struct security_descriptor *sd, |
546 | | const struct security_token *token, |
547 | | uint32_t access_desired, |
548 | | uint32_t *access_granted) |
549 | 5.55k | { |
550 | 5.55k | return se_access_check_implicit_owner(sd, |
551 | 5.55k | token, |
552 | 5.55k | access_desired, |
553 | 5.55k | access_granted, |
554 | 5.55k | IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS); |
555 | 5.55k | } |
556 | | |
557 | | /* |
558 | | The main entry point for access checking FOR THE FILE SERVER ONLY ! |
559 | | If returning ACCESS_DENIED this function returns the denied bits in |
560 | | the uint32_t pointed to by the access_granted pointer. |
561 | | */ |
562 | | NTSTATUS se_file_access_check(const struct security_descriptor *sd, |
563 | | const struct security_token *token, |
564 | | bool priv_open_requested, |
565 | | uint32_t access_desired, |
566 | | uint32_t *access_granted) |
567 | 0 | { |
568 | 0 | uint32_t bits_remaining; |
569 | 0 | NTSTATUS status; |
570 | |
|
571 | 0 | if (!priv_open_requested) { |
572 | | /* Fall back to generic se_access_check(). */ |
573 | 0 | return se_access_check_implicit_owner(sd, |
574 | 0 | token, |
575 | 0 | access_desired, |
576 | 0 | access_granted, |
577 | 0 | IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS); |
578 | 0 | } |
579 | | |
580 | | /* |
581 | | * We need to handle the maximum allowed flag |
582 | | * outside of se_access_check(), as we need to |
583 | | * add in the access allowed by the privileges |
584 | | * as well. |
585 | | */ |
586 | | |
587 | 0 | if (access_desired & SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) { |
588 | 0 | uint32_t orig_access_desired = access_desired; |
589 | |
|
590 | 0 | access_desired |= access_check_max_allowed(sd, token, true); |
591 | 0 | access_desired &= ~SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; |
592 | |
|
593 | 0 | if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_BACKUP)) { |
594 | 0 | access_desired |= SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_BACKUP; |
595 | 0 | } |
596 | |
|
597 | 0 | if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)) { |
598 | 0 | access_desired |= SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_RESTORE; |
599 | 0 | } |
600 | |
|
601 | 0 | DBG_DEBUG("MAX desired = 0x%0" PRIx32 " mapped to 0x%" PRIx32 |
602 | 0 | "\n ", |
603 | 0 | orig_access_desired, |
604 | 0 | access_desired); |
605 | 0 | } |
606 | |
|
607 | 0 | status = se_access_check_implicit_owner(sd, |
608 | 0 | token, |
609 | 0 | access_desired, |
610 | 0 | access_granted, |
611 | 0 | IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS); |
612 | |
|
613 | 0 | if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)) { |
614 | 0 | return status; |
615 | 0 | } |
616 | | |
617 | 0 | bits_remaining = *access_granted; |
618 | | |
619 | | /* Check if we should override with privileges. */ |
620 | 0 | if ((bits_remaining & SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_BACKUP) && |
621 | 0 | security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_BACKUP)) { |
622 | 0 | bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_BACKUP); |
623 | 0 | } |
624 | 0 | if ((bits_remaining & SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_RESTORE) && |
625 | 0 | security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)) { |
626 | 0 | bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_RESTORE); |
627 | 0 | } |
628 | 0 | if (bits_remaining != 0) { |
629 | 0 | *access_granted = bits_remaining; |
630 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; |
631 | 0 | } |
632 | | |
633 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
634 | 0 | } |
635 | | |
636 | | static const struct GUID *get_ace_object_type(const struct security_ace *ace) |
637 | 0 | { |
638 | 0 | if (ace->object.object.flags & SEC_ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT) { |
639 | 0 | return &ace->object.object.type.type; |
640 | 0 | } |
641 | | |
642 | 0 | return NULL; |
643 | 0 | } |
644 | | |
645 | | /** |
646 | | * Evaluates access rights specified in a object-specific ACE for an AD object. |
647 | | * This logic corresponds to MS-ADTS 5.1.3.3.3 Checking Object-Specific Access. |
648 | | * @param[in] ace - the ACE being processed |
649 | | * @param[in/out] tree - remaining_access gets updated for the tree |
650 | | * @param[out] grant_access - set to true if the ACE grants sufficient access |
651 | | * rights to the object/attribute |
652 | | * @returns NT_STATUS_OK, unless access was denied |
653 | | */ |
654 | | static NTSTATUS check_object_specific_access(const struct security_ace *ace, |
655 | | struct object_tree *tree, |
656 | | bool *grant_access) |
657 | 1.70k | { |
658 | 1.70k | struct object_tree *node = NULL; |
659 | 1.70k | const struct GUID *type = NULL; |
660 | | |
661 | 1.70k | *grant_access = false; |
662 | | |
663 | | /* if no tree was supplied, we can't do object-specific access checks */ |
664 | 1.70k | if (!tree) { |
665 | 1.70k | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
666 | 1.70k | } |
667 | | |
668 | | /* Get the ObjectType GUID this ACE applies to */ |
669 | 0 | type = get_ace_object_type(ace); |
670 | | |
671 | | /* |
672 | | * If the ACE doesn't have a type, then apply it to the whole tree, i.e. |
673 | | * treat 'OA' ACEs as 'A' and 'OD' as 'D' |
674 | | */ |
675 | 0 | if (!type) { |
676 | 0 | node = tree; |
677 | 0 | } else { |
678 | | |
679 | | /* skip it if the ACE's ObjectType GUID is not in the tree */ |
680 | 0 | node = get_object_tree_by_GUID(tree, type); |
681 | 0 | if (!node) { |
682 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
683 | 0 | } |
684 | 0 | } |
685 | | |
686 | 0 | if (ace->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT || |
687 | 0 | ace->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK_OBJECT) { |
688 | | /* apply the access rights to this node, and any children */ |
689 | 0 | object_tree_modify_access(node, ace->access_mask); |
690 | | |
691 | | /* |
692 | | * Currently all nodes in the tree request the same access mask, |
693 | | * so we can use any node to check if processing this ACE now |
694 | | * means the requested access has been granted |
695 | | */ |
696 | 0 | if (node->remaining_access == 0) { |
697 | 0 | *grant_access = true; |
698 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
699 | 0 | } |
700 | | |
701 | | /* |
702 | | * As per 5.1.3.3.4 Checking Control Access Right-Based Access, |
703 | | * if the CONTROL_ACCESS right is present, then we can grant |
704 | | * access and stop any further access checks |
705 | | */ |
706 | 0 | if (ace->access_mask & SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS) { |
707 | 0 | *grant_access = true; |
708 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
709 | 0 | } |
710 | 0 | } else { |
711 | | |
712 | | /* this ACE denies access to the requested object/attribute */ |
713 | 0 | if (node->remaining_access & ace->access_mask){ |
714 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; |
715 | 0 | } |
716 | 0 | } |
717 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
718 | 0 | } |
719 | | |
720 | | |
721 | | NTSTATUS sec_access_check_ds_implicit_owner(const struct security_descriptor *sd, |
722 | | const struct security_token *token, |
723 | | uint32_t access_desired, |
724 | | uint32_t *access_granted, |
725 | | struct object_tree *tree, |
726 | | const struct dom_sid *replace_sid, |
727 | | enum implicit_owner_rights implicit_owner_rights) |
728 | 6.27k | { |
729 | 6.27k | uint32_t i; |
730 | 6.27k | uint32_t bits_remaining; |
731 | | |
732 | 6.27k | *access_granted = access_desired; |
733 | 6.27k | bits_remaining = access_desired; |
734 | | |
735 | | /* handle the maximum allowed flag */ |
736 | 6.27k | if (access_desired & SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) { |
737 | 2.31k | access_desired |= access_check_max_allowed(sd, token, implicit_owner_rights); |
738 | 2.31k | access_desired &= ~SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; |
739 | 2.31k | *access_granted = access_desired; |
740 | 2.31k | bits_remaining = access_desired; |
741 | 2.31k | } |
742 | | |
743 | 6.27k | if (access_desired & SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY) { |
744 | 710 | if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_SECURITY)) { |
745 | 393 | bits_remaining &= ~SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY; |
746 | 393 | } else { |
747 | 317 | return NT_STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD; |
748 | 317 | } |
749 | 710 | } |
750 | | |
751 | | /* the owner always gets SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC and SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL */ |
752 | 5.95k | if ((bits_remaining & (SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL)) && |
753 | 5.95k | security_token_has_sid(token, sd->owner_sid)) { |
754 | 330 | switch (implicit_owner_rights) { |
755 | 0 | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_AND_WRITE_DAC_RIGHTS: |
756 | 0 | bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | |
757 | 0 | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL); |
758 | 0 | break; |
759 | 330 | case IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_RIGHTS: |
760 | 330 | bits_remaining &= ~SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; |
761 | 330 | break; |
762 | 330 | } |
763 | 330 | } |
764 | | |
765 | | /* SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP grants SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER */ |
766 | 5.95k | if ((bits_remaining & (SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER)) && |
767 | 5.95k | security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)) { |
768 | 128 | bits_remaining &= ~(SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER); |
769 | 128 | } |
770 | | |
771 | | /* a NULL dacl allows access */ |
772 | 5.95k | if ((sd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT) && sd->dacl == NULL) { |
773 | 22 | *access_granted = access_desired; |
774 | 22 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
775 | 22 | } |
776 | | |
777 | 5.93k | if (sd->dacl == NULL) { |
778 | 532 | goto done; |
779 | 532 | } |
780 | | |
781 | | /* check each ace in turn. */ |
782 | 133k | for (i=0; bits_remaining && i < sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) { |
783 | 129k | const struct dom_sid *trustee; |
784 | 129k | const struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i]; |
785 | 129k | NTSTATUS status; |
786 | 129k | bool grant_access = false; |
787 | | |
788 | 129k | if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { |
789 | 4.68k | continue; |
790 | 4.68k | } |
791 | | |
792 | 124k | if (dom_sid_equal(&ace->trustee, &global_sid_Self) && replace_sid) { |
793 | 0 | trustee = replace_sid; |
794 | 124k | } else { |
795 | 124k | trustee = &ace->trustee; |
796 | 124k | } |
797 | | |
798 | 124k | if (!security_token_has_sid(token, trustee)) { |
799 | 70.4k | continue; |
800 | 70.4k | } |
801 | | |
802 | 54.2k | switch (ace->type) { |
803 | 27.1k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: |
804 | 27.1k | if (tree) { |
805 | 0 | object_tree_modify_access(tree, ace->access_mask); |
806 | 0 | } |
807 | | |
808 | 27.1k | bits_remaining &= ~ace->access_mask; |
809 | 27.1k | break; |
810 | 4.26k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: |
811 | 4.26k | if (bits_remaining & ace->access_mask) { |
812 | 74 | return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; |
813 | 74 | } |
814 | 4.19k | break; |
815 | 4.19k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK: |
816 | 2.13k | { |
817 | 2.13k | enum ace_callback_result allow = |
818 | 2.13k | check_callback_ace_allow(ace, token, sd); |
819 | 2.13k | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
820 | 5 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACE_CONDITION; |
821 | 5 | } |
822 | 2.13k | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_ALLOW) { |
823 | 115 | bits_remaining &= ~ace->access_mask; |
824 | 115 | } |
825 | 2.13k | break; |
826 | 2.13k | } |
827 | | |
828 | 8.63k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK: |
829 | 8.63k | { |
830 | 8.63k | enum ace_callback_result deny = |
831 | 8.63k | check_callback_ace_deny(ace, token, sd); |
832 | 8.63k | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
833 | 3 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACE_CONDITION; |
834 | 3 | } |
835 | 8.62k | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_DENY) { |
836 | 7.83k | if (bits_remaining & ace->access_mask) { |
837 | 1.68k | return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; |
838 | 1.68k | } |
839 | 7.83k | } |
840 | 6.94k | break; |
841 | 8.62k | } |
842 | | |
843 | 6.94k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT: |
844 | 1.53k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT: |
845 | 1.53k | status = check_object_specific_access(ace, tree, |
846 | 1.53k | &grant_access); |
847 | | |
848 | 1.53k | if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { |
849 | 0 | return status; |
850 | 0 | } |
851 | | |
852 | 1.53k | if (grant_access) { |
853 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
854 | 0 | } |
855 | 1.53k | break; |
856 | 4.44k | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_CALLBACK_OBJECT: |
857 | 4.44k | { |
858 | | /* |
859 | | * if the callback says ALLOW, we treat this as a |
860 | | * SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT. |
861 | | * |
862 | | * Otherwise we act as if this ACE does not exist. |
863 | | */ |
864 | 4.44k | enum ace_callback_result allow = |
865 | 4.44k | check_callback_ace_allow(ace, token, sd); |
866 | 4.44k | if (allow == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
867 | 3 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACE_CONDITION; |
868 | 3 | } |
869 | 4.44k | if (allow != ACE_CALLBACK_ALLOW) { |
870 | 4.37k | break; |
871 | 4.37k | } |
872 | | |
873 | 70 | status = check_object_specific_access(ace, tree, |
874 | 70 | &grant_access); |
875 | | |
876 | 70 | if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { |
877 | 0 | return status; |
878 | 0 | } |
879 | | |
880 | 70 | if (grant_access) { |
881 | 0 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
882 | 0 | } |
883 | 70 | break; |
884 | 70 | } |
885 | 185 | case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK_OBJECT: |
886 | 185 | { |
887 | | /* |
888 | | * ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT ACEs can't grant access -- |
889 | | * they either don't match the object and slide |
890 | | * harmlessly past or they return |
891 | | * NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. |
892 | | * |
893 | | * ACCESS_DENIED_CALLBACK_OBJECT ACEs add another way |
894 | | * of not applying, and another way of failing. |
895 | | */ |
896 | 185 | enum ace_callback_result deny = |
897 | 185 | check_callback_ace_deny(ace, token, sd); |
898 | 185 | if (deny == ACE_CALLBACK_INVALID) { |
899 | 1 | return NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACE_CONDITION; |
900 | 1 | } |
901 | 184 | if (deny != ACE_CALLBACK_DENY) { |
902 | 80 | break; |
903 | 80 | } |
904 | 104 | status = check_object_specific_access(ace, tree, |
905 | 104 | &grant_access); |
906 | | |
907 | 104 | if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { |
908 | 0 | return status; |
909 | 0 | } |
910 | 104 | break; |
911 | 104 | } |
912 | 5.90k | default: /* Other ACE types not handled/supported */ |
913 | 5.90k | break; |
914 | 54.2k | } |
915 | 54.2k | } |
916 | | |
917 | 4.16k | done: |
918 | 4.16k | if (bits_remaining != 0) { |
919 | 3.98k | return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; |
920 | 3.98k | } |
921 | | |
922 | 182 | return NT_STATUS_OK; |
923 | 4.16k | } |
924 | | |
925 | | /** |
926 | | * @brief Perform directoryservice (DS) related access checks for a given user |
927 | | * |
928 | | * Perform DS access checks for the user represented by its security_token, on |
929 | | * the provided security descriptor. If an tree associating GUID and access |
930 | | * required is provided then object access (OA) are checked as well. * |
931 | | * @param[in] sd The security descriptor against which the required |
932 | | * access are requested |
933 | | * |
934 | | * @param[in] token The security_token associated with the user to |
935 | | * test |
936 | | * |
937 | | * @param[in] access_desired A bitfield of rights that must be granted for the |
938 | | * given user in the specified SD. |
939 | | * |
940 | | * If one |
941 | | * of the entry in the tree grants all the requested rights for the given GUID |
942 | | * FIXME |
943 | | * tree can be null if not null it's the |
944 | | * Lots of code duplication, it will be united in just one |
945 | | * function eventually */ |
946 | | |
947 | | NTSTATUS sec_access_check_ds(const struct security_descriptor *sd, |
948 | | const struct security_token *token, |
949 | | uint32_t access_desired, |
950 | | uint32_t *access_granted, |
951 | | struct object_tree *tree, |
952 | | const struct dom_sid *replace_sid) |
953 | 6.27k | { |
954 | 6.27k | return sec_access_check_ds_implicit_owner(sd, |
955 | 6.27k | token, |
956 | 6.27k | access_desired, |
957 | 6.27k | access_granted, |
958 | 6.27k | tree, |
959 | 6.27k | replace_sid, |
960 | 6.27k | IMPLICIT_OWNER_READ_CONTROL_RIGHTS); |
961 | 6.27k | } |