/*

 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 *

 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 */

#include <stdio.h>

#include <time.h>

#include "internal/cryptlib.h"

#include "bn_lcl.h"

#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include <openssl/sha.h>

typedef enum bnrand_flag_e {

    NORMAL, TESTING, PRIVATE

} BNRAND_FLAG;

static int bnrand(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)

{

    unsigned char *buf = NULL;

    int b, ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;

    if (bits == 0) {

        if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)

            goto toosmall;

        BN_zero(rnd);

        return 1;

    }

    if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0))

        goto toosmall;

    bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;

    bit = (bits - 1) % 8;

    mask = 0xff << (bit + 1);

    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes);

    if (buf == NULL) {

        BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

        goto err;

    }

    /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */

    b = flag == NORMAL ? RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) : RAND_priv_bytes(buf, bytes);

    if (b <= 0)

        goto err;

    if (flag == TESTING) {

        /*

         * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs

         */

        int i;

        unsigned char c;

        for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {

            if (RAND_bytes(&c, 1) <= 0)

                goto err;

            if (c >= 128 && i > 0)

                buf[i] = buf[i - 1];

            else if (c < 42)

                buf[i] = 0;

            else if (c < 84)

                buf[i] = 255;

        }

    }

    if (top >= 0) {

        if (top) {

            if (bit == 0) {

                buf[0] = 1;

                buf[1] |= 0x80;

            } else {

                buf[0] |= (3 << (bit - 1));

            }

        } else {

            buf[0] |= (1 << bit);

        }

    }

    buf[0] &= ~mask;

    if (bottom)                 /* set bottom bit if requested */

        buf[bytes - 1] |= 1;

    if (!BN_bin2bn(buf, bytes, rnd))

        goto err;

    ret = 1;

 err:

    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bytes);

    bn_check_top(rnd);

    return ret;

toosmall:

    BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);

    return 0;

}

int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)

{

    return bnrand(NORMAL, rnd, bits, top, bottom);

}

int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)

{

    return bnrand(TESTING, rnd, bits, top, bottom);

}

int BN_priv_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)

{

    return bnrand(PRIVATE, rnd, bits, top, bottom);

}

/* random number r:  0 <= r < range */

static int bnrand_range(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)

{

    int n;

    int count = 100;

    if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) {

        BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE);

        return 0;

    }

    n = BN_num_bits(range);     /* n > 0 */

    /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */

    if (n == 1)

        BN_zero(r);

    else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3)) {

        /*

         * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer

         * than range

         */

        do {

            if (!bnrand(flag, r, n + 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))

                return 0;

            /*

             * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r -

             * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since

             * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >=

             * .75.

             */

            if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) {

                if (!BN_sub(r, r, range))

                    return 0;

                if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0)

                    if (!BN_sub(r, r, range))

                        return 0;

            }

            if (!--count) {

                BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);

                return 0;

            }

        }

        while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);

    } else {

        do {

            /* range = 11..._2  or  range = 101..._2 */

            if (!bnrand(flag, r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))

                return 0;

            if (!--count) {

                BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);

                return 0;

            }

        }

        while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);

    }

    bn_check_top(r);

    return 1;

}

int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)

{

    return bnrand_range(NORMAL, r, range);

}

int BN_priv_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)

{

    return bnrand_range(PRIVATE, r, range);

}

int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)

{

    return BN_rand(rnd, bits, top, bottom);

}

int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)

{

    return BN_rand_range(r, range);

}

/*

 * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike

 * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in

 * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv|

 * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG

 * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is

 * used.

 */

int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range,

                          const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message,

                          size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    SHA512_CTX sha;

    /*

     * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at

     * least |range| bits of randomness.

     */

    unsigned char random_bytes[64];

    unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];

    unsigned done, todo;

    /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */

    const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8;

    unsigned char private_bytes[96];

    unsigned char *k_bytes;

    int ret = 0;

    k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes);

    if (k_bytes == NULL)

        goto err;

    /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */

    todo = sizeof(priv->d[0]) * priv->top;

    if (todo > sizeof(private_bytes)) {

        /*

         * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this

         * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the

         * length of the private key.

         */

        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE);

        goto err;

    }

    memcpy(private_bytes, priv->d, todo);

    memset(private_bytes + todo, 0, sizeof(private_bytes) - todo);

    for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) {

        if (RAND_priv_bytes(random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) != 1)

            goto err;

        SHA512_Init(&sha);

        SHA512_Update(&sha, &done, sizeof(done));

        SHA512_Update(&sha, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes));

        SHA512_Update(&sha, message, message_len);

        SHA512_Update(&sha, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes));

        SHA512_Final(digest, &sha);

        todo = num_k_bytes - done;

        if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)

            todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;

        memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo);

        done += todo;

    }

    if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out))

        goto err;

    if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1)

        goto err;

    ret = 1;

 err:

    OPENSSL_free(k_bytes);

    OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes));

    return ret;

}