/src/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
11 | | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
12 | | #include <openssl/pem.h> |
13 | | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
14 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
15 | | #include <openssl/cms.h> |
16 | | #include <openssl/aes.h> |
17 | | #include "cms_lcl.h" |
18 | | #include "internal/asn1_int.h" |
19 | | |
20 | | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ |
21 | | |
22 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
23 | | X509_ALGOR **palg, |
24 | | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) |
25 | 0 | { |
26 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
27 | 0 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG, |
28 | 0 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
29 | 0 | return 0; |
30 | 0 | } |
31 | 0 | if (palg) |
32 | 0 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; |
33 | 0 | if (pukm) |
34 | 0 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; |
35 | 0 | return 1; |
36 | 0 | } |
37 | | |
38 | | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ |
39 | | |
40 | | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) |
41 | | *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
42 | 0 | { |
43 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
44 | 0 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS, |
45 | 0 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
46 | 0 | return NULL; |
47 | 0 | } |
48 | 0 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; |
49 | 0 | } |
50 | | |
51 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
52 | | X509_ALGOR **pubalg, |
53 | | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, |
54 | | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
55 | | X509_NAME **issuer, |
56 | | ASN1_INTEGER **sno) |
57 | 0 | { |
58 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; |
59 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
60 | 0 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID, |
61 | 0 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
62 | 0 | return 0; |
63 | 0 | } |
64 | 0 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
65 | 0 | if (issuer) |
66 | 0 | *issuer = NULL; |
67 | 0 | if (sno) |
68 | 0 | *sno = NULL; |
69 | 0 | if (keyid) |
70 | 0 | *keyid = NULL; |
71 | 0 | if (pubalg) |
72 | 0 | *pubalg = NULL; |
73 | 0 | if (pubkey) |
74 | 0 | *pubkey = NULL; |
75 | 0 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { |
76 | 0 | if (issuer) |
77 | 0 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; |
78 | 0 | if (sno) |
79 | 0 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; |
80 | 0 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { |
81 | 0 | if (keyid) |
82 | 0 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; |
83 | 0 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { |
84 | 0 | if (pubalg) |
85 | 0 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; |
86 | 0 | if (pubkey) |
87 | 0 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; |
88 | 0 | } else |
89 | 0 | return 0; |
90 | 0 | return 1; |
91 | 0 | } |
92 | | |
93 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) |
94 | 0 | { |
95 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; |
96 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
97 | 0 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP, |
98 | 0 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
99 | 0 | return -2; |
100 | 0 | } |
101 | 0 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; |
102 | 0 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) |
103 | 0 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); |
104 | 0 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) |
105 | 0 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); |
106 | 0 | return -1; |
107 | 0 | } |
108 | | |
109 | | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, |
110 | | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
111 | | ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, |
112 | | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, |
113 | | X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) |
114 | 0 | { |
115 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; |
116 | 0 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { |
117 | 0 | if (issuer) |
118 | 0 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; |
119 | 0 | if (sno) |
120 | 0 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; |
121 | 0 | if (keyid) |
122 | 0 | *keyid = NULL; |
123 | 0 | if (tm) |
124 | 0 | *tm = NULL; |
125 | 0 | if (other) |
126 | 0 | *other = NULL; |
127 | 0 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { |
128 | 0 | if (keyid) |
129 | 0 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; |
130 | 0 | if (tm) |
131 | 0 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; |
132 | 0 | if (other) |
133 | 0 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; |
134 | 0 | if (issuer) |
135 | 0 | *issuer = NULL; |
136 | 0 | if (sno) |
137 | 0 | *sno = NULL; |
138 | 0 | } else |
139 | 0 | return 0; |
140 | 0 | return 1; |
141 | 0 | } |
142 | | |
143 | | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, |
144 | | X509 *cert) |
145 | 0 | { |
146 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; |
147 | 0 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) |
148 | 0 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); |
149 | 0 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) |
150 | 0 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); |
151 | 0 | else |
152 | 0 | return -1; |
153 | 0 | } |
154 | | |
155 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) |
156 | 0 | { |
157 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; |
158 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; |
159 | 0 |
|
160 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); |
161 | 0 | kari->pctx = NULL; |
162 | 0 | if (!pk) |
163 | 0 | return 1; |
164 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); |
165 | 0 | if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx)) |
166 | 0 | goto err; |
167 | 0 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
168 | 0 | return 1; |
169 | 0 | err: |
170 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
171 | 0 | return 0; |
172 | 0 | } |
173 | | |
174 | | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
175 | 0 | { |
176 | 0 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) |
177 | 0 | return ri->d.kari->ctx; |
178 | 0 | return NULL; |
179 | 0 | } |
180 | | |
181 | | /* |
182 | | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK |
183 | | * or the encrypted CEK. |
184 | | */ |
185 | | |
186 | | static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, |
187 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, |
188 | | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) |
189 | 0 | { |
190 | 0 | /* Key encryption key */ |
191 | 0 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
192 | 0 | size_t keklen; |
193 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
194 | 0 | unsigned char *out = NULL; |
195 | 0 | int outlen; |
196 | 0 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx); |
197 | 0 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) |
198 | 0 | return 0; |
199 | 0 | /* Derive KEK */ |
200 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) |
201 | 0 | goto err; |
202 | 0 | /* Set KEK in context */ |
203 | 0 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) |
204 | 0 | goto err; |
205 | 0 | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ |
206 | 0 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) |
207 | 0 | goto err; |
208 | 0 | out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); |
209 | 0 | if (out == NULL) |
210 | 0 | goto err; |
211 | 0 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) |
212 | 0 | goto err; |
213 | 0 | *pout = out; |
214 | 0 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; |
215 | 0 | rv = 1; |
216 | 0 |
|
217 | 0 | err: |
218 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen); |
219 | 0 | if (!rv) |
220 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(out); |
221 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx); |
222 | 0 | /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */ |
223 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); |
224 | 0 | kari->pctx = NULL; |
225 | 0 | return rv; |
226 | 0 | } |
227 | | |
228 | | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
229 | | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, |
230 | | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) |
231 | 0 | { |
232 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
233 | 0 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; |
234 | 0 | size_t enckeylen; |
235 | 0 | size_t ceklen; |
236 | 0 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; |
237 | 0 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; |
238 | 0 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; |
239 | 0 | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ |
240 | 0 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) |
241 | 0 | goto err; |
242 | 0 | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ |
243 | 0 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) |
244 | 0 | goto err; |
245 | 0 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; |
246 | 0 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); |
247 | 0 | ec->key = cek; |
248 | 0 | ec->keylen = ceklen; |
249 | 0 | cek = NULL; |
250 | 0 | rv = 1; |
251 | 0 | err: |
252 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(cek); |
253 | 0 | return rv; |
254 | 0 | } |
255 | | |
256 | | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ |
257 | | static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
258 | | EVP_PKEY *pk) |
259 | 0 | { |
260 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
261 | 0 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; |
262 | 0 | int rv = 0; |
263 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); |
264 | 0 | if (!pctx) |
265 | 0 | goto err; |
266 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) |
267 | 0 | goto err; |
268 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) |
269 | 0 | goto err; |
270 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
271 | 0 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL); |
272 | 0 | if (!pctx) |
273 | 0 | goto err; |
274 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) |
275 | 0 | goto err; |
276 | 0 | kari->pctx = pctx; |
277 | 0 | rv = 1; |
278 | 0 | err: |
279 | 0 | if (!rv) |
280 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
281 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); |
282 | 0 | return rv; |
283 | 0 | } |
284 | | |
285 | | /* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */ |
286 | | |
287 | | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, |
288 | | EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) |
289 | 0 | { |
290 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; |
291 | 0 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; |
292 | 0 |
|
293 | 0 | ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo); |
294 | 0 | if (!ri->d.kari) |
295 | 0 | return 0; |
296 | 0 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; |
297 | 0 |
|
298 | 0 | kari = ri->d.kari; |
299 | 0 | kari->version = 3; |
300 | 0 |
|
301 | 0 | rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); |
302 | 0 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { |
303 | 0 | M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); |
304 | 0 | return 0; |
305 | 0 | } |
306 | 0 |
|
307 | 0 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { |
308 | 0 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; |
309 | 0 | rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier); |
310 | 0 | if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL) |
311 | 0 | return 0; |
312 | 0 | if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) |
313 | 0 | return 0; |
314 | 0 | } else { |
315 | 0 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; |
316 | 0 | if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) |
317 | 0 | return 0; |
318 | 0 | } |
319 | 0 | |
320 | 0 | /* Create ephemeral key */ |
321 | 0 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk)) |
322 | 0 | return 0; |
323 | 0 | |
324 | 0 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); |
325 | 0 | rek->pkey = pk; |
326 | 0 | return 1; |
327 | 0 | } |
328 | | |
329 | | static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, |
330 | | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) |
331 | 0 | { |
332 | 0 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx; |
333 | 0 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; |
334 | 0 | int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); |
335 | 0 | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ |
336 | 0 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx); |
337 | 0 |
|
338 | 0 | if (kekcipher) { |
339 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) |
340 | 0 | return 0; |
341 | 0 | return 1; |
342 | 0 | } |
343 | 0 | /* |
344 | 0 | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use |
345 | 0 | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. |
346 | 0 | */ |
347 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES |
348 | 0 | if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) |
349 | 0 | kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); |
350 | 0 | else |
351 | 0 | #endif |
352 | 0 | if (keylen <= 16) |
353 | 0 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); |
354 | 0 | else if (keylen <= 24) |
355 | 0 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); |
356 | 0 | else |
357 | 0 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); |
358 | 0 | return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
359 | 0 | } |
360 | | |
361 | | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ |
362 | | |
363 | | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
364 | | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) |
365 | 0 | { |
366 | 0 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; |
367 | 0 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; |
368 | 0 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; |
369 | 0 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; |
370 | 0 | int i; |
371 | 0 |
|
372 | 0 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { |
373 | 0 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
374 | 0 | return 0; |
375 | 0 | } |
376 | 0 | kari = ri->d.kari; |
377 | 0 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; |
378 | 0 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; |
379 | 0 | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ |
380 | 0 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) |
381 | 0 | return 0; |
382 | 0 | /* |
383 | 0 | * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key |
384 | 0 | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. |
385 | 0 | */ |
386 | 0 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) { |
387 | 0 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; |
388 | 0 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; |
389 | 0 | oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey); |
390 | 0 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey) |
391 | 0 | return 0; |
392 | 0 | } |
393 | 0 | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ |
394 | 0 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) |
395 | 0 | return 0; |
396 | 0 | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ |
397 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { |
398 | 0 | unsigned char *enckey; |
399 | 0 | size_t enckeylen; |
400 | 0 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); |
401 | 0 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) |
402 | 0 | return 0; |
403 | 0 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, |
404 | 0 | kari, 1)) |
405 | 0 | return 0; |
406 | 0 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); |
407 | 0 | } |
408 | 0 |
|
409 | 0 | return 1; |
410 | 0 |
|
411 | 0 | } |