/*

 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 *

 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 */

#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"

#include <stdio.h>

#include "internal/cryptlib.h"

#include <openssl/bn.h>

#include <openssl/rsa.h>

#include <openssl/rand.h>

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen)

{

    int j;

    unsigned char *p;

    if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,

               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);

        return 0;

    }

    p = (unsigned char *)to;

    *(p++) = 0;

    *(p++) = 1;                 /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */

    /* pad out with 0xff data */

    j = tlen - 3 - flen;

    memset(p, 0xff, j);

    p += j;

    *(p++) = '\0';

    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);

    return 1;

}

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                   const unsigned char *from, int flen,

                                   int num)

{

    int i, j;

    const unsigned char *p;

    p = from;

    /*

     * The format is

     * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D

     * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF

     * D  - data.

     */

    if (num < 11)

        return -1;

    /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */

    if (num == flen) {

        if ((*p++) != 0x00) {

            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,

                   RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);

            return -1;

        }

        flen--;

    }

    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 0x01)) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,

               RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);

        return -1;

    }

    /* scan over padding data */

    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type. */

    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {

        if (*p != 0xff) {       /* should decrypt to 0xff */

            if (*p == 0) {

                p++;

                break;

            } else {

                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,

                       RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);

                return -1;

            }

        }

        p++;

    }

    if (i == j) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,

               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);

        return -1;

    }

    if (i < 8) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,

               RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);

        return -1;

    }

    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */

    j -= i;

    if (j > tlen) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);

        return -1;

    }

    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);

    return j;

}

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen)

{

    int i, j;

    unsigned char *p;

    if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,

               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);

        return 0;

    }

    p = (unsigned char *)to;

    *(p++) = 0;

    *(p++) = 2;                 /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */

    /* pad out with non-zero random data */

    j = tlen - 3 - flen;

    if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)

        return 0;

    for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {

        if (*p == '\0')

            do {

                if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)

                    return 0;

            } while (*p == '\0');

        p++;

    }

    *(p++) = '\0';

    memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);

    return 1;

}

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                   const unsigned char *from, int flen,

                                   int num)

{

    int i;

    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */

    unsigned char *em = NULL;

    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;

    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;

    if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)

        return -1;

    /*

     * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",

     * section 7.2.2.

     */

    if (flen > num)

        goto err;

    if (num < 11)

        goto err;

    if (flen != num) {

        em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);

        if (em == NULL) {

            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

            return -1;

        }

        /*

         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with

         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy

         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some

         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed

         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of

         * |from|.

         */

        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);

        from = em;

    }

    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);

    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);

    found_zero_byte = 0;

    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {

        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);

        zero_index =

            constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,

                                     zero_index);

        found_zero_byte |= equals0;

    }

    /*

     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.

     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check

     * also fails.

     */

    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);

    /*

     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte

     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.

     */

    msg_index = zero_index + 1;

    mlen = num - msg_index;

    /*

     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could

     * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.

     */

    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));

    /*

     * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result

     * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing

     * information at the API boundary.

     */

    if (!good) {

        mlen = -1;

        goto err;

    }

    memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);

 err:

    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);

    if (mlen == -1)

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,

               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);

    return mlen;

}