/src/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | #include <stdio.h> |
11 | | #include <time.h> |
12 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
13 | | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
14 | | #include "crypto/rand.h" |
15 | | #include "internal/thread_once.h" |
16 | | #include "crypto/rand_pool.h" |
17 | | |
18 | | /* |
19 | | * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool |
20 | | */ |
21 | | RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, |
22 | | size_t min_len, size_t max_len) |
23 | 48 | { |
24 | 48 | RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); |
25 | 48 | size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure); |
26 | | |
27 | 48 | if (pool == NULL) |
28 | 0 | return NULL; |
29 | | |
30 | 48 | pool->min_len = min_len; |
31 | 48 | pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ? |
32 | 48 | RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len; |
33 | 48 | pool->alloc_len = min_len < min_alloc_size ? min_alloc_size : min_len; |
34 | 48 | if (pool->alloc_len > pool->max_len) |
35 | 0 | pool->alloc_len = pool->max_len; |
36 | | |
37 | 48 | if (secure) |
38 | 48 | pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->alloc_len); |
39 | 0 | else |
40 | 0 | pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->alloc_len); |
41 | | |
42 | 48 | if (pool->buffer == NULL) |
43 | 0 | goto err; |
44 | | |
45 | 48 | pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested; |
46 | 48 | pool->secure = secure; |
47 | 48 | return pool; |
48 | | |
49 | 0 | err: |
50 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(pool); |
51 | 0 | return NULL; |
52 | 48 | } |
53 | | |
54 | | /* |
55 | | * Attach new random pool to the given buffer |
56 | | * |
57 | | * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data |
58 | | * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG. |
59 | | */ |
60 | | RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, |
61 | | size_t entropy) |
62 | 0 | { |
63 | 0 | RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); |
64 | |
|
65 | 0 | if (pool == NULL) |
66 | 0 | return NULL; |
67 | | |
68 | | /* |
69 | | * The const needs to be cast away, but attached buffers will not be |
70 | | * modified (in contrary to allocated buffers which are zeroed and |
71 | | * freed in the end). |
72 | | */ |
73 | 0 | pool->buffer = (unsigned char *) buffer; |
74 | 0 | pool->len = len; |
75 | |
|
76 | 0 | pool->attached = 1; |
77 | |
|
78 | 0 | pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->alloc_len = pool->len; |
79 | 0 | pool->entropy = entropy; |
80 | |
|
81 | 0 | return pool; |
82 | 0 | } |
83 | | |
84 | | /* |
85 | | * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer. |
86 | | */ |
87 | | void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) |
88 | 48 | { |
89 | 48 | if (pool == NULL) |
90 | 0 | return; |
91 | | |
92 | | /* |
93 | | * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint, |
94 | | * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed |
95 | | * to ossl_rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`. |
96 | | * (see corresponding comment in ossl_rand_pool_attach()). |
97 | | */ |
98 | 48 | if (!pool->attached) { |
99 | 48 | if (pool->secure) |
100 | 48 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len); |
101 | 0 | else |
102 | 0 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len); |
103 | 48 | } |
104 | | |
105 | 48 | OPENSSL_free(pool); |
106 | 48 | } |
107 | | |
108 | | /* |
109 | | * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly). |
110 | | */ |
111 | | const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) |
112 | 0 | { |
113 | 0 | return pool->buffer; |
114 | 0 | } |
115 | | |
116 | | /* |
117 | | * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller. |
118 | | */ |
119 | | size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) |
120 | 0 | { |
121 | 0 | return pool->entropy; |
122 | 0 | } |
123 | | |
124 | | /* |
125 | | * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller. |
126 | | */ |
127 | | size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool) |
128 | 48 | { |
129 | 48 | return pool->len; |
130 | 48 | } |
131 | | |
132 | | /* |
133 | | * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller. |
134 | | * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer |
135 | | * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it |
136 | | * again to the pool using ossl_rand_pool_reattach(). |
137 | | */ |
138 | | unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) |
139 | 48 | { |
140 | 48 | unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer; |
141 | 48 | pool->buffer = NULL; |
142 | 48 | pool->entropy = 0; |
143 | 48 | return ret; |
144 | 48 | } |
145 | | |
146 | | /* |
147 | | * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass |
148 | | * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool. |
149 | | */ |
150 | | void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer) |
151 | 0 | { |
152 | 0 | pool->buffer = buffer; |
153 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len); |
154 | 0 | pool->len = 0; |
155 | 0 | } |
156 | | |
157 | | /* |
158 | | * If |entropy_factor| bits contain 1 bit of entropy, how many bytes does one |
159 | | * need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy? |
160 | | */ |
161 | | #define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_factor) \ |
162 | 48 | (((bits) * (entropy_factor) + 7) / 8) |
163 | | |
164 | | |
165 | | /* |
166 | | * Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller. |
167 | | * This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough. |
168 | | * Returns |
169 | | * |
170 | | * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough |
171 | | * 0 otherwise |
172 | | */ |
173 | | size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) |
174 | 48 | { |
175 | 48 | if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) |
176 | 0 | return 0; |
177 | | |
178 | 48 | if (pool->len < pool->min_len) |
179 | 0 | return 0; |
180 | | |
181 | 48 | return pool->entropy; |
182 | 48 | } |
183 | | |
184 | | /* |
185 | | * Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill |
186 | | * the random pool. |
187 | | */ |
188 | | |
189 | | size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) |
190 | 48 | { |
191 | 48 | if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) |
192 | 48 | return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy; |
193 | | |
194 | 0 | return 0; |
195 | 48 | } |
196 | | |
197 | | /* Increase the allocation size -- not usable for an attached pool */ |
198 | | static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) |
199 | 96 | { |
200 | 96 | if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) { |
201 | 0 | unsigned char *p; |
202 | 0 | const size_t limit = pool->max_len / 2; |
203 | 0 | size_t newlen = pool->alloc_len; |
204 | |
|
205 | 0 | if (pool->attached || len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
206 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
207 | 0 | return 0; |
208 | 0 | } |
209 | | |
210 | 0 | do |
211 | 0 | newlen = newlen < limit ? newlen * 2 : pool->max_len; |
212 | 0 | while (len > newlen - pool->len); |
213 | |
|
214 | 0 | if (pool->secure) |
215 | 0 | p = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(newlen); |
216 | 0 | else |
217 | 0 | p = OPENSSL_zalloc(newlen); |
218 | 0 | if (p == NULL) |
219 | 0 | return 0; |
220 | 0 | memcpy(p, pool->buffer, pool->len); |
221 | 0 | if (pool->secure) |
222 | 0 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len); |
223 | 0 | else |
224 | 0 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len); |
225 | 0 | pool->buffer = p; |
226 | 0 | pool->alloc_len = newlen; |
227 | 0 | } |
228 | 96 | return 1; |
229 | 96 | } |
230 | | |
231 | | /* |
232 | | * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming |
233 | | * the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit. |
234 | | * In case of an error, 0 is returned. |
235 | | */ |
236 | | |
237 | | size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor) |
238 | 48 | { |
239 | 48 | size_t bytes_needed; |
240 | 48 | size_t entropy_needed = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool); |
241 | | |
242 | 48 | if (entropy_factor < 1) { |
243 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); |
244 | 0 | return 0; |
245 | 0 | } |
246 | | |
247 | 48 | bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_factor); |
248 | | |
249 | 48 | if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
250 | | /* not enough space left */ |
251 | 0 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW, |
252 | 0 | "entropy_factor=%u, entropy_needed=%zu, bytes_needed=%zu," |
253 | 0 | "pool->max_len=%zu, pool->len=%zu", |
254 | 0 | entropy_factor, entropy_needed, bytes_needed, |
255 | 0 | pool->max_len, pool->len); |
256 | 0 | return 0; |
257 | 0 | } |
258 | | |
259 | 48 | if (pool->len < pool->min_len && |
260 | 48 | bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len) |
261 | | /* to meet the min_len requirement */ |
262 | 0 | bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len; |
263 | | |
264 | | /* |
265 | | * Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount |
266 | | * of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where |
267 | | * ossl_rand_pool_add_begin, ossl_rand_pool_add_end or ossl_rand_pool_add |
268 | | * are used to collect entropy data without any error handling |
269 | | * whatsoever, continue to be valid. |
270 | | * Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that |
271 | | * we don't fall back to a less secure or even blocking random source, |
272 | | * as that could happen by the existing code patterns. |
273 | | * This is not a concern for additional data, therefore that |
274 | | * is not needed if rand_pool_grow fails in other places. |
275 | | */ |
276 | 48 | if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, bytes_needed)) { |
277 | | /* persistent error for this pool */ |
278 | 0 | pool->max_len = pool->len = 0; |
279 | 0 | return 0; |
280 | 0 | } |
281 | | |
282 | 48 | return bytes_needed; |
283 | 48 | } |
284 | | |
285 | | /* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */ |
286 | | size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) |
287 | 0 | { |
288 | 0 | return pool->max_len - pool->len; |
289 | 0 | } |
290 | | |
291 | | /* |
292 | | * Add random bytes to the random pool. |
293 | | * |
294 | | * It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of |
295 | | * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of |
296 | | * randomness. |
297 | | * |
298 | | * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0 |
299 | | */ |
300 | | int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, |
301 | | const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) |
302 | 0 | { |
303 | 0 | if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
304 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
305 | 0 | return 0; |
306 | 0 | } |
307 | | |
308 | 0 | if (pool->buffer == NULL) { |
309 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
310 | 0 | return 0; |
311 | 0 | } |
312 | | |
313 | 0 | if (len > 0) { |
314 | | /* |
315 | | * This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer |
316 | | * returned from ossl_rand_pool_add_begin. |
317 | | * The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the |
318 | | * address of the end of the allocated memory to something |
319 | | * different, since that comparison would have an |
320 | | * indeterminate result. |
321 | | */ |
322 | 0 | if (pool->alloc_len > pool->len && pool->buffer + pool->len == buffer) { |
323 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
324 | 0 | return 0; |
325 | 0 | } |
326 | | /* |
327 | | * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect |
328 | | * additional data. |
329 | | * For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within |
330 | | * the limits given by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow |
331 | | * below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens. |
332 | | */ |
333 | 0 | if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len)) |
334 | 0 | return 0; |
335 | 0 | memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len); |
336 | 0 | pool->len += len; |
337 | 0 | pool->entropy += entropy; |
338 | 0 | } |
339 | | |
340 | 0 | return 1; |
341 | 0 | } |
342 | | |
343 | | /* |
344 | | * Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place. |
345 | | * |
346 | | * Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place |
347 | | * and returns a pointer to the buffer. |
348 | | * The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer. |
349 | | * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer |
350 | | * is returned without producing an error message. |
351 | | * |
352 | | * After updating the buffer, ossl_rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called |
353 | | * to finish the update operation (see next comment). |
354 | | */ |
355 | | unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) |
356 | 48 | { |
357 | 48 | if (len == 0) |
358 | 0 | return NULL; |
359 | | |
360 | 48 | if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
361 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); |
362 | 0 | return NULL; |
363 | 0 | } |
364 | | |
365 | 48 | if (pool->buffer == NULL) { |
366 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
367 | 0 | return NULL; |
368 | 0 | } |
369 | | |
370 | | /* |
371 | | * As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given |
372 | | * by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed |
373 | | * to succeed, thus no allocation happens. |
374 | | * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect |
375 | | * additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here, |
376 | | * and of course the caller is responsible to check the return |
377 | | * value of this function. |
378 | | */ |
379 | 48 | if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len)) |
380 | 0 | return NULL; |
381 | | |
382 | 48 | return pool->buffer + pool->len; |
383 | 48 | } |
384 | | |
385 | | /* |
386 | | * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place. |
387 | | * |
388 | | * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by |
389 | | * ossl_rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment). |
390 | | * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added |
391 | | * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness. |
392 | | * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved. |
393 | | */ |
394 | | int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) |
395 | 48 | { |
396 | 48 | if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) { |
397 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); |
398 | 0 | return 0; |
399 | 0 | } |
400 | | |
401 | 48 | if (len > 0) { |
402 | 48 | pool->len += len; |
403 | 48 | pool->entropy += entropy; |
404 | 48 | } |
405 | | |
406 | 48 | return 1; |
407 | 48 | } |
408 | | |
409 | | /** |
410 | | * @brief Mix in the additional input into an existing entropy in the pool |
411 | | * |
412 | | * @param pool A RAND_POOL to mix the additional input in |
413 | | * @param adin A buffer with the additional input |
414 | | * @param adin_len A length of the additional input |
415 | | * |
416 | | * @return 1 if there is any existing entropy in the pool so the additional input |
417 | | * can be mixed in, 0 otherwise. |
418 | | */ |
419 | | |
420 | | int ossl_rand_pool_adin_mix_in(RAND_POOL *pool, const unsigned char *adin, |
421 | | size_t adin_len) |
422 | 48 | { |
423 | 48 | if (adin == NULL || adin_len == 0) |
424 | | /* Nothing to mix in -> success */ |
425 | 0 | return 1; |
426 | | |
427 | 48 | if (pool->buffer == NULL) { |
428 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
429 | 0 | return 0; |
430 | 0 | } |
431 | | |
432 | 48 | if (pool->len == 0) { |
433 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_IS_EMPTY); |
434 | 0 | return 0; |
435 | 0 | } |
436 | | |
437 | 48 | if (adin != NULL && adin_len > 0) { |
438 | 48 | size_t i; |
439 | | |
440 | | /* xor the additional data into the pool */ |
441 | 432 | for (i = 0; i < adin_len; ++i) |
442 | 384 | pool->buffer[i % pool->len] ^= adin[i]; |
443 | 48 | } |
444 | | |
445 | 48 | return 1; |
446 | 48 | } |