Coverage Report

Created: 2026-04-12 07:08

next uncovered line (L), next uncovered region (R), next uncovered branch (B)
/src/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
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Count
Source
1
/*
2
 * Copyright 2016-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3
 *
4
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
5
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
6
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8
 */
9
10
#if defined(__TANDEM) && defined(_SPT_MODEL_)
11
#include <spthread.h>
12
#include <spt_extensions.h> /* timeval */
13
#endif
14
15
#include <string.h>
16
#include "internal/nelem.h"
17
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
18
#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
19
#include "../ssl_local.h"
20
#include "statem_local.h"
21
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
22
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
23
24
/*
25
 * values for ext_defs ech_handling field
26
 * exceptionally, we don't conditionally compile that field to avoid a pile of
27
 * ifndefs all over the ext_defs values
28
 */
29
0
#define OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH 1 /* call constructor both times */
30
0
#define OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS 2 /* compress outer value into inner */
31
#define OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_DUPLICATE 3 /* same value in inner and outer */
32
/*
33
 * DUPLICATE isn't really useful other than to show we can,
34
 * and for debugging/tests/coverage so may disappear. Changes mostly
35
 * won't affect the outer CH size, due to padding, but might for some
36
 * larger extensions.
37
 *
38
 * Note there is a co-dependency with test/recipes/75-test_quicapi.t:
39
 * If you change an |ech_handling| value, that may well affect the order
40
 * of extensions in a ClientHello, which is reflected in the test data
41
 * in test/recipes/75-test_quicapi_data/\*.txt files. To fix, you need
42
 * to look in test-runs/test_quicapi for the "new" files and then edit
43
 * (replacing actual octets with "?" in relevant places), and copy the
44
 * result back over to test/recipes/75-test_quicapi_data/. The reason
45
 * this happens is the ECH COMPRESS'd extensions need to be contiguous
46
 * in the ClientHello, so changes to/from COMPRESS affect extension
47
 * order, in inner and outer CH. There doesn't seem to be an easy,
48
 * generic, way to reconcile these compile-time changes with having
49
 * fixed value test files. Likely the best option is to decide on the
50
 * disposition of ECH COMPRESS or not and consider that an at least
51
 * medium-term thing. (But still allow other builds to vary at
52
 * compile time if they need something different.)
53
 */
54
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
55
static int init_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
56
static int final_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
57
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECH */
58
59
static int final_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
60
static int init_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
61
static int final_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
62
static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
63
    int sent);
64
static int init_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
65
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
66
static int init_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
67
#endif
68
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
69
static int init_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
70
#endif
71
static int init_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
72
static int final_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
73
static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
74
static int init_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
75
static int init_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned int context);
76
static int init_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned int context);
77
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
78
    unsigned int context);
79
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
80
    WPACKET *pkt,
81
    unsigned int context,
82
    X509 *x,
83
    size_t chainidx);
84
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
85
    unsigned int context, X509 *x,
86
    size_t chainidx);
87
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
88
static int init_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
89
#endif
90
static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
91
static int init_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
92
static int init_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
93
static int final_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
94
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
95
static int final_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
96
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
97
static int init_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
98
#endif
99
static int final_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
100
static int final_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
101
    int sent);
102
static int final_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
103
static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
104
    int sent);
105
static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
106
static int final_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
107
static int tls_init_compress_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned int context);
108
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_compress_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
109
    unsigned int context,
110
    X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
111
static int tls_parse_compress_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
112
    unsigned int context,
113
    X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
114
115
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
116
typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
117
    /* The defined type for the extension */
118
    unsigned int type;
119
    /*
120
     * The context that this extension applies to, e.g. what messages and
121
     * protocol versions
122
     */
123
    unsigned int context;
124
    /*
125
     * exceptionally, we don't conditionally compile this field to avoid a
126
     * pile of ifndefs all over the ext_defs values
127
     */
128
    int ech_handling; /* how to handle ECH for this extension type */
129
    /*
130
     * Initialise extension before parsing. Always called for relevant contexts
131
     * even if extension not present
132
     */
133
    int (*init)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
134
    /* Parse extension sent from client to server */
135
    int (*parse_ctos)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
136
        X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
137
    /* Parse extension send from server to client */
138
    int (*parse_stoc)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
139
        X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
140
    /* Construct extension sent from server to client */
141
    EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
142
        unsigned int context,
143
        X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
144
    /* Construct extension sent from client to server */
145
    EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
146
        unsigned int context,
147
        X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
148
    /*
149
     * Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
150
     * initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
151
     * the extension was seen, or 0 otherwise.
152
     */
153
    int (*final)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
154
} EXTENSION_DEFINITION;
155
156
/*
157
 * Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
158
 * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
159
 * indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_local.h.
160
 * Extensions should be added to test/ext_internal_test.c as well, as that
161
 * tests the ordering of the extensions.
162
 *
163
 * Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
164
 * server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
165
 * extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the
166
 * extension in the message that we received. The parser functions are only
167
 * called if we see the extension in the message. The finalisers are always
168
 * called if the initialiser was called.
169
 * There are also server and client side constructor functions which are always
170
 * called during message construction if the extension is relevant for the
171
 * given context.
172
 * The initialisation, parsing, finalisation and construction functions are
173
 * always called in the order defined in this list. Some extensions may depend
174
 * on others having been processed first, so the order of this list is
175
 * significant.
176
 * The extension context is defined by a series of flags which specify which
177
 * messages the extension is relevant to. These flags also specify whether the
178
 * extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
179
 *
180
 * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at
181
 * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm.
182
 */
183
#define INVALID_EXTENSION { TLSEXT_TYPE_invalid, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
184
185
static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
186
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
187
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
188
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
189
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
190
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate, tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate,
191
        tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate, tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate,
192
        final_renegotiate },
193
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
194
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
195
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
196
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
197
        init_server_name,
198
        tls_parse_ctos_server_name, tls_parse_stoc_server_name,
199
        tls_construct_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_ctos_server_name,
200
        final_server_name },
201
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length,
202
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
203
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
204
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
205
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen, tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen,
206
        tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen, tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen,
207
        final_maxfragmentlen },
208
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
209
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,
210
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
211
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
212
        init_srp, tls_parse_ctos_srp, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_srp, NULL },
213
#else
214
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
215
#endif
216
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
217
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
218
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
219
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
220
        init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
221
        tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
222
        final_ec_pt_formats },
223
    { /*
224
       * "supported_groups" is spread across several specifications.
225
       * It was originally specified as "elliptic_curves" in RFC 4492,
226
       * and broadened to include named FFDH groups by RFC 7919.
227
       * Both RFCs 4492 and 7919 do not include a provision for the server
228
       * to indicate to the client the complete list of groups supported
229
       * by the server, with the server instead just indicating the
230
       * selected group for this connection in the ServerKeyExchange
231
       * message.  TLS 1.3 adds a scheme for the server to indicate
232
       * to the client its list of supported groups in the
233
       * EncryptedExtensions message, but none of the relevant
234
       * specifications permit sending supported_groups in the ServerHello.
235
       * Nonetheless (possibly due to the close proximity to the
236
       * "ec_point_formats" extension, which is allowed in the ServerHello),
237
       * there are several servers that send this extension in the
238
       * ServerHello anyway.  Up to and including the 1.1.0 release,
239
       * we did not check for the presence of nonpermitted extensions,
240
       * so to avoid a regression, we must permit this extension in the
241
       * TLS 1.2 ServerHello as well.
242
       *
243
       * Note that there is no tls_parse_stoc_supported_groups function,
244
       * so we do not perform any additional parsing, validation, or
245
       * processing on the server's group list -- this is just a minimal
246
       * change to preserve compatibility with these misbehaving servers.
247
       */
248
        TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
249
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
250
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
251
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
252
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL,
253
        tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups,
254
        tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL },
255
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
256
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
257
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
258
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
259
        init_session_ticket, tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket,
260
        tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket,
261
        tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL },
262
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
263
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
264
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
265
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
266
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
267
        init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request,
268
        tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request,
269
        tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL },
270
#else
271
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
272
#endif
273
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
275
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
276
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
277
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
278
        init_npn, tls_parse_ctos_npn, tls_parse_stoc_npn,
279
        tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg, tls_construct_ctos_npn, NULL },
280
#else
281
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
282
#endif
283
    { /*
284
       * Must appear in this list after server_name so that finalisation
285
       * happens after server_name callbacks
286
       */
287
        TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
288
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
289
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
290
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
291
        init_alpn, tls_parse_ctos_alpn, tls_parse_stoc_alpn,
292
        tls_construct_stoc_alpn, tls_construct_ctos_alpn, final_alpn },
293
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
294
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,
295
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
296
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY,
297
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
298
        init_srtp, tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp, tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp,
299
        tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp, tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp, NULL },
300
#else
301
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
302
#endif
303
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,
304
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
305
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
306
        /*
307
         * If you want to demonstrate/exercise duplicate, then
308
         * this does that and has no effect on sizes, but it
309
         * will break the quicapi test (see above). Probably
310
         * best done in local tests and not committed to any
311
         * upstream.
312
         * OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_DUPLICATE,
313
         */
314
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
315
        init_etm, tls_parse_ctos_etm, tls_parse_stoc_etm,
316
        tls_construct_stoc_etm, tls_construct_ctos_etm, NULL },
317
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
318
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
319
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
320
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
321
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
322
        NULL,
323
        /*
324
         * No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom
325
         * extension. This is an exception to the rule that custom extensions
326
         * cannot override built in ones.
327
         */
328
        NULL, tls_parse_stoc_sct, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_sct, NULL },
329
#else
330
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
331
#endif
332
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
333
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
334
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
335
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
336
        init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
337
        tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems },
338
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert,
339
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
340
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
341
        init_sig_algs_cert, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert,
342
        tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert,
343
        /* We do not generate signature_algorithms_cert at present. */
344
        NULL, NULL, NULL },
345
    {
346
        TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth,
347
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
348
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
349
        init_post_handshake_auth,
350
        tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth,
351
        NULL,
352
        NULL,
353
        tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth,
354
        NULL,
355
    },
356
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_client_cert_type,
357
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
358
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
359
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
360
        init_client_cert_type,
361
        tls_parse_ctos_client_cert_type, tls_parse_stoc_client_cert_type,
362
        tls_construct_stoc_client_cert_type, tls_construct_ctos_client_cert_type,
363
        NULL },
364
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_server_cert_type,
365
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
366
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
367
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
368
        init_server_cert_type,
369
        tls_parse_ctos_server_cert_type, tls_parse_stoc_server_cert_type,
370
        tls_construct_stoc_server_cert_type, tls_construct_ctos_server_cert_type,
371
        NULL },
372
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
373
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
374
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
375
        init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
376
        tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
377
        tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs },
378
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
379
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
380
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY,
381
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
382
        NULL,
383
        /* Processed inline as part of version selection */
384
        NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions,
385
        tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions,
386
        tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, final_supported_versions },
387
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes,
388
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
389
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
390
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
391
        init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL,
392
        tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL },
393
    { /*
394
       * Must be in this list after supported_groups. We need that to have
395
       * been parsed before we do this one.
396
       */
397
        TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
398
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
399
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
400
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
401
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
402
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share,
403
        tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
404
        final_key_share },
405
    { /* Must be after key_share */
406
        TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
407
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
408
            | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
409
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
410
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_cookie, tls_parse_stoc_cookie,
411
        tls_construct_stoc_cookie, tls_construct_ctos_cookie, NULL },
412
    { /*
413
       * Special unsolicited ServerHello extension only used when
414
       * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set. We allow it in a ClientHello but
415
       * ignore it.
416
       */
417
        TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug,
418
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
419
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
420
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
421
        NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL },
422
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_compress_certificate,
423
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
424
            | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
425
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
426
        tls_init_compress_certificate,
427
        tls_parse_compress_certificate, tls_parse_compress_certificate,
428
        tls_construct_compress_certificate, tls_construct_compress_certificate,
429
        NULL },
430
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
431
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
432
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
433
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
434
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
435
        tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data,
436
        final_early_data },
437
    {
438
        TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities,
439
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
440
            | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
441
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS,
442
        init_certificate_authorities,
443
        tls_parse_certificate_authorities,
444
        tls_parse_certificate_authorities,
445
        tls_construct_certificate_authorities,
446
        tls_construct_certificate_authorities,
447
        NULL,
448
    },
449
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
450
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_ech,
451
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
452
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
453
        init_ech,
454
        tls_parse_ctos_ech, tls_parse_stoc_ech,
455
        tls_construct_stoc_ech, tls_construct_ctos_ech,
456
        final_ech },
457
    { TLSEXT_TYPE_outer_extensions,
458
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
459
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
460
        NULL,
461
        NULL, NULL,
462
        NULL, NULL,
463
        NULL },
464
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_ECH */
465
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
466
    INVALID_EXTENSION,
467
#endif /* END_OPENSSL_NO_ECH */
468
    { /* RFC 8701 GREASE extension 1 - type is dynamic */
469
        TLSEXT_TYPE_grease1,
470
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
471
        0,
472
        NULL,
473
        NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_grease1, NULL },
474
    { /* RFC 8701 GREASE extension 2 - type is dynamic */
475
        TLSEXT_TYPE_grease2,
476
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
477
        0,
478
        NULL,
479
        NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_grease2, NULL },
480
    { /* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */
481
        TLSEXT_TYPE_padding,
482
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
483
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
484
        NULL,
485
        /* We send this, but don't read it */
486
        NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL },
487
    { /* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */
488
        TLSEXT_TYPE_psk,
489
        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
490
            | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
491
        OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH,
492
        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk,
493
        tls_construct_ctos_psk, final_psk }
494
};
495
496
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
497
/*
498
 * Copy an inner extension value to outer.
499
 * inner CH must have been pre-decoded into s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts
500
 * already.
501
 */
502
int ossl_ech_copy_inner2outer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t ext_type,
503
    int ind, WPACKET *pkt)
504
0
{
505
0
    RAW_EXTENSION *myext = NULL, *raws = NULL;
506
507
0
    if (s == NULL || s->clienthello == NULL)
508
0
        return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
509
0
    raws = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts;
510
0
    if (raws == NULL)
511
0
        return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
512
0
    myext = &raws[ind];
513
0
    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
514
0
    {
515
0
        BIO_printf(trc_out, "inner2outer: Copying ext type %d to outer\n",
516
0
            ext_type);
517
0
    }
518
0
    OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
519
520
    /*
521
     * copy inner value to outer
522
     */
523
0
    if (PACKET_data(&myext->data) != NULL
524
0
        && PACKET_remaining(&myext->data) > 0) {
525
0
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ext_type)
526
0
            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, PACKET_data(&myext->data),
527
0
                PACKET_remaining(&myext->data)))
528
0
            return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
529
0
    } else {
530
        /* empty extension */
531
0
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ext_type)
532
0
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0))
533
0
            return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
534
0
    }
535
0
    return 1;
536
0
}
537
538
/*
539
 * DUPEMALL is useful for testing - this turns off compression and
540
 * causes two calls to each extension constructor, which'd be the same
541
 * as making all entries in ext_tab use the CALL_BOTH value
542
 */
543
#undef DUPEMALL
544
545
/*
546
 * Check if we're using the same/different key shares
547
 * return 1 if same key share in inner and outer, 0 otherwise
548
 */
549
int ossl_ech_same_key_share(void)
550
0
{
551
#ifdef DUPEMALL
552
    return 0;
553
#endif
554
0
    return ext_defs[TLSEXT_IDX_key_share].ech_handling
555
0
        != OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH;
556
0
}
557
558
/*
559
 * say if extension at index |ind| in ext_defs is to be ECH compressed
560
 * return 1 if this one is to be compressed, 0 if not, -1 for error
561
 */
562
int ossl_ech_2bcompressed(size_t ind)
563
0
{
564
0
    const size_t nexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
565
566
#ifdef DUPEMALL
567
    return 0;
568
#endif
569
0
    if (ind >= nexts)
570
0
        return -1;
571
0
    return ext_defs[ind].ech_handling == OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS;
572
0
}
573
574
/* as needed, repeat extension from inner in outer handling compression */
575
int ossl_ech_same_ext(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
576
0
{
577
0
    unsigned int type = 0;
578
0
    int tind = 0, nexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
579
580
#ifdef DUPEMALL
581
    return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_CONTINUE;
582
#endif
583
0
    if (s == NULL || s->ext.ech.es == NULL)
584
0
        return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_CONTINUE; /* nothing to do */
585
    /*
586
     * We store/access the index of the extension handler in
587
     * s->ext.ech.ext_ind, as we'd otherwise not know it here.
588
     * Be nice were there a better way to handle that.
589
     */
590
0
    tind = s->ext.ech.ext_ind;
591
    /* If this index'd extension won't be compressed, we're done */
592
0
    if (tind < 0 || tind >= nexts)
593
0
        return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
594
0
    type = ext_defs[tind].type;
595
0
    if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1) {
596
        /* inner CH - just note compression as configured */
597
0
        if (ext_defs[tind].ech_handling != OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_COMPRESS)
598
0
            return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_CONTINUE;
599
        /* mark this one to be "compressed" */
600
0
        if (s->ext.ech.n_outer_only >= OSSL_ECH_OUTERS_MAX)
601
0
            return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
602
0
        s->ext.ech.outer_only[s->ext.ech.n_outer_only] = type;
603
0
        s->ext.ech.n_outer_only++;
604
0
        OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
605
0
        {
606
0
            BIO_printf(trc_out, "ech_same_ext: Marking (type %u, ind %d "
607
0
                                "tot-comp %d) for compression\n",
608
0
                type, tind,
609
0
                (int)s->ext.ech.n_outer_only);
610
0
        }
611
0
        OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
612
0
        return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_CONTINUE;
613
0
    } else {
614
        /* Copy value from inner to outer, or indicate a new value needed */
615
0
        if (s->clienthello == NULL || pkt == NULL)
616
0
            return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
617
0
        if (ext_defs[tind].ech_handling == OSSL_ECH_HANDLING_CALL_BOTH)
618
0
            return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_CONTINUE;
619
0
        else
620
0
            return ossl_ech_copy_inner2outer(s, type, tind, pkt);
621
0
    }
622
    /* just in case - shouldn't happen */
623
0
    return OSSL_ECH_SAME_EXT_ERR;
624
0
}
625
#endif
626
627
/* Returns a TLSEXT_TYPE for the given index */
628
unsigned int ossl_get_extension_type(size_t idx)
629
0
{
630
0
    size_t num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
631
632
0
    if (idx >= num_exts)
633
0
        return TLSEXT_TYPE_out_of_range;
634
635
0
    return ext_defs[idx].type;
636
0
}
637
638
/* Check whether an extension's context matches the current context */
639
static int validate_context(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int extctx,
640
    unsigned int thisctx)
641
0
{
642
    /* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */
643
0
    if ((thisctx & extctx) == 0)
644
0
        return 0;
645
646
0
    if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
647
0
        if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0)
648
0
            return 0;
649
0
    } else if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) {
650
0
        return 0;
651
0
    }
652
653
0
    return 1;
654
0
}
655
656
int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int thisctx,
657
    RAW_EXTENSION *exts)
658
0
{
659
0
    size_t i, num_exts, builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs), offset;
660
0
    RAW_EXTENSION *thisext;
661
0
    unsigned int context;
662
0
    ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
663
664
0
    if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
665
0
        role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
666
0
    else if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
667
0
        role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
668
669
    /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
670
0
    num_exts = builtin_num + s->cert->custext.meths_count;
671
672
0
    for (thisext = exts, i = 0; i < num_exts; i++, thisext++) {
673
0
        if (!thisext->present)
674
0
            continue;
675
676
0
        if (i < builtin_num) {
677
0
            context = ext_defs[i].context;
678
0
        } else {
679
0
            custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
680
681
0
            meth = custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, thisext->type,
682
0
                &offset);
683
0
            if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL))
684
0
                return 0;
685
0
            context = meth->context;
686
0
        }
687
688
0
        if (!validate_context(s, context, thisctx))
689
0
            return 0;
690
0
    }
691
692
0
    return 1;
693
0
}
694
695
/*
696
 * Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current
697
 * |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to
698
 * indicate the extension is not allowed. If returning 1 then |*found| is set to
699
 * the definition for the extension we found.
700
 */
701
static int verify_extension(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
702
    unsigned int type, custom_ext_methods *meths,
703
    RAW_EXTENSION *rawexlist, RAW_EXTENSION **found)
704
0
{
705
0
    size_t i;
706
0
    size_t builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
707
0
    const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisext;
708
709
0
    for (i = 0, thisext = ext_defs; i < builtin_num; i++, thisext++) {
710
0
        if (type == thisext->type) {
711
0
            if (!validate_context(s, thisext->context, context))
712
0
                return 0;
713
714
0
            *found = &rawexlist[i];
715
0
            return 1;
716
0
        }
717
0
    }
718
719
    /* Check the custom extensions */
720
0
    if (meths != NULL) {
721
0
        size_t offset = 0;
722
0
        ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
723
0
        custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
724
725
0
        if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
726
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
727
0
            if (s->ext.ech.attempted == 1 && s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1)
728
0
                role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
729
0
            else
730
0
                role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
731
#else
732
            role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
733
#endif
734
0
        } else if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
735
0
            role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
736
737
0
        meth = custom_ext_find(meths, role, type, &offset);
738
0
        if (meth != NULL) {
739
0
            if (!validate_context(s, meth->context, context))
740
0
                return 0;
741
0
            *found = &rawexlist[offset + builtin_num];
742
0
            return 1;
743
0
        }
744
0
    }
745
746
    /* Unknown extension. We allow it */
747
0
    *found = NULL;
748
0
    return 1;
749
0
}
750
751
/*
752
 * Check whether the context defined for an extension |extctx| means whether
753
 * the extension is relevant for the current context |thisctx| or not. Returns
754
 * 1 if the extension is relevant for this context, and 0 otherwise
755
 */
756
int extension_is_relevant(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int extctx,
757
    unsigned int thisctx)
758
0
{
759
0
    int is_tls13;
760
761
    /*
762
     * For HRR we haven't selected the version yet but we know it will be
763
     * TLSv1.3
764
     */
765
0
    if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
766
0
        is_tls13 = 1;
767
0
    else
768
0
        is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
769
770
0
    if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
771
0
            && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
772
        /*
773
         * Note that SSL_IS_TLS13() means "TLS 1.3 has been negotiated",
774
         * which is never true when generating the ClientHello.
775
         * However, version negotiation *has* occurred by the time the
776
         * ClientHello extensions are being parsed.
777
         * Be careful to allow TLS 1.3-only extensions when generating
778
         * the ClientHello.
779
         */
780
0
        || (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
781
0
        || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
782
0
            && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
783
0
        || (s->server && !is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
784
0
        || (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0))
785
0
        return 0;
786
0
    return 1;
787
0
}
788
789
/*
790
 * Gather a list of all the extensions from the data in |packet]. |context|
791
 * tells us which message this extension is for. The raw extension data is
792
 * stored in |*res| on success. We don't actually process the content of the
793
 * extensions yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the
794
 * initialiser functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether
795
 * we have collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for
796
 * freeing the contents of |*res|.
797
 *
798
 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
799
 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
800
 * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
801
 * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
802
 * found, or an internal error occurred. We only check duplicates for
803
 * extensions that we know about. We ignore others.
804
 */
805
int tls_collect_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *packet,
806
    unsigned int context,
807
    RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init)
808
0
{
809
0
    PACKET extensions = *packet;
810
0
    size_t i = 0;
811
0
    size_t num_exts;
812
0
    custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext;
813
0
    RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
814
0
    const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
815
816
0
    *res = NULL;
817
818
    /*
819
     * Initialise server side custom extensions. Client side is done during
820
     * construction of extensions for the ClientHello.
821
     */
822
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
823
0
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 && s->ext.ech.attempted == 0)
824
0
        custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
825
#else
826
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
827
        custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
828
#endif
829
830
0
    num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0);
831
0
    raw_extensions = OPENSSL_calloc(num_exts, sizeof(*raw_extensions));
832
0
    if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
833
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
834
0
        return 0;
835
0
    }
836
837
0
    i = 0;
838
0
    while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
839
0
        unsigned int type, idx;
840
0
        PACKET extension;
841
0
        RAW_EXTENSION *thisex;
842
843
0
        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
844
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
845
0
            goto err;
846
0
        }
847
        /*
848
         * Verify this extension is allowed. We only check duplicates for
849
         * extensions that we recognise. We also have a special case for the
850
         * PSK extension, which must be the last one in the ClientHello.
851
         */
852
0
        if (!verify_extension(s, context, type, exts, raw_extensions, &thisex)
853
0
            || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)
854
0
            || (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
855
0
                && (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
856
0
                && PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) {
857
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
858
0
            goto err;
859
0
        }
860
0
        idx = (unsigned int)(thisex - raw_extensions);
861
        /*-
862
         * Check that we requested this extension (if appropriate). Requests can
863
         * be sent in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Unsolicited
864
         * extensions can be sent in the NewSessionTicket. We only do this for
865
         * the built-in extensions. Custom extensions have a different but
866
         * similar check elsewhere.
867
         * Special cases:
868
         * - The HRR cookie extension is unsolicited
869
         * - The renegotiate extension is unsolicited (the client signals
870
         *   support via an SCSV)
871
         * - The signed_certificate_timestamp extension can be provided by a
872
         * custom extension or by the built-in version. We let the extension
873
         * itself handle unsolicited response checks.
874
         */
875
0
        if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)
876
0
            && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) == 0
877
0
            && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
878
0
            && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
879
0
            && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
880
0
            && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0
881
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
882
0
            && !((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
883
0
                && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug)
884
0
#endif
885
0
        ) {
886
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
887
0
                SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
888
0
            goto err;
889
0
        }
890
0
        if (thisex != NULL) {
891
0
            thisex->data = extension;
892
0
            thisex->present = 1;
893
0
            thisex->type = type;
894
0
            thisex->received_order = i++;
895
0
            if (s->ext.debug_cb)
896
0
                s->ext.debug_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), !s->server,
897
0
                    thisex->type, PACKET_data(&thisex->data),
898
0
                    (int)PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data),
899
0
                    s->ext.debug_arg);
900
0
        }
901
0
    }
902
903
0
    if (init) {
904
        /*
905
         * Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context,
906
         * whether we have found them or not
907
         */
908
0
        for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
909
0
            i++, thisexd++) {
910
0
            if (thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
911
0
                && extension_is_relevant(s, thisexd->context, context)
912
0
                && !thisexd->init(s, context)) {
913
                /* SSLfatal() already called */
914
0
                goto err;
915
0
            }
916
0
        }
917
0
    }
918
919
0
    *res = raw_extensions;
920
0
    if (len != NULL)
921
0
        *len = num_exts;
922
0
    return 1;
923
924
0
err:
925
0
    OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
926
0
    return 0;
927
0
}
928
929
/*
930
 * Runs the parser for a given extension with index |idx|. |exts| contains the
931
 * list of all parsed extensions previously collected by
932
 * tls_collect_extensions(). The parser is only run if it is applicable for the
933
 * given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a
934
 * Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant
935
 * Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first
936
 * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If an extension is not
937
 * present this counted as success.
938
 */
939
int tls_parse_extension(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
940
    RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
941
0
{
942
0
    RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx];
943
0
    int (*parser)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
944
0
        size_t chainidx)
945
0
        = NULL;
946
947
    /* Skip if the extension is not present */
948
0
    if (!currext->present)
949
0
        return 1;
950
951
    /* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
952
0
    if (currext->parsed)
953
0
        return 1;
954
955
0
    currext->parsed = 1;
956
957
0
    if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)) {
958
        /* We are handling a built-in extension */
959
0
        const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *extdef = &ext_defs[idx];
960
961
        /* Check if extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
962
0
        if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extdef->context, context))
963
0
            return 1;
964
965
0
        parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc;
966
967
0
        if (parser != NULL)
968
0
            return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx);
969
970
        /*
971
         * If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension
972
         * processing
973
         */
974
0
    }
975
976
    /* Parse custom extensions */
977
0
    return custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type,
978
0
        PACKET_data(&currext->data),
979
0
        PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
980
0
        x, chainidx);
981
0
}
982
983
/*
984
 * Parse all remaining extensions that have not yet been parsed. Also calls the
985
 * finalisation for all extensions at the end if |fin| is nonzero, whether we
986
 * collected them or not. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are
987
 * working on a Certificate message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and
988
 * its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate.
989
 */
990
int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int context,
991
    RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
992
    size_t chainidx, int fin)
993
0
{
994
0
    size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
995
0
    const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
996
997
    /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
998
0
    numexts += s->cert->custext.meths_count;
999
1000
    /* Parse each extension in turn */
1001
0
    for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) {
1002
0
        if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) {
1003
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
1004
0
            return 0;
1005
0
        }
1006
0
    }
1007
1008
0
    if (fin) {
1009
        /*
1010
         * Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context,
1011
         * whether we have found them or not
1012
         */
1013
0
        for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
1014
0
            i++, thisexd++) {
1015
0
            if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
1016
0
                && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) {
1017
                /* SSLfatal() already called */
1018
0
                return 0;
1019
0
            }
1020
0
        }
1021
0
    }
1022
1023
0
    return 1;
1024
0
}
1025
1026
int should_add_extension(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int extctx,
1027
    unsigned int thisctx, int max_version)
1028
0
{
1029
    /* Skip if not relevant for our context */
1030
0
    if ((extctx & thisctx) == 0)
1031
0
        return 0;
1032
1033
    /* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
1034
0
    if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extctx, thisctx)
1035
0
        || ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
1036
0
            && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
1037
0
            && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)))
1038
0
        return 0;
1039
1040
0
    return 1;
1041
0
}
1042
1043
/*
1044
 * Construct all the extensions relevant to the current |context| and write
1045
 * them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate
1046
 * message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and
1047
 * |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with
1048
 * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On a
1049
 * failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct.
1050
 */
1051
int tls_construct_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1052
    unsigned int context,
1053
    X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1054
0
{
1055
0
    size_t i;
1056
0
    int min_version, max_version = 0, reason;
1057
0
    const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
1058
0
    int for_comp = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0;
1059
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1060
0
    int pass;
1061
0
#endif
1062
1063
0
    if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1064
        /*
1065
         * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
1066
         * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello
1067
         * (for non-TLSv1.3).
1068
         */
1069
0
        || ((context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
1070
0
            && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
1071
0
                WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) {
1072
0
        if (!for_comp)
1073
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074
0
        return 0;
1075
0
    }
1076
1077
0
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
1078
0
        reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
1079
0
        if (reason != 0) {
1080
0
            if (!for_comp)
1081
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
1082
0
            return 0;
1083
0
        }
1084
0
    }
1085
1086
    /* Add custom extensions first */
1087
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1088
0
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 && s->ext.ech.attempted == 0)
1089
        /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
1090
0
        custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
1091
#else
1092
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
1093
        /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
1094
        custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
1095
#endif
1096
0
    if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version)) {
1097
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1098
0
        return 0;
1099
0
    }
1100
1101
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1102
    /*
1103
     * Two passes if doing real ECH - we first construct the
1104
     * to-be-ECH-compressed extensions, and then go around again
1105
     * constructing those that aren't to be ECH-compressed. We
1106
     * need to ensure this ordering so that all the ECH-compressed
1107
     * extensions are contiguous in the encoding. The actual
1108
     * compression happens later in ech_encode_inner().
1109
     */
1110
0
    for (pass = 0; pass <= 1; pass++)
1111
0
#endif
1112
1113
0
        for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
1114
0
            i++, thisexd++) {
1115
0
            EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1116
0
                unsigned int context,
1117
0
                X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
1118
0
            EXT_RETURN ret;
1119
1120
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1121
            /* do compressed in pass 0, non-compressed in pass 1 */
1122
0
            if (ossl_ech_2bcompressed((int)i) == pass)
1123
0
                continue;
1124
            /* stash index - needed for COMPRESS ECH handling */
1125
0
            s->ext.ech.ext_ind = (int)i;
1126
0
#endif
1127
            /* Skip if not relevant for our context */
1128
0
            if (!should_add_extension(s, thisexd->context, context, max_version))
1129
0
                continue;
1130
1131
0
            construct = s->server ? thisexd->construct_stoc
1132
0
                                  : thisexd->construct_ctos;
1133
1134
0
            if (construct == NULL)
1135
0
                continue;
1136
1137
0
            ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx);
1138
0
            if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL) {
1139
                /* SSLfatal() already called */
1140
0
                return 0;
1141
0
            }
1142
0
            if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT
1143
0
                && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) != 0)
1144
0
                s->ext.extflags[i] |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT;
1145
0
        }
1146
1147
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1148
    /*
1149
     * don't close yet if client in the middle of doing ECH, we'll
1150
     * eventually close this in ech_aad_and_encrypt() after we add
1151
     * the real ECH extension value
1152
     */
1153
0
    if (s->server
1154
0
        || context != SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
1155
0
        || s->ext.ech.attempted == 0
1156
0
        || s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1
1157
0
        || s->ext.ech.grease == OSSL_ECH_IS_GREASE) {
1158
0
        if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1159
0
            if (!for_comp)
1160
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161
0
            return 0;
1162
0
        }
1163
0
    }
1164
#else
1165
    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166
        if (!for_comp)
1167
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1168
        return 0;
1169
    }
1170
#endif
1171
0
    return 1;
1172
0
}
1173
1174
/*
1175
 * Built in extension finalisation and initialisation functions. All initialise
1176
 * or finalise the associated extension type for the given |context|. For
1177
 * finalisers |sent| is set to 1 if we saw the extension during parsing, and 0
1178
 * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1179
 */
1180
1181
static int final_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1182
0
{
1183
0
    if (!s->server) {
1184
        /*
1185
         * Check if we can connect to a server that doesn't support safe
1186
         * renegotiation
1187
         */
1188
0
        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1189
0
            && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
1190
0
            && !sent) {
1191
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1192
0
                SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1193
0
            return 0;
1194
0
        }
1195
1196
0
        return 1;
1197
0
    }
1198
1199
    /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1200
0
    if (s->renegotiate
1201
0
        && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
1202
0
        && !sent) {
1203
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1204
0
            SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1205
0
        return 0;
1206
0
    }
1207
1208
0
    return 1;
1209
0
}
1210
1211
static ossl_inline void ssl_tsan_decr(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
1212
    TSAN_QUALIFIER int *stat)
1213
0
{
1214
0
    if (ssl_tsan_lock(ctx)) {
1215
0
        tsan_decr(stat);
1216
0
        ssl_tsan_unlock(ctx);
1217
0
    }
1218
0
}
1219
1220
static int init_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1221
0
{
1222
0
    if (s->server) {
1223
0
        s->servername_done = 0;
1224
1225
0
        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
1226
0
        s->ext.hostname = NULL;
1227
0
    }
1228
1229
0
    return 1;
1230
0
}
1231
1232
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1233
/*
1234
 * Just note that ech is not yet done
1235
 * return 1 for good, 0 otherwise
1236
 */
1237
static int init_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1238
0
{
1239
0
    const int nexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
1240
1241
    /* we don't need this assert everywhere - anywhere is fine */
1242
0
    if (!ossl_assert(TLSEXT_IDX_num_builtins == nexts)) {
1243
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244
0
        return 0;
1245
0
    }
1246
0
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
1247
0
        s->ext.ech.done = 0;
1248
0
    return 1;
1249
0
}
1250
1251
static int final_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1252
0
{
1253
0
    if (s->server && s->ext.ech.success == 1
1254
0
        && s->ext.ech.inner_ech_seen_ok != 1) {
1255
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_ECH_REQUIRED);
1256
0
        return 0;
1257
0
    }
1258
0
    return 1;
1259
0
}
1260
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECH */
1261
1262
static int final_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1263
0
{
1264
0
    int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1265
0
    int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1266
0
    SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1267
0
    SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1268
0
    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1269
0
    int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
1270
1271
0
    if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) {
1272
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273
0
        return 0;
1274
0
    }
1275
1276
0
    if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1277
0
        ret = sctx->ext.servername_cb(ussl, &altmp,
1278
0
            sctx->ext.servername_arg);
1279
0
    else if (s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1280
0
        ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(ussl, &altmp,
1281
0
            s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
1282
1283
    /*
1284
     * For servers, propagate the SNI hostname from the temporary
1285
     * storage in the SSL to the persistent SSL_SESSION, now that we
1286
     * know we accepted it.
1287
     * Clients make this copy when parsing the server's response to
1288
     * the extension, which is when they find out that the negotiation
1289
     * was successful.
1290
     */
1291
0
    if (s->server) {
1292
0
        if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && !s->hit) {
1293
            /* Only store the hostname in the session if we accepted it. */
1294
0
            OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
1295
0
            s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1296
0
            if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL && s->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1297
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298
0
            }
1299
0
        }
1300
0
    }
1301
1302
    /*
1303
     * If we switched contexts (whether here or in the client_hello callback),
1304
     * move the sess_accept increment from the session_ctx to the new
1305
     * context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good
1306
     * exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
1307
     */
1308
0
    if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && sctx != s->session_ctx
1309
0
        && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1310
0
        ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept);
1311
0
        ssl_tsan_decr(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
1312
0
    }
1313
1314
    /*
1315
     * If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled,
1316
     * and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket.
1317
     * Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID
1318
     */
1319
0
    if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected
1320
0
        && was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) {
1321
0
        s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1322
0
        if (!s->hit) {
1323
0
            SSL_SESSION *ss = SSL_get_session(ssl);
1324
1325
0
            if (ss != NULL) {
1326
0
                OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick);
1327
0
                ss->ext.tick = NULL;
1328
0
                ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
1329
0
                ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
1330
0
                ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
1331
0
                if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
1332
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333
0
                    return 0;
1334
0
                }
1335
0
            } else {
1336
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1337
0
                return 0;
1338
0
            }
1339
0
        }
1340
0
    }
1341
1342
0
    switch (ret) {
1343
0
    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1344
0
        SSLfatal(s, altmp, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1345
0
        return 0;
1346
1347
0
    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1348
        /* TLSv1.3 doesn't have warning alerts so we suppress this */
1349
0
        if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1350
0
            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
1351
0
        s->servername_done = 0;
1352
0
        return 1;
1353
1354
0
    case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1355
0
        s->servername_done = 0;
1356
0
        return 1;
1357
1358
0
    default:
1359
0
        return 1;
1360
0
    }
1361
0
}
1362
1363
static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
1364
    int sent)
1365
0
{
1366
0
    unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1367
1368
0
    if (s->server)
1369
0
        return 1;
1370
1371
0
    alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1372
0
    alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1373
1374
    /*
1375
     * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1376
     * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
1377
     * must contain uncompressed.
1378
     */
1379
0
    if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
1380
0
        && s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
1381
0
        && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL
1382
0
        && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0
1383
0
        && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1384
        /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1385
0
        size_t i;
1386
0
        unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats;
1387
1388
0
        for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
1389
0
            if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1390
0
                break;
1391
0
        }
1392
0
        if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) {
1393
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1394
0
                SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1395
0
            return 0;
1396
0
        }
1397
0
    }
1398
1399
0
    return 1;
1400
0
}
1401
1402
static int init_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1403
0
{
1404
0
    if (!s->server)
1405
0
        s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1406
1407
0
    return 1;
1408
0
}
1409
1410
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1411
static int init_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1412
0
{
1413
0
    if (s->server) {
1414
0
        s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
1415
0
    } else {
1416
        /*
1417
         * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
1418
         * that we don't receive a status message
1419
         */
1420
0
        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
1421
0
        s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
1422
0
        s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
1423
1424
0
        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
1425
0
        s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL;
1426
0
    }
1427
1428
0
    return 1;
1429
0
}
1430
#endif
1431
1432
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1433
static int init_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1434
0
{
1435
0
    s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
1436
1437
0
    return 1;
1438
0
}
1439
#endif
1440
1441
static int init_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1442
0
{
1443
0
    OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
1444
0
    s->s3.alpn_selected = NULL;
1445
0
    s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
1446
0
    if (s->server) {
1447
0
        OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
1448
0
        s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
1449
0
        s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1450
0
    }
1451
0
    return 1;
1452
0
}
1453
1454
static int final_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1455
0
{
1456
0
    if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)
1457
0
        s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1458
1459
0
    if (!s->server || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1460
0
        return 1;
1461
1462
    /*
1463
     * Call alpn_select callback if needed.  Has to be done after SNI and
1464
     * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
1465
     * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
1466
     * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
1467
     * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
1468
     *
1469
     * On failure SSLfatal() already called.
1470
     */
1471
0
    return tls_handle_alpn(s);
1472
0
}
1473
1474
static int init_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1475
0
{
1476
    /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1477
0
    OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1478
0
    s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1479
0
    s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen = 0;
1480
1481
0
    return 1;
1482
0
}
1483
1484
static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1485
    ossl_unused unsigned int context)
1486
0
{
1487
    /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1488
0
    OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs);
1489
0
    s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL;
1490
0
    s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen = 0;
1491
1492
0
    return 1;
1493
0
}
1494
1495
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1496
static int init_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1497
0
{
1498
0
    OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1499
0
    s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1500
1501
0
    return 1;
1502
0
}
1503
#endif
1504
1505
static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1506
0
{
1507
0
    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
1508
0
    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
1509
0
    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1510
1511
0
    return 1;
1512
0
}
1513
1514
static int init_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1515
0
{
1516
0
    s->ext.use_etm = 0;
1517
1518
0
    return 1;
1519
0
}
1520
1521
static int init_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1522
0
{
1523
0
    if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1524
0
        s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1525
0
        s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS;
1526
0
    }
1527
1528
0
    return 1;
1529
0
}
1530
1531
static int final_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1532
0
{
1533
    /*
1534
     * Check extended master secret extension is not dropped on
1535
     * renegotiation.
1536
     */
1537
0
    if (!(s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
1538
0
        && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS)) {
1539
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
1540
0
        return 0;
1541
0
    }
1542
0
    if (!s->server && s->hit) {
1543
        /*
1544
         * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
1545
         * original session.
1546
         */
1547
0
        if (!(s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
1548
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
1549
0
            return 0;
1550
0
        }
1551
0
    }
1552
1553
0
    return 1;
1554
0
}
1555
1556
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1557
0
{
1558
0
    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
1559
0
    s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL;
1560
0
    return 1;
1561
0
}
1562
1563
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1564
    WPACKET *pkt,
1565
    unsigned int context,
1566
    X509 *x,
1567
    size_t chainidx)
1568
0
{
1569
0
    const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = get_ca_names(s);
1570
1571
0
    if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
1572
0
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1573
1574
0
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities)
1575
0
        || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1576
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1577
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1578
0
    }
1579
1580
0
    if (!construct_ca_names(s, ca_sk, pkt)) {
1581
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1582
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1583
0
    }
1584
1585
0
    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1586
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587
0
        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1588
0
    }
1589
1590
0
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1591
0
}
1592
1593
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1594
    unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1595
    size_t chainidx)
1596
0
{
1597
0
    if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt))
1598
0
        return 0;
1599
0
    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1600
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1601
0
        return 0;
1602
0
    }
1603
0
    return 1;
1604
0
}
1605
1606
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1607
static int init_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1608
0
{
1609
0
    if (s->server)
1610
0
        s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1611
1612
0
    return 1;
1613
0
}
1614
#endif
1615
1616
static int final_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1617
0
{
1618
0
    if (!sent && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) {
1619
0
        SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
1620
0
            SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
1621
0
        return 0;
1622
0
    }
1623
1624
0
    return 1;
1625
0
}
1626
1627
static int final_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
1628
    int sent)
1629
0
{
1630
0
    if (!sent && context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
1631
0
        SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
1632
0
            SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXTENSION);
1633
0
        return 0;
1634
0
    }
1635
1636
0
    return 1;
1637
0
}
1638
1639
static int final_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1640
0
{
1641
0
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
1642
0
    if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1643
0
        return 1;
1644
1645
    /* Nothing to do for key_share in an HRR */
1646
0
    if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
1647
0
        return 1;
1648
1649
    /*
1650
     * If
1651
     *     we are a client
1652
     *     AND
1653
     *     we have no key_share
1654
     *     AND
1655
     *     (we are not resuming
1656
     *      OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes)
1657
     * THEN
1658
     *     fail;
1659
     */
1660
0
    if (!s->server
1661
0
        && !sent) {
1662
0
        if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
1663
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1664
0
            return 0;
1665
0
        }
1666
0
        if (!s->hit) {
1667
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1668
0
            return 0;
1669
0
        }
1670
0
    }
1671
    /*
1672
     * IF
1673
     *     we are a server
1674
     * THEN
1675
     *     IF
1676
     *         we have a suitable key_share
1677
     *     THEN
1678
     *         IF
1679
     *             we are stateless AND we have no cookie
1680
     *         THEN
1681
     *             send a HelloRetryRequest
1682
     *     ELSE
1683
     *         IF
1684
     *             we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
1685
     *             AND
1686
     *             the client sent a key_share extension
1687
     *             AND
1688
     *             (we are not resuming
1689
     *              OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
1690
     *             AND
1691
     *             a shared group exists
1692
     *         THEN
1693
     *             send a HelloRetryRequest
1694
     *         ELSE IF
1695
     *             we are not resuming
1696
     *             OR
1697
     *             the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
1698
     *         THEN
1699
     *             fail
1700
     *         ELSE IF
1701
     *             we are stateless AND we have no cookie
1702
     *         THEN
1703
     *             send a HelloRetryRequest
1704
     */
1705
0
    if (s->server) {
1706
0
        if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
1707
            /* We have a suitable key_share */
1708
0
            if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0
1709
0
                && !s->ext.cookieok) {
1710
0
                if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) {
1711
                    /*
1712
                     * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any
1713
                     * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other
1714
                     * than 0?
1715
                     */
1716
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1717
0
                    return 0;
1718
0
                }
1719
0
                s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1720
0
                return 1;
1721
0
            }
1722
0
        } else {
1723
            /* No suitable key_share */
1724
0
            if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent
1725
0
                && (!s->hit
1726
0
                    || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) != 0)) {
1727
1728
                /* Did we detect group overlap in tls_parse_ctos_key_share ? */
1729
0
                if (s->s3.group_id_candidate != 0) {
1730
                    /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
1731
0
                    s->s3.group_id = s->s3.group_id_candidate;
1732
0
                    s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1733
0
                    return 1;
1734
0
                }
1735
0
            }
1736
0
            if (!s->hit
1737
0
                || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
1738
                /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
1739
0
                SSLfatal(s, sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
1740
0
                    SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1741
0
                return 0;
1742
0
            }
1743
1744
0
            if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0
1745
0
                && !s->ext.cookieok) {
1746
0
                if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) {
1747
                    /*
1748
                     * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any
1749
                     * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other
1750
                     * than 0?
1751
                     */
1752
0
                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1753
0
                    return 0;
1754
0
                }
1755
0
                s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1756
0
                return 1;
1757
0
            }
1758
0
        }
1759
1760
        /*
1761
         * We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest
1762
         * messages
1763
         */
1764
0
        if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1765
0
            s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE;
1766
0
    } else {
1767
        /*
1768
         * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
1769
         * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
1770
         * processing).
1771
         */
1772
0
        if (!sent && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1773
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1774
0
            return 0;
1775
0
        }
1776
0
    }
1777
0
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3) */
1778
0
    return 1;
1779
0
}
1780
1781
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
1782
0
{
1783
0
    s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE;
1784
0
    return 1;
1785
0
}
1786
1787
int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
1788
    const unsigned char *msgstart,
1789
    size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
1790
    unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign,
1791
    int external)
1792
0
{
1793
0
    EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
1794
0
    EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
1795
0
    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1796
0
    unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1797
0
    unsigned char *early_secret;
1798
    /* ASCII: "res binder", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
1799
0
    static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x62\x69\x6E\x64\x65\x72";
1800
    /* ASCII: "ext binder", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
1801
0
    static const unsigned char external_label[] = "\x65\x78\x74\x20\x62\x69\x6E\x64\x65\x72";
1802
0
    const unsigned char *label;
1803
0
    size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize;
1804
0
    int hashsizei = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
1805
0
    int ret = -1;
1806
0
    int usepskfored = 0;
1807
0
    SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1808
0
    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
1809
1810
    /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
1811
0
    if (!ossl_assert(hashsizei > 0)) {
1812
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1813
0
        goto err;
1814
0
    }
1815
0
    hashsize = (size_t)hashsizei;
1816
1817
0
    if (external
1818
0
        && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
1819
0
        && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
1820
0
        && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0)
1821
0
        usepskfored = 1;
1822
1823
0
    if (external) {
1824
0
        label = external_label;
1825
0
        labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1;
1826
0
    } else {
1827
0
        label = resumption_label;
1828
0
        labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
1829
0
    }
1830
1831
    /*
1832
     * Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
1833
     * resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
1834
     * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK
1835
     * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early
1836
     * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we
1837
     * generate it but store it away for later use.
1838
     */
1839
0
    if (s->server || !external || usepskfored)
1840
0
        early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
1841
0
    else
1842
0
        early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
1843
1844
0
    if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
1845
0
            sess->master_key_length, early_secret)) {
1846
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1847
0
        goto err;
1848
0
    }
1849
1850
    /*
1851
     * Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are
1852
     * empty!
1853
     */
1854
0
    mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1855
0
    if (mctx == NULL
1856
0
        || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1857
0
        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
1858
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859
0
        goto err;
1860
0
    }
1861
1862
    /* Generate the binder key */
1863
0
    if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, label, labelsize, hash,
1864
0
            hashsize, binderkey, hashsize, 1)) {
1865
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1866
0
        goto err;
1867
0
    }
1868
1869
    /* Generate the finished key */
1870
0
    if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
1871
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
1872
0
        goto err;
1873
0
    }
1874
1875
0
    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
1876
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1877
0
        goto err;
1878
0
    }
1879
1880
    /*
1881
     * Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders. If we are
1882
     * following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first
1883
     * ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself.
1884
     */
1885
0
    if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1886
0
        size_t hdatalen;
1887
0
        long hdatalen_l;
1888
0
        void *hdata;
1889
1890
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1891
        /* handle the hashing as per ECH needs (on client) */
1892
0
        if (s->ext.ech.attempted == 1 && s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1) {
1893
0
            if (ossl_ech_intbuf_fetch(s, (unsigned char **)&hdata, &hdatalen) != 1) {
1894
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1895
0
                goto err;
1896
0
            }
1897
0
        } else {
1898
0
#endif
1899
0
            hdatalen = hdatalen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
1900
0
            if (hdatalen_l <= 0) {
1901
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
1902
0
                goto err;
1903
0
            }
1904
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
1905
0
        }
1906
0
#endif
1907
1908
        /*
1909
         * For servers the handshake buffer data will include the second
1910
         * ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off.
1911
         */
1912
0
        if (s->server) {
1913
0
            PACKET hashprefix, msg;
1914
1915
            /* Find how many bytes are left after the first two messages */
1916
0
            if (!PACKET_buf_init(&hashprefix, hdata, hdatalen)
1917
0
                || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
1918
0
                || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)
1919
0
                || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
1920
0
                || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) {
1921
0
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1922
0
                goto err;
1923
0
            }
1924
0
            hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix);
1925
0
        }
1926
1927
0
        if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
1928
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1929
0
            goto err;
1930
0
        }
1931
0
    }
1932
1933
0
    if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
1934
0
        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
1935
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1936
0
        goto err;
1937
0
    }
1938
1939
0
    mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(sctx->libctx, "HMAC",
1940
0
        sctx->propq, finishedkey,
1941
0
        hashsize);
1942
0
    if (mackey == NULL) {
1943
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1944
0
        goto err;
1945
0
    }
1946
1947
0
    if (!sign)
1948
0
        binderout = tmpbinder;
1949
1950
0
    if (sctx->propq != NULL)
1951
0
        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
1952
0
            (char *)sctx->propq, 0);
1953
0
    bindersize = hashsize;
1954
0
    if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md), sctx->libctx,
1955
0
            sctx->propq, mackey, params)
1956
0
            <= 0
1957
0
        || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
1958
0
        || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
1959
0
        || bindersize != hashsize) {
1960
0
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1961
0
        goto err;
1962
0
    }
1963
1964
0
    if (sign) {
1965
0
        ret = 1;
1966
0
    } else {
1967
        /* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
1968
0
        ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
1969
0
        if (!ret)
1970
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY);
1971
0
    }
1972
1973
0
err:
1974
0
    OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey));
1975
0
    OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey));
1976
0
    EVP_PKEY_free(mackey);
1977
0
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
1978
0
    return ret;
1979
0
}
1980
1981
static int final_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
1982
0
{
1983
0
    if (!sent)
1984
0
        return 1;
1985
1986
0
    if (!s->server) {
1987
0
        if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
1988
0
            && sent
1989
0
            && !s->ext.early_data_ok) {
1990
            /*
1991
             * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we
1992
             * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent
1993
             * ALPN)
1994
             */
1995
0
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA);
1996
0
            return 0;
1997
0
        }
1998
1999
0
        return 1;
2000
0
    }
2001
2002
0
    if (s->max_early_data == 0
2003
0
        || !s->hit
2004
0
        || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
2005
0
        || !s->ext.early_data_ok
2006
0
        || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
2007
0
        || (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL
2008
0
            && !s->allow_early_data_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
2009
0
                s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) {
2010
0
        s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
2011
0
    } else {
2012
0
        s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
2013
2014
0
        if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
2015
0
                SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
2016
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
2017
0
            return 0;
2018
0
        }
2019
0
    }
2020
2021
0
    return 1;
2022
0
}
2023
2024
static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context,
2025
    int sent)
2026
0
{
2027
0
    if (s->session == NULL)
2028
0
        return 1;
2029
2030
    /* MaxFragmentLength defaults to disabled */
2031
0
    if (s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_UNSPECIFIED)
2032
0
        s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED;
2033
2034
0
    if (USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) {
2035
0
        s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_max_frag_len(s->rlayer.rrl,
2036
0
            GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session));
2037
0
        s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_max_frag_len(s->rlayer.wrl,
2038
0
            ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s));
2039
0
    }
2040
2041
0
    return 1;
2042
0
}
2043
2044
static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2045
    ossl_unused unsigned int context)
2046
0
{
2047
0
    s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_NONE;
2048
2049
0
    return 1;
2050
0
}
2051
2052
/*
2053
 * If clients offer "pre_shared_key" without a "psk_key_exchange_modes"
2054
 * extension, servers MUST abort the handshake.
2055
 */
2056
static int final_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
2057
0
{
2058
0
    if (s->server && sent && s->clienthello != NULL
2059
0
        && !s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes].present) {
2060
0
        SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
2061
0
            SSL_R_MISSING_PSK_KEX_MODES_EXTENSION);
2062
0
        return 0;
2063
0
    }
2064
2065
0
    return 1;
2066
0
}
2067
2068
static int tls_init_compress_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned int context)
2069
0
{
2070
0
    memset(sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer, 0,
2071
0
        sizeof(sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer));
2072
0
    return 1;
2073
0
}
2074
2075
/* The order these are put into the packet imply a preference order: [brotli, zlib, zstd] */
2076
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_compress_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
2077
    unsigned int context,
2078
    X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2079
0
{
2080
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2081
    int i;
2082
2083
    if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(0))
2084
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2085
2086
    /* Server: Don't attempt to compress a non-X509 (i.e. an RPK) */
2087
    if (sc->server && sc->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
2088
        sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
2089
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2090
    }
2091
2092
    /* Client: If we sent a client cert-type extension, don't indicate compression */
2093
    if (!sc->server && sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos) {
2094
        sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
2095
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2096
    }
2097
2098
    /* Do not indicate we support receiving compressed certificates */
2099
    if ((sc->options & SSL_OP_NO_RX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
2100
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2101
2102
    if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] == TLSEXT_comp_cert_none)
2103
        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2104
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
2105
    ECH_SAME_EXT(sc, context, pkt);
2106
#endif
2107
2108
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_compress_certificate)
2109
        || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2110
        || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt))
2111
        goto err;
2112
2113
    for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) {
2114
        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, sc->cert_comp_prefs[i]))
2115
            goto err;
2116
    }
2117
    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
2118
        goto err;
2119
2120
    sc->ext.compress_certificate_sent = 1;
2121
    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
2122
err:
2123
    SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2124
    return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2125
#else
2126
0
    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2127
0
#endif
2128
0
}
2129
2130
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2131
static int tls_comp_in_pref(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, int alg)
2132
{
2133
    int i;
2134
2135
    /* ossl_comp_has_alg() considers 0 as "any" */
2136
    if (alg == 0)
2137
        return 0;
2138
    /* Make sure algorithm is enabled */
2139
    if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(alg))
2140
        return 0;
2141
    /* If no preferences are set, it's ok */
2142
    if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] == TLSEXT_comp_cert_none)
2143
        return 1;
2144
    /* Find the algorithm */
2145
    for (i = 0; i < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; i++)
2146
        if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == alg)
2147
            return 1;
2148
    return 0;
2149
}
2150
#endif
2151
2152
int tls_parse_compress_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
2153
    X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2154
0
{
2155
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2156
    PACKET supported_comp_algs;
2157
    unsigned int comp;
2158
    int already_set[TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit];
2159
    int j = 0;
2160
2161
    /* If no algorithms are available, ignore the extension */
2162
    if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(0))
2163
        return 1;
2164
2165
    /* Don't attempt to compress a non-X509 (i.e. an RPK) */
2166
    if (sc->server && sc->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509)
2167
        return 1;
2168
    if (!sc->server && sc->ext.client_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509)
2169
        return 1;
2170
2171
    /* Ignore the extension and don't send compressed certificates */
2172
    if ((sc->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
2173
        return 1;
2174
2175
    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &supported_comp_algs)
2176
        || PACKET_remaining(&supported_comp_algs) == 0) {
2177
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2178
        return 0;
2179
    }
2180
2181
    memset(already_set, 0, sizeof(already_set));
2182
    /*
2183
     * The preference array has real values, so take a look at each
2184
     * value coming in, and make sure it's in our preference list
2185
     * The array is 0 (i.e. "none") terminated
2186
     * The preference list only contains supported algorithms
2187
     */
2188
    while (PACKET_get_net_2(&supported_comp_algs, &comp)) {
2189
        if (tls_comp_in_pref(sc, comp) && !already_set[comp]) {
2190
            sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[j++] = comp;
2191
            already_set[comp] = 1;
2192
        }
2193
    }
2194
    if (PACKET_remaining(&supported_comp_algs) != 0) {
2195
        SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2196
        return 0;
2197
    }
2198
#endif
2199
0
    return 1;
2200
0
}
2201
2202
static int init_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned int context)
2203
0
{
2204
    /* Only reset when parsing client hello */
2205
0
    if (sc->server) {
2206
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2207
0
        sc->ext.server_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
2208
0
    }
2209
0
    return 1;
2210
0
}
2211
2212
static int init_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned int context)
2213
0
{
2214
    /* Only reset when parsing client hello */
2215
0
    if (sc->server) {
2216
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2217
0
        sc->ext.client_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
2218
0
    }
2219
0
    return 1;
2220
0
}