/src/openssl/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
Line | Count | Source |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2020-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
12 | | * internal use. |
13 | | */ |
14 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
15 | | #include "internal/nelem.h" |
16 | | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
17 | | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
20 | | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
21 | | #include <openssl/params.h> |
22 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
23 | | #include <openssl/proverr.h> |
24 | | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
25 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
26 | | #include "internal/fips.h" |
27 | | #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" |
28 | | #include "prov/providercommon.h" |
29 | | #include "prov/implementations.h" |
30 | | #include "prov/securitycheck.h" |
31 | | #include "providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.inc" |
32 | | |
33 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_newctx_fn rsakem_newctx; |
34 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_init_fn rsakem_encapsulate_init; |
35 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_fn rsakem_generate; |
36 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_init_fn rsakem_decapsulate_init; |
37 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_fn rsakem_recover; |
38 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_freectx_fn rsakem_freectx; |
39 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_dupctx_fn rsakem_dupctx; |
40 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_get_ctx_params_fn rsakem_get_ctx_params; |
41 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsakem_gettable_ctx_params; |
42 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_set_ctx_params_fn rsakem_set_ctx_params; |
43 | | static OSSL_FUNC_kem_settable_ctx_params_fn rsakem_settable_ctx_params; |
44 | | |
45 | | /* |
46 | | * Only the KEM for RSASVE as defined in SP800-56b r2 is implemented |
47 | | * currently. |
48 | | */ |
49 | | #define KEM_OP_UNDEFINED -1 |
50 | 0 | #define KEM_OP_RSASVE 0 |
51 | | |
52 | | /* |
53 | | * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. |
54 | | * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so |
55 | | * we use that here too. |
56 | | */ |
57 | | typedef struct { |
58 | | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx; |
59 | | RSA *rsa; |
60 | | int op; |
61 | | OSSL_FIPS_IND_DECLARE |
62 | | } PROV_RSA_CTX; |
63 | | |
64 | | static const OSSL_ITEM rsakem_opname_id_map[] = { |
65 | | { KEM_OP_RSASVE, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION_RSASVE }, |
66 | | }; |
67 | | |
68 | | static int name2id(const char *name, const OSSL_ITEM *map, size_t sz) |
69 | 0 | { |
70 | 0 | size_t i; |
71 | |
|
72 | 0 | if (name == NULL) |
73 | 0 | return -1; |
74 | | |
75 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sz; ++i) { |
76 | 0 | if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(map[i].ptr, name) == 0) |
77 | 0 | return map[i].id; |
78 | 0 | } |
79 | 0 | return -1; |
80 | 0 | } |
81 | | |
82 | | static int rsakem_opname2id(const char *name) |
83 | 0 | { |
84 | 0 | return name2id(name, rsakem_opname_id_map, OSSL_NELEM(rsakem_opname_id_map)); |
85 | 0 | } |
86 | | |
87 | | static void *rsakem_newctx(void *provctx) |
88 | 0 | { |
89 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx; |
90 | |
|
91 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
92 | 0 | return NULL; |
93 | | |
94 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
95 | | if (!ossl_deferred_self_test(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx), |
96 | | ST_ID_ASYM_CIPHER_RSA_ENC)) |
97 | | return NULL; |
98 | | #endif |
99 | | |
100 | 0 | prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX)); |
101 | 0 | if (prsactx == NULL) |
102 | 0 | return NULL; |
103 | 0 | prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx); |
104 | 0 | prsactx->op = KEM_OP_RSASVE; |
105 | 0 | OSSL_FIPS_IND_INIT(prsactx) |
106 | |
|
107 | 0 | return prsactx; |
108 | 0 | } |
109 | | |
110 | | static void rsakem_freectx(void *vprsactx) |
111 | 0 | { |
112 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
113 | |
|
114 | 0 | RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); |
115 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(prsactx); |
116 | 0 | } |
117 | | |
118 | | static void *rsakem_dupctx(void *vprsactx) |
119 | 0 | { |
120 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
121 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx; |
122 | |
|
123 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
124 | 0 | return NULL; |
125 | | |
126 | 0 | dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); |
127 | 0 | if (dstctx == NULL) |
128 | 0 | return NULL; |
129 | | |
130 | 0 | *dstctx = *srcctx; |
131 | 0 | if (dstctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(dstctx->rsa)) { |
132 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(dstctx); |
133 | 0 | return NULL; |
134 | 0 | } |
135 | 0 | return dstctx; |
136 | 0 | } |
137 | | |
138 | | static int rsakem_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, |
139 | | const OSSL_PARAM params[], int operation, |
140 | | const char *desc) |
141 | 0 | { |
142 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
143 | 0 | const BIGNUM *e = NULL; |
144 | 0 | int protect = 0; |
145 | |
|
146 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
147 | 0 | return 0; |
148 | | |
149 | 0 | if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL) |
150 | 0 | return 0; |
151 | | |
152 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_key_op_get_protect(vrsa, operation, &protect)) |
153 | 0 | return 0; |
154 | 0 | if (!RSA_up_ref(vrsa)) |
155 | 0 | return 0; |
156 | 0 | RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); |
157 | 0 | prsactx->rsa = vrsa; |
158 | | |
159 | | /* |
160 | | * Reject the trivial public exponent e <= 1. The FIPS module enforces the |
161 | | * full SP 800-56B §6.4.1.1 constraints via ossl_fips_ind_rsa_key_check() |
162 | | * below; non-FIPS callers wanting the complete §6.4.2 vetting can use |
163 | | * EVP_PKEY_public_check(). |
164 | | */ |
165 | 0 | RSA_get0_key(prsactx->rsa, NULL, &e, NULL); |
166 | 0 | if (e == NULL || BN_cmp(e, BN_value_one()) <= 0) { |
167 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY); |
168 | 0 | return 0; |
169 | 0 | } |
170 | | |
171 | 0 | OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_APPROVED(prsactx) |
172 | 0 | if (!rsakem_set_ctx_params(prsactx, params)) |
173 | 0 | return 0; |
174 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
175 | | if (!ossl_fips_ind_rsa_key_check(OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET(prsactx), |
176 | | OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, prsactx->libctx, |
177 | | prsactx->rsa, desc, protect)) |
178 | | return 0; |
179 | | #endif |
180 | 0 | return 1; |
181 | 0 | } |
182 | | |
183 | | static int rsakem_encapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, |
184 | | const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
185 | 0 | { |
186 | 0 | return rsakem_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE, |
187 | 0 | "RSA Encapsulate Init"); |
188 | 0 | } |
189 | | |
190 | | static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, |
191 | | const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
192 | 0 | { |
193 | 0 | return rsakem_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE, |
194 | 0 | "RSA Decapsulate Init"); |
195 | 0 | } |
196 | | |
197 | | static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) |
198 | 0 | { |
199 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
200 | 0 | struct rsakem_get_ctx_params_st p; |
201 | |
|
202 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL || !rsakem_get_ctx_params_decoder(params, &p)) |
203 | 0 | return 0; |
204 | | |
205 | 0 | if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_FROM_PARAM(ctx, p.ind)) |
206 | 0 | return 0; |
207 | 0 | return 1; |
208 | 0 | } |
209 | | |
210 | | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsakem_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx, |
211 | | ossl_unused void *provctx) |
212 | 0 | { |
213 | 0 | return rsakem_get_ctx_params_list; |
214 | 0 | } |
215 | | |
216 | | static int rsakem_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
217 | 0 | { |
218 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
219 | 0 | struct rsakem_set_ctx_params_st p; |
220 | 0 | int op; |
221 | |
|
222 | 0 | if (prsactx == NULL || !rsakem_set_ctx_params_decoder(params, &p)) |
223 | 0 | return 0; |
224 | | |
225 | 0 | if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_FROM_PARAM(prsactx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, |
226 | 0 | p.ind_k)) |
227 | 0 | return 0; |
228 | | |
229 | 0 | if (p.op != NULL) { |
230 | 0 | if (p.op->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
231 | 0 | return 0; |
232 | 0 | op = rsakem_opname2id(p.op->data); |
233 | 0 | if (op < 0) |
234 | 0 | return 0; |
235 | 0 | prsactx->op = op; |
236 | 0 | } |
237 | 0 | return 1; |
238 | 0 | } |
239 | | |
240 | | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsakem_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx, |
241 | | ossl_unused void *provctx) |
242 | 0 | { |
243 | 0 | return rsakem_set_ctx_params_list; |
244 | 0 | } |
245 | | |
246 | | /* |
247 | | * NIST.SP.800-56Br2 |
248 | | * 7.2.1.2 RSASVE Generate Operation (RSASVE.GENERATE). |
249 | | * |
250 | | * Generate a random in the range 1 < z < (n – 1) |
251 | | */ |
252 | | static int rsasve_gen_rand_bytes(RSA *rsa_pub, |
253 | | unsigned char *out, int outlen) |
254 | 0 | { |
255 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
256 | 0 | BN_CTX *bnctx; |
257 | 0 | BIGNUM *z, *nminus3; |
258 | |
|
259 | 0 | bnctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(rsa_pub)); |
260 | 0 | if (bnctx == NULL) |
261 | 0 | return 0; |
262 | | |
263 | | /* |
264 | | * Generate a random in the range 1 < z < (n – 1). |
265 | | * Since BN_priv_rand_range_ex() returns a value in range 0 <= r < max |
266 | | * We can achieve this by adding 2.. but then we need to subtract 3 from |
267 | | * the upper bound i.e: 2 + (0 <= r < (n - 3)) |
268 | | */ |
269 | 0 | BN_CTX_start(bnctx); |
270 | 0 | nminus3 = BN_CTX_get(bnctx); |
271 | 0 | z = BN_CTX_get(bnctx); |
272 | 0 | ret = (z != NULL |
273 | 0 | && (BN_copy(nminus3, RSA_get0_n(rsa_pub)) != NULL) |
274 | 0 | && BN_sub_word(nminus3, 3) |
275 | 0 | && BN_priv_rand_range_ex(z, nminus3, 0, bnctx) |
276 | 0 | && BN_add_word(z, 2) |
277 | 0 | && (BN_bn2binpad(z, out, outlen) == outlen)); |
278 | 0 | BN_CTX_end(bnctx); |
279 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(bnctx); |
280 | 0 | return ret; |
281 | 0 | } |
282 | | |
283 | | /* |
284 | | * NIST.SP.800-56Br2 |
285 | | * 7.2.1.2 RSASVE Generate Operation (RSASVE.GENERATE). |
286 | | */ |
287 | | static int rsasve_generate(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, |
288 | | unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, |
289 | | unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen) |
290 | 0 | { |
291 | 0 | int ret; |
292 | 0 | size_t nlen; |
293 | | |
294 | | /* Step (1): nlen = Ceil(len(n)/8) */ |
295 | 0 | nlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); |
296 | |
|
297 | 0 | if (out == NULL) { |
298 | 0 | if (nlen == 0) { |
299 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY); |
300 | 0 | return 0; |
301 | 0 | } |
302 | 0 | if (outlen == NULL && secretlen == NULL) |
303 | 0 | return 0; |
304 | 0 | if (outlen != NULL) |
305 | 0 | *outlen = nlen; |
306 | 0 | if (secretlen != NULL) |
307 | 0 | *secretlen = nlen; |
308 | 0 | return 1; |
309 | 0 | } |
310 | | |
311 | | /* |
312 | | * If outlen is specified, then it must report the length |
313 | | * of the out buffer on input so that we can confirm |
314 | | * its size is sufficient for encapsulation |
315 | | */ |
316 | 0 | if (outlen != NULL && *outlen < nlen) { |
317 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH); |
318 | 0 | return 0; |
319 | 0 | } |
320 | | |
321 | | /* |
322 | | * Step (2): Generate a random byte string z of nlen bytes where |
323 | | * 1 < z < n - 1 |
324 | | */ |
325 | 0 | if (!rsasve_gen_rand_bytes(prsactx->rsa, secret, (int)nlen)) |
326 | 0 | return 0; |
327 | | |
328 | | /* Step(3): out = RSAEP((n,e), z) */ |
329 | 0 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt((int)nlen, secret, out, prsactx->rsa, |
330 | 0 | RSA_NO_PADDING); |
331 | 0 | if (ret <= 0 || ret != (int)nlen) { |
332 | 0 | OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, nlen); |
333 | 0 | return 0; |
334 | 0 | } |
335 | | |
336 | 0 | if (outlen != NULL) |
337 | 0 | *outlen = nlen; |
338 | 0 | if (secretlen != NULL) |
339 | 0 | *secretlen = nlen; |
340 | |
|
341 | 0 | return 1; |
342 | 0 | } |
343 | | |
344 | | /** |
345 | | * rsasve_recover - Recovers a secret value from ciphertext using an RSA |
346 | | * private key. Once, recovered, the secret value is considered to be a |
347 | | * shared secret. Algorithm is performed as per |
348 | | * NIST SP 800-56B Rev 2 |
349 | | * 7.2.1.3 RSASVE Recovery Operation (RSASVE.RECOVER). |
350 | | * |
351 | | * This function performs RSA decryption using the private key from the |
352 | | * provided RSA context (`prsactx`). It takes the input ciphertext, decrypts |
353 | | * it, and writes the decrypted message to the output buffer. |
354 | | * |
355 | | * @prsactx: The RSA context containing the private key. |
356 | | * @out: The output buffer to store the decrypted message. |
357 | | * @outlen: On input, the size of the output buffer. On successful |
358 | | * completion, the actual length of the decrypted message. |
359 | | * @in: The input buffer containing the ciphertext to be decrypted. |
360 | | * @inlen: The length of the input ciphertext in bytes. |
361 | | * |
362 | | * Returns 1 on success, or 0 on error. In case of error, appropriate |
363 | | * error messages are raised using the ERR_raise function. |
364 | | */ |
365 | | static int rsasve_recover(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, |
366 | | unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, |
367 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) |
368 | 0 | { |
369 | 0 | size_t nlen; |
370 | 0 | int ret; |
371 | | |
372 | | /* Step (1): get the byte length of n */ |
373 | 0 | nlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); |
374 | |
|
375 | 0 | if (out == NULL) { |
376 | 0 | if (nlen == 0) { |
377 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY); |
378 | 0 | return 0; |
379 | 0 | } |
380 | 0 | *outlen = nlen; |
381 | 0 | return 1; |
382 | 0 | } |
383 | | |
384 | | /* |
385 | | * Step (2): check the input ciphertext 'inlen' matches the nlen |
386 | | * and that outlen is at least nlen bytes |
387 | | */ |
388 | 0 | if (inlen != nlen) { |
389 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
390 | 0 | return 0; |
391 | 0 | } |
392 | | |
393 | | /* |
394 | | * If outlen is specified, then it must report the length |
395 | | * of the out buffer, so that we can confirm that it is of |
396 | | * sufficient size to hold the output of decapsulation |
397 | | */ |
398 | 0 | if (outlen != NULL && *outlen < nlen) { |
399 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH); |
400 | 0 | return 0; |
401 | 0 | } |
402 | | |
403 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
404 | | /* |
405 | | * Reject clearly degenerate ciphertexts, c in {0, 1, n-1}. |
406 | | * |
407 | | * SP 800-56B Rev 2, 7.1.2.1 requires RSADP to enforce 1 < c < n-1. In a |
408 | | * FIPS build that bound is applied by the RSADP primitive itself (see |
409 | | * crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c, guarded by FIPS_MODULE), where it is also needed |
410 | | * for KTS-OAEP; the primitive does not apply it in a non-FIPS build, so |
411 | | * enforce it here for RSASVE. Raise the same errors as the primitive so |
412 | | * the behaviour matches in both builds; keep the two sites in step. |
413 | | */ |
414 | 0 | { |
415 | 0 | const BIGNUM *n = RSA_get0_n(prsactx->rsa); |
416 | 0 | BIGNUM *c = BN_new(); |
417 | 0 | BIGNUM *nminus1 = BN_new(); |
418 | 0 | int reason = 0; |
419 | |
|
420 | 0 | if (n == NULL || c == NULL || nminus1 == NULL |
421 | 0 | || BN_bin2bn(in, (int)inlen, c) == NULL |
422 | 0 | || BN_copy(nminus1, n) == NULL |
423 | 0 | || !BN_sub_word(nminus1, 1)) { |
424 | 0 | BN_free(c); |
425 | 0 | BN_free(nminus1); |
426 | 0 | return 0; |
427 | 0 | } |
428 | 0 | if (BN_ucmp(c, BN_value_one()) <= 0) |
429 | 0 | reason = RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL; |
430 | 0 | else if (BN_ucmp(c, nminus1) >= 0) |
431 | 0 | reason = RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS; |
432 | 0 | BN_free(c); |
433 | 0 | BN_free(nminus1); |
434 | 0 | if (reason != 0) { |
435 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, reason); |
436 | 0 | return 0; |
437 | 0 | } |
438 | 0 | } |
439 | 0 | #endif |
440 | | |
441 | | /* Step (3): out = RSADP((n,d), in) */ |
442 | 0 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt((int)inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
443 | 0 | if (ret > 0 && outlen != NULL) |
444 | 0 | *outlen = ret; |
445 | 0 | return ret > 0; |
446 | 0 | } |
447 | | |
448 | | static int rsakem_generate(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, |
449 | | unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen) |
450 | 0 | { |
451 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
452 | |
|
453 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
454 | 0 | return 0; |
455 | | |
456 | 0 | switch (prsactx->op) { |
457 | 0 | case KEM_OP_RSASVE: |
458 | 0 | return rsasve_generate(prsactx, out, outlen, secret, secretlen); |
459 | 0 | default: |
460 | 0 | return -2; |
461 | 0 | } |
462 | 0 | } |
463 | | |
464 | | static int rsakem_recover(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, |
465 | | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) |
466 | 0 | { |
467 | 0 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
468 | |
|
469 | 0 | if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
470 | 0 | return 0; |
471 | | |
472 | 0 | switch (prsactx->op) { |
473 | 0 | case KEM_OP_RSASVE: |
474 | 0 | return rsasve_recover(prsactx, out, outlen, in, inlen); |
475 | 0 | default: |
476 | 0 | return -2; |
477 | 0 | } |
478 | 0 | } |
479 | | |
480 | | const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_asym_kem_functions[] = { |
481 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsakem_newctx }, |
482 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE_INIT, |
483 | | (void (*)(void))rsakem_encapsulate_init }, |
484 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE, (void (*)(void))rsakem_generate }, |
485 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE_INIT, |
486 | | (void (*)(void))rsakem_decapsulate_init }, |
487 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE, (void (*)(void))rsakem_recover }, |
488 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsakem_freectx }, |
489 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsakem_dupctx }, |
490 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_GET_CTX_PARAMS, |
491 | | (void (*)(void))rsakem_get_ctx_params }, |
492 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, |
493 | | (void (*)(void))rsakem_gettable_ctx_params }, |
494 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_SET_CTX_PARAMS, |
495 | | (void (*)(void))rsakem_set_ctx_params }, |
496 | | { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, |
497 | | (void (*)(void))rsakem_settable_ctx_params }, |
498 | | OSSL_DISPATCH_END |
499 | | }; |