/src/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
Line | Count | Source |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2020-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
12 | | * internal use. |
13 | | */ |
14 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
15 | | |
16 | | #include <string.h> |
17 | | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
18 | | #include <openssl/params.h> |
19 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
20 | | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
21 | | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
22 | | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
23 | | #include "crypto/asn1.h" |
24 | | #endif |
25 | | #include "internal/sizes.h" |
26 | | #include "internal/param_build_set.h" |
27 | | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
28 | | #include "crypto/rsa_params.h" |
29 | | #include "rsa_local.h" |
30 | | |
31 | | /* |
32 | | * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend functions |
33 | | * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD) and provider implementations |
34 | | * alike. |
35 | | */ |
36 | | |
37 | | DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) |
38 | | |
39 | | static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers, |
40 | | OSSL_PARAM *const params[], size_t num_params) |
41 | 0 | { |
42 | 0 | size_t i; |
43 | |
|
44 | 0 | if (numbers == NULL) |
45 | 0 | return 0; |
46 | | |
47 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < num_params; i++) { |
48 | 0 | if (params[i] != NULL) { |
49 | 0 | BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; |
50 | |
|
51 | 0 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(params[i], &tmp)) |
52 | 0 | return 0; |
53 | 0 | if (sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) { |
54 | 0 | BN_clear_free(tmp); |
55 | 0 | return 0; |
56 | 0 | } |
57 | 0 | } |
58 | 0 | } |
59 | | |
60 | 0 | return 1; |
61 | 0 | } |
62 | | |
63 | | int ossl_rsa_fromdata_parsed(RSA *rsa, const RSA_PARAMS *p, |
64 | | int include_private) |
65 | 0 | { |
66 | 0 | BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL; |
67 | 0 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL; |
68 | 0 | int is_private = 0; |
69 | 0 | int derive_from_pq = 0; |
70 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
71 | |
|
72 | 0 | if (rsa == NULL || p == NULL) |
73 | 0 | return 0; |
74 | | |
75 | 0 | if ((p->n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p->n, &n)) |
76 | 0 | || (p->e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p->e, &e))) { |
77 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
78 | 0 | goto err; |
79 | 0 | } |
80 | | |
81 | 0 | if (include_private) { |
82 | 0 | if ((p->derive != NULL) |
83 | 0 | && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p->derive, &derive_from_pq)) |
84 | 0 | goto err; |
85 | | |
86 | 0 | if (p->d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p->d, &d)) { |
87 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
88 | 0 | goto err; |
89 | 0 | } |
90 | | |
91 | 0 | if (derive_from_pq) { |
92 | 0 | ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx); |
93 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
94 | 0 | goto err; |
95 | | |
96 | | /* we need at minimum p, q */ |
97 | 0 | if (p->mp.factors[0] == NULL || p->mp.factors[1] == NULL) { |
98 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
99 | 0 | goto err; |
100 | 0 | } |
101 | 0 | } |
102 | 0 | } |
103 | | |
104 | 0 | is_private = (d != NULL); |
105 | |
|
106 | 0 | if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)) |
107 | 0 | goto err; |
108 | 0 | n = e = d = NULL; |
109 | |
|
110 | 0 | if (is_private) { |
111 | 0 | if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), p->mp.factors, |
112 | 0 | OSSL_NELEM(p->mp.factors)) |
113 | 0 | || !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), p->mp.exps, |
114 | 0 | OSSL_NELEM(p->mp.exps)) |
115 | 0 | || !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), p->mp.coeffs, |
116 | 0 | OSSL_NELEM(p->mp.coeffs))) |
117 | 0 | goto err; |
118 | | |
119 | 0 | if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0 |
120 | 0 | && sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) { |
121 | | /* |
122 | | * If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we |
123 | | * need to have at least 2 factors |
124 | | */ |
125 | 0 | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) { |
126 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
127 | 0 | goto err; |
128 | 0 | } |
129 | | |
130 | | /* |
131 | | * if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have |
132 | | * been provided |
133 | | */ |
134 | 0 | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2 |
135 | 0 | && (p->n == NULL || p->d == NULL)) { |
136 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
137 | 0 | goto err; |
138 | 0 | } |
139 | | |
140 | | /* build our exponents and coefficients here */ |
141 | 0 | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) { |
142 | | /* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */ |
143 | 0 | if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0), |
144 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) { |
145 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
146 | 0 | goto err; |
147 | 0 | } |
148 | | /* |
149 | | * once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack |
150 | | * so we don't free them below |
151 | | */ |
152 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors); |
153 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors); |
154 | | |
155 | | /* |
156 | | * Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no |
157 | | * additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and |
158 | | * since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip |
159 | | * the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params |
160 | | */ |
161 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa, |
162 | 0 | RSA_bits(rsa), |
163 | 0 | NULL, ctx)) { |
164 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
165 | 0 | goto err; |
166 | 0 | } |
167 | 0 | } else { |
168 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
169 | | /* |
170 | | * in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here |
171 | | * for each additional prime |
172 | | */ |
173 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) { |
174 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
175 | 0 | goto err; |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | | |
178 | | /* |
179 | | * Now we should have all our factors, exponents and |
180 | | * coefficients |
181 | | */ |
182 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) { |
183 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
184 | 0 | goto err; |
185 | 0 | } |
186 | |
|
187 | | #else |
188 | | /* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */ |
189 | | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED); |
190 | | goto err; |
191 | | #endif |
192 | 0 | } |
193 | |
|
194 | 0 | } else { |
195 | | /* |
196 | | * It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d |
197 | | * but only if we're not using derive_from_pq |
198 | | */ |
199 | 0 | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 |
200 | 0 | && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) |
201 | 0 | goto err; |
202 | 0 | } |
203 | | /* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */ |
204 | 0 | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 |
205 | 0 | || sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0 |
206 | 0 | || sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) { |
207 | 0 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
208 | 0 | "There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n", |
209 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps), |
210 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs)); |
211 | 0 | goto err; |
212 | 0 | } |
213 | 0 | } |
214 | | |
215 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_check_factors(rsa)) { |
216 | 0 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR, |
217 | 0 | "RSA factors/exponents are too big for n-modulus\n"); |
218 | 0 | goto err; |
219 | 0 | } |
220 | | |
221 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_free(factors); |
222 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_free(exps); |
223 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs); |
224 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
225 | 0 | return 1; |
226 | | |
227 | 0 | err: |
228 | 0 | BN_free(n); |
229 | 0 | BN_free(e); |
230 | 0 | BN_free(d); |
231 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free); |
232 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free); |
233 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free); |
234 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
235 | 0 | return 0; |
236 | 0 | } |
237 | | |
238 | | int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], |
239 | | int include_private) |
240 | 0 | { |
241 | 0 | RSA_PARAMS p; |
242 | |
|
243 | 0 | if (!rsa_key_fromdata_decoder(params, &p)) |
244 | 0 | return 0; |
245 | 0 | return ossl_rsa_fromdata_parsed(rsa, &p, include_private); |
246 | 0 | } |
247 | | |
248 | | DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) |
249 | | |
250 | | static int rsa_set_multi_key_bn(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, |
251 | | OSSL_PARAM *const params[], size_t num_params, const char *names[], |
252 | | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *numbers) |
253 | 0 | { |
254 | 0 | int i, num_numbers = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(numbers); |
255 | |
|
256 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < num_numbers && (size_t)i < num_params |
257 | 0 | && names[i] != NULL; |
258 | 0 | i++) { |
259 | 0 | const BIGNUM *bn = sk_BIGNUM_const_value(numbers, i); |
260 | 0 | OSSL_PARAM *p = bld == NULL ? params[i] : NULL; |
261 | |
|
262 | 0 | if (bn != NULL && !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, p, names[i], bn)) |
263 | 0 | return 0; |
264 | 0 | } |
265 | 0 | return 1; |
266 | 0 | } |
267 | | |
268 | | int ossl_rsa_todata_parsed(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, |
269 | | const RSA_PARAMS *p, int include_private) |
270 | 0 | { |
271 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
272 | 0 | const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; |
273 | 0 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
274 | 0 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
275 | 0 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
276 | |
|
277 | 0 | if (rsa == NULL || (bld == NULL && p == NULL) |
278 | 0 | || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) |
279 | 0 | goto err; |
280 | | |
281 | 0 | RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); |
282 | 0 | ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs); |
283 | |
|
284 | 0 | if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, p == NULL ? NULL : p->n, |
285 | 0 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n) |
286 | 0 | || !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, p == NULL ? NULL : p->e, |
287 | 0 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e)) |
288 | 0 | goto err; |
289 | | |
290 | | /* Check private key data integrity */ |
291 | 0 | if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) { |
292 | |
|
293 | 0 | if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, p == NULL ? NULL : p->d, |
294 | 0 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, |
295 | 0 | rsa_d) |
296 | 0 | || !rsa_set_multi_key_bn(bld, |
297 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->mp.factors, |
298 | 0 | OSSL_RSA_PARAM_MAX_PRIMES, ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names, factors) |
299 | 0 | || !rsa_set_multi_key_bn(bld, |
300 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->mp.exps, |
301 | 0 | OSSL_RSA_PARAM_MAX_PRIMES, ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps) |
302 | 0 | || !rsa_set_multi_key_bn(bld, |
303 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->mp.coeffs, |
304 | 0 | OSSL_RSA_PARAM_MAX_PRIMES - 1, |
305 | 0 | ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names, coeffs)) |
306 | 0 | goto err; |
307 | 0 | } |
308 | | |
309 | | #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) |
310 | | /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */ |
311 | | if (bld == NULL) |
312 | | ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params_parsed(rsa, p); |
313 | | #endif |
314 | 0 | ret = 1; |
315 | 0 | err: |
316 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors); |
317 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps); |
318 | 0 | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs); |
319 | 0 | return ret; |
320 | 0 | } |
321 | | |
322 | | int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[], |
323 | | int include_private) |
324 | 0 | { |
325 | 0 | RSA_PARAMS p; |
326 | |
|
327 | 0 | if (params != NULL) { |
328 | 0 | if (!rsa_key_todata_decoder(params, &p)) |
329 | 0 | return 0; |
330 | 0 | return ossl_rsa_todata_parsed(rsa, bld, &p, include_private); |
331 | 0 | } |
332 | 0 | return ossl_rsa_todata_parsed(rsa, bld, NULL, include_private); |
333 | 0 | } |
334 | | |
335 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata_parsed(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, |
336 | | OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, const RSA_PARAMS *p) |
337 | 0 | { |
338 | 0 | if (bld == NULL && p == NULL) |
339 | 0 | return 0; |
340 | | |
341 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { |
342 | 0 | int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); |
343 | 0 | int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss); |
344 | 0 | int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); |
345 | 0 | int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); |
346 | 0 | int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL); |
347 | 0 | int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
348 | 0 | int default_maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL); |
349 | 0 | const char *mdname = (hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid |
350 | 0 | ? NULL |
351 | 0 | : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid)); |
352 | 0 | const char *mgfname = (maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid |
353 | 0 | ? NULL |
354 | 0 | : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid)); |
355 | 0 | const char *mgf1mdname = (maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid |
356 | 0 | ? NULL |
357 | 0 | : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid)); |
358 | 0 | const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST; |
359 | 0 | const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC; |
360 | 0 | const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST; |
361 | 0 | const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN; |
362 | | |
363 | | /* |
364 | | * To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient, |
365 | | * we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even |
366 | | * if it has a default value; saltlen. |
367 | | */ |
368 | 0 | if ((mdname != NULL |
369 | 0 | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, |
370 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->digest, key_md, mdname)) |
371 | 0 | || (mgfname != NULL |
372 | 0 | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, |
373 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->maskgenfunc, key_mgf, mgfname)) |
374 | 0 | || (mgf1mdname != NULL |
375 | 0 | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, |
376 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->mgf1_digest, |
377 | 0 | key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname)) |
378 | 0 | || (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, |
379 | 0 | p == NULL ? NULL : p->pss_saltlen, |
380 | 0 | key_saltlen, saltlen))) |
381 | 0 | return 0; |
382 | 0 | } |
383 | 0 | return 1; |
384 | 0 | } |
385 | | |
386 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, |
387 | | OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
388 | 0 | { |
389 | 0 | RSA_PARAMS p; |
390 | |
|
391 | 0 | if (params != NULL) { |
392 | 0 | if (!rsa_pss_todata_decoder(params, &p)) |
393 | 0 | return 0; |
394 | 0 | return ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata_parsed(pss, bld, &p); |
395 | 0 | } |
396 | 0 | return ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata_parsed(pss, bld, NULL); |
397 | 0 | } |
398 | | |
399 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata_parsed(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params, |
400 | | int *defaults_set, const RSA_PARAMS *p, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
401 | 0 | { |
402 | 0 | const char *propq = NULL; |
403 | 0 | EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
404 | 0 | int saltlen; |
405 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
406 | |
|
407 | 0 | if (pss_params == NULL || defaults_set == NULL || p == NULL) |
408 | 0 | return 0; |
409 | | |
410 | 0 | if (p->digest_props != NULL) { |
411 | 0 | if (p->digest_props->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
412 | 0 | propq = p->digest_props->data; |
413 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(p->digest_props, &propq)) |
414 | 0 | return 0; |
415 | 0 | } |
416 | | /* |
417 | | * If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some |
418 | | * restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each |
419 | | * parameter override their specific restriction data. |
420 | | */ |
421 | 0 | if (!*defaults_set |
422 | 0 | && (p->digest != NULL || p->maskgenfunc != NULL || p->mgf1_digest != NULL |
423 | 0 | || p->pss_saltlen != NULL)) { |
424 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params)) |
425 | 0 | return 0; |
426 | 0 | *defaults_set = 1; |
427 | 0 | } |
428 | | |
429 | 0 | if (p->maskgenfunc != NULL) { |
430 | 0 | int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
431 | 0 | const char *mgfname = NULL; |
432 | |
|
433 | 0 | if (p->maskgenfunc->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
434 | 0 | mgfname = p->maskgenfunc->data; |
435 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(p->maskgenfunc, &mgfname)) |
436 | 0 | return 0; |
437 | | |
438 | 0 | if (mgfname == NULL |
439 | 0 | || OPENSSL_strcasecmp(mgfname, |
440 | 0 | ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) |
441 | 0 | != 0) |
442 | 0 | return 0; |
443 | 0 | } |
444 | | |
445 | | /* |
446 | | * We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the |
447 | | * exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below. |
448 | | */ |
449 | | |
450 | 0 | if (p->digest != NULL) { |
451 | 0 | const char *mdname = NULL; |
452 | |
|
453 | 0 | if (p->digest->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
454 | 0 | mdname = p->digest->data; |
455 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(p->digest, &mdname)) |
456 | 0 | goto err; |
457 | | |
458 | 0 | if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL |
459 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params, |
460 | 0 | ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md))) |
461 | 0 | goto err; |
462 | 0 | } |
463 | | |
464 | 0 | if (p->mgf1_digest != NULL) { |
465 | 0 | const char *mgf1mdname = NULL; |
466 | |
|
467 | 0 | if (p->mgf1_digest->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
468 | 0 | mgf1mdname = p->mgf1_digest->data; |
469 | 0 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(p->mgf1_digest, &mgf1mdname)) |
470 | 0 | goto err; |
471 | | |
472 | 0 | if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL |
473 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg( |
474 | 0 | pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md))) |
475 | 0 | goto err; |
476 | 0 | } |
477 | | |
478 | 0 | if (p->pss_saltlen != NULL) { |
479 | 0 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p->pss_saltlen, &saltlen) |
480 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen)) |
481 | 0 | goto err; |
482 | 0 | } |
483 | | |
484 | 0 | ret = 1; |
485 | |
|
486 | 0 | err: |
487 | 0 | EVP_MD_free(md); |
488 | 0 | EVP_MD_free(mgf1md); |
489 | 0 | return ret; |
490 | 0 | } |
491 | | |
492 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params, |
493 | | int *defaults_set, const OSSL_PARAM params[], OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
494 | 0 | { |
495 | 0 | RSA_PARAMS p; |
496 | |
|
497 | 0 | if (!rsa_pss_fromdata_decoder(params, &p)) |
498 | 0 | return 0; |
499 | 0 | return ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata_parsed(pss_params, defaults_set, |
500 | 0 | &p, libctx); |
501 | 0 | } |
502 | | |
503 | | int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa) |
504 | 0 | { |
505 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
506 | 0 | if (RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) |
507 | 0 | return 1; |
508 | 0 | #endif |
509 | 0 | return 0; |
510 | 0 | } |
511 | | |
512 | | static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f) |
513 | 0 | { |
514 | 0 | if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL) |
515 | 0 | return 0; |
516 | 0 | return 1; |
517 | 0 | } |
518 | | |
519 | | RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection) |
520 | 0 | { |
521 | 0 | RSA *dupkey = NULL; |
522 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
523 | 0 | int pnum, i; |
524 | 0 | #endif |
525 | | |
526 | | /* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */ |
527 | 0 | if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa)) |
528 | 0 | return NULL; |
529 | | |
530 | 0 | if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL) |
531 | 0 | return NULL; |
532 | | |
533 | | /* public key */ |
534 | 0 | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) { |
535 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n)) |
536 | 0 | goto err; |
537 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e)) |
538 | 0 | goto err; |
539 | 0 | } |
540 | | |
541 | 0 | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) { |
542 | | |
543 | | /* private key */ |
544 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d)) |
545 | 0 | goto err; |
546 | | |
547 | | /* factors and crt params */ |
548 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p)) |
549 | 0 | goto err; |
550 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q)) |
551 | 0 | goto err; |
552 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1)) |
553 | 0 | goto err; |
554 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1)) |
555 | 0 | goto err; |
556 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp)) |
557 | 0 | goto err; |
558 | 0 | } |
559 | | |
560 | 0 | dupkey->version = rsa->version; |
561 | 0 | dupkey->flags = rsa->flags; |
562 | | /* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */ |
563 | 0 | dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params; |
564 | |
|
565 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
566 | | /* multiprime */ |
567 | 0 | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0 |
568 | 0 | && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) { |
569 | 0 | dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
570 | 0 | if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL) |
571 | 0 | goto err; |
572 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
573 | 0 | const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; |
574 | 0 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL; |
575 | |
|
576 | 0 | if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL) |
577 | 0 | goto err; |
578 | | /* push first so cleanup in error case works */ |
579 | 0 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo); |
580 | |
|
581 | 0 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i); |
582 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r)) |
583 | 0 | goto err; |
584 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d)) |
585 | 0 | goto err; |
586 | 0 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t)) |
587 | 0 | goto err; |
588 | 0 | } |
589 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey)) |
590 | 0 | goto err; |
591 | 0 | } |
592 | | |
593 | 0 | if (rsa->pss != NULL) { |
594 | 0 | if ((dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss)) == NULL) |
595 | 0 | goto err; |
596 | 0 | if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL |
597 | 0 | && dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) { |
598 | 0 | dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm); |
599 | 0 | if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL) |
600 | 0 | goto err; |
601 | 0 | } |
602 | 0 | } |
603 | 0 | if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, |
604 | 0 | &dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data)) |
605 | 0 | goto err; |
606 | 0 | #endif |
607 | | |
608 | 0 | return dupkey; |
609 | | |
610 | 0 | err: |
611 | 0 | RSA_free(dupkey); |
612 | 0 | return NULL; |
613 | 0 | } |
614 | | |
615 | | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
616 | | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg) |
617 | 0 | { |
618 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; |
619 | |
|
620 | 0 | pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), |
621 | 0 | alg->parameter); |
622 | |
|
623 | 0 | if (pss == NULL) |
624 | 0 | return NULL; |
625 | | |
626 | 0 | if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) { |
627 | 0 | pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); |
628 | 0 | if (pss->maskHash == NULL) { |
629 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); |
630 | 0 | return NULL; |
631 | 0 | } |
632 | 0 | } |
633 | | |
634 | 0 | return pss; |
635 | 0 | } |
636 | | |
637 | | static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa) |
638 | 0 | { |
639 | 0 | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL; |
640 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL; |
641 | |
|
642 | 0 | if (rsa != NULL |
643 | 0 | && (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL |
644 | 0 | && (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) { |
645 | 0 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
646 | 0 | int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField; |
647 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
648 | | |
649 | | /* |
650 | | * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just |
651 | | * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible |
652 | | * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test |
653 | | * a bad situation. |
654 | | * |
655 | | * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will |
656 | | * be checked, eventually. |
657 | | */ |
658 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md, |
659 | 0 | &saltlen, &trailerField)) |
660 | 0 | return 0; |
661 | 0 | md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); |
662 | 0 | mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md); |
663 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params) |
664 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid) |
665 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, |
666 | 0 | mgf1md_nid) |
667 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen) |
668 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params, |
669 | 0 | trailerField)) |
670 | 0 | return 0; |
671 | 0 | *pss = pss_params; |
672 | 0 | } |
673 | 0 | return 1; |
674 | 0 | } |
675 | | |
676 | | int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, |
677 | | const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, |
678 | | int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField) |
679 | 0 | { |
680 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
681 | | |
682 | | /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */ |
683 | 0 | (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params); |
684 | |
|
685 | 0 | if (pss == NULL) |
686 | 0 | return 0; |
687 | 0 | *pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); |
688 | 0 | if (*pmd == NULL) |
689 | 0 | return 0; |
690 | 0 | *pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash); |
691 | 0 | if (*pmgf1md == NULL) |
692 | 0 | return 0; |
693 | 0 | if (pss->saltLength) |
694 | 0 | *psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); |
695 | 0 | else |
696 | 0 | *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params); |
697 | 0 | if (pss->trailerField) |
698 | 0 | *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField); |
699 | 0 | else |
700 | 0 | *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params); |
701 | |
|
702 | 0 | return 1; |
703 | 0 | } |
704 | | |
705 | | int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg) |
706 | 0 | { |
707 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; |
708 | 0 | const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; |
709 | 0 | const void *algp; |
710 | 0 | int algptype; |
711 | |
|
712 | 0 | X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg); |
713 | 0 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
714 | 0 | return 1; |
715 | 0 | if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) |
716 | 0 | return 1; |
717 | 0 | if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { |
718 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); |
719 | 0 | return 0; |
720 | 0 | } |
721 | 0 | if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL |
722 | 0 | || !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) { |
723 | 0 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); |
724 | 0 | return 0; |
725 | 0 | } |
726 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa)) |
727 | 0 | return 0; |
728 | 0 | return 1; |
729 | 0 | } |
730 | | |
731 | | RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, |
732 | | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) |
733 | 0 | { |
734 | 0 | const unsigned char *p; |
735 | 0 | RSA *rsa; |
736 | 0 | int pklen; |
737 | 0 | const X509_ALGOR *alg; |
738 | |
|
739 | 0 | if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf)) |
740 | 0 | return 0; |
741 | 0 | rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen); |
742 | 0 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
743 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
744 | 0 | return NULL; |
745 | 0 | } |
746 | 0 | if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { |
747 | 0 | RSA_free(rsa); |
748 | 0 | return NULL; |
749 | 0 | } |
750 | | |
751 | 0 | RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK); |
752 | 0 | switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) { |
753 | 0 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
754 | 0 | RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA); |
755 | 0 | break; |
756 | 0 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS: |
757 | 0 | RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS); |
758 | 0 | break; |
759 | 0 | default: |
760 | | /* Leave the type bits zero */ |
761 | 0 | break; |
762 | 0 | } |
763 | | |
764 | 0 | return rsa; |
765 | 0 | } |
766 | | #endif |