/src/unbound/validator/validator.c

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/*
 * validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module
 *
 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
 *
 * This software is open source.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 
 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 
 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 
 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 * specific prior written permission.
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

/**
 * \file
 *
 * This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries.
 * According to RFC 4034.
 */
#include "config.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include "validator/validator.h"
#include "validator/val_anchor.h"
#include "validator/val_kcache.h"
#include "validator/val_kentry.h"
#include "validator/val_utils.h"
#include "validator/val_nsec.h"
#include "validator/val_nsec3.h"
#include "validator/val_neg.h"
#include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
#include "validator/autotrust.h"
#include "services/cache/dns.h"
#include "services/cache/rrset.h"
#include "util/data/dname.h"
#include "util/module.h"
#include "util/log.h"
#include "util/net_help.h"
#include "util/regional.h"
#include "util/config_file.h"
#include "util/fptr_wlist.h"
#include "sldns/rrdef.h"
#include "sldns/wire2str.h"
#include "sldns/str2wire.h"

/** Max number of RRSIGs to validate at once, suspend query for later. */
#define MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE 8
/** Max number of validation suspends allowed, error out otherwise. */
#define MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS 16

/* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */
static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, 
  struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, 
  struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin, int* suspend,
  struct module_qstate* sub_qstate);


/* Updates the supplied EDE (RFC8914) code selectively so we don't lose
 * a more specific code */
static void
update_reason_bogus(struct reply_info* rep, sldns_ede_code reason_bogus)
{
  if(reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_NONE) return;
  if(reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS
    && rep->reason_bogus != LDNS_EDE_NONE
    && rep->reason_bogus != LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS) return;
  rep->reason_bogus = reason_bogus;
}


/** fill up nsec3 key iterations config entry */
static int
fill_nsec3_iter(size_t** keysize, size_t** maxiter, char* s, int c)
{
  char* e;
  int i;
  *keysize = (size_t*)calloc((size_t)c, sizeof(size_t));
  *maxiter = (size_t*)calloc((size_t)c, sizeof(size_t));
  if(!*keysize || !*maxiter) {
    free(*keysize);
    *keysize = NULL;
    free(*maxiter);
    *maxiter = NULL;
    log_err("out of memory");
    return 0;
  }
  for(i=0; i<c; i++) {
    (*keysize)[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10);
    if(s == e) {
      log_err("cannot parse: %s", s);
      free(*keysize);
      *keysize = NULL;
      free(*maxiter);
      *maxiter = NULL;
      return 0;
    }
    s = e;
    (*maxiter)[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10);
    if(s == e) {
      log_err("cannot parse: %s", s);
      free(*keysize);
      *keysize = NULL;
      free(*maxiter);
      *maxiter = NULL;
      return 0;
    }
    s = e;
    if(i>0 && (*keysize)[i-1] >= (*keysize)[i]) {
      log_err("nsec3 key iterations not ascending: %d %d",
        (int)(*keysize)[i-1], (int)(*keysize)[i]);
      free(*keysize);
      *keysize = NULL;
      free(*maxiter);
      *maxiter = NULL;
      return 0;
    }
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator nsec3cfg keysz %d mxiter %d",
      (int)(*keysize)[i], (int)(*maxiter)[i]);
  }
  return 1;
}

int
val_env_parse_key_iter(char* val_nsec3_key_iterations, size_t** keysize,
  size_t** maxiter, int* keyiter_count)
{
  int c;
  c = cfg_count_numbers(val_nsec3_key_iterations);
  if(c < 1 || (c&1)) {
    log_err("validator: unparsable or odd nsec3 key "
      "iterations: %s", val_nsec3_key_iterations);
    return 0;
  }
  *keyiter_count = c/2;
  if(!fill_nsec3_iter(keysize, maxiter, val_nsec3_key_iterations, c/2)) {
    log_err("validator: cannot apply nsec3 key iterations");
    return 0;
  }
  return 1;
}

void
val_env_apply_cfg(struct val_env* val_env, struct config_file* cfg,
  size_t* keysize, size_t* maxiter, int keyiter_count)
{
  free(val_env->nsec3_keysize);
  free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter);
  val_env->nsec3_keysize = keysize;
  val_env->nsec3_maxiter = maxiter;
  val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count = keyiter_count;
  val_env->bogus_ttl = (uint32_t)cfg->bogus_ttl;
  val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override;
  val_env->skew_min = cfg->val_sig_skew_min;
  val_env->skew_max = cfg->val_sig_skew_max;
  val_env->max_restart = cfg->val_max_restart;
}

/** apply config settings to validator */
static int
val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env, 
  struct config_file* cfg)
{
  size_t* keysize=NULL, *maxiter=NULL;
  int keyiter_count = 0;
  if(!env->anchors)
    env->anchors = anchors_create();
  if(!env->anchors) {
    log_err("out of memory");
    return 0;
  }
  if (env->key_cache)
    val_env->kcache = env->key_cache;
  if(!val_env->kcache)
    val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg);
  if(!val_env->kcache) {
    log_err("out of memory");
    return 0;
  }
  env->key_cache = val_env->kcache;
  if(!anchors_apply_cfg(env->anchors, cfg)) {
    log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config");
    return 0;
  }
  if(!val_env_parse_key_iter(cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations,
    &keysize, &maxiter, &keyiter_count)) {
    return 0;
  }
  val_env_apply_cfg(val_env, cfg, keysize, maxiter, keyiter_count);
  if (env->neg_cache)
    val_env->neg_cache = env->neg_cache;
  if(!val_env->neg_cache)
    val_env->neg_cache = val_neg_create(cfg,
      val_env->nsec3_maxiter[val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count-1]);
  if(!val_env->neg_cache) {
    log_err("out of memory");
    return 0;
  }
  env->neg_cache = val_env->neg_cache;
  return 1;
}

#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND
void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void);
#endif
int
val_init(struct module_env* env, int id)
{
  struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1,
    sizeof(struct val_env));
  if(!val_env) {
    log_err("malloc failure");
    return 0;
  }
  env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env;
  env->need_to_validate = 1;
  lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock);
  lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus,
    sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus));
#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND
  ecdsa_evp_workaround_init();
#endif
  if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) {
    log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings.");
    return 0;
  }
  if(env->cfg->disable_edns_do) {
    struct trust_anchor* anchor = anchors_find_any_noninsecure(
      env->anchors);
    if(anchor) {
      char b[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN];
      dname_str(anchor->name, b);
      log_warn("validator: disable-edns-do is enabled, but there is a trust anchor for '%s'. Since DNSSEC could not work, the disable-edns-do setting is turned off. Continuing without it.", b);
      lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
      env->cfg->disable_edns_do = 0;
    }
  }

  return 1;
}

void
val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id)
{
  struct val_env* val_env;
  if(!env || !env->modinfo[id])
    return;
  val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id];
  lock_basic_destroy(&val_env->bogus_lock);
  anchors_delete(env->anchors);
  env->anchors = NULL;
  key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache);
  env->key_cache = NULL;
  neg_cache_delete(val_env->neg_cache);
  env->neg_cache = NULL;
  free(val_env->nsec3_keysize);
  free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter);
  free(val_env);
  env->modinfo[id] = NULL;
}

/** fill in message structure */
static struct val_qstate*
val_new_getmsg(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq)
{
  if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
    /* create a message to verify */
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation");
    vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)regional_alloc(qstate->region,
      sizeof(struct dns_msg));
    if(!vq->orig_msg)
      return NULL;
    vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo;
    vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)regional_alloc(
      qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info));
    if(!vq->orig_msg->rep)
      return NULL;
    memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info));
    vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf)
      |BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD));
    vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1;
    vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NONE;
  } else {
    vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg;
  }
  vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo;
  /* chase reply will be an edited (sub)set of the orig msg rrset ptrs */
  vq->chase_reply = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, 
    vq->orig_msg->rep, 
    sizeof(struct reply_info) - sizeof(struct rrset_ref));
  if(!vq->chase_reply)
    return NULL;
  if(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > RR_COUNT_MAX)
    return NULL; /* protect against integer overflow */
  /* Over allocate (+an_numrrsets) in case we need to put extra DNAME
   * records for unsigned CNAME repetitions */
  vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc(qstate->region,
    sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) *
    (vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count
    + vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets));
  if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets)
    return NULL;
  memmove(vq->chase_reply->rrsets, vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets,
    sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) *
    vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count);
  vq->rrset_skip = 0;
  return vq;
}

/** allocate new validator query state */
static struct val_qstate*
val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
  struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)regional_alloc(
    qstate->region, sizeof(*vq));
  log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]);
  if(!vq)
    return NULL;
  memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
  qstate->minfo[id] = vq;
  vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
  return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq);
}

/** reset validator query state for query restart */
static void
val_restart(struct val_qstate* vq)
{
  struct comm_timer* temp_timer;
  int restart_count;
  if(!vq) return;
  temp_timer = vq->suspend_timer;
  restart_count = vq->restart_count+1;
  memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
  vq->suspend_timer = temp_timer;
  vq->restart_count = restart_count;
  vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
}

/**
 * Exit validation with an error status
 * 
 * @param qstate: query state
 * @param id: validator id.
 * @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing.
 */
static int
val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
  qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
  qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL;
  return 0;
}

/** 
 * Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation
 * process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was
 * on in the original request, or the response is a kind of message that 
 * is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL, REFUSED, etc.)
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param ret_rc: rcode for this message (if noerror - examine ret_msg).
 * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL; look at rcode instead.
 * @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not
 *         mean we can actually validate this response).
 */
static int
needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, int ret_rc, 
  struct dns_msg* ret_msg)
{
  int rcode;

  /* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then you could think
   * that we don't bother to validate anything.
   * But this is signalled internally with the valrec flag.
   * User queries are validated with BIT_CD to make our cache clean
   * so that bogus messages get retried by the upstream also for
   * downstream validators that set BIT_CD.
   * For DNS64 bit_cd signals no dns64 processing, but we want to
   * provide validation there too */
  /*
  if((qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD)) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit");
    return 0;
  }
  */
  if(qstate->is_valrec) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response, is valrec"
      "(validation recursion lookup)");
    return 0;
  }

  if(ret_rc != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR || !ret_msg)
    rcode = ret_rc;
  else  rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(ret_msg->rep->flags);

  if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) {
    if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
      char rc[16];
      rc[0]=0;
      (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc));
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s", rc);
    }
    return 0;
  }

  /* cannot validate positive RRSIG response. (negatives can) */
  if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG &&
    rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && ret_msg &&
    ret_msg->rep->an_numrrsets > 0) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate RRSIG, no sigs on sigs.");
    return 0;
  }
  return 1;
}

/**
 * Check to see if the response has already been validated.
 * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL
 * @return true if the response has already been validated
 */
static int
already_validated(struct dns_msg* ret_msg)
{
  /* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */
  if (ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus)
  {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated: %s",
      sec_status_to_string(ret_msg->rep->security));
    return 1;
  }
  return 0;
}

/**
 * Generate a request for DNS data.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state that is the parent.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param name: what name to query for.
 * @param namelen: length of name.
 * @param qtype: query type.
 * @param qclass: query class.
 * @param flags: additional flags, such as the CD bit (BIT_CD), or 0.
 * @param newq: If the subquery is newly created, it is returned,
 *  otherwise NULL is returned
 * @param detached: true if this qstate should not attach to the subquery
 * @return false on alloc failure.
 */
static int
generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name, 
  size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass, uint16_t flags, 
  struct module_qstate** newq, int detached)
{
  struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
  struct query_info ask;
  int valrec;
  ask.qname = name;
  ask.qname_len = namelen;
  ask.qtype = qtype;
  ask.qclass = qclass;
  ask.local_alias = NULL;
  log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask);
  /* enable valrec flag to avoid recursion to the same validation
   * routine, this lookup is simply a lookup. */
  valrec = 1;

  fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_detect_cycle(qstate->env->detect_cycle));
  if((*qstate->env->detect_cycle)(qstate, &ask,
    (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec)) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not generate request: cycle detected");
    return 0;
  }

  if(detached) {
    struct mesh_state* sub = NULL;
    fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_add_sub(
      qstate->env->add_sub));
    if(!(*qstate->env->add_sub)(qstate, &ask, 
      (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq, &sub)){
      log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory");
      return 0;
    }
  }
  else {
    fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub(
      qstate->env->attach_sub));
    if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask, 
      (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq)){
      log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory");
      return 0;
    }
  }
  /* newq; validator does not need state created for that
   * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */
  if(*newq) {
    /* add our blacklist to the query blacklist */
    sock_list_merge(&(*newq)->blacklist, (*newq)->region,
      vq->chain_blacklist);
  }
  qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery;
  return 1;
}

/**
 * Generate, send and detach key tag signaling query.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param ta: trust anchor, locked.
 * @return false on a processing error.
 */
static int
generate_keytag_query(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
  struct trust_anchor* ta)
{
  /* 3 bytes for "_ta", 5 bytes per tag (4 bytes + "-") */
#define MAX_LABEL_TAGS (LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN-3)/5
  size_t i, numtag;
  uint16_t tags[MAX_LABEL_TAGS];
  char tagstr[LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN+1] = "_ta"; /* +1 for NULL byte */
  size_t tagstr_left = sizeof(tagstr) - strlen(tagstr);
  char* tagstr_pos = tagstr + strlen(tagstr);
  uint8_t dnamebuf[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+1]; /* +1 for label length byte */
  size_t dnamebuf_len = sizeof(dnamebuf);
  uint8_t* keytagdname;
  struct module_qstate* newq = NULL;
  enum module_ext_state ext_state = qstate->ext_state[id];

  numtag = anchor_list_keytags(ta, tags, MAX_LABEL_TAGS);
  if(numtag == 0)
    return 0;

  for(i=0; i<numtag; i++) {
    /* Buffer can't overflow; numtag is limited to tags that fit in
     * the buffer. */
    snprintf(tagstr_pos, tagstr_left, "-%04x", (unsigned)tags[i]);
    tagstr_left -= strlen(tagstr_pos);
    tagstr_pos += strlen(tagstr_pos);
  }

  sldns_str2wire_dname_buf_origin(tagstr, dnamebuf, &dnamebuf_len,
    ta->name, ta->namelen);
  if(!(keytagdname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
    dnamebuf, dnamebuf_len))) {
    log_err("could not generate key tag query: out of memory");
    return 0;
  }

  log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "generate keytag query", keytagdname,
    LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass);
  if(!generate_request(qstate, id, keytagdname, dnamebuf_len,
    LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass, 0, &newq, 1)) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "failed to generate key tag signaling request");
    return 0;
  }

  /* Not interested in subquery response. Restore the ext_state,
   * that might be changed by generate_request() */
  qstate->ext_state[id] = ext_state;

  return 1;
}

/**
 * Get keytag as uint16_t from string
 *
 * @param start: start of string containing keytag
 * @param keytag: pointer where to store the extracted keytag
 * @return: 1 if keytag was extracted, else 0.
 */
static int
sentinel_get_keytag(char* start, uint16_t* keytag) {
  char* keytag_str;
  char* e = NULL;
  keytag_str = calloc(1, SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN + 1 /* null byte */);
  if(!keytag_str)
    return 0;
  memmove(keytag_str, start, SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN);
  keytag_str[SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN] = '\0';
  *keytag = (uint16_t)strtol(keytag_str, &e, 10);
  if(!e || *e != '\0') {
    free(keytag_str);
    return 0;
  }
  free(keytag_str);
  return 1;
}

/**
 * Prime trust anchor for use.
 * Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor.
 * The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param toprime: what to prime.
 * @return false on a processing error.
 */
static int
prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime)
{
  struct module_qstate* newq = NULL;
  int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen,
    LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0);

  if(newq && qstate->env->cfg->trust_anchor_signaling &&
    !generate_keytag_query(qstate, id, toprime)) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "keytag signaling query failed");
    return 0;
  }

  if(!ret) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not prime trust anchor");
    return 0;
  }
  /* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that
   * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */
  vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing 
    from the validator inform_super() routine */
  /* store trust anchor name for later lookup when prime returns */
  vq->trust_anchor_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
    toprime->name, toprime->namelen);
  vq->trust_anchor_len = toprime->namelen;
  vq->trust_anchor_labs = toprime->namelabs;
  if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) {
    log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory");
    return 0;
  }
  return 1;
}

/**
 * Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets.
 * They must be validly signed with the given key.
 * Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them.
 * Allows unsigned CNAME after a DNAME that expands the DNAME.
 * 
 * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
 * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
 * completed.
 * 
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to validate.
 * @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 * @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message 
 *  fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus.
 */
static int
validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry,
  int* suspend)
{
  uint8_t* sname;
  size_t i, slen;
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
  enum sec_status sec;
  int num_verifies = 0, verified, have_state = 0;
  char reasonbuf[256];
  char* reason = NULL;
  sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
  *suspend = 0;
  if(vq->msg_signatures_state) {
    /* Pick up the state, and reset it, may not be needed now. */
    vq->msg_signatures_state = 0;
    have_state = 1;
  }

  /* validate the ANSWER section */
  for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
    if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
      continue;
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
    /* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
     * Because of the normalization routines in the iterator, 
     * there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME 
     * (unless qtype=DNAME in the answer part). */
    if(i>0 && ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->rk.type) ==
      LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME &&
      ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
      ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure &&
      dname_strict_subdomain_c(s->rk.dname, chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->rk.dname)
      ) {
      /* CNAME was synthesized by our own iterator */
      /* since the DNAME verified, mark the CNAME as secure */
      ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->security =
        sec_status_secure;
      ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->trust =
        rrset_trust_validated;
      continue;
    }

    /* Verify the answer rrset */
    sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
      &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified,
      reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));
    /* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this 
     * message is BAD. */
    if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
      log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response "
        "has failed ANSWER rrset:", s->rk.dname,
        ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
        errinf(qstate, "for CNAME");
      else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
        errinf(qstate, "for DNAME");
      errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus);

      return 0;
    }

    num_verifies += verified;
    if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
      i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional?
      chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets:
      chase_reply->rrset_count)) {
      /* If the number of RRSIGs exceeds the maximum in
       * one go, suspend. Only suspend if there is a next
       * rrset to verify, i+1<loopmax. Store where to
       * continue later. */
      *suspend = 1;
      vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
      vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
        "suspended");
      return 0;
    }
  }

  /* validate the AUTHORITY section */
  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
    chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
      continue;
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
    sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
      &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate,
      &verified, reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));
    /* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, 
     * we have a bad message. */
    if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
      log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response "
        "has failed AUTHORITY rrset:", s->rk.dname,
        ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
      errinf_rrset(qstate, s);
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus);
      return 0;
    }
    num_verifies += verified;
    if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
      i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional?
      chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets:
      chase_reply->rrset_count)) {
      *suspend = 1;
      vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
      vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
        "suspended");
      return 0;
    }
  }

  /* If set, the validator should clean the additional section of
   * secure messages. */
  if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional)
    return 1;
  /* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */
  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; 
    i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) {
    if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
      continue;
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
    /* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */
    /* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */
    val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen);

    verified = 0;
    if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0)
      (void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry,
        &reason, NULL, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate,
        &verified, reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));
    /* the additional section can fail to be secure, 
     * it is optional, check signature in case we need
     * to clean the additional section later. */
    num_verifies += verified;
    if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
      i+1 < chase_reply->rrset_count) {
      *suspend = 1;
      vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
      vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
        "suspended");
      return 0;
    }
  }

  return 1;
}

void
validate_suspend_timer_cb(void* arg)
{
  struct module_qstate* qstate = (struct module_qstate*)arg;
  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer, continue");
  mesh_run(qstate->env->mesh, qstate->mesh_info, module_event_pass,
    NULL);
}

/** Setup timer to continue validation of msg signatures later */
static int
validate_suspend_setup_timer(struct module_qstate* qstate,
  struct val_qstate* vq, int id, enum val_state resume_state)
{
  struct timeval tv;
  int usec, slack, base;
  if(vq->suspend_count >= MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer: "
      "reached MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS (%d); error out",
      MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS);
    errinf(qstate, "max validation suspends reached, "
      "too many RRSIG validations");
    return 0;
  }
  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer, set for suspend");
  vq->state = resume_state;
  qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_reply;
  if(!vq->suspend_timer) {
    vq->suspend_timer = comm_timer_create(
      qstate->env->worker_base,
      validate_suspend_timer_cb, qstate);
    if(!vq->suspend_timer) {
      log_err("validate_suspend_setup_timer: "
        "out of memory for comm_timer_create");
      return 0;
    }
  }
  /* The timer is activated later, after other events in the event
   * loop have been processed. The query state can also be deleted,
   * when the list is full and query states are dropped. */
  /* Extend wait time if there are a lot of queries or if this one
   * is taking long, to keep around cpu time for ordinary queries. */
  usec = 50000; /* 50 msec */
  slack = 0;
  if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states)
    slack += 3;
  else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/2)
    slack += 2;
  else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/4)
    slack += 1;
  if(vq->suspend_count > 3)
    slack += 3;
  else if(vq->suspend_count > 0)
    slack += vq->suspend_count;
  if(slack != 0 && slack <= 12 /* No numeric overflow. */) {
    usec = usec << slack;
  }
  /* Spread such timeouts within 90%-100% of the original timer. */
  base = usec * 9/10;
  usec = base + ub_random_max(qstate->env->rnd, usec-base);
  tv.tv_usec = (usec % 1000000);
  tv.tv_sec = (usec / 1000000);
  vq->suspend_count ++;
  comm_timer_set(vq->suspend_timer, &tv);
  return 1;
}

/**
 * Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding
 * and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral).
 * The positive response has a mangled authority section.
 * Remove that authority section and the additional section.
 * @param rep: reply
 * @return true if a wrongly truncated response.
 */
static int
detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep)
{
  size_t i;
  /* only NS in authority, and it is bogus */
  if(rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 || rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
    return 0;
  if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
    return 0;
  if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]
    ->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure)
    return 0;
  /* answer section is present and secure */
  for(i=0; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
    if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ]
      ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure)
      return 0;
  }
  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncating to minimal response");
  return 1;
}

/**
 * For messages that are not referrals, if the chase reply contains an
 * unsigned NS record in the authority section it could have been
 * inserted by a (BIND) forwarder that thinks the zone is insecure, and
 * that has an NS record without signatures in cache.  Remove the NS
 * record since the reply does not hinge on that record (in the authority
 * section), but do not remove it if it removes the last record from the
 * answer+authority sections.
 * @param chase_reply: the chased reply, we have a key for this contents,
 *  so we should have signatures for these rrsets and not having
 *  signatures means it will be bogus.
 * @param orig_reply: original reply, remove NS from there as well because
 *  we cannot mark the NS record as DNSSEC valid because it is not
 *  validated by signatures.
 */
static void
remove_spurious_authority(struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct reply_info* orig_reply)
{
  size_t i, found = 0;
  int remove = 0;
  /* if no answer and only 1 auth RRset, do not remove that one */
  if(chase_reply->an_numrrsets == 0 && chase_reply->ns_numrrsets == 1)
    return;
  /* search authority section for unsigned NS records */
  for(i = chase_reply->an_numrrsets;
    i < chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
      chase_reply->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
    if(ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS
      && d->rrsig_count == 0) {
      found = i;
      remove = 1;
      break;
    }
  }
  /* see if we found the entry */
  if(!remove) return;
  log_rrset_key(VERB_ALGO, "Removing spurious unsigned NS record "
    "(likely inserted by forwarder)", chase_reply->rrsets[found]);

  /* find rrset in orig_reply */
  for(i = orig_reply->an_numrrsets;
    i < orig_reply->an_numrrsets+orig_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    if(ntohs(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS
      && query_dname_compare(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
        chase_reply->rrsets[found]->rk.dname) == 0) {
      /* remove from orig_msg */
      val_reply_remove_auth(orig_reply, i);
      break;
    }
  }
  /* remove rrset from chase_reply */
  val_reply_remove_auth(chase_reply, found);
}

/**
 * Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
 * question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. 
 *
 * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure.
 * 
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param qchase: query that was made.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param qstate: query state for the region.
 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 */
static void
validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
  struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
{
  uint8_t* wc = NULL;
  size_t wl;
  int wc_cached = 0;
  int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
  int nsec3s_seen = 0;
  size_t i;
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
  *suspend = 0;

  /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */
  for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard 
     * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be 
     * made in the authority section. */
    if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
      log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive response has "
        "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname,
        ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
      return;
    }
    if(wc && !wc_cached && env->cfg->aggressive_nsec) {
      rrset_cache_update_wildcard(env->rrset_cache, s, wc, wl,
        env->alloc, *env->now);
      wc_cached = 1;
    }

  }

  /* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be 
   * the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */
  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
    chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a 
     * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove 
     * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard 
     * was used. */
    if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
      if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
        wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
      }
      /* if not, continue looking for proof */
    }

    /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and 
     * we have NSEC3 records */
    if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
      nsec3s_seen = 1;
    }
  }

  /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
   * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
   * records. */
  if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen &&
    nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
    enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
      chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
      chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc,
      &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
    if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive wildcard response is "
        "insecure");
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
      return;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
      wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    }
  }

  /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
   * response, fail. */
  if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive response was wildcard "
      "expansion and did not prove original data "
      "did not exist");
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }

  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response");
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}

/** 
 * Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a
 * NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of making 
 * certain that the authority section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname 
 * does exist and the qtype doesn't.
 *
 * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure.
 *
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param qchase: query that was made.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param qstate: query state for the region.
 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 */
static void
validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
  struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
{
  /* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
   * validate. */
  /* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
   * instead, they are chased down into individual CNAME validations,
   * and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER 
   * validation.) */
  
  /* validate the AUTHORITY section */
  int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/
  uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the 
        proven closest encloser. */
  uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */
  int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 
  size_t i;
  *suspend = 0;

  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
    chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
    /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove 
     * NODATA.
     * This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */
    if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
      if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) {
        has_valid_nsec = 1;
        /* sets wc-encloser if wildcard applicable */
      } 
      if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) {
        ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
      }
      if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) {
        verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure");
        chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
        return;
      }
    } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
      nsec3s_seen = 1;
    }
  }

  /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */

  /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exist 
   * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC 
   * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */
  if(wc && !ce)
    has_valid_nsec = 0;
  else if(wc && ce) {
    if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) {
      has_valid_nsec = 0;
    }
  }
  
  if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen &&
    nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
    enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nodata(env, ve, 
      chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
      chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey,
      &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
    if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response is insecure");
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
      return;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
      has_valid_nsec = 1;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
      /* check is incomplete; suspend */
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    }
  }

  if(!has_valid_nsec) {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA "
      "status with NSEC/NSEC3");
    if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
      log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply);
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }

  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response.");
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}

/** 
 * Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN
 * Rcode. 
 * This consists of making certain that the authority section NSEC proves 
 * that the qname doesn't exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist..
 * 
 * The answer and authority RRsets must have already been verified as secure.
 *
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param qchase: query that was made.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param rcode: adjusted RCODE, in case of RCODE/proof mismatch leniency.
 * @param qstate: query state for the region.
 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 */
static void
validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* rcode,
  struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
{
  int has_valid_nsec = 0;
  int has_valid_wnsec = 0;
  int nsec3s_seen = 0;
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 
  size_t i;
  uint8_t* ce;
  int ce_labs = 0;
  int prev_ce_labs = 0;
  *suspend = 0;

  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
    chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
    if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
      if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname))
        has_valid_nsec = 1;
      ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);            
      ce_labs = dname_count_labels(ce);                        
      /* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */
      if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs ||                             
             (ce_labs == prev_ce_labs &&                      
               has_valid_wnsec == 0)) {                 
             if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname,       
               qchase->qname_len))                      
               has_valid_wnsec = 1;                     
             else                                             
               has_valid_wnsec = 0;                     
      }                                                        
      prev_ce_labs = ce_labs; 
      if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) {
        verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure");
        chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
        return;
      }
    } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3)
      nsec3s_seen = 1;
  }

  if((!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) && nsec3s_seen &&
    nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
    /* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case
     * NSEC3s end up in the answer (due to qtype=NSEC3 or so) */
    chase_reply->security = nsec3_prove_nameerror(env, ve,
      chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
      chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey,
      &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
    if(chase_reply->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    } else if(chase_reply->security != sec_status_secure) {
      verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response failed nsec, "
        "nsec3 proof was %s", sec_status_to_string(
        chase_reply->security));
      return;
    }
    has_valid_nsec = 1;
    has_valid_wnsec = 1;
  }

  /* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */
  if(!has_valid_nsec) {
    validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey,
      qstate, vq, nsec3_calculations, suspend);
    if(*suspend) return;
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: "
              "qname does not exist");
    /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */
    if(chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) {
      *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR;
    } else {
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    }
    return;
  }

  if(!has_valid_wnsec) {
    validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey,
      qstate, vq, nsec3_calculations, suspend);
    if(*suspend) return;
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: "
              "covering wildcard does not exist");
    /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */
    if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) {
      *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR;
    } else {
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    }
    return;
  }

  /* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */
  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response.");
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}

/** 
 * Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset
 * as the current validation status.
 * 
 * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
 * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
 * completed.
 * 
 * @param chase_reply: answer to validate.
 */
static void
validate_referral_response(struct reply_info* chase_reply)
{
  size_t i;
  enum sec_status s;
  /* message security equals lowest rrset security */
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
  for(i=0; i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) {
    s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i]
      ->entry.data)->security;
    if(s < chase_reply->security)
      chase_reply->security = s;
  }
  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validated part of referral response as %s",
    sec_status_to_string(chase_reply->security));
}

/** 
 * Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a
 * qtype==ANY question, with answers. This does no checking that all 
 * types are present.
 * 
 * NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records
 * here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the
 * upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead
 * treating them as referrals.
 * 
 * NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon
 * clarification. Clarification draft -05 says to not check all types are
 * present.
 * 
 * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
 * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
 * completed.
 * 
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param qchase: query that was made.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param qstate: query state for the region.
 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 */
static void
validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
  struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
{
  /* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */
  /* but check if a wildcard response is given, then check NSEC/NSEC3
   * for qname denial to see if wildcard is applicable */
  uint8_t* wc = NULL;
  size_t wl;
  int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
  int nsec3s_seen = 0;
  size_t i;
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
  *suspend = 0;

  if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) {
    log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY");
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }

  /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */
  for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard 
     * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be 
     * made in the authority section. */
    if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
      log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive ANY response"
        " has inconsistent wildcard sigs:", 
        s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), 
        ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
      return;
    }
  }

  /* if it was a wildcard, check for NSEC/NSEC3s in both answer
   * and authority sections (NSEC may be moved to the ANSWER section) */
  if(wc != NULL)
    for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; 
      i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a 
     * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove 
     * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard 
     * was used. */
    if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
      if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
        wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
      }
      /* if not, continue looking for proof */
    }

    /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and 
     * we have NSEC3 records */
    if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
      nsec3s_seen = 1;
    }
  }

  /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
   * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
   * records. */
  if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen &&
    nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
    /* look both in answer and auth section for NSEC3s */
    enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
      chase_reply->rrsets,
      chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets,
      qchase, kkey, wc, &vq->nsec3_cache_table,
      nsec3_calculations);
    if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive ANY wildcard response is "
        "insecure");
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
      return;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
      wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    }
  }

  /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
   * response, fail. */
  if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive ANY response was wildcard "
      "expansion and did not prove original data "
      "did not exist");
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }

  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response");
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}

/**
 * Validate CNAME response, or DNAME+CNAME.
 * This is just like a positive proof, except that this is about a 
 * DNAME+CNAME. Possible wildcard proof.
 * Difference with positive proof is that this routine refuses 
 * wildcarded DNAMEs.
 * 
 * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure.
 * 
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param qchase: query that was made.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param qstate: query state for the region.
 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 */
static void
validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
  struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
{
  uint8_t* wc = NULL;
  size_t wl;
  int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
  int nsec3s_seen = 0;
  size_t i;
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
  *suspend = 0;

  /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */
  for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard 
     * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be 
     * made in the authority section. */
    if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
      log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has "
        "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname,
        ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
      return;
    }
    
    /* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597. 
     * Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because 
     * its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */
    if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && 
      ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) {
      log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a "
        "wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname, 
        ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
      return;
    }

    /* If we have found a CNAME, stop looking for one.
     * The iterator has placed the CNAME chain in correct
     * order. */
    if (ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
      break;
    }
  }

  /* AUTHORITY section */
  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
    chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a 
     * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove 
     * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard 
     * was used. */
    if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
      if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
        wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
      }
      /* if not, continue looking for proof */
    }

    /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and 
     * we have NSEC3 records */
    if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
      nsec3s_seen = 1;
    }
  }

  /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
   * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
   * records. */
  if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen &&
    nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
    enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
      chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
      chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc,
      &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
    if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is "
        "insecure");
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
      return;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
      wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    }
  }

  /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
   * response, fail. */
  if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard "
      "expansion and did not prove original data "
      "did not exist");
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }

  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response");
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}

/**
 * Validate CNAME NOANSWER response, no more data after a CNAME chain.
 * This can be a NODATA or a NAME ERROR case, but not both at the same time.
 * We don't know because the rcode has been set to NOERROR by the CNAME.
 * 
 * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure.
 * 
 * @param env: module env for verify.
 * @param ve: validator env for verify.
 * @param qchase: query that was made.
 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
 *  the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
 * @param qstate: query state for the region.
 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 */
static void
validate_cname_noanswer_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
  struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
  struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
{
  int nodata_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then NODATA has been proven.*/
  uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the 
        proven closest encloser. */
  uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */
  int nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; /* if true, nameerror has been proven */
  int nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0;
  int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 
  size_t i;
  uint8_t* nsec_ce; /* Used to find the NSEC with the longest ce */
  int ce_labs = 0;
  int prev_ce_labs = 0;
  *suspend = 0;

  /* the AUTHORITY section */
  for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
    chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
    s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];

    /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove 
     * NODATA. This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. 
     * Also try to prove NAMEERROR, and absence of a wildcard */
    if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
      if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) {
        nodata_valid_nsec = 1;
        /* set wc encloser if wildcard applicable */
      } 
      if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) {
        ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
        nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1;
      }
      nsec_ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
      ce_labs = dname_count_labels(nsec_ce);
      /* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */
      if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs ||
             (ce_labs == prev_ce_labs &&
               nxdomain_valid_wnsec == 0)) {
             if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname,
               qchase->qname_len))
               nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 1;
             else
               nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0;
      }
      prev_ce_labs = ce_labs;
      if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) {
        verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure");
        chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
        return;
      }
    } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
      nsec3s_seen = 1;
    }
  }

  /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */

  /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists 
   * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC 
   * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */
  if(wc && !ce)
    nodata_valid_nsec = 0;
  else if(wc && ce) {
    if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) {
      nodata_valid_nsec = 0;
    }
  }
  if(nxdomain_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_wnsec) {
    /* name error is missing wildcard denial proof */
    nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0;
  }
  
  if(nodata_valid_nsec && nxdomain_valid_nsec) {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer proves that name "
      "exists and not exists, bogus");
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }
  if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen &&
    nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
    int nodata;
    enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nxornodata(env, ve, 
      chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
      chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, &nodata,
      &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
    if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response "
        "is insecure");
      chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
      return;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
      if(nodata)
        nodata_valid_nsec = 1;
      else  nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1;
    } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    }
  }

  if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec) {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response failed "
      "to prove status with NSEC/NSEC3");
    if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
      log_dns_msg("Failed CNAMEnoanswer", qchase, chase_reply);
    chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    return;
  }

  if(nodata_valid_nsec)
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a "
      "NODATA response.");
  else  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a "
      "NAMEERROR response.");
  chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
}

/** 
 * Process init state for validator.
 * Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state.
 * This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial
 * key search is done.
 * 
 * Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted
 * to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to
 * validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request
 * event will be generated.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param ve: validator shared global environment.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
 *         not.
 */
static int
processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 
  struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
  uint8_t* lookup_name;
  size_t lookup_len;
  struct trust_anchor* anchor;
  enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response(
    qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, 
    vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
  if(vq->restart_count > ve->max_restart) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "restart count exceeded");
    return val_error(qstate, id);
  }

  /* correctly initialize reason_bogus */
  update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);

  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator classification %s", 
    val_classification_to_string(subtype));
  if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL && 
    vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) {
    /* referral uses the rrset name as qchase, to find keys for
     * that rrset */
    vq->qchase.qname = vq->orig_msg->rep->
      rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname;
    vq->qchase.qname_len = vq->orig_msg->rep->
      rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len;
    vq->qchase.qtype = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->
      rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type);
    vq->qchase.qclass = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->
      rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class);
  }
  lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname;
  lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len;
  /* for type DS look at the parent side for keys/trustanchor */
  /* also for NSEC not at apex */
  if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS ||
    (vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && 
     vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > vq->rrset_skip &&
     ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) ==
     LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&
     !(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->
     rk.flags&PACKED_RRSET_NSEC_AT_APEX))) {
    dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len);
  }

  val_mark_indeterminate(vq->chase_reply, qstate->env->anchors, 
    qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
  vq->key_entry = NULL;
  vq->empty_DS_name = NULL;
  vq->ds_rrset = 0;
  anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, 
    lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass);

  /* Determine the signer/lookup name */
  val_find_signer(subtype, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, 
    vq->rrset_skip, &vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len);
  if(vq->signer_name != NULL &&
    !dname_subdomain_c(lookup_name, vq->signer_name)) {
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "this signer name is not a parent "
      "of lookupname, omitted", vq->signer_name, 0, 0);
    vq->signer_name = NULL;
  }
  if(vq->signer_name == NULL) {
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "no signer, using", lookup_name,
      0, 0);
  } else {
    lookup_name = vq->signer_name;
    lookup_len = vq->signer_len;
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "signer is", lookup_name, 0, 0);
  }

  /* for NXDOMAIN it could be signed by a parent of the trust anchor */
  if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR && vq->signer_name &&
    anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, lookup_name)){
    lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
    anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, 
      lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass);
    if(!anchor) { /* unsigned parent denies anchor*/
      verbose(VERB_QUERY, "unsigned parent zone denies"
        " trust anchor, indeterminate");
      vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
      update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE);
      vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
      return 1;
    }
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trust anchor NXDOMAIN by signed parent");
  } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE &&
    qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY &&
    query_dname_compare(lookup_name, qstate->qinfo.qname) == 0) {
    /* is a DNSKEY so lookup a bit higher since we want to
     * get it from a parent or from trustanchor */
    dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len);
  }

  if(vq->rrset_skip > 0 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME ||
    subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
    /* extract this part of orig_msg into chase_reply for
     * the eventual VALIDATE stage */
    val_fill_reply(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep, 
      vq->rrset_skip, lookup_name, lookup_len, 
      vq->signer_name);
    if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
      log_dns_msg("chased extract", &vq->qchase, 
        vq->chase_reply);
  }

  vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len,
    vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, *qstate->env->now);

  /* there is no key and no trust anchor */
  if(vq->key_entry == NULL && anchor == NULL) {
    /*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
    update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE);
    /* go to finished state to cache this result */
    vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
    return 1;
  }
  /* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e.
   * the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */
  else if(vq->key_entry == NULL || (anchor &&
    dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name))) {
    /* trust anchor is an 'unsigned' trust anchor */
    if(anchor && anchor->numDS == 0 && anchor->numDNSKEY == 0) {
      vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
      val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, anchor->name, 
        qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
      lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
      /* go to finished state to cache this result */
      vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
      return 1;
    }
    /* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */
    verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "prime trust anchor");
    if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, anchor)) {
      lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
      return val_error(qstate, id);
    }
    lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
    /* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event.
     * (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */
    vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE;
    return 0;
  }
  if(anchor) {
    lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
  }

  if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
    /* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate
     * However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is 
     * essentially proven insecure. */
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
    val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, 
      qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
    /* go to finished state to cache this result */
    vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
    return 1;
  } else if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
    /* Bad keys should have the relevant EDE code and text */
    sldns_ede_code ede = key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry);
    /* key is bad, chain is bad, reply is bogus */
    errinf_dname(qstate, "key for validation", vq->key_entry->name);
    errinf_ede(qstate, "is marked as invalid", ede);
    errinf(qstate, "because of a previous");
    errinf(qstate, key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry));

    /* no retries, stop bothering the authority until timeout */
    vq->restart_count = ve->max_restart;
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, ede);
    vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
    return 1;
  }

  /* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue 
   * processing in the next state. */
  vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE;
  return 1;
}

/**
 * Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name
 * to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see
 * if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will
 * advance the event to the next state.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
 *         not.
 */
static int
processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id)
{
  uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name;
  size_t target_key_len;
  int strip_lab;
  struct module_qstate* newq = NULL;

  log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey", &vq->qchase);
  /* We know that state.key_entry is not 0 or bad key -- if it were,
   * then previous processing should have directed this event to 
   * a different state. 
   * It could be an isnull key, which signals the DNSKEY failed
   * with retry and has to be looked up again. */
  log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry));
  if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
    if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 
      vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 
      vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request");
      return val_error(qstate, id);
    }
    return 0;
  }

  target_key_name = vq->signer_name;
  target_key_len = vq->signer_len;
  if(!target_key_name) {
    target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname;
    target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len;
  }

  current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name;

  /* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */
  if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) {
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
    return 1;
  }

  if(vq->empty_DS_name) {
    /* if the last empty nonterminal/emptyDS name we detected is
     * below the current key, use that name to make progress
     * along the chain of trust */
    if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, 
      vq->empty_DS_name) == 0) {
      /* do not query for empty_DS_name again */
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Cannot retrieve DS for signature");
      errinf_ede(qstate, "no signatures", LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
      errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
      vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
      vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
      return 1;
    }
    current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name;
  }

  log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name,
    LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
  log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name,
    LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
  /* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */
  if(!dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name)) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "bad signer name");
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
    return 1;
  }
  /* so this value is >= -1 */
  strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) - 
    dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1;
  log_assert(strip_lab >= -1);
  verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab);
  if(strip_lab > 0) {
    dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len, 
      strip_lab);
  }
  log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name,
    LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);

  /* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query 
   * for the next DNSKEY. */
  if(vq->ds_rrset)
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DS RRset", vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
  else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No DS RRset");

  if(vq->ds_rrset && query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
    vq->key_entry->name) != 0) {
    if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 
      vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 
      vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request");
      return val_error(qstate, id);
    }
    return 0;
  }

  if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
    target_key_name) != 0) {
    /* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if
     * there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and
     * thus can disprove the secure delegation we seek.
     * We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA
     * record that would be required by the iterator to supply
     * a completely protocol-correct response. 
     * Uses negative cache for NSEC3 lookup of DS responses. */
    /* only if cache not blacklisted, of course */
    struct dns_msg* msg;
    int suspend;
    if(vq->sub_ds_msg) {
      /* We have a suspended DS reply from a sub-query;
       * process it. */
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process suspended sub DS response");
      msg = vq->sub_ds_msg;
      process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR,
        msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL, &suspend, NULL);
      if(suspend) {
        /* we'll come back here later to continue */
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
          id, VAL_FINDKEY_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      vq->sub_ds_msg = NULL;
      return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */
    } else if(!qstate->blacklist && !vq->chain_blacklist &&
      (msg=val_find_DS(qstate->env, target_key_name, 
      target_key_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region,
      vq->key_entry->name)) ) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process cached DS response");
      process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR,
        msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL, &suspend, NULL);
      if(suspend) {
        /* we'll come back here later to continue */
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
          id, VAL_FINDKEY_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */
    }
    if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name, 
      target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass,
      BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DS request");
      return val_error(qstate, id);
    }
    return 0;
  }

  /* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */
  if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 
    vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 
    vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request");
    return val_error(qstate, id);
  }

  return 0;
}

/**
 * Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished,
 * and the right keys are available to validate the response.
 * Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response.
 *
 * After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets,
 * and finished state is started.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param ve: validator shared global environment.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
 *         not.
 */
static int
processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 
  struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
  enum val_classification subtype;
  int rcode, suspend, nsec3_calculations = 0;

  if(!vq->key_entry) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed");
    return val_error(qstate, id);
  }

  /* This is the default next state. */
  vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;

  /* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/
  if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
    verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Verified that %sresponse is INSECURE",
      vq->signer_name?"":"unsigned ");
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
    val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, 
      qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
    key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
      qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
    return 1;
  }

  if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish a chain "
      "of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name,
      LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class);
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply,
      key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry));
    errinf_ede(qstate, "while building chain of trust",
      key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry));
    if(vq->restart_count >= ve->max_restart)
      key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
        qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
    return 1;
  }

  /* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was 
   * unsigned */
  if(vq->signer_name == NULL) {
    log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no "
      "signer name", &vq->qchase);
    verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish validation of "
              "INSECURE status of unsigned response.");
    errinf_ede(qstate, "no signatures", LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
    errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
    update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
    return 1;
  }
  subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo,
    &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
  if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL)
    remove_spurious_authority(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep);

  /* check signatures in the message; 
   * answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */
  if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, vq, qstate->env, ve,
    vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &suspend)) {
    if(suspend) {
      if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
        id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
        return val_error(qstate, id);
      return 0;
    }
    /* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even
     * with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section
     * for positive replies*/
    if((subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY
      || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) &&
      detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) {
      /* truncate the message some more */
      vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
      vq->orig_msg->rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
      vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count = 
        vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets;
      vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0;
      vq->chase_reply->ar_numrrsets = 0;
      vq->chase_reply->rrset_count = 
        vq->chase_reply->an_numrrsets;
      qstate->errinf = NULL;
    }
    else {
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains "
        "bad rrsets");
      return 1;
    }
  }

  switch(subtype) {
    case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response");
      validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve,
        &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
        qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
      if(suspend) {
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
          vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      break;

    case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response");
      validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve,
        &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
        qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
      if(suspend) {
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
          vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nodata): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      break;

    case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:
      rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags);
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response");
      validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve, 
        &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &rcode,
        qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
      if(suspend) {
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
          vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nxdomain): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags, rcode);
      FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->chase_reply->flags, rcode);
      break;

    case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response");
      validate_cname_response(qstate->env, ve,
        &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
        qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
      if(suspend) {
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
          vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      break;

    case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname noanswer "
        "response");
      validate_cname_noanswer_response(qstate->env, ve,
        &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
        qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
      if(suspend) {
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
          vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname_noanswer): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      break;

    case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a referral response");
      validate_referral_response(vq->chase_reply);
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(referral): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      break;

    case VAL_CLASS_ANY:
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY "
        "response");
      validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase,
        vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, qstate, vq,
        &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
      if(suspend) {
        if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
          vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
          return val_error(qstate, id);
        return 0;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive_any): %s",
          sec_status_to_string(
        vq->chase_reply->security));
      break;

    default:
      log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d",
        subtype);
  }
  if(vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_bogus) {
    if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE)
      errinf(qstate, "wildcard");
    else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype));
    errinf(qstate, "proof failed");
    errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
  }

  return 1;
}

/**
 * The Finished state. The validation status (good or bad) has been determined.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param ve: validator shared global environment.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
 *         not.
 */
static int
processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 
  struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
  enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response(
    qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, 
    vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);

  /* store overall validation result in orig_msg */
  if(vq->rrset_skip == 0) {
    vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security;
    update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->chase_reply->reason_bogus);
  } else if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL ||
    vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets + 
    vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets) {
    /* ignore sec status of additional section if a referral 
     * type message skips there and
     * use the lowest security status as end result. */
    if(vq->chase_reply->security < vq->orig_msg->rep->security) {
      vq->orig_msg->rep->security = 
        vq->chase_reply->security;
      update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->chase_reply->reason_bogus);
    }
  }

  if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
    /* for a referral, move to next unchecked rrset and check it*/
    vq->rrset_skip = val_next_unchecked(vq->orig_msg->rep, 
      vq->rrset_skip);
    if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) {
      /* and restart for this rrset */
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: go to next rrset");
      vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked;
      vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
      return 1;
    }
    /* referral chase is done */
  }
  if(vq->chase_reply->security != sec_status_bogus &&
    subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
    /* chase the CNAME; process next part of the message */
    if(!val_chase_cname(&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, 
      &vq->rrset_skip)) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: failed to chase CNAME");
      vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
      update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
    } else {
      /* restart process for new qchase at rrset_skip */
      log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: chased to",
        &vq->qchase);
      vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked;
      vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
      return 1;
    }
  }

  if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) {
    /* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are
     * secure (i.e. some inserted RRset for CNAME chain with
     * a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets
     * that are not secure (if clean-additional option is set) */
    /* this may cause the msg to be marked bogus */
    val_check_nonsecure(qstate->env, vq->orig_msg->rep);
    if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) {
      log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validation success", 
        &qstate->qinfo);
      if(!qstate->no_cache_store) {
        val_neg_addreply(qstate->env->neg_cache,
          vq->orig_msg->rep);
      }
    }
  }

  /* if the result is bogus - set message ttl to bogus ttl to avoid
   * endless bogus revalidation */
  if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) {
    struct msgreply_entry* e;

    /* see if we can try again to fetch data */
    if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, "
        "blacklist and retry to fetch data");
      val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region, 
        qstate->reply_origin, 0);
      qstate->reply_origin = NULL;
      qstate->errinf = NULL;
      val_restart(vq);
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module");
      qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next;
      return 0;
    }

    if(qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired &&
      (e=msg_cache_lookup(qstate->env, qstate->qinfo.qname,
      qstate->qinfo.qname_len, qstate->qinfo.qtype,
      qstate->qinfo.qclass, qstate->query_flags,
      0 /*now; allow expired*/,
      1 /*wr; we may update the data*/))) {
      struct reply_info* rep = (struct reply_info*)e->entry.data;
      if(rep && rep->security > sec_status_bogus &&
        (!qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl ||
         qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl_reset ||
        *qstate->env->now <= rep->serve_expired_ttl)) {
        verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed but "
          "previously cached valid response "
          "exists; set serve-expired-norec-ttl "
          "for response in cache");
        rep->serve_expired_norec_ttl = NORR_TTL +
          *qstate->env->now;
        if(qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl_reset &&
          *qstate->env->now + qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl
          > rep->serve_expired_ttl) {
          verbose(VERB_ALGO, "reset serve-expired-ttl for "
            "valid response in cache");
          rep->serve_expired_ttl = *qstate->env->now +
            qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl;
        }
        /* Return an error response.
         * If serve-expired-client-timeout is enabled,
         * the client-timeout logic will try to find an
         * (expired) answer in the cache as last
         * resort. If it is not enabled, expired
         * answers are already used before the mesh
         * activation. */
        qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL;
        qstate->return_msg = NULL;
        qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
        lock_rw_unlock(&e->entry.lock);
        return 0;
      }
      lock_rw_unlock(&e->entry.lock);
    }

    vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
    vq->orig_msg->rep->prefetch_ttl = 
      PREFETCH_TTL_CALC(vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl);
    vq->orig_msg->rep->serve_expired_ttl =
      vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl + qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl;
    if((qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 1 ||
      qstate->env->cfg->log_servfail) &&
      !qstate->env->cfg->val_log_squelch) {
      if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level < 2 &&
        !qstate->env->cfg->log_servfail)
        log_query_info(NO_VERBOSE, "validation failure",
          &qstate->qinfo);
      else {
        char* err_str = errinf_to_str_bogus(qstate,
          qstate->region);
        if(err_str) {
          log_info("%s", err_str);
          vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus_str = err_str;
        }
      }
    }
    /*
     * If set, the validator will not make messages bogus, instead
     * indeterminate is issued, so that no clients receive SERVFAIL.
     * This allows an operator to run validation 'shadow' without
     * hurting responses to clients.
     */
    /* If we are in permissive mode, bogus gets indeterminate */
    if(qstate->env->cfg->val_permissive_mode)
      vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
  }

  if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure &&
    qstate->env->cfg->root_key_sentinel &&
    (qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_A ||
    qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA)) {
    char* keytag_start;
    uint16_t keytag;
    if(*qstate->qinfo.qname == strlen(SENTINEL_IS) +
      SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN &&
      dname_lab_startswith(qstate->qinfo.qname, SENTINEL_IS,
      &keytag_start)) {
      if(sentinel_get_keytag(keytag_start, &keytag) &&
        !anchor_has_keytag(qstate->env->anchors,
        (uint8_t*)"", 1, 0, vq->qchase.qclass, keytag)) {
        vq->orig_msg->rep->security =
          sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail;
      }
    } else if(*qstate->qinfo.qname == strlen(SENTINEL_NOT) +
      SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN &&
      dname_lab_startswith(qstate->qinfo.qname, SENTINEL_NOT,
      &keytag_start)) {
      if(sentinel_get_keytag(keytag_start, &keytag) &&
        anchor_has_keytag(qstate->env->anchors,
        (uint8_t*)"", 1, 0, vq->qchase.qclass, keytag)) {
        vq->orig_msg->rep->security =
          sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail;
      }
    }
  }

  /* Update rep->reason_bogus as it is the one being cached */
  update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, errinf_to_reason_bogus(qstate));
  if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security != sec_status_bogus &&
    vq->orig_msg->rep->security != sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail
    && vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS) {
    /* Not interested in any DNSSEC EDE here, validator by default
     * uses LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
     * TODO revisit default value for the module */
    vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NONE;
  }

  /* store results in cache */
  if((qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD)) {
    /* if secure, this will override cache anyway, no need
     * to check if from parentNS */
    if(!qstate->no_cache_store) {
      if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo,
        vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway,
        0, qstate->region, qstate->query_flags,
        qstate->qstarttime, qstate->is_valrec)) {
        log_err("out of memory caching validator results");
      }
    }
  } else {
    /* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */
    /* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */
    if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo,
      vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, 0, qstate->region,
      qstate->query_flags, qstate->qstarttime,
      qstate->is_valrec)) {
      log_err("out of memory caching validator results");
    }
  }
  qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR;
  qstate->return_msg = vq->orig_msg;
  qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
  return 0;
}

/** 
 * Handle validator state.
 * If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then
 * processing will stop.
 * @param qstate: query state.
 * @param vq: validator query state.
 * @param ve: validator shared global environment.
 * @param id: module id.
 */
static void
val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 
  struct val_env* ve, int id)
{
  int cont = 1;
  while(cont) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s",
      val_state_to_string(vq->state));
    switch(vq->state) {
      case VAL_INIT_STATE:
        cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id);
        break;
      case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: 
        cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id);
        break;
      case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: 
        cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id);
        break;
      case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: 
        cont = processFinished(qstate, vq, ve, id);
        break;
      default:
        log_warn("validator: invalid state %d",
          vq->state);
        cont = 0;
        break;
    }
  }
}

void
val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id,
        struct outbound_entry* outbound)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
  struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
  verbose(VERB_QUERY, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s "
    "event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]), 
    strmodulevent(event));
  log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: query",
    &qstate->qinfo);
  if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname) 
    log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: chased to",
    &vq->qchase);
  (void)outbound;
  if(event == module_event_new || 
    (event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) {

    /* pass request to next module, to get it */
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module");
    qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module;
    return;
  }
  if(event == module_event_moddone) {
    /* check if validation is needed */
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned");

    if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode, 
      qstate->return_msg)) {
      /* no need to validate this */
      if(qstate->return_msg)
        qstate->return_msg->rep->security =
          sec_status_indeterminate;
      qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
      return;
    }
    if(already_validated(qstate->return_msg)) {
      qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
      return;
    }
    if(qstate->rpz_applied) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rpz applied, mark it as insecure");
      if(qstate->return_msg)
        qstate->return_msg->rep->security =
          sec_status_insecure;
      qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
      return;
    }
    /* qclass ANY should have validation result from spawned 
     * queries. If we get here, it is bogus or an internal error */
    if(qstate->qinfo.qclass == LDNS_RR_CLASS_ANY) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate classANY: bogus");
      if(qstate->return_msg) {
        qstate->return_msg->rep->security =
          sec_status_bogus;
        update_reason_bogus(qstate->return_msg->rep, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
      }
      qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
      return;
    }
    /* create state to start validation */
    qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */
    if(!vq) {
      vq = val_new(qstate, id);
      if(!vq) {
        log_err("validator: malloc failure");
        qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
        return;
      }
    } else if(!vq->orig_msg) {
      if(!val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq)) {
        log_err("validator: malloc failure");
        qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
        return;
      }
    }
    val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id);
    return;
  }
  if(event == module_event_pass) {
    qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */
    /* continue processing, since val_env exists */
    val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id);
    return;
  }
  log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event));
  qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
  return;
}

/**
 * Evaluate the response to a priming request.
 *
 * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset (can be NULL if none) in prime reply.
 *  (this rrset is allocated in the wrong region, not the qstate).
 * @param ta: trust anchor.
 * @param qstate: qstate that needs key.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param sub_qstate: the sub query state, that is the lookup that fetched
 *  the trust anchor data, it contains error information for the answer.
 * @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure.
 *  The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or
 *  represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a
 *  Bad key (validation failed).
 */
static struct key_entry_key*
primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
  struct trust_anchor* ta, struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
  struct module_qstate* sub_qstate)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
  struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL;
  enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked;
  char reasonbuf[256];
  char* reason = NULL;
  sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
  int downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade;

  if(!dnskey_rrset) {
    char* err = errinf_to_str_misc(sub_qstate);
    char rstr[1024];
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- "
      "could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", 
      ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass);
    reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISSING;
    if(!err) {
      snprintf(rstr, sizeof(rstr), "no DNSKEY rrset");
    } else {
      snprintf(rstr, sizeof(rstr), "no DNSKEY rrset "
        "[%s]", err);
    }
    if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) {
      errinf_ede(qstate, rstr, reason_bogus);
      kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name,
        ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL,
        reason_bogus, rstr, *qstate->env->now);
    } else  kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name,
        ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL,
        reason_bogus, rstr, *qstate->env->now);
    if(!kkey) {
      log_err("out of memory: allocate fail prime key");
      return NULL;
    }
    return kkey;
  }
  /* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */
  kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, 
    dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot,
    &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate, reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));
  if(!kkey) {
    log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA");
    return NULL;
  }
  if(key_entry_isgood(kkey))
    sec = sec_status_secure;
  else
    sec = sec_status_bogus;
  verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate keys with anchor(DS): %s", 
    sec_status_to_string(sec));

  if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
    log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- "
      "DNSKEY rrset is not secure", 
      ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass);
    /* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust 
     * anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */
    if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) {
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name,
        ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL,
        reason_bogus, reason,
        *qstate->env->now);
    } else  kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name,
        ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL,
        reason_bogus, reason,
        *qstate->env->now);
    if(!kkey) {
      log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key");
      return NULL;
    }
    return kkey;
  }

  log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Successfully primed trust anchor", 
    ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass);
  return kkey;
}

/**
 * In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current
 * keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS.
 * @param vq: validator query state
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param rcode: rcode result value.
 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
 * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
 * @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns
 *  is_bad if the DS response fails to validate, is_null if the
 *  DS response indicated an end to secure space, is_good if the DS
 *  validated. It returns ke=NULL if the DS response indicated that the
 *  request wasn't a delegation point.
 * @param sub_qstate: the sub query state, that is the lookup that fetched
 *  the trust anchor data, it contains error information for the answer.
 *  Can be NULL.
 * @return
 *  0 on success,
 *  1 on servfail error (malloc failure),
 *  2 on NSEC3 suspend.
 */
static int
ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
        int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
  struct key_entry_key** ke, struct module_qstate* sub_qstate)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
  char reasonbuf[256];
  char* reason = NULL;
  sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
  enum val_classification subtype;
  int verified;
  if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
    char rc[16];
    rc[0]=0;
    (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc));
    /* errors here pretty much break validation */
    verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS response was error, thus bogus");
    errinf(qstate, rc);
    reason = "no DS";
    if(sub_qstate) {
      char* err = errinf_to_str_misc(sub_qstate);
      if(err) {
        char buf[1024];
        snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "[%s]", err);
        errinf(qstate, buf);
      }
    }
    reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NETWORK_ERROR;
    errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
    goto return_bogus;
  }

  subtype = val_classify_response(BIT_RD, qinfo, qinfo, msg->rep, 0);
  if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
    struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds;
    enum sec_status sec;
    ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep);
    /* If there was no DS rrset, then we have misclassified
     * this message. */
    if(!ds) {
      log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was "
        "missing DS.");
      reason = "no DS record";
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      goto return_bogus;
    }
    /* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is 
     * bogus, then we are done. */
    sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds,
      vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus,
      LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified, reasonbuf,
      sizeof(reasonbuf));
    if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did "
        "not verify");
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      goto return_bogus;
    }

    /* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure 
     * that they are usable. */
    if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) {
      /* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like 
       * there was no DS. */
      *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region,
        qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass,
        ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds),
        LDNS_EDE_UNSUPPORTED_DS_DIGEST, NULL,
        *qstate->env->now);
      return (*ke) == NULL;
    }

    /* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */
    log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DS", qinfo);
    *ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region,
      qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds,
      NULL, LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL, *qstate->env->now);
    return (*ke) == NULL;
  } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA || 
    subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) {
    /* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was 
     * no DS.  This is a pretty normal case. */
    time_t proof_ttl = 0;
    enum sec_status sec;

    /* make sure there are NSECs or NSEC3s with signatures */
    if(!val_has_signed_nsecs(msg->rep, &reason)) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "no NSECs: %s", reason);
      reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NSEC_MISSING;
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      goto return_bogus;
    }

    /* For subtype Name Error.
     * attempt ANS 2.8.1.0 compatibility where it sets rcode
     * to nxdomain, but really this is an Nodata/Noerror response.
     * Find and prove the empty nonterminal in that case */

    /* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */
    sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(
      qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry, 
      &proof_ttl, &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate,
      reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));
    switch(sec) {
      case sec_status_secure:
        verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
          "referral proved no DS.");
        *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, 
          qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, 
          qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl,
          LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL,
          *qstate->env->now);
        return (*ke) == NULL;
      case sec_status_insecure:
        verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
          "referral proved not a delegation point");
        *ke = NULL;
        return 0;
      case sec_status_bogus:
        verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
          "referral did not prove no DS.");
        errinf(qstate, reason);
        goto return_bogus;
      case sec_status_unchecked:
      default:
        /* NSEC proof did not work, try next */
        break;
    }

    if(!nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
      log_err("malloc failure in ds_response_to_ke for "
        "NSEC3 cache");
      reason = "malloc failure";
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, 0);
      goto return_bogus;
    }
    sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve, 
      msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets,
      msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason,
      &reason_bogus, qstate, &vq->nsec3_cache_table,
      reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));
    switch(sec) {
      case sec_status_insecure:
        /* case insecure also continues to unsigned
         * space.  If nsec3-iter-count too high or
         * optout, then treat below as unsigned */
      case sec_status_secure:
        verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the "
          "referral proved no DS.");
        *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, 
          qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, 
          qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl,
          LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL,
          *qstate->env->now);
        return (*ke) == NULL;
      case sec_status_indeterminate:
        verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the "
          "referral proved no delegation");
        *ke = NULL;
        return 0;
      case sec_status_bogus:
        verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the "
          "referral did not prove no DS.");
        errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
        goto return_bogus;
      case sec_status_unchecked:
        return 2;
      default:
        /* NSEC3 proof did not work */
        break;
    }

    /* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so 
     * this is BOGUS. */
    verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS %s ran out of options, so return "
      "bogus", val_classification_to_string(subtype));
    reason = "no DS but also no proof of that";
    errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
    goto return_bogus;
  } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || 
    subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
    /* if the CNAME matches the exact name we want and is signed
     * properly, then also, we are sure that no DS exists there,
     * much like a NODATA proof */
    enum sec_status sec;
    struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname;
    cname = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, qinfo->qname,
      qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qinfo->qclass);
    if(!cname) {
      reason = "validator classified CNAME but no "
        "CNAME of the queried name for DS";
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      goto return_bogus;
    }
    if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)cname->entry.data)->rrsig_count
      == 0) {
            if(msg->rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && ntohs(msg->rep->
        rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
        reason = "DS got DNAME answer";
      } else {
        reason = "DS got unsigned CNAME answer";
      }
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      goto return_bogus;
    }
    sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname,
      vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus,
      LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified, reasonbuf,
      sizeof(reasonbuf));
    if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
      verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, "
        "proof that DS does not exist");
      /* and that it is not a referral point */
      *ke = NULL;
      return 0;
    }
    errinf(qstate, "CNAME in DS response was not secure.");
    errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
    goto return_bogus;
  } else {
    verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Encountered an unhandled type of "
      "DS response, thus bogus.");
    errinf(qstate, "no DS and");
    reason = "no DS";
    if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
      char rc[16];
      rc[0]=0;
      (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf((int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(
        msg->rep->flags), rc, sizeof(rc));
      errinf(qstate, rc);
    } else  errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype));
    errinf(qstate, "message fails to prove that");
    goto return_bogus;
  }
return_bogus:
  *ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname,
    qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL,
    reason_bogus, reason, *qstate->env->now);
  return (*ke) == NULL;
}

/**
 * Process DS response. Called from inform_supers.
 * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks
 * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead
 * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon.
 * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS.
 * @param vq: validator query state
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param rcode: rcode result value.
 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
 * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
 * @param origin: the origin of msg.
 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
 *  suspend to continue the effort later.
 * @param sub_qstate: the sub query state, that is the lookup that fetched
 *  the trust anchor data, it contains error information for the answer.
 *  Can be NULL.
 */
static void
process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
  struct sock_list* origin, int* suspend,
  struct module_qstate* sub_qstate)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
  struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL;
  uint8_t* olds = vq->empty_DS_name;
  int ret;
  *suspend = 0;
  vq->empty_DS_name = NULL;
  if(sub_qstate && sub_qstate->rpz_applied) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rpz was applied to the DS lookup, "
      "make it insecure");
    vq->key_entry = NULL;
    vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
    return;
  }
  ret = ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske,
    sub_qstate);
  if(ret != 0) {
    switch(ret) {
    case 1:
      log_err("malloc failure in process_ds_response");
      vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
      vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
      return;
    case 2:
      *suspend = 1;
      return;
    default:
      log_err("unhandled error value for ds_response_to_ke");
      vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
      vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
      return;
    }
  }
  if(dske == NULL) {
    vq->empty_DS_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
      qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len);
    if(!vq->empty_DS_name) {
      log_err("malloc failure in empty_DS_name");
      vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
      vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
      return;
    }
    vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len;
    vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
    /* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point.
     * Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */
  } else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) {
    vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region);
    if(!vq->ds_rrset) {
      log_err("malloc failure in process DS");
      vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
      vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
      return;
    }
    vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* fresh blacklist for next part*/
    /* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */
  } else if(key_entry_isbad(dske) 
    && vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
    vq->empty_DS_name = olds;
    val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1);
    qstate->errinf = NULL;
    vq->restart_count++;
  } else {
    if(key_entry_isbad(dske)) {
      errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
      errinf_dname(qstate, "for DS", qinfo->qname);
    }
    /* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is, 
     * either bad or null) should have been logged by 
     * dsResponseToKE. */
    vq->key_entry = dske;
    /* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
  }
}

/**
 * Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers.
 * Sets the key entry in the state.
 * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks
 * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead
 * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon.
 * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY.
 * @param vq: validator query state
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param rcode: rcode result value.
 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
 * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
 * @param origin: the origin of msg.
 * @param sub_qstate: the sub query state, that is the lookup that fetched
 *  the trust anchor data, it contains error information for the answer.
 */
static void
process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
  struct sock_list* origin, struct module_qstate* sub_qstate)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
  struct key_entry_key* old = vq->key_entry;
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL;
  int downprot;
  char reasonbuf[256];
  char* reason = NULL;
  sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;

  if(sub_qstate && sub_qstate->rpz_applied) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rpz was applied to the DNSKEY lookup, "
      "make it insecure");
    vq->key_entry = NULL;
    vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
    vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
    return;
  }

  if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR)
    dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep);

  if(dnskey == NULL) {
    char* err;
    char rstr[1024];
    /* bad response */
    verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to "
      "DNSKEY query.");

    if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
      val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region,
        origin, 1);
      qstate->errinf = NULL;
      vq->restart_count++;
      return;
    }
    err = errinf_to_str_misc(sub_qstate);
    if(!err) {
      snprintf(rstr, sizeof(rstr), "No DNSKEY record");
    } else {
      snprintf(rstr, sizeof(rstr), "No DNSKEY record "
        "[%s]", err);
    }
    reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISSING;
    vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region,
      qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass,
      BOGUS_KEY_TTL, reason_bogus, rstr, *qstate->env->now);
    if(!vq->key_entry) {
      log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response");
      /* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */
    }
    errinf_ede(qstate, rstr, reason_bogus);
    errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
    errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname);
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
    return;
  }
  if(!vq->ds_rrset) {
    log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response");
    vq->key_entry = NULL;
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
    return;
  }
  downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade;
  vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env,
    ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason, &reason_bogus,
    qstate, reasonbuf, sizeof(reasonbuf));

  if(!vq->key_entry) {
    log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs");
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
    return;
  }
  /* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next
   * state. */
  if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) {
    if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
      if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
        val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, 
          qstate->region, origin, 1);
        qstate->errinf = NULL;
        vq->restart_count++;
        vq->key_entry = old;
        return;
      }
      verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, "
        "thus bogus.");
      errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
      errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
      errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname);
    }
    vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
    return;
  }
  vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
  qstate->errinf = NULL;

  /* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */
  key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
    qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);

  /* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */
  log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DNSKEY", qinfo);
}

/**
 * Process prime response
 * Sets the key entry in the state.
 *
 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor.
 * @param vq: validator query state
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param rcode: rcode result value.
 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
 * @param origin: the origin of msg.
 * @param sub_qstate: the sub query state, that is the lookup that fetched
 *  the trust anchor data, it contains error information for the answer.
 */
static void
process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct sock_list* origin,
  struct module_qstate* sub_qstate)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
  struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL;
  struct trust_anchor* ta = anchor_find(qstate->env->anchors, 
    vq->trust_anchor_name, vq->trust_anchor_labs,
    vq->trust_anchor_len, vq->qchase.qclass);
  if(!ta) {
    /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */
    vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
    if(!vq->trust_anchor_name)
      vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; /* break a loop */
    vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL;
    return;
  }
  /* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the 
   * current trust anchor. */
  if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
    dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep,
      ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
      ta->dclass);
  }

  if(ta->autr) {
    if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset,
      qstate)) {
      /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */
      vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
      vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL;
      return;
    }
  }
  vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(dnskey_rrset, ta, qstate, id,
    sub_qstate);
  lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
  if(vq->key_entry) {
    if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry) 
      && vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
      val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, 
        origin, 1);
      qstate->errinf = NULL;
      vq->restart_count++;
      vq->key_entry = NULL;
      vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
      return;
    } 
    vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
    errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
    errinf_dname(qstate, "for trust anchor", ta->name);
    /* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */
    key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
      qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
  }

  /* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/
  if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry) ||
    key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
    vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
  }
  /* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */
}

/* 
 * inform validator super.
 * 
 * @param qstate: query state that finished.
 * @param id: module id.
 * @param super: the qstate to inform.
 */
void
val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
  struct module_qstate* super)
{
  struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id];
  log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is",
    &qstate->qinfo);
  log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo);
  if(!vq) {
    verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state");
    return;
  }
  if(vq->wait_prime_ta) {
    vq->wait_prime_ta = 0;
    process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
      qstate->return_msg, qstate->reply_origin, qstate);
    return;
  }
  if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) {
    int suspend;
    process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
      qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo,
      qstate->reply_origin, &suspend, qstate);
    /* If NSEC3 was needed during validation, NULL the NSEC3 cache;
     * it will be re-initiated if needed later on.
     * Validation (and the cache table) are happening/allocated in
     * the super qstate whilst the RRs are allocated (and pointed
     * to) in this sub qstate. */
    if(vq->nsec3_cache_table.ct) {
      vq->nsec3_cache_table.ct = NULL;
    }
    if(suspend) {
      /* deep copy the return_msg to vq->sub_ds_msg; it will
       * be resumed later in the super state with the caveat
       * that the initial calculations will be re-calculated
       * and re-suspended there before continuing. */
      vq->sub_ds_msg = dns_msg_deepcopy_region(
        qstate->return_msg, super->region);
    }
    return;
  } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
    process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
      qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo,
      qstate->reply_origin, qstate);
    return;
  }
  log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible");
}

void
val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
{
  struct val_qstate* vq;
  if(!qstate)
    return;
  vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
  if(vq) {
    if(vq->suspend_timer) {
      comm_timer_delete(vq->suspend_timer);
    }
  }
  /* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */
  qstate->minfo[id] = NULL;
}

size_t 
val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id)
{
  struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id];
  if(!ve)
    return 0;
  return sizeof(*ve) + key_cache_get_mem(ve->kcache) + 
    val_neg_get_mem(ve->neg_cache) +
    sizeof(size_t)*2*ve->nsec3_keyiter_count;
}

/**
 * The validator function block 
 */
static struct module_func_block val_block = {
  "validator",
  NULL, NULL, &val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super,
  &val_clear, &val_get_mem
};

struct module_func_block* 
val_get_funcblock(void)
{
  return &val_block;
}

const char* 
val_state_to_string(enum val_state state)
{
  switch(state) {
    case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE";
    case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE";
    case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE";
    case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE";
  }
  return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE";
}


Coverage Report

Created: 2025-08-03 06:57