/src/gnutls/lib/nettle/pk.c

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/*
 * Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 * Copyright (C) 2013-2017 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
 * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Red Hat, Inc.
 *
 * Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
 *
 * This file is part of GNUTLS.
 *
 * The GNUTLS library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
 * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
 * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
 *
 */

/* This file contains the functions needed for RSA/DSA public key
 * encryption and signatures.
 */

#include "gnutls_int.h"
#include "mpi.h"
#include "pk.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "datum.h"
#include "global.h"
#include "tls-sig.h"
#include "num.h"
#include "x509/x509_int.h"
#include "x509/common.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "pk.h"
#include <nettle/dsa.h>
#include "dsa-fips.h"
#include "rsa-fips.h"
#include <nettle/rsa.h>
#ifndef HAVE_NETTLE_RSA_OAEP_SHA256_ENCRYPT
#include "int/rsa-oaep.h"
#endif
#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
#include <nettle/bignum.h>
#include <nettle/ecc.h>
#include <nettle/ecdsa.h>
#include <nettle/ecc-curve.h>
#include <nettle/curve25519.h>
#include <nettle/curve448.h>
#include <nettle/eddsa.h>
#include <nettle/version.h>
#if ENABLE_GOST
#if NEED_INT_ECC
#include "ecc/gostdsa.h"
#include "ecc-gost-curve.h"
#else
#include <nettle/gostdsa.h>
#define gost_point_mul_g ecc_point_mul_g
#define gost_point_set ecc_point_set
#endif
#include "gost/gostdsa2.h"
#endif
#include "int/ecdsa-compute-k.h"
#include "int/dsa-compute-k.h"
#include "gnettle.h"
#include "fips.h"
#include "dh.h"
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
#include "dlwrap/oqs.h"
#endif

static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_nist_curve(int curve);
static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_gost_curve(int curve);

static inline const char *get_supported_nist_curve_order(int curve);
static inline const char *get_supported_nist_curve_modulus(int curve);

/* When these callbacks are used for a nettle operation, the
 * caller must check the macro HAVE_LIB_ERROR() after the operation
 * is complete. If the macro is true, the operation is to be considered
 * failed (meaning the random generation failed).
 */
static void rnd_key_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
  if (gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_KEY, data, length) < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
  }
}

static void rnd_tmpkey_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
  if (gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_RANDOM, data, length) < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
  }
}

static void rnd_nonce_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
  if (gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, data, length) < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
  }
}

static void rnd_datum_func(void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
  gnutls_datum_t *d = ctx;

  if (length > d->size) {
    memset(data, 0, length - d->size);
    memcpy(data + (length - d->size), d->data, d->size);
  } else {
    memcpy(data, d->data, length);
  }
}

static void rnd_nonce_func_fallback(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
  if (unlikely(_gnutls_get_lib_state() != LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)) {
    _gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
  }

  memset(data, 0xAA, length);
}

static void ecc_scalar_zclear(struct ecc_scalar *s)
{
  zeroize_key(s->p, ecc_size(s->ecc) * sizeof(mp_limb_t));
  ecc_scalar_clear(s);
}

static void ecc_point_zclear(struct ecc_point *p)
{
  zeroize_key(p->p, ecc_size_a(p->ecc) * sizeof(mp_limb_t));
  ecc_point_clear(p);
}

static void _dsa_params_get(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
          struct dsa_params *pub)
{
  memcpy(pub->p, pk_params->params[DSA_P], SIZEOF_MPZT);

  if (pk_params->params[DSA_Q])
    memcpy(&pub->q, pk_params->params[DSA_Q], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(pub->g, pk_params->params[DSA_G], SIZEOF_MPZT);
}

static void _rsa_params_to_privkey(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
           struct rsa_private_key *priv)
{
  memcpy(priv->d, pk_params->params[RSA_PRIV], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(priv->p, pk_params->params[RSA_PRIME1], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(priv->q, pk_params->params[RSA_PRIME2], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(priv->c, pk_params->params[RSA_COEF], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(priv->a, pk_params->params[RSA_E1], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(priv->b, pk_params->params[RSA_E2], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  /* we do not rsa_private_key_prepare() because it involves a multiplication.
   * we call it once when we import the parameters */
  priv->size = nettle_mpz_sizeinbase_256_u(
    TOMPZ(pk_params->params[RSA_MODULUS]));
}

/* returns a negative value on invalid pubkey */
static int _rsa_params_to_pubkey(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
         struct rsa_public_key *pub)
{
  memcpy(pub->n, pk_params->params[RSA_MODULUS], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  memcpy(pub->e, pk_params->params[RSA_PUB], SIZEOF_MPZT);
  if (rsa_public_key_prepare(pub) == 0)
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY);

  return 0;
}

static int _ecc_params_to_privkey(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
          struct ecc_scalar *priv,
          const struct ecc_curve *curve)
{
  ecc_scalar_init(priv, curve);
  if (ecc_scalar_set(priv, pk_params->params[ECC_K]) == 0) {
    ecc_scalar_clear(priv);
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);
  }

  return 0;
}

static int _ecc_params_to_pubkey(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
         struct ecc_point *pub,
         const struct ecc_curve *curve)
{
  ecc_point_init(pub, curve);
  if (ecc_point_set(pub, pk_params->params[ECC_X],
        pk_params->params[ECC_Y]) == 0) {
    ecc_point_clear(pub);
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY);
  }

  return 0;
}

#if ENABLE_GOST
static int _gost_params_to_privkey(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
           struct ecc_scalar *priv,
           const struct ecc_curve *curve)
{
  ecc_scalar_init(priv, curve);
  if (ecc_scalar_set(priv, pk_params->params[GOST_K]) == 0) {
    ecc_scalar_clear(priv);
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);
  }

  return 0;
}

static int _gost_params_to_pubkey(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
          struct ecc_point *pub,
          const struct ecc_curve *curve)
{
  ecc_point_init(pub, curve);
  if (gost_point_set(pub, pk_params->params[GOST_X],
         pk_params->params[GOST_Y]) == 0) {
    ecc_point_clear(pub);
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
  }

  return 0;
}
#endif

static int ecc_shared_secret(struct ecc_scalar *private_key,
           struct ecc_point *public_key, void *out,
           unsigned size)
{
  struct ecc_point r;
  mpz_t x, y;
  int ret = 0;

  mpz_init(x);
  mpz_init(y);
  ecc_point_init(&r, public_key->ecc);

  ecc_point_mul(&r, private_key, public_key);

  ecc_point_get(&r, x, y);

  /* Check if the point is not an identity element.  Note that this cannot
   * happen in nettle implementation, because it cannot represent an
   * infinity point. */
  if (mpz_cmp_ui(x, 0) == 0 && mpz_cmp_ui(y, 0) == 0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  nettle_mpz_get_str_256(size, out, x);

cleanup:
  mpz_clear(x);
  mpz_clear(y);
  ecc_point_clear(&r);

  return ret;
}

#define MAX_DH_BITS DEFAULT_MAX_VERIFY_BITS
/* This is used when we have no idea on the structure
 * of p-1 used by the peer. It is still a conservative
 * choice, but small than what we've been using before.
 */
#define DH_EXPONENT_SIZE(p_size) (2 * _gnutls_pk_bits_to_subgroup_bits(p_size))

static inline int edwards_curve_mul(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo, uint8_t *q,
            const uint8_t *n, const uint8_t *p)
{
  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
    curve25519_mul(q, n, p);
    return 0;
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448:
    curve448_mul(q, n, p);
    return 0;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
  }
}

/* This is used for DH or ECDH key derivation. In DH for example
 * it is given the peers Y and our x, and calculates Y^x
 */
static int _wrap_nettle_pk_derive(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
          gnutls_datum_t *out,
          const gnutls_pk_params_st *priv,
          const gnutls_pk_params_st *pub,
          const gnutls_datum_t *nonce,
          unsigned int flags)
{
  int ret;
  bool not_approved = false;

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_DH: {
    bigint_t f, x, q, prime;
    bigint_t k = NULL, primesub1 = NULL, r = NULL;
    unsigned int bits;

    if (nonce != NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    f = pub->params[DH_Y];
    x = priv->params[DH_X];
    q = priv->params[DH_Q];
    prime = priv->params[DH_P];

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&k, &primesub1, &r, NULL);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_sub_ui(primesub1, prime, 1);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    /* check if f==0,1, or f >= p-1 */
    if ((_gnutls_mpi_cmp_ui(f, 1) == 0) ||
        (_gnutls_mpi_cmp_ui(f, 0) == 0) ||
        (_gnutls_mpi_cmp(f, primesub1) >= 0)) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    /* if we have Q check that y ^ q mod p == 1 */
    if (q != NULL) {
      ret = _gnutls_mpi_powm(r, f, q, prime);
      if (ret < 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        goto dh_cleanup;
      }
      ret = _gnutls_mpi_cmp_ui(r, 1);
      if (ret != 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        goto dh_cleanup;
      }
    } else if ((flags & PK_DERIVE_TLS13) &&
         _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled()) {
      /* Mandatory in FIPS mode for TLS 1.3 */
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    /* prevent denial of service */
    bits = _gnutls_mpi_get_nbits(prime);
    if (bits == 0 || bits > MAX_DH_BITS) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    if (bits < 2048) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_powm(k, f, x, prime);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    /* check if k==0,1, or k = p-1 */
    if ((_gnutls_mpi_cmp_ui(k, 1) == 0) ||
        (_gnutls_mpi_cmp_ui(k, 0) == 0) ||
        (_gnutls_mpi_cmp(k, primesub1) == 0)) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    if (flags & PK_DERIVE_TLS13) {
      ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_size(k, out, (bits + 7) / 8);
    } else {
      ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint(k, out);
    }

    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto dh_cleanup;
    }

    ret = 0;
  dh_cleanup:
    _gnutls_mpi_release(&r);
    _gnutls_mpi_release(&primesub1);
    zrelease_temp_mpi_key(&k);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_EC: {
    struct ecc_scalar ecc_priv;
    struct ecc_point ecc_pub;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;
    struct ecc_scalar n;
    struct ecc_scalar m;
    struct ecc_point r;
    mpz_t x, y, xx, yy, nn, mm;

    out->data = NULL;

    if (nonce != NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    curve = get_supported_nist_curve(priv->curve);
    if (curve == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* P-192 is not supported in FIPS 140-3 */
    if (priv->curve == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    mpz_init(x);
    mpz_init(y);
    mpz_init(xx);
    mpz_init(yy);
    mpz_init(nn);
    mpz_init(mm);

    ecc_scalar_init(&n, curve);
    ecc_scalar_init(&m, curve);
    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);

    ret = _ecc_params_to_pubkey(pub, &ecc_pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto ecc_fail_cleanup;
    }

    ret = _ecc_params_to_privkey(priv, &ecc_priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ecc_point_clear(&ecc_pub);
      gnutls_assert();
      goto ecc_fail_cleanup;
    }

    out->size = gnutls_ecc_curve_get_size(priv->curve);
    /*ecc_size(curve)*sizeof(mp_limb_t); */
    out->data = gnutls_malloc(out->size);
    if (out->data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto ecc_cleanup;
    }

    /* Perform ECC Full Public-Key Validation Routine
       * according to SP800-56A (revision 3), 5.6.2.3.3.
       */

    /* Step 1: verify that Q is not an identity
       * element (an infinity point). Note that this
       * cannot happen in the nettle implementation,
       * because it cannot represent an infinity point
       * on curves. */
    ret = ecc_shared_secret(&ecc_priv, &ecc_pub, out->data,
          out->size);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_free(out->data);
      goto ecc_cleanup;
    }
#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
    if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled()) {
      const char *order, *modulus;

      ecc_point_mul(&r, &ecc_priv, &ecc_pub);
      ecc_point_get(&r, x, y);

      /* Step 2: verify that both coordinates of Q are
         * in the range [0, p - 1].
         *
         * Step 3: verify that Q lie on the curve
         *
         * Both checks are performed in nettle.  */
      if (!ecc_point_set(&r, x, y)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        goto ecc_cleanup;
      }

      /* Step 4: verify that n * Q, where n is the
         * curve order, result in an identity element
         *
         * Since nettle internally cannot represent an
         * identity element on curves, we validate this
         * instead:
         *
         *   (n - 1) * Q = -Q
         *
         * That effectively means: n * Q = -Q + Q = O
         */
      order = get_supported_nist_curve_order(priv->curve);
      if (unlikely(order == NULL)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto ecc_cleanup;
      }

      ret = mpz_set_str(nn, order, 16);
      if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
        goto ecc_cleanup;
      }

      modulus = get_supported_nist_curve_modulus(priv->curve);
      if (unlikely(modulus == NULL)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto ecc_cleanup;
      }

      ret = mpz_set_str(mm, modulus, 16);
      if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
        goto ecc_cleanup;
      }

      /* (n - 1) * Q = -Q */
      mpz_sub_ui(nn, nn, 1);
      ecc_scalar_set(&n, nn);
      ecc_point_mul(&r, &n, &r);
      ecc_point_get(&r, xx, yy);
      mpz_sub(mm, mm, y);

      if (mpz_cmp(xx, x) != 0 || mpz_cmp(yy, mm) != 0) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        goto ecc_cleanup;
      }
    } else {
      not_approved = true;
    }
#endif

  ecc_cleanup:
    ecc_point_clear(&ecc_pub);
    ecc_scalar_zclear(&ecc_priv);
  ecc_fail_cleanup:
    mpz_clear(x);
    mpz_clear(y);
    mpz_clear(xx);
    mpz_clear(yy);
    mpz_clear(nn);
    mpz_clear(mm);
    ecc_point_clear(&r);
    ecc_scalar_clear(&n);
    ecc_scalar_clear(&m);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;
    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448: {
    unsigned size = gnutls_ecc_curve_get_size(priv->curve);

    /* Edwards curves are not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    if (nonce != NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* The point is in pub, while the private part (scalar) in priv. */

    if (size == 0 || priv->raw_priv.size != size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    out->data = gnutls_malloc(size);
    if (out->data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    out->size = size;

    ret = edwards_curve_mul(algo, out->data, priv->raw_priv.data,
          pub->raw_pub.data);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;

    if (_gnutls_mem_is_zero(out->data, out->size)) {
      gnutls_free(out->data);
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
      goto cleanup;
    }
    break;
  }
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512: {
    struct ecc_scalar ecc_priv;
    struct ecc_point ecc_pub;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    /* GOST curves are not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    out->data = NULL;

    curve = get_supported_gost_curve(priv->curve);
    if (curve == NULL) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE;
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (nonce == NULL) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gost_params_to_pubkey(pub, &ecc_pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gost_params_to_privkey(priv, &ecc_priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ecc_point_clear(&ecc_pub);
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    out->size = 2 * gnutls_ecc_curve_get_size(priv->curve);
    out->data = gnutls_malloc(out->size);
    if (out->data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto gost_cleanup;
    }

    gostdsa_vko(&ecc_priv, &ecc_pub, nonce->size, nonce->data,
          out->data);

  gost_cleanup:
    ecc_point_clear(&ecc_pub);
    ecc_scalar_zclear(&ecc_priv);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;
    break;
  }
#endif
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;

cleanup:
  if (ret < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
  } else if (not_approved) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED);
  } else {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);
  }

  return ret;
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_encaps(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
          gnutls_datum_t *ciphertext,
          gnutls_datum_t *shared_secret,
          const gnutls_datum_t *pub)
{
  int ret;

  switch (algo) {
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
  case GNUTLS_PK_EXP_KYBER768: {
    OQS_KEM *kem = NULL;
    OQS_STATUS rc;

    kem = GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_new)(OQS_KEM_alg_kyber_768);
    if (kem == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);

    ciphertext->data = gnutls_malloc(kem->length_ciphertext);
    if (ciphertext->data == NULL) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    ciphertext->size = kem->length_ciphertext;

    shared_secret->data = gnutls_malloc(kem->length_shared_secret);
    if (shared_secret->data == NULL) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    shared_secret->size = kem->length_shared_secret;

    rc = GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_encaps)(
      kem, ciphertext->data, shared_secret->data, pub->data);
    if (rc != OQS_SUCCESS) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
    ret = 0;
  } break;
#endif
  default:
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
    goto cleanup;
  }

cleanup:
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_free(ciphertext->data);
    gnutls_free(shared_secret->data);
  }
  return ret;
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_decaps(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
          gnutls_datum_t *shared_secret,
          const gnutls_datum_t *ciphertext,
          const gnutls_datum_t *priv)
{
  int ret;

  switch (algo) {
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
  case GNUTLS_PK_EXP_KYBER768: {
    OQS_KEM *kem = NULL;
    OQS_STATUS rc;

    kem = GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_new)(OQS_KEM_alg_kyber_768);
    if (kem == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);

    shared_secret->data = gnutls_malloc(kem->length_shared_secret);
    if (shared_secret->data == NULL) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    shared_secret->size = kem->length_shared_secret;

    rc = GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_decaps)(
      kem, shared_secret->data, ciphertext->data, priv->data);
    if (rc != OQS_SUCCESS) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
    ret = 0;
  } break;
#endif
  default:
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
    goto cleanup;
  }
cleanup:
  if (ret < 0)
    gnutls_free(shared_secret->data);
  return ret;
}

/* This wraps nettle_rsa_encrypt so it returns ciphertext as a byte
 * array instead of a mpz_t value.  Returns 1 on success; 0 otherwise.
 */
static inline int _rsa_encrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *key, void *rnd_ctx,
             nettle_random_func *rnd_func, size_t length,
             const uint8_t *message, uint8_t *ciphertext)
{
  mpz_t p;
  int ret;

  mpz_init(p);

  ret = rsa_encrypt(key, rnd_ctx, rnd_func, length, message, p);

  if (ret == 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (_gnutls_mpi_bprint_size(p, ciphertext, key->size) < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

cleanup:
  mpz_clear(p);
  return ret;
}

/* This wraps nettle_rsa_oaep_sha*_encrypt to parametrize the function
 * calls with a DIG argument.  Returns 1 on success; 0 otherwise.
 */
static inline int _rsa_oaep_encrypt(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t dig,
            const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
            void *rnd_ctx, nettle_random_func *rnd_func,
            size_t label_length, const uint8_t *label,
            size_t length, const uint8_t *message,
            uint8_t *ciphertext)
{
  int (*encrypt_func)(const struct rsa_public_key *, void *,
          nettle_random_func *, size_t, const uint8_t *,
          size_t, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *);

  switch (dig) {
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
    encrypt_func = rsa_oaep_sha256_encrypt;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
    encrypt_func = rsa_oaep_sha384_encrypt;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
    encrypt_func = rsa_oaep_sha512_encrypt;
    break;
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    return 0;
  }

  return encrypt_func(pub, rnd_ctx, rnd_func, label_length, label, length,
          message, ciphertext);
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_encrypt(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
           gnutls_datum_t *ciphertext,
           const gnutls_datum_t *plaintext,
           const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params)
{
  int ret;
  bool not_approved = false;
  uint8_t *buf = NULL;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA && pk_params->spki.pk == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP) {
    algo = GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP;
  }

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA: {
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;

    if (!_gnutls_config_is_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_allowed()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* RSA encryption with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func_fallback;
    else
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;

    buf = gnutls_malloc(pub.size);
    if (!buf) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _rsa_encrypt(&pub, NULL, random_func, plaintext->size,
           plaintext->data, buf);
    if (ret == 0 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ciphertext->data = buf;
    buf = NULL;
    ciphertext->size = pub.size;
    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP: {
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;

    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func_fallback;
    else
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;

    buf = gnutls_malloc(pub.size);
    if (!buf) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _rsa_oaep_encrypt(pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_dig, &pub,
          NULL, random_func,
          pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_label.size,
          pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_label.data,
          plaintext->size, plaintext->data, buf);
    if (ret == 0 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    ciphertext->data = buf;
    buf = NULL;
    ciphertext->size = pub.size;
    break;
  }
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;

cleanup:
  gnutls_free(buf);
  if (ret < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
  } else if (not_approved) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED);
  } else {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);
  }

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return ret;
}

/* This wraps nettle_rsa_decrypt_tr so it takes ciphertext as a byte
 * array instead of a mpz_t value.  Returns 1 on success; 0 otherwise.
 */
static inline int _rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
          const struct rsa_private_key *key,
          void *rnd_ctx, nettle_random_func *rnd_func,
          size_t *length, uint8_t *message,
          const uint8_t *ciphertext)
{
  bigint_t c;
  int ret;

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&c, ciphertext, pub->size) < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    return 0;
  }

  ret = rsa_decrypt_tr(pub, key, rnd_ctx, rnd_func, length, message, c);

  _gnutls_mpi_release(&c);

  return ret;
}

/* This wraps nettle_rsa_oaep_sha*_decrypt to parametrize the function
 * calls with a DIG argument.  Returns 1 on success; 0 otherwise.
 */
static inline int _rsa_oaep_decrypt(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t dig,
            const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
            const struct rsa_private_key *key,
            void *rnd_ctx, nettle_random_func *rnd_func,
            size_t label_length, const uint8_t *label,
            size_t *length, uint8_t *message,
            const uint8_t *ciphertext)
{
  int (*decrypt_func)(const struct rsa_public_key *,
          const struct rsa_private_key *, void *,
          nettle_random_func *, size_t, const uint8_t *,
          size_t *, uint8_t *, const uint8_t *);

  switch (dig) {
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
    decrypt_func = rsa_oaep_sha256_decrypt;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
    decrypt_func = rsa_oaep_sha384_decrypt;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
    decrypt_func = rsa_oaep_sha512_decrypt;
    break;
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    return GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM;
  }

  return decrypt_func(pub, key, rnd_ctx, rnd_func, label_length, label,
          length, message, ciphertext);
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_decrypt(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
           gnutls_datum_t *plaintext,
           const gnutls_datum_t *ciphertext,
           const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params)
{
  int ret;
  bool not_approved = false;
  uint8_t *buf = NULL;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA && pk_params->spki.pk == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP) {
    algo = GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP;
  }

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA: {
    struct rsa_private_key priv;
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    size_t length;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;

    if (!_gnutls_config_is_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_allowed()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* RSA decryption with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    _rsa_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv);
    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (ciphertext->size != pub.size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    length = pub.size;
    buf = gnutls_malloc(length);
    if (!buf) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func_fallback;
    else
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
    ret = _rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &priv, NULL, random_func, &length,
              buf, ciphertext->data);

    if (ret == 0 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    plaintext->data = buf;
    buf = NULL;
    plaintext->size = length;
    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP: {
    struct rsa_private_key priv;
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    size_t length;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;

    _rsa_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv);
    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (ciphertext->size != pub.size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    length = pub.size;
    buf = gnutls_malloc(length);
    if (!buf) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func_fallback;
    else
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
    ret = _rsa_oaep_decrypt(pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_dig, &pub,
          &priv, NULL, random_func,
          pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_label.size,
          pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_label.data,
          &length, buf, ciphertext->data);

    if (ret == 0 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    plaintext->data = buf;
    buf = NULL;
    plaintext->size = length;
    break;
  }
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;

cleanup:
  gnutls_free(buf);
  if (ret < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
  } else if (not_approved) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED);
  } else {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);
  }

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return ret;
}

/* This wraps nettle_rsa_sec_decrypt so it takes ciphertext as a byte
 * array instead of a mpz_t value.  Returns 1 on success; 0 otherwise.
 */
static inline int _rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
           const struct rsa_private_key *key,
           void *rnd_ctx, nettle_random_func *rnd_func,
           size_t length, uint8_t *message,
           const uint8_t *ciphertext)
{
  bigint_t c;
  int ret;

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&c, ciphertext, pub->size) < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    return 0;
  }

  ret = rsa_sec_decrypt(pub, key, rnd_ctx, rnd_func, length, message, c);

  _gnutls_mpi_release(&c);

  return ret;
}

/* Note: we do not allocate in this function to avoid asymettric
 * unallocation (which creates a side channel) in case of failure
 * */
static int _wrap_nettle_pk_decrypt2(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
            const gnutls_datum_t *ciphertext,
            unsigned char *plaintext,
            size_t plaintext_size,
            const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params)
{
  struct rsa_private_key priv;
  struct rsa_public_key pub;
  uint32_t is_err;
  int ret;
  nettle_random_func *random_func;
  bool not_approved = false;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  if (algo != GNUTLS_PK_RSA || plaintext == NULL) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    goto fail;
  }

  if (pk_params->spki.pk == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP) {
    algo = GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP;
  }

  _rsa_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv);
  ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto fail;
  }

  if (ciphertext->size != pub.size) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
    goto fail;
  }

  if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)
    random_func = rnd_nonce_func_fallback;
  else
    random_func = rnd_nonce_func;

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
    if (!_gnutls_config_is_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_allowed()) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
      goto fail;
    }

    /* RSA decryption with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    ret = _rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &priv, NULL, random_func,
               plaintext_size, plaintext,
               ciphertext->data);
    break;
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP:
    ret = _rsa_oaep_decrypt(pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_dig, &pub,
          &priv, NULL, random_func,
          pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_label.size,
          pk_params->spki.rsa_oaep_label.data,
          &plaintext_size, plaintext,
          ciphertext->data);
    break;
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    goto fail;
  }

  /* The decrypt operation is infallible; treat the approved
   * operation as complete at this point, regardless of any
   * decryption failure detected below.
   */
  _gnutls_switch_fips_state(not_approved ?
            GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED :
            GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);

  /* after this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
   * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
   * channel that can be used as an oracle, so thread very carefully */

  /* Here HAVE_LIB_ERROR() should be fine as it doesn't have
   * branches in it and returns a bool */
  is_err = HAVE_LIB_ERROR();
  /* if is_err != 0 */
  is_err = CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(is_err, 0);
  /* or ret == 0 */
  is_err |= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
  /* then return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED */
  return (int)((is_err * UINT_MAX) & GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

fail:
  _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);

  return ret;
}

#define CHECK_INVALID_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(dig_size, salt_size, pub_size, err) \
  if (unlikely(dig_size + salt_size + 2 > pub_size))               \
  return gnutls_assert_val(err)

static int _rsa_pss_sign_digest_tr(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t dig,
           const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
           const struct rsa_private_key *priv,
           void *rnd_ctx, nettle_random_func *rnd_func,
           size_t salt_size, const uint8_t *digest,
           mpz_t s)
{
  int (*sign_func)(const struct rsa_public_key *,
       const struct rsa_private_key *, void *,
       nettle_random_func *, size_t, const uint8_t *,
       const uint8_t *, mpz_t);
  uint8_t *salt = NULL;
  size_t hash_size;
  int ret;

  switch (dig) {
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
    sign_func = rsa_pss_sha256_sign_digest_tr;
    hash_size = 32;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
    sign_func = rsa_pss_sha384_sign_digest_tr;
    hash_size = 48;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
    sign_func = rsa_pss_sha512_sign_digest_tr;
    hash_size = 64;
    break;
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    return GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM;
  }

  /* This is also checked in pss_encode_mgf1, but error out earlier.  */
  CHECK_INVALID_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(hash_size, salt_size, pub->size,
             GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY_PARAMS);

  if (salt_size > 0) {
    salt = gnutls_malloc(salt_size);
    if (salt == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);

    ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, salt, salt_size);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }
  }

  ret = sign_func(pub, priv, rnd_ctx, rnd_func, salt_size, salt, digest,
      s);
  if (ret == 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
  } else
    ret = 0;

cleanup:
  gnutls_free(salt);
  return ret;
}

static inline gnutls_ecc_curve_t get_eddsa_curve(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo)
{
  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
    return GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_ED25519;
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
    return GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_ED448;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_INVALID);
  }
}

static inline gnutls_ecc_curve_t get_ecdh_curve(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo)
{
  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
    return GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_X25519;
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448:
    return GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_X448;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_INVALID);
  }
}

static inline int eddsa_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo, const uint8_t *pub,
           const uint8_t *priv, size_t length,
           const uint8_t *msg, uint8_t *signature)
{
  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
    ed25519_sha512_sign(pub, priv, length, msg, signature);
    return 0;
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
    ed448_shake256_sign(pub, priv, length, msg, signature);
    return 0;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(
      GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
  }
}

/* This is the lower-level part of privkey_sign_raw_data().
 *
 * It accepts data in the appropriate hash form, i.e., DigestInfo
 * for PK_RSA, hash for PK_ECDSA, PK_DSA, PK_RSA_PSS, and raw data
 * for Ed25519 and Ed448.
 *
 * in case of EC/DSA, signed data are encoded into r,s values
 */
static int _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
        gnutls_datum_t *signature,
        const gnutls_datum_t *vdata,
        const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
        const gnutls_x509_spki_st *sign_params)
{
  int ret;
  unsigned int hash_len;
  const mac_entry_st *me;
  bool not_approved = false;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  /* check if the curve relates to the algorithm used */
  if (IS_EC(algo) && gnutls_ecc_curve_get_pk(pk_params->curve) != algo) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  /* deterministic ECDSA/DSA is prohibited under FIPS except in
   * the selftests */
  if ((algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA || algo == GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA) &&
      (sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE) &&
      _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled() &&
      _gnutls_get_lib_state() != LIB_STATE_SELFTEST) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519: /* we do EdDSA */
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448: {
    const gnutls_ecc_curve_entry_st *e;

    /* EdDSA is not approved yet */
    not_approved = true;

    if (unlikely(get_eddsa_curve(algo) != pk_params->curve)) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    e = _gnutls_ecc_curve_get_params(pk_params->curve);
    if (e == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    signature->data = gnutls_malloc(e->sig_size);
    if (signature->data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    signature->size = e->sig_size;

    if (pk_params->raw_pub.size != e->size ||
        pk_params->raw_priv.size != e->size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = eddsa_sign(algo, pk_params->raw_pub.data,
         pk_params->raw_priv.data, vdata->size,
         vdata->data, signature->data);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;

    break;
  }
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512: {
    struct ecc_scalar priv;
    struct dsa_signature sig;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    /* GOSTDSA is not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    curve = get_supported_gost_curve(pk_params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _ecc_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* This call will return a valid MAC entry and
       * getters will check that is not null anyway. */
    me = hash_to_entry(_gnutls_gost_digest(pk_params->algo));
    if (_gnutls_mac_get_algo_len(me) != vdata->size) {
      _gnutls_debug_log(
        "Security level of algorithm requires hash %s(%zd)\n",
        _gnutls_mac_get_name(me),
        _gnutls_mac_get_algo_len(me));
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    dsa_signature_init(&sig);

    gostdsa_sign(&priv, NULL, rnd_tmpkey_func, vdata->size,
           vdata->data, &sig);

    ret = _gnutls_encode_gost_rs(signature, &sig.r, &sig.s,
               (ecc_bit_size(curve) + 7) / 8);

    dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
    ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);

    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }
    break;
  }
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA: /* we do ECDSA */
  {
    struct ecc_scalar priv;
    struct dsa_signature sig;
    int curve_id = pk_params->curve;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;
    mpz_t q;
    /* 521-bit elliptic curve generator at maximum */
    uint8_t buf[(521 + 7) / 8];
    gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
    void *random_ctx;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;

    curve = get_supported_nist_curve(curve_id);
    if (curve == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* P-192 is not supported in FIPS 140-3 */
    if (curve_id == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    ret = _ecc_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    dsa_signature_init(&sig);

    me = _gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(pk_params, &hash_len);

    if (hash_len > vdata->size) {
      gnutls_assert();
      _gnutls_debug_log(
        "Security level of algorithm requires hash %s(%d) or better\n",
        _gnutls_mac_get_name(me), hash_len);
      hash_len = vdata->size;
    }

    /* Only SHA-2 is allowed in FIPS 140-3 */
    switch (DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig)) {
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA384:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA512:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA224:
      break;
    default:
      not_approved = true;
    }

    mpz_init(q);

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
        (sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
      mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];

      ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(q, curve_id);
      if (ret < 0)
        goto ecdsa_cleanup;

      ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
        h, mpz_limbs_read(q), priv.p,
        ecc_size(priv.ecc), ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc),
        DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
        vdata->size);
      if (ret < 0)
        goto ecdsa_cleanup;

      k.data = buf;
      k.size = (ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc) + 7) / 8;

      _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
                   ecc_size(priv.ecc));

      random_ctx = &k;
      random_func = rnd_datum_func;
    } else {
      random_ctx = NULL;
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
    }
    ecdsa_sign(&priv, random_ctx, random_func, hash_len,
         vdata->data, &sig);

    /* prevent memory leaks */
    if (HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      ret = GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE;
      goto ecdsa_cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_encode_ber_rs(signature, &sig.r, &sig.s);

  ecdsa_cleanup:
    dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
    ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);
    mpz_clear(q);

    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }
    break;
  }
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA: {
    struct dsa_params pub;
    bigint_t priv;
    struct dsa_signature sig;
    /* 512-bit DSA subgroup at maximum */
    uint8_t buf[(512 + 7) / 8];
    gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
    void *random_ctx;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;

    /* DSA is currently being defined as sunset with the
       * current draft of FIPS 186-5 */
    not_approved = true;

    memset(&priv, 0, sizeof(priv));
    memset(&pub, 0, sizeof(pub));
    _dsa_params_get(pk_params, &pub);

    priv = pk_params->params[DSA_X];

    dsa_signature_init(&sig);

    me = _gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(pk_params, &hash_len);

    if (hash_len > vdata->size) {
      gnutls_assert();
      _gnutls_debug_log(
        "Security level of algorithm requires hash %s(%d) or better (have: %d)\n",
        _gnutls_mac_get_name(me), hash_len,
        (int)vdata->size);
      hash_len = vdata->size;
    }

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
        (sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
      mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];

      ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
        h, mpz_limbs_read(pub.q),
        mpz_limbs_read(TOMPZ(priv)), mpz_size(pub.q),
        mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2),
        DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
        vdata->size);
      if (ret < 0)
        goto dsa_fail;

      k.data = buf;
      k.size = (mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2) + 7) / 8;

      _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
                 mpz_size(pub.q));

      random_ctx = &k;
      random_func = rnd_datum_func;
    } else {
      random_ctx = NULL;
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
    }
    ret = dsa_sign(&pub, TOMPZ(priv), random_ctx, random_func,
             hash_len, vdata->data, &sig);
    if (ret == 0 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
      goto dsa_fail;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_encode_ber_rs(signature, &sig.r, &sig.s);

  dsa_fail:
    dsa_signature_clear(&sig);

    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }
    break;
  }
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA: {
    struct rsa_private_key priv;
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    nettle_random_func *random_func;
    mpz_t s;

    _rsa_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv);

    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* RSA modulus size should be 2048-bit or larger in FIPS
       * 140-3.  In addition to this, only SHA-2 is allowed
       * for SigGen; it is checked in pk_prepare_hash lib/pk.c
       */
    if (unlikely(mpz_sizeinbase(pub.n, 2) < 2048)) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    mpz_init(s);

    if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST)
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func_fallback;
    else
      random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
    ret = rsa_pkcs1_sign_tr(&pub, &priv, NULL, random_func,
          vdata->size, vdata->data, s);
    if (ret == 0 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
      goto rsa_fail;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_size(s, signature, pub.size);

  rsa_fail:
    mpz_clear(s);

    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS: {
    struct rsa_private_key priv;
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    mpz_t s;

    _rsa_params_to_privkey(pk_params, &priv);

    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* RSA modulus size should be 2048-bit or larger in FIPS
       * 140-3.  In addition to this, only SHA-2 is allowed
       * for SigGen; however, Nettle only support SHA256,
       * SHA384, and SHA512 for RSA-PSS (see
       * _rsa_pss_sign_digest_tr in this file for details).
       */
    if (unlikely(mpz_sizeinbase(pub.n, 2) < 2048)) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    mpz_init(s);

    me = hash_to_entry(sign_params->rsa_pss_dig);

    /* According to FIPS 186-5 5.4, the salt length must be
       * in the range between 0 and the hash length inclusive.
       */
    if (sign_params->salt_size > _gnutls_mac_get_algo_len(me)) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    ret = _rsa_pss_sign_digest_tr(sign_params->rsa_pss_dig, &pub,
                &priv, NULL, rnd_nonce_func,
                sign_params->salt_size,
                vdata->data, s);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
      goto rsa_pss_fail;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_size(s, signature, pub.size);

  rsa_pss_fail:
    mpz_clear(s);

    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    break;
  }
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;

cleanup:
  if (ret < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
  } else if (not_approved) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED);
  } else {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);
  }

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return ret;
}

static int _rsa_pss_verify_digest(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t dig,
          const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
          size_t salt_size, const uint8_t *digest,
          size_t digest_size, const mpz_t s)
{
  int (*verify_func)(const struct rsa_public_key *, size_t,
         const uint8_t *, const mpz_t);
  size_t hash_size;

  switch (dig) {
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
    verify_func = rsa_pss_sha256_verify_digest;
    hash_size = 32;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
    verify_func = rsa_pss_sha384_verify_digest;
    hash_size = 48;
    break;
  case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
    verify_func = rsa_pss_sha512_verify_digest;
    hash_size = 64;
    break;
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    return 0;
  }

  if (digest_size != hash_size)
    return gnutls_assert_val(0);

  CHECK_INVALID_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(hash_size, salt_size, pub->size, 0);

  return verify_func(pub, salt_size, digest, s);
}

static inline int eddsa_verify(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo, const uint8_t *pub,
             size_t length, const uint8_t *msg,
             const uint8_t *signature)
{
  int ret;

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
    ret = ed25519_sha512_verify(pub, length, msg, signature);
    if (ret == 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
    return 0;
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
    ret = ed448_shake256_verify(pub, length, msg, signature);
    if (ret == 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
    return 0;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(
      GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
  }
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_verify(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
          const gnutls_datum_t *vdata,
          const gnutls_datum_t *signature,
          const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params,
          const gnutls_x509_spki_st *sign_params)
{
  int ret;
  unsigned int hash_len;
  bigint_t tmp[2] = { NULL, NULL };
  bool not_approved = false;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  /* check if the curve relates to the algorithm used */
  if (IS_EC(algo) && gnutls_ecc_curve_get_pk(pk_params->curve) != algo) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519: /* we do EdDSA */
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448: {
    const gnutls_ecc_curve_entry_st *e;

    /* EdDSA is not approved yet */
    not_approved = true;

    if (unlikely(get_eddsa_curve(algo) != pk_params->curve)) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    e = _gnutls_ecc_curve_get_params(pk_params->curve);
    if (e == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (signature->size != e->sig_size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (pk_params->raw_pub.size != e->size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = eddsa_verify(algo, pk_params->raw_pub.data, vdata->size,
           vdata->data, signature->data);
    break;
  }
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512: {
    struct ecc_point pub;
    struct dsa_signature sig;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;
    const mac_entry_st *me;

    /* GOSTDSA is not approved */
    not_approved = true;

    curve = get_supported_gost_curve(pk_params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* This call will return a valid MAC entry and
       * getters will check that is not null anyway. */
    me = hash_to_entry(_gnutls_gost_digest(pk_params->algo));
    if (_gnutls_mac_get_algo_len(me) != vdata->size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_decode_gost_rs(signature, &tmp[0], &tmp[1]);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gost_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    memcpy(sig.r, tmp[0], SIZEOF_MPZT);
    memcpy(sig.s, tmp[1], SIZEOF_MPZT);

    ret = gostdsa_verify(&pub, vdata->size, vdata->data, &sig);
    if (ret == 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED;
    } else
      ret = 0;

    ecc_point_clear(&pub);
    break;
  }
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA: /* ECDSA */
  {
    struct ecc_point pub;
    struct dsa_signature sig;
    int curve_id = pk_params->curve;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    curve = get_supported_nist_curve(curve_id);
    if (curve == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_decode_ber_rs(signature, &tmp[0], &tmp[1]);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _ecc_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    memcpy(sig.r, tmp[0], SIZEOF_MPZT);
    memcpy(sig.s, tmp[1], SIZEOF_MPZT);

    (void)_gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(pk_params, &hash_len);

    if (hash_len > vdata->size)
      hash_len = vdata->size;

    /* SHA-1 is allowed for SigVer in FIPS 140-3 in legacy
       * mode */
    switch (DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig)) {
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA1:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA384:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA512:
    case GNUTLS_MAC_SHA224:
      break;
    default:
      not_approved = true;
    }

    ret = ecdsa_verify(&pub, hash_len, vdata->data, &sig);
    if (ret == 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED;
    } else
      ret = 0;

    ecc_point_clear(&pub);
    break;
  }
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA: {
    struct dsa_params pub;
    struct dsa_signature sig;
    bigint_t y;

    /* DSA is currently being defined as sunset with the
       * current draft of FIPS 186-5 */
    not_approved = true;

    ret = _gnutls_decode_ber_rs(signature, &tmp[0], &tmp[1]);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }
    memset(&pub, 0, sizeof(pub));
    _dsa_params_get(pk_params, &pub);
    y = pk_params->params[DSA_Y];

    memcpy(sig.r, tmp[0], SIZEOF_MPZT);
    memcpy(sig.s, tmp[1], SIZEOF_MPZT);

    _gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(pk_params, &hash_len);

    if (hash_len > vdata->size)
      hash_len = vdata->size;

    ret = dsa_verify(&pub, TOMPZ(y), hash_len, vdata->data, &sig);
    if (ret == 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED;
    } else
      ret = 0;

    break;
  }
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA: {
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    size_t bits;

    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    bits = mpz_sizeinbase(pub.n, 2);

    /* In FIPS 140-3, RSA key size should be larger than
       * 2048-bit or one of the known lengths (1024, 1280,
       * 1536, 1792; i.e., multiple of 256-bits).
       *
       * In addition to this, only SHA-1 and SHA-2 are allowed
       * for SigVer; it is checked in _pkcs1_rsa_verify_sig in
       * lib/pubkey.c.
       */
    if (unlikely(bits < 2048 && bits != 1024 && bits != 1280 &&
           bits != 1536 && bits != 1792)) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    if (signature->size != pub.size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&tmp[0], signature->data,
                 signature->size);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = rsa_pkcs1_verify(&pub, vdata->size, vdata->data,
               TOMPZ(tmp[0]));
    if (ret == 0)
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
    else
      ret = 0;

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS: {
    struct rsa_public_key pub;

    if ((sign_params->flags &
         GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_RSA_PSS_FIXED_SALT_LENGTH) &&
        sign_params->salt_size != vdata->size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _rsa_params_to_pubkey(pk_params, &pub);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    /* RSA modulus size should be 2048-bit or larger in FIPS
       * 140-3.  In addition to this, only SHA-1 and SHA-2 are
       * allowed for SigVer, while Nettle only supports
       * SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 for RSA-PSS (see
       * _rsa_pss_verify_digest in this file for the details).
       */
    if (unlikely(mpz_sizeinbase(pub.n, 2) < 2048)) {
      not_approved = true;
    }

    if (signature->size != pub.size) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&tmp[0], signature->data,
                 signature->size);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _rsa_pss_verify_digest(sign_params->rsa_pss_dig, &pub,
               sign_params->salt_size,
               vdata->data, vdata->size,
               TOMPZ(tmp[0]));
    if (ret == 0)
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED);
    else
      ret = 0;

    break;
  }
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    ret = GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    goto cleanup;
  }

cleanup:
  if (ret < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
  } else if (not_approved) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED);
  } else {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);
  }

  _gnutls_mpi_release(&tmp[0]);
  _gnutls_mpi_release(&tmp[1]);
  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return ret;
}

static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_nist_curve(int curve)
{
  switch (curve) {
#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1:
    return nettle_get_secp_192r1();
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1:
    return nettle_get_secp_224r1();
#endif
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1:
    return nettle_get_secp_256r1();
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1:
    return nettle_get_secp_384r1();
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1:
    return nettle_get_secp_521r1();
  default:
    return NULL;
  }
}

static inline const char *get_supported_nist_curve_order(int curve)
{
  static const struct {
    int curve;
    const char *order;
  } orders[] = {
#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1, "ffffffffffffffffffffffff99def836"
                "146bc9b1b4d22831" },
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1, "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffff16a2"
                "e0b8f03e13dd29455c5c2a3d" },
#endif
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1,
      "ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffff"
      "bce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551" },
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1,
      "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
      "ffffffffffffffffc7634d81f4372ddf"
      "581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52973" },
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1, "1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
                "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
                "ffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a"
                "5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e91386"
                "409" },
  };
  size_t i;

  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(orders) / sizeof(orders[0]); i++) {
    if (orders[i].curve == curve)
      return orders[i].order;
  }
  return NULL;
}

static inline const char *get_supported_nist_curve_modulus(int curve)
{
  static const struct {
    int curve;
    const char *order;
  } orders[] = {
#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1, "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe"
                "ffffffffffffffff" },
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1, "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
                "000000000000000000000001" },
#endif
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1,
      "ffffffff000000010000000000000000"
      "00000000ffffffffffffffffffffffff" },
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1,
      "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
      "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe"
      "ffffffff0000000000000000ffffffff" },
    { GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1,
      "1ff"
      "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
      "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
      "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
      "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" },
  };
  size_t i;

  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(orders) / sizeof(orders[0]); i++) {
    if (orders[i].curve == curve)
      return orders[i].order;
  }
  return NULL;
}

static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_gost_curve(int curve)
{
  switch (curve) {
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA:
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPXA:
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256B:
    return nettle_get_gost_gc256b();
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST512A:
    return nettle_get_gost_gc512a();
#endif
  default:
    return NULL;
  }
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_curve_exists(gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
{
  switch (curve) {
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_ED448:
  case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_X448:
    return 1;
  default:
    return ((get_supported_nist_curve(curve) != NULL ||
       get_supported_gost_curve(curve) != NULL) ?
        1 :
        0);
  }
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_exists(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
{
  switch (pk) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_DH:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
  case GNUTLS_PK_EXP_KYBER768:
#endif
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
    return 1;
  default:
    return 0;
  }
}

static int _wrap_nettle_pk_sign_exists(gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sign)
{
  switch (sign) {
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA1:
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA1:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD5:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_RMD160:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA512:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA224:
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA224:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA256:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA224:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA512:
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA512:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA3_224:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA3_256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA3_384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA3_512:

#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA3_224:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA3_256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA3_384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA3_512:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA3_224:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA3_256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA3_384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA3_512:

  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_EDDSA_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_RAW:

  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:

  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:

#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_94:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_256:
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_512:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_SIGN_EDDSA_ED448:
    return 1;
  default:
    return 0;
  }
}

/* Generates algorithm's parameters. That is:
 *  For DSA: p, q, and g are generated.
 *  For RSA: nothing
 *  For ECDSA/EDDSA: nothing
 */
static int wrap_nettle_pk_generate_params(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
            unsigned int level /*bits or curve */,
            gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  int ret;
  unsigned int i, q_bits;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  params->algo = algo;

  switch (algo) {
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_DH: {
    struct dsa_params pub;
    struct dss_params_validation_seeds cert;
    unsigned index;

    dsa_params_init(&pub);

    if (GNUTLS_BITS_HAVE_SUBGROUP(level)) {
      q_bits = GNUTLS_BITS_TO_SUBGROUP(level);
      level = GNUTLS_BITS_TO_GROUP(level);
    } else {
      q_bits = _gnutls_pk_bits_to_subgroup_bits(level);
    }

    if (q_bits == 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);

    if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled() != 0 ||
        params->pkflags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_PROVABLE) {
      if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA)
        index = 1;
      else
        index = 2;

      if (params->palgo != 0 &&
          params->palgo != GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384) {
        ret = GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
        goto dsa_fail;
      }

      params->palgo = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384;

      if (params->seed_size) {
        ret = _dsa_generate_dss_pqg(&pub, &cert, index,
                  params->seed_size,
                  params->seed, NULL,
                  NULL, level,
                  q_bits);
      } else {
        ret = dsa_generate_dss_pqg(&pub, &cert, index,
                 NULL,
                 rnd_tmpkey_func,
                 NULL, NULL, level,
                 q_bits);
      }
      if (ret != 1 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR;
        goto dsa_fail;
      }

      if (cert.seed_length &&
          cert.seed_length < sizeof(params->seed)) {
        params->seed_size = cert.seed_length;
        memcpy(params->seed, cert.seed,
               cert.seed_length);
      }

      /* verify the generated parameters */
      ret = dsa_validate_dss_pqg(&pub, &cert, index);
      if (ret != 1) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR;
        goto dsa_fail;
      }
    } else {
      if (q_bits < 160)
        q_bits = 160;

      ret = dsa_generate_params(&pub, NULL, rnd_tmpkey_func,
              NULL, NULL, level, q_bits);
      if (ret != 1 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR;
        goto dsa_fail;
      }
    }

    params->params_nr = 0;

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&params->params[DSA_P],
               &params->params[DSA_Q],
               &params->params[DSA_G], NULL);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto dsa_fail;
    }
    params->params_nr = 3;

    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_P]), pub.p);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_Q]), pub.q);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_G]), pub.g);

    ret = 0;

  dsa_fail:
    dsa_params_clear(&pub);

    if (ret < 0)
      goto fail;

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448:
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
#endif
    break;
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
  }

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return 0;

fail:

  for (i = 0; i < params->params_nr; i++) {
    _gnutls_mpi_release(&params->params[i]);
  }
  params->params_nr = 0;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return ret;
}

#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
int _gnutls_dh_generate_key(gnutls_dh_params_t dh_params,
          gnutls_datum_t *priv_key, gnutls_datum_t *pub_key);

int _gnutls_dh_compute_key(gnutls_dh_params_t dh_params,
         const gnutls_datum_t *priv_key,
         const gnutls_datum_t *pub_key,
         const gnutls_datum_t *peer_key, gnutls_datum_t *Z);

int _gnutls_ecdh_compute_key(gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve, const gnutls_datum_t *x,
           const gnutls_datum_t *y, const gnutls_datum_t *k,
           const gnutls_datum_t *peer_x,
           const gnutls_datum_t *peer_y, gnutls_datum_t *Z);

int _gnutls_ecdh_generate_key(gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve, gnutls_datum_t *x,
            gnutls_datum_t *y, gnutls_datum_t *k);

int _gnutls_dh_generate_key(gnutls_dh_params_t dh_params,
          gnutls_datum_t *priv_key, gnutls_datum_t *pub_key)
{
  gnutls_pk_params_st params;
  int ret;

  gnutls_pk_params_init(&params);
  params.params[DH_P] = _gnutls_mpi_copy(dh_params->params[0]);
  params.params[DH_G] = _gnutls_mpi_copy(dh_params->params[1]);

  params.params_nr = 5;
  params.algo = GNUTLS_PK_DH;

  priv_key->data = NULL;
  pub_key->data = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_pk_generate_keys(GNUTLS_PK_DH, dh_params->q_bits, &params,
               0);
  if (ret < 0) {
    return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
  }

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_lz(params.params[DH_X], priv_key);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto fail;
  }

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_lz(params.params[DH_Y], pub_key);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto fail;
  }

  ret = 0;
  goto cleanup;
fail:
  gnutls_free(pub_key->data);
  gnutls_free(priv_key->data);
cleanup:
  gnutls_pk_params_clear(&params);
  gnutls_pk_params_release(&params);
  return ret;
}

/* Note that the value of Z will have the leading bytes stripped if they are zero -
 * which follows the TLS approach. */
int _gnutls_dh_compute_key(gnutls_dh_params_t dh_params,
         const gnutls_datum_t *priv_key,
         const gnutls_datum_t *pub_key,
         const gnutls_datum_t *peer_key, gnutls_datum_t *Z)
{
  gnutls_pk_params_st pub, priv;
  int ret;

  gnutls_pk_params_init(&pub);
  pub.params_nr = 5;
  pub.algo = GNUTLS_PK_DH;

  gnutls_pk_params_init(&priv);
  priv.params_nr = 5;
  priv.algo = GNUTLS_PK_DH;

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&pub.params[DH_Y], peer_key->data,
             peer_key->size) != 0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  priv.params[DH_P] = _gnutls_mpi_copy(dh_params->params[0]);
  priv.params[DH_G] = _gnutls_mpi_copy(dh_params->params[1]);
  if (dh_params->params[2])
    priv.params[DH_Q] = _gnutls_mpi_copy(dh_params->params[2]);

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&priv.params[DH_X], priv_key->data,
             priv_key->size) != 0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  Z->data = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_pk_derive(GNUTLS_PK_DH, Z, &priv, &pub);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;
cleanup:
  gnutls_pk_params_clear(&pub);
  gnutls_pk_params_release(&pub);
  gnutls_pk_params_clear(&priv);
  gnutls_pk_params_release(&priv);
  return ret;
}

int _gnutls_ecdh_generate_key(gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve, gnutls_datum_t *x,
            gnutls_datum_t *y, gnutls_datum_t *k)
{
  gnutls_pk_params_st params;
  int ret;

  gnutls_pk_params_init(&params);
  params.params_nr = 3;
  params.curve = curve;
  params.algo = GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA;

  x->data = NULL;
  y->data = NULL;
  k->data = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_pk_generate_keys(GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA, curve, &params, 0);
  if (ret < 0) {
    return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
  }

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_lz(params.params[ECC_X], x);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto fail;
  }

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_lz(params.params[ECC_Y], y);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto fail;
  }

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint_lz(params.params[ECC_K], k);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto fail;
  }

  ret = 0;
  goto cleanup;
fail:
  gnutls_free(y->data);
  gnutls_free(x->data);
  gnutls_free(k->data);
cleanup:
  gnutls_pk_params_clear(&params);
  gnutls_pk_params_release(&params);
  return ret;
}

int _gnutls_ecdh_compute_key(gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve, const gnutls_datum_t *x,
           const gnutls_datum_t *y, const gnutls_datum_t *k,
           const gnutls_datum_t *peer_x,
           const gnutls_datum_t *peer_y, gnutls_datum_t *Z)
{
  gnutls_pk_params_st pub, priv;
  int ret;

  gnutls_pk_params_init(&pub);
  pub.params_nr = 3;
  pub.algo = GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA;
  pub.curve = curve;

  gnutls_pk_params_init(&priv);
  priv.params_nr = 3;
  priv.algo = GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA;
  priv.curve = curve;

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&pub.params[ECC_Y], peer_y->data,
             peer_y->size) != 0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&pub.params[ECC_X], peer_x->data,
             peer_x->size) != 0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&priv.params[ECC_Y], y->data, y->size) !=
      0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&priv.params[ECC_X], x->data, x->size) !=
      0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&priv.params[ECC_K], k->data, k->size) !=
      0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  Z->data = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_pk_derive(GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA, Z, &priv, &pub);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;
cleanup:
  gnutls_pk_params_clear(&pub);
  gnutls_pk_params_release(&pub);
  gnutls_pk_params_clear(&priv);
  gnutls_pk_params_release(&priv);
  return ret;
}

static int pct_test(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
        const gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  int ret;
  gnutls_datum_t sig = { NULL, 0 };
  const char const_data[20] = "onetwothreefourfive";
  const char const_data_sha256[32] = "onetwothreefourfivesixseveneight";
  const char const_data_sha384[48] =
    "onetwothreefourfivesixseveneightnineteneleventwe";
  const char const_data_sha512[64] =
    "onetwothreefourfivesixseveneightnineteneleventwelvethirteenfourt";
  gnutls_datum_t ddata, tmp = { NULL, 0 };
  char *gen_data = NULL;
  gnutls_x509_spki_st spki;
  gnutls_fips140_context_t context;

  ret = _gnutls_x509_spki_copy(&spki, &params->spki);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA || algo == GNUTLS_PK_EC) {
    unsigned hash_len;
    const mac_entry_st *me;

    me = _gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(params, &hash_len);
    spki.dsa_dig = MAC_TO_DIG(me->id);
    gen_data = gnutls_malloc(hash_len);
    gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, gen_data, hash_len);

    ddata.data = (void *)gen_data;
    ddata.size = hash_len;
  } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01 || algo == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256) {
    ddata.data = (void *)const_data_sha256;
    ddata.size = sizeof(const_data_sha256);
  } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512) {
    ddata.data = (void *)const_data_sha512;
    ddata.size = sizeof(const_data_sha512);
  } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS) {
    if (spki.rsa_pss_dig == GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN)
      spki.rsa_pss_dig = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256;

    switch (spki.rsa_pss_dig) {
    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
      ddata.data = (void *)const_data_sha256;
      ddata.size = sizeof(const_data_sha256);
      break;
    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
      ddata.data = (void *)const_data_sha384;
      ddata.size = sizeof(const_data_sha384);
      break;
    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
      ddata.data = (void *)const_data_sha512;
      ddata.size = sizeof(const_data_sha512);
      break;
    default:
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }
  } else {
    ddata.data = (void *)const_data;
    ddata.size = sizeof(const_data);
  }

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP:
    if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
      /* Push a temporary FIPS context because _gnutls_pk_encrypt and
       * _gnutls_pk_decrypt below will mark RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 operation
       * non-approved */
      if (gnutls_fips140_context_init(&context) < 0) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
        goto cleanup;
      }
      if (gnutls_fips140_push_context(context) < 0) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
        gnutls_fips140_context_deinit(context);
        goto cleanup;
      }
    }

    ret = _gnutls_pk_encrypt(algo, &sig, &ddata, params);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
    }
    if (ret == 0 && ddata.size == sig.size &&
        memcmp(ddata.data, sig.data, sig.size) == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
    }
    if (ret == 0 &&
        _gnutls_pk_decrypt(algo, &tmp, &sig, params) < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
    }
    if (ret == 0 &&
        !(tmp.size == ddata.size &&
          memcmp(tmp.data, ddata.data, tmp.size) == 0)) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
    }

    if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
      if (unlikely(gnutls_fips140_pop_context() < 0)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
      }
      gnutls_fips140_context_deinit(context);
    }

    if (ret < 0) {
      goto cleanup;
    }

    free(sig.data);
    sig.data = NULL;

    /* RSA-OAEP can't be used for signing */
    if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP) {
      break;
    }

    FALLTHROUGH;
  case GNUTLS_PK_EC: /* we only do keys for ECDSA */
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
    ret = _gnutls_pk_sign(algo, &sig, &ddata, params, &spki);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = _gnutls_pk_verify(algo, &ddata, &sig, params, &spki);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
      gnutls_assert();
      goto cleanup;
    }
    break;
  case GNUTLS_PK_DH: {
    mpz_t y;

    /* Perform SP800 56A (rev 3) 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance
       * of Pair-wise Consistency check, even if we only
       * support ephemeral DH, as it is required by FIPS
       * 140-3 IG 10.3.A.
       *
       * Use the private key, x, along with the generator g
       * and prime modulus p included in the domain
       * parameters associated with the key pair to compute
       * g^x mod p. Compare the result to the public key, y.
       */
    mpz_init(y);
    mpz_powm(y, TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_G]),
       TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_X]),
       TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_P]));
    if (unlikely(mpz_cmp(y, TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_Y])) != 0)) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR);
      mpz_clear(y);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    mpz_clear(y);
    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448:
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
  case GNUTLS_PK_EXP_KYBER768:
#endif
    ret = 0;
    goto cleanup;
  default:
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_PK_ALGORITHM);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = 0;
cleanup:
  if (ret == GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR) {
    _gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
  }
  _gnutls_x509_spki_clear(&spki);
  gnutls_free(gen_data);
  gnutls_free(sig.data);
  gnutls_free(tmp.data);
  return ret;
}
#endif

static inline int eddsa_public_key(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo, uint8_t *pub,
           const uint8_t *priv)
{
  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
    ed25519_sha512_public_key(pub, priv);
    return 0;
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
    ed448_shake256_public_key(pub, priv);
    return 0;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(
      GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
  }
}

static inline int edwards_curve_mul_g(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo, uint8_t *q,
              const uint8_t *n)
{
  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
    curve25519_mul_g(q, n);
    return 0;
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448:
    curve448_mul_g(q, n);
    return 0;
  default:
    return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
  }
}

static inline int dh_find_q(const gnutls_pk_params_st *pk_params, mpz_t q)
{
  gnutls_datum_t prime = { NULL, 0 };
  gnutls_datum_t generator = { NULL, 0 };
  uint8_t *data_q;
  size_t n_q;
  bigint_t _q;
  int ret = 0;

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint(pk_params->params[DSA_P], &prime);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_dprint(pk_params->params[DSA_G], &generator);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (!_gnutls_dh_prime_match_fips_approved(
        prime.data, prime.size, generator.data, generator.size,
        &data_q, &n_q)) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (_gnutls_mpi_init_scan_nz(&_q, data_q, n_q) != 0) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  mpz_set(q, TOMPZ(_q));
  _gnutls_mpi_release(&_q);

cleanup:
  gnutls_free(prime.data);
  gnutls_free(generator.data);

  return ret;
}

/* To generate a DH key either q must be set in the params or
 * level should be set to the number of required bits.
 */
static int
wrap_nettle_pk_generate_keys(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
           unsigned int level /*bits or curve */,
           gnutls_pk_params_st *params, unsigned ephemeral
           /*non-zero if they are ephemeral keys */)
{
  int ret;
  unsigned int i;
  unsigned rnd_level;
  nettle_random_func *rnd_func;
  bool not_approved = false;

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;

  /* check if the curve relates to the algorithm used */
  if (IS_EC(algo) && gnutls_ecc_curve_get_pk(level) != algo) {
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
    goto cleanup;
  }

  if (ephemeral) {
    rnd_level = GNUTLS_RND_RANDOM;
    rnd_func = rnd_tmpkey_func;
  } else {
    rnd_func = rnd_key_func;
    rnd_level = GNUTLS_RND_KEY;
  }

  switch (algo) {
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
    if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled() != 0) {
      struct dsa_params pub;
      mpz_t x, y;

      /* DSA is currently being defined as sunset with the
       * current draft of FIPS 186-5 */
      not_approved = true;

      if (params->params[DSA_Q] == NULL) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
        goto cleanup;
      }

      _dsa_params_get(params, &pub);

      mpz_init(x);
      mpz_init(y);

      ret = dsa_generate_dss_keypair(&pub, y, x, NULL,
                   rnd_func, NULL, NULL);
      if (ret != 1 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR;
        goto dsa_fail;
      }

      ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&params->params[DSA_Y],
                 &params->params[DSA_X],
                 NULL);
      if (ret < 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        goto dsa_fail;
      }

      mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_Y]), y);
      mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_X]), x);
      params->params_nr += 2;

    dsa_fail:
      mpz_clear(x);
      mpz_clear(y);

      if (ret < 0)
        goto cleanup;

      break;
    }
#endif
    FALLTHROUGH;
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_DH: {
    struct dsa_params pub;
    mpz_t r;
    mpz_t x, y;
    int max_tries;
    unsigned have_q = 0;
    mpz_t q;
    mpz_t primesub1;
    mpz_t ypowq;

    if (algo != params->algo) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    _dsa_params_get(params, &pub);

    if (params->params[DSA_Q] != NULL)
      have_q = 1;

    /* This check is for the case !ENABLE_FIPS140 */
    if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA && have_q == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    mpz_init(r);
    mpz_init(x);
    mpz_init(y);

    mpz_init(q);
    mpz_init(primesub1);
    mpz_init(ypowq);

    max_tries = 3;
    do {
      if (have_q) {
        mpz_set(r, pub.q);
        mpz_sub_ui(r, r, 2);
        nettle_mpz_random(x, NULL, rnd_func, r);
        mpz_add_ui(x, x, 1);
      } else {
        unsigned size = mpz_sizeinbase(pub.p, 2);
        if (level == 0)
          level = MIN(size,
                DH_EXPONENT_SIZE(size));
        nettle_mpz_random_size(x, NULL, rnd_func,
                   level);

        if (level >= size)
          mpz_mod(x, x, pub.p);
      }

      mpz_powm(y, pub.g, x, pub.p);

      max_tries--;
      if (max_tries <= 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED;
        goto dh_fail;
      }

      if (HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
        gnutls_assert();
        ret = GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE;
        goto dh_fail;
      }

    } while (mpz_cmp_ui(y, 1) == 0);

#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
    if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled()) {
      /* Perform FFC full public key validation checks
         * according to SP800-56A (revision 3), 5.6.2.3.1.
         */

      /* Step 1: 2 <= y <= p - 2 */
      mpz_sub_ui(primesub1, pub.p, 1);

      if (mpz_cmp_ui(y, 2) < 0 ||
          mpz_cmp(y, primesub1) >= 0) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED);
        goto dh_fail;
      }

      /* Step 2: 1 = y^q mod p */
      if (have_q)
        mpz_set(q, pub.q);
      else {
        ret = dh_find_q(params, q);
        if (ret < 0)
          goto dh_fail;
      }

      mpz_powm(ypowq, y, q, pub.p);
      if (mpz_cmp_ui(ypowq, 1) != 0) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED);
        goto dh_fail;
      }
    }
#endif

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&params->params[DSA_Y],
               &params->params[DSA_X], NULL);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto dh_fail;
    }

    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_Y]), y);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[DSA_X]), x);
    params->params_nr += 2;

    ret = 0;

  dh_fail:
    mpz_clear(r);
    mpz_clear(x);
    mpz_clear(y);
    mpz_clear(q);
    mpz_clear(primesub1);
    mpz_clear(ypowq);

    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA: {
    struct rsa_public_key pub;
    struct rsa_private_key priv;

    rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
    rsa_private_key_init(&priv);

    mpz_set_ui(pub.e, 65537);

    if ((params->pkflags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_PROVABLE) ||
        _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled() != 0) {
      params->pkflags |= GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_PROVABLE;
      if (params->palgo != 0 &&
          params->palgo != GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384) {
        ret = GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
        goto rsa_fail;
      }

      params->palgo = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384;

      if (params->seed_size) {
        ret = _rsa_generate_fips186_4_keypair(
          &pub, &priv, params->seed_size,
          params->seed, NULL, NULL, level);
      } else {
        unsigned retries = 0;
        /* The provable RSA key generation process is deterministic
           * but has an internal maximum iteration counter and when
           * exceed will fail for certain random seeds. This is a very
           * rare condition, but it nevertheless happens and even CI builds fail
           * occasionally. When we generate the random seed internally, remediate
           * by retrying a different seed on failure. */
        do {
          params->seed_size =
            sizeof(params->seed);
          ret = rsa_generate_fips186_4_keypair(
            &pub, &priv, NULL, rnd_func,
            NULL, NULL, &params->seed_size,
            params->seed, level);
        } while (ret != 1 && ++retries < 3);
      }
    } else {
      not_approved = true;

      ret = rsa_generate_keypair(&pub, &priv, NULL, rnd_func,
               NULL, NULL, level, 0);
    }
    if (ret != 1 || HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
      gnutls_assert();
      ret = GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR;
      goto rsa_fail;
    }

    params->params_nr = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS; i++) {
      ret = _gnutls_mpi_init(&params->params[i]);
      if (ret < 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        goto rsa_fail;
      }
      params->params_nr++;
    }

    /* In FIPS 140-3, pub.n should be 2048-bit or larger; it
       * is assured in rsa_generate_fips186_4_keypair in
       * lib/nettle/int/rsa-keygen-fips186.c. */

    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_MODULUS]), pub.n);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PUB]), pub.e);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIV]), priv.d);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME1]), priv.p);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME2]), priv.q);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_COEF]), priv.c);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_E1]), priv.a);
    mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_E2]), priv.b);

    ret = 0;

  rsa_fail:
    rsa_private_key_clear(&priv);
    rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);

    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448: {
    unsigned size = gnutls_ecc_curve_get_size(level);

    /* EdDSA is not approved yet */
    not_approved = true;

    if (params->pkflags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_PROVABLE) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (unlikely(get_eddsa_curve(algo) != level)) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    if (size == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    params->curve = level;

    params->raw_priv.data = gnutls_malloc(size);
    if (params->raw_priv.data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    params->raw_pub.data = gnutls_malloc(size);
    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = gnutls_rnd(rnd_level, params->raw_priv.data, size);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    params->raw_pub.size = size;
    params->raw_priv.size = size;

    ret = eddsa_public_key(algo, params->raw_pub.data,
               params->raw_priv.data);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;

    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA:
    if (params->pkflags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_PROVABLE)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    {
      struct ecc_scalar key;
      struct ecc_point pub;
      const struct ecc_curve *curve;
      struct ecc_scalar n;
      struct ecc_scalar m;
      struct ecc_point r;
      mpz_t x, y, xx, yy, nn, mm;

      curve = get_supported_nist_curve(level);
      if (curve == NULL) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
        goto cleanup;
      }

      /* P-192 is not supported in FIPS 140-3 */
      if (level == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1) {
        not_approved = true;
      }

      mpz_init(x);
      mpz_init(y);
      mpz_init(xx);
      mpz_init(yy);
      mpz_init(nn);
      mpz_init(mm);

      ecc_scalar_init(&key, curve);
      ecc_point_init(&pub, curve);
      ecc_scalar_init(&n, curve);
      ecc_scalar_init(&m, curve);
      ecc_point_init(&r, curve);

      ecdsa_generate_keypair(&pub, &key, NULL, rnd_func);
      if (HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE);
        goto ecc_fail;
      }

      ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&params->params[ECC_X],
                 &params->params[ECC_Y],
                 &params->params[ECC_K],
                 NULL);
      if (ret < 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        goto ecc_fail;
      }

      params->curve = level;
      params->params_nr = ECC_PRIVATE_PARAMS;

      ecc_point_get(&pub, x, y);

#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
      if (_gnutls_fips_mode_enabled()) {
        /* Perform ECC full public key validation checks
         * according to SP800-56A (revision 3), 5.6.2.3.3.
         */

        const char *order, *modulus;

        /* Step 1: verify that Q is not an identity
         * element (an infinity point).  Note that this
         * cannot happen in the nettle implementation,
         * because it cannot represent an infinity point
         * on curves. */
        if (mpz_cmp_ui(x, 0) == 0 &&
            mpz_cmp_ui(y, 0) == 0) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }

        /* Step 2: verify that both coordinates of Q are
         * in the range [0, p - 1].
         *
         * Step 3: verify that Q lie on the curve
         *
         * Both checks are performed in nettle.  */
        if (!ecc_point_set(&r, x, y)) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }

        /* Step 4: verify that n * Q, where n is the
         * curve order, result in an identity element
         *
         * Since nettle internally cannot represent an
         * identity element on curves, we validate this
         * instead:
         *
         *   (n - 1) * Q = -Q
         *
         * That effectively means: n * Q = -Q + Q = O
         */
        order = get_supported_nist_curve_order(level);
        if (unlikely(order == NULL)) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }

        ret = mpz_set_str(nn, order, 16);
        if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }

        modulus =
          get_supported_nist_curve_modulus(level);
        if (unlikely(modulus == NULL)) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }

        ret = mpz_set_str(mm, modulus, 16);
        if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }

        /* (n - 1) * Q = -Q */
        mpz_sub_ui(nn, nn, 1);
        ecc_scalar_set(&n, nn);
        ecc_point_mul(&r, &n, &r);
        ecc_point_get(&r, xx, yy);
        mpz_sub(mm, mm, y);

        if (mpz_cmp(xx, x) != 0 ||
            mpz_cmp(yy, mm) != 0) {
          ret = gnutls_assert_val(
            GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
          goto ecc_fail;
        }
      } else {
        not_approved = true;
      }
#endif

      mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_X]), x);
      mpz_set(TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_Y]), y);

      ecc_scalar_get(&key, TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_K]));

      ret = 0;

    ecc_fail:
      mpz_clear(x);
      mpz_clear(y);
      mpz_clear(xx);
      mpz_clear(yy);
      mpz_clear(nn);
      mpz_clear(mm);
      ecc_point_clear(&pub);
      ecc_scalar_clear(&key);
      ecc_point_clear(&r);
      ecc_scalar_clear(&n);
      ecc_scalar_clear(&m);

      if (ret < 0)
        goto cleanup;

      break;
    }
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
    if (params->pkflags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_PROVABLE)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    {
      struct ecc_scalar key;
      struct ecc_point pub;
      const struct ecc_curve *curve;
      const mac_entry_st *me;

      /* GOST curves are not approved */
      not_approved = true;

      curve = get_supported_gost_curve(level);
      if (curve == NULL) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);
        goto cleanup;
      }

      me = hash_to_entry(_gnutls_gost_digest(algo));
      if (!me || me->output_size * 8 != ecc_bit_size(curve)) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
        goto cleanup;
      }

      ecc_scalar_init(&key, curve);
      ecc_point_init(&pub, curve);

      gostdsa_generate_keypair(&pub, &key, NULL,
             rnd_key_func);
      if (HAVE_LIB_ERROR()) {
        ret = gnutls_assert_val(
          GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE);
        goto ecc_fail;
      }

      ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&params->params[GOST_X],
                 &params->params[GOST_Y],
                 &params->params[GOST_K],
                 NULL);
      if (ret < 0) {
        gnutls_assert();
        goto gost_fail;
      }

      params->curve = level;
      params->params_nr = GOST_PRIVATE_PARAMS;

      ecc_point_get(&pub, TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_X]),
              TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_Y]));
      ecc_scalar_get(&key, TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_K]));

      ret = 0;

    gost_fail:
      ecc_point_clear(&pub);
      ecc_scalar_clear(&key);

      if (ret < 0)
        goto cleanup;

      break;
    }
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448: {
    unsigned size = gnutls_ecc_curve_get_size(level);

    not_approved = true;

    if (size == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    params->curve = level;

    params->raw_priv.data = gnutls_malloc(size);
    if (params->raw_priv.data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    params->raw_pub.data = gnutls_malloc(size);
    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = gnutls_rnd(rnd_level, params->raw_priv.data, size);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }
    params->raw_pub.size = size;
    params->raw_priv.size = size;

    ret = edwards_curve_mul_g(algo, params->raw_pub.data,
            params->raw_priv.data);
    if (ret < 0)
      goto cleanup;
    break;
  }
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
  case GNUTLS_PK_EXP_KYBER768: {
    OQS_KEM *kem = NULL;
    OQS_STATUS rc;

    not_approved = true;

    kem = GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_new)(OQS_KEM_alg_kyber_768);
    if (kem == NULL) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    params->raw_priv.size = kem->length_secret_key;
    params->raw_priv.data = gnutls_malloc(params->raw_priv.size);
    if (params->raw_priv.data == NULL) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    params->raw_pub.size = kem->length_public_key;
    params->raw_pub.data = gnutls_malloc(params->raw_pub.size);
    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    rc = GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_keypair)(kem, params->raw_pub.data,
                  params->raw_priv.data);
    if (rc != OQS_SUCCESS) {
      GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto cleanup;
    }

    GNUTLS_OQS_FUNC(OQS_KEM_free)(kem);

    ret = 0;
    break;
  }
#endif
  default:
    gnutls_assert();
    return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
  }

  params->algo = algo;

#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
  ret = pct_test(algo, params);
  if (ret < 0) {
    gnutls_assert();
    goto cleanup;
  }
#endif

cleanup:
  if (ret < 0) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR);
    for (i = 0; i < params->params_nr; i++) {
      _gnutls_mpi_release(&params->params[i]);
    }
    params->params_nr = 0;
    gnutls_free(params->raw_priv.data);
    gnutls_free(params->raw_pub.data);
  } else if (not_approved) {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED);
  } else {
    _gnutls_switch_fips_state(GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED);
  }

  FAIL_IF_LIB_ERROR;
  return ret;
}

static int wrap_nettle_pk_verify_priv_params(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
               const gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  int ret;

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP: {
    bigint_t t1 = NULL, t2 = NULL;

    if (params->params_nr != RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&t1, &t2, NULL);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    _gnutls_mpi_mulm(t1, params->params[RSA_PRIME1],
         params->params[RSA_PRIME2],
         params->params[RSA_MODULUS]);
    if (_gnutls_mpi_cmp_ui(t1, 0) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto rsa_cleanup;
    }

    mpz_invert(TOMPZ(t1), TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME2]),
         TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME1]));
    if (_gnutls_mpi_cmp(t1, params->params[RSA_COEF]) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto rsa_cleanup;
    }

    /* [RSA_PRIME1] = d % p-1, [RSA_PRIME2] = d % q-1 */
    _gnutls_mpi_sub_ui(t1, params->params[RSA_PRIME1], 1);
    ret = _gnutls_mpi_modm(t2, params->params[RSA_PRIV], t1);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto rsa_cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_mpi_cmp(params->params[RSA_E1], t2) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto rsa_cleanup;
    }

    _gnutls_mpi_sub_ui(t1, params->params[RSA_PRIME2], 1);

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_modm(t2, params->params[RSA_PRIV], t1);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
      goto rsa_cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_mpi_cmp(params->params[RSA_E2], t2) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto rsa_cleanup;
    }

    ret = 0;

  rsa_cleanup:
    zrelease_mpi_key(&t1);
    zrelease_mpi_key(&t2);
  }

  break;
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_DH: {
    bigint_t t1 = NULL;

    if (params->params_nr != DSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_init(&t1);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    ret = _gnutls_mpi_powm(t1, params->params[DSA_G],
               params->params[DSA_X],
               params->params[DSA_P]);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_assert();
      goto dsa_cleanup;
    }

    if (_gnutls_mpi_cmp(t1, params->params[DSA_Y]) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto dsa_cleanup;
    }

    ret = 0;

  dsa_cleanup:
    zrelease_mpi_key(&t1);
  }

  break;
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA: {
    struct ecc_point r, pub;
    struct ecc_scalar priv;
    mpz_t x1, y1, x2, y2;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    if (params->params_nr != ECC_PRIVATE_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    curve = get_supported_nist_curve(params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    ret = _ecc_params_to_pubkey(params, &pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    ret = _ecc_params_to_privkey(params, &priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ecc_point_clear(&pub);
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
    }

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    /* verify that x,y lie on the curve */
    ret = ecc_point_set(&r, TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_X]),
            TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_Y]));
    if (ret == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto ecc_cleanup;
    }
    ecc_point_clear(&r);

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    ecc_point_mul_g(&r, &priv);

    mpz_init(x1);
    mpz_init(y1);
    ecc_point_get(&r, x1, y1);
    ecc_point_zclear(&r);

    mpz_init(x2);
    mpz_init(y2);
    ecc_point_get(&pub, x2, y2);

    /* verify that k*(Gx,Gy)=(x,y) */
    if (mpz_cmp(x1, x2) != 0 || mpz_cmp(y1, y2) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto ecc_cleanup;
    }

    ret = 0;

  ecc_cleanup:
    ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);
    ecc_point_clear(&pub);

    mpz_clear(x1);
    mpz_clear(y1);
    mpz_clear(x2);
    mpz_clear(y2);
  } break;
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448: {
    gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve;
    const gnutls_ecc_curve_entry_st *e;
    uint8_t pub[57]; /* can accommodate both curves */

    curve = get_eddsa_curve(algo);
    e = _gnutls_ecc_curve_get_params(curve);
    if (e == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      return 0; /* nothing to verify */
    }

    if (params->raw_pub.size != e->size)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);

    ret = eddsa_public_key(algo, pub, params->raw_priv.data);
    if (ret < 0)
      return ret;

    if (memcmp(params->raw_pub.data, pub, e->size) != 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);

    ret = 0;
    break;
  }
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448: {
    gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve;
    const gnutls_ecc_curve_entry_st *e;
    uint8_t pub[57]; /* can accommodate both curves */

    curve = get_ecdh_curve(algo);
    e = _gnutls_ecc_curve_get_params(curve);
    if (e == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      return 0; /* nothing to verify */
    }

    if (params->raw_pub.size != e->size)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);

    ret = edwards_curve_mul_g(algo, pub, params->raw_priv.data);
    if (ret < 0)
      return ret;

    if (memcmp(params->raw_pub.data, pub, e->size) != 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);

    ret = 0;
    break;
  }
#ifdef HAVE_LIBOQS
  case GNUTLS_PK_EXP_KYBER768:
    ret = 0;
    break;
#endif
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512: {
    struct ecc_point r, pub;
    struct ecc_scalar priv;
    mpz_t x1, y1, x2, y2;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    if (params->params_nr != GOST_PRIVATE_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    curve = get_supported_gost_curve(params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    ret = _gost_params_to_pubkey(params, &pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    ret = _gost_params_to_privkey(params, &priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      ecc_point_clear(&pub);
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
    }

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    /* verify that x,y lie on the curve */
    ret = gost_point_set(&r, TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_X]),
             TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_Y]));
    if (ret == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto gost_cleanup;
    }
    ecc_point_clear(&r);

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    gost_point_mul_g(&r, &priv);

    mpz_init(x1);
    mpz_init(y1);
    ecc_point_get(&r, x1, y1);
    ecc_point_zclear(&r);

    mpz_init(x2);
    mpz_init(y2);
    ecc_point_get(&pub, x2, y2);

    /* verify that k*(Gx,Gy)=(x,y) */
    if (mpz_cmp(x1, x2) != 0 || mpz_cmp(y1, y2) != 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto gost_cleanup;
    }

    ret = 0;

  gost_cleanup:
    ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);
    ecc_point_clear(&pub);

    mpz_clear(x1);
    mpz_clear(y1);
    mpz_clear(x2);
    mpz_clear(y2);
  } break;
#endif
  default:
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
  }

  return ret;
}

static int wrap_nettle_pk_verify_pub_params(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
              const gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  int ret;

  switch (algo) {
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
  case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_OAEP:
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
#endif
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519:
  case GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448:
    return 0;
  case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA: {
    /* just verify that x and y lie on the curve */
    struct ecc_point r, pub;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    if (params->params_nr != ECC_PUBLIC_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    curve = get_supported_nist_curve(params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    ret = _ecc_params_to_pubkey(params, &pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    /* verify that x,y lie on the curve */
    ret = ecc_point_set(&r, TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_X]),
            TOMPZ(params->params[ECC_Y]));
    if (ret == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto ecc_cleanup;
    }
    ecc_point_clear(&r);

    ret = 0;

  ecc_cleanup:
    ecc_point_clear(&pub);
  } break;
#if ENABLE_GOST
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
  case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512: {
    /* just verify that x and y lie on the curve */
    struct ecc_point r, pub;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    if (params->params_nr != GOST_PUBLIC_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    curve = get_supported_gost_curve(params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    ret = _gost_params_to_pubkey(params, &pub, curve);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    /* verify that x,y lie on the curve */
    ret = ecc_point_set(&r, TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_X]),
            TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_Y]));
    if (ret == 0) {
      ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
      goto gost_cleanup;
    }
    ecc_point_clear(&r);

    ret = 0;

  gost_cleanup:
    ecc_point_clear(&pub);
  } break;
#endif
  default:
    ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
  }

  return ret;
}

static int calc_rsa_exp(gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  bigint_t tmp;
  int ret;

  if (params->params_nr < RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS - 2) {
    gnutls_assert();
    return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  }

  params->params[RSA_E1] = params->params[RSA_E2] = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&tmp, &params->params[RSA_E1],
             &params->params[RSA_E2], NULL);
  if (ret < 0)
    return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

  /* [6] = d % p-1, [7] = d % q-1 */
  _gnutls_mpi_sub_ui(tmp, params->params[RSA_PRIME1], 1);
  ret = _gnutls_mpi_modm(params->params[RSA_E1],
             params->params[RSA_PRIV] /*d */, tmp);
  if (ret < 0)
    goto fail;

  _gnutls_mpi_sub_ui(tmp, params->params[RSA_PRIME2], 1);
  ret = _gnutls_mpi_modm(params->params[RSA_E2],
             params->params[RSA_PRIV] /*d */, tmp);
  if (ret < 0)
    goto fail;

  zrelease_mpi_key(&tmp);

  return 0;

fail:
  zrelease_mpi_key(&tmp);
  zrelease_mpi_key(&params->params[RSA_E1]);
  zrelease_mpi_key(&params->params[RSA_E2]);

  return ret;
}

static int calc_rsa_priv(gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  bigint_t lcm, p1, q1;
  int ret;

  params->params[RSA_PRIV] = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_multi(&params->params[RSA_PRIV], &lcm, &p1, &q1,
             NULL);
  if (ret < 0)
    return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

  /* lcm(p - 1, q - 1) */
  mpz_sub_ui(p1, params->params[RSA_PRIME1], 1);
  mpz_sub_ui(q1, params->params[RSA_PRIME2], 1);
  mpz_lcm(lcm, p1, q1);

  zrelease_mpi_key(&p1);
  zrelease_mpi_key(&q1);

  /* d = e^{-1} (mod lcm) */
  ret = mpz_invert(params->params[RSA_PRIV], params->params[RSA_PUB],
       lcm);

  zrelease_mpi_key(&lcm);

  if (ret == 0) {
    zrelease_mpi_key(&params->params[RSA_PRIV]);
    return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
  }

  return 0;
}

#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
static int calc_dsa_pub(gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  int ret;

  params->params[DSA_Y] = NULL;

  ret = _gnutls_mpi_init(&params->params[DSA_Y]);
  if (ret < 0)
    return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

  /* y = g^x mod p */
  ret = _gnutls_mpi_powm(params->params[DSA_Y], params->params[DSA_G],
             params->params[DSA_X], params->params[DSA_P]);
  if (ret < 0) {
    zrelease_mpi_key(&params->params[DSA_Y]);
    return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
  }

  return 0;
}
#endif

static int wrap_nettle_pk_fixup(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
        gnutls_direction_t direction,
        gnutls_pk_params_st *params)
{
  int ret;

  if (direction != GNUTLS_IMPORT)
    return 0;

  if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
    struct rsa_private_key priv;

    if (params->params[RSA_PRIV] == NULL) {
      ret = calc_rsa_priv(params);
      if (ret < 0)
        return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
      params->params_nr++;
    }

    /* do not trust the generated values. Some old private keys
     * generated by us have mess on the values. Those were very
     * old but it seemed some of the shipped example private
     * keys were as old.
     */
    if (params->params_nr < RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS - 3)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);

    if (params->params[RSA_COEF] == NULL) {
      ret = _gnutls_mpi_init(&params->params[RSA_COEF]);
      if (ret < 0)
        return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
    }

    if (mpz_cmp_ui(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME1]), 0) == 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);

    if (mpz_invert(TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_COEF]),
             TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME2]),
             TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_PRIME1])) == 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);

    /* calculate exp1 [6] and exp2 [7] */
    zrelease_mpi_key(&params->params[RSA_E1]);
    zrelease_mpi_key(&params->params[RSA_E2]);

    /* marks RSA_COEF as present */
    params->params_nr = RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS - 2;
    ret = calc_rsa_exp(params);
    if (ret < 0)
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);

    params->params_nr = RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS;

    /* perform nettle's internal checks */
    _rsa_params_to_privkey(params, &priv);
    ret = rsa_private_key_prepare(&priv);
    if (ret == 0) {
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);
    }
  } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED25519 ||
       algo == GNUTLS_PK_EDDSA_ED448) {
    if (unlikely(get_eddsa_curve(algo) != params->curve))
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    if (params->raw_priv.data == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);

    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      params->raw_pub.data =
        gnutls_malloc(params->raw_priv.size);
    }

    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);

    ret = eddsa_public_key(algo, params->raw_pub.data,
               params->raw_priv.data);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_free(params->raw_pub.data);
      return ret;
    }

    params->raw_pub.size = params->raw_priv.size;
  } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X25519 ||
       algo == GNUTLS_PK_ECDH_X448) {
    if (unlikely(get_ecdh_curve(algo) != params->curve))
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    if (params->raw_priv.data == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);

    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL) {
      params->raw_pub.data =
        gnutls_malloc(params->raw_priv.size);
    }

    if (params->raw_pub.data == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);

    ret = edwards_curve_mul_g(algo, params->raw_pub.data,
            params->raw_priv.data);
    if (ret < 0) {
      gnutls_free(params->raw_pub.data);
      return ret;
    }

    params->raw_pub.size = params->raw_priv.size;
  } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS) {
    if (params->params_nr < RSA_PRIVATE_PARAMS - 3)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PRIVKEY);

    if (params->spki.rsa_pss_dig != 0) {
      unsigned pub_size = nettle_mpz_sizeinbase_256_u(
        TOMPZ(params->params[RSA_MODULUS]));
      /* sanity check for private key */
      CHECK_INVALID_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(
        gnutls_hash_get_len(params->spki.rsa_pss_dig),
        params->spki.salt_size, pub_size,
        GNUTLS_E_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY_PARAMS);
    }
  }
#ifdef ENABLE_DSA
  else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
    if (params->params[DSA_Y] == NULL) {
      ret = calc_dsa_pub(params);
      if (ret < 0)
        return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
      params->params_nr++;
    }
  }
#endif
#if ENABLE_GOST
  else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01 || algo == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256 ||
     algo == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512) {
    struct ecc_point r;
    struct ecc_scalar priv;
    const struct ecc_curve *curve;

    if (params->params_nr != GOST_PRIVATE_PARAMS)
      return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);

    curve = get_supported_gost_curve(params->curve);
    if (curve == NULL)
      return gnutls_assert_val(
        GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE);

    if (ecc_bit_size(curve) <
        _gnutls_mpi_get_nbits(params->params[GOST_K]))
      gostdsa_unmask_key(curve,
             TOMPZ(params->params[GOST_K]));

    ret = _gost_params_to_privkey(params, &priv, curve);
    if (ret < 0) {
      return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
    }

    ecc_point_init(&r, curve);
    gost_point_mul_g(&r, &priv);

    ecc_point_get(&r, params->params[GOST_X],
            params->params[GOST_Y]);

    ecc_point_clear(&r);
    ecc_scalar_clear(&priv);
  }
#endif

  return 0;
}

int crypto_pk_prio = INT_MAX;

gnutls_crypto_pk_st _gnutls_pk_ops = {
  .encrypt = _wrap_nettle_pk_encrypt,
  .decrypt = _wrap_nettle_pk_decrypt,
  .decrypt2 = _wrap_nettle_pk_decrypt2,
  .sign = _wrap_nettle_pk_sign,
  .verify = _wrap_nettle_pk_verify,
  .verify_priv_params = wrap_nettle_pk_verify_priv_params,
  .verify_pub_params = wrap_nettle_pk_verify_pub_params,
  .generate_params = wrap_nettle_pk_generate_params,
  .generate_keys = wrap_nettle_pk_generate_keys,
  .pk_fixup_private_params = wrap_nettle_pk_fixup,
  .derive = _wrap_nettle_pk_derive,
  .encaps = _wrap_nettle_pk_encaps,
  .decaps = _wrap_nettle_pk_decaps,
  .curve_exists = _wrap_nettle_pk_curve_exists,
  .pk_exists = _wrap_nettle_pk_exists,
  .sign_exists = _wrap_nettle_pk_sign_exists
};

Coverage Report

Created: 2024-07-23 07:36