/src/wolfssl-sp-math/wolfcrypt/src/ed25519.c
Line | Count | Source |
1 | | /* ed25519.c |
2 | | * |
3 | | * Copyright (C) 2006-2026 wolfSSL Inc. |
4 | | * |
5 | | * This file is part of wolfSSL. |
6 | | * |
7 | | * wolfSSL is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
8 | | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
9 | | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or |
10 | | * (at your option) any later version. |
11 | | * |
12 | | * wolfSSL is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
13 | | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
14 | | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
15 | | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
16 | | * |
17 | | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
18 | | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
19 | | * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1335, USA |
20 | | */ |
21 | | |
22 | | |
23 | | /* Based On Daniel J Bernstein's ed25519 Public Domain ref10 work. */ |
24 | | |
25 | | |
26 | | /* Possible Ed25519 enable options: |
27 | | * WOLFSSL_EDDSA_CHECK_PRIV_ON_SIGN Default: OFF |
28 | | * Check that the private key didn't change during the signing operations. |
29 | | */ |
30 | | |
31 | | #define WC_FIPS_LL_CRYPTO |
32 | | #define _WC_BUILDING_ED25519_C |
33 | | |
34 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/libwolfssl_sources.h> |
35 | | |
36 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519 |
37 | | #if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(6,0,0) |
38 | | #ifdef USE_WINDOWS_API |
39 | | #pragma code_seg(".fipsA$f") |
40 | | #pragma const_seg(".fipsB$f") |
41 | | #endif |
42 | | #endif |
43 | | |
44 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ed25519.h> |
45 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ge_operations.h> |
46 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/hash.h> |
47 | | #ifdef NO_INLINE |
48 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/misc.h> |
49 | | #else |
50 | | #define WOLFSSL_MISC_INCLUDED |
51 | | #include <wolfcrypt/src/misc.c> |
52 | | #endif |
53 | | |
54 | | #if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(6,0,0) |
55 | | const unsigned int wolfCrypt_FIPS_ed25519_ro_sanity[2] = |
56 | | { 0x1a2b3c4d, 0x00000006 }; |
57 | | int wolfCrypt_FIPS_ED25519_sanity(void) |
58 | | { |
59 | | return 0; |
60 | | } |
61 | | #endif |
62 | | |
63 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
64 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/port/nxp/ksdk_port.h> |
65 | | #endif |
66 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_SE050 |
67 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/port/nxp/se050_port.h> |
68 | | #endif |
69 | | |
70 | | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
71 | | #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/cryptocb.h> |
72 | | #endif |
73 | | |
74 | | #if defined(HAVE_ED25519_SIGN) || defined(HAVE_ED25519_VERIFY) |
75 | | /* Set a static message string for "Sig No Collisions Message SNC". |
76 | | ** Note this is a static string per spec, see: |
77 | | ** https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8032/ |
78 | | */ |
79 | | #define ED25519CTX_SNC_MESSAGE "SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions" |
80 | 0 | #define ED25519CTX_SIZE 32 /* 32 chars: fixed length of SNC Message. */ |
81 | | |
82 | | /* The 32 bytes of ED25519CTX_SIZE is used elsewhere, but we need one |
83 | | ** more char for saving the line ending in our ed25519Ctx[] here: */ |
84 | | static const byte ed25519Ctx[ED25519CTX_SIZE + 1] = ED25519CTX_SNC_MESSAGE; |
85 | | #endif |
86 | | |
87 | | static int WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(1) WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(2) |
88 | | ed25519_hash_init(ed25519_key* key, wc_Sha512 *sha) |
89 | 5.23k | { |
90 | 5.23k | int ret; |
91 | | |
92 | 5.23k | ret = wc_InitSha512_ex(sha, key->heap, |
93 | 5.23k | #if defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB) |
94 | 5.23k | key->devId |
95 | | #else |
96 | | INVALID_DEVID |
97 | | #endif |
98 | 5.23k | ); |
99 | | |
100 | 5.23k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
101 | 5.23k | if (ret == 0) { |
102 | 5.23k | key->sha_clean_flag = 1; |
103 | 5.23k | } |
104 | 5.23k | #endif |
105 | | |
106 | 5.23k | return ret; |
107 | 5.23k | } |
108 | | |
109 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
110 | | static int WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(1) ed25519_hash_reset(ed25519_key* key) |
111 | 6.42k | { |
112 | 6.42k | int ret; |
113 | | |
114 | 6.42k | if (key->sha_clean_flag) { |
115 | 6.42k | ret = 0; |
116 | 6.42k | } |
117 | 0 | else { |
118 | 0 | wc_Sha512Free(&key->sha); |
119 | 0 | ret = wc_InitSha512_ex(&key->sha, key->heap, |
120 | 0 | #if defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB) |
121 | 0 | key->devId |
122 | | #else |
123 | | INVALID_DEVID |
124 | | #endif |
125 | 0 | ); |
126 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
127 | 0 | key->sha_clean_flag = 1; |
128 | 0 | } |
129 | | |
130 | 6.42k | return ret; |
131 | 6.42k | } |
132 | | #endif /* WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA */ |
133 | | |
134 | | static int WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(1) |
135 | | ed25519_hash_update(ed25519_key* key, wc_Sha512 *sha, |
136 | | const byte* data, word32 len) |
137 | 126k | { |
138 | 126k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
139 | 126k | if (key->sha_clean_flag) { |
140 | 8.84k | key->sha_clean_flag = 0; |
141 | 8.84k | } |
142 | | #else |
143 | | (void)key; |
144 | | #endif |
145 | 126k | return wc_Sha512Update(sha, data, len); |
146 | 126k | } |
147 | | |
148 | | static int WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(1) |
149 | | ed25519_hash_final(ed25519_key* key, wc_Sha512 *sha, byte* hash) |
150 | 8.60k | { |
151 | 8.60k | int ret = wc_Sha512Final(sha, hash); |
152 | 8.60k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
153 | 8.60k | if (ret == 0) { |
154 | 8.16k | key->sha_clean_flag = 1; |
155 | 8.16k | } |
156 | | #else |
157 | | (void)key; |
158 | | #endif |
159 | 8.60k | return ret; |
160 | 8.60k | } |
161 | | |
162 | | static void WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(1) |
163 | | ed25519_hash_free(ed25519_key* key, wc_Sha512 *sha) |
164 | 5.23k | { |
165 | 5.23k | wc_Sha512Free(sha); |
166 | 5.23k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
167 | 5.23k | key->sha_clean_flag = 0; |
168 | | #else |
169 | | (void)key; |
170 | | #endif |
171 | 5.23k | } |
172 | | |
173 | | |
174 | | static int ed25519_hash(ed25519_key* key, const byte* in, word32 inLen, |
175 | | byte* hash) |
176 | 4.71k | { |
177 | 4.71k | int ret; |
178 | | #ifndef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
179 | | WC_DECLARE_VAR(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key ? key->heap : NULL); |
180 | | #else |
181 | 4.71k | wc_Sha512 *sha; |
182 | 4.71k | #endif |
183 | | |
184 | 4.71k | if (key == NULL || (in == NULL && inLen > 0) || hash == NULL) { |
185 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
186 | 0 | } |
187 | | |
188 | 4.71k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
189 | 4.71k | sha = &key->sha; |
190 | 4.71k | ret = ed25519_hash_reset(key); |
191 | | #else |
192 | | WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES, |
193 | | return MEMORY_E); |
194 | | ret = ed25519_hash_init(key, sha); |
195 | | #endif |
196 | 4.71k | if (ret == 0) { |
197 | 4.71k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, in, inLen); |
198 | 4.71k | if (ret == 0) |
199 | 4.71k | ret = ed25519_hash_final(key, sha, hash); |
200 | | |
201 | | #ifndef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
202 | | ed25519_hash_free(key, sha); |
203 | | #endif |
204 | 4.71k | } |
205 | | |
206 | | #ifndef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
207 | | WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sha, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES); |
208 | | #endif |
209 | 4.71k | return ret; |
210 | 4.71k | } |
211 | | |
212 | | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 |
213 | | /* Reject small-order Ed25519 public keys: h*A vanishes during verification |
214 | | * so any (R = [S]B, S) verifies for an arbitrary message. */ |
215 | | static int ed25519_is_small_order(const byte p[ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE]) |
216 | 4.09k | { |
217 | | /* y-coordinates of every order-1/2/4/8 point plus the two non-canonical |
218 | | * encodings y = p / y = p+1. Sign bit masked before compare. Only |
219 | | * {y, y + p} fits in 32 bytes (2p overflows the 255-bit y field), so |
220 | | * listing y and y + p exhausts the reachable encodings for each |
221 | | * small-order y. */ |
222 | 4.09k | static const byte small_order_y[][ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE] = { |
223 | | /* order 4: y = 0 */ |
224 | 4.09k | {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, |
225 | 4.09k | 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, |
226 | 4.09k | 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, |
227 | 4.09k | 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, |
228 | | /* order 1: y = 1 (identity) */ |
229 | 4.09k | {0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, |
230 | 4.09k | 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, |
231 | 4.09k | 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, |
232 | 4.09k | 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, |
233 | | /* order 8 */ |
234 | 4.09k | {0x26,0xe8,0x95,0x8f,0xc2,0xb2,0x27,0xb0, |
235 | 4.09k | 0x45,0xc3,0xf4,0x89,0xf2,0xef,0x98,0xf0, |
236 | 4.09k | 0xd5,0xdf,0xac,0x05,0xd3,0xc6,0x33,0x39, |
237 | 4.09k | 0xb1,0x38,0x02,0x88,0x6d,0x53,0xfc,0x05}, |
238 | | /* order 8 */ |
239 | 4.09k | {0xc7,0x17,0x6a,0x70,0x3d,0x4d,0xd8,0x4f, |
240 | 4.09k | 0xba,0x3c,0x0b,0x76,0x0d,0x10,0x67,0x0f, |
241 | 4.09k | 0x2a,0x20,0x53,0xfa,0x2c,0x39,0xcc,0xc6, |
242 | 4.09k | 0x4e,0xc7,0xfd,0x77,0x92,0xac,0x03,0x7a}, |
243 | | /* order 2: y = p - 1 */ |
244 | 4.09k | {0xec,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
245 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
246 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
247 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x7f}, |
248 | | /* non-canonical y = p (decodes to y = 0) */ |
249 | 4.09k | {0xed,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
250 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
251 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
252 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x7f}, |
253 | | /* non-canonical y = p + 1 (decodes to y = 1) */ |
254 | 4.09k | {0xee,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
255 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
256 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, |
257 | 4.09k | 0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x7f}, |
258 | 4.09k | }; |
259 | 4.09k | byte y[ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE]; |
260 | 4.09k | word32 i; |
261 | | |
262 | 4.09k | XMEMCPY(y, p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
263 | 4.09k | y[ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE - 1] &= 0x7f; |
264 | 32.4k | for (i = 0; i < sizeof(small_order_y) / ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; i++) { |
265 | 28.3k | if (XMEMCMP(y, small_order_y[i], ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) == 0) |
266 | 49 | return 1; |
267 | 28.3k | } |
268 | 4.04k | return 0; |
269 | 4.09k | } |
270 | | #endif /* !WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 */ |
271 | | |
272 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_MAKE_KEY |
273 | | #if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(6,0,0) |
274 | | /* Performs a Pairwise Consistency Test on an Ed25519 key pair. |
275 | | * |
276 | | * @param [in] key Ed25519 key to test. |
277 | | * @param [in] rng Random number generator to use to create random digest. |
278 | | * @return 0 on success. |
279 | | * @return ECC_PCT_E when signing or verification fail. |
280 | | * @return Other -ve when random number generation fails. |
281 | | */ |
282 | | static int ed25519_pairwise_consistency_test(ed25519_key* key, WC_RNG* rng) |
283 | | { |
284 | | int err = 0; |
285 | | byte digest[WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
286 | | word32 digestLen = WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE; |
287 | | byte sig[ED25519_SIG_SIZE]; |
288 | | word32 sigLen = ED25519_SIG_SIZE; |
289 | | int res = 0; |
290 | | |
291 | | /* Generate a random digest to sign. */ |
292 | | err = wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(rng, digest, digestLen); |
293 | | if (err == 0) { |
294 | | /* Sign digest without context. */ |
295 | | err = wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex(digest, digestLen, sig, &sigLen, key, |
296 | | (byte)Ed25519, NULL, 0); |
297 | | if (err != 0) { |
298 | | /* Any sign failure means test failed. */ |
299 | | err = ECC_PCT_E; |
300 | | } |
301 | | } |
302 | | if (err == 0) { |
303 | | /* Verify digest without context. */ |
304 | | err = wc_ed25519_verify_msg_ex(sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen, &res, |
305 | | key, (byte)Ed25519, NULL, 0); |
306 | | if (err != 0) { |
307 | | /* Any verification operation failure means test failed. */ |
308 | | err = ECC_PCT_E; |
309 | | } |
310 | | /* Check whether the signature verified. */ |
311 | | else if (res == 0) { |
312 | | /* Test failed. */ |
313 | | err = ECC_PCT_E; |
314 | | } |
315 | | } |
316 | | |
317 | | ForceZero(sig, sigLen); |
318 | | |
319 | | return err; |
320 | | } |
321 | | #endif |
322 | | |
323 | | /* Mirror a derived public key into the key structure itself, leaving the same |
324 | | * layout wc_ed25519_make_key() does: the compressed point in key->p and a copy |
325 | | * in the second half of key->k. Only called when the key had no public half |
326 | | * yet, so an existing public key is never overwritten - deriving into a |
327 | | * scratch buffer and comparing against key->p is how wc_ed25519_check_key() |
328 | | * validates a keypair. |
329 | | */ |
330 | | static void ed25519_store_public(ed25519_key* key, const byte* pubKey) |
331 | 1.83k | { |
332 | 1.83k | if (pubKey != key->p) { |
333 | 1.45k | XMEMCPY(key->p, pubKey, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
334 | 1.45k | } |
335 | | /* put public key after private key, on the same buffer */ |
336 | 1.83k | XMEMMOVE(key->k + ED25519_KEY_SIZE, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
337 | 1.83k | } |
338 | | |
339 | | int wc_ed25519_make_public(ed25519_key* key, unsigned char* pubKey, |
340 | | word32 pubKeySz) |
341 | 3.50k | { |
342 | 3.50k | int ret = 0; |
343 | 3.50k | int storePub = 0; |
344 | 3.50k | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 |
345 | 3.50k | ALIGN16 byte az[ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE]; |
346 | 3.50k | #if !defined(FREESCALE_LTC_ECC) |
347 | 3.50k | ge_p3 A; |
348 | 3.50k | #endif |
349 | 3.50k | #endif /* !WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 */ |
350 | | |
351 | 3.50k | if (key == NULL || pubKey == NULL || pubKeySz != ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) |
352 | 0 | ret = BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
353 | | |
354 | 3.50k | if ((ret == 0) && (!key->privKeySet)) { |
355 | 63 | ret = ECC_PRIV_KEY_E; |
356 | 63 | } |
357 | | |
358 | 3.50k | if (ret == 0) { |
359 | | /* The key doesn't carry its public half yet (e.g. it was decoded from |
360 | | * a PKCS#8 v1 PrivateKeyInfo, which holds only the seed): fill it in |
361 | | * as well, so pubKeySet below doesn't end up set on a key whose p/k |
362 | | * are still empty. */ |
363 | 3.43k | storePub = !key->pubKeySet; |
364 | 3.43k | } |
365 | | |
366 | 3.50k | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
367 | | /* Device-first: offload the public-key derivation. Fall through to the |
368 | | * software path below only when the device reports the operation |
369 | | * unavailable. */ |
370 | 3.50k | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
371 | 3.50k | if ((ret == 0) && (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID)) |
372 | | #else |
373 | | if (ret == 0) |
374 | | #endif |
375 | 0 | { |
376 | 0 | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519MakePub(key, pubKey, pubKeySz); |
377 | 0 | if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) { |
378 | 0 | if (ret == 0) { |
379 | 0 | if (storePub) |
380 | 0 | ed25519_store_public(key, pubKey); |
381 | 0 | key->pubKeySet = 1; |
382 | 0 | } |
383 | 0 | return ret; |
384 | 0 | } |
385 | 0 | ret = 0; /* device declined the offload; fall back */ |
386 | 0 | } |
387 | 3.50k | #endif |
388 | | |
389 | | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 |
390 | | /* software derivation is stripped and no device handled the op; |
391 | | * fail closed */ |
392 | | if (ret == 0) |
393 | | ret = NO_VALID_DEVID; |
394 | | #else |
395 | 3.50k | if (ret == 0) |
396 | 3.43k | ret = ed25519_hash(key, key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE, az); |
397 | 3.50k | if (ret == 0) { |
398 | | /* apply clamp */ |
399 | 3.17k | az[0] &= 248; |
400 | 3.17k | az[31] &= 63; /* same than az[31] &= 127 because of az[31] |= 64 */ |
401 | 3.17k | az[31] |= 64; |
402 | | |
403 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
404 | | ltc_pkha_ecc_point_t publicKey = {0}; |
405 | | publicKey.X = key->pointX; |
406 | | publicKey.Y = key->pointY; |
407 | | LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_PointMul(LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_BasePoint(), az, |
408 | | ED25519_KEY_SIZE, &publicKey, kLTC_Ed25519 /* result on Ed25519 */); |
409 | | LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_Compress(&publicKey, pubKey); |
410 | | #else |
411 | 3.17k | ge_scalarmult_base(&A, az); |
412 | 3.17k | ge_p3_tobytes(pubKey, &A); |
413 | 3.17k | #endif |
414 | | |
415 | 3.17k | if (storePub) |
416 | 1.83k | ed25519_store_public(key, pubKey); |
417 | 3.17k | key->pubKeySet = 1; |
418 | 3.17k | } |
419 | 3.50k | #endif /* WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 */ |
420 | | |
421 | 3.50k | return ret; |
422 | 3.50k | } |
423 | | |
424 | | /* generate an ed25519 key pair. |
425 | | * returns 0 on success |
426 | | */ |
427 | | int wc_ed25519_make_key(WC_RNG* rng, int keySz, ed25519_key* key) |
428 | 516 | { |
429 | 516 | int ret; |
430 | | |
431 | 516 | if (rng == NULL || key == NULL) |
432 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
433 | | |
434 | | /* ed25519 has 32 byte key sizes */ |
435 | 516 | if (keySz != ED25519_KEY_SIZE) |
436 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
437 | | |
438 | 516 | key->privKeySet = 0; |
439 | 516 | key->pubKeySet = 0; |
440 | | |
441 | 516 | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
442 | 516 | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
443 | 516 | if (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID) |
444 | 0 | #endif |
445 | 0 | { |
446 | 0 | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519Gen(rng, keySz, key); |
447 | 0 | if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) |
448 | 0 | return ret; |
449 | | /* fall-through when unavailable */ |
450 | 0 | } |
451 | 516 | #endif |
452 | | |
453 | | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 |
454 | | return NO_VALID_DEVID; |
455 | | #else |
456 | 516 | ret = wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(rng, key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
457 | 516 | if (ret != 0) |
458 | 103 | return ret; |
459 | | |
460 | 413 | key->privKeySet = 1; |
461 | | /* pubKeySet was just cleared, so this also stores the public key in key->p |
462 | | * and after the private key in key->k */ |
463 | 413 | ret = wc_ed25519_make_public(key, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
464 | 413 | if (ret != 0) { |
465 | 36 | key->privKeySet = 0; |
466 | 36 | ForceZero(key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
467 | 36 | return ret; |
468 | 36 | } |
469 | | |
470 | | #if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(6,0,0) |
471 | | ret = wc_ed25519_check_key(key); |
472 | | if (ret == 0) { |
473 | | ret = ed25519_pairwise_consistency_test(key, rng); |
474 | | } |
475 | | #endif |
476 | | |
477 | 377 | return ret; |
478 | 413 | #endif /* WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 */ |
479 | 413 | } |
480 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_MAKE_KEY */ |
481 | | |
482 | | |
483 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_SIGN |
484 | | /* |
485 | | in contains the message to sign |
486 | | inLen is the length of the message to sign |
487 | | out is the buffer to write the signature |
488 | | outLen [in/out] input size of out buf |
489 | | output gets set as the final length of out |
490 | | key is the ed25519 key to use when signing |
491 | | type one of Ed25519, Ed25519ctx or Ed25519ph |
492 | | context extra signing data |
493 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
494 | | return 0 on success |
495 | | */ |
496 | | int wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex(const byte* in, word32 inLen, byte* out, |
497 | | word32 *outLen, ed25519_key* key, byte type, |
498 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
499 | 1.27k | { |
500 | 1.27k | int ret; |
501 | | #if defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) && !defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID) |
502 | | (void)context; |
503 | | (void)contextLen; |
504 | | (void)type; |
505 | | ret = se050_ed25519_sign_msg(in, inLen, out, outLen, key); |
506 | | #elif defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519) |
507 | | (void)ed25519Ctx; |
508 | | ret = WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE); |
509 | | |
510 | | if (((in == NULL) && (inLen != 0)) || out == NULL || outLen == NULL || |
511 | | key == NULL || (context == NULL && contextLen != 0)) { |
512 | | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
513 | | } |
514 | | /* An empty message may be passed as (NULL, 0); canonicalize it to a |
515 | | * readable stand-in so that downstream consumers -- hash updates and |
516 | | * crypto callbacks -- never see a NULL pointer. */ |
517 | | if (in == NULL) { |
518 | | static const byte ed25519_empty_msg = 0; |
519 | | in = &ed25519_empty_msg; |
520 | | } |
521 | | |
522 | | if ((type == Ed25519ph) && |
523 | | (inLen != WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)) |
524 | | { |
525 | | return BAD_LENGTH_E; |
526 | | } |
527 | | |
528 | | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
529 | | if (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID) |
530 | | #endif |
531 | | { |
532 | | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519Sign(in, inLen, out, outLen, key, type, |
533 | | context, contextLen); |
534 | | } |
535 | | if (ret == WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) { |
536 | | ret = NO_VALID_DEVID; |
537 | | } |
538 | | #else |
539 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
540 | | ALIGN16 byte tempBuf[ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE]; |
541 | | ltc_pkha_ecc_point_t ltcPoint = {0}; |
542 | | #else |
543 | 1.27k | ge_p3 R; |
544 | 1.27k | #endif |
545 | 1.27k | ALIGN16 byte nonce[WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
546 | 1.27k | ALIGN16 byte hram[WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
547 | 1.27k | ALIGN16 byte az[ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE]; |
548 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_EDDSA_CHECK_PRIV_ON_SIGN |
549 | | byte orig_k[ED25519_KEY_SIZE]; |
550 | | #endif |
551 | | |
552 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
553 | 1.27k | if (((in == NULL) && (inLen != 0)) || out == NULL || outLen == NULL || |
554 | 1.27k | key == NULL || (context == NULL && contextLen != 0)) { |
555 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
556 | 0 | } |
557 | | /* An empty message may be passed as (NULL, 0); canonicalize it to a |
558 | | * readable stand-in so that downstream consumers -- hash updates and |
559 | | * crypto callbacks -- never see a NULL pointer. */ |
560 | 1.27k | if (in == NULL) { |
561 | 41 | static const byte ed25519_empty_msg = 0; |
562 | 41 | in = &ed25519_empty_msg; |
563 | 41 | } |
564 | | |
565 | | #if defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) && defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID) |
566 | | /* Key resident in the SE050: sign in hardware. Software keys fall through |
567 | | * to the wolfCrypt software implementation below. */ |
568 | | if (key->keyIdSet) { |
569 | | /* The SE050 performs only PureEdDSA; it cannot apply the Ed25519ctx or |
570 | | * Ed25519ph variants, so reject them rather than silently signing with |
571 | | * the wrong scheme. */ |
572 | | if (type == Ed25519ctx || type == Ed25519ph || contextLen != 0) { |
573 | | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
574 | | } |
575 | | return se050_ed25519_sign_msg(in, inLen, out, outLen, key); |
576 | | } |
577 | | #endif |
578 | | |
579 | 1.27k | if ((type == Ed25519ph) && |
580 | 0 | (inLen != WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)) |
581 | 0 | { |
582 | 0 | return BAD_LENGTH_E; |
583 | 0 | } |
584 | | |
585 | 1.27k | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
586 | 1.27k | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
587 | 1.27k | if (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID) |
588 | 0 | #endif |
589 | 0 | { |
590 | 0 | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519Sign(in, inLen, out, outLen, key, type, |
591 | 0 | context, contextLen); |
592 | 0 | if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) |
593 | 0 | return ret; |
594 | | /* fall-through when unavailable */ |
595 | 0 | } |
596 | 1.27k | #endif |
597 | | |
598 | 1.27k | if (!key->pubKeySet) |
599 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
600 | 1.27k | if (!key->privKeySet) |
601 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
602 | | |
603 | | /* check and set up out length */ |
604 | 1.27k | if (*outLen < ED25519_SIG_SIZE) { |
605 | 0 | *outLen = ED25519_SIG_SIZE; |
606 | 0 | return BUFFER_E; |
607 | 0 | } |
608 | 1.27k | *outLen = ED25519_SIG_SIZE; |
609 | | |
610 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO |
611 | | /* Register the secret nonce/expanded-key buffers up front so that any exit |
612 | | * path from here to the ForceZero below is checked for proper zeroization. |
613 | | * XMEMSET gives them a defined value before the hash steps fill them. */ |
614 | | XMEMSET(az, 0, sizeof(az)); |
615 | | XMEMSET(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce)); |
616 | | wc_MemZero_Add("wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex az", az, sizeof(az)); |
617 | | wc_MemZero_Add("wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex nonce", nonce, sizeof(nonce)); |
618 | | #endif |
619 | | |
620 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_EDDSA_CHECK_PRIV_ON_SIGN |
621 | | XMEMCPY(orig_k, key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
622 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO |
623 | | wc_MemZero_Add("wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex orig_k", orig_k, sizeof(orig_k)); |
624 | | #endif |
625 | | #endif |
626 | | |
627 | | /* step 1: create nonce to use where nonce is r in |
628 | | r = H(h_b, ... ,h_2b-1,M) */ |
629 | 1.27k | ret = ed25519_hash(key, key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE, az); |
630 | | |
631 | 1.27k | if (ret == 0) { |
632 | 1.24k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
633 | 1.24k | wc_Sha512 *sha = &key->sha; |
634 | | #else |
635 | | WC_DECLARE_VAR(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key->heap); |
636 | | WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES, |
637 | | ret = MEMORY_E); |
638 | | if (ret == 0) |
639 | | ret = ed25519_hash_init(key, sha); |
640 | | #endif |
641 | | |
642 | | /* apply clamp */ |
643 | 1.24k | az[0] &= 248; |
644 | 1.24k | az[31] &= 63; /* same than az[31] &= 127 because of az[31] |= 64 */ |
645 | 1.24k | az[31] |= 64; |
646 | | |
647 | 1.24k | if (ret == 0 && (type == Ed25519ctx || type == Ed25519ph)) { |
648 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, ed25519Ctx, ED25519CTX_SIZE); |
649 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
650 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, &type, sizeof(type)); |
651 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
652 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, &contextLen, |
653 | 0 | sizeof(contextLen)); |
654 | 0 | if (ret == 0 && context != NULL) |
655 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, context, contextLen); |
656 | 0 | } |
657 | 1.24k | if (ret == 0) |
658 | 1.24k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, az + ED25519_KEY_SIZE, |
659 | 1.24k | ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
660 | 1.24k | if (ret == 0) |
661 | 1.24k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, in, inLen); |
662 | 1.24k | if (ret == 0) |
663 | 1.20k | ret = ed25519_hash_final(key, sha, nonce); |
664 | | #ifndef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
665 | | ed25519_hash_free(key, sha); |
666 | | WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sha, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES); |
667 | | #endif |
668 | 1.24k | } |
669 | | |
670 | 1.27k | if (ret == 0) { |
671 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
672 | | ltcPoint.X = &tempBuf[0]; |
673 | | ltcPoint.Y = &tempBuf[32]; |
674 | | LTC_PKHA_sc_reduce(nonce); |
675 | | LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_PointMul(LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_BasePoint(), nonce, |
676 | | ED25519_KEY_SIZE, <cPoint, |
677 | | kLTC_Ed25519 /* result on Ed25519 */); |
678 | | LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_Compress(<cPoint, out); |
679 | | #else |
680 | 1.18k | sc_reduce(nonce); |
681 | | |
682 | | /* step 2: computing R = rB where rB is the scalar multiplication of |
683 | | r and B */ |
684 | 1.18k | ge_scalarmult_base(&R,nonce); |
685 | 1.18k | ge_p3_tobytes(out,&R); |
686 | 1.18k | #endif |
687 | 1.18k | } |
688 | | |
689 | | /* step 3: hash R + public key + message getting H(R,A,M) then |
690 | | creating S = (r + H(R,A,M)a) mod l */ |
691 | 1.27k | if (ret == 0) { |
692 | 1.18k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
693 | 1.18k | wc_Sha512 *sha = &key->sha; |
694 | | #else |
695 | | WC_DECLARE_VAR(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key->heap); |
696 | | WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES, |
697 | | ret = MEMORY_E); |
698 | | if (ret == 0) |
699 | | ret = ed25519_hash_init(key, sha); |
700 | | #endif |
701 | | |
702 | 1.18k | if (ret == 0 && (type == Ed25519ctx || type == Ed25519ph)) { |
703 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, ed25519Ctx, ED25519CTX_SIZE); |
704 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
705 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, &type, sizeof(type)); |
706 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
707 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, &contextLen, |
708 | 0 | sizeof(contextLen)); |
709 | 0 | if (ret == 0 && context != NULL) |
710 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, context, contextLen); |
711 | 0 | } |
712 | 1.18k | if (ret == 0) |
713 | 1.18k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, out, ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2); |
714 | 1.18k | if (ret == 0) |
715 | 1.18k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
716 | 1.18k | if (ret == 0) |
717 | 1.18k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, in, inLen); |
718 | 1.18k | if (ret == 0) |
719 | 1.16k | ret = ed25519_hash_final(key, sha, hram); |
720 | | #ifndef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
721 | | ed25519_hash_free(key, sha); |
722 | | WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sha, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES); |
723 | | #endif |
724 | 1.18k | } |
725 | | |
726 | 1.27k | if (ret == 0) { |
727 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
728 | | LTC_PKHA_sc_reduce(hram); |
729 | | LTC_PKHA_sc_muladd(out + (ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2), hram, az, nonce); |
730 | | #else |
731 | 1.13k | sc_reduce(hram); |
732 | 1.13k | sc_muladd(out + (ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2), hram, az, nonce); |
733 | 1.13k | #endif |
734 | 1.13k | } |
735 | | |
736 | 1.27k | ForceZero(az, sizeof(az)); |
737 | 1.27k | ForceZero(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); |
738 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO |
739 | | wc_MemZero_Check(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); |
740 | | wc_MemZero_Check(az, sizeof(az)); |
741 | | #endif |
742 | | |
743 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_EDDSA_CHECK_PRIV_ON_SIGN |
744 | | /* belongs to the software path: orig_k snapshots the key the software |
745 | | * math read, so there is nothing to compare when a device signs */ |
746 | | if (ret == 0) { |
747 | | int i; |
748 | | byte c = 0; |
749 | | for (i = 0; i < ED25519_KEY_SIZE; i++) { |
750 | | c |= key->k[i] ^ orig_k[i]; |
751 | | } |
752 | | ret = ctMaskGT(c, 0) & SIG_VERIFY_E; |
753 | | } |
754 | | ForceZero(orig_k, sizeof(orig_k)); |
755 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO |
756 | | wc_MemZero_Check(orig_k, sizeof(orig_k)); |
757 | | #endif |
758 | | #endif |
759 | 1.27k | #endif /* WOLFSSL_SE050 */ |
760 | | |
761 | 1.27k | return ret; |
762 | 1.27k | } |
763 | | |
764 | | /* |
765 | | in contains the message to sign |
766 | | inLen is the length of the message to sign |
767 | | out is the buffer to write the signature |
768 | | outLen [in/out] input size of out buf |
769 | | output gets set as the final length of out |
770 | | key is the ed25519 key to use when signing |
771 | | return 0 on success |
772 | | */ |
773 | | int wc_ed25519_sign_msg(const byte* in, word32 inLen, byte* out, |
774 | | word32 *outLen, ed25519_key* key) |
775 | 1.27k | { |
776 | 1.27k | return wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex(in, inLen, out, outLen, key, (byte)Ed25519, |
777 | 1.27k | NULL, 0); |
778 | 1.27k | } |
779 | | |
780 | | /* |
781 | | in contains the message to sign |
782 | | inLen is the length of the message to sign |
783 | | out is the buffer to write the signature |
784 | | outLen [in/out] input size of out buf |
785 | | output gets set as the final length of out |
786 | | key is the ed25519 key to use when signing |
787 | | context extra signing data |
788 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
789 | | return 0 on success |
790 | | */ |
791 | | int wc_ed25519ctx_sign_msg(const byte* in, word32 inLen, byte* out, |
792 | | word32 *outLen, ed25519_key* key, |
793 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
794 | 0 | { |
795 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex(in, inLen, out, outLen, key, Ed25519ctx, |
796 | 0 | context, contextLen); |
797 | 0 | } |
798 | | |
799 | | /* |
800 | | hash contains the SHA-512 hash of the message to sign |
801 | | hashLen is the length of the SHA-512 hash of the message to sign |
802 | | out is the buffer to write the signature |
803 | | outLen [in/out] input size of out buf |
804 | | output gets set as the final length of out |
805 | | key is the ed25519 key to use when signing |
806 | | context extra signing data |
807 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
808 | | return 0 on success |
809 | | */ |
810 | | int wc_ed25519ph_sign_hash(const byte* hash, word32 hashLen, byte* out, |
811 | | word32 *outLen, ed25519_key* key, |
812 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
813 | 0 | { |
814 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex(hash, hashLen, out, outLen, key, Ed25519ph, |
815 | 0 | context, contextLen); |
816 | 0 | } |
817 | | |
818 | | /* |
819 | | in contains the message to sign |
820 | | inLen is the length of the message to sign |
821 | | out is the buffer to write the signature |
822 | | outLen [in/out] input size of out buf |
823 | | output gets set as the final length of out |
824 | | key is the ed25519 key to use when signing |
825 | | context extra signing data |
826 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
827 | | return 0 on success |
828 | | */ |
829 | | int wc_ed25519ph_sign_msg(const byte* in, word32 inLen, byte* out, |
830 | | word32 *outLen, ed25519_key* key, |
831 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
832 | 0 | { |
833 | 0 | int ret; |
834 | 0 | byte hash[WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
835 | |
|
836 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash(key, in, inLen, hash); |
837 | 0 | if (ret != 0) |
838 | 0 | return ret; |
839 | | |
840 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_sign_msg_ex(hash, sizeof(hash), out, outLen, key, |
841 | 0 | Ed25519ph, context, contextLen); |
842 | 0 | } |
843 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_SIGN */ |
844 | | |
845 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_VERIFY |
846 | | /* The software verify helpers are also needed under WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID |
847 | | * so that software keys (keyIdSet == 0) can be verified in wolfCrypt. */ |
848 | | #if (!defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) || defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID)) && \ |
849 | | !defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519) |
850 | | |
851 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_VER_FAULTS |
852 | | static const byte sha512_empty[] = { |
853 | | 0xcf, 0x83, 0xe1, 0x35, 0x7e, 0xef, 0xb8, 0xbd, |
854 | | 0xf1, 0x54, 0x28, 0x50, 0xd6, 0x6d, 0x80, 0x07, |
855 | | 0xd6, 0x20, 0xe4, 0x05, 0x0b, 0x57, 0x15, 0xdc, |
856 | | 0x83, 0xf4, 0xa9, 0x21, 0xd3, 0x6c, 0xe9, 0xce, |
857 | | 0x47, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0x85, 0xf2, 0xb0, |
858 | | 0xff, 0x83, 0x18, 0xd2, 0x87, 0x7e, 0xec, 0x2f, |
859 | | 0x63, 0xb9, 0x31, 0xbd, 0x47, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x81, |
860 | | 0xa5, 0x38, 0x32, 0x7a, 0xf9, 0x27, 0xda, 0x3e |
861 | | }; |
862 | | |
863 | | /* sanity check that hash operation happened |
864 | | * returns 0 on success */ |
865 | | static int ed25519_hash_check(ed25519_key* key, byte* h) |
866 | | { |
867 | | (void)key; /* passing in key in case other hash algroithms are used */ |
868 | | |
869 | | if (XMEMCMP(h, sha512_empty, WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) { |
870 | | return 0; |
871 | | } |
872 | | else { |
873 | | return BAD_STATE_E; |
874 | | } |
875 | | } |
876 | | #endif |
877 | | |
878 | | |
879 | | /* |
880 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
881 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
882 | | key Ed25519 public key |
883 | | return 0 on success |
884 | | type variant to use -- Ed25519, Ed25519ctx, or Ed25519ph |
885 | | context extra signing data |
886 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
887 | | */ |
888 | | static int ed25519_verify_msg_init_with_sha(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, |
889 | | ed25519_key* key, wc_Sha512 *sha, |
890 | | byte type, const byte* context, |
891 | | byte contextLen) |
892 | 1.82k | { |
893 | 1.82k | int ret; |
894 | | |
895 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
896 | 1.82k | if (sig == NULL || key == NULL || |
897 | 1.82k | (context == NULL && contextLen != 0)) { |
898 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
899 | 0 | } |
900 | | |
901 | | /* check on basics needed to verify signature */ |
902 | 1.82k | if (sigLen != ED25519_SIG_SIZE || (sig[ED25519_SIG_SIZE-1] & 224)) |
903 | 113 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
904 | | |
905 | | /* find H(R,A,M) and store it as h */ |
906 | | |
907 | 1.71k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
908 | 1.71k | ret = ed25519_hash_reset(key); |
909 | 1.71k | if (ret != 0) |
910 | 0 | return ret; |
911 | | #else |
912 | | ret = 0; |
913 | | #endif |
914 | | |
915 | 1.71k | if (type == Ed25519ctx || type == Ed25519ph) { |
916 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, ed25519Ctx, ED25519CTX_SIZE); |
917 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
918 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, &type, sizeof(type)); |
919 | 0 | if (ret == 0) |
920 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, &contextLen, sizeof(contextLen)); |
921 | 0 | if (ret == 0 && context != NULL) |
922 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, context, contextLen); |
923 | 0 | } |
924 | 1.71k | if (ret == 0) |
925 | 1.71k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, sig, ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2); |
926 | | |
927 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_VER_FAULTS |
928 | | /* sanity check that hash operation happened */ |
929 | | if (ret == 0) { |
930 | | byte h[WC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
931 | | |
932 | | ret = wc_Sha512GetHash(sha, h); |
933 | | if (ret == 0) { |
934 | | ret = ed25519_hash_check(key, h); |
935 | | if (ret != 0) { |
936 | | WOLFSSL_MSG("Unexpected initial state of hash found"); |
937 | | } |
938 | | } |
939 | | } |
940 | | #endif |
941 | | |
942 | 1.71k | if (ret == 0) |
943 | 1.71k | ret = ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
944 | | |
945 | 1.71k | return ret; |
946 | 1.71k | } |
947 | | |
948 | | /* |
949 | | msgSegment an array of bytes containing a message segment |
950 | | msgSegmentLen length of msgSegment |
951 | | key Ed25519 public key |
952 | | return 0 on success |
953 | | */ |
954 | | static int ed25519_verify_msg_update_with_sha(const byte* msgSegment, |
955 | | word32 msgSegmentLen, |
956 | | ed25519_key* key, |
957 | 112k | wc_Sha512 *sha) { |
958 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
959 | 112k | if (msgSegment == NULL || key == NULL) |
960 | 4 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
961 | | |
962 | 112k | return ed25519_hash_update(key, sha, msgSegment, msgSegmentLen); |
963 | 112k | } |
964 | | |
965 | | /* ed25519 order in little endian. */ |
966 | | static const byte ed25519_order[] = { |
967 | | 0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, |
968 | | 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, |
969 | | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, |
970 | | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10 |
971 | | }; |
972 | | |
973 | | /* |
974 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
975 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
976 | | res will be 1 on successful verify and 0 on unsuccessful |
977 | | key Ed25519 public key |
978 | | return 0 and res of 1 on success |
979 | | */ |
980 | | static int ed25519_verify_msg_final_with_sha(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, |
981 | | int* res, ed25519_key* key, |
982 | | wc_Sha512 *sha) |
983 | 1.59k | { |
984 | 1.59k | ALIGN16 byte rcheck[ED25519_KEY_SIZE]; |
985 | 1.59k | ALIGN16 byte h[WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
986 | 1.59k | #ifndef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
987 | 1.59k | ge_p3 A; |
988 | 1.59k | ge_p2 R; |
989 | 1.59k | #endif |
990 | 1.59k | int ret; |
991 | 1.59k | int i; |
992 | | |
993 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
994 | 1.59k | if (sig == NULL || res == NULL || key == NULL) |
995 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
996 | | |
997 | | /* set verification failed by default */ |
998 | 1.59k | *res = 0; |
999 | | |
1000 | | /* check on basics needed to verify signature */ |
1001 | 1.59k | if (sigLen != ED25519_SIG_SIZE) |
1002 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1003 | | /* S is not larger or equal to the order: |
1004 | | * 2^252 + 0x14def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed |
1005 | | * = 0x1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed |
1006 | | */ |
1007 | | |
1008 | | /* Check S is not larger than or equal to order. */ |
1009 | 1.77k | for (i = (int)sizeof(ed25519_order) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
1010 | | /* Bigger than order. */ |
1011 | 1.77k | if (sig[ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2 + i] > ed25519_order[i]) |
1012 | 75 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1013 | | /* Less than order. */ |
1014 | 1.69k | if (sig[ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2 + i] < ed25519_order[i]) |
1015 | 1.52k | break; |
1016 | 1.69k | } |
1017 | | /* Check equal - all bytes match. */ |
1018 | 1.52k | if (i == -1) |
1019 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1020 | | |
1021 | | /* Defence in depth: also catch small-order keys imported with trusted=1. */ |
1022 | 1.52k | if (ed25519_is_small_order(key->p)) { |
1023 | 0 | WOLFSSL_MSG("Ed25519 small-order public key rejected during " |
1024 | 0 | "signature verification"); |
1025 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1026 | 0 | } |
1027 | | |
1028 | | /* uncompress A (public key), test if valid, and negate it */ |
1029 | 1.52k | #ifndef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
1030 | 1.52k | if (ge_frombytes_negate_vartime(&A, key->p) != 0) |
1031 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1032 | 1.52k | #endif |
1033 | | |
1034 | | /* find H(R,A,M) and store it as h */ |
1035 | | |
1036 | 1.52k | ret = ed25519_hash_final(key, sha, h); |
1037 | 1.52k | if (ret != 0) |
1038 | 97 | return ret; |
1039 | | |
1040 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
1041 | | ret = LTC_PKHA_sc_reduce(h); |
1042 | | if (ret != kStatus_Success) |
1043 | | return ret; |
1044 | | ret = LTC_PKHA_SignatureForVerify(rcheck, h, sig + (ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2), key); |
1045 | | if (ret != kStatus_Success) |
1046 | | return ret; |
1047 | | #else |
1048 | 1.42k | sc_reduce(h); |
1049 | | |
1050 | | /* |
1051 | | Uses a fast single-signature verification SB = R + H(R,A,M)A becomes |
1052 | | SB - H(R,A,M)A saving decompression of R |
1053 | | */ |
1054 | 1.42k | ret = ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(&R, h, &A, sig + (ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2)); |
1055 | 1.42k | if (ret != 0) |
1056 | 33 | return ret; |
1057 | | |
1058 | 1.39k | ge_tobytes_nct(rcheck, &R); |
1059 | 1.39k | #endif /* FREESCALE_LTC_ECC */ |
1060 | | |
1061 | | /* comparison of R created to R in sig */ |
1062 | 1.39k | ret = ConstantCompare(rcheck, sig, ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2); |
1063 | 1.39k | if (ret != 0) { |
1064 | 400 | ret = SIG_VERIFY_E; |
1065 | 400 | } |
1066 | | |
1067 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_VER_FAULTS |
1068 | | /* redundant comparison as sanity check that first one happened */ |
1069 | | if (ret == 0 && ConstantCompare(rcheck, sig, ED25519_SIG_SIZE/2) != 0) { |
1070 | | ret = SIG_VERIFY_E; |
1071 | | } |
1072 | | #endif |
1073 | | |
1074 | 1.39k | if (ret == 0) { |
1075 | | /* set the verification status */ |
1076 | 994 | *res = 1; |
1077 | 994 | } |
1078 | | |
1079 | 1.39k | return ret; |
1080 | 1.42k | } |
1081 | | #endif /* (!WOLFSSL_SE050 || WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID) && |
1082 | | * !WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 */ |
1083 | | |
1084 | | #if defined(WOLFSSL_ED25519_STREAMING_VERIFY) && \ |
1085 | | (!defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) || defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID)) |
1086 | | |
1087 | | int wc_ed25519_verify_msg_init(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, ed25519_key* key, |
1088 | 691 | byte type, const byte* context, byte contextLen) { |
1089 | 691 | if (key == NULL) |
1090 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1091 | 691 | return ed25519_verify_msg_init_with_sha(sig, sigLen, key, &key->sha, |
1092 | 691 | type, context, contextLen); |
1093 | 691 | } |
1094 | | |
1095 | | int wc_ed25519_verify_msg_update(const byte* msgSegment, word32 msgSegmentLen, |
1096 | 111k | ed25519_key* key) { |
1097 | 111k | if (key == NULL) |
1098 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1099 | 111k | return ed25519_verify_msg_update_with_sha(msgSegment, msgSegmentLen, |
1100 | 111k | key, &key->sha); |
1101 | 111k | } |
1102 | | |
1103 | | int wc_ed25519_verify_msg_final(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, int* res, |
1104 | 606 | ed25519_key* key) { |
1105 | 606 | if (key == NULL) |
1106 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1107 | 606 | return ed25519_verify_msg_final_with_sha(sig, sigLen, res, |
1108 | 606 | key, &key->sha); |
1109 | 606 | } |
1110 | | |
1111 | | #endif /* WOLFSSL_ED25519_STREAMING_VERIFY && |
1112 | | * (!WOLFSSL_SE050 || WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID) */ |
1113 | | |
1114 | | /* |
1115 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
1116 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
1117 | | msg the array of bytes containing the message |
1118 | | msgLen length of msg array |
1119 | | res will be 1 on successful verify and 0 on unsuccessful |
1120 | | key Ed25519 public key |
1121 | | return 0 and res of 1 on success |
1122 | | */ |
1123 | | int wc_ed25519_verify_msg_ex(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, const byte* msg, |
1124 | | word32 msgLen, int* res, ed25519_key* key, |
1125 | | byte type, const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
1126 | 1.13k | { |
1127 | 1.13k | int ret; |
1128 | | #if defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) && !defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID) |
1129 | | (void)type; |
1130 | | (void)context; |
1131 | | (void)contextLen; |
1132 | | (void)ed25519Ctx; |
1133 | | ret = se050_ed25519_verify_msg(sig, sigLen, msg, msgLen, key, res); |
1134 | | #elif defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519) |
1135 | | (void)ed25519Ctx; |
1136 | | ret = WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE); |
1137 | | |
1138 | | if (sig == NULL || ((msg == NULL) && (msgLen != 0)) || res == NULL || |
1139 | | key == NULL || (context == NULL && contextLen != 0)) |
1140 | | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1141 | | /* An empty message may be passed as (NULL, 0); canonicalize it to a |
1142 | | * readable stand-in so that downstream consumers -- hash updates and |
1143 | | * crypto callbacks -- never see a NULL pointer. */ |
1144 | | if (msg == NULL) { |
1145 | | static const byte ed25519_empty_msg = 0; |
1146 | | msg = &ed25519_empty_msg; |
1147 | | } |
1148 | | |
1149 | | if ((type == Ed25519ph) && |
1150 | | (msgLen != WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)) |
1151 | | { |
1152 | | return BAD_LENGTH_E; |
1153 | | } |
1154 | | |
1155 | | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
1156 | | if (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID) |
1157 | | #endif |
1158 | | { |
1159 | | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519Verify(sig, sigLen, msg, msgLen, res, key, |
1160 | | type, context, contextLen); |
1161 | | } |
1162 | | if (ret == WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) { |
1163 | | ret = NO_VALID_DEVID; |
1164 | | } |
1165 | | #else |
1166 | 1.13k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
1167 | 1.13k | wc_Sha512 *sha; |
1168 | | #else |
1169 | | WC_DECLARE_VAR(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key ? key->heap : NULL); |
1170 | | #endif |
1171 | | |
1172 | | #if defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) && defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_ONLY_KEY_ID) |
1173 | | /* Key resident in the SE050: verify in hardware. Software keys fall through |
1174 | | * to the wolfCrypt software implementation below. */ |
1175 | | if (key != NULL && key->keyIdSet) { |
1176 | | /* The SE050 performs only PureEdDSA; it cannot apply the Ed25519ctx or |
1177 | | * Ed25519ph variants, so reject them rather than silently verifying |
1178 | | * against the wrong scheme. */ |
1179 | | if (type == Ed25519ctx || type == Ed25519ph || contextLen != 0) { |
1180 | | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1181 | | } |
1182 | | return se050_ed25519_verify_msg(sig, sigLen, msg, msgLen, key, res); |
1183 | | } |
1184 | | #endif |
1185 | | |
1186 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
1187 | 1.13k | if (sig == NULL || ((msg == NULL) && (msgLen != 0)) || res == NULL || |
1188 | 1.13k | key == NULL || (context == NULL && contextLen != 0)) |
1189 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1190 | | /* An empty message may be passed as (NULL, 0); canonicalize it to a |
1191 | | * readable stand-in so that downstream consumers -- hash updates and |
1192 | | * crypto callbacks -- never see a NULL pointer. */ |
1193 | 1.13k | if (msg == NULL) { |
1194 | 44 | static const byte ed25519_empty_msg = 0; |
1195 | 44 | msg = &ed25519_empty_msg; |
1196 | 44 | } |
1197 | | |
1198 | 1.13k | if ((type == Ed25519ph) && |
1199 | 0 | (msgLen != WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)) |
1200 | 0 | { |
1201 | 0 | return BAD_LENGTH_E; |
1202 | 0 | } |
1203 | | |
1204 | 1.13k | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
1205 | 1.13k | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
1206 | 1.13k | if (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID) |
1207 | 0 | #endif |
1208 | 0 | { |
1209 | 0 | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519Verify(sig, sigLen, msg, msgLen, res, key, |
1210 | 0 | type, context, contextLen); |
1211 | 0 | if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) |
1212 | 0 | return ret; |
1213 | | /* fall-through when unavailable */ |
1214 | 0 | } |
1215 | 1.13k | #endif |
1216 | | |
1217 | 1.13k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
1218 | 1.13k | sha = &key->sha; |
1219 | | #else |
1220 | | WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(sha, wc_Sha512, 1, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES, |
1221 | | return MEMORY_E); |
1222 | | ret = ed25519_hash_init(key, sha); |
1223 | | if (ret < 0) { |
1224 | | WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sha, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES); |
1225 | | return ret; |
1226 | | } |
1227 | | #endif /* WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA */ |
1228 | | |
1229 | 1.13k | ret = ed25519_verify_msg_init_with_sha(sig, sigLen, key, sha, type, context, |
1230 | 1.13k | contextLen); |
1231 | 1.13k | if (ret == 0) |
1232 | 1.07k | ret = ed25519_verify_msg_update_with_sha(msg, msgLen, key, sha); |
1233 | 1.13k | if (ret == 0) |
1234 | 993 | ret = ed25519_verify_msg_final_with_sha(sig, sigLen, res, key, sha); |
1235 | | |
1236 | | #ifndef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
1237 | | ed25519_hash_free(key, sha); |
1238 | | WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sha, key->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES); |
1239 | | #endif |
1240 | 1.13k | #endif /* WOLFSSL_SE050 */ |
1241 | 1.13k | return ret; |
1242 | 1.13k | } |
1243 | | |
1244 | | /* |
1245 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
1246 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
1247 | | msg the array of bytes containing the message |
1248 | | msgLen length of msg array |
1249 | | res will be 1 on successful verify and 0 on unsuccessful |
1250 | | key Ed25519 public key |
1251 | | return 0 and res of 1 on success |
1252 | | */ |
1253 | | int wc_ed25519_verify_msg(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, const byte* msg, |
1254 | | word32 msgLen, int* res, ed25519_key* key) |
1255 | 1.13k | { |
1256 | 1.13k | return wc_ed25519_verify_msg_ex(sig, sigLen, msg, msgLen, res, key, |
1257 | 1.13k | (byte)Ed25519, NULL, 0); |
1258 | 1.13k | } |
1259 | | |
1260 | | /* |
1261 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
1262 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
1263 | | msg the array of bytes containing the message |
1264 | | msgLen length of msg array |
1265 | | res will be 1 on successful verify and 0 on unsuccessful |
1266 | | key Ed25519 public key |
1267 | | context extra signing data |
1268 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
1269 | | return 0 and res of 1 on success |
1270 | | */ |
1271 | | int wc_ed25519ctx_verify_msg(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, const byte* msg, |
1272 | | word32 msgLen, int* res, ed25519_key* key, |
1273 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
1274 | 0 | { |
1275 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_verify_msg_ex(sig, sigLen, msg, msgLen, res, key, |
1276 | 0 | Ed25519ctx, context, contextLen); |
1277 | 0 | } |
1278 | | |
1279 | | /* |
1280 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
1281 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
1282 | | hash the array of bytes containing the SHA-512 hash of the message |
1283 | | hashLen length of hash array |
1284 | | res will be 1 on successful verify and 0 on unsuccessful |
1285 | | key Ed25519 public key |
1286 | | context extra signing data |
1287 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
1288 | | return 0 and res of 1 on success |
1289 | | */ |
1290 | | int wc_ed25519ph_verify_hash(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, const byte* hash, |
1291 | | word32 hashLen, int* res, ed25519_key* key, |
1292 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
1293 | 0 | { |
1294 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_verify_msg_ex(sig, sigLen, hash, hashLen, res, key, |
1295 | 0 | Ed25519ph, context, contextLen); |
1296 | 0 | } |
1297 | | |
1298 | | /* |
1299 | | sig is array of bytes containing the signature |
1300 | | sigLen is the length of sig byte array |
1301 | | msg the array of bytes containing the message |
1302 | | msgLen length of msg array |
1303 | | res will be 1 on successful verify and 0 on unsuccessful |
1304 | | key Ed25519 public key |
1305 | | context extra signing data |
1306 | | contextLen length of extra signing data |
1307 | | return 0 and res of 1 on success |
1308 | | */ |
1309 | | int wc_ed25519ph_verify_msg(const byte* sig, word32 sigLen, const byte* msg, |
1310 | | word32 msgLen, int* res, ed25519_key* key, |
1311 | | const byte* context, byte contextLen) |
1312 | 0 | { |
1313 | 0 | int ret; |
1314 | 0 | byte hash[WC_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
1315 | |
|
1316 | 0 | ret = ed25519_hash(key, msg, msgLen, hash); |
1317 | 0 | if (ret != 0) |
1318 | 0 | return ret; |
1319 | | |
1320 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_verify_msg_ex(sig, sigLen, hash, sizeof(hash), res, key, |
1321 | 0 | Ed25519ph, context, contextLen); |
1322 | 0 | } |
1323 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_VERIFY */ |
1324 | | |
1325 | | #ifndef WC_NO_CONSTRUCTORS |
1326 | | ed25519_key* wc_ed25519_new(void* heap, int devId, int *result_code) |
1327 | 740 | { |
1328 | 740 | int ret; |
1329 | 740 | ed25519_key* key = (ed25519_key*)XMALLOC(sizeof(ed25519_key), heap, |
1330 | 740 | DYNAMIC_TYPE_ED25519); |
1331 | 740 | if (key == NULL) { |
1332 | 0 | ret = MEMORY_E; |
1333 | 0 | } |
1334 | 740 | else { |
1335 | 740 | ret = wc_ed25519_init_ex(key, heap, devId); |
1336 | 740 | if (ret != 0) { |
1337 | 0 | XFREE(key, heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ED25519); |
1338 | 0 | key = NULL; |
1339 | 0 | } |
1340 | 740 | } |
1341 | | |
1342 | 740 | if (result_code != NULL) |
1343 | 0 | *result_code = ret; |
1344 | | |
1345 | 740 | return key; |
1346 | 740 | } |
1347 | | |
1348 | 740 | int wc_ed25519_delete(ed25519_key* key, ed25519_key** key_p) { |
1349 | 740 | void* heap; |
1350 | 740 | if (key == NULL) |
1351 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1352 | 740 | heap = key->heap; |
1353 | 740 | wc_ed25519_free(key); |
1354 | 740 | XFREE(key, heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ED25519); |
1355 | 740 | if (key_p != NULL) |
1356 | 0 | *key_p = NULL; |
1357 | 740 | return 0; |
1358 | 740 | } |
1359 | | #endif /* !WC_NO_CONSTRUCTORS */ |
1360 | | |
1361 | | /* initialize information and memory for key */ |
1362 | | int wc_ed25519_init_ex(ed25519_key* key, void* heap, int devId) |
1363 | 5.23k | { |
1364 | 5.23k | if (key == NULL) |
1365 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1366 | | |
1367 | | /* for init, ensure the key is zeroed*/ |
1368 | 5.23k | XMEMSET(key, 0, sizeof(ed25519_key)); |
1369 | | |
1370 | 5.23k | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
1371 | 5.23k | key->devId = devId; |
1372 | | #else |
1373 | | (void)devId; |
1374 | | #endif |
1375 | 5.23k | key->heap = heap; |
1376 | | |
1377 | | /* no field math is linked when all Ed25519 ops route through the callback */ |
1378 | 5.23k | #if !defined(FREESCALE_LTC_ECC) && !defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519) |
1379 | 5.23k | fe_init(); |
1380 | 5.23k | #endif |
1381 | | |
1382 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO |
1383 | | wc_MemZero_Add("wc_ed25519_init_ex key->k", &key->k, sizeof(key->k)); |
1384 | | #endif |
1385 | | |
1386 | 5.23k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
1387 | 5.23k | return ed25519_hash_init(key, &key->sha); |
1388 | | #else /* !WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA */ |
1389 | | return 0; |
1390 | | #endif /* WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA */ |
1391 | 5.23k | } |
1392 | | |
1393 | | int wc_ed25519_init(ed25519_key* key) |
1394 | 4.49k | { |
1395 | 4.49k | return wc_ed25519_init_ex(key, NULL, INVALID_DEVID); |
1396 | 4.49k | } |
1397 | | |
1398 | | /* clear memory of key */ |
1399 | | void wc_ed25519_free(ed25519_key* key) |
1400 | 5.23k | { |
1401 | 5.23k | if (key == NULL) |
1402 | 0 | return; |
1403 | | |
1404 | 5.23k | #ifdef WOLFSSL_ED25519_PERSISTENT_SHA |
1405 | 5.23k | ed25519_hash_free(key, &key->sha); |
1406 | 5.23k | #endif |
1407 | | |
1408 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_SE050 |
1409 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_SE050_AUTO_ERASE |
1410 | | wc_se050_erase_object(key->keyId); |
1411 | | #endif |
1412 | | se050_ed25519_free_key(key); |
1413 | | #endif |
1414 | | |
1415 | 5.23k | ForceZero(key, sizeof(ed25519_key)); |
1416 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO |
1417 | | wc_MemZero_Check(key, sizeof(ed25519_key)); |
1418 | | #endif |
1419 | 5.23k | } |
1420 | | |
1421 | | |
1422 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_KEY_EXPORT |
1423 | | |
1424 | | /* |
1425 | | outLen should contain the size of out buffer when input. outLen is than set |
1426 | | to the final output length. |
1427 | | returns 0 on success |
1428 | | */ |
1429 | | int wc_ed25519_export_public(const ed25519_key* key, byte* out, word32* outLen) |
1430 | 233 | { |
1431 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
1432 | 233 | if (key == NULL || out == NULL || outLen == NULL) |
1433 | 89 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1434 | | |
1435 | 144 | if (*outLen < ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) { |
1436 | 22 | *outLen = ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; |
1437 | 22 | return BUFFER_E; |
1438 | 22 | } |
1439 | | |
1440 | 122 | if (!key->pubKeySet) |
1441 | 0 | return PUBLIC_KEY_E; |
1442 | | |
1443 | 122 | *outLen = ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; |
1444 | 122 | XMEMCPY(out, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
1445 | | |
1446 | 122 | return 0; |
1447 | 122 | } |
1448 | | |
1449 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_KEY_EXPORT */ |
1450 | | |
1451 | | |
1452 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_KEY_IMPORT |
1453 | | /* |
1454 | | Imports a compressed/uncompressed public key. |
1455 | | in the byte array containing the public key |
1456 | | inLen the length of the byte array being passed in |
1457 | | key ed25519 key struct to put the public key in |
1458 | | trusted whether the public key is trusted to match private key if set |
1459 | | */ |
1460 | | int wc_ed25519_import_public_ex(const byte* in, word32 inLen, ed25519_key* key, |
1461 | | int trusted) |
1462 | 2.23k | { |
1463 | 2.23k | int ret = 0; |
1464 | | |
1465 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
1466 | 2.23k | if (in == NULL || key == NULL) |
1467 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1468 | | |
1469 | 2.23k | if (inLen < ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) |
1470 | 4 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1471 | | |
1472 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_SE050 |
1473 | | /* Importing new key material invalidates any prior SE050 object binding; |
1474 | | * erase the old object (no-op when keyIdSet == 0) so the host and the |
1475 | | * secure element agree on what's bound. Clear the binding fields |
1476 | | * explicitly afterwards so a stale keyId never survives, even when |
1477 | | * se050_ed25519_free_key() returns early because the SE050 session isn't |
1478 | | * configured yet. */ |
1479 | | se050_ed25519_free_key(key); |
1480 | | key->keyId = 0; |
1481 | | key->keyIdSet = 0; |
1482 | | #endif |
1483 | | |
1484 | | /* compressed prefix according to draft |
1485 | | http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-koch-eddsa-for-openpgp-02.txt */ |
1486 | 2.23k | if (in[0] == 0x40 && inLen == ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE + 1) { |
1487 | | /* key is stored in compressed format so just copy in */ |
1488 | 1 | XMEMCPY(key->p, (in + 1), ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
1489 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
1490 | | /* recover X coordinate */ |
1491 | | ltc_pkha_ecc_point_t pubKey; |
1492 | | pubKey.X = key->pointX; |
1493 | | pubKey.Y = key->pointY; |
1494 | | LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_PointDecompress(key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE, &pubKey); |
1495 | | #endif |
1496 | 1 | } |
1497 | | /* importing uncompressed public key */ |
1498 | 2.22k | else if (in[0] == 0x04 && inLen > 2*ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) { |
1499 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
1500 | | /* reverse bytes for little endian byte order */ |
1501 | | for (int i = 0; i < ED25519_KEY_SIZE; i++) |
1502 | | { |
1503 | | key->pointX[i] = *(in + ED25519_KEY_SIZE - i); |
1504 | | key->pointY[i] = *(in + 2*ED25519_KEY_SIZE - i); |
1505 | | } |
1506 | | XMEMCPY(key->p, key->pointY, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
1507 | | #elif defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519) |
1508 | | { |
1509 | | /* Compress without the stripped curve math: y crosses reversed |
1510 | | * with its top bit replaced by the parity of x. Same byte |
1511 | | * transform as ge_compress_key minus the canonical reduction |
1512 | | * (as in the ED25519_SMALL variant); the key check below |
1513 | | * rejects non-canonical keys. This inlined code avoids pulling |
1514 | | * in ge_compress_key(), etc. */ |
1515 | | const byte* xIn = in + 1; |
1516 | | const byte* yIn = in + 1 + ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; |
1517 | | int i; |
1518 | | |
1519 | | for (i = 0; i < ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; i++) { |
1520 | | key->p[i] = yIn[ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE - 1 - i]; |
1521 | | } |
1522 | | key->p[0] = (byte)((key->p[0] & 0x7f) | ((xIn[0] & 1) << 7)); |
1523 | | } |
1524 | | #else |
1525 | | /* pass in (x,y) and store compressed key */ |
1526 | 3 | ret = ge_compress_key(key->p, in+1, |
1527 | 3 | in+1+ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
1528 | 3 | #endif /* FREESCALE_LTC_ECC */ |
1529 | 3 | } |
1530 | | /* if not specified compressed or uncompressed check key size |
1531 | | if key size is equal to compressed key size copy in key */ |
1532 | 2.22k | else if (inLen == ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) { |
1533 | 2.19k | XMEMCPY(key->p, in, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
1534 | | #ifdef FREESCALE_LTC_ECC |
1535 | | /* recover X coordinate */ |
1536 | | ltc_pkha_ecc_point_t pubKey; |
1537 | | pubKey.X = key->pointX; |
1538 | | pubKey.Y = key->pointY; |
1539 | | LTC_PKHA_Ed25519_PointDecompress(key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE, &pubKey); |
1540 | | #endif |
1541 | 2.19k | } |
1542 | 36 | else { |
1543 | 36 | ret = BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1544 | 36 | } |
1545 | | |
1546 | 2.23k | if (ret == 0) { |
1547 | 2.19k | key->pubKeySet = 1; |
1548 | 2.19k | if (!trusted) { |
1549 | 2.19k | ret = wc_ed25519_check_key(key); |
1550 | 2.19k | } |
1551 | 2.19k | } |
1552 | 2.23k | if (ret != 0) { |
1553 | 235 | key->pubKeySet = 0; |
1554 | 235 | } |
1555 | | |
1556 | | /* bad public key format */ |
1557 | 2.23k | return ret; |
1558 | 2.23k | } |
1559 | | |
1560 | | /* |
1561 | | Imports a compressed/uncompressed public key. |
1562 | | in the byte array containing the public key |
1563 | | inLen the length of the byte array being passed in |
1564 | | key ed25519 key struct to put the public key in |
1565 | | */ |
1566 | | int wc_ed25519_import_public(const byte* in, word32 inLen, ed25519_key* key) |
1567 | 2.23k | { |
1568 | 2.23k | return wc_ed25519_import_public_ex(in, inLen, key, 0); |
1569 | 2.23k | } |
1570 | | |
1571 | | /* |
1572 | | For importing a private key. |
1573 | | */ |
1574 | | int wc_ed25519_import_private_only(const byte* priv, word32 privSz, |
1575 | | ed25519_key* key) |
1576 | 1.56k | { |
1577 | 1.56k | int ret = 0; |
1578 | | |
1579 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
1580 | 1.56k | if (priv == NULL || key == NULL) |
1581 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1582 | | |
1583 | | /* key size check */ |
1584 | 1.56k | if (privSz != ED25519_KEY_SIZE) |
1585 | 20 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1586 | | |
1587 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_SE050 |
1588 | | /* Importing new key material invalidates any prior SE050 object binding; |
1589 | | * erase the old object (no-op when keyIdSet == 0) so the host and the |
1590 | | * secure element agree on what's bound. Clear the binding fields |
1591 | | * explicitly afterwards so a stale keyId never survives, even when |
1592 | | * se050_ed25519_free_key() returns early because the SE050 session isn't |
1593 | | * configured yet. */ |
1594 | | se050_ed25519_free_key(key); |
1595 | | key->keyId = 0; |
1596 | | key->keyIdSet = 0; |
1597 | | #endif |
1598 | | |
1599 | 1.54k | XMEMCPY(key->k, priv, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
1600 | 1.54k | key->privKeySet = 1; |
1601 | | |
1602 | 1.54k | if (key->pubKeySet) { |
1603 | | /* Validate loaded public key */ |
1604 | 0 | ret = wc_ed25519_check_key(key); |
1605 | 0 | } |
1606 | 1.54k | if (ret != 0) { |
1607 | 0 | key->privKeySet = 0; |
1608 | 0 | ForceZero(key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
1609 | 0 | } |
1610 | | |
1611 | 1.54k | return ret; |
1612 | 1.56k | } |
1613 | | |
1614 | | |
1615 | | /* Import an ed25519 private and public keys from byte array(s). |
1616 | | * |
1617 | | * priv [in] Array holding private key from |
1618 | | * wc_ed25519_export_private_only(), or private+public keys from |
1619 | | * wc_ed25519_export_private(). |
1620 | | * privSz [in] Number of bytes of data in private key array. |
1621 | | * pub [in] Array holding public key (or NULL). |
1622 | | * pubSz [in] Number of bytes of data in public key array (or 0). |
1623 | | * key [in] Ed25519 private/public key. |
1624 | | * trusted [in] Indicates whether the public key data is trusted. |
1625 | | * When 0, checks public key matches private key. |
1626 | | * When 1, doesn't check public key matches private key. |
1627 | | * returns BAD_FUNC_ARG when a required parameter is NULL or an invalid |
1628 | | * combination of keys/lengths is supplied, 0 otherwise. |
1629 | | */ |
1630 | | int wc_ed25519_import_private_key_ex(const byte* priv, word32 privSz, |
1631 | | const byte* pub, word32 pubSz, ed25519_key* key, int trusted) |
1632 | 0 | { |
1633 | 0 | int ret; |
1634 | | |
1635 | | /* sanity check on arguments */ |
1636 | 0 | if (priv == NULL || key == NULL) |
1637 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1638 | | |
1639 | | /* key size check */ |
1640 | 0 | if (privSz != ED25519_KEY_SIZE && privSz != ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE) |
1641 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1642 | | |
1643 | 0 | if (pub == NULL) { |
1644 | 0 | if (pubSz != 0) |
1645 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1646 | 0 | if (privSz != ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE) |
1647 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1648 | 0 | pub = priv + ED25519_KEY_SIZE; |
1649 | 0 | pubSz = ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; |
1650 | 0 | } |
1651 | 0 | else if (pubSz < ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) { |
1652 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1653 | 0 | } |
1654 | | |
1655 | | #ifdef WOLFSSL_SE050 |
1656 | | /* Importing new key material invalidates any prior SE050 object binding; |
1657 | | * erase the old object (no-op when keyIdSet == 0) so the host and the |
1658 | | * secure element agree on what's bound. key->k is overwritten before the |
1659 | | * wc_ed25519_import_public_ex() call below, so the binding must be |
1660 | | * dropped here first in case that function fails its own early-return |
1661 | | * argument checks before reaching its reset. Clear the binding fields |
1662 | | * explicitly afterwards so a stale keyId never survives, even when |
1663 | | * se050_ed25519_free_key() returns early because the SE050 session isn't |
1664 | | * configured yet. */ |
1665 | | se050_ed25519_free_key(key); |
1666 | | key->keyId = 0; |
1667 | | key->keyIdSet = 0; |
1668 | | #endif |
1669 | | |
1670 | 0 | XMEMCPY(key->k, priv, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
1671 | 0 | key->privKeySet = 1; |
1672 | | |
1673 | | /* import public key */ |
1674 | 0 | ret = wc_ed25519_import_public_ex(pub, pubSz, key, trusted); |
1675 | 0 | if (ret != 0) { |
1676 | 0 | key->privKeySet = 0; |
1677 | 0 | ForceZero(key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
1678 | 0 | return ret; |
1679 | 0 | } |
1680 | | |
1681 | | /* make the private key (priv + pub) */ |
1682 | 0 | XMEMCPY(key->k + ED25519_KEY_SIZE, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE); |
1683 | |
|
1684 | 0 | return ret; |
1685 | 0 | } |
1686 | | |
1687 | | /* Import an ed25519 private and public keys from byte array(s). |
1688 | | * |
1689 | | * priv [in] Array holding private key from wc_ed25519_export_private_only(), |
1690 | | * or private+public keys from wc_ed25519_export_private(). |
1691 | | * privSz [in] Number of bytes of data in private key array. |
1692 | | * pub [in] Array holding public key (or NULL). |
1693 | | * pubSz [in] Number of bytes of data in public key array (or 0). |
1694 | | * key [in] Ed25519 private/public key. |
1695 | | * returns BAD_FUNC_ARG when a required parameter is NULL or an invalid |
1696 | | * combination of keys/lengths is supplied, 0 otherwise. |
1697 | | */ |
1698 | | int wc_ed25519_import_private_key(const byte* priv, word32 privSz, |
1699 | | const byte* pub, word32 pubSz, ed25519_key* key) |
1700 | 0 | { |
1701 | 0 | return wc_ed25519_import_private_key_ex(priv, privSz, pub, pubSz, key, 0); |
1702 | 0 | } |
1703 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_KEY_IMPORT */ |
1704 | | |
1705 | | |
1706 | | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_KEY_EXPORT |
1707 | | |
1708 | | /* |
1709 | | export private key only (secret part so 32 bytes) |
1710 | | outLen should contain the size of out buffer when input. outLen is than set |
1711 | | to the final output length. |
1712 | | returns 0 on success |
1713 | | */ |
1714 | | int wc_ed25519_export_private_only(const ed25519_key* key, byte* out, word32* outLen) |
1715 | 377 | { |
1716 | | /* sanity checks on arguments */ |
1717 | 377 | if (key == NULL || !key->privKeySet || out == NULL || outLen == NULL) |
1718 | 95 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1719 | | |
1720 | 282 | if (*outLen < ED25519_KEY_SIZE) { |
1721 | 15 | *outLen = ED25519_KEY_SIZE; |
1722 | 15 | return BUFFER_E; |
1723 | 15 | } |
1724 | | |
1725 | 267 | *outLen = ED25519_KEY_SIZE; |
1726 | 267 | XMEMCPY(out, key->k, ED25519_KEY_SIZE); |
1727 | | |
1728 | 267 | return 0; |
1729 | 282 | } |
1730 | | |
1731 | | /* |
1732 | | export private key, including public part |
1733 | | outLen should contain the size of out buffer when input. outLen is than set |
1734 | | to the final output length. |
1735 | | returns 0 on success |
1736 | | */ |
1737 | | int wc_ed25519_export_private(const ed25519_key* key, byte* out, word32* outLen) |
1738 | 0 | { |
1739 | | /* sanity checks on arguments */ |
1740 | 0 | if (key == NULL || !key->privKeySet || out == NULL || outLen == NULL) |
1741 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1742 | | |
1743 | 0 | if (*outLen < ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE) { |
1744 | 0 | *outLen = ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE; |
1745 | 0 | return BUFFER_E; |
1746 | 0 | } |
1747 | | |
1748 | 0 | *outLen = ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE; |
1749 | 0 | XMEMCPY(out, key->k, ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE); |
1750 | |
|
1751 | 0 | return 0; |
1752 | 0 | } |
1753 | | |
1754 | | /* export full private key and public key |
1755 | | return 0 on success |
1756 | | */ |
1757 | | int wc_ed25519_export_key(const ed25519_key* key, |
1758 | | byte* priv, word32 *privSz, |
1759 | | byte* pub, word32 *pubSz) |
1760 | 0 | { |
1761 | 0 | int ret; |
1762 | | |
1763 | | /* export 'full' private part */ |
1764 | 0 | ret = wc_ed25519_export_private(key, priv, privSz); |
1765 | 0 | if (ret == 0) { |
1766 | | /* export public part */ |
1767 | 0 | ret = wc_ed25519_export_public(key, pub, pubSz); |
1768 | 0 | } |
1769 | |
|
1770 | 0 | return ret; |
1771 | 0 | } |
1772 | | |
1773 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_KEY_EXPORT */ |
1774 | | |
1775 | | /* Check the public key is valid. |
1776 | | * |
1777 | | * When private key available, check the calculated public key matches. |
1778 | | * When no private key, check Y is in range and an X is able to be calculated. |
1779 | | * |
1780 | | * @param [in] key Ed25519 private/public key. |
1781 | | * @return 0 otherwise. |
1782 | | * @return BAD_FUNC_ARG when key is NULL. |
1783 | | * @return PUBLIC_KEY_E when the public key is not set, doesn't match or is |
1784 | | * invalid. |
1785 | | * @return other -ve value on hash failure. |
1786 | | */ |
1787 | | int wc_ed25519_check_key(ed25519_key* key) |
1788 | 2.57k | { |
1789 | 2.57k | int ret = 0; |
1790 | | |
1791 | | /* Validate parameter. */ |
1792 | 2.57k | if (key == NULL) { |
1793 | 0 | ret = BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1794 | 0 | } |
1795 | | |
1796 | | /* Check we have a public key to check. */ |
1797 | 2.57k | if ((ret == 0) && (!key->pubKeySet)) { |
1798 | 0 | ret = PUBLIC_KEY_E; |
1799 | 0 | } |
1800 | | |
1801 | 2.57k | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB |
1802 | | /* Device-first: let a configured device validate the key. Fall through |
1803 | | * to the software checks below only when the device reports the |
1804 | | * operation unavailable. */ |
1805 | 2.57k | #ifndef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND |
1806 | 2.57k | if ((ret == 0) && (key->devId != INVALID_DEVID)) |
1807 | | #else |
1808 | | if (ret == 0) |
1809 | | #endif |
1810 | 0 | { |
1811 | 0 | ret = wc_CryptoCb_Ed25519CheckKey(key); |
1812 | 0 | if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE)) |
1813 | 0 | return ret; |
1814 | 0 | ret = 0; /* device declined; fall through to software */ |
1815 | 0 | } |
1816 | 2.57k | #endif |
1817 | | |
1818 | | #ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 |
1819 | | /* Software validation is stripped; the device-first check above either |
1820 | | * handled the key or reported the op unavailable, so fail closed rather |
1821 | | * than accept an unvalidated key. */ |
1822 | | if (ret == 0) |
1823 | | ret = NO_VALID_DEVID; |
1824 | | #else |
1825 | | /* Reject small-order pub key before the priv-vs-pub compare so the |
1826 | | * diagnostic isn't masked by a "mismatch" error. */ |
1827 | 2.57k | if ((ret == 0) && ed25519_is_small_order(key->p)) { |
1828 | 49 | WOLFSSL_MSG("Ed25519 small-order public key rejected during key check"); |
1829 | 49 | ret = PUBLIC_KEY_E; |
1830 | 49 | } |
1831 | | |
1832 | 2.57k | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_MAKE_KEY |
1833 | | /* If we have a private key just make the public key and compare. */ |
1834 | 2.57k | if ((ret == 0) && (key->privKeySet)) { |
1835 | 377 | ALIGN16 unsigned char pubKey[ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE]; |
1836 | | |
1837 | 377 | ret = wc_ed25519_make_public(key, pubKey, sizeof(pubKey)); |
1838 | 377 | if (ret == 0 && XMEMCMP(pubKey, key->p, ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE) != 0) |
1839 | 0 | ret = PUBLIC_KEY_E; |
1840 | 377 | } |
1841 | | #else |
1842 | | (void)key; |
1843 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519_MAKE_KEY */ |
1844 | | |
1845 | | /* No private key (or ability to make a public key), check Y is valid. */ |
1846 | 2.57k | if (ret == 0 |
1847 | 2.40k | #ifdef HAVE_ED25519_MAKE_KEY |
1848 | 2.40k | && (!key->privKeySet) |
1849 | 2.57k | #endif |
1850 | 2.57k | ) { |
1851 | | /* Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the interval [0, p - 1]. |
1852 | | * Only have yQ so check that ordinate. p = 2^255 - 19 */ |
1853 | 2.14k | if ((key->p[ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE - 1] & 0x7f) == 0x7f) { |
1854 | 190 | int i; |
1855 | | |
1856 | 190 | ret = PUBLIC_KEY_E; |
1857 | | /* Check up to last byte. */ |
1858 | 1.14k | for (i = ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE - 2; i > 0; i--) { |
1859 | 1.13k | if (key->p[i] != 0xff) { |
1860 | 182 | ret = 0; |
1861 | 182 | break; |
1862 | 182 | } |
1863 | 1.13k | } |
1864 | | /* Bits are all one up to last byte - check less than -19. */ |
1865 | 190 | if ((ret == WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(PUBLIC_KEY_E)) && (key->p[0] < 0xed)) { |
1866 | 6 | ret = 0; |
1867 | 6 | } |
1868 | 190 | } |
1869 | | |
1870 | 2.14k | if (ret == 0) { |
1871 | | /* Verify that Q is on the curve. |
1872 | | * Uncompressing the public key will validate yQ. */ |
1873 | 2.14k | ge_p3 A; |
1874 | | |
1875 | 2.14k | if (ge_frombytes_negate_vartime(&A, key->p) != 0) { |
1876 | 148 | ret = PUBLIC_KEY_E; |
1877 | 148 | } |
1878 | 2.14k | } |
1879 | 2.14k | } |
1880 | 2.57k | #endif /* WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ED25519 */ |
1881 | | |
1882 | 2.57k | return ret; |
1883 | 2.57k | } |
1884 | | |
1885 | | /* returns the private key size (secret only) in bytes */ |
1886 | | int wc_ed25519_size(const ed25519_key* key) |
1887 | 0 | { |
1888 | 0 | if (key == NULL) |
1889 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1890 | | |
1891 | 0 | return ED25519_KEY_SIZE; |
1892 | 0 | } |
1893 | | |
1894 | | /* returns the private key size (secret + public) in bytes */ |
1895 | | int wc_ed25519_priv_size(const ed25519_key* key) |
1896 | 0 | { |
1897 | 0 | if (key == NULL) |
1898 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1899 | | |
1900 | 0 | return ED25519_PRV_KEY_SIZE; |
1901 | 0 | } |
1902 | | |
1903 | | /* returns the compressed key size in bytes (public key) */ |
1904 | | int wc_ed25519_pub_size(const ed25519_key* key) |
1905 | 0 | { |
1906 | 0 | if (key == NULL) |
1907 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1908 | | |
1909 | 0 | return ED25519_PUB_KEY_SIZE; |
1910 | 0 | } |
1911 | | |
1912 | | /* returns the size of signature in bytes */ |
1913 | | int wc_ed25519_sig_size(const ed25519_key* key) |
1914 | 0 | { |
1915 | 0 | if (key == NULL) |
1916 | 0 | return BAD_FUNC_ARG; |
1917 | | |
1918 | 0 | return ED25519_SIG_SIZE; |
1919 | 0 | } |
1920 | | |
1921 | | #endif /* HAVE_ED25519 */ |