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ENDORSED  
FILED  
San Francisco County Superior Court  
NOV 14 2018  
CLERK OF THE COURT  
BY: ROSSALY DE LA VEGA  
Deputy Clerk

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11 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**  
12 **IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO**

13 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF  
FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS, INC.;

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 CHEVRON CORP.; CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.;

17 EXXON MOBIL CORP.; EXXONMOBIL OIL

18 CORP.; BP P.L.C.; BP AMERICA, INC.;

19 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC; SHELL OIL

20 PRODUCTS CO. LLC; CITGO PETROLEUM

21 CORP.; CONOCOPHILLIPS;

22 CONOCOPHILLIPS CO.; PHILLIPS 66;

23 TOTAL E&P USA INC.; TOTAL

24 SPECIALTIES USA INC.; ENI S.P.A.; ENI OIL

25 & GAS INC.; ANADARKO PETROLEUM

26 CORP.; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP.;

27 OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP.; REPSOL

28 S.A.; REPSOL ENERGY NORTH AMERICA

CORP.; REPSOL TRADING USA CORP.;

MARATHON OIL CO.; MARATHON OIL

CORP.; MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP.;

HESS CORP.; DEVON ENERGY CORP.;

DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION CO., L.P.;

ENCANA CORP.; APACHE CORP.; and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. **CGC-18-571285**  
COMPLAINT FOR:

1. NUISANCE;
2. STRICT LIABILITY – FAILURE TO WARN;
3. STRICT LIABILITY – DESIGN DEFECT;
4. NEGLIGENCE; and
5. NEGLIGENCE – FAILURE TO WARN.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 1. The world’s oceans are changing, and commercial fishermen and -women, their  
3 businesses, their communities, and their families are paying the price. Climate change is impacting  
4 the oceans by increasing average sea temperatures, increasing the frequency and intensity of  
5 marine heatwaves, destabilizing and disturbing marine wildlife populations, affecting ocean  
6 circulation, and increasing the frequency and severity of harmful algal blooms. These changes  
7 threaten both the productivity of commercial fisheries and safety of commercially harvested  
8 seafood products. In so doing, they also threaten those that rely on ocean fisheries and ecosystems  
9 for their livelihoods, by rendering it at times impossible to ply their trade. With this action, the  
10 largest commercial fishing industry trade group on the west coast seeks to hold responsible parties  
11 accountable for acute changes to the ocean off of California and Oregon that resulted, over the last  
12 three years, in prolonged regulatory closures of the Dungeness crab fisheries—the most lucrative  
13 and reliable fisheries on the west coast. Such closures will recur, as the conditions giving rise to  
14 them increase in frequency and magnitude as the oceans continue to warm. Accordingly, the crab  
15 fishing industry brings this action to force the parties responsible for this severe disruption to  
16 fishing opportunity, and the consequent impacts on fishing families, to bear the costs of their  
17 conduct.

18 2. Defendants, major corporate members of the fossil fuel industry, have known for  
19 nearly a half century that unrestricted production and use of their fossil fuel products create  
20 greenhouse gas pollution that warms the planet, changes our climate, and disrupts the oceans. They  
21 have known for decades that those impacts could be catastrophic and that only a narrow window  
22 existed to take action before the consequences would be irreversible. They have nevertheless  
23 engaged in a coordinated, multi-front effort to conceal and deny their own knowledge of those  
24 threats, discredit the growing body of publicly available scientific evidence, and persistently create  
25 doubt in the minds of customers, consumers, regulators, the media, journalists, teachers, and the  
26 public about the reality and consequences of the impacts of their fossil fuel pollution. At the same  
27 time, Defendants have promoted and profited from a massive increase in the extraction and  
28 consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas, which has in turn caused an enormous, foreseeable, and

1 avoidable increase in global greenhouse gas pollution and an accompanying increase in the  
2 concentration of greenhouse gases,<sup>1</sup> particularly carbon dioxide (“CO<sub>2</sub>”) and methane, in the  
3 atmosphere. Those disruptions of Earth’s otherwise balanced carbon cycle have substantially  
4 contributed to a wide range of dire climate-related effects, including global warming, rising  
5 atmospheric and ocean temperatures, ocean acidification, melting polar ice caps and glaciers, more  
6 extreme and volatile weather, sea level rise, and marine heatwaves with concomitant harmful algal  
7 blooms. Families and businesses that depend on the health and productivity of the Dungeness crab  
8 fishery to earn their livings suffer the consequences.

9         3. Defendants are vertically integrated extractors, producers, refiners, manufacturers,  
10 distributors, promoters, marketers, and sellers of fossil fuel products. Decades of scientific  
11 research show that pollution from the production and use of Defendants’ fossil fuel products plays  
12 a direct and substantial role in the unprecedented rise in emissions of greenhouse gas pollution and  
13 increased atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations since the mid-20th century. This dramatic increase in  
14 atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> and other greenhouse gases is the main driver of the gravely dangerous changes  
15 occurring to the global climate.

16         4. Anthropogenic (human-caused) greenhouse gas pollution, primarily in the form of  
17 CO<sub>2</sub>, is far and away the dominant cause of global warming and the observed increase in ocean  
18 temperatures,<sup>2</sup> including marine heatwaves.<sup>3</sup> The primary source of this pollution is the extraction,  
19 production and consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas, referred to collectively in this Complaint  
20 as “fossil fuel products.”<sup>4</sup>

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21  
22 <sup>1</sup> As used in this Complaint, “greenhouse gases” refers collectively to carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.  
23 Where a source refers to a specific gas or gases, or when a process relates only to a specific gas or gases, this Complaint  
24 refers to them by name.

25 <sup>2</sup> See IPCC, *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report*. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth  
26 Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A.  
27 Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland (2014), at 6, Figure SMP.3, <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr> (hereinafter,  
28 “IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report”).

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Emanuele Di Lorenzo & Nathan Mantua, *Multi-year persistence of the 2014/15 North Pacific marine  
heatwave*, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, 1 (July 11, 2016), <https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3082>; Eric C.J.  
Oliver et al., *The unprecedented 2015/16 Tasman Sea marine heatwave*, NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 8:16101, 1 (July  
14, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> See C. Le Quéré et al., *Global Carbon Budget 2016*, EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA 8, 632 (2016), <http://www.earth-syst-sci-data.net/8/605/2016>. Cumulative emissions since the beginning of the industrial revolution to 2015 were 413 GtC  
attributable to fossil fuels, and 190 GtC attributable to land use change. *Id.* Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuels

1           5.       The rate at which Defendants have extracted and sold fossil fuel products has  
2 exploded since the Second World War, as have emissions from those products. The substantial  
3 majority of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in history has occurred since the 1950s, a  
4 period known as the “Great Acceleration.”<sup>5</sup> About three quarters of all industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
5 in history have occurred since the 1960s,<sup>6</sup> and more than half have occurred since the late 1980s.<sup>7</sup>  
6 The annual rate of carbon dioxide emissions from production, consumption, and use of fossil fuels  
7 has increased by more than 60% since 1990.<sup>8</sup>

8           6.       Defendants have known for nearly 50 years that greenhouse gas pollution from their  
9 fossil fuel products has a significant impact on Earth’s climate, including a warming of the oceans.  
10 Defendants’ awareness of the negative implications of their own behavior corresponds almost  
11 exactly with the Great Acceleration, and with skyrocketing greenhouse gas emissions. With that  
12 knowledge, Defendants took steps to protect their own assets from these threats through immense  
13 internal investment in research, infrastructure improvements, and plans to exploit new  
14 opportunities in a warming world.

15           7.       Instead of working to reduce the use and combustion of fossil fuel products, lower  
16 the rate of greenhouse gas emissions, minimize the damage associated with continued high use  
17 and combustion of such products, and ease the transition to a lower carbon economy, Defendants  
18 concealed the dangers, sought to undermine public support for greenhouse gas regulation, and  
19 engaged in massive campaigns to promote the ever-increasing use of their products at ever greater  
20 volumes. Thus, each Defendant’s conduct has contributed substantially to the buildup of CO<sub>2</sub> in  
21 the environment that drives ocean warming.

22           8.       As an actual and proximate consequence of Defendants’ conduct, the crab fishing  
23 industry has been deprived of valuable fishing opportunities, and consequently suffered severe

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24  
25 and industry remained nearly constant at 9.9 GtC in 2015, distributed among coal (41%), oil (34%), gas (19%), cement  
(5.6%), and gas flaring (0.7%). *Id.* at 629.

26 <sup>5</sup> Will Steffen et al., *The Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration*, 2 THE ANTHROPOCENE REVIEW 81,  
81 (2015).

27 <sup>6</sup> R.J. Andres et al., *A synthesis of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel combustion*, 9 BIOGEOSCIENCES, 1845,  
1851 (2012).

28 <sup>7</sup> *Id.*

<sup>8</sup> *Global Carbon Budget 2016*, *supra* note 4, at 630.

1 financial hardships. These injuries derive from rising ocean temperatures in the eastern Pacific  
2 Ocean generally and periodic extreme marine heatwaves—the results of anthropogenic ocean  
3 warming caused by the foreseeable and intended use of Defendants’ products. Recent marine  
4 heatwaves along the United States’ west coast created the ideal conditions for the toxic algal group  
5 *Pseudo-nitzschia* to increase in abundance and invade the marine regions that correspond with  
6 some of the most productive Dungeness crab fishery grounds. The massive *Pseudo-nitzschia*  
7 bloom generated unprecedented concentrations of the neurotoxin domoic acid, a compound which,  
8 when ingested by humans, causes “amnesic shellfish poisoning” which induces symptoms  
9 including vomiting, diarrhea, cramps, and other gastrointestinal upset, permanent short-term  
10 memory loss, and, in severe cases, death.

11           9.       Rising ocean temperatures and the resultant *Pseudo-nitzschia* blooms allow domoic  
12 acid to enter the marine food web and accumulate in crab flesh, rendering it at times dangerous  
13 and unfit for human consumption.

14           10.       In response to this public health crisis, the California Department of Fish and  
15 Wildlife (“CDFW”), in coordination with the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”),  
16 closed—for the first time ever—significant portions of the California coast to commercial  
17 Dungeness crab fishing in the 2015–16 fishing season, and again in 2016–17. The Oregon  
18 Department of Fish and Wildlife (“ODFW”) and the Oregon Department of Agriculture (“ODA”)  
19 similarly closed large areas of the Oregon coast to commercial crabbing during the 2015–16, 2016–  
20 17, and 2017–18 commercial crab seasons because of domoic acid toxicity. Because of those  
21 closures, hundreds of commercial fishermen and -women holding Dungeness crab permits could  
22 not untie their boats or deploy their crab traps until crabs became safe to consume. Additional  
23 precautionary measures and stigma from negative publicity related to domoic acid contamination  
24 have deprived the crab industry of the full value of its harvests these last three seasons by  
25 depressing the market demand for crab products.

26           11.       Plaintiff represents commercial Dungeness crab harvesters and onshore crab  
27 processors and wholesalers that have suffered, and continue to suffer, substantial economic losses  
28 due to those lost fishing opportunities. The severe curtailment of the crab fishery, which is among

1 the most productive, lucrative, and reliable fisheries on the west coast, had damaging ripple effects  
2 throughout California's and Oregon's fishing families and communities, creating severe hardships  
3 that many fishermen and fishing businesses, including Plaintiff's members, have struggled to  
4 overcome. The severity of the economic loss endured by the crabbing community prompted the  
5 federal government to declare the 2015–16 California crab season a federal fishery disaster under  
6 the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Management and Conservation Act.

7 12. Domoic acid incidents on the west coast, and consequent injuries to the fishing  
8 industry and west coast fishing communities generally, are the new normal. These phenomena will  
9 increase in severity and frequency as the oceans continue to change with anthropogenic global  
10 warming. Indeed, California's 2018–19 crab season—set to begin on November 15, 2018—will  
11 be delayed in parts of the fishery because of domoic acid toxicity.

12 13. Additional crab fishery closures will occur in the future, with increasing frequency  
13 and severity, with concomitant impacts on the fishing families, fishing communities, and the west  
14 coast fishing industry at large.

15 14. Defendants are directly responsible for a large and substantial portion of total CO<sub>2</sub>  
16 emissions between 1965 and 2015. For example, based on Defendants' direct extractions of fossil  
17 fuels, they are responsible for more than two hundred gigatons of emissions representing over 15%  
18 of total emissions of that potent greenhouse gas during that period. Defendants are responsible for  
19 significantly larger shares of emissions based on their production, wholesale and retail sales of  
20 their products. Accordingly, Defendants are directly responsible for a substantial portion of  
21 elevated ocean temperatures that caused the domoic acid contamination on the west coast, which  
22 in turn caused the substantial and material economic injuries described herein.

23 15. Defendants' production, promotion, marketing, and use of fossil fuel products,  
24 simultaneous concealment of the known hazards of those products, and their championing of anti-  
25 regulation and anti-science campaigns, actually and proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries.

26 16. Accordingly, Plaintiff in its own name, in a representative capacity on behalf of its  
27 members and the west coast fishing community, and as the assignee of claims arising from domoic  
28



1 acid impacts on the crab fishery, brings this action against Defendants for Nuisance, Strict Liability  
2 for Failure to Warn, Strict Liability for Design Defect, Negligence, and Negligent Failure to Warn.

3 17. By this action, the Plaintiff seeks to ensure that the parties responsible for the  
4 fishery closures bear the costs of its impacts, rather than Plaintiff and the men, women, families  
5 and businesses of the west coast crab industry.

6 **II. PARTIES**

7 **A. Plaintiff**

8 18. Plaintiff the **Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc.**  
9 (“PCFFA”) is the largest trade association of commercial fishermen on the West Coast. PCFFA  
10 has led the fishing industry in protecting the rights of west coast fishermen and fishing  
11 communities since 1976. PCFFA fights for the long-term survival of commercial fishing—  
12 including commercial Dungeness crab fishing—as a productive livelihood and way of life. PCFFA  
13 is a 501(c)(5) not-for-profit trade organization incorporated in California and headquartered in the  
14 city and county of San Francisco, California. PCFFA represents, *inter alia*, crab fishermen and  
15 local fishermen’s marketing associations.

16 19. PCFFA brings these claims in its own name; as a representative of its members that  
17 are and will continue to be injured financially and otherwise by Defendants’ conduct and  
18 consequent domoic acid incidents and domoic acid-induced crab fishery closures; and as assignee  
19 of claims assigned to it by individuals and businesses that derive income from the California and  
20 Oregon Dungeness crab fisheries that have suffered and will continue to suffer financial and other  
21 injuries because of Defendants’ conduct and consequent domoic acid blooms and domoic acid-  
22 induced crab fishery closures. As used hereinafter, the term “Plaintiff” refers to PCFFA, its  
23 members, and businesses that have assigned PCFFA claims arising from the facts described herein.

24 20. PCFFA has diverted resources to addressing domoic acid impacts on the  
25 commercial crab fishery, including by dedicating staff time and energy to address these outbreaks  
26 in the media, working with state agencies to determine crab fishery closure and reopening  
27 procedures, sharing information on domoic acid and closures with its members, and appealing to  
28 state and federal entities for fishery disaster relief, among other activities. Domoic acid outbreaks

1 and resultant fishery closures have frustrated and will continue to frustrate PCFFA's mission of  
2 ensuring that commercial fishing remains a sustainable livelihood, by damaging markets and  
3 preventing trade in crab harvested on the west coast.

4 **B. Defendants**

5 21. Defendants are responsible for a substantial portion of the total greenhouse gases  
6 emitted since 1965. Defendants, individually and collectively, are responsible for extracting,  
7 refining, processing, producing, promoting, and marketing fossil fuel products, the normal and  
8 intended use of which has led to the emission of a substantial percentage of the total volume of  
9 greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere since 1965. Indeed, between 1965 and 2015, the  
10 named Defendants extracted enough fossil fuel materials (i.e. crude oil, coal, and natural gas) to  
11 account for more than one in every five tons of carbon dioxide and methane emitted worldwide.  
12 Accounting in addition for their wholesale and retail sales of products, as well as their wrongful  
13 promotion and marketing activities, Defendants bear a dominant responsibility for global warming  
14 generally and for Plaintiff's injuries in particular.

15 22. When reference in this complaint is made to an act or omission of the Defendants,  
16 unless specifically attributed or otherwise stated, such references should be interpreted to mean  
17 that the officers, directors, agents, employees, or representatives of the Defendants committed or  
18 authorized such an act or omission, or failed to adequately supervise or properly control or direct  
19 their employees while engaged in the management, direction, operation or control of the affairs of  
20 Defendants, and did so while acting within the scope of their employment or agency.

21 23. **Chevron Entities**

22 a. Chevron Corporation is a multinational, vertically integrated energy and  
23 chemicals company incorporated in the State of Delaware, with its global headquarters and  
24 principal place of business in San Ramon, California.

25 b. Chevron Corporation controls and has controlled companywide decisions  
26 about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.  
27  
28

1 c. Chevron Corporation controls and has controlled companywide decisions  
2 related to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including  
3 those of its subsidiaries.

4 d. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. is a Pennsylvania Corporation with its principal place  
5 of business located in San Ramon, California. Chevron USA is a wholly owned subsidiary of  
6 Chevron Corporation that acts on Chevron Corporation's behalf and subject to Chevron  
7 Corporation's control. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was formerly known as, and did or does business as,  
8 and/or is the successor in liability to Gulf Oil Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation of Pennsylvania,  
9 Chevron Products Company, Chevron Chemical Company, Chevron Energy Solutions Company,  
10 ChevronTexaco Products Company, Chevron U.S.A. Production Company, and Chevron U.S.A.  
11 Products Company.

12 e. "Chevron" as used hereafter, means collectively, Defendants Chevron  
13 Corp. and Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

14 f. Chevron operates through a web of U.S. and international subsidiaries at all  
15 levels of the fossil fuel supply chain. Chevron's and its subsidiaries' operations consist of  
16 exploring for, developing, and producing crude oil and natural gas; processing, liquefaction,  
17 transportation, and regasification associated with liquefied natural gas; transporting crude oil by  
18 major international oil export pipelines; transporting, storage, and marketing of natural gas;  
19 refining crude oil into petroleum products; marketing of crude oil and refined products;  
20 transporting crude oil and refined products by pipeline, marine vessel, motor equipment and rail  
21 car; basic and applied research in multiple scientific fields including of chemistry, geology, and  
22 engineering; and manufacturing and marketing of commodity petrochemicals, plastics for  
23 industrial uses, and fuel and lubricant additives.

24 g. Chevron directs and has directed substantial fossil fuel-related business to  
25 California. A substantial portion of Chevron's fossil fuel products are or have been extracted,  
26 refined, transported, traded, distributed, marketed, promoted, manufactured, sold, and/or  
27 consumed in California, from which Chevron derives and has derived substantial revenue.

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24. **Exxon Entities**

a. Exxon Mobil Corporation is a multinational, vertically integrated energy and chemicals company incorporated in the State of New Jersey with its headquarters and principal place of business in Irving, Texas. Exxon is among the largest publicly traded international oil and gas companies in the world. Exxon Mobil Corporation was formerly known as, did or does business as, and/or is the successor in liability to ExxonMobil Refining and Supply Company, Exxon Chemical U.S.A., ExxonMobil Chemical Corporation, ExxonMobil Chemical U.S.A., ExxonMobil Refining & Supply Corporation, Exxon Company, U.S.A., Exxon Corporation, and Mobil Corporation.

a. Exxon Mobil Corporation controls and has controlled companywide decisions about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries. Exxon Mobil Corporation recently represented that its success, including its “ability to mitigate risk and provide attractive returns to shareholders, depends on [its] ability to successfully manage [its] overall portfolio, including diversification among types and locations of our projects.”<sup>9</sup>

b. Exxon Mobil Corporation controls and has controlled companywide decisions related to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of its subsidiaries. Exxon Mobil Corporation’s Board, or an individual/sub-set of the Board, or another committee appointed by the Board, holds the highest level of direct responsibility for climate change policy within the company. Exxon Mobil Corporation’s Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, its President and the other members of its Management Committee are actively engaged in discussions relating to greenhouse gas emissions and the risks of climate change on an ongoing basis. Exxon Mobil Corporation requires its subsidiaries to provide an estimate of greenhouse gas-related emissions costs in their economic projections when seeking funding for capital investments.

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<sup>9</sup> ExxonMobil, “Factors affecting future results” (Feb. 2018), <https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~media/global/files/investor-reports/2018/2018-factors-affecting-future-results.pdf>.

1 c. ExxonMobil Oil Corporation is wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon Mobil  
2 Corporation that acts on Exxon Mobil Corporation's behalf and subject to Exxon Mobil  
3 Corporation's control. ExxonMobil Oil Corporation is incorporated in the State of New York with  
4 its principal place of business in Irving, Texas. ExxonMobil Oil Corporation is qualified to do  
5 business in California. ExxonMobil Oil Corporation was formerly known as, did or does business  
6 as, and/or is the successor in liability to Mobil Oil Corporation.

7 d. "Exxon," as used hereafter, means collectively defendants Exxon Mobil  
8 Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, and their predecessors, successors, parents,  
9 subsidiaries, affiliates, and divisions.

10 e. Exxon consists of numerous divisions and affiliates in all areas of the fossil  
11 fuel industry, including exploration for and production of crude oil and natural gas; manufacture  
12 of petroleum products; and transportation, marketing, and sale of crude oil, natural gas, and  
13 petroleum products. Exxon is also a major manufacturer and marketer of commodity  
14 petrochemical products.

15 f. Exxon directs and has directed substantial fossil fuel product-related  
16 business to California, and a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are extracted, refined,  
17 transported, traded, distributed, marketed, and/or sold in California. Among other operations, more  
18 than 540 Exxon-, Mobil-, or Esso-branded gas stations operate throughout the state, and Exxon  
19 owns and operates a petroleum storage and transport facility in the San Ardo Oil Field in San Ardo,  
20 Monterey County, California. From 1966 to 2016, Exxon owned and operated an oil refinery in  
21 Torrance, Los Angeles County, California. Exxon Co. USA, an Exxon subsidiary, operated a  
22 petroleum refinery in Benicia, Solano County, California, from 1968 to 2000.

23 25. **BP Entities**

24 a. BP P.L.C. is a multi-national, vertically integrated energy and  
25 petrochemical public limited company, registered in England and Wales with its principal place of  
26 business in London, England. BP P.L.C. consists of three main operating segments: (1) exploration  
27  
28

1 and production, (2) refining and marketing, and (3) gas power and renewables.

2           b.       BP P.L.C. is the ultimate parent company for numerous subsidiaries that  
3 find and produce oil and gas worldwide, that refine oil into fossil fuel products such as gasoline,  
4 and that market and sell oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas worldwide. BP P.L.C.'s  
5 subsidiaries explore for oil and natural gas under a wide range of licensing, joint arrangement, and  
6 other contractual agreements.

7           c.       BP P.L.C. controls and has controlled companywide decisions about the  
8 quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries. BP P.L.C.  
9 is the ultimate decisionmaker on fundamental decisions about the company's core business, i.e.,  
10 the level of companywide fossil fuels to produce, including production among BP P.L.C.'s  
11 subsidiaries. For instance, BP P.L.C. reported that in 2016–2017 it brought online thirteen major  
12 exploration and production projects, which contributed to a 12% increase in the BP group's overall  
13 fossil fuel product production. These projects were carried out by BP P.L.C.'s subsidiaries. Based  
14 on these projects, BP P.L.C. expects the company to deliver to customers 900,000 barrels of new  
15 product per day by 2021. BP P.L.C. further reported that in 2017 it sanctioned three new  
16 exploration projects in Trinidad, India, and the Gulf of Mexico and added 143% reserves  
17 replacement for the group of entities over which it is the ultimate parent company.

18           d.       BP P.L.C. makes fossil fuel production decisions for the entire BP group  
19 based on a number of factors, including climate change. BP P.L.C.'s Board, an individual/subset  
20 of the Board, or a committee appointed by the Board, is the highest level within the company with  
21 direct responsibility for climate change policy. BP P.L.C.'s chief executive is responsible for  
22 maintaining the BP group's system of internal control that governs the BP group's business  
23 conduct. BP P.L.C. reviews climate change risks facing the BP group through two executive  
24 committees chaired by the group chief executive and one working group chaired by the executive  
25 vice president and group chief of staff, as part of BP group's established management structure.

26           e.       BP P.L.C. does substantial fossil-fuel related business in the United States,  
27 by marketing through licensure; franchising its petroleum products in the U.S. under the BP,  
28

1 ARCO and ARAL brands; and by operating oil and gas extraction and refining projects in the Gulf  
2 of Mexico, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming.

3 f. BP America, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BP P.L.C. that acts on  
4 BP P.L.C.'s behalf and subject to BP P.L.C.'s control. BP America Inc. is a vertically integrated  
5 energy and petrochemical company incorporated in the State of Delaware with its headquarters  
6 and principal place of business in Houston, Texas. BP America, Inc., consists of numerous  
7 divisions and affiliates in all aspects of the fossil fuel industry, including exploration for and  
8 production of crude oil and natural gas; manufacture of petroleum products; and transportation,  
9 marketing, and sale of crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products. BP America Inc. was  
10 formerly known as, did or does business as, and/or is the successor in liability to BP Products  
11 North America Inc., Atlantic Richfield Company, BP Amoco Corporation, Amoco Corporation,  
12 Amoco Oil Company, The American Oil Company, BP Exploration & Oil Inc., Sohio Oil  
13 Company, Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO), Standard Oil (Indiana), BP Amoco Plc, BP Oil Inc., BP  
14 Oil Company, Atlantic Richfield Delaware Corporation, Atlantic Richfield Company (a  
15 Pennsylvania corporation), ARCO Products Company, and Arco Chemical Company, a division  
16 of Atlantic Richfield Company. BP is also a major manufacturer and marketer of commodity  
17 petrochemical products. BP America Inc. is registered to do business in the State of California and  
18 has a registered agent for service of process with the California Secretary of State.

19 g. Defendants BP P.L.C. and BP America, Inc. are collectively referred to  
20 herein as "BP."

21 h. BP does substantial fossil fuel product-related business in California, and a  
22 substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are extracted, refined, transported, traded, distributed,  
23 marketed, and/or sold in California. Among other operations, BP operates 275 ARCO-licensed  
24 and branded gas stations in California and more than 70 compressed natural gas and liquefied  
25 natural gas fueling stations, provides natural gas used to power more than 6.9 million California  
26 households, and distributes and markets petroleum-based lubricants marketed under the "Castrol"  
27 brand name throughout the state. From 2000 to 2013, BP also owned and operated an oil refinery  
28 in Carson, Los Angeles County, California. BP's marketing and trading business maintains an

1 office in Irvine, Orange County, California. BP maintains an energy research center in San Diego,  
2 San Diego County, California.

3 26. **Shell Entities**

4 a. Royal Dutch Shell PLC is a vertically integrated, multinational energy and  
5 petrochemical company. Royal Dutch Shell is incorporated in England and Wales, with its  
6 headquarters and principal place of business in the Hague, Netherlands. Royal Dutch Shell PLC  
7 consists of numerous divisions, subsidiaries and affiliates engaged in all aspects of the fossil fuel  
8 industry, including exploration, development, extraction, manufacturing and energy production,  
9 transport, trading, marketing and sales.

10 b. Royal Dutch Shell PLC controls and has controlled companywide decisions  
11 about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.  
12 Royal Dutch Shell PLC's Board of Directors in the Hague determines whether and to what extent  
13 Shell subsidiary holdings around the globe produce Shell-branded fossil fuel products. For  
14 instance, Royal Dutch Shell PLC's Board of Directors makes individual decisions on whether and  
15 when to initiate drilling in particular oil reserves.

16 c. Royal Dutch Shell PLC controls and has controlled companywide decisions  
17 related to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including  
18 those of its subsidiaries. Overall accountability for climate change within the Shell group of  
19 companies lies with Royal Dutch Shell PLC's Chief Executive Officer and Executive Committee.  
20 Additionally, Royal Dutch Shell PLC has directed its subsidiaries to reduce the carbon footprint  
21 of all fossil fuel products produced under the Shell brand, including those of its subsidiaries, and  
22 across all upstream and downstream segments of its operations.

23 d. Shell Oil Products Company LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Royal  
24 Dutch Shell PLC. Shell Oil Products Company LLC is incorporated in the State of Delaware and  
25 maintains its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. Shell Oil Products Company LLC is  
26 registered to do business in the State of California and has a registered agent for service of process  
27 in California. Shell Oil Products Company LLC is an energy and petrochemical company involved  
28 in refining, transportation, distribution and marketing of Shell fossil fuel products.



1 e. Defendants Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Shell Oil Products Company LLC  
2 are collectively referred to as “Shell.”

3 f. Shell does substantial fossil fuel product-related business in California, and  
4 a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are extracted, refined, transported, traded,  
5 distributed, marketed and/or sold in California. Among other endeavors, Shell operates a  
6 petroleum refinery in Martinez, Contra Costa County, California; operates a distribution center in  
7 Carson, California; and produces heavy oil and natural gas within the state. Shell also owned and  
8 operated a refinery in Wilmington (Los Angeles), Los Angeles County, California, from 1998 to  
9 2007, and a refinery in Bakersfield, Kern County, California, from 2001 to 2005. Shell also  
10 operates hundreds of Shell-branded gas stations in California.

11 27. **Citgo Petroleum Corporation (“Citgo”)**

12 a. Citgo is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of PDV America, Incorporated,  
13 which is a wholly owned subsidiary of PDV Holding, Incorporated. These organizations’ ultimate  
14 parent is Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), an entity wholly owned by the Republic of  
15 Venezuela that plans, coordinates, supervises and controls activities carried out by its subsidiaries.  
16 Citgo is incorporated in the State of Delaware and maintains its headquarters in Houston, Texas.

17 b. Citgo controls and has controlled companywide decisions about the  
18 quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.

19 c. Citgo controls and has controlled companywide decisions related to climate  
20 change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of its  
21 subsidiaries.

22 d. Citgo and its subsidiaries are engaged in the refining, marketing, and  
23 transportation of petroleum products including gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, petrochemicals,  
24 lubricants, asphalt, and refined waxes.

25 e. Citgo is registered to do business in the State of California and has  
26 designated an agent for service of process in California. Citgo further does substantial fossil fuel  
27 product-related business in California, and a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are  
28 extracted, refined, transported, traded, distributed, marketed, and/or sold in California. For

1 instance, Citgo sells significant volumes of fossil-fuel derived consumer motor oils and automobile  
2 lubricants through retail and wholesale distributors. Citgo further sells a wide variety of greases  
3 and oils for use in construction, mining, agricultural, and metalworking machinery and vehicles,  
4 and in many other industrial and commercial settings, through licensed distributors in California.

5 28. **ConocoPhillips Entities**

6 a. ConocoPhillips is a multinational energy company incorporated in the State  
7 of Delaware and with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. ConocoPhillips consists  
8 of numerous divisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates engaged in all aspects of the fossil fuel industry,  
9 including exploration, extraction, production, manufacture, transport, and marketing.

10 b. ConocoPhillips controls and has controlled companywide decisions about  
11 the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.  
12 ConocoPhillips' most recent annual report subsumes the operations of the entire ConocoPhillips  
13 group of subsidiaries under its name. Therein, ConocoPhillips represents that its value—for which  
14 ConocoPhillips maintains ultimate responsibility—is a function of its decisions to direct  
15 subsidiaries to explore for and produce fossil fuels: “Unless we successfully add to our existing  
16 proved reserves, our future crude oil, bitumen, natural gas and natural gas liquids production will  
17 decline, resulting in an adverse impact to our business.” ConocoPhillips optimizes the  
18 ConocoPhillips group's oil and gas portfolio to fit ConocoPhillips' strategic plan. For example, in  
19 November 2016, ConocoPhillips announced a plan to generate \$5 billion to \$8 billion over two  
20 years by optimizing its business portfolio, including its fossil fuel product business, to focus on  
21 low cost-of-supply fossil fuel production projects that strategically fit its development plans.

22 c. ConocoPhillips controls and has controlled companywide decisions related  
23 to global warming and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of  
24 its subsidiaries. For instance, ConocoPhillips' Board has the highest level of direct responsibility  
25 for climate change policy within the company. ConocoPhillips has developed and implements a  
26 corporate Climate Change Action Plan to govern climate change decision-making across all  
27 entities in the ConocoPhillips group.

28

1           d.       ConocoPhillips Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of ConocoPhillips  
2 that acts on ConocoPhillips' behalf and subject to ConocoPhillips' control. ConocoPhillips  
3 Company is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal office in Bartlesville, Oklahoma.  
4 ConocoPhillips Company is registered to do business in California and has a registered agent for  
5 service of process in California.

6           e.       Phillips 66 is a multinational energy and petrochemical company  
7 incorporated in Delaware and with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. It  
8 encompasses downstream fossil fuel processing, refining, transport, and marketing segments that  
9 were formerly owned and/or controlled by ConocoPhillips. Phillips 66 is registered to do business  
10 in the State of California and has a registered agent for service of process in California.

11           f.       Defendants ConocoPhillips, ConocoPhillips Company, and Phillips 66, and  
12 their predecessors, successors, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and divisions are collectively  
13 referred to herein as "ConocoPhillips."

14           g.       ConocoPhillips does substantial fossil fuel product-related business in  
15 California, and a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are extracted, refined, transported,  
16 traded, distributed, marketed, and/or sold in California. For instance, ConocoPhillips owns and  
17 operates oil and natural gas terminals in California, owns and operates refineries in Arroyo Grande  
18 (San Luis Obispo County), Colton (San Bernardino County), and Wilmington (Los Angeles  
19 County), California, and distributes its products throughout California. Phillips 66 also owns and  
20 operates oil refineries in Rodeo (Contra Costa County), Santa Maria (Santa Barbara County), and  
21 Wilmington (Los Angeles County), California, each of which was owned and operated by  
22 ConocoPhillips and its predecessors in interest from 1997 to 2012.

23           29.       **Total Entities**

24           a.       Total E&P USA Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Total S.A.—a French  
25 energy conglomerate—engaged in the North American segment of Total SA's fossil fuel products-  
26 related business. Total E&P USA Inc. and its subsidiaries are involved in the exploration for and  
27 extraction, transportation, research, and marketing of Total S.A.'s fossil fuel products. Total E&P

1 USA Inc. is registered to do business in the State of California and has designated an agent for  
2 service of process in California.

3 b. Total E&P USA Inc. controls and has controlled companywide decisions  
4 about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.

5 c. Total E&P USA Inc. controls and has controlled companywide decisions  
6 related to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including  
7 those of its subsidiaries.

8 d. Total Specialties USA Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Total S.A.,  
9 involved in the marketing and distribution of Total S.A.'s fossil fuel products. Total Specialties  
10 USA Inc. is incorporated in the State of Delaware and headquartered in Houston, Texas. Total  
11 Specialties USA Inc. is registered to do business in the State of California and has designated an  
12 agent for service of process in California. Total Specialties USA Inc. does substantial fossil fuel  
13 product-related business in California, and a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are  
14 extracted, refined, transported, traded, distributed, marketed, and/or sold in California. For  
15 instance, Total Specialties USA Inc. maintains regular distributorship relationships with several  
16 California distributors of Total fossil fuel products, including engine oils, lubricants, greases, and  
17 industrial petroleum products.

18 30. **Eni Entities**

19 a. Eni S.p.A. ("Eni") is a vertically integrated, multinational energy company  
20 focusing on petroleum and natural gas. Eni is incorporated in the Republic of Italy, with its  
21 principal place of business in Rome, Italy. With its consolidated subsidiaries, Eni engages in the  
22 exploration, development, and production of hydrocarbons; in the supply and marketing of gas,  
23 liquid natural gas, and power; in the refining and marketing of petroleum products; in the  
24 production and marketing of basic petrochemicals, plastics and elastomers; in commodity trading;  
25 and in electricity marketing and generation.

26 b. Eni controls and has controlled companywide decisions about the quantity  
27 and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.

28

1 c. Eni controls and has controlled companywide decisions related to climate  
2 change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of its  
3 subsidiaries.

4 d. Eni Oil & Gas Inc. is incorporated in Texas, with its principal place of  
5 business in Houston, Texas. Eni Oil & Gas Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eni America Ltd.,  
6 a Delaware corporation doing business in the United States. Eni America, Ltd. is a wholly owned  
7 subsidiary of Eni UHL Ltd., a British corporation with its registered office in London, United  
8 Kingdom. Eni UHL Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eni ULT, Ltd., a British corporation with  
9 its registered office on London, United Kingdom. Eni ULT, Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of  
10 Eni Lasmo Plc, a British corporation with its registered office on London, United Kingdom. Eni  
11 Investments Plc, a British corporation with its registered office in London, United Kingdom, holds  
12 a 99.99% ownership interest in Eni Lasmo Plc (the other 0.01% ownership interest is held by  
13 another Eni entity, Eni UK Ltd, a British corporation with its registered office in London, United  
14 Kingdom). Eni S.p.A owns a 99.99% interest in Eni Investments Plc. Eni UK Ltd. holds the  
15 remainder interest in Eni Investments Plc. Collectively, these entities are referred to as “Eni.”

16 e. Eni Oil & Gas Inc. is a successor-in-interest to Golden Eagle Refining  
17 Company, Inc. (“Golden Eagle”). At times relevant to this complaint, Golden Eagle did substantial  
18 fossil fuel-related business in California. Specifically, Golden Eagle owned and/or operated oil  
19 refineries in Carson (Los Angeles County) and Martinez (Contra Costa County), California, and  
20 owned and/or operated oil pipelines in or near Long Beach (Los Angeles County), California.

21 31. **Anadarko Petroleum Corp.**

22 a. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (“Anadarko”) is incorporated in the State  
23 of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in The Woodlands, Texas. Anadarko is  
24 a multinational, vertically integrated energy company comprised of multiple upstream and  
25 downstream segments. These include exploration, production, gathering, processing, treating,  
26 transporting, marketing, and selling fossil fuel products derived primarily from petroleum and  
27 natural gas. In the United States, Anadarko entities operate fossil fuel product exploration and  
28 production concerns in Texas, the Gulf of Mexico, Alaska, the Powder River Basin, Utah,

1 Colorado, and the Marcellus Shale Formation. Anadarko operates fossil fuel product production  
2 and exploration activities internationally in Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique, and Columbia, among  
3 others. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation is registered to do business in California and has  
4 designated an agent for service of process in California.

5           b.       Anadarko Petroleum Corporation is a successor-in-interest to HS Resources  
6 Inc. (“HS”). HS was an energy company headquartered in San Francisco, California. It owned  
7 natural gas reserves in Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and along the coasts of  
8 Texas and Louisiana, which it extracted and imported to California. HS was acquired by Kerr-  
9 McGee Corporation in 2001. Kerr-McGee was an energy exploration and production company  
10 owning oil and natural gas rights in the Gulf of Mexico, Colorado, and Utah, with its corporate  
11 headquarters in Oklahoma. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation acquired Kerr-McGee Corporation  
12 in 2006.

13           32.       **Occidental Entities**

14           a.       Occidental Petroleum Corporation is a multinational, vertically integrated  
15 energy and chemical company incorporated in the State of Delaware and with its principal place  
16 of business in Houston, Texas. Occidental’s operations consist of three segments: Occidental’s  
17 operations consist of three segments: (1) the exploration for, extraction of, and production of oil  
18 and natural gas products; (2) the manufacture and marketing of chemicals and vinyls; and  
19 (3) processing, transport, storage, purchase, and marketing of oil, natural gas, and power.  
20 Occidental Petroleum Corporation is registered to do business in the State of California and has  
21 designated an agent for service of process in the State of California.

22           b.       Occidental Petroleum Corporation controls and has controlled  
23 companywide decisions about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including  
24 those of its subsidiaries.

25           c.       Occidental Petroleum Corporation controls and has controlled  
26 companywide decisions related to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil  
27 fuel products, including those of its subsidiaries.

28

1 d. Occidental Chemical Corporation, a manufacturer and marketer of  
2 petrochemicals, such as polyvinyl chloride resins, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental  
3 Petroleum Corporation. Occidental Chemical Corporation is registered to do business in the State  
4 of California and has designated an agent for service of process in the State of California.

5 e. Defendants Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Chemical  
6 Corporation are collectively referred to as “Occidental.”

7 f. Occidental does substantial fossil fuel product-related business in the State  
8 of California, and a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are extracted, refined, transported,  
9 traded, distributed, marketed, and/or sold in California. For instance, Occidental has extracted and  
10 transported its fossil fuel products from approximately 30,900 drilling locations within the San  
11 Joaquin, Los Angeles, Ventura, and Sacramento Basins in California.

12 33. **Repsol S.A.**

13 a. Repsol S.A. (“Repsol”) is a vertically integrated, multinational global  
14 energy company, incorporated in the Kingdom of Spain, with its principal place of business in  
15 Madrid, Spain. Repsol is involved in multiple aspects of the fossil fuel industry, including  
16 exploration, production, marketing, and trading. Repsol engages in significant fossil fuel  
17 exploration and production activities in the United States, including in the Gulf of Mexico, the  
18 Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania, the Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas, the Mississippi Lime in  
19 Oklahoma and Kansas, the North Slope in Alaska, and the Trenton-Black River in New York.

20 b. Repsol controls and has controlled companywide decisions about the  
21 quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.

22 c. Repsol controls and has controlled companywide decisions related to  
23 climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of its  
24 subsidiaries.

25 d. Repsol does substantial fossil fuel product-related business in the State of  
26 California, and a substantial portion of its fossil fuel products are extracted, refined, transported,  
27 traded, distributed, marketed, and/or sold in California. For instance, Repsol subsidiary Repsol  
28 Energy North America Corporation, incorporated in the State of Texas and with its principal place

1 of business in The Woodlands, Texas, is listed as a natural gas procurement, storage,  
2 transportation, scheduling, and risk management provider by Pacific Gas and Electric Co.  
3 (“PG&E”), a California utility. Repsol Energy North America Corporation is registered to do  
4 business in California and has designated an agent for service of process in California. Repsol  
5 subsidiary Repsol Trading USA Corporation, incorporated in the State of Texas and with its  
6 principal place of business in The Woodlands, Texas, is also registered do business in California  
7 and has designated an agent for service of process in California. Additionally, Repsol represents  
8 on its website that it is engaging in strategic opportunities involving its fossil fuel products in  
9 California, which may consist of crude oil, gasoline, diesel, and/or jet fuel.

10 34. **Marathon Entities**

11 a. Marathon Oil Company is an energy company incorporated in the State of  
12 Ohio and with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. Marathon Oil Company is  
13 registered to do business in California and has designated an agent for service of process in  
14 California. Marathon Oil Company is a corporate ancestor of Marathon Oil Corporation and  
15 Marathon Petroleum Company.

16 b. Marathon Oil Company is a successor-in-interest to Husky Oil Ltd.  
17 (“Husky”), which it acquired in 1984. During times relevant to this Complaint, Husky operated oil  
18 production facilities near Santa Maria (Santa Barbara County), California, where it produced  
19 nearly 1,100 barrels per day. During the period relevant to this litigation, Husky did substantial  
20 fossil fuel product-related business in California.

21 c. Marathon Oil Corporation is a multinational energy company incorporated  
22 in the State of Delaware and with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. Marathon Oil  
23 Corporation consists of multiple subsidiaries and affiliates involved in the exploration for,  
24 extraction, production, and marketing of fossil fuel products.

25 d. Marathon Petroleum Corporation is a multinational energy company  
26 incorporated in Delaware and with its principal place of business in Findlay, Ohio. Marathon  
27 Petroleum Corporation was spun off from Marathon Oil Corporation operations in 2011. It consists  
28 of multiple subsidiaries and affiliates involved in fossil fuel product refining, marketing, retail,



1 and transport, including both petroleum and natural gas products.

2 e. Marathon Oil Corporation and Marathon Petroleum Corporation control  
3 and have controlled their companywide decisions about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel  
4 production and sales, including those of their subsidiaries.

5 f. Marathon Oil Corporation and Marathon Petroleum Corporation control  
6 and have controlled their companywide decisions related to climate change and greenhouse gas  
7 emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of its subsidiaries.

8 g. Defendants Marathon Oil Company, Marathon Oil Corporation, and  
9 Marathon Petroleum Corporation are collectively referred to as “Marathon.”

10 35. **Hess Corporation**

11 a. Hess Corporation (“Hess”) is a global, vertically integrated petroleum  
12 exploration and extraction company incorporated in the State of Delaware with its headquarters  
13 and principal place of business in New York, New York. Hess is registered to do business in  
14 California and has designated an agent for service of process in California.

15 b. Hess controls and has controlled companywide decisions about the quantity  
16 and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its subsidiaries.

17 c. Hess controls and has controlled companywide decisions related to climate  
18 change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products, including those of its  
19 subsidiaries.

20 d. Hess is engaged in the exploration, development, production,  
21 transportation, purchase, marketing, and sale of crude oil and natural gas. Its oil and gas production  
22 operations are located primarily in the United States, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia,  
23 Thailand, and Norway. Prior to 2014, Hess also conducted extensive retail operations in its own  
24 name and through subsidiaries. Hess owned and operated more than 1,000 gas stations throughout  
25 the United States, including in California, during times relevant to this complaint. Prior to 2013,  
26 Hess also operated oil refineries in the continental United States and U.S. Virgin Islands.

27 36. **Devon Energy Entities**

28 a. Devon Energy Corporation is an independent energy company engaged in

1 the exploration, development, and production of oil, and natural gas. It is incorporated in the State  
2 of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Devon is  
3 engaged in multiple aspects of the fossil fuel industry, including exploration, development,  
4 production, and marketing of its fossil fuel products.

5           b.       Devon Energy Corporation controls and has controlled companywide  
6 decisions about the quantity and extent of fossil fuel production and sales, including those of its  
7 subsidiaries.

8           c.       Devon Energy Corporation controls and has controlled companywide  
9 decisions related to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions from its fossil fuel products,  
10 including those of its subsidiaries.

11           d.       Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., is a Devon subsidiary registered  
12 to do business in the State of California and with a designated agent for service of process in  
13 California. Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., does substantial fossil fuel product-related  
14 business in California.

15           e.       Devon Energy Corporation is a successor-in-interest to the Pauley  
16 Petroleum Company (“Pauley”). At times relevant to this complaint, Pauley did substantial fossil-  
17 fuel related business in California. Specifically, this included owning and operating a petroleum  
18 refinery in Newhall (Los Angeles County), California, from 1959 to 1989, and a refinery in  
19 Wilmington (Los Angeles County), California, from 1988 to 1992. Pauley merged with Hondo Oil  
20 and Gas Co. (“Hondo”) in 1987. Subsequently, Devon Energy Corp. acquired Hondo in 1992.

21           f.       Defendants Devon Energy Corporation and Devon Energy Production  
22 Company, L.P., are collectively referred to as “Devon.”

23           37.       **Encana Corporation**

24           a.       Encana Corporation (“Encana”) is a Canadian corporation with its principal  
25 place of business in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Encana is an extractor and marketer of oil and  
26 natural gas and has facilities including gas plants and gas wells in Colorado, Texas, Wyoming,  
27 Louisiana, and New Mexico. By approximately 2005, Encana was the largest independent owner  
28 and operator of natural gas storage facilities in North America.

1           b.       Encana has done and continues to do substantial fossil fuel product-related  
2 business in California. Between 1997 and 2006, Encana owned and operated the Wild Goose  
3 Storage underground natural gas storage facility in Butte County, California. In 2003, Encana  
4 began transporting natural gas through a 25-mile pipeline from the Wild Goose Station to a PG&E  
5 compressor station in Colusa County, California, where gas entered the main PG&E pipeline.  
6 Encana invested in a 100 billion cubic foot expansion of the facility in 2004, bringing gas storage  
7 capacity at Wild Goose to 24 billion cubic feet.

8           38.       **Apache Corporation**

9           a.       Apache Corporation is a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its  
10 principal place of business in Houston, Texas. Apache is an oil and gas exploration and production  
11 company, with crude oil and natural gas exploration and extraction operations in the United States,  
12 Canada, Egypt, and in the North Sea.

13           b.       During the time at issue, Apache extracted natural gas from wells developed  
14 on approximately seven million acres of land held in the Canadian provinces of British Columbia,  
15 Alberta, and Saskatchewan, and Apache did substantial fossil fuel product-related business in  
16 California. Apache transported a substantial volume of the natural gas extracted from its Canadian  
17 holdings to California, where it sold that gas to electric utilities, end-users, other fossil fuel  
18 companies, supply aggregators, and other fossil fuel marketers. Apache directed sales of its natural  
19 gas to California in addition to markets in Washington state, Chicago, and western Canada, to  
20 intentionally retain a diverse customer base and maximize profits from the differential price rates  
21 and demand levels in those respective markets.

22           39.       **Doe Defendants**

23           a.       The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or  
24 otherwise of Defendants Does 1 through 100, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore  
25 sues said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure  
26 Section 474. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that each of the  
27  
28

1 fictitiously named Defendants is responsible in some manner for the acts and occurrences herein  
2 alleged, and that Plaintiff's injuries and damages were caused by such Defendants.

3 **C. Relevant Non-Parties: Fossil Fuel Industry Associations**

4 40. As set forth in greater detail below, each Defendant had actual knowledge that its  
5 fossil fuel products were hazardous. Defendants obtained knowledge of the hazards of their  
6 products independently and through their membership and involvement in trade associations.

7 41. Each Defendant's fossil fuel promotion and marketing efforts were assisted by the  
8 trade associations described below. Acting on behalf of the Defendants, the industry associations  
9 engaged in a long-term course of conduct to misrepresent, omit, and conceal the dangers of  
10 Defendants' fossil fuel products.

11 a. **The American Petroleum Institute (API)**: API is a national trade  
12 association representing the oil and gas industry, formed in 1919. At least the following  
13 Defendants and/or their predecessors in interest are and/or have been API members at times  
14 relevant to this litigation: Chevron, Exxon, BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips, Hess, Anadarko,  
15 Occidental, Repsol, Marathon, Devon, Encana, and Apache.<sup>10</sup>

16 b. **The Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA)**: WSPA is a trade  
17 association representing oil producers in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.<sup>11</sup>  
18 Its members include, and at times relevant to this Complaint, have included, at least Defendants  
19 Chevron, BP, ConocoPhillips, Shell, and Exxon.<sup>12</sup>

20 c. **The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)** is a  
21 national association of petroleum and petrochemical companies. At relevant times, its members  
22 included, but were not limited to, at least BP Petrochemicals, BP Products North America,  
23 Chevron U.S.A. Inc., CITGO Petroleum Corporation, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Occidental  
24  
25  
26

27 <sup>10</sup> American Petroleum Institute (API), *Members*, <http://www.api.org/membership/members> (accessed Nov. 5, 2018).

28 <sup>11</sup> WSPA, *About*, <https://www.wspa.org/about> (accessed Nov. 5, 2018).

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

1 Chemical Corporation, Phillips 66, Shell Chemical Company, and Total Petrochemicals &  
2 Refining USA, Inc.<sup>13</sup>

3 d. **The Information Council for the Environment (ICE)**: ICE was formed  
4 by coal companies and their allies, including Western Fuels Association and the National Coal  
5 Association. Associated companies included at least Pittsburg and Midway Coal Mining  
6 (Chevron),<sup>14</sup> and Island Creek Coal Company (Occidental).

7 e. **The Global Climate Coalition (GCC)**: GCC was an industry group formed  
8 to oppose greenhouse gas emission reduction policies and the Kyoto Protocol. It was founded in  
9 1989 shortly after the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change meeting was held, and  
10 disbanded in 2001. Founding members included the National Association of Manufacturers, the  
11 Edison Electric Institute, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. The GCC's early  
12 individual corporate members included Amoco (BP), API, Chevron, Exxon, Shell Oil, Texaco  
13 (Chevron) and Phillips Petroleum (ConocoPhillips). During its existence, other members and  
14 funders included ARCO (BP), the National Mining Association, and the Western Fuels  
15 Association. The coalition also operated for several years out of the National Association of  
16 Manufacturers' offices.

17 **III. AGENCY**

18 42. At all times herein mentioned, each of the Defendants was the agent, servant,  
19 partner, aider and abettor, co-conspirator, and/or joint venturer of each of the remaining  
20 Defendants herein and was at all times operating and acting within the purpose and scope of said  
21 agency, service, employment, partnership, conspiracy, and joint venture and rendered substantial  
22 assistance and encouragement to the other Defendants, knowing that their conduct was wrongful  
23 and/or constituted a breach of duty.

24 **IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

25 43. This court's personal jurisdiction over Defendants named herein is proper because  
26 each Defendant maintains substantial contacts with California by and through its fossil fuel  
27

28 <sup>13</sup> AFPM, *Membership Directory*, <https://www.afpm.org/membership-directory> (accessed Nov. 5, 2018).

<sup>14</sup> Hereinafter, parenthetical references to Defendants indicate corporate ancestry and/or affiliation.

1 business operations in this state, as described above, and because Plaintiff’s injuries described  
2 herein arose out of and relate to those operations and occurred in California.

3 44. The Superior Court of California for San Francisco County is a court of general  
4 jurisdiction and therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

5 45. Venue is proper in San Francisco County pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure  
6 section 395.5 because Defendants are corporations and/or associations, and because a substantial  
7 portion of the injuries giving rise to Defendants’ liability occurred in San Francisco County.

8 **V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

9 **A. Global Land and Ocean Warming—Observed Effects and Known Cause**


10 46. Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the  
11 observed changes to the climate system are unprecedented over decades to millennia.

12 47. The average ocean temperature in 2016 was approximately 1.7° F warmer than the  
13 20th-century baseline, which is the greatest positive anomaly observed since at least 1880.<sup>15</sup> The  
14 increase in hotter temperatures and more frequent positive anomalies during the Great  
15 Acceleration is occurring both globally and locally. The graph below shows the increase in global  
16 land and ocean temperature anomalies since 1880, as measured against the 1910–2000 global  
17 average temperature.<sup>16</sup>

18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28 <sup>15</sup> NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, *Climate at a Glance (Global Time Series)* (June 2017)  
[https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/time-series/global/globe/land\\_ocean/ytd/12/1880-2016](https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/time-series/global/globe/land_ocean/ytd/12/1880-2016).

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*

**Figure 1: Global Ocean Temperature Anomalies, January - December**



48. The mechanism by which human activity causes the oceans to warm is well established: ocean warming, like atmospheric warming, is overwhelmingly caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>17</sup>

49. When emitted, greenhouse gases trap heat within Earth's atmosphere that would otherwise radiate into space.


50. Greenhouse gases are largely byproducts of humans burning fossil fuels to produce energy, and using fossil fuels to create petrochemical products.

51. Human activity, particularly greenhouse gas emissions, is the primary cause of global ambient air and ocean warming, and associated effects on Earth's climate.

52. Prior to World War II, most anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were caused by land-use practices, such as forestry and agriculture, which altered the ability of the land and global biosphere to absorb CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere; the impacts of such activities on Earth's climate were relatively minor. Since the beginning of the Great Acceleration, however, both the annual rate and total volume of human CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have increased enormously following the advent of major

<sup>17</sup> IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report, *supra* note 2, at 4.

1 uses of oil, gas, and coal. The graph below shows that while CO<sub>2</sub> emissions attributable to forestry  
2 and other land-use change have remained relatively constant, total emissions attributable to fossil  
3 fuels have increased dramatically since the 1950s.<sup>18</sup>



18 **Figure 2: Total Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Source, 1860–2016:**


19  
20 53. As human reliance on fossil fuels for industrial and mechanical processes has  
21 increased, so too have greenhouse gas emissions, especially of CO<sub>2</sub>. The Great Acceleration is  
22 marked by a massive increase in the annual rate of fossil fuel emissions: more than half of all  
23 cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have occurred since 1988.<sup>19</sup> The rate of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuels  
24 and industry, moreover, has increased threefold since the 1960s, and by more than 60% since

25  
26 <sup>18</sup> Global Carbon Project, Global Carbon Budget 2017 (Nov. 13, 2017), [http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/GCP\\_CarbonBudget\\_2017.pdf](http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/GCP_CarbonBudget_2017.pdf) (citing CDIAC; R.A. Houghton & Alexander A. Nassikas, *Global and Regional Fluxes of Carbon from Land Use and Land Cover Change 1850–2015*, 31 GLOBAL BIOCHEMICAL CYCLES 3, 456 (Feb. 2017)).

27  
28 <sup>19</sup> R.J. Andres et al., *A synthesis of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel combustion*, BIOGEOSCIENCES, 9, 1851 (2012), <http://www.biogeosciences.net/9/1845/2012>.



1 1990.<sup>20</sup> The graph below illustrates the increasing rate of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions since the industrial  
2 era began.<sup>21</sup>



13  
14 **Figure 3: Cumulative Annual Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1751–2014:**

15 54. Because of the increased use of fossil fuel products, concentrations of greenhouse  
16 gases in the atmosphere are now at a level unprecedented in at least 800,000 years.<sup>22</sup> The graph  
17 below illustrates the nearly 30% increase in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration above pre-Industrial  
18 levels since 1960.<sup>23</sup>


25  
26 <sup>20</sup> *Global Carbon Budget 2016*, *supra* note 4, at 630 (“Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuels and industry have increased every decade from an average of 3.1±0.2 GtC/yr in the 1960s to an average of 9.3±0.5 GtC/yr during 2006–2015.”).

27 <sup>21</sup> Peter Frumhoff et al., *The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers*, 132 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 164 (2015).

28 <sup>22</sup> IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report, *supra* note 2, at 4.

<sup>23</sup> *Global Carbon Budget 2016*, *supra* note 4, at 608.

**Figure 4: Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentration in Parts Per Million, 1960–2015:**



55. Of the increase in energy that has accumulated in Earth’s atmosphere between 1971 and 2010, more than 90% is stored in the oceans.<sup>24</sup>

56. In addition to the positive (increasing) trend in ocean surface temperature, marine heatwaves—prolonged, discrete, anomalously warm water events that can be described by their duration, intensity, rate of evolution, and spatial extent<sup>25</sup>—have become more frequent under continued anthropogenic warming.<sup>26</sup> This trend will continue and worsen in the future.

### **B. Domoic Acid Outbreaks**

57. Domoic acid is a neurotoxin produced by species of marine algae, including the diatom *Pseudo-nitzschia australis*, that when ingested by humans causes “amnesic shellfish

<sup>24</sup> IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report, *supra* note 2, at 4.

<sup>25</sup> Alistair J. Hobday et al., *A hierarchical approach to defining marine heatwaves*, PROGRESS IN OCEANOGRAPHY 141, 227–38 (Feb. 2016).

<sup>26</sup> See, e.g., Evan Weller et al., *Human Contribution to the 2014 Record High Sea Surface Temperatures Over the Western Tropical and Northeast Pacific*, BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, Vol. 96, No. 12, S103 (Dec. 2015).

1 poisoning,” which induces symptoms including vomiting, diarrhea, cramps, and other  
2 gastrointestinal upset, permanent short-term memory loss, and, in severe cases, death.

3 58. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has established a domoic acid  
4 action level in Dungeness crab viscera of 30 parts per million (“ppm”). Above that action level,  
5 crab is considered “adulterated” and illegal to sell. California and Oregon both adhere to that action  
6 level and impose precautionary measures when crabs in those states contain domoic acid at levels  
7 exceeding the action level.

8 59. Members of the algal genus *Pseudo-nitzschia* thrive in warming oceans.<sup>27</sup> In  
9 particular, *Pseudo-nitzschia australis* increases its growth rate, photosynthesis, and toxigenicity in  
10 warmer water temperatures.<sup>28</sup>

11 60. In late 2013, a sea surface temperature anomaly developed in the Northeastern  
12 Pacific Ocean, including along the California coast. Eventually dubbed “the Blob” by scientists,<sup>29</sup>  
13 this mass of warm water would persist through 2016,<sup>30</sup> extend from Alaska to Mexico,<sup>31</sup> and  
14 feature positive temperature anomalies of greater than 4.5° F—more than three standard deviations  
15 above the expected sea surface temperature in the area.<sup>32</sup>

16 61. Conditions within the Blob were characterized by unusually warm waters,  
17 particularly before the initiation of the upwelling season.<sup>33</sup>

18 62. The conditions brought by the Blob favored *Pseudo-nitzschia* and allowed small  
19 seed populations to become established, specifically in those temperature ranges present along the  
20 California coast.<sup>34</sup>

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21  
22 <sup>27</sup> Zhi Zhu et al., *Understanding the blob bloom: Warming increases toxicity and abundance of the harmful bloom*  
*diatom Pseudo-Nitzschia in California Coastal Waters*, 67 HARMFUL ALGAE 36, 36 (2017).

23 <sup>28</sup> *Id.*

24 <sup>29</sup> See Nicholas A. Bond et al., *Causes and impacts of the 2014 warm anomaly in the NE Pacific*, GEOPHYSICAL  
RESEARCH LETTERS 42, 3414 (May 5, 2015).

25 <sup>30</sup> See Dr. Raphael Kudela, California Joint Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture Hearing Testimony (Oct. 4,  
2016) (Blob persisted into July 2016, causing late *Pseudo-nitzschia* bloom).

26 <sup>31</sup> Di Lorenzo & Mantua, *supra* note 3, at 1.

27 <sup>32</sup> See Bond et al., *supra* note 29, at 3414.

28 <sup>33</sup> “Upwelling” is the phenomenon by which the Northwest winds blowing out of the Gulf of Alaska displace surface  
water and bring cooler, nutrient-rich water from depth. This annual phenomenon is the principal reason that the  
California Current ecosystem is among the most productive, diverse marine ecosystems on the planet.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.*

1           63. With the onset of upwelling came a deluge of nutrients that caused *Pseudo-*  
2 *nitzschia* seed populations to explode in abundance, resulting in a harmful algal bloom  
3 unprecedented in its extent and persistence.<sup>35</sup> The sheer biomass and extent of *Pseudo-nitzschia*  
4 produced similarly unprecedented concentrations of domoic acid.<sup>36</sup> The toxin entered the marine  
5 trophic chain, where it accumulated in crabs feeding on other contaminated organisms. Domoic  
6 acid contamination persists in ocean sediments and therefore continues to impact organisms living  
7 and feeding on the bottom of the ocean floor (“benthic organisms”) long after the toxin-producing  
8 algal species have dissipated.<sup>37</sup>

9           64. In response to testing showing that crabs off the west coast contained domoic acid  
10 concentrations greater than FDA’s 30-ppm action level, CDFW and ODFW have closed large  
11 swaths of those states’ coasts to commercial crabbing. ODFW also has imposed additional  
12 precautionary measures, such as requiring crabs harvested from areas that had been under a domoic  
13 acid-induced closure to be eviscerated (thereby removing the viscera, or guts, which typically  
14 contain the highest concentration of domoic acid) before proceeding to the retail market.

15           65. As the sea surface temperature warming trend continues, domoic acid outbreaks  
16 will become a recurring facet of the California Current ecosystem,<sup>38</sup> and will continue to impact  
17 commercial fisheries. Indeed, testing in California and Oregon ahead of the 2018–19 commercial  
18 Dungeness crab season has shown crabs that exceed the 30-ppm action level. In response, CDFW  
19 has already announced the closure of a large section of the California coast from Bodega Head to  
20 the Sonoma/Mendocino County line to commercial crabbing at the outset of the 2018–19 season.  
21 Continued ocean warming through the 21st century will promote the intensification and  
22  
23

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>35</sup> Ryan M. McCabe et al., *The unprecedented coastwide toxic algal bloom linked to anomalous ocean conditions*,  
GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 43, 10,369 (2016); see also S. Morgaine McKibben, *Climatic regulation of the*  
*neurotoxin domoic acid*, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 114, 240 (Jan. 10, 2017).

26 <sup>36</sup> McCabe et al., *supra* note 35, at 10,372.

27 <sup>37</sup> *Id.* at 10,371 (citing R.A. Horner et al., *Retention of domoic acid by Pacific Razor Clams, Siliqua patula, Preliminary*  
*Study*, 12 JOURNAL OF SHELLFISH RESEARCH 451, 451–56 (1993)).

28 <sup>38</sup> *Id.* at 10,373; Zhu, *supra* note 27, at 40 (noting that anticipated summertime sea surface temperature increases will  
correspond with the temperatures observed in the Blob).

1 redistribution of harmful algal blooms around the world,<sup>39</sup> including *Pseudo-nitzschia* blooms on  
2 the west coast.

3 **C. Attribution**

4 66. “Carbon factors” analysis, devised by the International Panel on Climate Change  
5 (IPCC), the United Nations International Energy Agency, and the U.S. Environmental Protection  
6 Agency, quantifies the amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions attributable to a unit of raw fossil fuel extracted  
7 from the ground.<sup>40</sup> Emissions factors for oil, coal, liquid natural gas, and natural gas are different  
8 for each material but are nevertheless known and quantifiable for each.<sup>41</sup> This analysis accounts  
9 for the use of Defendants’ fossil fuel products, including non-combustion purposes that sequester  
10 CO<sub>2</sub> rather than emit it (e.g., production of asphalt).

11 67. Defendants’ historical and current fossil fuel extraction and production records are  
12 publicly available in various fora. These include university and public library collections, company  
13 websites, company reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, company  
14 histories, and other sources. The cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> and methane emissions attributable to  
15 Defendants’ fossil fuel products were calculated by reference to such publicly available  
16 documents.

17 68. While it is possible to distinguish CO<sub>2</sub> derived from fossil fuels from other sources,  
18 it is not possible to determine the source of any particular individual molecule of CO<sub>2</sub> in the  
19 atmosphere attributable to anthropogenic sources because such greenhouse gas molecules do not  
20 bear markers that permit tracing them to their source, and because greenhouse gasses quickly  
21 diffuse and commingle in the atmosphere. However, cumulative carbon analysis allows an accurate  
22 calculation of net annual CO<sub>2</sub> and methane emissions attributable to each Defendant by quantifying  
23 the amount and type of fossil fuels products each Defendant extracted and placed into the stream  
24 of commerce, and multiplying those quantities by each fossil fuel product’s carbon factor.

25  
26  
27 <sup>39</sup> See Christopher J. Gobler, et al., *Ocean warming since 1982 has expanded the niche of toxic algal blooms in the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans*, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (March 23, 2017).

28 <sup>40</sup> See Richard Heede, *Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010*, CLIMATIC CHANGE 122, 232–33 (2014).

<sup>41</sup> See, e.g., *id.*

1           69. Defendants, through their extraction, promotion, marketing, and sale of their fossil  
2 fuel products, caused more than 15% of global fossil fuel product-related CO<sub>2</sub> between 1965 and  
3 2015, with contributions currently continuing unabated. This constitutes a substantial portion of  
4 all such emissions in history, and the attendant increase in mean sea surface temperature; increase  
5 in frequency and intensity of marine heatwaves, including the Blob; increase in the expanse,  
6 persistence, and severity of harmful algal blooms; increase in *Pseudo-nitzschia* toxigenicity; and  
7 the associated domoic acid-related injuries.

8           70. By quantifying CO<sub>2</sub> and methane pollution attributable to Defendants by and  
9 through their fossil fuel products, ocean temperature responses to those emissions are also  
10 calculable, and can be attributed to Defendants on an individual and aggregate basis. Individually  
11 and collectively, Defendants’ extraction, sale, and promotion of their fossil fuel products at the  
12 extraction, wholesale and retail levels are responsible for substantial increases in ocean  
13 temperature, harmful algal blooms, anomalous weather conditions and events, and specifically the  
14 domoic acid outbreaks and related injuries endured by Plaintiff, as described herein.

15           71. Marine outbreaks of domoic acid are climatically regulated.<sup>42</sup> The warmer the  
16 ocean conditions, the more likely domoic acid concentrations are to surpass alert thresholds during  
17 upwelling season, and the more toxic and/or widespread a domoic acid event has the potential to  
18 become.<sup>43</sup>

19           72. A marine heatwave as massive and warm as the Blob is “extremely rare” without  
20 the influence of anthropogenic climate forcing on the atmosphere.<sup>44</sup> Anthropogenic climate forcing  
21 has already increased the risk for extreme sea surface temperature events like the Blob by at least  
22 a factor of five.<sup>45</sup> Despite the known influence of normal sea surface temperature variability  
23 observed in Northeast Pacific on semi-decadal, decadal, and other relatively short timeframes, the  
24 Blob was still “significantly attributable to anthropogenic forcing.”<sup>46</sup>

25  
26 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>42</sup> McKibben, *supra* note 35, at 239–44.

27 <sup>43</sup> *Id.* at 243.

28 <sup>44</sup> Weller et al., *supra* note 26, at S103.

<sup>45</sup> Di Lorenzo & Mantua, *supra* note 3, at 6.

<sup>46</sup> Weller et al., *supra* note 27.

1           73. But for the Blob, caused by Defendants’ actions, the California and Oregon  
2 commercial Dungeness crab fisheries would not have been closed as described herein. As ocean  
3 warming and circulation anomalies continue and domoic acid outbreaks increase in frequency and  
4 severity, such closures will continue to occur and continue to injure Plaintiff and the west coast  
5 crab industry.

6           74. Defendants, through their extraction, promotion, marketing, and sale of their fossil  
7 fuel products, caused a substantial portion of both those emissions and the attendant domoic acid  
8 outbreaks that forced California and Oregon to close their commercial crab fisheries during each  
9 of the last three seasons and will compel them to close the fisheries during future seasons.

10          75. As explained above, this analysis considers only the volume of raw material  
11 actually extracted from the earth by these Defendants. Many of these Defendants actually are  
12 responsible for far greater volumes of emissions because they also refine, manufacture, produce,  
13 market, promote, and sell more fossil fuel derivatives than they extract themselves by purchasing  
14 fossil fuel products extracted by independent third parties.

15          76. In addition, considering the Defendants’ lead role in promoting, marketing, and  
16 selling their fossil fuels products between 1965 and 2015; their efforts to conceal the hazards of  
17 those products from consumers; their promotion of their fossil fuel products despite knowing the  
18 dangers associated with those products; their dogged campaign against regulation of those  
19 products based on falsehoods, omissions, and deceptions; and their failure to pursue less hazardous  
20 alternatives available to them, Defendants, individually and together, have substantially and  
21 measurably contributed to Plaintiff’s domoic acid-related injuries.

22           **D. Defendants Went to Great Lengths to Understand the Hazards Associated**  
23           **With and Knew or Should Have Known of the Dangers Associated with the**  
24           **Extraction, Promotion, and Sale of Their Fossil Fuel Products.**

25          77. By 1965, concern about the risks of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions  
26 reached the highest level of the United States’ scientific community. In that year, President Lyndon  
27 B. Johnson’s Science Advisory Committee Panel on Environmental Pollution reported that by the  
28 year 2000, anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would “modify the heat balance of the atmosphere to  
such an extent that marked changes in climate . . . could occur,” and that atmospheric warming

1 would create an equivalent sea temperature increase that could impact fisheries.<sup>47</sup> President  
2 Johnson announced in a special message to Congress that “[t]his generation has altered the  
3 composition of the atmosphere on a global scale through . . . a steady increase in carbon dioxide  
4 from the burning of fossil fuels.”<sup>48</sup>

5 78. These statements from the Johnson Administration, at a minimum, put Defendants  
6 on notice of the potentially substantial dangers to people, communities, and the planet associated  
7 with unabated use of their fossil fuel products. Moreover, Defendants had amassed a considerable  
8 body of knowledge on the subject through their own independent efforts.

9 79. A 1963 Conservation Foundation report on a conference of scientists referenced in  
10 the 1966 World Book Encyclopedia, as well as in presidential panel reports and other sources  
11 around that time, described many specific consequences of rising greenhouse gas pollution in the  
12 atmosphere. It warned that

13 a continuing rise in the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide is likely to be  
14 accompanied by a significant warming of the surface of the earth which by melting  
15 the polar ice caps would raise sea level and by warming the oceans would change  
considerably the distributions of marine species including commercial fisheries.

16 It warned of the possibility of “wiping out the world’s present commercial fisheries.” The report,  
17 in fact, noted that “the changes in marine life in the North Atlantic which accompanied the  
18 temperature change have been very noticeable.”<sup>49</sup>

19 80. In 1968, a Stanford Research Institute (SRI) report commissioned by the American  
20 Petroleum Institute (“API”) and made available to all of its members, concluded, among other  
21 things:

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25 <sup>47</sup> President’s Science Advisory Committee, *Restoring the Quality of Our Environment: Report of the Environmental  
Pollution Panel*, at 9, 123–24 (Nov. 1965), <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4315678>.

26 <sup>48</sup> President Lyndon B. Johnson, *Special Message to Congress on Conservation and Restoration of Natural Beauty*  
(Feb. 8, 1965), <http://acsc.lib.udel.edu/items/show/292>.

27 <sup>49</sup> The Conservation Foundation, *Implications of Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmosphere: A statement of  
28 trends and implications of carbon dioxide research reviewed at a conference of scientists* (Mar. 1963),  
<https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004619030;view=1up;seq=5>.



1 If the Earth's temperature increases significantly, a number of events might be  
2 expected to occur including the melting of the Antarctic ice cap, a rise in sea levels,  
warming of the oceans and an increase in photosynthesis. . . .

3 It is clear that we are unsure as to what our long-lived pollutants are doing to our  
4 environment; however, there seems to be no doubt that the potential damage to our  
5 environment could be severe. . . . [T]he prospect for the future must be of serious  
concern.<sup>50</sup>

6 81. In a supplement to the 1968 report prepared for API in 1969, authors Robinson and  
7 Robbins projected that based on current fuel usage, atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations would reach  
8 370 ppm by 2000—almost exactly what it turned out to be (369.34 ppm, according to data from  
9 NASA).<sup>51</sup> The report also drew the connection between rising atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations  
10 and the use of fossil fuels, stating that “balance between environmental sources and sinks has been  
11 disturbed by the emission to the atmosphere of additional CO<sub>2</sub> from the increased combustion of  
12 carbonaceous fuels” and that it seemed “unlikely that the observed rise in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> has  
13 been due to changes in the biosphere.” The authors warn repeatedly of the temptations and  
14 consequences of ignoring CO<sub>2</sub> as a problem and pollutant:

15 CO<sub>2</sub> is so common and such an integral part of all our activities that air pollution  
16 regulations typically state that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are not to be considered as pollutants.  
17 This is perhaps fortunate for our present mode of living, centered as it is around  
18 carbon combustion. However, this seeming necessity, the CO<sub>2</sub> emission, is the only  
air pollutant, as we shall see, that has been shown to be of global importance as a  
factor that could change man's environment on the basis of a long period of  
scientific investigation.<sup>52</sup>

19 82. In 1969, Shell memorialized an ongoing, 18-month project to collect ocean data  
20 from oil platforms to develop and calibrate environmental forecasting theories related to predicting  
21 wave, wind, storm, sea level, and current changes and trends.<sup>53</sup> Several Defendants and/or their  
22 predecessors participated in the project, including Esso Production Research Company (Exxon),  
23 Mobil Research and Development Company (Exxon), Pan American Petroleum Corporation (BP),  
24

25 <sup>50</sup> Elmer Robinson & R.C. Robbins, *Sources, Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric Pollutants*, Stanford  
Research Institute (Feb. 1968), <https://www.smokeandfumes.org/documents/document16>.

26 <sup>51</sup> “Global Mean CO<sub>2</sub> Mixing Ratios (ppm): Observations,” NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies,  
<https://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/ghgases/Fig1A.ext.txt> (webpage) (accessed June 16, 2018).

27 <sup>52</sup> Elmer Robinson & R.C. Robbins, *Sources, Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric Pollutants Supplement*,  
Stanford Research Institute (June 1969).

28 <sup>53</sup> M.M. Patterson, *An Ocean Data Gathering Program for the Gulf of Mexico*, Society of Petroleum Engineers (1969),  
<https://www.onepetro.org/conference-paper/SPE-2638-MS>.

1 Gulf Oil Corporation (Chevron), Texaco Inc. (Chevron), and the Chevron Oil Field Research  
2 Company.

3 83. In a 1970 report by H.R. Holland from the Engineering Division of Imperial Oil  
4 (Exxon), he stated: “Since pollution means disaster to the affected species, the only satisfactory  
5 course of action is to prevent it—to maintain the addition of foreign matter at such levels that it  
6 can be diluted, assimilated or destroyed by natural processes—to protect man’s environment from  
7 man.” He also noted that “a problem of such size, complexity and importance cannot be dealt with  
8 on a voluntary basis.” CO<sub>2</sub> was listed as an air pollutant in the document.<sup>54</sup>

9 84. In 1972, API members, including Defendants, received a status report on all  
10 environmental research projects funded by API. The report summarized the 1968 SRI report  
11 describing the impact of Defendants’ fossil fuel products on the environment, including global  
12 surface and ocean warming. Industry participants who received this report include: American  
13 Standard of Indiana (BP), Asiatic (Shell), Ashland (Marathon), Atlantic Richfield (BP), British  
14 Petroleum (BP), Chevron Standard of California (Chevron), Cities Service (Citgo), Continental  
15 (ConocoPhillips), Dupont (former owner of Conoco), Esso Research (Exxon), Ethyl (formerly  
16 affiliated with Esso, which was subsumed by Exxon Mobil), Getty (Exxon), Gulf (Chevron, among  
17 others), Humble Standard of New Jersey (Exxon/Chevron/BP), Marathon, Mobil (Exxon), Pan  
18 American (BP), Phillips (ConocoPhillips), Shell, Standard of Ohio (BP), Texaco (Chevron), Union  
19 (Chevron), Edison Electric Institute (representing electric utilities), Bituminous Coal Research  
20 (coal industry research group), Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association (presently the U.S. Oil &  
21 Gas Association, a national trade association), Western Oil & Gas Association, National Petroleum  
22 Refiners Association (presently the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers Association,  
23 a national trade association), Champlin (Anadarko), Skelly (Exxon), Colonial Pipeline (ownership  
24 has included BP, Citgo, Exxon, ConocoPhillips, Chevron entities, among others) and Caltex  
25 (Chevron), among others.<sup>55</sup>

26  
27 <sup>54</sup> H.R. Holland, “Pollution is Everybody’s Business,” Imperial Oil (1970), <https://www.desmogblog.com/sites/beta.desmogblog.com/files/DeSmogBlog-Imperial%20Oil%20Archive-Pollution-Everyone-Business-1970.pdf>.

28 <sup>55</sup> American Petroleum Institute, *Environmental Research, A Status Report*, Committee for Air and Water Conservation (Jan. 1972), available at <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED066339.pdf>.

1           85.     In a 1977 presentation and again in a 1978 briefing, Exxon scientists warned the  
2 Exxon Corporation Management Committee that CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations were building in Earth's  
3 atmosphere at an increasing rate, that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions attributable to fossil fuels were retained in  
4 the atmosphere, and that CO<sub>2</sub> was contributing to global warming.<sup>56</sup> The report stated:

5           There is general scientific agreement that the most likely manner in which mankind  
6 is influencing the global climate is through carbon dioxide release from the burning  
7 of fossil fuels . . . [and that] Man has a time window of five to ten years before the  
need for hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies might become  
critical.<sup>57</sup>

8 The report concluded that “doubling in CO<sub>2</sub> could increase average global temperature 1°C to  
9 3°C by 2050 A.D. (10°C predicted at poles).”<sup>58</sup>

10           86.     Thereafter, Exxon engaged in a research program to study the environmental fate  
11 of fossil fuel-derived greenhouse gases and their impacts, which included publication of peer-  
12 reviewed research by Exxon staff scientists and the conversion of a supertanker into a research  
13 vessel to study the greenhouse effect and the role of the oceans in absorbing anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>.  
14 Much of this research was communicated in a variety of industry fora, symposia, and papers shared  
15 through trade associations and directly with other Defendants.

16           87.     Exxon scientists made the case internally for using company resources to build  
17 corporate knowledge about the impacts of the promotion, marketing, and consumption of  
18 Defendants' fossil fuel products. Exxon climate researcher Henry Shaw wrote in 1978: “The  
19 rationale for Exxon's involvement and commitment of funds and personnel is based on our need  
20 to assess the possible impact of the greenhouse effect on Exxon business. Exxon must develop a  
21 credible scientific team that can critically evaluate the information generated on the subject and be  
22 able to carry bad news, if any, to the corporation.”<sup>59</sup> Moreover, Shaw emphasized the need to

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24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>56</sup> Memo from J.F. Black to F.G. Turpin, *The Greenhouse Effect*, Exxon Research and Engineering Co. (June 6, 1978),  
[http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1978-exxon-memo-on-greenhouse-effect-for-exxon-corporation-  
management-committee](http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1978-exxon-memo-on-greenhouse-effect-for-exxon-corporation-management-committee).

26 <sup>57</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>58</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>59</sup> Memo from Henry Shaw to Edward David Jr., *The “Greenhouse Effect,”* Exxon Research and Engineering  
Company (Dec. 7, 1978), [http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Credible%20Scientific  
%20Team%201978%20Letter.pdf](http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Credible%20Scientific%20Team%201978%20Letter.pdf).

1 collaborate with universities and government to more completely understand what he called the  
2 “CO<sub>2</sub> problem.”<sup>60</sup>

3 88. In 1979, API and its members, including Defendants, convened a Task Force to  
4 monitor and share cutting edge climate research among the oil industry. The group was initially  
5 called the CO<sub>2</sub> and Climate Task Force, but changed its name to the Climate and Energy Task  
6 Force in 1980 (hereinafter referred to as “API CO<sub>2</sub> Task Force”). Membership included senior  
7 scientists and engineers from nearly every major U.S. and multinational oil and gas company,  
8 including Exxon, Mobil (Exxon), Amoco (BP), Phillips (ConocoPhillips), Texaco (Chevron),  
9 Shell, Sunoco, Sohio (BP) as well as Standard Oil of California (BP) and Gulf Oil (Chevron,  
10 among others). The Task Force was charged with assessing the implications of emerging science  
11 on the petroleum and gas industries and identifying where reductions in greenhouse gas emissions  
12 from Defendants’ fossil fuel products could be made.<sup>61</sup>

13 89. In 1979, API sent its members a background memo related to the API CO<sub>2</sub> and  
14 Climate Task Force’s efforts, stating that CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations were rising steadily in the  
15 atmosphere, and predicting when the first clear effects of climate change might be felt.<sup>62</sup>

16 90. Also in 1979, Exxon scientists advocated internally for additional fossil fuel  
17 industry-generated research in light of the growing consensus that consumption of fossil fuel  
18 products was changing the planet’s climate:

19 “We should determine how Exxon can best participate in all these [atmospheric  
20 science research] areas and influence possible legislation on environmental  
21 controls. It is important to begin to anticipate the strong intervention of  
22 environmental groups and be prepared to respond with reliable and credible data. It  
23 behooves [Exxon] to start a very aggressive defensive program in the indicated  
24 areas of atmospheric science and climate because there is a good probability that  
25 legislation affecting our business will be passed. Clearly, it is in our interest for  
26 such legislation to be based on hard scientific data. The data obtained from research

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25 <sup>60</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>61</sup> American Petroleum Institute, *AQ-9 Task Force Meeting Minutes* (Mar. 18, 1980), <http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/AQ-9%20Task%20Force%20Meeting%20%281980%29.pdf> (AQ-9 refers to the “CO<sub>2</sub> and Climate” Task Force).

27 <sup>62</sup> Neela Banerjee, *Exxon’s Oil Industry Peers Knew About Climate Dangers in the 1970s, Too*, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS  
28 (Dec. 22, 2015), <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/22122015/exxon-mobil-oil-industry-peers-knew-about-climate-change-dangers-1970s-american-petroleum-institute-api-shell-chevron-texaco>.

1 on the global damage from pollution, e.g., from coal combustion, will give us the  
2 needed focus for further research to avoid or control such pollutants.”<sup>63</sup>

3 91. That same year, Exxon Research and Engineering reported that: “The most widely  
4 held theory [about increasing CO<sub>2</sub> concentration] is that the increase is due to fossil fuel  
5 combustion, increasing CO<sub>2</sub> concentration will cause a warming of the earth’s surface, and the  
6 present trend of fossil fuel consumption will cause dramatic environmental effects before the year  
7 2050.”<sup>64</sup> According to the report, “ecological consequences of increased CO<sub>2</sub>” to 500 ppm (1.7  
8 times 1850 levels) could mean that “marine life would be markedly changed;” and, by way of  
9 example, that “maintaining runs of salmon and steelhead and other subarctic species in the  
10 Columbia River system would become increasingly difficult.”<sup>65</sup> With a doubling of the 1860 CO<sub>2</sub>  
11 concentration, “ocean levels would rise four feet” and “the Arctic Ocean would be ice free for at  
12 least six months each year, causing major shifts in weather patterns in the northern hemisphere.”<sup>66</sup>

13 92. Further, the report stated that unless fossil fuel use was constrained, there would be  
14 “noticeable temperature changes” associated with an increase in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> from about 280  
15 parts per million before the Industrial Revolution to 400 parts per million by the year 2010.<sup>67</sup> Those  
16 projections proved remarkably accurate—atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations surpassed 400 parts per  
17 million in May 2013, for the first time in millions of years.<sup>68</sup> In 2015, the annual average CO<sub>2</sub>  
18 concentration rose above 400 parts per million, and in 2016 the annual low surpassed 400 parts  
19 per million, meaning atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration remained above that threshold all year.<sup>69</sup>

22 <sup>63</sup> Henry Shaw, *Exxon Memo to H.N. Weinberg about “Research in Atmospheric Science”*, Exxon Inter-Office  
23 Correspondence (Nov. 19, 1979), [https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Probable%20Legislation%20Memo%20\(1979\).pdf](https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Probable%20Legislation%20Memo%20(1979).pdf).

24 <sup>64</sup> W.L. Ferrall, *Exxon Memo to R.L. Hirsch about “Controlling Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>”*, Exxon Research and Engineering  
25 Co. (Oct. 16, 1979), <http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/CO2%20and%20Fuel%20Use%20Projections.pdf>.

25 <sup>65</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>66</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>67</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>68</sup> Nicola Jones, *How the World Passed a Carbon Threshold and Why it Matters*, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Jan. 26,  
28 2017), <http://e360.yale.edu/features/how-the-world-passed-a-carbon-threshold-400ppm-and-why-it-matters>.

28 <sup>69</sup> *Id.*

1           93.     In 1980, API’s CO<sub>2</sub> Task Force members discussed the oil industry’s responsibility  
2 to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by changing refining processes and developing fuels that emit less CO<sub>2</sub>.  
3 The minutes from the Task Force’s February 29, 1980, meeting included a summary of a  
4 presentation on “The CO<sub>2</sub> Problem” given by Dr. John Laurmann, which identified the “scientific  
5 consensus on the potential for large future climatic response to increased CO<sub>2</sub> levels” as a reason  
6 for API members to have concern with the “CO<sub>2</sub> problem” and informed attendees that there was  
7 “strong empirical evidence that rise [in CO<sub>2</sub> concentration was] caused by anthropogenic release  
8 of CO<sub>2</sub>, mainly from fossil fuel combustion.”<sup>70</sup> Moreover, Dr. Laurmann warned that the amount  
9 of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere could double by 2038, which he said would likely lead to a 2.5° C (4.5°  
10 F) rise in global average temperatures with “major economic consequences.” He then told the Task  
11 Force that models showed a 5°C (9° F) rise by 2067, with “globally catastrophic effects.”<sup>71</sup> A  
12 taskforce member and representative of Texaco leadership present at the meeting posited that the  
13 API CO<sub>2</sub> Task Force should develop ground rules for energy release of fuels and the cleanup of  
14 fuels as they relate to CO<sub>2</sub> creation.

15           94.     In 1980, the API CO<sub>2</sub> Task Force also discussed a potential area for investigation:  
16 alternative energy sources as a means of mitigating CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from Defendants’ fossil fuel  
17 products. These efforts called for research and development to “Investigate the Market Penetration  
18 Requirements of Introducing a New Energy Source into World Wide Use.” Such investigation was  
19 to include the technical implications of energy source changeover, research timing, and  
20 requirements.<sup>72</sup>

21           95.     By 1980, Exxon’s senior leadership had become intimately familiar with the  
22 greenhouse effect and the role of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere. In that year, Exxon Senior Vice President  
23 and Board member George Piercy questioned Exxon researchers on the minutiae of the ocean’s  
24 role in absorbing atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>, including whether there was a net CO<sub>2</sub> flux out of the ocean  
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27 <sup>70</sup> American Petroleum Institute, *AQ-9 Task Force Meeting Minutes*, *supra* note 59 (AQ-9 refers to the “CO<sub>2</sub> and  
Climate” Task Force).

28 <sup>71</sup> *Id.*

<sup>72</sup> *Id.*

1 into the atmosphere in certain zones where upwelling of cold water to the surface occurs, because  
2 Piercy evidently believed that the oceans could absorb and retain higher concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub>  
3 than the atmosphere.<sup>73</sup> This inquiry aligns with Exxon supertanker research into whether the ocean  
4 would act as a significant CO<sub>2</sub> sink that would sequester atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> long enough to allow  
5 unabated emissions without triggering dire climatic consequences. As described below, Exxon  
6 eventually scrapped this research before it produced sufficient data to derive a conclusion.<sup>74</sup>

7 96. Also in 1980, Imperial Oil (Exxon) reported to Esso and Exxon managers and  
8 environmental staff that increases in fossil fuel usage aggravates CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere. Noting  
9 that the United Nations was encouraging research into the carbon cycle, Imperial reported that  
10 “[t]echnology exists to remove CO<sub>2</sub> from [fossil fuel power plant] stack gases but removal of only  
11 50% of the CO<sub>2</sub> would double the cost of power generation.”

12 97. Exxon scientist Roger Cohen warned his colleagues in a 1981 internal  
13 memorandum that “future developments in global data gathering and analysis, along with advances  
14 in climate modeling, may provide strong evidence for a delayed CO<sub>2</sub> effect of a truly substantial  
15 magnitude,” and that under certain circumstances it would be “very likely that we will  
16 unambiguously recognize the threat by the year 2000.”<sup>75</sup> Cohen had expressed concern that the  
17 memorandum mischaracterized potential effects of unabated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from Defendants’  
18 fossil fuel products: “[I]t is distinctly possible that the . . . [Exxon Planning Division’s] scenario  
19 will produce effects which will indeed be catastrophic (at least for a substantial fraction of the  
20 world’s population).”<sup>76</sup>

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24 <sup>73</sup> Neela Banerjee, *More Exxon Documents Show How Much It Knew About Climate 35 Years Ago*, INSIDE CLIMATE  
NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015), <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01122015/documents-exxons-early-co2-position-senior-executives-engage-and-warming-forecast>.

25 <sup>74</sup> Neela Banerjee et al., *Exxon Believed Deep Dive Into Climate Research Would Protect Its Business*, INSIDE CLIMATE  
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015), <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092015/exxon-believed-deep-dive-into-climate-research-would-protect-its-business>.

26 <sup>75</sup> Roger W. Cohen, *Exxon Memo to W. Glass about possible “catastrophic” effect of CO<sub>2</sub>*, Exxon Inter-Office  
27 Correspondence (Aug. 18, 1981), <http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1981-exxon-memo-on-possible-emission-consequences-of-fossil-fuel-consumption>.

28 <sup>76</sup> *Id.*

1           98.     In 1981, Exxon’s Henry Shaw, the company’s lead climate researcher at the time,  
2 prepared a summary of Exxon’s current position on the greenhouse effect for Edward David Jr.,  
3 president of Exxon Research and Engineering, stating in relevant part:

- 4                     • “Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> will double in 100 years if fossil fuels grow at 1.4%/ a<sup>2</sup>.
- 5                     • 3°C global average temperature rise and 10°C at poles if CO<sub>2</sub> doubles.
  - 6                         ○ Major shifts in rainfall/agriculture
  - 6                         ○ Polar ice may melt”<sup>77</sup>

7           99.     In 1982, another report prepared for API by scientists at the Lamont-Doherty  
8 Geological Observatory at Columbia University recognized that atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration  
9 had risen significantly compared to the beginning of the industrial revolution from about 290 parts  
10 per million to about 340 parts per million in 1981 and acknowledged that despite differences in  
11 climate modelers’ predictions, all models indicated a temperature increase caused by  
12 anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> within a global mean range of 4° C (7.2° F). The report advised that there was  
13 scientific consensus that “a doubling of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> from [] pre-industrial revolution value  
14 would result in an average global temperature rise of (3.0 ± 1.5)°C [5.4 ± 2.7° F].” It went further,  
15 warning that “[s]uch a warming can have serious consequences for man’s comfort and survival  
16 since patterns of aridity and rainfall can change, the height of the sea level can increase  
17 considerably and the world food supply can be affected.”<sup>78</sup> Exxon’s own modeling research  
18 confirmed this, and the company’s results were later published in at least three peer-reviewed  
19 scientific papers.<sup>79</sup>

20           100.    Also in 1982, Exxon’s Environmental Affairs Manager distributed a primer on  
21 climate change to a “wide circulation [of] Exxon management . . . intended to familiarize Exxon  
22  
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24 <sup>77</sup> Henry Shaw, *Exxon Memo to E. E. David, Jr. about “CO<sub>2</sub>Position Statement”*, Exxon Inter-Office Correspondence  
25 (May 15, 1981), <https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Exxon%20Position%20on%20CO2%20%281981%29.pdf>.

26 <sup>78</sup> American Petroleum Institute, *Climate Models and CO<sub>2</sub> Warming: A Selective Review and Summary*, Lamont-  
27 Doherty Geological Observatory (Columbia University) (Mar. 1982), <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2805626/1982-API-Climate-Models-and-CO2-Warming-a.pdf>.

28 <sup>79</sup> See Roger W. Cohen, *Exxon Memo summarizing findings of research in climate modeling*, Exxon Research and  
Engineering Co. (Sept. 2, 1982), [https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/%2522Consensus%2522%20on%20CO2%20Impacts%20\(1982\).pdf](https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/%2522Consensus%2522%20on%20CO2%20Impacts%20(1982).pdf) (discussing research articles).



1 personnel with the subject.”<sup>80</sup> The primer also was “restricted to Exxon personnel and not to be  
2 distributed externally.”<sup>81</sup> The primer compiled science on climate change available at the time, and  
3 confirmed fossil fuel combustion as a primary anthropogenic contributor to global warming. The  
4 report estimated a CO<sub>2</sub> doubling around 2090 based on Exxon’s long-range modeled outlook. The  
5 author warned that “there are some potentially catastrophic events that must be considered,”  
6 including increased sea surface temperatures, and the loss of Antarctic ice sheets.<sup>82</sup> It noted that  
7 some scientific groups were concerned “that once the effects are measurable, they might not be  
8 reversible.”<sup>83</sup>

9 101. In a summary of Exxon’s climate modeling research from 1982, Director of  
10 Exxon’s Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences Laboratory Roger Cohen wrote that “the time  
11 required for doubling of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> depends on future world consumption of fossil fuels.”  
12 Cohen concluded that Exxon’s own results were “consistent with the published predictions of more  
13 complex climate models” and “in accord with the scientific consensus on the effect of increased  
14 atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> on climate.”<sup>84</sup>

15 102. At the fourth biennial Maurice Ewing Symposium at the Lamont-Doherty  
16 Geophysical Observatory in October 1982, attended by members of API, Exxon Research and  
17 Engineering Company president E.E. David delivered a speech titled: “Inventing the Future:  
18 Energy and the CO<sub>2</sub> ‘Greenhouse Effect.’”<sup>85</sup> His remarks included the following statement: “[F]ew  
19 people doubt that the world has entered an energy transition away from dependence upon fossil  
20 fuels and toward some mix of renewable resources that will not pose problems of CO<sub>2</sub>  
21 accumulation.” He went on, discussing the human opportunity to address anthropogenic climate  
22 change before the point of no return:  
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25 <sup>80</sup> M. B. Glaser, *Exxon Memo to Management about “CO<sub>2</sub> ‘Greenhouse’ Effect”*, Exxon Research and Engineering  
26 Co. (Nov. 12, 1982), <http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/1982%20Exxon%20Primer%20on%20CO2%20Greenhouse%20Effect.pdf>.

26 <sup>81</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>82</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>83</sup> *Id.*

<sup>84</sup> Cohen, *Exxon Memo summarizing findings of research in climate modeling*, *supra* note 77.

<sup>85</sup> E. E. David, Jr., *Inventing the Future: Energy and the CO<sub>2</sub> Greenhouse Effect: Remarks at the Fourth Annual Ewing Symposium, Tenafly, NJ* (1982), available at <http://sites.agu.org/publications/files/2015/09/ch1.pdf>.

1 It is ironic that the biggest uncertainties about the CO<sub>2</sub> buildup are not in predicting  
2 what the climate will do, but in predicting what people will do. . . .[It] appears we  
3 still have time to generate the wealth and knowledge we will need to invent the  
4 transition to a stable energy system.

5 103. Throughout the early 1980s, at Exxon's direction, Exxon climate scientist Henry  
6 Shaw forecasted emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel use. Those estimates were incorporated into  
7 Exxon's 21st century energy projections and were distributed among Exxon's various divisions.  
8 Shaw's conclusions included an expectation that atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations would double in  
9 2090 per the Exxon model, with an attendant 2.3–5.6° F average global temperature increase. Shaw  
10 compared his model results to those of the U.S. EPA, the National Academy of Sciences, and the  
11 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, indicating that the Exxon model predicted a longer delay  
12 than any of the other models, although its temperature increase prediction was in the mid-range of  
13 the four projections.<sup>86</sup>

14 104. During the 1980s, many Defendants formed their own research units focused on  
15 climate modeling. The API, including the API CO<sub>2</sub> Task Force, provided a forum for Defendants  
16 to share their research efforts and corroborate their findings related to anthropogenic greenhouse  
17 gas emissions.<sup>87</sup>

18 105. During this time, Defendants' statements express an understanding of their  
19 obligation to consider and mitigate the externalities of unabated promotion, marketing, and sale of  
20 their fossil fuel products. For example, in 1988, Richard Tucker, the president of Mobil Oil,  
21 presented at the American Institute of Chemical Engineers National Meeting, the premier  
22 educational forum for chemical engineers, where he stated:

23 [H]umanity, which has created the industrial system that has transformed civilities,  
24 is also responsible for the environment, which sometimes is at risk because of  
25 unintended consequences of industrialization. . . . Maintaining the health of this  
26 life-support system is emerging as one of the highest priorities. . . .[W]e must all be  
27 environmentalists.

28 The environmental covenant requires action on many fronts...the low-atmosphere  
ozone problem, the upper-atmosphere ozone problem and the greenhouse effect, to

<sup>86</sup> Banerjee, *More Exxon Documents Show How Much It Knew About Climate 35 Years Ago*, *supra* note 77.

<sup>87</sup> Banerjee, *Exxon's Oil Industry Peers Knew About Climate Dangers in the 1970s, Too*, *supra* note 620.

1 name a few. . . .Our strategy must be to reduce pollution before it is ever generated  
2 – to prevent problems at the source.

3 Prevention means engineering a new generation of fuels, lubricants and chemical  
4 products. . . . Prevention means designing catalysts and processes that minimize or  
5 eliminate the production of unwanted byproducts. . . .Prevention on a global scale  
6 may even require a dramatic reduction in our dependence on fossil fuels—and a  
7 shift towards solar, hydrogen, and safe nuclear power. It may be possible that—just  
8 possible—that the energy industry will transform itself so completely that observers  
9 will declare it a new industry. . . .Brute force, low-tech responses and money alone  
10 won’t meet the challenges we face in the energy industry.<sup>88</sup>

11 106. Also in 1988, the Shell Greenhouse Effect Working Group issued a confidential  
12 internal report, “The Greenhouse Effect,” which acknowledged global warming’s anthropogenic  
13 nature: “Man-made carbon dioxide released into and accumulated in the atmosphere is believed to  
14 warm the earth through the so-called greenhouse effect.” The authors also noted the burning of  
15 fossil fuel as a primary driver of CO<sub>2</sub> buildup and warned that ocean warming would impact marine  
16 species populations and that “shifts in ranges and migration patterns could result in local losses of  
17 food source revenues, and could require [fishing] operations in other (more distant) grounds.”<sup>89</sup>

18 107. Similar to early warnings by Exxon scientists, the Shell report notes that “by the  
19 time the global warming becomes detectable it could be too late to take effective countermeasures  
20 to reduce the effects or even to stabilize the situation.” The authors mention the need to consider  
21 policy changes on multiple occasions, noting that “the potential implications for the world are. . .so  
22 large that policy options need to be considered much earlier” and that research should be “directed  
23 more to the analysis of policy and energy options than to studies of what we will be facing  
24 exactly.”<sup>90</sup>

25 108. In 1991, Shell produced a film called “Climate of Concern.” The film advises that  
26 while “no two [climate change projection] scenarios fully agree. . . [they] have each prompted the  
27 same serious warning. A warning endorsed by a uniquely broad consensus of scientists in their  
28

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<sup>88</sup> Richard E. Tucker, *High Tech Frontiers in the Energy Industry: The Challenge Ahead*, AIChE National Meeting (Nov. 30, 1988), available at <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pur1.32754074119482?urlappend=%3Bseq=522>.

<sup>89</sup> Shell Internationale Petroleum Greenhouse Effect Working Group, *The Greenhouse Effect* (May 30, 1988), <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4411090-Document3.html#document/p9/a411239>.

<sup>90</sup> *Id.*

1 report to the UN at the end of 1990.” The video concludes with a stark admonition: “Global  
2 warming is not yet certain, but many think that the wait for final proof would be irresponsible.  
3 Action now is seen as the only safe insurance.”<sup>91</sup>

4 109. The fossil fuel industry, including Defendants, was at the forefront of carbon  
5 dioxide research for much of the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. They developed cutting edge and  
6 innovative technology and worked with many of the field’s top researchers to produce  
7 exceptionally sophisticated studies and models. For instance, in the mid-nineties Shell began using  
8 scenarios to plan how the company could respond to various global forces in the future. In one  
9 scenario published in a 1998 internal report, Shell paints an eerily prescient scene:

10 In 2010, a series of violent storms causes extensive damage to the eastern coast of  
11 the U.S. Although it is not clear whether the storms are caused by climate change,  
12 people are not willing to take further chances. The insurance industry refuses to  
13 accept liability, setting off a fierce debate over who is liable: the insurance industry  
14 or the government. After all, two successive IPCC reports since 1995 have  
15 reinforced the human connection to climate change....Following the storms, a  
16 coalition of environmental NGOs brings a class-action suit against the US  
17 government and fossil-fuel companies on the grounds of neglecting what scientists  
(including their own) have been saying for years: that something must be done. A  
social reaction to the use of fossil fuels grows, and individuals become ‘vigilante  
environmentalists’ in the same way, a generation earlier, they had become fiercely  
anti-tobacco. Direct-action campaigns against companies escalate. Young  
consumers, especially, demand action.<sup>92</sup>

18 110. Climate change research conducted by Defendants and their industry associations  
19 frequently acknowledged uncertainties in their climate modeling—those uncertainties, however,  
20 were merely with respect to the magnitude and timing of climate impacts resulting from fossil fuel  
21 consumption, not that significant changes would eventually occur. The Defendants’ researchers  
22 and the researchers at their industry associations harbored little doubt that climate change was  
23 occurring and that fossil fuel products were, and are, the primary cause.

24 111. Despite the overwhelming information about the threats to people and the planet  
25 posed by continued unabated use of their fossil fuel products, Defendants failed to act as they

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27 <sup>91</sup>Jelmer Mommers, *Shell made a film about climate change in 1991 (then neglected to heed its own warning)*, DE  
CORRESPONDENT (Feb. 27, 2017), <https://thecorrespondent.com/6285/shell-made-a-film-about-climate-change-in-1991-then-neglected-to-heed-its-own-warning/692663565-875331f6>.

28 <sup>92</sup>Royal Dutch/Shell Group, *Group Scenarios 1998–2020*, 115 (1998),  
<http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4430277-27-1-Compiled.html>.

1 reasonably should have to mitigate or avoid those dire adverse impacts. Defendants instead  
2 adopted the position, as described below, that the absence of meaningful regulations on the  
3 consumption of their fossil fuel products was the equivalent of a social license to continue the  
4 unfettered pursuit of profits from those products. This position was an abdication of Defendants’  
5 responsibility to consumers and the public, including Plaintiff, to act on their unique knowledge  
6 of the reasonably foreseeable hazards of unabated production and consumption of their fossil fuel  
7 products.

8 **E. Defendants Did Not Disclose Known Harms Associated with the Extraction,**  
9 **Promotion, and Consumption of Their Fossil Fuel Products and Instead**  
10 **Affirmatively Acted to Obscure Those Harms and Engaged in a Concerted**  
11 **Campaign to Evade Regulation.**

12 112. By 1988, Defendants had amassed a compelling body of knowledge about the role  
13 of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, and specifically those emitted from the normal use of  
14 Defendants’ fossil fuel products, in causing global warming, increased mean sea surface  
15 temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and the attendant consequences for human  
16 communities and the environment. On notice that their products were causing global climate  
17 change and dire effects on the planet, Defendants were faced with the decision of whether to take  
18 steps to limit the damages their fossil fuel products were causing and would continue to cause for  
19 virtually every one of Earth’s inhabitants, including Plaintiff.

20 113. Defendants at any time before or thereafter could and should reasonably have taken  
21 any of a number of steps to mitigate the damages caused by their fossil fuel products, and their  
22 own comments reveal an awareness of what some of these steps may have been. Defendants should  
23 have made reasonable warnings to consumers, the public, and regulators of the dangers known to  
24 them of the unabated consumption of their fossil fuel products, and they should have taken  
25 reasonable steps to limit the potential greenhouse gas emissions arising out of those products.

26 114. But several key events during the period 1988–1992 appear to have prompted  
27 Defendants to change their tactics from general research and internal discussion on climate change  
28 to a public campaign aimed at evading regulation of their fossil fuel products and/or emissions  
therefrom. These include:

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- a. In 1988, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) scientists confirmed that human activities were actually contributing to global warming.<sup>93</sup> On June 23 of that year, NASA scientist James Hansen’s presentation of this information to Congress engendered significant news coverage and publicity for the announcement, including coverage on the front page of the New York Times.
- b. On July 28, 1988, Senator Robert Stafford and four bipartisan co-sponsors introduced S. 2666, “The Global Environmental Protection Act,” to regulate CO<sub>2</sub> and other greenhouse gases. Four more bipartisan bills to significantly reduce CO<sub>2</sub> pollution were introduced over the following ten weeks, and in August, U.S. Presidential candidate George H.W. Bush pledged that his presidency would “combat the greenhouse effect with the White House effect.”<sup>94</sup> Political will in the United States to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the harms associated with Defendants’ fossil fuel products was gaining momentum.
- c. In December 1988, the United Nations formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), a scientific panel dedicated to providing the world’s governments with an objective, scientific analysis of climate change and its environmental, political, and economic impacts.
- d. In 1990, the IPCC published its First Assessment Report on anthropogenic climate change,<sup>95</sup> in which it concluded that (1) “there is a natural greenhouse effect which already keeps the Earth warmer than it would otherwise be,” and (2) that  

emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)

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<sup>93</sup> See Frumhoff et al., *The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers*, *supra* note 211.  
<sup>94</sup> N.Y. TIMES, *The White House and the Greenhouse* (May 9, 1998), <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/09/opinion/the-white-house-and-the-greenhouse.html>.  
<sup>95</sup> See IPCC, *Reports*, [http://www.ipcc.ch/publications\\_and\\_data/publications\\_and\\_data\\_reports.shtml](http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml).

1 and nitrous oxide. These increases will enhance the  
2 greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional  
3 warming of the Earth's surface. The main greenhouse gas,  
4 water vapour, will increase in response to global warming  
5 and further enhance it.<sup>96</sup>

6 The IPCC reconfirmed these conclusions in a 1992 supplement to  
7 the First Assessment Report.<sup>97</sup>

8 e. The United Nations began preparation for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de  
9 Janeiro, Brazil, a major, newsworthy gathering of 172 world governments,  
10 of which 116 sent their heads of state. The Summit resulted in the United  
11 Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), an  
12 international environmental treaty providing protocols for future  
13 negotiations aimed at “stabiliz[ing] greenhouse gas concentrations in the  
14 atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic  
15 interference with the climate system.”<sup>98</sup>

16 115. These world events marked a shift in public discussion of climate change, and the  
17 initiation of international efforts to curb anthropogenic greenhouse emissions—developments that  
18 had stark implications for, and would have diminished the profitability of, Defendants’ fossil fuel  
19 products.

20 116. But rather than collaborating with the international community by acting to  
21 forestall, or at least decrease, their fossil fuel products’ contributions to global warming, increased  
22 mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and marine toxin  
23 outbreaks, and consequent injuries to Plaintiff, Defendants embarked on a decades-long campaign  
24 designed to maximize continued dependence on their products and undermine national and  
25 international efforts to rein in greenhouse gas emissions.

26 <sup>96</sup> IPCC, *Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment*, “Policymakers Summary” (1990),  
27 [http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg\\_I/ipcc\\_far\\_wg\\_I\\_spm.pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_spm.pdf).

28 <sup>97</sup> IPCC, *1992 Supplement to the First Assessment Report* (1992), [http://www.ipcc.ch/publications\\_and\\_data/publications\\_ipcc\\_90\\_92\\_assessments\\_far.shtml](http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_90_92_assessments_far.shtml).

<sup>98</sup> United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, Article 2 (1992),  
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>.

1           117. Defendants’ campaign, which focused on concealing, discrediting, and/or  
2 misrepresenting information that tended to support restricting consumption of (and thereby  
3 decreasing demand for) Defendants’ fossil fuel products, took several forms. The campaign  
4 enabled Defendants to accelerate their business practice of exploiting fossil fuel reserves, and  
5 concurrently externalize the social and environmental costs of their fossil fuel products. These  
6 activities stood in direct contradiction to Defendants’ own prior recognition that the science of  
7 anthropogenic climate change was clear and that the greatest uncertainties involved responsive  
8 human behavior, not scientific understanding of the issue.

9           118. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal, from Plaintiff and the general public,  
10 the foreseeable impacts of the use of their fossil fuel products on Earth’s climate and associated  
11 harms to people and communities. Defendants embarked on a concerted public relations campaign  
12 to cast doubt on the science connecting global climate change to fossil fuel products and  
13 greenhouse gas emissions, in order to influence public perception of the existence of anthropogenic  
14 global warming. The effort included promoting their hazardous products through advertising  
15 campaigns and the initiation and funding of climate change denialist organizations, designed to  
16 influence consumers to continue using Defendants’ fossil fuel products irrespective of those  
17 products’ damage to communities and the environment.

18           119. For example, in 1988, Joseph Carlson, an Exxon public affairs manager, described  
19 the “Exxon Position,” which included among others, two important messaging tenets: (1)  
20 “[e]mphasize the uncertainty in scientific conclusions regarding the potential enhanced  
21 Greenhouse Effect;” and (2) “[r]esist the overstatement and sensationalization [sic] of potential  
22 greenhouse effect which could lead to noneconomic development of non-fossil fuel resources.”<sup>99</sup>

23           120. A 1994 Shell report entitled “The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect: A Review of the  
24 Scientific Aspects” by Royal Dutch Shell environmental advisor Peter Langcake stands in stark  
25 contrast to the company’s 1988 report on the same topic. Whereas before, the authors  
26 recommended consideration of policy solutions early on, Langcake warned of the potentially  
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<sup>99</sup>Joseph M. Carlson, *Exxon Memo on “The Greenhouse Effect”* (Aug. 3, 1988), <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3024180/1998-Exxon-Memo-on-the-Greenhouse-Effect.pdf>.



1 dramatic “economic effects of ill-advised policy measures.” While the report recognized the IPCC  
2 conclusions as the mainstream view, Langcake still emphasized scientific uncertainty, noting, for  
3 example, that “the postulated link between any observed temperature rise and human activities has  
4 to be seen in relation to natural variability, which is still largely unpredictable.” The Group position  
5 is stated clearly in the report: “Scientific uncertainty and the evolution of energy systems indicate  
6 that policies to curb greenhouse gas emissions beyond 'no regrets' measures could be premature,  
7 divert resources from more pressing needs and further distort markets.”<sup>100</sup>

8 121. In 1991, for example, the Information Council for the Environment (“ICE”), whose  
9 members included affiliates, predecessors and/or subsidiaries of Defendants, including Pittsburg  
10 and Midway Coal Mining (Chevron), and Island Creek Coal Company (Occidental), launched a  
11 national climate change science denial campaign with full-page newspaper ads, radio commercials,  
12 a public relations tour schedule, “mailers,” and research tools to measure campaign success.  
13 Included among the campaign strategies was to “reposition global warming as theory (not fact).”  
14 Its target audience included older less-educated males who are “predisposed to favor the ICE  
15 agenda, and likely to be even more supportive of that agenda following exposure to new  
16 information.”<sup>101</sup>

17 122. An implicit goal of ICE’s advertising campaign was to change public opinion and  
18 avoid regulation. A memo from Richard Lawson, president of the National Coal Association asked  
19 members to contribute to the ICE campaign with the justification that “policymakers are prepared  
20 to act [on global warming]. Public opinion polls reveal that 60% of the American people already  
21 believe global warming is a serious environmental problem. Our industry cannot sit on the  
22 sidelines in this debate.”<sup>102</sup>

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26 <sup>100</sup> P. Langcake, *The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect: A review of the Scientific Aspects*, (Dec. 1994),  
<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4411099-Document11.html#document/p15/a411511>.

27 <sup>101</sup> Union of Concerned Scientists, *Deception Dossier #5: Coal’s “Information Council on the Environment” Sham*,  
(1991), [http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Climate-Deception-Dossier-5\\_ICE.pdf](http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Climate-Deception-Dossier-5_ICE.pdf).

28 <sup>102</sup> Naomi Oreskes, *My Facts Are Better Than Your Facts: Spreading Good News about Global Warming* (2010), in  
Peter Howlett et al., *How Well Do Facts Travel?: The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge*, 136–66. Cambridge  
University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511762154.008.8

1 123. The following images are examples of ICE-funded print advertisements  
 2 challenging the validity of climate science and intended to obscure the scientific consensus on  
 3 anthropogenic climate change and induce political inertia to address it.<sup>103</sup>



14 124. In 1996, Exxon released a publication called "Global Warming: Who's Right?  
 15 Facts about a debate that's turned up more questions than answers." In the publication's preface,  
 16 Exxon CEO Lee Raymond stated that "taking drastic action immediately is unnecessary since  
 17 many scientists agree there's ample time to better understand the climate system." The subsequent  
 18 article described the greenhouse effect as "unquestionably real and definitely a good thing," while  
 19 ignoring the severe consequences that would result from the influence of the increased CO<sub>2</sub>  
 20 concentration on Earth's climate. Instead, it characterized the greenhouse effect as simply "what  
 21 makes the earth's atmosphere livable." Directly contradicting their own internal reports and peer-  
 22 reviewed science, the article ascribed the rise in temperature since the late 19th century to "natural  
 23 fluctuations that occur over long periods of time" rather than to the anthropogenic emissions that  
 24 Exxon and other scientists had confirmed were responsible. The article also falsely challenged the  
 25 computer models that projected the future impacts of unabated fossil fuel product consumption,  
 26 including those developed by Exxon's own employees, as having been "proved to be inaccurate."  
 27 The article contradicted the numerous reports circulated among Exxon's staff, and by the API, by

28 <sup>103</sup> Union of Concerned Scientists, *Deception Dossier #5*, supra note 98.

1 stating that “the indications are that a warmer world would be far more benign than many imagine  
2 . . . moderate warming would reduce mortality rates in the US, so a slightly warmer climate would  
3 be more healthful.” Raymond concluded his preface by attacking advocates for limiting the use of  
4 his company’s fossil fuel products as “drawing on bad science, faulty logic, or unrealistic  
5 assumptions”—despite the important role that Exxon’s own scientists had played in compiling  
6 those same scientific underpinnings.<sup>104</sup>

7           125. API published an extensive report in the same year warning against concern over  
8 CO<sub>2</sub> buildup and any need to curb consumption or regulate the industry. The introduction states  
9 that “there is no persuasive basis for forcing Americans to dramatically change their lifestyles to  
10 use less oil.” The authors discourage the further development of certain alternative energy sources,  
11 writing that “government agencies have advocated the increased use of ethanol and the electric  
12 car, without the facts to support the assertion that either is superior to existing fuels and  
13 technologies” and that “policies that mandate replacing oil with specific alternative fuel  
14 technologies freeze progress at the current level of technology, and reduce the chance that  
15 innovation will develop better solutions.” The paper also denies the human connection to climate  
16 change, saying that no “scientific evidence exists that human activities are significantly affecting  
17 sea levels, rainfall, surface temperatures or the intensity and frequency of storms.” The message  
18 the report repeatedly sends is clear: “Facts don’t support the arguments for restraining oil use.”<sup>105</sup>

19           126. In a speech presented at the World Petroleum Congress in Beijing in 1997 at which  
20 many of the Defendants were present, Exxon CEO Lee Raymond reiterated these views. This time,  
21 he presented a false dichotomy between stable energy markets and abatement of the marketing,  
22 promotion, and sale of fossil fuel products known to Defendants to be hazardous. He stated:

23           Some people who argue that we should drastically curtail our use of fossil fuels for  
24 environmental reasons...my belief [is] that such proposals are neither prudent nor  
25 practical. With no readily available economic alternatives on the horizon, fossil  
26 fuels will continue to supply most of the world’s and this region’s energy for the  
27 foreseeable future.

28 <sup>104</sup> Exxon Corp., *Global warming: who’s right?* (1996), <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2805542-Exxon-Global-Warming-Whos-Right.html>.

1 Governments also need to provide a stable investment climate...They should avoid  
2 the temptation to intervene in energy markets in ways that give advantage to one  
competitor over another or one fuel over another.

3 We also have to keep in mind that most of the greenhouse effects comes from  
4 natural sources...Leaping to radically cut this tiny sliver of the greenhouse pie on  
5 the premise that it will affect climate defies common sense and lacks foundation in  
our current understanding of the climate system.

6 Let's agree there's a lot we really don't know about how climate will change in the  
7 21st century and beyond...It is highly unlikely that the temperature in the middle  
8 of the next century will be significantly affected whether policies are enacted now  
or 20 years from now. It's bad public policy to impose very costly regulations and  
restrictions when their need has yet to be proven.<sup>106</sup>

9 127. Imperial Oil (Exxon) CEO Robert Peterson falsely denied the established  
10 connection between Defendants' fossil fuel products and anthropogenic climate change in the  
11 Summer 1998 Imperial Oil Review, "A Cleaner Canada":

12 [T]his issue [referring to climate change] has absolutely nothing to do with  
13 pollution and air quality. Carbon dioxide is not a pollutant but an essential  
14 ingredient of life on this planet.... [T]he question of whether or not the trapping of  
'greenhouse' gases will result in the planet's getting warmer...has no connection  
15 whatsoever with our day-to-day weather.

16 There is absolutely no agreement among climatologists on whether or not the planet  
17 is getting warmer, or, if it is, on whether the warming is the result of man-made  
factors or natural variations in the climate....I feel very safe in saying that the view  
18 that burning fossil fuels will result in global climate change remains an unproved  
hypothesis.<sup>107</sup>

19 128. Mobil (Exxon) paid for a series of "advertorials," advertisements located in the  
20 editorial section of the New York Times and meant to look like editorials rather than paid ads.  
21 These ads discussed various aspects of the public discussion of climate change and sought to  
22 undermine the justifications for tackling greenhouse gas emissions, referring to it as unsettled  
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27 <sup>106</sup> Lee R. Raymond, *Energy – Key to growth and a better environment for Asia-Pacific nations*, World Petroleum  
Congress (Oct. 13, 1997), [https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2840902/1997-Lee-Raymond-Speech-at-  
China-World-Petroleum.pdf](https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2840902/1997-Lee-Raymond-Speech-at-China-World-Petroleum.pdf).

28 <sup>107</sup> Robert Peterson, *A Cleaner Canada in Imperial Oil Review* (1998), [http://www.documentcloud.org/  
documents/2827818-1998-Imperial-Oil-Robert-Peterson-A-Cleaner-Canada.html](http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2827818-1998-Imperial-Oil-Robert-Peterson-A-Cleaner-Canada.html).

1 science. The 1997 advertorial below<sup>108</sup> argued that economic analysis of emissions restrictions was  
2 faulty and inconclusive and therefore a justification for delaying action on climate change.

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## When facts don't square with the theory, throw out the facts



That seems to characterize the administration's attitude on two of its own studies which show that international efforts to curb global warming could spark a big run-up in energy prices.

For months, the administration—playing its cards close to the vest—has promised to provide details of the emission reduction plan it will put on the table at the climate change meeting in Kyoto, Japan, later this year. It also promised to evaluate the economics of that policy and measure its impact. Those results are important because the proposals submitted by other countries thus far would be disruptive and costly to the U.S. economy.

Yet, when the results from its own economic models were finally generated, the administration started distancing itself from the findings and models that produced them. The administration's top economic advisor said that economic models can't provide a "definitive answer" on the impact of controlling emissions. The effort, she said, was "futile." At best, the models can only provide a "range of potential impacts."

Frankly, we're puzzled. The White House has promised to lay the economic facts before the public. Yet, the administration's top advisor said such an analysis won't be based on models and it will "preclude...detailed numbers." If you don't provide numbers and don't rely on models, what kind of rigorous economic examination can Congress and the public expect?

We're also puzzled by ambivalence over models. The administration downplays the utility of economic models to forecast cost impacts 10–15 years from now, yet its negotiators accept as gospel the 50–100-year predictions of global warming that have been generated by climate models—many of which have been criticized as seriously flawed.

The second study, conducted by Argonne National Laboratory under a contract with the Energy Department, examined what would

happen if the U.S. had to commit to higher energy prices under the emission reduction plans that several nations had advanced last year. Such increases, the report concluded, would result in "significant reductions in output and employment" in six industries—aluminum, cement, chemical, paper and pulp, petroleum refining and steel.

Hit hardest, the study noted, would be the chemical industry, with estimates that up to 30 percent of U.S. chemical manufacturing capacity would move offshore to developing countries. Job losses could amount to some 200,000 in that industry, with another 100,000 in the steel sector. And despite the substantial loss of U.S. jobs and manufacturing capacity, the net emission reduction could be insignificant since developing countries will not be bound by the emission targets of a global warming treaty.

Downplaying Argonne's findings, the Energy Department noted that the study used outdated energy prices (mid-1996), didn't reflect the gains that would come from international emissions trading and failed to factor in the benefits of accelerated developments in energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies.

What it failed to mention is just what these new technologies are and when we can expect their benefits to kick in. As for emissions trading, many economists have theorized about the role they could play in reducing emissions, but few have grappled with the practicality of implementing and policing such a scheme.

We applaud the goals the U.S. wants to achieve in these upcoming negotiations—namely, that a final agreement must be "flexible, cost-effective, realistic, achievable and ultimately global in scope." But until we see the details of the administration's policy, we are concerned that plans are being developed in the absence of rigorous economic analysis. Too much is at stake to simply ignore facts that don't square with preconceived theories.

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to make a difference.

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<sup>108</sup> Mobil, *When Facts Don't Square with the Theory, Throw Out the Facts*, N.Y. TIMES, A31 (Aug. 14, 1997), <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/705550-mob-nyt-1997-aug-14-whenfactsdentsquare.html>.

1            129. In 1998, API, on behalf of Defendants, among other fossil fuel companies and  
2 organizations supported by fossil fuel corporate grants, developed a Global Climate Science  
3 Communications Plan that stated that unless “climate change becomes a non-issue . . . there may  
4 be no moment when we can declare victory for our efforts.” Rather, API proclaimed that “[v]ictory  
5 will be achieved when . . . average citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate  
6 science; [and when] recognition of uncertainties becomes part of the ‘conventional wisdom.’”<sup>109</sup>  
7 The multi-million-dollar, multi-year proposed budget included public outreach and the  
8 dissemination of educational materials to schools to “begin to erect a barrier against further efforts  
9 to impose Kyoto-like measures in the future.”<sup>110</sup>

10            130. Soon after, API distributed a memo to its members identifying public agreement on  
11 fossil fuel products’ role in climate change as its highest priority issue.<sup>111</sup> The memorandum  
12 illuminates API’s and Defendants’ concern over the potential regulation of Defendants’ fossil fuel  
13 products: “Climate is at the center of the industry’s business interests. Policies limiting carbon  
14 emissions reduce petroleum product use. That is why it is API’s highest priority issue and defined  
15 as ‘strategic.’”<sup>112</sup> Further, the API memo stresses many of the strategies that Defendants  
16 individually and collectively utilized to combat the perception of their fossil fuel products as  
17 hazardous. These included:

- 18            a. Influencing the tenor of the climate change “debate” as a means to establish  
19            that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were not necessary to  
20            responsibly address climate change;
- 21            b. Maintaining strong working relationships between government regulators  
22            and communications-oriented organizations like the Global Climate  
23            Coalition, the Heartland Institute, and other groups carrying Defendants’

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25 <sup>109</sup> Joe Walker, *E-mail to Global Climate Science Team, attaching the Draft Global Science Communications Plan*  
26 (Apr. 3, 1998), [https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/784572/api-global-climate-science-communications-  
plan.pdf](https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/784572/api-global-climate-science-communications-plan.pdf).

27 <sup>110</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>111</sup> Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *Allegations of Political Interference with Government Climate  
Change Science*, page 51 (Mar. 19, 2007), [https://ia601904.us.archive.org/25/items/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-  
110hhr37415/CHRG-110hhr37415.pdf](https://ia601904.us.archive.org/25/items/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-110hhr37415/CHRG-110hhr37415.pdf).

<sup>112</sup> *Id.*

1 message minimizing the hazards of the unabated use of their fossil fuel  
2 products and opposing regulation thereof;

3 c. Building the case for (and falsely dichotomizing) Defendants’ positive  
4 contributions to a “long-term approach” (ostensibly for regulation of their  
5 products) as a reason for society to reject short term fossil fuel regulations,  
6 and engaging in climate change science uncertainty research; and

7 d. Presenting Defendants’ positions on climate change in domestic and  
8 international forums, including by preparing rebuttals to IPCC reports.

9 131. Additionally, Defendants mounted a campaign against regulation of their business  
10 practices in order to continue placing their fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce, despite  
11 their own knowledge and the growing national and international scientific consensus about the  
12 hazards of doing so. These efforts came despite Defendants’ recognition that “risks to nearly every  
13 facet of life on Earth . . . could be avoided only if timely steps were taken to address climate  
14 change.”<sup>113</sup>

15 132. The Global Climate Coalition (GCC), on behalf of Defendants and other fossil fuel  
16 companies, funded advertising campaigns and distributed material to generate public uncertainty  
17 around the climate debate, with the specific purpose of preventing U.S. adoption of the Kyoto  
18 Protocol, despite the leading role that the U.S. had played in the Protocol negotiations.<sup>114</sup> Despite  
19 an internal primer stating that various “contrarian theories” [i.e., climate change skepticism] do  
20 not “offer convincing arguments against the conventional model of greenhouse gas emission-  
21 induced climate change,” GCC excluded this section from the public version of the backgrounder  
22 and instead funded efforts to promote some of those same contrarian theories over subsequent  
23 years.<sup>115</sup>

24 133. A key strategy in Defendants’ efforts to discredit scientific consensus on climate  
25 change and the IPCC was to bankroll scientists who, although accredited, held fringe opinions that

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>113</sup> Banerjee, *Exxon’s Oil Industry Peers Knew About Climate Dangers in the 1970s, Too*, *supra* note 60.

28 <sup>114</sup> *Id.*

<sup>115</sup> Gregory J. Dana, *Memo to AIAM Technical Committee Re: Global Climate Coalition (GCC) – Primer on Climate Change Science – Final Draft*, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (Jan. 18, 1996), <http://www.webcitation.org/6FyqHawb9>.

1 were even more questionable given the sources of their research funding. These scientists obtained  
2 part or all of their research budget from Defendants directly or through Defendant-funded  
3 organizations like API,<sup>116</sup> but they frequently failed to disclose their fossil fuel industry  
4 underwriters.<sup>117</sup>

5 134. Creating a false sense of disagreement in the scientific community (despite the  
6 consensus that its own scientists, experts, and managers had previously acknowledged) has had an  
7 evident impact on public opinion. A 2007 Yale University-Gallup poll found that while 71% of  
8 Americans personally believed global warming was happening, only 48% believed that there was  
9 a consensus among the scientific community, and 40% believed there was a lot of disagreement  
10 among scientists over whether global warming was occurring.<sup>118</sup>

11 135. 2007 was the same year the IPCC published its Fourth Assessment Report, in which  
12 it concluded that “there is *very high confidence* that the net effect of human activities since 1750  
13 has been one of warming.”<sup>119</sup> The IPCC defined “very high confidence” as at least a 9 out of 10  
14 chance.<sup>120</sup>

15 136. Defendants borrowed pages out of the playbook of prior denialist campaigns. A  
16 “Global Climate Science Team” (“GCST”) was created that mirrored a front group created by the  
17 tobacco industry, known as The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition, whose purpose was to  
18 sow uncertainty about the fact that cigarette smoke is carcinogenic. The GCST’s membership  
19 included Steve Milloy (a key player on the tobacco industry’s front group) for Exxon; an API  
20 public relations representative; and representatives from Chevron and Southern Company that  
21 drafted API’s 1998 Communications Plan. There were no scientists on the “Global Climate  
22

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23 <sup>116</sup> Willie Soon & Sallie Baliunas, *Proxy Climatic and Environmental Changes of the Past 1000 Years*, 23 CLIMATE  
RESEARCH 88, 105 (Jan. 31, 2003), <http://www.int-res.com/articles/cr2003/23/c023p089.pdf>.

24 <sup>117</sup> Newsdesk, *Smithsonian Statement: Dr. Wei-Hock (Willie) Soon*, SMITHSONIAN (Feb. 26, 2015),  
<http://newsdesk.si.edu/releases/smithsonian-statement-dr-wei-hock-willie-soon>.

25 <sup>118</sup> *American Opinions on Global Warming: A Yale/Gallup/Clearvision Poll*, Yale Program on Climate Change  
26 Communication (July 31, 2007), <http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/american-opinions-on-global-warming>.

27 <sup>119</sup> IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, page 3 (emphasis in original), *Climate Change 2007: The Physical  
28 Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on  
Climate Change* (2007), <https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf>.

<sup>120</sup> *Id.*



1 Science Team.” GCST developed a strategy to spend millions of dollars manufacturing climate  
2 change uncertainty. Between 2000 and 2004, Exxon donated \$110,000 to Milloy’s efforts and  
3 another organization, the Free Enterprise Education Institute and \$50,000 to the Free Enterprise  
4 Action Institute, both registered to Milloy’s home address.<sup>121</sup>

5 137. Defendants by and through their trade association memberships, worked directly,  
6 and often in a deliberately obscured manner, to evade regulation of the emissions resulting from  
7 use of their fossil fuel products.

8 138. Defendants have funded dozens of think tanks, front groups, and dark money  
9 foundations pushing climate change denial. These include the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the  
10 Heartland Institute, Frontiers for Freedom, Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, and Heritage  
11 Foundation. From 1998 to 2014 Exxon spent almost \$31 million funding numerous organizations  
12 misrepresenting the scientific consensus that Defendants’ fossil fuel products were causing climate  
13 change. Several Defendants have been linked to other groups that undermine the scientific basis  
14 linking Defendants’ fossil fuel products to climate change, including the Frontiers of Freedom  
15 Institute and the George C. Marshall Institute.

16 139. Exxon acknowledged its own previous success in sowing uncertainty and slowing  
17 mitigation through funding of climate denial groups. In its 2007 Corporate Citizenship Report,  
18 Exxon declared: “In 2008, we will discontinue contributions to several public policy research  
19 groups whose position on climate change could divert attention from the important discussion on  
20 how the world will secure the energy required for economic growth in an environmentally  
21 responsible manner.”<sup>122</sup> Despite this pronouncement, Exxon remained financially associated with  
22 several such groups after the report’s publication.

23 140. Today, Defendants, including Exxon, Chevron, BP, Shell, and ConocoPhillips  
24 publicly purport to accept the consensus embodied in the most recent IPCC reports, that global  
25 warming is occurring, and that human activity has been the dominant cause of global warming and  
26

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27 <sup>121</sup> Seth Shulman et al. *Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air: How ExxonMobil Uses Big Tobacco’s Tactics to Manufacture*  
*Uncertainty on Climate Science*, Union of Concerned Scientists, 19 (Jan. 2007),  
28 [http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global\\_warming/exxon\\_report.pdf](http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf).

<sup>122</sup> ExxonMobil, *2007 Corporate Citizenship Report* (Dec. 31, 2007), <http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2799777-ExxonMobil-2007-Corporate-Citizenship-Report.html>.

1 related climactic changes since the beginning of the Great Acceleration. At the same time,  
2 however, Defendants continue to play up the uncertainty of future climate modeling, and the  
3 purported historic uncertainty, imprecision, and inconsistency of climate science to disguise and  
4 distract from their own knowledge and intensive research dating back to at least 1960s. While  
5 Defendants claim to accept the scientific consensus on climate change, moreover, they still  
6 continue to promote and expand their exploration, production, promotion, marketing, and sale of  
7 fossil fuels that are the dominant cause of anthropogenic global warming.

8           141. Defendants could have contributed to the global effort to mitigate the impacts of  
9 greenhouse gas emissions by, for example, delineating practical policy goals and regulatory  
10 structures that would have allowed them to continue their business ventures while reducing  
11 greenhouse gas emissions and supporting a transition to a lower carbon future. Instead, Defendants  
12 undertook a momentous effort to evade international and national regulation of greenhouse gas  
13 emissions to enable them to continue unabated fossil fuel production.

14           142. As a result of Defendants' tortious, false and misleading conduct, reasonable  
15 consumers of Defendants' fossil fuel products, members of the public, and policy-makers, have  
16 been deliberately and unnecessarily deceived about: the role of fossil fuel products in causing  
17 ocean warming and consequent harmful algal blooms and domoic outbreaks; the acceleration of  
18 global warming since the mid-20th century and the continuation thereof; and about the fact that  
19 the continued increase in fossil fuel product consumption creates severe environmental threats and  
20 significant economic costs for members of the ocean-dependent economy. Reasonable consumers  
21 and policy makers have also been deceived about the depth and breadth of the state of the scientific  
22 evidence on anthropogenic climate change, and in particular, on the strength of the scientific  
23 consensus demonstrating the role of fossil fuels in causing climate change and its potentially  
24 destructive impacts.

25           **F. In Contrast to Their Public Statements, Defendants' Internal Actions**  
26           **Demonstrate Their Awareness of and Intent to Profit from the Unabated Use**  
              **of Fossil Fuel Products.**

27           143. In contrast to their public-facing efforts challenging the validity of the scientific  
28 consensus about anthropogenic climate change, Defendants' acts and omissions evidence their

1 internal acknowledgement of the reality of climate change and its likely consequences. These  
2 actions include, but are not limited to, making multi-billion-dollar infrastructure investments for  
3 their own operations that acknowledge the reality of coming anthropogenic climate-related change.  
4 These investments included (among others), raising offshore oil platforms to protect against sea  
5 level rise; reinforcing offshore oil platforms to withstand increased wave strength and storm  
6 severity; and developing and patenting designs for equipment intended to extract crude oil and/or  
7 natural gas in areas previously unreachable because of the presence of polar ice sheets.<sup>123</sup>

8 144. For example, in 1973 Exxon obtained a patent for a cargo ship capable of breaking  
9 through sea ice<sup>124</sup> and for an oil tanker<sup>125</sup> designed specifically for use in previously unreachable  
10 areas of the Arctic.

11 145. In 1974, Chevron obtained a patent for a mobile arctic drilling platform designed  
12 to withstand significant interference from lateral ice masses,<sup>126</sup> allowing for drilling in areas with  
13 increased ice floe movement due to elevated temperature.

14 146. That same year, Texaco (Chevron) worked toward obtaining a patent for a method  
15 and apparatus for reducing ice forces on a marine structure prone to being frozen in ice through  
16 natural weather conditions,<sup>127</sup> allowing for drilling in previously unreachable Arctic areas that  
17 would become seasonally accessible.

18 147. Shell obtained a patent similar to Texaco's (Chevron) in 1984.<sup>128</sup>

19 148. In 1989, Norske Shell, Royal Dutch Shell's Norwegian subsidiary, altered designs  
20 for a natural gas platform planned for construction in the North Sea to account for anticipated sea  
21

22  
23 <sup>123</sup> Amy Lieberman & Suzanne Rust, *Big Oil braced for global warming while it fought regulations*, L.A. TIMES (Dec.  
31, 2015), <http://graphics.latimes.com/oil-operations>.

24 <sup>124</sup> Patents, *Icebreaking cargo vessel*, Exxon Research Engineering Co. (Apr. 17, 1973), <https://www.google.com/patents/US3727571>.

25 <sup>125</sup> Patents, *Tanker vessel*, Exxon Research Engineering Co. (July 17, 1973), <https://www.google.com/patents/US3745960>.

26 <sup>126</sup> Patents, *Arctic offshore platform*, Chevron Research & Technology Co. (Aug. 27, 1974) <https://www.google.com/patents/US3831385>.

27 <sup>127</sup> Patents, *Mobile, arctic drilling and production platform*, Texaco Inc. (Feb. 26, 1974) <https://www.google.com/patents/US3793840>.

28 <sup>128</sup> Patents, *Arctic offshore platform*, Shell Oil Co. (Jan. 24, 1984) <https://www.google.com/patents/US4427320>.

1 level rise. Those design changes were ultimately carried out by Shell’s contractors, adding  
2 substantial costs to the project.<sup>129</sup>

3 a. The Troll field, off the Norwegian coast in the North Sea, was proven to  
4 contain large natural oil and gas deposits in 1979, shortly after Norske Shell  
5 was approved by Norwegian oil and gas regulators to operate a portion of  
6 the field.

7 b. In 1986, the Norwegian parliament granted Norske Shell authority to  
8 complete the first development phase of the Troll field gas deposits, and  
9 Norske Shell began designing the “Troll A” gas platform, with the intent to  
10 begin operation of the platform in approximately 1995. Based on the very  
11 large size of the gas deposits in the Troll field, the Troll A platform was  
12 projected to operate for approximately 70 years.

13 c. The platform was originally designed to stand approximately 100 feet above  
14 sea level—the amount necessary to stay above waves in a once-in-a-century  
15 strength storm.

16 d. In 1989, Shell engineers revised their plans to increase the above-water  
17 height of the platform by 3–6 feet, specifically to account for higher  
18 anticipated average sea levels and increased storm intensity due to global  
19 warming over the platform’s 70-year operational life.<sup>130</sup>

20 e. Shell projected that the additional 3–6 feet of above-water construction  
21 would increase the cost of the Troll A platform by as much as \$40 million.

22 **G. Defendants’ Actions Prevented the Development of Alternatives That Would**  
23 **Have Eased the Transition to a Less Fossil Fuel Dependent Economy.**

24 149. The harms and benefits of Defendants’ conduct can be balanced in part by weighing  
25 the social benefit of extracting and burning a unit of fossil fuels against the costs that a unit of fuel  
26 imposes on society, known as the “social cost of carbon” or “SCC.”

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>129</sup> *Greenhouse Effect: Shell Anticipates A Sea Change*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1989)  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/business/greenhouse-effect-shell-anticipates-a-sea-change.html>.

<sup>130</sup> *Id.*; Lieberman & Rust, *Big Oil braced for global warming while it fought regulations*, *supra* note 123.

1           150. Because climatic responses to atmospheric temperature increases are non-linear,  
2 and because greenhouse gas pollution accumulates in the atmosphere, some of which does not  
3 dissipate for potentially thousands of years (namely CO<sub>2</sub>), there is broad agreement that SCC  
4 increases as emissions rise, and as the climate warms. Relatedly, as atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> levels and  
5 surface temperature increase, the costs associated with remediating environmental injuries—such  
6 as the domoic acid outbreaks described herein—also increases. In short, each additional ton of  
7 CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere will have a greater net social cost as emissions increase, and each  
8 additional ton of CO<sub>2</sub> will have a greater net social cost as global warming accelerates.

9           151. A critical corollary of the non-linear relationship between atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>  
10 concentrations and SCC is that delayed efforts to curb those emissions have increased  
11 environmental harms and increase the magnitude and cost to remediate harms that have already  
12 occurred or are locked in by previous emissions. Therefore, Defendants’ campaign to obscure the  
13 science of climate change and to expand the extraction and use of fossil fuels greatly increased  
14 and continues to increase the harms and rate of harms suffered by Plaintiff.

15           152. The consequences of delayed action on climate change, exacerbated by Defendants’  
16 actions, has already drastically increased the cost of mitigating further harm. Had concerted action  
17 begun even as late as 2005, an annual 3.5% reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to lower atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>  
18 to 350 ppm by the year 2100 would have restored Earth’s energy balance<sup>131</sup> and halted future  
19 global warming, although such efforts would not forestall committed sea level rise already locked  
20 in.<sup>132</sup> If efforts do not begin until 2020, however, a 15% annual reduction will be required to restore  
21 Earth’s energy balance by the end of the century.<sup>133</sup> Earlier steps to reduce emissions would have  
22 led to smaller—and less disruptive—measures needed to mitigate the impacts of fossil fuel  
23 production.

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>131</sup> “Climate equilibrium” is the balance between Earth’s absorption of solar energy and its own energy radiation. Earth  
26 is currently out of equilibrium due to the influence of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, which prevent radiation of  
27 energy into space. Earth therefore warms and move back toward energy balance. Reduction of global CO<sub>2</sub>  
28 concentrations to 350 ppm is necessary to re-achieve energy balance, if the aim is to stabilize climate without further  
global warming. See James Hansen et al., *Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon  
Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature*, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 4–5 (Dec. 3, 2013).

<sup>132</sup> Hansen et al., *Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young  
People, Future Generations and Nature*, *supra* note 1310, at 10.

<sup>133</sup> *Id.*

1           153. The costs of inaction and the opportunities to confront anthropogenic climate  
2 change caused by normal consumption of their fossil fuel products, were not lost on Defendants.  
3 In a 1997 speech by John Browne, Group Executive for BP America, at Stanford University,  
4 Browne described Defendants' and the entire fossil fuel industry's responsibility and opportunities  
5 to reduce use of fossil fuel products, reduce global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and mitigate the harms  
6 associated with the use and consumption of such products:

7           A new age demands a fresh perspective of the nature of society and responsibility.  
8 We need to go beyond analysis and to take action. It is a moment for change and  
9 for a rethinking of corporate responsibility. . . .

10          [T]here is now an effective consensus among the world's leading scientists and  
11 serious and well informed people outside the scientific community that there is a  
12 discernible human influence on the climate, and a link between the concentration  
13 of carbon dioxide and the increase in temperature.

14          The prediction of the IPCC is that over the next century temperatures might rise by  
15 a further 1 to 3.5 degrees centigrade [1.8° – 6.3° F], and that sea levels might rise  
16 by between 15 and 95 centimetres [5.9 and 37.4 inches]. Some of that impact is  
17 probably unavoidable, because it results from current emissions. . . .

18          [I]t would be unwise and potentially dangerous to ignore the mounting concern.

19          The time to consider the policy dimensions of climate change is not when the link  
20 between greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven . . . but when  
21 the possibility cannot be discounted and is taken seriously by the society of which  
22 we are part. . . .

23          We [the fossil fuel industry] have a responsibility to act, and I hope that through  
24 our actions we can contribute to the much wider process which is desirable and  
25 necessary.

26          BP accepts that responsibility and we're therefore taking some specific steps.

27          To control our own emissions.

28          To fund continuing scientific research.

        To take initiatives for joint implementation.

        To develop alternative fuels for the long term.

        And to contribute to the public policy debate in search of the wider global answers  
to the problem.<sup>134</sup>

154. Despite Defendants' knowledge of the foreseeable, measurable harms associated

<sup>134</sup> John Browne, *BP Climate Change Speech to Stanford*, Climate Files (May 19, 1997),  
<http://www.climatefiles.com/bp/bp-climate-change-speech-to-stanford>.

1 with the unabated consumption and use of their fossil fuel products, and despite the existence and  
2 Defendants' knowledge of technologies and practices that could have helped to reduce the  
3 foreseeable dangers associated with their fossil fuel products, Defendants continued to market and  
4 promote heavy fossil fuel use, dramatically increasing the cost of abatement. At all relevant times,  
5 Defendants were deeply familiar with opportunities to reduce the use of their fossil fuel products,  
6 reduce global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions associated therewith, and mitigate the harms associated with the use  
7 and consumption of such products. Examples of that recognition include, but are not limited to the  
8 following:

- 9 a. In 1963, Esso (Exxon) obtained multiple patents on technologies for fuel  
10 cells, including on the design of a fuel cell and necessary electrodes,<sup>135</sup> and  
11 on a process for increasing the oxidation of a fuel, specifically methanol, to  
12 produce electricity in a fuel cell.<sup>136</sup>
- 13 b. In 1970, Esso (Exxon) obtained a patent for a “low-polluting engine and  
14 drive system” that used an interburner and air compressor to reduce  
15 pollutant emissions, including CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, from gasoline combustion  
16 engines (the system also increased the efficiency of the fossil fuel products  
17 used in such engines, thereby lowering the amount of fossil fuel product  
18 necessary to operate engines equipped with this technology).<sup>137</sup>

19 155. Defendants could have made major inroads to mitigate Plaintiff's injuries through  
20 technology by developing and employing technologies to capture and sequester greenhouse gases  
21 emissions associated with conventional use of their fossil fuel products. Defendants had  
22 knowledge dating at least back to the 1960s, and indeed, internally researched and perfected many  
23 such technologies. For instance:

24  
25  
26 <sup>135</sup> Patents, *Fuel cell and fuel cell electrodes*, Exxon Research Engineering Co. (Dec. 31, 1963),  
<https://www.google.com/patents/US3116169>.

27 <sup>136</sup> Patents, *Direct production of electrical energy from liquid fuels*, Exxon Research Engineering Co. (Dec. 3, 1963),  
<https://www.google.com/patents/US3113049>.

28 <sup>137</sup> Patents, *Low-polluting engine and drive system*, Exxon Research Engineering Co. (May 16, 1970),  
<https://www.google.com/patents/US3513929>.

- 1 a. The first patent for enhanced oil recovery technology, a process by which  
2 CO<sub>2</sub> is captured and reinjected into oil deposits, was granted to an ARCO  
3 (BP) subsidiary in 1952.<sup>138</sup> This technology could have been further  
4 developed as a carbon capture and sequestration technique;
- 5 b. Phillips Petroleum Company (ConocoPhillips) obtained a patent in 1966 for  
6 a “Method for recovering a purified component from a gas” outlining a  
7 process to remove carbon from natural gas and gasoline streams;<sup>139</sup> and
- 8 c. In 1973, Shell patented a process to remove acidic gases, including CO<sub>2</sub>,  
9 from gaseous mixtures.

10 156. Despite this knowledge, Defendants’ later forays into the alternative energy sector  
11 were largely pretenses. For instance, in 2001, Chevron developed and shared a sophisticated  
12 information management system to gather greenhouse gas emissions data from its explorations  
13 and production to help regulate and set reduction goals.<sup>140</sup> Beyond this technological breakthrough,  
14 Chevron touted “profitable renewable energy” as part of its business plan for several years and  
15 launched a 2010 advertising campaign promoting the company’s move towards renewable energy.  
16 Despite all this, Chevron rolled back its renewable and alternative energy projects in 2014.<sup>141</sup>

17 157. Similarly, ConocoPhillips’ 2012 Sustainable Development report declared  
18 developing renewable energy a priority in keeping with their position on sustainable development  
19 and climate change.<sup>142</sup> Their 10-K filing from the same year told a different story: “As an  
20 independent E&P company, we are solely focused on our core business of exploring for,  
21  
22

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23 <sup>138</sup> James P. Meyer, *Summary of Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil Recovery (CO<sub>2</sub>EOR) Injection Well Technology*,  
24 American Petroleum Institute, at 1, <http://www.api.org/~media/Files/EHS/climate-change/Summary-carbon-dioxide-enhanced-oil-recovery-well-tech.pdf>.

25 <sup>139</sup> Patents, *Method for recovering a purified component from a gas*, Phillips Petroleum Co. (Jan. 11, 1966),  
<https://www.google.com/patents/US3228874>.

26 <sup>140</sup> Chevron, *Chevron Introduces New System to Manage Energy Use* (press release) (Sept. 25, 2001),  
<https://www.chevron.com/stories/chevron-introduces-new-system-to-manage-energy-use>.

27 <sup>141</sup> Benjamin Elgin, *Chevron Dims the Lights on Green Power*, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2014),  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-29/chevron-dims-the-lights-on-renewable-energy-projects>.

28 <sup>142</sup> ConocoPhillips, *Sustainable Development* (2013) <http://www.conocophillips.com/sustainable-development/Documents/2013.11.7%201200%20Our%20Approach%20Section%20Final.pdf>.



1 developing and producing crude oil and natural gas globally.”<sup>143</sup>

2 158. Likewise, while Shell orchestrated an entire public relations campaign around  
3 energy transitions towards net zero emissions, a fine-print disclaimer in its 2016 net-zero pathways  
4 report reads: “We have no immediate plans to move to a net-zero emissions portfolio over our  
5 investment horizon of 10–20 years.”<sup>144</sup>

6 159. BP, appearing to abide by the representations Lord Browne made in his speech  
7 described in paragraph 153 above, engaged in a rebranding campaign to convey an air of  
8 environmental stewardship and renewable energy to its consumers. This included renouncing its  
9 membership in the GCC in 2007, changing its name from “British Petroleum” to “BP” while  
10 adopting the slogan “Beyond Petroleum,” and adopting a conspicuously green corporate logo.  
11 However, BP’s self-touted “alternative energy” investments during this turnaround included  
12 investments in natural gas, a fossil fuel, and in 2007 the company reinvested in Canadian tar sands,  
13 a particularly high-carbon source of oil.<sup>145</sup> The company ultimately abandoned its wind and solar  
14 assets in 2011 and 2013, respectively, and even the “Beyond Petroleum” moniker in 2013.<sup>146</sup>

15 160. After posting a \$10 billion quarterly profit, Exxon in 2005 stated that “We’re an oil  
16 and gas company. In times past, when we tried to get into other businesses, we didn’t do it well.  
17 We’d rather re-invest in what we know.”<sup>147</sup>

18 161. Even if Defendants did not adopt technological or energy source alternatives that  
19 would have reduced use of fossil fuels, reduced global greenhouse gas pollution, and/or mitigated  
20 the harms associated with the use and consumption of such products, Defendants could have taken  
21 other practical, cost-effective steps to reduce the use of their fossil fuel products, reduce global  
22 greenhouse gas pollution associated therewith, and mitigate the harms associated with the use and  
23

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24 <sup>143</sup> ConocoPhillips Form 10-K, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Webpage (Dec. 31, 2012),  
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1163165/000119312513065426/d452384d10k.htm>.

25 <sup>144</sup> *Energy Transitions Towards Net Zero Emissions*, Shell (2016), [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B\\_L1nw8WLu0Bbi1QWnJRcHIZbIE/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_L1nw8WLu0Bbi1QWnJRcHIZbIE/view) (accessed Nov. 6, 2018).

26 <sup>145</sup> Fred Pearce, *Greenwash: BP and the Myth of a World ‘Beyond Petroleum’*, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2008),  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/nov/20/fossilfuels-energy>.

27 <sup>146</sup> Javier E. David, *‘Beyond Petroleum’ No More? BP Goes Back to Basics*, CNBC (Apr. 20, 2013),  
<http://www.cnbc.com/id/100647034>.

28 <sup>147</sup> James R. Healy, *Alternate Energy Not in Cards at ExxonMobil*, USA TODAY (Oct. 28, 2005),  
[https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2005-10-27-oil-invest-usat\\_x.htm](https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2005-10-27-oil-invest-usat_x.htm).

1 consumption of such products. These alternatives could have included, among other measures:

- 2 a. Accepting scientific evidence on the validity of anthropogenic climate  
3 change and the damages it will cause people and communities, including  
4 Plaintiff, and the environment. Mere acceptance of that information would  
5 have altered the debate from *whether* to combat global warming to *how* to  
6 combat it; and avoided much of the public confusion that has ensued over  
7 nearly 30 years, since at least 1988;
- 8 b. Forthrightly communicating with Defendants' shareholders, banks,  
9 insurers, the public, regulators, and Plaintiff about the global warming and  
10 ocean temperature increase hazards of Defendants' fossil fuel products that  
11 were known to Defendants, would have enabled those groups to make  
12 material, informed decisions about whether and how to address climate  
13 change vis-à-vis Defendants' products;
- 14 c. Refraining from affirmative efforts, whether directly, through coalitions, or  
15 through front groups, to distort public debate, and to cause many consumers  
16 and business and political leaders to think the relevant science was far less  
17 certain that it actually was;
- 18 d. Sharing their internal scientific research with the public, and with other  
19 scientists and business leaders, so as to increase public understanding of the  
20 scientific underpinnings of climate change and its relation to Defendants'  
21 fossil fuel products;
- 22 e. Supporting and encouraging policies to avoid dangerous climate change,  
23 and demonstrating corporate leadership in addressing the challenges of  
24 transitioning to a low-carbon economy;
- 25 f. Prioritizing alternative sources of energy through sustained investment  
26 and research on renewable energy sources to replace dependence on  
27 Defendants' inherently hazardous fossil fuel products;

28

1 g. Adopting their shareholders' concerns about Defendants' need to protect  
2 their businesses from the inevitable consequences of profiting from their  
3 fossil fuel products. Over the period of 1990–2015, Defendants'  
4 shareholders proposed hundreds of resolutions to change Defendants'  
5 policies and business practices regarding climate change. These included  
6 increasing renewable energy investment, cutting emissions, and performing  
7 carbon risk assessments, among others.

8 162. Despite their knowledge of the foreseeable harms associated with the consumption  
9 of Defendants' fossil fuel products, and despite the existence and fossil fuel industry knowledge  
10 of opportunities that would have reduced the foreseeable dangers associated with those products,  
11 Defendants wrongfully and falsely promoted, campaigned against regulation of, and concealed the  
12 hazards of use of their fossil fuel products.

13 **H. Defendants Caused Plaintiff's Injuries**

14 163. Defendants individually and collectively extracted a substantial percentage of all  
15 raw fossil fuels extracted globally since 1965.

16 164. CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that are attributable to fossil fuels that Defendants extracted from  
17 the earth and injected into the market are responsible for a substantial percentage of greenhouse  
18 gas pollution since 1965.

19 165. Defendants' individual and collective conduct—including, but not limited to, their  
20 extraction, refining, and/or formulation of fossil fuel products; their introduction of fossil fuel  
21 products into the stream of commerce; their wrongful promotion of their fossil fuel products and  
22 concealment of known hazards associated with use of those products; and their failure to pursue  
23 less hazardous alternatives available to them—is a substantial factor in causing the increase in  
24 global mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, marine toxin  
25 outbreaks, and related injuries, among other consequences.

26 166. Defendants have actually and proximately caused the increase in mean sea surface  
27 temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and domoic acid outbreaks; and the  
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1 consequent social and economic injuries associated with those physical and environmental  
2 impacts, which are the causes of Plaintiff's injuries and damages as described herein.

3 167. Plaintiff has already incurred, and will foreseeably continue to incur, injuries and  
4 damages because of domoic acid outbreaks caused by Defendants' conduct.

5 168. California's commercial Dungeness crab fishery is seasonal and normally runs for  
6 eight months (from November 15 to June 15 south of the Sonoma/Mendocino County line and  
7 from December 1 to July 1 north of that line to the California/Oregon border). In Oregon, the  
8 season runs from December 1 to August 14 under normal conditions. The early part of crab season  
9 is by far the most productive because at that time there are the most crabs on the crab grounds, the  
10 crabs' meat content (the ratio of meat weight to total weight) is at its highest, and the demand for  
11 crab spikes around the Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year and Lunar New Year holidays, and  
12 the Super Bowl.

13 169. As a precaution to avoid poisoning humans with domoic acid, the State of  
14 California delayed opening the Dungeness crab season at the beginning of the 2015–16 and 2016–  
15 17 commercial seasons, and will delay the beginning of the 2018–19 season:

- 16 a. In 2015–16, the fishery south of the Sonoma/Mendocino County line  
17 opened approximately four-and-a-half months late; the fishery north of the  
18 Sonoma/Mendocino County line did not fully open until nearly six months  
19 after the normal opening date;
- 20 b. In 2016–17, the fishery opened piecemeal, with a large section of the  
21 southern management area and a portion of the northern management area  
22 from the Oregon border to Redwood Creek opening on time, and six distinct  
23 areas north of Point Reyes in Marin County opening either on time, or with  
24 a delay in the range of 18 days to one-and-a-half months.
- 25 c. The area from Bodega Head to the Sonoma/Mendocino County line will be  
26 closed to commercial crabbing indefinitely; the season will not open as  
27 scheduled on November 15, 2018. Sampling farther north has shown that  
28 crabs at fishing grounds accessible from ports in Crescent City and

1                   Trinidad, in Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, have levels of domoic acid  
2                   that exceed the action threshold.

3           170.   As a precaution to avoid poisoning humans with domoic acid, the State of Oregon  
4 delayed the opening of the Dungeness crab season at the beginning of the 2015–16, 2016–17,  
5 and 2017–18 commercial Dungeness crab seasons:

6                   a.    In 2015–16, the entire coast of Oregon was closed to commercial crabbing  
7                   until nearly five weeks after the normal season opening date.

8                   b.    In 2016–17, the commercial crabbing season was delayed by approximately  
9                   one month. After being open for approximately one month, the season was  
10                  interrupted when domoic acid was again identified in crab at levels  
11                  exceeding the action threshold. In response, ODFW and ODA curtailed the  
12                  fishery in several ways, including by closing large areas of the ocean to  
13                  crabbing and by issuing mandatory evisceration orders, which prohibit crab  
14                  wholesalers from purveying live crabs or any crab product containing the  
15                  crab viscera.

16                  c.    In 2017–18, the statewide commercial crab season was again delayed over  
17                  six weeks in response to domoic acid contamination. ODFW and ODA also  
18                  imposed mandatory evisceration orders for certain times and areas.

19                  d.    As of this writing, the 2018 Oregon recreational crab fishery (which  
20                  operates on a different schedule than the commercial fishery) is closed from  
21                  Cape Blanco to the Oregon/California border due to high levels of domoic  
22                  acid in crab.

23           171.   Additional domoic acid-induced Dungeness crab fishery closures will occur in the  
24 future, with increasing frequency and severity, and with concomitant impacts on and injuries to  
25 Plaintiff and west coast fishing families, communities and businesses.

26           172.   Due to domoic acid contamination and the resultant crab fishery closures,  
27 commercial fishermen were deprived of valuable opportunities to fish for Dungeness crab during  
28 substantial portions of the 2015–16, 2016–17, and 2017–18 crab seasons, and will be deprived of

1 crabbing opportunities in the 2018–19 crab season and future seasons. Fishermen and fishery-  
2 dependent businesses, including Plaintiff, were therefore deprived of a substantial portion of their  
3 annual revenue from the Dungeness crab fishery for those seasons, and many suffered additional  
4 financial injuries by incurring debt to pay for operating and living expenses during the closures.  
5 Fishermen and fishery-dependent businesses, including Plaintiff, will continue to suffer such  
6 injuries during future domoic acid-induced fishery closures.

7 173. Because fisheries are seasonal, fishermen often pursue multiple different fisheries  
8 throughout the year. The delayed opening of the crab fishery in 2015–16, 2016–17, and 2017–18,  
9 caused many fishermen, including Plaintiff, to delay their entry into other fisheries they would  
10 normally have pursued earlier, including salmon, coonstripe shrimp, albacore, and others. Because  
11 those other fisheries are open only for limited portions of the calendar year, those fishermen were  
12 deprived of valuable fishing opportunities, thereby diminishing their earnings in those fisheries.  
13 Fishermen and fishery-dependent businesses, including Plaintiff, were therefore deprived of a  
14 substantial portion of their annual revenue from those other fisheries during years impacted by  
15 domoic acid-induced crab fishery closures, and will continue to suffer such injuries during future  
16 domoic acid-induced fishery closures.

17 174. Onshore crab wholesalers and processors, including Plaintiff, were deprived of a  
18 substantial portion of their annual revenue during the 2015–16, 2016–17, and 2017–18 crab  
19 seasons, and will continue to suffer such injuries during future domoic acid-induced fishery  
20 closures. That revenue substantially depends on the supply of Dungeness crab and other species  
21 harvested by commercial fishermen, which were not available due to the crab fishery delays that  
22 curtailed and will continue to curtail fishing opportunity.

23 175. The market for crab products, including Plaintiff's, was and during future crab  
24 seasons will be artificially depressed because of the stigma that Plaintiff's crab products were and  
25 are unsafe for human consumption, which adversely affects Plaintiff and its members. That  
26 depressed market has caused Plaintiff and its members a substantial loss of income, and will  
27 continue to do so as long as domoic acid outbreaks threaten the crab fishery.

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1 176. Due to domoic acid contamination and the resultant past and future fishery closures,  
2 Plaintiff and west coast fishing families, communities, and businesses have suffered and will  
3 continue to suffer other harms beyond direct economic harms, including, but not limited to, the  
4 loss of the iconic west coast commercial fishing lifestyle, loss of a regional commercial fishing  
5 culture and identity, and loss of public confidence in the safety and quality of west coast Dungeness  
6 crab products and the fishery itself.

7 177. Defendants' conduct as described herein is therefore an actual, substantial, and  
8 proximate cause of Plaintiff's domoic acid-related injuries.

9 178. Future injuries arising out of domoic acid contamination in the crab fishery are  
10 abatable. Examples of technologies that could be used to prevent or mitigate to Plaintiff and the  
11 crab industry include, but are not limited to, monitoring and testing technologies that could permit  
12 real-time domoic acid testing, which would permit fishermen to separate contaminated crabs from  
13 clean ones at the time of harvest, thereby assuaging the public health concerns that currently induce  
14 fishery closures;<sup>148</sup> or "depuration," the process by which crabs in an environment and food free  
15 of domoic acid will naturally rid themselves of domoic acid.<sup>149</sup> Given large enough depuration  
16 facilities, commercially harvested crabs could be depurated on an industrial scale, and thereafter  
17 brought to market even if they contain domoic acid at the time of harvest.

18 **VI. CAUSES OF ACTION**

19 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

20 **(Nuisance)**

21 **(Against All Defendants)**

22 179. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above, as  
23 though set forth herein in full.

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25 <sup>148</sup> See, e.g., Nat'l Ctrs. For Coastal Ocean Science, "Fast Tool to Detect Toxic Shellfish" (2017) (announcing  
26 development of an antibody-based test kit for domoic acid that provides quick results),  
27 <https://coastalscience.noaa.gov/project/fast-tool-detect-toxic-shellfish>; Nat'l Science & Tech. Council Subcommittee  
28 on Ocean Science & Tech., *Harmful Algal Blooms and Hypoxia – Comprehensive Research Plan and Action Strategy; An Interagency Report* (Feb. 2016), <http://www.whoi.edu/fileserver.do?id=230904&pt=10&p=19132> (discussing how development of a toxin test-kit enabled fishermen to determine when and where clams were safe to harvest, re-enabling access to valuable shellfish resources).

<sup>149</sup> See, e.g., J.A.K. Lund, et al., *Domoic acid uptake and depuration in dungeness crab (Cancer magister Dana 1852)*, 16 JOURNAL OF SHELLFISH RESEARCH 225 (1997).

1           180. Defendants, and each of them, by their acts and omissions, created a condition and  
2 permitted that condition to persist, which constitutes a nuisance in the form of increased mean sea  
3 surface temperature and intense marine heatwaves, which caused recurring *Pseudo-nitzschia* algal  
4 blooms unprecedented in their range and toxicity, which caused and will continue to cause domoic  
5 acid to contaminate Dungeness crabs at potentially dangerous concentrations, all of which resulted  
6 in past injuries and will cause future injuries to Plaintiff.

7           181. The condition created by Defendants substantially and negatively affects the  
8 interests of the public at large. In particular, increased mean sea surface temperature, marine  
9 heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and domoic acid contamination: (1) are harmful and dangerous  
10 to human health; (2) are indecent and offensive to the senses of the ordinary person; and  
11 (3) obstruct and threaten to obstruct the free use of natural resources held in the public trust, so as  
12 to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property.

13           182. The condition created by Defendants affected, and will continue to affect, Plaintiff,  
14 because the economic impacts of fishery closures cascaded to impact entire fishery-dependent  
15 communities and businesses, and because the public was deprived of safe, local, and sustainable  
16 seafood.

17           183. The seriousness of the harms to Plaintiff caused by increased mean sea surface  
18 temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and domoic acid contamination are  
19 extremely grave, and outweigh the public benefit of Defendants' wrongful over-marketing and  
20 overpromotion of their dangerous fossil fuel products with knowledge of the harm that would  
21 result, and their long-standing efforts to sow doubt about the science surrounding the effects of  
22 their products on the world's climate and oceans, and campaigns to avoid regulation. The  
23 seriousness of the harm to Plaintiff outweighs the public benefit of Defendants' and each of their  
24 conduct, because

- 25           a. the interference with natural resources held in the public trust are expected  
26 to become regular, recurrent, and increasingly severe, so as to become a  
27 permanent ecological feature of the crab fishery;



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- b. the nature of the harm is the deprivation of the right to use and enjoy natural resources held in the public trust, as well as potential physical injury to consumers, rather than mere annoyance;
- c. the interference borne by Plaintiff is the deprivation of the right to obtain and use natural resources held in the public trust, deprivation of the right to use commercial fishing privileges, the loss of normal and expected revenue from the use of those resources and privileges, and the deprivation of a livelihood that depends on those resources;
- d. The natural resources contaminated with domoic acid as a direct consequence of Defendants’ conduct are not suitable for such contamination because those resources are consumed by humans and other organisms;
- e. the burden on Plaintiff to mitigate and prevent the interference with the natural resources held in the public trust, fishing privileges, and the right to use and enjoy those resources and privileges to pursue fishing community livelihoods, is significant and severe, as costs associated with preventing such interference or contamination are prohibitive;
- f. the social benefit of placing fossil fuels into the stream of commerce, if any, is outweighed by the availability of other sources of energy that could have been placed into the stream of commerce that would not have caused increased mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and domoic acid contamination; Defendants, and each of them, knew of the external costs of placing their fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce, and rather than striving to mitigate those externalities, instead acted affirmatively to obscure them from public consciousness; and Defendants’ over-promotion and over-marketing of their products with knowledge of the harm that would result, and their long-standing efforts to sow doubt about the science surrounding the effects of their products on the

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world’s climate and oceans, and campaigns to avoid regulation, have no social utility;

g. the social cost of each ton of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere increases as total global emissions increase, so that unchecked extraction and consumption of fossil fuel products is more harmful and costly than moderated extraction and consumption; and

h. it was practical for Defendants, and each of them, in light of their extensive knowledge of the hazards of placing fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce and extensive scientific engineering expertise, to develop better technologies and to pursue and adopt known, practical, and available technologies, energy sources, and business practices that would have mitigated their greenhouse gas pollution and eased the transition to a lower carbon economy.

184. In addition to the harms suffered by the public at large, Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, special injuries that are different in kind. Among other harms, Plaintiff suffered economic losses due to the prohibition on harvesting and transacting in Dungeness crabs, which constitute a substantial and significant portion of Plaintiff’s revenue. Additionally, the markets for Plaintiff’s products were artificially depressed because of public health concerns over the potential presence of domoic acid in those products. The public at large has not suffered the same deprivation of a livelihood as has Plaintiff.

185. Defendants’ wrongful conduct was oppressive, malicious, and fraudulent, in that their conduct was willful, intentional, and in conscious disregard for the rights of others. Defendants’ conduct was so vile, base, and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by reasonable people, justifying an award of punitive and exemplary damages in an amount subject to proof at trial, and justifying equitable disgorgement of all profits Defendants obtained through their unlawful and outrageous conduct.

186. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, as set forth above, Plaintiff has been unreasonably interfered with because Defendants knew or should have known that their

1 conduct would create a continuing problem with long-lasting significant negative effects on the  
2 rights of the public.

3 187. Defendants' actions are a direct and legal cause of the public nuisance.

4 188. Defendants' acts and omissions as alleged herein are substantial and indivisible  
5 causes of Plaintiff's injuries and damages as alleged herein.

6 189. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and other appropriate relief for the foregoing  
7 public nuisance.

8 190. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

9 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

10 **(Strict Liability – Failure to Warn)**

11 **(Against All Defendants)**

12 191. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above, as  
13 though set forth herein in full.

14 192. Defendants, and each of them, extracted raw fossil fuel products, including crude  
15 oil, coal, and natural gas from the earth, and placed those fossil fuel products into the stream of  
16 commerce.

17 193. Defendants, and each of them, extracted, refined, formulated, designed, packaged,  
18 distributed, tested, constructed, fabricated, analyzed, recommended, merchandised, advertised,  
19 promoted and/or sold fossil fuel products, which were intended by Defendants, and each of them,  
20 to be burned for energy, refined into petrochemicals, and refined and/or incorporated into  
21 petrochemical products including fuels and plastics.

22 194. Defendants, and each of them, heavily marketed, promoted, and advertised fossil  
23 fuel products and their derivatives, which were sold or used by their respective affiliates and  
24 subsidiaries. Defendants received direct financial benefit from their affiliates' and subsidiaries'  
25 sales of fossil fuel products. Defendants' role as promoter and marketer was integral to their  
26 respective businesses and a necessary factor in bringing fossil fuel products and their derivatives  
27 to the consumer market, such that Defendants had control over, and a substantial ability to  
28 influence, the manufacturing and distribution processes of their affiliates and subsidiaries.

1           195. Throughout the times at issue, Defendants individually and collectively knew or  
2 should have known, in light of the scientific knowledge generally accepted at the time, that fossil  
3 fuel products, whether used as intended or misused in a foreseeable manner, release greenhouse  
4 gases into the atmosphere that inevitably cause *inter alia* global warming, increased mean sea  
5 surface temperature, marine heatwaves, and harmful algal blooms with a capacity for producing  
6 marine toxins.

7           196. Throughout the times at issue and continuing today, fossil fuel products presented  
8 and still present a substantial risk of injury to Plaintiff through the climate and ocean temperature  
9 effects described above, whether used as intended or misused in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

10           197. Throughout the times at issue, the ordinary consumer would not recognize that the  
11 use or foreseeable misuse of fossil fuel products causes global and localized changes in climate  
12 and the world's oceans, including those effects described herein.

13           198. Throughout the times at issue, Defendants individually and in concert widely  
14 disseminated marketing materials, refuted the generally accepted scientific knowledge at the time,  
15 and advanced pseudo-scientific theories of their own, and developed public relations campaigns  
16 and materials that prevented reasonable consumers from recognizing the risk that fossil fuel  
17 products would cause grave climate changes, including those described herein.

18           199. Defendants, and each of them, failed to adequately warn customers, consumers,  
19 elected officials and regulators of known and foreseeable risk of climate change and the  
20 consequences that inevitably follow from the normal, intended use and foreseeable misuse of  
21 Defendants' fossil fuel products.

22           200. Defendants' wrongful conduct was oppressive, malicious, and fraudulent, in that  
23 their conduct was willful, intentional, and in conscious disregard for the rights of others.  
24 Defendants' conduct was so vile, base, and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and  
25 despised by reasonable people, justifying an award of punitive and exemplary damages in an  
26 amount subject to proof at trial, and justifying equitable disgorgement of all profits Defendants  
27 obtained through their unlawful and outrageous conduct.

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1           201. As a direct and proximate result of the defects previously described, fossil fuel  
2 products caused and will continue to cause Plaintiff to sustain the injuries and damages set forth  
3 in this Complaint, including economic loss, damage to natural resources held in the public trust,  
4 deprivation of the right to use fishing privileges, and the creation and maintenance of a nuisance  
5 that interferes with the rights of Plaintiff and commercial fishery-dependent communities along  
6 the west coast.

7           202. Defendants' acts and omissions as alleged herein are indivisible causes of  
8 Plaintiff's injuries and damages as alleged herein.

9           203. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and other appropriate relief for the foregoing  
10 failure to warn of product defects.

11           204. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

12   **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

13   **(Strict Liability – Design Defect)**

14   **(Against All Defendants)**

15           205. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above, as  
16 though set forth herein in full.

17           206. Defendants, and each of them, extracted raw fossil fuel products, including crude  
18 oil, coal, and natural gas from the earth and placed those fossil fuel products into the stream of  
19 commerce.

20           207. Defendants, and each of them, extracted, refined, formulated, designed, packaged,  
21 distributed, tested, constructed, fabricated, analyzed, recommended, merchandised, advertised,  
22 promoted and/or sold fossil fuel products, which were intended by Defendants, and each of them,  
23 to be burned for energy, refined into petrochemicals, and refined and/or incorporated into  
24 petrochemical products including but not limited to fuels and plastics.

25           208. Defendants, and each of them, heavily marketed, promoted, and advertised fossil  
26 fuel products and their derivatives, which were sold or used by their respective affiliates and  
27 subsidiaries. Defendants' received direct financial benefit from their affiliates' and subsidiaries'  
28 sales of fossil fuel products. Defendants role as promoter and marketer was integral to their

1 respective businesses and a necessary factor in bringing fossil fuel products and their derivatives  
2 to the consumer market, such that Defendants had control over, and a substantial ability to  
3 influence, the manufacturing and distribution processes of their affiliates and subsidiaries.

4 209. Throughout the time at issue, fossil fuel products have not performed as safely as  
5 an ordinary consumer would expect them to because greenhouse gas emissions from their use  
6 cause numerous global and local changes to Earth's climate. In particular, ordinary consumers did  
7 not expect that:

- 8 a. fossil fuel products are the primary cause of global warming since the dawn  
9 of the industrial revolution, and by far the primary cause of global warming  
10 acceleration in the 20th and 21st centuries;
- 11 b. fossil fuel products would cause increase mean sea surface temperature;
- 12 c. fossil fuel products would cause increased frequency and intensity of  
13 marine heatwaves;
- 14 d. unmitigated use of fossil fuel products causes increased frequency and  
15 intensity of harmful algal blooms;
- 16 e. fossil fuel products cause increased frequency and intensity of marine toxin  
17 outbreaks and contamination of natural resources held in the public trust,  
18 including Dungeness crabs, necessitating commercial fishery closures and  
19 concordant economic injuries;
- 20 f. the social cost of each ton of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere increases as  
21 total global emissions increase, so that unchecked extraction and  
22 consumption of fossil fuel products is more harmful and costly than  
23 moderated extraction and consumption; and
- 24 g. for these reasons and others, the unmitigated use of fossil fuel products  
25 present significant threats to the environment and human health and  
26 welfare, especially to coastal and ocean-dependent communities.

27 210. Throughout the times at issue, Defendants individually and in concert widely  
28 disseminated marketing materials, refuted the generally accepted scientific knowledge at the time,

1 advanced pseudo-scientific theories of their own, and developed public relations materials, among  
2 other public messaging efforts, that prevented reasonable consumers from forming an expectation  
3 that fossil fuel products would cause grave climate changes, including those described herein.

4 211. Additionally, and in the alternative, Defendants' fossil fuel products are defective  
5 because the risks they pose to consumers and to the public, including and especially to Plaintiff,  
6 outweigh their benefits.

7 a. The gravity of the potential harms caused by fossil fuel products is extreme;  
8 global warming and its attendant consequences are guaranteed to occur  
9 following the use or foreseeable misuse of fossil fuel products because fossil  
10 fuel products inherently release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere; and  
11 global warming would continue to occur for decades even if all greenhouse  
12 gas emissions ceased.

13 b. The social benefit of the purpose of placing fossil fuels into the stream of  
14 commerce is overshadowed by the availability of other sources of energy  
15 that could have been placed into the stream of commerce that would not  
16 have caused increased mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves,  
17 harmful algal blooms, and marine toxin outbreaks, and accordingly  
18 Plaintiff's injuries; Defendants, and each of them, knew of the external costs  
19 of placing their fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce, and rather  
20 than striving to mitigate those externalities, instead acted affirmatively to  
21 obscure them from public consciousness.

22 c. Defendants' campaign of disinformation regarding global warming and the  
23 climatic effects of fossil fuel products prevented customers, consumers,  
24 regulators, and the general public from taking steps to mitigate the  
25 inevitable consequences of fossil fuel consumption, and incorporating those  
26 consequences into either short-term decisions or long-term planning.

27 d. The cost to society of each ton of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere increases  
28 as total global emissions increase so that unchecked extraction and

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consumption of fossil fuel products is more harmful and costly than moderated extraction and consumption.

e. It was practical for Defendants, and each of them, in light of their extensive knowledge of the hazards of placing fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce, to pursue and adopt known, practical, and available technologies, energy sources, and business practices that would have mitigated their greenhouse gas pollution and eased the transition to a lower carbon economy, reduced global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and mitigated the harms associated with the use and consumption of such products.

212. Defendants' individual and aggregate fossil fuel products were used in a manner for which they were intended to be used, or misused in a manner foreseeable to Defendants and each of them, by individual and corporate consumers, the result of which was the addition of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to the global atmosphere with attendant global and local consequences.

213. As a direct and proximate result of the defects in fossil fuel products described herein, Plaintiff sustained and will continue to sustain the injuries and damages set forth in this Complaint, including, but not limited to, economic losses due to commercial fishery closures.

214. Defendants' wrongful conduct was oppressive, malicious, and fraudulent, in that their conduct was willful, intentional, and in conscious disregard for the rights of others. Defendants' conduct was so vile, base, and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by reasonable people, justifying an award of punitive and exemplary damages in an amount subject to proof at trial, and justifying equitable disgorgement of all profits Defendants obtained through their unlawful and outrageous conduct.

215. Defendants' acts and omissions as alleged herein are indivisible causes of Plaintiff's injuries and damages as alleged herein.

216. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and other appropriate relief for the foregoing design defects.

217. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.



1 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

2 **(Negligence)**

3 **(Against All Defendants)**

4 218. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above, as  
5 though set forth herein in full.

6 219. Defendants knew or should have known of the climate effects inherently caused by  
7 the normal use and operation of their fossil fuel products, including the likelihood and likely  
8 severity of increased mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and  
9 marine toxin outbreaks, and including Plaintiff's injuries and damages alleged herein.

10 220. Defendants, collectively and individually, had a duty to use due care in developing,  
11 designing, testing, inspecting and distributing their fossil fuel products. That duty obligated  
12 Defendants collectively and individually to, *inter alia*, prevent defective products from entering  
13 the stream of commerce, and prevent reasonably foreseeable harm that could have resulted from  
14 the ordinary use or reasonably foreseeable misuse of Defendants' products.

15 221. Defendants, and each of them, breached their duty of due care by, *inter alia*:

- 16 a. allowing fossil fuel products to enter the stream of commerce, despite  
17 knowing them to be defective due to their inevitable propensity to cause  
18 increased mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal  
19 blooms, marine toxin outbreaks, and related injuries;
- 20 b. failing to act on the information and warnings they received from their own  
21 internal research staff, as well as from the international scientific  
22 community, that the unabated extraction, promotion and sale of their fossil  
23 fuel products would result in material dangers to the public, including to  
24 Plaintiff;
- 25 c. failing to take actions including but not limited to pursuing and adopting  
26 known, practical, and available technologies, energy sources, and business  
27 practices that would have mitigated their greenhouse gas pollution and  
28 eased the transition to a lower carbon economy; shifting to non-fossil fuel

1 products, and researching and/or offering technologies to mitigate CO<sub>2</sub>  
2 emissions in conjunction with sale and distribution of their fossil fuel  
3 products; and pursuing other available alternatives that would have  
4 prevented or mitigated the injuries to Plaintiff caused by increased mean sea  
5 surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, and marine  
6 toxin outbreaks that Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have  
7 foreseen would inevitably result from use of Defendants' fossil fuel  
8 products;

9 d. engaging in a campaign of disinformation regarding global warming and  
10 the climatic effects of fossil fuel products that prevented customers,  
11 consumers, regulators, and the general public from staking steps to mitigate  
12 the inevitable consequences of fossil fuel consumption, and incorporating  
13 those consequences into either short-term decisions or long-term planning.

14 222. Defendants' individual and collective acts and omissions were actual, substantial  
15 causes of increased mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms,  
16 marine toxin outbreaks, and related consequences, including Plaintiff's injuries and damages set  
17 forth herein, because the oceanographic conditions that caused Plaintiff's injuries would not have  
18 happened, or would not have reached expanse and toxicity that they did, but for Defendants'  
19 introduction of their fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce.

20 223. Defendants' individual and collective acts and omissions were proximate causes of  
21 increased mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, marine toxin  
22 outbreaks, and their consequences, including Plaintiff's injuries and damages set forth herein. No  
23 other act, omission, or natural phenomenon intervened in the chain of causation between  
24 Defendants' conduct and Plaintiff's injuries and damages, or superseded Defendants' breach of  
25 their duties' substantiality in causing Plaintiff's injuries and damages.

26 224. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' and each of their acts and  
27 omissions, Plaintiff sustained and will continue to sustain injuries and damages as set forth herein.

28

1           225. Defendants' acts and omissions as alleged herein are indivisible causes of  
2 Plaintiff's injuries and damages as alleged herein.

3           226. Defendants' wrongful conduct was oppressive, malicious, and fraudulent, in that  
4 their conduct was willful, intentional, and in conscious disregard for the rights of others.  
5 Defendants' conduct was so vile, base, and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and  
6 despised by reasonable people, justifying an award of punitive and exemplary damages in an  
7 amount subject to proof at trial, and justifying equitable disgorgement of all profits Defendants  
8 obtained through their unlawful and outrageous conduct.

9           227. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and other appropriate relief for the foregoing  
10 negligent conduct.

11           228. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

12   **FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

13   **(Negligence – Failure to Warn)**

14   **(Against All Defendants)**

15           229. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above, as  
16 though set forth herein in full.

17           230. Defendants knew or should have known, based on information passed to them from  
18 their internal research divisions and affiliates and/or from the international scientific community,  
19 of the climate effects inherently caused by the normal use and operation of their fossil fuel  
20 products, including global warming, and the likely increases in frequency and severity of increased  
21 mean sea surface temperature, marine heatwaves, harmful algal blooms, marine toxin outbreaks,  
22 and the consequences of those phenomena, including Plaintiff's injuries and damages described  
23 herein.

24           231. Defendants knew or should have known, based on information passed to them from  
25 their internal research divisions and affiliates and/or from the international scientific community,  
26 that the climate effects described above rendered their fossil fuel products dangerous, or likely to  
27 be dangerous, when used as intended or misused in a reasonably foreseeable manner.  
28

1           232. Throughout the times at issue, Defendants failed to adequately warn any consumers  
2 or any other party of the climate effects that inevitably flow from the use or foreseeable misuse of  
3 their fossil fuel products.

4           233. Throughout the times at issue, Defendants individually and in concert widely  
5 disseminated marketing materials, refuted the generally accepted scientific knowledge at the time,  
6 advanced pseudo-scientific theories of their own, and developed public relations materials that  
7 prevented reasonable consumers from recognizing the risk that fossil fuel products would cause  
8 grave climate changes, undermining and rendering ineffective any warnings that Defendants may  
9 have also disseminated.

10           234. Given the grave dangers presented by the climate effects that inevitably flow from  
11 the normal use or foreseeable misuse of fossil fuel products, a reasonable extractor, manufacturer,  
12 formulator, seller, or other participant responsible for introducing fossil fuel products into the  
13 stream of commerce, would have warned of those known, inevitable climate effects.

14           235. Defendants' conduct was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and a  
15 substantial factor in the harms suffered by Plaintiff as described in this Complaint.

16           236. Defendants' acts and omissions as alleged herein are indivisible causes of  
17 Plaintiff's injuries and damages as alleged herein.

18           237. Defendants' wrongful conduct was oppressive, malicious, and fraudulent, in that  
19 their conduct was willful, intentional, and in conscious disregard for the rights of others.  
20 Defendants' conduct was so vile, base, and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and  
21 despised by reasonable people, justifying an award of punitive and exemplary damages in an  
22 amount subject to proof at trial, and justifying equitable disgorgement of all profits Defendants  
23 obtained through their unlawful and outrageous conduct.

24           238. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and other appropriate relief for the foregoing  
25 negligent failure to warn.

26           239. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.  
27  
28

1 **VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:

- 3 1. Compensatory damages in an amount according to proof;  
4 2. Equitable relief, including abatement of the nuisance described herein;  
5 3. Reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5

6 or otherwise;

- 7 4. Punitive damages;  
8 5. Disgorgement of profits;  
9 6. Costs of suit; and  
10 7. For such and other relief as the court may deem proper.

11  
12 Dated: November 14, 2018

**SHER EDLING LLP**

13  
14 By: 

15 VICTOR M. SHER  
16 MATTHEW K. EDLING  
17 TIMOTHY R. SLOANE  
18 KATIE H. JONES  
19 MARTIN D. QUIÑONES  
20 MEREDITH S. WILENSKY

21  
22 *Attorneys for Pacific Coast Federation of*  
23 *Fishermen's Associations Inc.*


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**VIII. JURY DEMAND**

Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues so triable.

Dated: November 14, 2018

**SHER EDLING LLP**

By:   
VICTOR M. SHER  
MATTHEW K. EDLING  
TIMOTHY R. SLOANE  
KATIE H. JONES  
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