

# S1 Supporting Information

Know Your Neighbor:

The Impact of Social Context on Fairness Behavior

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## Appendix. Related Studies

The table below presents an overview of the fifteen most cited ultimatum game studies in descending order. Based on the search term in Google Scholar “ultimatum game”. Accessed: January 14, 2018. [1] and [2] are among the most highly-cited studies but are meta-studies and do not conduct an original ultimatum game experiment. We have therefore left them out of the table.

Table 1: Studies Using the Ultimatum Game

Study	Type	Sender	Receiver	Sample	Participants	Cites
This study	LF	R	R	K	Rural villagers in Sierra Leone	NA
Charness et al. [3]	L	A	A	U	Students at Pompeu Fabra and Berkeley	3,304
Henrich et al. [? ]	LF	A	A	K	Members of small-scale societies	2,520
Forsythe et al. [? ]	L	A	A	U	Students at University of Iowa	2,090
Falk et al. [4]	L	A	A	U	Unknown	796
Cameron [5]	L	A	A	U	Students in Indonesia	700
Henrich [6]	LF	A	A	K	Small-scale society members and UCLA students	623
Hoffman et al. [7]	L	A	A	U	Subjects at University of Arizona	482
Kagel et al. [8]	L	A	A	U	Undergraduate students	467
Gale et al. [9]	L	A	A	U	Unknown	428
Charness et al. [10]	L	R	A	U	Participants from two universities	412
Bornstein et al. [11]	L	A	A	U	Male students	356
Solnick [12]	L	A	A	U	Students at University of Pennsylvania	354
Solnick et al. [13]	L	R	R	U	Students from two universities	344
Ruffle et al. [14]	L	A	A	U	Subjects recruited via Princeton University	256
Croson [15]	L	A	A	U	Students at Harvard University	219

Column ‘Type’, “L” indicates laboratory games, whereas “LF” are lab-in-the-field experiments. ‘Sender’ and ‘Receiver’, “A” (“R”) indicates whether the player is anonymous (revealed) towards the other player. Finally, ‘Sample’ indicates if the players are known to each other (“K”), or not (“U”).

## Appendix. Experimental Text

The table below presents the text that was given to the players *verbatim*, after discussing the rules of the ultimatum game.

Table 2: Text by Experimental Condition and Player Type

Condition	Text to Sender	Text to Receiver
AA	“You are a sender. You have 5,000 Le, and you must decide how much to offer your receiver. You can offer any amount from 0 to 5,000 Le. We will NEVER tell you the name of your receiver. We will NEVER tell the receiver your name either. How much do you want to offer the receiver?”	“You are a receiver. You are matched with a sender in your village who could have offered you any amount between 0 and 5,000 Le. You have to decide to accept or reject the offer. We will NEVER tell you the name of your sender. We will NEVER tell the sender your name either. You received an offer of [...] Le. Do you accept or reject the offer?”
AR	“You are a sender. You have 5,000 Le, and you must decide how much to offer your receiver. You can offer any amount from 0 to 5,000 Le. Your receiver is [give the name of the household representative from the household this sender is matched with]. We will NEVER tell the receiver your name. How much do you want to offer the receiver?”	“You are a receiver. You are matched with a sender in your village who could have offered you any amount between 0 and 5,000 Le. You have to decide to accept or reject the offer. We will NEVER tell you the name of your sender. We DID tell the sender your name. You received an offer of [...] Le. Do you accept or reject the offer?”
RA	“You are a sender. You have 5,000 Le, and you must decide how much to offer your receiver. You can offer any amount from 0 to 5,000 Le. We will NEVER tell you the name of your receiver. We WILL tell the receiver your name. How much do you want to offer the receiver?”	“You are a receiver. You are matched with a sender in your village who could have offered you any amount between 0 and 5,000 Le. You have to decide to accept or reject the offer. Your sender is [give the name of the household representative from the household this receiver is matched with]. We will NEVER tell the sender your name. You received an offer of [...] Le. Do you accept or reject the offer?”
RR	“You are a sender. You have 5,000 Le, and you must decide how much to offer your receiver. You can offer any amount from 0 to 5,000 Le. Your receiver is [give the name of the household representative from the household this sender is matched with]. We WILL tell the receiver your name as well. How much do you want to offer the receiver?”	“You are a receiver. You are matched with a sender in your village who could have offered you any amount between 0 and 10,000 Le. You have to decide to accept or reject the offer. Your sender is [give the name of the household representative from the household this receiver is matched with]. We DID tell the sender your name as well. You received an offer of [...] Le. Do you accept or reject the offer?”

## Appendix. Balance

The table below lists the average for each variable for all conditions combined and the four different variations, and the difference between them.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Test

Variable	All (sd)	AA (sd)	AR (sd)	RA (sd)	RR (sd)	AA-AR (se)	AA-RA (se)	AA-RR (se)	AR-RA (se)	AR-RR (se)	RA-RA (se)
<i>Sender</i>											
Age	42.59 (15.05)	43.06 (13.44)	44.87 (17.53)	44.46 (16.15)	37.53 (13.85)	-1.80 (2.94)	-1.40 (2.15)	5.53** (2.45)	0.41 (3.71)	7.33** (2.98)	6.93** (3.01)
Male	0.81 (0.39)	0.86 (0.35)	0.78 (0.42)	0.78 (0.42)	0.77 (0.42)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)
# HH members	5.91 (2.85)	5.97 (2.67)	5.93 (2.93)	5.90 (2.94)	5.79 (3.13)	0.03 (0.51)	0.06 (0.44)	0.18 (0.55)	0.03 (0.56)	0.15 (0.46)	0.12 (0.55)
Potential chief	0.45 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.46 (0.50)	0.42 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Years in village	17.87 (17.02)	17.13 (16.68)	19.40 (15.30)	20.91 (21.42)	15.53 (14.10)	-2.28 (2.69)	-3.79 (3.29)	1.6 (2.61)	-1.51 (2.80)	3.88* (2.04)	5.39 (3.25)
Mende	0.88 (0.32)	0.84 (0.37)	0.90 (0.30)	0.90 (0.30)	0.94 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.10** (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)
Muslim	0.96 (0.20)	0.94 (0.24)	0.97 (0.18)	0.95 (0.21)	1.00 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)
<i>Receiver</i>											
Age	44.75 (15.14)	41.31 (16.02)	45.69 (16.02)	44.87 (14.19)	45.54 (14.47)	-4.39** (2.05)	-3.56 (2.64)	-4.23* (2.32)	0.82 (2.16)	0.15 (2.32)	-0.67 (1.91)
Male	0.85 (0.36)	0.79 (0.41)	0.86 (0.34)	0.89 (0.32)	0.83 (0.38)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)
# HH members	6.19 (3.52)	5.49 (3.92)	6.44 (3.37)	6.70 (4.29)	5.78 (2.62)	-0.95 (0.62)	-1.21 (0.74)	-0.29 (0.46)	-0.27 (0.69)	0.66 (0.46)	0.93 (0.59)
Potential chief	0.46 (0.50)	0.34 (0.48)	0.51 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.39 (0.49)	-0.17 (0.12)	-0.19** (0.09)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.14 (0.13)
Mende	0.85 (0.35)	0.92 (0.28)	0.82 (0.39)	0.93 (0.26)	0.81 (0.40)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Muslim	0.96 (0.20)	0.96 (0.20)	0.96 (0.19)	0.98 (0.14)	0.92 (0.27)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)

Standard errors clustered at the village level. \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

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