Introduction

2020 will be a year long-remembered in American history for the far-reaching impact of the pandemic and the election. The legacy of these major events is still being written. 2020 was also a year of "racial reckoning," particularly in the movements to address Anti-Asian racism (Sinophobia[1] specifically) and the overwhelming resurgence of Black Lives Matter (Anand & Hsu, 2020). This sparked public commitments from workplaces across the country, from higher education to corporate, towards investing in DEI and social justice (Corley et al., 2021; Gyllenhaal, 2021; Anand & Hsu, 2020).

On Juneteenth 2020, SDSU leadership announced a ten-point plan to advance the needs of Black faculty, students, and staff (De La Torre et al., 2020). Later that summer, San Diego State University's President announced the university's 5-year strategic plan, noting: "When we began this journey, we did not expect that our [five year strategic] plan's launch would come in the midst of a global pandemic and the resulting devastating economic downturn" (de la Torre, 2020). This strategic plan outlined five main priorities supported by short-term and long-term goals with deadlines ranging from 2020-2025. One of these main priorities was advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion in "everything we do: research, teaching, professional development, student experiences in and outside the classroom, and community relationships" (San Diego State University, 2020).

Around this time, an essay published in the *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Higher Education* declared with frustration that in the wake of 2020's social upheaval, "Most higher education institutions have ostentatiously committed themselves to antiracism efforts, and yet, there has been little evidence to show actual change in the institutional power structures in addressing systemic racism" (Anand & Hsu, 2020). Likely to

[1] Anti-Chinese sentiment (Anand & Hsu, 2020).

avoid common failures in DEI implementation, the Division of Student Affairs and Campus Diversity publishes an annual online report on the progress of all of SDSU's DEI initiatives as compared to their deadlines (San Diego State University, 2022). As the Division of Student Affairs and Campus Diversity notes, although "institutions across the country increased their focus on anti-racism" in the wake of 2020's reckoning, "San Diego State's commitment in this arena began well before last summer" (San Diego State University, 2022). In spring 2018, SDSU launched a 40-point plan "to advance social justice, equity, diversity and inclusion" (San Diego State University, 2022). The annual "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do" report tracks each university-wide goal, using labels to indicate from which plan each goal originates ("SP=Strategic Plan, DP=unit Diversity Plans, J=Juneteenth message") (San Diego State University, 2022).

Purpose

As this paper will demonstrate, institutional change management is incredibly difficult even with sincere buy-in, especially for DEI-related initiatives. Now that years have passed since these plans were announced, the purpose of this paper is to explore progress on the university's DEI vision, using the Journalism & Media Studies (JMS) department's unit Diversity Plan as a case study.

What does this mean for organizations who adopted DEI initiatives in 2020? This analysis is ideally not just a case study of SDSU's plan, or even a case study example of higher education DEI initiatives in the wake of 2020. SDSU may be in academia, but it is also a workplace. Many workplaces outside of higher education also announced DEI commitments (Corley et al., 2020), to which this paper seeks to apply learnings from this case study and accompanying literature review. Indeed, higher education environments "and practitioners" have

a deep connection to “post-collegiate workplace socialization and employment” (Perez & Haley, 2021; Williams & Davis, 2021, as cited in Williams, 2023), and are therefore likely affected by DEI change management barriers outside of academia.

However, higher education of course matters in the context of economic mobility for marginalized groups, particularly people of color. As Scripps Professor Hao Huang has researched, however, higher education often performs racial and class gatekeeping despite its potential to create opportunities: “education does remain critical to reverse the erosion of upward mobility in the United States and yet with [data] trends and costs, completion and debt, higher education now serves more to stratify than to dissolve class privilege [...]" (Huang, 2013). Therefore, higher education workplaces have even more responsibility than other workplaces to dismantle class oppression, racial oppression, and other forms of hegemonic hostility.

In the Learning Design & Technology (LDT) graduate program at SDSU, which sits within JMS, students learn the varied skills of research, instructional design, and performance evaluation to improve training and instruction. They learn to evaluate a training need, analyze existing data, and create an instructional intervention. They study psychological theory, emerging technology, and professional analysis methods to understand learners in the hopes of better reaching them. As the literature review will demonstrate, there is almost nothing empirically known about what methods are effective for DEI training, or if DEI training is even a meaningful intervention at all. Yet DEI training, which is not substantially covered by the core LDT curriculum, is one of the most commonly requested solutions for social justice or even simply to avoid liability (Paluck et al., 2021; Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Training appears in multiple pieces of the university’s five-year DEI strategy and is specifically prescribed in the JMS DEI Plan.

DEI is an incredibly complex field, and instructional design's purpose, in part, is to break down complexity into strategic improvement. As the literature review will explore, there are complexities and power dynamics specific to DEI that would be overly simplistic, even harmful, to assume instructional design can resolve. Indeed, there is a risk of applying instructional design to DEI that can cause or even enable harm to groups already deeply impacted by adverse experiences. Mindful of these limitations and others, this study aims to apply the methods and theory of instructional design to recent research on workplace DEI programs and ultimately provide insight and recommendations to support JMS' DEI initiatives. The case study is a real-world example of how the ideas and ambitions of three years ago are being enacted, both successfully and not.

Rationale

The head of SDSU's Center of Inclusive Excellence recommended performing this project as a case study on one department, given the sheer size of SDSU and the level of depth and breadth in its DEI strategy. A case study analysis aligns with demonstrating the skills the LDT program emphasizes in its curriculum. Many of the final projects in the program emphasize working with real world clients to gain hands-on skills. The LDT senior capstone seminar has two assignments: a case study project in which students must demonstrate mastery of performance analysis techniques, and a capstone project in which they provide performance support to a client. Similarly, this case study analysis will demonstrate the researcher's familiarity with common practices in the field as taught in the program, along with awareness of realistic shortcomings in the instructional design industry.

Background: SDSU's DEI Initiatives

As recently reported as February 2023, SDSU reported that its overall "We Rise We Defy" 5-year initiatives are 65% complete, resulting in:

> [...] new academic programs and certificates offered across SDSU, SDSU Imperial Valley and through SDSU Global Campus; major new research initiatives and partnerships, including those in Latin America; additional faculty hires and cluster hires; stronger connections between SDSU and SDSU Imperial Valley; the launch of new sustainability efforts; and more. (de la Torre, 2023)

SDSU's strategic plan, "We Rise We Defy: Transcending Borders, Transforming Lives" includes five priorities. One priority is to become a highly ranked research university, which it aims to accomplish by "leveraging" its status as a "Hispanic-Serving Institution (HSI) located on Kumeyaay land" (San Diego State University, 2020). Another priority is to ensure that the university is both financially and environmentally sustainable (San Diego State University, 2020). The "We Are SDSU" priority aims to consolidate SDSU across its different campus sites across the globe, given how many sites the university has acquired (San Diego State University, 2020). The "Students at Our Core" priority is to "cultivate a university culture and infrastructure that facilitates an affordable, student-centered, wellness-focused, life-long educational journey," both for students and for "lifelong learners" (San Diego State University, 2020). The supporting goals for this priority include making instructors aware of classroom equity gaps, providing research-based recommendations to resolve equity gaps, improving wellness resources, and professional development initiatives for both professors and students (San Diego State University, 2020). The "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do" priority is to set an exemplary global standard in diversity, equity, and inclusion.

There are many goals outlined in the SDSU plan to support "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do." The goals originally set for completion by the end of 2020 include the university establishing an ongoing process to better organize and promote heritage month programming (San Diego State University, 2020). Also by the end of 2020, the university must establish a DEI Initiative, and every college and division within the university must form a "standing diversity council" to support "unit-specific Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) activities" (San Diego State University, 2020). JMS' individual DEI council and goals are a result of this plan.

The 2021 "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do" goals include funding an accessibility-focused IT team, creating a centralized university DEI event planning calendar, and developing a routine diversity review process for campus events and content (San Diego State University, 2020). 2021 also outlines several plans to implement training interventions. Beginning 2021 staff new hires will be trained on "implicit bias, inclusive communication, SDSU's designation and identity as an Hispanic-Serving Institution, and the university's connection with the Kumeyaay people" (San Diego State University, 2020). According to the plan, this training will expand over the next few years to incrementally include student and faculty, presumably until all SDSU populations receive the instruction and it is included in every group's orientation process (San Diego State University, 2020). Also beginning 2021 with one university population and expanding to others over time, SDSU will assign a training on "professional learning on inclusive practice" (San Diego State University, 2020). Specifically, this training targets SDSU teams and roles with the power to make hiring, promotion, tenure, admissions, and supervisory decisions (San Diego State University, 2020). Because these

trainings are implemented university-wide, they will not appear in the JMS plan, which outlines department-specific goals.

From 2022-2023, "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do" focuses on continuing to expand its related infrastructure and support informal DEI-related learning. The infrastructure-related goals include adding additional responsibilities to Diversity Liaison's role, and leveraging a task force to apply for Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-Serving Institutions (AANAPISI) status. The informal DEI-related learning goals include launching "intergroup dialogue programs (such as Human Library, racial equity learning groups, peacemaking circles)", supporting "structured mentoring programs for all faculty and staff," and creating "structured leadership development opportunities" for faculty and staff (San Diego State University, 2020). The leadership development piece is meant to be aligned with individual department DEI plans, but it has a December 2023 deadline, so it does not appear in the latest versions of JMS' plan.

The final outlined goal in the five-year "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do" strategy is to represent "diverse communities" by installing permanent outdoor art displays (such as murals or statues) across SDSU campuses (San Diego State University, 2020). This does not directly apply to JMS, so it's out of scope for this analysis.

As discussed earlier, "Equity and Inclusion in Everything We Do" is not the university's only DEI plan. Still, it is a helpful backdrop for the continuation of the 2018 DEI strategy. Indeed, JMS' DEI initiatives are the result of a 2018 University Senate resolution that required all units to create individual DEI plans "congruent with the University plan" (San Diego State University, 2022). The university provided the necessary criteria for any individual DEI plan,

and promised to provide "training and support for developing these plans" (San Diego State University, 2022). The then-President enforced this resolution with an initial Fall 2020 deadline (Lindemann, 2019). Each plan submission had to include the names of the committee who devised the plan, and document which SDSU DEI readings and training participation each member had completed at the time of submission (Lindemann, 2019). Any department that missed the submission deadline would be subject to a hiring freeze until they complied (Lindemann, 2019). The initial Fall 2020 deadline to comply was later extended to March 2021 (Lindemann, 2019), which likely caused the "We Rise, We Defy" plan to influence each departments DEI plan development process.

Background on SDSU Unit DEI Plans: The College of Professional Studies and Fine Arts and the Journalism and Media Studies Department

The School of Journalism and Media Studies is one of the ten schools that sit within the College of Professional Studies and Fine Arts (PSFA), which in turn is one of eight colleges at the university. As such, this section will overview the PSFA DEI plan first, and detail the JMS DEI plan. Both include plans to implement training, which is especially relevant as this paper primarily focuses on DEI training.

> Per the PFSA Diversity and Inclusion Statement, submitted September, 2019:
>
> To ensure an environment that is welcoming, supportive, and inclusive, we plan to: 1) Build a sense of shared responsibility for creating and maintaining diversity, equity, and inclusion among individuals and groups within the college; 2) Develop a framework to create and maintain a safe environment free from all forms of harassment; 3) Incentivize the schools of the college to prioritize diversity in its efforts

> to recruit and retain students, faculty and staff; and 4) Establish protocols that ensure inclusive governance and decision-making within the college. (Lindemann, 2019)

DEI training appears among the various tactics and resources the PFSA Diversity Plan intends to use to support the above.

Because many of the College's goals involve achieving demographic benchmarks, the Plan calls for training interventions to support inclusive hiring. SDSU requires all departments, not just PFSA and its schools, to assign its search committees mandatory bias training and place at least one certified Inclusion Representative on every search committee. Therefore the PSFA Plan mandates bias training for "anyone involved in staff searches" or on hiring committees (Lindemann, 2019). The Plan says the College will leverage a "Google drive with training documents & resources" to provide the training (Lindemann, 2019). To encourage accountability, "Search committee chairs will submit evidence of each member's respective training to Dean's office and PSFA Diversity Liaison/Inclusion Council" (Lindemann, 2019). The Plan also asks that at least one member of all faculty hiring committees should be a trained Inclusion Representative (Lindemann, 2019). To achieve this, "Student Affairs & Campus Diversity (SACD) will provide training, compensation, and inclusion representative recommendations" (Lindemann, 2019).

As a strategy to retain existing marginalized faculty, the Plan says that PFSA Faculty will provide training on grant writing and research in the hopes of increasing published research and acquired grants (Lindemann, 2019). It also promises to create a "sustainable staff mentoring program," and use (presumably related) "records of training completion" to encourage accountability on this promise (Lindemann, 2019). Ultimately, the PSFA Plan aims to improve diverse hiring and retention, and training appears as just one tool in the strategy. The Plan will

leverage training "offered through SDSU and PSFA" to impart bias reduction, inclusion promotion, and research writing skills in applicable areas (Lindemann, 2019).

Per the October 2021 version of the JMS DEI Plan, its DEI initiatives will launch in Spring 2022. Its Inclusivity Statement outlines the department's key commitments:

> [...] the school is committed to:
>
> 1. Creating and maintaining an environment that promotes participation by all while demonstrating our responsibility to historically underrepresented groups.
> 2. Fostering understanding of each other's backgrounds and experiences.
> 3. Practicing anti-racism, anti-discrimination and inclusivity in our teaching, research and activities.
> 4. Cultivating mindfulness of the unconscious biases we all have and of the inequalities that can threaten progress within the school as well as acknowledging that diversity is an evolving concept that needs constant updating.
> 5. Recruiting, hiring, promoting and retaining diverse faculty and staff. (Northup & Shannon, 2022)

DEI training is included in the JMS Plan, including mandatory bias training for at least one Inclusion Representative certification on every search committee, as SDSU has prescribed. However, other training interventions also appear in the JMS Plan to support both faculty and student outcomes. The Department Diversity Committee promises to identify appropriate trainings from existing SDSU offerings that cover "inclusive teaching and inclusive student support," and encourage faculty/staff participation in these events through department emails (Northup & Shannon, 2022). The Plan acknowledges that participation is encouraged, not

mandatory, because "faculty are overburdened already and short on time. It can be hard to incentivize participation" and notes that guest lecturers usually don't attend trainings (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Therefore, Plan says JMS will make arrangements with Campus Diversity to host a training on inclusive teaching in JMS staff retreats, beginning Spring 2022 (Northup & Shannon, 2022). The department director will also set aside to allow faculty to share "new things we have learned from trainings" during department meetings, although guest lecturers do not always attend (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Additionally, the department may contact Instructional Technology Services for training to help faculty and staff "ensure that all course syllabi, course materials, and department materials (e.g., event flyers, department website) are accessible for individuals with visual or other impairments" (Northup & Shannon, 2022).

The JMS Plan also includes applying training, both formal and informal, to student audiences. The Plan includes an initiative that leverages training to directly improve marginalized student enrollment. The Plan acknowledges that the Grammar-Spelling-Punctuation Test, which was used for years as a JMS admission requirement, disadvantaged students from marginalized backgrounds (Northup & Shannon, 2022). As a solution, the test is being replaced with the English Grammar Usage Mechanics Punctuation Program (EGUMPP), a four-part online grammar tutorial, to train students on writing standards and enrich their outcome, rather than exclude them outright (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Informally, the JMS Plan also includes a commitment to continue an informal DEI learning intervention, "Screening Circle" (Northup & Shannon, 2022). "Billed as being like a book club but with streamed content," the JMS Plan explains, "the purpose [...] is to allow students from all majors to gather together to discuss a piece of popular culture/media content that has important social themes," specifically race, gender, and sexuality (Northup & Shannon, 2022).

As required for unit DEI Plans, the JMS Plan includes accountability controls. The JMS Director is appointed to make sure all search committee members complete the mandatory bias training, and that the search committee has at least one certified Inclusion Representative (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Otherwise, the Director will not allow any hiring searches to begin (Northup & Shannon, 2022). The accountability controls for the other training-related goals, however, mainly depend on the department submitting an annual report to the PSFA Diversity Council to confirm they acted on their own initiatives. This annual report, compiled by the JMS Director, would detail the percentage of faculty and staff who have participated in any DEI trainings, list any course improvements made based on inclusive teaching training, and detail if/how the department meeting fostered discussions about inclusivity (Northup & Shannon, 2022).

As the evaluation section of this paper will discuss, there is no penalty for not submitting the annual report report. The Plan also does not establish any standard, internal or external, for evaluating the quality of the report. However, the Plan demonstrates awareness of the need to balance accountability with the ability to adapt the Plan: "By routinely visiting this document and comparing what we have done to what we have said we will do, we will have a system of accountability" (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Additionally, it places clear ownership on the DEI committee and Director and outlines their planning process:

> As a member of the DEI committee, a great deal of the responsibility and accountability goes to the Director of the school to make sure that everything outlined happens. The Director will work with the DEI committee to have an annual plan at the start of the year that outlines the general expectations of what will happen in the upcoming year (for instance, ideas related to everything from faculty trainings to the Screening Circle), and

> then the Director with the DEI committee will prepare an end-of-year report outlining goals and the extent to which they were accomplished. (Northup & Shannon, 2022)

The report also dedicates a section to highlight recent DEI-related accomplishments from the JMS Glen M. Broom Center for Professional Development in Public Relations (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Before the JMS Plan was completed, the Broom Center had already created a Black Mass Communications Scholar database to increase easy access to Black communications scholars (Northup & Shannon, 2022). The department then asked leaders from other Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communications schools beyond SDSU to share the new database resource with their faculty and "encourage more representation in the syllabus" (Northup & Shannon, 2022). The Broom Center had also already launched the Broom Speakers Bureau, which specifically recruited practitioners of color for speaking engagements, and had begun including Spanish and ASL interpreters in its webinar series (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Most significant to JMS' DEI implementation, the Broom Center had apparently hosted a "Scrub the Syllabus" webinar in 2020, a "well-attended event encouraging educators to adopt an anti-racist syllabus and approach to their class for fall 2020 and beyond" (Northup & Shannon, 2022). Though the JMS Plan does not make the explicit connection between this webinar and its initiatives, the Plan mentions that the department plans to review the required JMS curriculum "with a DEI lens to see what changes could be made" (cite).

The case study analysis of the JMS DEI Plan began in January 2023, roughly a year and a half after the JMS Plan had launched. Not all of the outlined actions have not yet been successfully implemented. In later sections, this paper will discuss the methodology and results of the analysis to indicate which training-related pieces of the plan seem to be successful, and which may need revision to improve outcomes.

Literature Review

I was like the one who filled the quota [...] for the diversity aspect at the firm. 'Alright, we got one.' You know what I mean?
[...] If I made a mistake, it was amplified, it was magnified, because I *made the mistake, like 'you might not have been here anyway, but now you have to deal with this.'*
[...] I felt like I was walking on eggshells. I couldn't necessarily talk or do the things that I wanted to do, the way that I want to do 'em, y'know?
[...] I just felt like I had to be on the straight and narrow all the time.
[...] It hurt
[...] I was anxious about doing the wrong thing and potentially losing my job
[...] so I wanted to, instead of having somebody control the narrative and control my destiny, to be able to do that for myself

—Dasarte Yarnway, Founder of Berknell Financial, on his experience working in finance in the 2010s (Ross, 2019)

Literature Review Introduction:

The merits of the anti-mandatory DEI training argument are mainly supported by the consequences of poor DEI training

At the time that Dasarte Yarnway was experiencing subtle hostility in his early career, white Americans had, on average, 18 times more wealth than Latines, and 20 times more wealth than Black Americans (Taylor et al., 2011, as cited in Huang, 2013). Around this time, Pew researchers observed that racial wealth disparity between Black and white Americans was the largest they had ever witnessed since initially collecting the data (Taylor et al., 2011, as cited in Huang, 2013). Dasarte's experience exemplifies how predominantly white workplaces gatekept prosperity from marginalized people. The gatekeeping is especially heinous when reckoning with

its prevalence in industries with the most potential upward economic mobility for Black and brown Americans.

A decade later, Britney Williams publishes similar qualitative data about Black women's experiences in higher education work environments, urging the importance of studying and addressing white policing in the workplace in light of "high turnover rates and exodus from the profession" (West, 2020, as cited in Williams, 2023). One of the first generation Black women she interviewed describes how her white colleagues chose to treat her change in demeanor at the height of the pandemic (Williams, 2023). Had these colleagues chosen to approach her with concern instead of the social ostracization they opted for, they would have learned Denise was dealing with the grief of losing two family members to COVID (Williams, 2023). "Denise's horrific stream of tragedies led to feelings of isolation and depression, and rather than being supported, she was deemed angry" (Williams, 2023). This is one example of many in her research that indicates experiences like Dasarte's remain persistent today, despite an overwhelming surge of investment into DEI programs within the past decade.

In his thesis on corporate social advocacy post-2020, Gyllenhaal (2021) explains that the same-sex marriage, #metoo, and Black Lives Matter movements in the 2010s contributed to a rise in corporate advocacy for social justice, reinforced by consumers' increased demand for corporate advocacy. This came to a fever pitch in 2020 as a result of the overwhelming increase in Black Lives Matter demonstrations and advocacy (Gyllenhaal, 2021). DEI programming increased across workplaces and higher education as a result, among other effects (Corley et al., 2022). The US DEI industry, already having grown exponentially since 2020, is expected to reach $17.2 billion by 2027 (NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel, 2022).

The increase in support for DEI programs and training has also been met with backlash and debate. News coverage of Silicon Valley Bank's collapse in 2023 is a prime example. Despite detailing the causes of this collapse, including SVB's failure to wisely diversify their portfolio strategy and properly control for risk, the *Wall Street Journal* couldn't resist an aside speculating that SVB was also distracted by diversifying their Board (Kessler, 2023). "I'm not saying 12 white men would have avoided this mess," author Andy Kessler capitulated in the piece, but the damage was done (Kessler, 2023). Conservative media picked up on it and framed DEI efforts as the central cause of the collapse, upholding this as proof that DEI is simply not compatible with effective business practices and is, therefore, a waste (Kim, 2023).

Less hyperbolically, researchers Dobbin & Kalev have been making the case for years that DEI training is utterly ineffective, favoring specific program strategies for effective DEI outcomes (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016 & 2018). This line of thinking likely sparked the trend among DEI training vendors like Mathison (A. Woods, personal communication, December 13, 2021) to favor voluntary DEI training over mandatory. This literature review will examine and evaluate these more nuanced and well-researched claims.

DEI instruction can encompass many goals and methods, but the most common goal is centered around recognizing and reducing bias. Around the time Dasarte was experiencing racialized scrutiny of his performance in major financial firms, nearly all Fortune 500 companies trained their employees on bias reduction (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). In their analysis of over 800 companies' DEI methods, Dobbin & Kalev (2016) find that half of the midsize firms use bias reduction training as well. Other common DEI training methods include offering learners "personalized information about their bias," promoting the results of possible bias-reducing actions the workplace can adopt, and generally aiming to change "hearts and minds" around the

importance of equitable workplaces (Paluck et al., 2021) (Singal, 2023). Many companies also bring in trainers or consultants from marginalized backgrounds as part of their DEI strategy (Paluck et al., 2021). Organizations also use messages in their training that leverage the legal or monetary consequences of discrimination, namely expensive lawsuits (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). In other words, the strategy is typically one-size-fits-all, centered around awareness of bias, and ignores the nuances between anti-discrimination and pro-inclusion/belonging. If one compares these approaches to the under-the-table hostility that Dasarte and Williams' interviewees experienced, it's easy to see why DEI advocates would be skeptical of DEI training's effectiveness. Researchers like Dobbin & Kalev argue that solid DEI programming and voluntary DEI training are far more effective than mandatory training.

The argument favoring voluntary DEI training over mandatory erroneously conflates attitude-based and behavior-based DEI instructional goals, as though interchangeable. Evidence indicates attitude-based DEI goals are ineffective, yet behavior-based DEI goals are effective if embedded within a comprehensive DEI program to reinforce behavior. The argument also fails to recognize its basis on failed change management and poor implementation, which are common ills of business practice that impact DEI training's effectiveness and reputation. If, however, resources are limited and an organization must make a hard reductionist choice between better DEI accountability controls and better DEI training, behavioral psychology suggests prioritizing the program.

Literature Review, Part 1:

Statistics: Current state of diversity, inclusion, and equity in American workplace culture

The landscape of diversity, inclusion, and equity across US workplaces and industries is difficult to summarize: there have been some gains, but the landscape is generally bleak. A 2020

McKinsey study indicates that these issues have great importance to employees, yet are often inadequately addressed in their workplace (Hunt et al., 2020).

The data on demographics in leadership is generally discouraging. In their analysis of demographic representation in leadership amongst 829 companies, Dobbin & Kalev (2016) find that from 1985-2014, the proportion of Black male managers increased from 3% to 3.3%, and white female managers have been coasting on an increase from 22% to 29%, which has held since 2000. Years after their data collection, the landscape does not look much better. The 2020 McKinsey report shows that half the companies they've tracked since 2015 made no progress on increasing the gender and racial diversity of their executive teams (Hunt et al., 2020). In fact, some have even regressed into becoming more male and white-dominated (Hunt et al., 2020). However, a third of the companies "achieved real gains in executive team diversity" (Hunt et al., 2020). It should also be noted, however, that their data combines the US and UK. Hunt et al (2020) lament that "progress overall has been slow," observing that female executives in the companies they studied from 2014-2019 increased by 5% (started from 15% in 2014). This increase mostly consists of white female executives, judging by the even smaller increase in racial diversity among the same companies' executive teams (6% increase after starting at 7% in 2014) (Hunt et al., 2020).

While demographics are not the sole measure of a company's DEI, poor demographics among companies' decisionmakers are clearly not the most encouraging indicator. In a social listening analysis, Hunt et al. (2020) find that almost half of employees' DEI-related comments are about leadership, and over half of those comments are negative. They argue that this indicates companies are not meaningfully involving managers in their DEI programming, which must go beyond purely demographic goals (Hunt et al., 2020). The current landscape of inclusion and

belonging also looks grim: "Even where companies are more diverse, many appear as yet unable to cultivate work environments which effectively promote inclusive leadership and accountability among managers, equality and fairness of opportunity, and openness and freedom from bias and discrimination" (Hunt et al., 2020). Considering that the firm's research also found that men are less likely than "women, especially black women" to face "everyday discrimination" (Hunt et al., 2020), inclusion and belonging are not being meaningfully addressed in American workplaces, at the expense of marginalized employees' wellbeing and prosperity.

Literature Review, Part 2:

The case for DEI programs as an arm of a necessary broader economic intervention

"The Black/white income gap has risen, not fallen since the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s," Huang (2013) asserts. The evidence is overwhelming, and it speaks to the widespread influence on generational economic prosperity. Scripps College Professor Huang's 2013 presentation is the result of detailed research from sources such as the Brookings Institute, *New Statesman*, Pew Research Center, the Irwin Institute, the Education Trust, and even public-facing CIA research. This research shows that in 1974, Black families earned almost 2/3s of what white families were earning (Isaacs, 2007, as cited in Huang, 2013). Even though there had been no appreciable increase in white male income since 1975, the numbers got worse: Black families earned 58% of what white families made in 2004 (Isaacs, 2007, as cited in Huang, 2013).

Economic disparity is bleak across demographics, particularly when observing how it impacted people of color entering the workforce during and after The Great Recession. Between 2005 and 2009, the average Asian American family's net worth sank 54% (Taylor et al., 2011, as cited in Huang, 2013). Between 2007 and 2010, Latine families "lost 40% of their wealth," and

"Black families lost 31%" (Taylor et al., 2011, as cited in Huang, 2013). White families, by stark contrast, lost 11% (Taylor et al., 2011, as cited in Huang, 2013). "For the current generation of non-Hispanic Latin men, they earn 12% less than their fathers did a quarter century ago," Huang (2013) asserts. If families lost the means to afford college, which Huang (2013) notes is also a major predictor of wealth for people of color, what does this mean for millennials of colors' debt accrual and overall upward mobility? Additionally, without stratifying for race, the wage gap between men and women is forecast to close in 2058 (Hayes, 2013, as cited in Huang, 2013). What does this mean for a millennial of color's ability to support their aging parents?

Knowing the current generation's wealth setback along color lines makes discrepancies in gains from college degrees even more disturbing. Whites with Associate's degrees have a lower unemployment rate than Black Americans with Bachelor's degrees (Huang, 2013). White graduates of Bachelor's programs earn $13,000 more than graduates of any color (Huang, 2013). White graduates of Masters programs earn substantially more than Black MS/MA graduates (Huang, 2013). Even after overcoming barriers to earn a degree, color impacts employability and income, which creates a ripple effect for upward economic mobility and generational wealth.

As Martin Luther King Jr. has said, at the time that America was ending chattel slavery, the US was giving land grants to white immigrants, creating "an economic floor" (King, 2018). He remarked on how at the same time, the government refused to establish adequate economic interventions for newly freed Americans who, by contrast, had been "held in slavery 244 years" (King, 2018). In *The Color of Law*, Richard Rothstein traces US government policies through the 20th century that were deliberately designed to keep Black Americans from quality housing and generational income (Rothstein, 2017). Government policy has the power to alleviate these disparities, and it's hard to overlook its responsibility in creating them. It makes individual

companies' DEI efforts and training seem absolutely insignificant. Yet it's impossible to ignore that hiring, pay, and company governance have a tremendous impact on reinforcing income gaps across race, gender, and other demographics.

In a capitalist nation, government is not most civilians' main source of accruing wealth. It is impossible to argue that businesses would have treated hires equally if only the government hadn't intervened to make them discriminate. Therefore, while the researcher acknowledges the critical role of government policy in facilitating equality, this paper will focus on DEI as a private sector tool towards closing income gaps and promoting prosperity.

This is not to conflate DEI with anti-discrimination. Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Belonging encompass a wide spectrum of experiences, protections, and incentives, ranging from proactive hiring to addressing hostility too subtle to be legally considered a "hostile work environment."

Consider Williams' examples of Black women's workplace experiences. "When workplace policing is amplified by the hidden curriculum and pet-to-threat phenomenon, the resulting combinations influence promotion, hiring, and workplace assignments" (Hollis, 2018; Thomas et al., 2013, as cited in Williams, 2023). Ergo, even subtle forms of workplace racism and sexism have a devastating emotional and economic impact, and thrive in being unaddressed. Therefore, if a company does not have infrastructure to address these issues, its infrastructure sustains these problems. Williams herself advocates for training and educational reform in several of her recommended solutions. She suggests implicit bias training and bystander intervention to all employees (Williams, 2023). These are familiar DEI training practices, as established earlier in this review. Williams, however, recommends tailoring them to specifically address workplace policing and "issues of perceived white superiority," explicitly promoting

"increased accountability from white professionals in the workplace" (Williams, 2023). She also advocates for acknowledging these issues in higher education curricula: Higher Education and Student Affairs (HESA) "graduate preparation programs must also take on a more integral role in better addressing workplace issues through supervision-specific education and embedding equity within and across coursework" (Williams, 2023). The solution is more than government policy. DEI programs and training function as part of a broader, necessary economic intervention.

Literature Review, Part 3:

The case for DEI as a business strategy, and the risks of this argument

Given the scrutiny against DEI's very existence, it would stand to reason that stakeholders are more convinced of DEI's merits if they see the business value. Indeed, Anand & Winters (2018) argue that the "DEI as business advantage" argument emerged as a result of Reaganism removing government-enforced diversity obligations[2]. In the absence of court-enforced mandates for quotas and training, the only programs that survived were specialized programs designed to help employees from marginalized groups cope with their adverse experiences (Anand & Winters, 2018), not programs designed to rethink the workplace environment itself. This later evolved into the argument that, due to changing demographics across America, diversity initiatives were necessary for business survival (Anand & Winters, 2018) (Thomas, 1990, as cited in Anand & Winters, 2018). As late as the 2020s, the argument that DEI is a business case persisted as the main means of stakeholder buy-in (Corley et al., 2022). Without a strong argument for its value, "DEI is likely to be considered an expendable part of a company. [...] DEI is still often considered the fat to be trimmed" (Bryant, 2023).

[2] Anand & Winters (2018) are regrettably lacking in citations, leaving this researcher to evaluate which of their arguments seems most credible, an issue this literature review will return to later.

DEI's business value has credible evidence. "Diverse companies earn 2.5 times higher cash flow per employee and inclusive teams are productive by over 35%. High-diversity environments and all-inclusive culture has [sic] clear benefits and advantages" (NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel, 2022). The 2020 McKinzey study shows that more racially and gender diverse companies are likely to outcompete and out-earn their less diverse competitors (Hunt et al., 2020). Their data also makes the case that subtle forms of hostility are bad for business because they increase turnover (Hunt et al., 2020). "By contrast," they write, "when employees believe they have equal opportunity and the workplace is fair then they are three times more likely to say they are happy with their career and will stay at their company longer" (Hunt et al., 2020). There's also a compelling value to inviting diverse perspectives. Product designer Suchithra Sathiyamurthy's piece on UX Design, *The Art of Unlearning*, is not about DEI at all, yet she makes a startlingly applicable argument: "Yes, tried and tested solutions work, but they aren't foolproof. So, when confronted with a design challenge, take a step back to see if there's a better way of solving it. Try new ideas. Weigh the risks" (Sathiyamurthy, 2023). Therefore, the business case for DEI is not just the appeal of avoiding lawsuits and turnover, but the competitive advantage of productivity due to a thriving environment that draws on multiple perspectives to solve problems.

DEI's business value is also boosted by consumerist trends over the past decade, which have seen a substantial increase in corporate advocacy. Per Gyllenhaal (2021), corporate advocacy can make people feel more connected to a brand, even at the risk of alienating consumers that disagree. There is also an additional risk of alienating the very customers the strategy intended to retain: a weak strategy will lose them too, creating a crisis for the company (Gyllenhaal, 2021). If the strategy "does not sufficiently address the needs of the group being

advocated for, the organization may wind up being isolated by people on both sides of the issue" (Gyllenhaal, 2021). Because "understanding the identity of the people being advocated for is necessary in order to produce successful corporate advocacy," DEI presents an advantage if the company invests resources into effective execution (Gyllenhaal, 2021).

The overall argument that DEI is good for business, despite its evidence and intentions, leaves some marginalized groups vulnerable and ignores others. Corley et al (2022)'s interviews with over 40 Chief Diversity Officers (CDOs) across industries shows patterns of burnout from the rise in DEI initiatives in 2020 not being met with resources. Perhaps, given their data also shows patterns of white management favoring the appearance of corporate advocacy without investing the proper resources (Corley et al., 2022), it's enough for a company to have the appearance of advocacy and solid DEI without truly delivering. Additionally, famed media theorist Stuart Hall states that by changing a meaning, we only prove how unfixed it is, that it can change again (Hall, 1997). For example, combatting a negative stereotype with a positive image does not transform or inoculate the image's meaning forever (Hall, 1997). Applying this to the "DEI as business advantage" argument calls into question whether changes in industrialization will dissolve DEI's benefits. It's hard to ignore the inherent commodification in the argument: marginalized people are only valuable so long as including them yields capital gains. The unspoken implication is that investing in them is conditional. This also has uncomfortable implications for marginalized Americans too old or disabled to work: doesn't the "DEI as business advantage" worldview imply they're disposable? It's also hard to ignore class. The evidence in favor of DEI as a business advantage seems, to this researcher, to skew towards white collar. Consider, for example, that chattel slavery was advantageous to enslavers because it made them richer (Geloso, 2019). Consider prison labor, which is disproportionately Black

(Alexander, 2010). Per *The Atlantic*, imprisoned Americans are required to work once they are cleared by the prison's medical unit, with few exceptions (Benns, 2015). "Punishments for refusing to do so include solitary confinement, loss of earned good time, and revocation of family visitation. For this forced labor, prisoners earn pennies per hour, if anything at all" (Benns, 2015). Realistically, how could companies profiting off American prison labor implement DEI among their prison workforce without dissolving the practice entirely? It simply is not in their best business interest, which indicates that the argument in favor of DEI as a business incentive is selective, at best.

The evidence dispelling DEI's reputation of "excess fat" is credible, but these arguments come at the expense of marginalized Americans. This paper acknowledges the intentions behind these arguments, even as a survival necessity in white collar workplaces post-Reagan. Still, DEI is clearly necessary because of the unacceptable experiences across marginalized races, genders, and other demographics. Whether stakeholders buy into DEI programming and training due to its impact on the business or its impact on the livelihoods of marginalized Americans, this paper takes the position that mandatory DEI training imparts a necessary skill.

Literature Review, Part 4:

The argument that advocates DEI programs, but condemns mandatory DEI training

It's debated whether diversity training should be the driving force of organizational change towards a more inclusive and equitable workplace (Kulik et al., 2007). "If common diversity trainings definitively made institutions fairer or more inclusive in measurable ways, then one could argue they are worth it, backlash [...] notwithstanding. But there's little evidence that they do" (Singal, 2023). The argument is that training is overprescribed and ineffective, whereas a solid infrastructure tailored to each organization's DEI needs is far more effective

(Singal, 2023) (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016 & 2018). Dobbin & Kalev's 2016 Harvard Business Review piece, *Why Diversity Programs Fail and What Works Better*, is an exemplary version of the DEI training skeptic's argument. Therefore, this literature review will evaluate the article's points, many of which are well-researched and credible, and present a counter-argument.

In their 2016 piece, their ideal DEI outcome is greater demographic gender and racial diversity among managers (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Though this review earlier acknowledged that demographics is a limited measure, their data is nevertheless compelling when comparing long term demographic gains and losses. For simplicity, this section will conflate greater manager racial and gender diversity with ideal DEI outcomes.

Dobbin & Kalev outline their multifaceted prescriptions for an effective DEI program based on three decades of research. An effective DEI strategy, they argue, must involve managers, use initiatives that organically expose managers to people from different demographics, and leverage vanity or a social panopticon to motivate participation, rather than liability scare tactics (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016 & 2018). They advocate for "recruiting initiatives, mentoring programs, and diversity task forces" because these methods "engage managers in solving the problem, increase contact with women and minority workers, and promote social accountability" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). They also recommend avoiding labeling some strategies as diversity initiatives, particularly those intended for intergroup contact, to make the tactics more appealing to reluctant managers (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). The ulterior DEI strategies include: mentorship programs, adopting cross-functional teams for everyday business processes, and "rotating management trainees through departments," also called cross-training (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). The overt DEI strategies are diversity task forces, hiring a diversity manager, voluntary DEI training, and targeted college recruiting (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). They

also note that most of the companies they studied did not employ the tactics with the highest impact (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016), implying that resources were wasted by being invested into weaker strategies.

Figure 1

Least adopted yet most effective DEI tactics, per Dobbin & Kalev's research

Highest Positive Impact	Absence in Companies Studied (829 total)
Diversity Task Force	80%
Mentorship Program	85%
Targeted College Recruitment	90%

Adapted from "Why Diversity Programs Fail and What Works Better," by Dobbin, F. and Kalev, A. *Harvard Business Review*, 2016, Harvard Business Publishing (https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail). Copyright © 2023 Harvard Business School Publishing.

Figure 2

Dobbin & Kalev's measurements of demographic changes in managers amongst 829 midsize and large US firms



From "Why diversity programs fail: and what works better" by Dobbin, F. and Kalev, A. *Harvard Business Review*, 2016, Harvard Business Publishing

(https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail). Copyright © 2023 Harvard Business School Publishing.

Dobbin & Kalev give many examples to explain why leveraging a social panopticon is an excellent motivation strategy. An experiment in Israel, which, they add has been successfully replicated by other researchers, examined a racial discrepancy between grades received by European descended students, who received Bs, and African or Asian descended students, who received Ds, despite comparable essays (Kruglanski, 1983, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). "The difference evaporated, however, when trainees were told that they would discuss their grades with peers" (Kruglanski, 1983, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). They also point to an MIT study, in which a company noticed Black employees were receiving lower wages than whites, despite, echoing the Israel study premise, identical titles and performance ratings (Castilla, 2015, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). The gap drastically closed once the researcher suggested the company post each team's pay raise and performance rating by race and gender (Castilla, 2015, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Therefore, Dobbin & Kalev (2016) recommend hiring a diversity manager as one example of the same accountability strategy: "simply having a diversity manager who could ask them questions prompts managers to step back and consider everyone who is qualified instead of hiring or promoting the first people who come to mind." This is a compelling argument that ongoing monitoring is superior to training, even if the training is repeated.

Dobbin & Kalev's data-based criticism against mandatory DEI training is that voluntary training outperforms mandatory in their sample. Over a five year span, voluntary training yields net gains, whereas mandatory results in losses (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). The authors attribute these better results to voluntary training bestowing greater autonomy, which increases likelihood of intended behavior (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). They believe this sense of autonomy, amplified by

intergroup contact, is the reason mentorship programs and targeted college recruiting yielded even higher gains than voluntary training (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016).

Dobbin & Kalev (2016) emphasize the importance of autonomy because they argue that mandatory training and other tactics they describe as "force-feeding" provoke backlash. They argue the backlash comes from a natural human resistance against being told what to do, at least in part (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). They also acknowledge that the other contributing factor is the defensiveness provoked among (presumably cisgender) white males (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Dobbin & Kalev (2016) point to an inter-university study in which white male candidates showed higher cardiovascular distress and expressed concerns about discrimination when asked to simulate job interviews at a pro-diversity company, as compared to treatment groups who interviewed with a company that was not explicitly pro-diversity (Dover et al., 2016, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Similarly, Kulik et al. (2007) cite several examples of research showing white men may feel unjustly blamed for diversity issues, that the training is essentially punishment-based thought policing, or that they will be treated unfairly in the workplace as a result of the training (Gilbert, Stead, & Ivancevich, 1999; Rossett & Bickham, 1994; Flynn, 1999, as cited in Kulik et al., 2007). Because of this reaction, Kulik et al. (2007) observe that organizations have adopted voluntary DEI training, at least for lower level employees. When considering this evidence against Dobbin & Kalev's findings that mandatory training reduced diversity over time, it's understandable why many DEI advocates advise voluntary training. Why use a tactic that harms the very people it is meant to support?

Literature Review, Part 5:

Counter-argument: The case for mandatory DEI training, provided it is not standalone

DEI interventions are a fraught issue because of what is truly at stake for marginalized Americans. Although their data is compelling and they make excellent points about the value of learner autonomy, the flaws in Dobbin & Kalev's argument against mandatory training must be addressed. This review will present evidence that backlash is sparked by poor training interventions, not mandatory ones. As for volunteer training, only those already literate in a skill benefit, leaving out the learners who need the skill the most. As this review will demonstrate, emotionally traumatic conflict emerges even from just integrating one marginalized employee. This leaves the question of what interventions are best to support their experiences. Even this review acknowledges that training is not the best intervention in every circumstance. When examining the different purposes training is meant to serve, however, it becomes obvious why it should be mandatory yet cannot be the sole intervention.

Dobbin & Kalev have a solid dataset, yet they misuse some of the external sources to support their argument, which assesses causation based on correlation. They have valuable findings in their data, but the data cannot identify a cause, leaving them to rely on reasoning and external sources to give the impression of authority on their diagnosis.

They draw on the works of Paluck & Green, researchers who analyzed a decade of anti-prejudice experiments in 2007, and then again in 2019 alongside two companion researchers. Paluck & Green's research is an excellent source for Dobbin & Kalev to use because of their thoroughness and integrity. They acknowledge that despite the richness of literature in psychological and social research into anti-prejudice interventions, little is empirically clear about what actually works, despite the urgent need for actionable items (Paluck & Green, 2009)

(Paluck et al., 2021). Unfortunately, Dobbin & Kalev take Paluck & Green's findings out of context to argue that mandatory interventions cause backlash. Paluck & Green (2009) acknowledge that "thought suppression, awareness, reconditioning, and control" tends to backfire, leading to higher rates of prejudicial behavior. However, they also observe better results from studies that asked participants to reflect on a time in their lives when they treated someone with prejudice (Paluck & Green, 2009), contradicting Dobbin & Kalev's dismissal of thought-based interventions. Paluck & Green raise questions about contradictions and lack of evidence, in contrast to Dobbin & Kalev's certainty about what is known and not known:

> One can argue that diversity training workshops succeed because they break down stereotypes and encourage empathy. Alternatively, one can argue that such workshops reinforce stereotypes and elicit reactance among the most prejudiced participants. Neither of these conflicting arguments is backed by the type of evidence that would convince a skeptic. (Paluck & Green, 2009)

As previously acknowledged, Anand & Winters (2018) is regrettably lacking in citations other than personal communications from the very companies claiming their interventions were successful. Yet this researcher came across their work because Dobbin & Kalev use them to support their argument without acknowledging this caveat. Anand & Winters (2018) describe the most common DEI intervention methods used from decade to decade, alongside employees' reactions to them. Without citations to support these (potentially accurate) claims, it is hard to consider them as credible evidence for Dobbin & Kalev's argument regarding which training methods do and do not work. Additionally, the authors characterize Black DEI training pioneer R. Roosevelt Thomas Jr's advice as outdated:

> Another reason is that about three-quarters of firms with training still follow the dated advice of the late diversity guru R. Roosevelt Thomas Jr. "If diversity management is strategic to the organization," he used to say, diversity training must be mandatory, and management has to make it clear that "if you can't deal with that, then we have to ask you to leave." (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016)

It seems in poor taste to dismiss a Black man's research and recommendations based on lived experiences through adversity as outdated, particularly if these recommendations were given in living memory. This is not to say that all Black men are immune from criticism or critique, but this aside from Dobbin and Kalev is regrettable given their flawed assessment of causation in their results.

There is ample external evidence, however, to support Dobbin and Kalev's claims about the importance of autonomy in intervention design. Famed instructional designer and consultant Julie Dirksen advises that humans prefer to feel agency, which can make them resistant to being told to change their behavior, thereby decreasing the chances that training will be effective (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Dirksen gives the example of consulting for a hospital struggling with employee handwashing: they tried a multitude of tactics, including persuasive messaging and training, to improve employee handwashing, but to no avail. The numbers finally budged when the experts created employee focus groups to ask for their input on a solution (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Despite the employees making suggestions the experts had already tried, simply the act of asking for their engagement with solving the problem improved their behavior (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Imagine making a critical training on employee handwashing voluntary to avoid backlash. Dirksen, unlike Dobbin & Kalev, does not conclude training should

be voluntary. Instead, she suggests making employees feel involved in the solution (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020).

It seems that mandating DEI interventions are being conflated with depriving employees of agency. It's true that evidence shows that eliminating employee autonomy can increase turnover, decrease performance, and can even be an act of self-sabotage, given employee autonomy can bring a company out of crisis, as indicated by Dirksen's handwashing case (Gulati, 2018) (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). "If employees are involved in setting guidelines that detail an organization's purpose, priorities, and principles -- that is, a galvanizing framework -- leaders can equip them to make autonomous decisions that benefit the company's goals," writes Gulati (2018). However, if the company goals Gulati describes are not DEI, yet they are imposed on employees and balanced with a structure that supports autonomy, why is imparting DEI skills via training being characterized as too imperious?

It also must be acknowledged that while there is evidence autonomy improves outcomes, human behavior and free will are full of contradictions. Somehow, it seems to be both true that humans resist being told what to do, yet cannot help being told what to do. While Schutz (1958) famously argues that the need for autonomy in the workplace is based on desires to feel included and valued in a predictable environment, Paluck & Green (2009) raises the question of how the notorious Milgram experiments could possibly fit into the claims that prejudice interventions must leverage autonomy:

> What if interventions were instead to harness forces such as obedience and conformity, the very forces that have been implicated in some of the most notorious expressions of prejudice in world history? If people can be induced to express prejudice at the behest of

> political leaders, can they also be induced to repudiate prejudice if instructed to do so? (Paluck & Green, 2009)

Paluck & Green (2009) cannot offer an answer, instead urging researchers to explore this apparent paradox.

Evidence also suggests that people with a lower skill level will not seek out voluntary resources on skill improvement, not necessarily due to aversion but nevertheless preserving their illiteracy in the skill. For example, Hoffman & Otteby (2018) found that personal finance blogs only benefit the financially literate because recognize their value and seek them out. By contrast, people with low financial literacy don't use personal finance blogs, and the reasons vary from being unaware of their value to finance-related overwhelm (Hoffman and Otteby, 2018). Similarly, in *The Rich Get Richer*, Kulik et al. (2007) find that existing cultural competency is a predictor for voluntary DEI training interest and attendance. "In contexts where white men occupy the largest proportion of the organizational hierarchy," they write, "women, non-whites, and other non-traditional employees might be more likely to volunteer for training, since they are most likely to benefit from diversity initiatives" (Kulik et al., 2007). Given this undermines the value of voluntary training and their work is also used in *Why Diversity Programs Fail*, this seems another instance of Dobbin & Kalev selectively interpreting their sources to serve their argument. Indeed, Kulik et al. explicitly point out the limited value of voluntary DEI training: "Voluntary diversity training is most likely to attract the trainees who have the least need of training" and miss low skill employees, yet "it is these individuals who are likely to do the most harm in damaging the organization's diversity climate" (Kulik et al., 2007). They observe almost the same phenomenon as Hoffman & Otteby, "[...] trainees with low competence in the diversity

domain are unaware of their low competence levels and therefore are not motivated to participate in training programs designed to increase diversity competence" (Kulik et al., 2007).

One might hope that the more literate attendees use peer pressure or create a sort of "herd immunity" to diffuse takeaways from voluntary DEI training. However, Paluck & Green are pessimistic. Herd immunity DEI tactics are not effective: "More subtle manipulations designed to convey a tolerant social norm (e.g., an antiracism advertisement [...]) seem to produce weaker effects" (Watt et al., 2007, as cited in Paluck & Green, 2009). They also add that "field research on prejudice reduction does not have much to say about influencing those who do not sign up for antiprejudice interventions" (Paluck & Green, 2009), therefore it is difficult to support Dobbin and Kalev's claims about what their data truly means about voluntary DEI training's value.

One must always remember what is at stake if DEI skill gaps are not addressed in a workplace. The stakes are different than, say, personal finance literacy. If there is an inclusion literacy gap, privileged employees may preserve personal advantages, but marginalized employees suffer, as evidenced earlier in this paper. While this paper advocates for mandatory training to address a skill gap, it will also acknowledge that not every problem has the same solution, and it may even be insulting to suggest training may resolve some DEI issues.

"Decades of social science research point to a simple truth," Dobbin and Kalev (2016) assert to dismiss mandatory training, "You won't get managers on board by blaming and shaming them with rules and reeducation." While DEI education methods vary, doesn't the argument against rules and education prioritize white cis male defensiveness during a training session over everyday lived experiences?

Simply being different and entering a work environment can cause trauma. In a 2004 *CleveScene* article, Black firefighter Bruce Williams recounted how, upon joining the Cleveland

Firefighter Department in 1981, the racism his father experienced as one of the department's first Black rescuers persisted in how his white colleagues treated him and his brother (Hoffman, 2004). The hazing rituals they performed on all rookies always went "overboard" on Black rookies (Hoffman, 2004). A colleague told him: "'You better hope you don't get in a situation you can't handle, because help might not be there'" (Hoffman, 2004). Meanwhile, the Chief claimed: "Nobody has any consideration about what color somebody is when we're performing firefighting duties," despite evidence from multiple firefighters (Hoffman, 2004). Several lawsuits ensued (Hoffman, 2004), but the department remained divided even by 2004, with dramatic numbers showing segregation. "No matter what happens, there's always going to be resentment," a white firefighter observed, lamenting that it was too late for a dialogue or similar interventions (Hoffman, 2004). Black firefighters experienced retaliation for joining the suit, prompting yet more lawsuits and strife (Hoffman, 2004). Given the defensiveness and backlash the lawsuits and media attention provoked in the white firefighters, surely that doesn't mean that interventions against racism will always be comfortable. This example also indicates that training is not the solution to every DEI problem, and it's simply not possible to avoid devastating conflict regardless of the actions or inactions of marginalized employees.

Sergeant Charles Duke defended his use of a baton on Rodney King as the result of a chokehold ban: "We lost upper body control holds, because we had something like 17-20 deaths [...] Blacks were dying, so the political framework was laid for eliminating upper body control holds," which prompted his department to adopt baton beatings to subdue suspects instead (Smith, 1993). It would be an absurd oversimplification to suggest that training would have been the solution to these horrors, mandatory or not.

So far, this paper has compared mandatory DEI training to mandatory handwashing training, but these extreme examples demand the comparison to mandatory domestic abuse interventions. In a research paper on potentially harmful psychological therapy treatments, Lilienfeld (2007) mentions that court-ordered psychological intervention for domestic abusers sometimes harms the victims it was intended to protect (Feder & Wilson, 2005, as cited in Lilienfeld, 2007).

Should courts and workplaces intervene with abusers, given their propensity for backlash (Bancroft, 2002)? The alternative is no intervention, no standards, and that abuse is acceptable. Lundy Bancroft (2002)[3], is an abuse counselor with experience working with male abusers, and he can't offer an easy solution. He works with a wide variety of abusers, both voluntary and mandatory enrollees, varying from blue collar workers to Harvard professors (Bancroft, 2002). The objective advantages that come from being abusive make it hard to choose change at all (Bancroft, 2002). Additionally, "the perspective their counselors are presenting to them is just too uncomfortable and difficult and offends their [...] certainty about everything" (Bancroft, 2002). In the few instances where Bancroft (2002) has seen lasting change (and not the performance of change Bancroft is very accustomed to unmasking), the abuser is extrinsically motivated, not self-motivated and engages in deep work over a span of months in an abuser program, not therapy. However, the program also benefits the abused partner by working with him/her/them to help see through their partner's behavior (Bancroft, 2002). Bancroft's example shows that free will is complicated, and that while mandatory programs cannot guarantee adoption of behavior, casting them aside to avoid backlash does little to avoid harm. Given that

[3] While Bancroft centers the book around male abusers and hetero relationships, he acknowledges there are many types of abusers or relationships. Early on in this book, however, Lundy Bancroft makes the objectively false claim that men cannot be sexually assaulted. This researcher chose to trust his decades of experience with abuser programs as credible evidence, but disavows Bancroft's harmful assertion regarding rape.

his programs also show substantial benefits to abused partners, Bancroft's work in abuse also applies to DEI because of the similarity in how conversations around backlash often seem to prioritize how people acting harmfully feel, rather than whom they harm.

In the chapter *The Process of Change*, Bancroft provides a list of behaviors to help a partner privately gauge whether or not the abuser is changing at all (Bancroft, 2002). He also provides specific details on what to look for in a good abuser program, and contrasts these with signs of an ineffective abuser program (Bancroft, 2002). However, even in a good abuser program, "the majority of abusive men do not make deep and lasting changes," Bancroft admits, despite this potentially undermining his very profession (Bancroft, 2002). He even agrees that some abusers get worse with intervention (Bancroft, 2002). Ultimately, he acknowledges that intervention is necessary and yet change is messy and not guaranteed (Bancroft, 2002). Just as Bancroft advises against poor abuser interventions but cannot dismiss mandatory abuse interventions, this paper advocates for quality mandatory DEI training, embedded in a quality DEI program, as a foundational step for organizations to adopt.

Regardless of topic, training serves many purposes: closing a skill gap, preventing learners from harming or being harmed, and/or as a liability control. For example, instructional design consultant Guy Wallace meets with his client's subject matter experts (SMEs) multiple times to understand what skills mastery is necessary to make a new hire fully productive in their role (Wallace, 2021). After asking SMEs what tasks are necessary in the role, associated responsibilities, and how one can tell a "good" performance from a bad one, Wallace (2021) maps typical performance gaps and their causes to determine whether training is the best means of closing the gap. Compare this to Dobbin and Kalev (2016)'s straw man argument: "diversity training is likely the most expensive, and least effective, diversity program around. But they

persist, worried about the optics of getting rid of training [...].” Imagine a role requires typing skills, which the recruiting team looks for, but the talent pool consistently falls below standard. Shouldn’t the company train new hires on typing skills? Why would a company make a voluntary training for a job-necessary skill like typing? The logic just doesn’t fit for voluntary DEI training. It’s over simplistic to write off opposition to DEI training as pearl clutching over optics: if DEI skills, like the typing training example, are not mandatory, the company is being clear that they are not necessary for the job, and any associated skill gaps simply don’t matter.

Another example: consider mandatory safety training. Like DEI, it certainly risks being unpopular. If employees don’t take safety training, they can seriously harm themselves or other people. Sometimes companies even have to require training for a safety skill that is not being used, yet this is not always a wasteful choice. Cassidy (2022) offers the example of a $10 million annual investment in a training on “how to land a fully loaded 747 aircraft if the landing gear are jammed,” which teaches pilots “how to land it safely and not kill everybody on board.” The instructional consultant explains no employees were using the skill imparted in the training, but the value is obvious (Cassidy, 2022).

Surely, if there is time and resources for a job-necessary skill that’s never needed in practice, time and resources are also available to close a skill gap regarding everyday actions. Otherwise, the issues, which this author acknowledges vary from one workspace to the next, cannot be adequately addressed. “In a perfect world, white colleagues would be aware of their racism and sexism to avoid policing Black women at work,” Williams (2023) acknowledges, yet in predominantly white higher education workplaces, “there is an urgent need to recenter humanity, anti-racism, and ageism awareness discussions [...].”

If it turns out a safety training is not working, should a company make it voluntary instead? Dirksen offers an example of mandatory safety training missing a critical skills gap: at a construction company, training was improving the accident rates, but there was no change in fatal accidents (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Upon performing a needs analysis, she discovered the skills gap: the workers felt uncomfortable approaching their manager upon noticing the safety risks they'd been trained to recognize, preferring to take on the risk that experience guaranteed discomfort addressing it (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). In this case, the training was the problem, but the solution was not to eliminate it. Adjusting the mandatory training to include teaching employees how to broach tough subjects with an authority figure resolved the problem (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Similarly, while other environmental factors may inhibit the effectiveness of a mandatory DEI training, such as poor DEI controls, it's also possible that many DEI trainings are poorly designed, which is why quality mandatory training, like safety or abuse interventions, is worth investing in.

Beyond practical needs like imparting necessary job skills or preventing harm, training is also used to control for liability. Anand & Winters (2018) claim that the 1964 Civil Rights Act prompted many discrimination suits and class action suits, which then prompted widespread diversity training in the late 60s through 1970s, either due to court mandates or as a preventative measure. Additionally, discrimination suits are expensive. Some of the most expensive high-profile racial discrimination settlements to date have included Coca-Cola, Texaco, and Merril Lynch's $192.5 million, $176 million, and $160 million suits, respectively (BofA's Merrill reaches $160M settlement in racial discrimination lawsuit, 2013). Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley have had to pay in total over $300 million for three distinct sex discrimination suits (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Training is one of the "precious few shields" (P. Tuffin, personal

communication, 2021) a company can use to avoid liability, for better or, as this review will acknowledge, for worse.

Training as a liability control can quickly dissolve into ineffective and toxically performative instructional interventions. As former Google instructional designer George Kinney (2023a) puts it:

> The way in which these topics on ethics are frequently presented in corporate training is not meant to teach but to make sure the company isn't liable for the bad behavior of its employees. The real ethical question might be: is it ok to absolve a company of liability by providing training that it knows full well does not stop sexual harassment or mitigate bias etc?

Training as liability control tends to fall into a "check-the-box" trap, in which the purpose of the training is to exist, not to impart a skill or provide a quality experience. Phrases like "checking the box" appear over and over in writings on this topic: "Too often ethics and compliance training is seen as checking a box rather than engaging with what it actually means to work in a more ethical manner" (Kinney, 2023a). Singal (2023), in very much the same vein, writes: "Ticking a box and moving on can be the more attractive option," adding a quote from their interview with a Harvard researcher and diversity consultant: "'Some organizations want to do window dressing.'"

It should be noted that Singal, like Dobbin & Kalev, is in favor of DEI programming, but also critical of mandatory DEI training. Could the connection be that all three of these critics are reacting to a market oversaturated with poorly executed, one-size-fits-all, "check-the-box" instructional DEI interventions, particularly if they divert company resources from DEI programming?

Examine Dobbin & Kalev (2016)'s straw man argument that diversity training is preserved because of the optics of removing it. They also argue that companies preserve it because they are "concerned about litigation, unwilling to take more difficult but consequential steps or simply in the thrall of glossy training materials and their purveyors" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Their descriptions of the performative nature of DEI training seem to align it with liability avoidance, not actually imparting skills. They say classic DEI training and tools are "designed to preempt lawsuits by policing managers' decisions and actions," and that about 75% of the 829 companies they studied "use negative messages in their training. By headlining the legal case for diversity and trotting out stories of huge settlements, they issue an implied threat: 'Discriminate, and the company will pay the price'" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). All of this language indicates that most DEI training in practice today is, unfortunately, "check-the-box" liability avoidance training.

Another problem with DEI as "check-the-box" liability avoidance training: Dobbin & Kalev argue the tone inherently communicates that it just doesn't matter to the company. ""Kidder and colleagues showed that when diversity programs are introduced with an external rationale — avoiding lawsuit — participants were more resistant than when they were introduced with an organizational rationale — management needs" (Kidder et al., 2004, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2018). Brinkerhoff says that liability avoidance is a very common and unfortunate incentive used for DEI training (Cassidy, 2022). If the messaging is "'make sure you get that done because they're auditing at the end of the month, got to make sure you took the course,'" the training team can hardly expect learning transfer because the organization is not communicating that expectation (Cassidy, 2022). However, if the messaging focuses on addressing specific behaviors, and how the training can help address them, "that's a very

different paradigm" (Cassidy, 2022). Liability avoidance simply doesn't communicate the virtues of DEI.

By assigning training as a liability shield, "organizations may be satisfied with minimal employee skills that avoid the most problematic forms of discriminatory behavior," write Kulik et al. (2007), arguing that companies satisfied with "check-the-box" are missing the point. "However, organizations wishing to capitalize on diversity's benefits on creativity and innovation need employees with more finely-honed diversity skills and a more proactive approach to diversity management" (Kulik et al., 2007). DEI education encompasses more than anti-discrimination liability avoidance, and can be designed to impart necessary skills to ensure not just surface-level anti-discrimination or "check-the-box" demographics, but deep inclusion and belonging.

Literature Review, Part 6:

Diagnosis for mandatory DEI training's bad reputation: Weak accountability infrastructure and weak change management

"Often, learning & development professionals are tasked with solving problems that it's not their place to solve" Dirksen admits (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). DEI training should be a tool as part of a broader program; it cannot replace it. If a DEI program does not exist, or is too weak, the training cannot be expected to be effective. Especially in light of post-2020 DEI enthusiasm, change management, which is very difficult for organizations in general, is yet another challenge for DEI programming and training quality. Finally, as alluded to before, poor training design and weak evaluation methods lead to poor or even non-existent results, which this section will explore further. Many of these problems are outside of the control of the instructional designer, particularly if their institution does not provide proper resources and

support. All of these factors, in tandem with hostile hegemony, contribute to poor DEI training outcomes and ultimately discredit DEI's reputation.

Dobbin and Kalev (2016) provide extensive data and examples of bias in the execution of DEI programming. Job tests, performance ratings, and grievance systems were all common diversity controls in their vast sample of mid-to-large-sized companies, all of which yielded abysmal results in increasing manager diversity (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Job tests are intended to level the playing field by helping hiring managers measure and compare applicants' skill without bias (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). People of color and white women don't underperform on job applicant tests, but bias causes them to be more adversely affected than white and/or male applicants (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Hiring managers disproportionately undertest white and/or male applicants (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). When they do test them, the managers use bias to interpret the results, even selectively ignoring white males' low scores (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016).

Dobbin & Kalev provide shocking examples. Reminiscent of voting literacy tests in the South, white managers at a company on the West Coast hired white friends without tests, only assigning tests to applicants of color (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). A Northwestern professor shadowed hiring discussions, only to find that hiring teams ignored the results if a white male candidate failed, but paid "close attention when women and blacks [sic] did" (Rivera, 2015, as cited in Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). People of color and white women also tend to be underrated on annual performance evaluation metrics, which is especially heinous given annual performance ratings are used to defend against allegations of discrimination in determining pay and promotion (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Despite DEI training being so common in Dobbin & Kalev's sample, they provide substantial evidence that bias ultimately sabotages DEI programs intended to uplift marginalized workers.

Grievance systems are also part of the problem, despite their intended purpose as a medium for employees to dispute pay, promotion, and termination (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Few complaints tends to falsely indicate there isn't a problem, yet surveys indicate that most people who experience discrimination don't report it (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). This aversion to report is, sadly, understandable. Even though retaliation is illegal, managers retaliate (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016), as also demonstrated by the Cleveland firefighters example presented earlier. "Among the nearly 90,000 discrimination complaints made to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2015," Dobbin & Kalev (2016) write, "45% included a charge of retaliation—which suggests that the original report was met with ridicule, demotion, or worse." Tragically, these systems also create a bias complacency, according to Dobbin & Kalev's research. Privileged employees tend to operate under a false assumption that anti-discrimination laws or employer's anti-bias policies are infallible: "lab studies show that protective measures like grievance systems lead people to drop their guard and let bias affect their decisions, because they think company policies will guarantee fairness" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). This paints a frightening picture for poor DEI controls leaving marginalized employees trapped in a system intended to support them.

Failure to execute DEI promises or policy without being held accountable is also very common among leadership (Melaco & Austin, 2023). Clients of equity assessment organization Beloved often report that despite policy documentation or promises, their boards aren't performing any annual review of DEI metrics (Melaco & Austin, 2023). Despite policy, managers aren't requiring their employees to set DEI-related goals, nor are they revisiting them during one-on-one performance reviews (Melaco & Austin, 2023). Not to dismiss bias as the likely culprit (it is, given the evidence in this review), but part of the problem is lack of

accountability enforced by DEI program controls. When bias comes into the picture on top of the generally difficulty of change management, it's easy and frustrating to see why DEI initiatives struggle.

Social justice pressure aside, due to changing global demographics, "companies are being forced to effect major structural reorganizations spanning all key areas of business operations, marketing, talent recruitment and retention functions" (NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel, 2022). This literature review will show that major structural reorganizations are incredibly fraught endeavors. Add DEI's relationship with institutional oppression, and it becomes even more fraught. Per a stock market news item in 2022, "Achieving real equality and inclusion is a challenging task and over 65% of employees are of the opinion that their managers do not foster an inclusive environment" (NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel, 2022).

Even with stakeholder buy-in, which DEI may not necessarily have, shifting organizational behavior is incredibly hard. "We still nod, but we don't make the changes that are necessary. Why hasn't this shifted? We all seem to be in violent agreement [...] Yet our reward systems still do not recognize this" Kaye (2012) laments about the gap between HR strategy research and business implementation. Experts, including famed Peter Drucker, have observed for decades that businesses fail to act on what experts and research recommend, even if the business leaders know better (Drucker, 2007) (Tavis et al., 2012). Even setting buy-in barriers aside, if a program needs long-term investment and a very detailed execution, like DEI programming should, it has to compete with other priorities (Claessens et al., 2010). This gets even more complicated if a business if an unanticipated disruption arises, even if the disruption is not a crisis. Research shows humans prioritize tasks based on perceived urgency, and

unanticipated tasks are even more likely to be perceived as such (Shah et al., 2012) (Zhu et al., 2018) (Claessens et al., 2010). These interruptions bode ill for adequately executing a long-term DEI strategy. Overestimated timelines are also common because "narrow focus on successful future plans" causes "biased planning based on overly optimistic task completion times," thereby also complicating long-term project success, especially if a disruption arises (Claessens et al., 2010). Even if a team realizes they need to change strategy, such as upon realizing their DEI program doesn't work, they can collapse under the pressure (Wufka & Ralph, 2015). None of this is to make excuses for poor DEI programs, just as poor safety controls would also be inexcusable. This evidence is instead intended to provide helpful context on what yields poor DEI programming, which in turn yields poor DEI training and outcomes.

Dysfunction can also create a gap between recognizing a need for a training intervention, particularly as liability control, and implementing it. For example, in an April 2022 filing to the SEC, Aurora Acquisition Corp acknowledged that the company it is in the process of acquiring, Better Mortgage, has experienced negative press coverage (Aurora Acquisition Corp, 2022). Better, a "majority-minority company" had experienced "negative publicity arising from actions of the Better Founder and CEO" and as a result of laying off thousands of employees (Aurora Acquisition Corp, 2022). Among the actions the company took to repair the situation, such as an independent culture review and hiring new leaders to assist the CEO, the filing said the company "will also implement a company-wide training program on ensuring a respectful workplace" (Aurora Acquisition Corp, 2022). Even by the final quarter of 2022, no company-wide respectful workplace training had actually taken place (A. Himmelmann, personal communication, 2022) (M. L. Leatherman, 2022). It's also dubious, given the lack of evidence supporting this diagnosis

in the filing, that a company-wide respectful workplace training would have been the appropriate intervention regardless.

Another common organizational dysfunction that also impacts DEI is the "undiscussable," as coined by Toegel & Barsoux (2019), namely the "say, but don't mean" undiscussable. Toegel & Barsoux (2019) never directly address DEI in their article. They include an example of a female manager navigating authority, but the connection is not explicit (Toegel & Barsoux, 2019). Their description of "say but don't mean" is undeniably also experienced in DEI:

> This false positivity, which people express by simply mouthing accepted values, practices, and objectives — the espoused theory — hides any concerns that the team might be incapable of making the necessary changes to the organization and that people might lose their jobs as a result. This protective impulse may appear innocent, but in the long run, it undermines learning and leads to disillusionment as people stop trusting the value of one another's words and commitments. (Toegel & Barsoux, 2019)

This is eerily reminiscent to the frustration Corley et al. (2022) document: Chief Diversity Officers are "deeply concerned about their organizations' short-term, reactive approaches, and the messages that many of their companies' shortsighted actions might be inadvertently sending to those directly impacted by inequity, inequality, and exclusion." The McKinzey report observes the same undiscussable phenomenon in its DEI research: "A disconnect between what the company says and the progress it is making on the ground can seriously erode credibility both inside and outside of the organization, and further contribute to a lack of experienced inclusion" (Hunt et al., 2020). Note examples from the McKinzey social listening analysis, which showed them a "gap between public pronouncements of commitments to [DEI], and the sentiments

employees are willing to express in the relatively risk-free environment of a job-search website" (Hunt et al., 2020):

Figure 3

Examples of DEI undiscussables as revealed by McKinzey's social listening data



From "Diversity wins" by Hunt, S., Hunt, V., Prince, S., and Dolan, K. *McKinzey & Company*, 2020 (https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/diversity%20and%20inclusion/diversity%20wins%20how%20inclusion%20matters/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters-vf.pdf). Copyright © McKinsey & Company

Performative allyship and exploiting marginalized employees are inextricably tied to this undiscussable under a DEI lens. Corley et al. (2022) write that the Chief Diversity Officers (CDOs) they interviewed "felt that attempts to combat racial injustice had largely been

performative, and had not fostered long-term organizational change." The data from the interviews showed patterns of CDOs being, in a tragic twist, burdened by the very enthusiasm they'd always courted from leadership finally emerging in 2020 (Corley et al., 2022). "[...] as mounting expectations of CDOs and outward promises failed to be met with real internal accountability [...] many CDOs ended up taking on this difficult, emotional work all by themselves, further taxing these leaders" (Corley et al., 2022). Leadership at each of their companies consistently failed to match its demands with accountability and support, leaving their CDOs at the "peak of exhaustion" in their careers and disillusioned (Corley et al., 2022). McKinzey notes a similar exploitation pattern from data collected prior to 2020, in which leaders impose on "employee resource groups to drive their [DEI] agendas, rather than giving leaders and managers true accountability for strengthening diversity" (Hunt et al., 2020). Company leadership, McKinzey researchers observe, may publicly commit to DEI (Hunt et al., 2020), reminiscent of Gyllenhaal's observations about corporate advocacy as a courtship strategy. CEOs may even sign "public pledges to do so. But many companies have yet to adopt the systematic, business-led approach [...] that is needed to translate these pledges into actual change" (Hunt et al., 2020).

Additionally, there is the "feel but can't name" undiscussable, in which negative feelings that seem like they can't be discussed openly or constructively (Toegel & Barsoux, 2019). This behavior aligns with Williams' findings: "Naming these issues for what they are and chronicling their pervasive nature is a first, albeit minimal, step to addressing these issues. The HESA profession cannot fix a problem that it does not acknowledge exists" (Williams, 2023). Toegel and Barsoux's characterization of this undiscussable seems ill-advised, however. They suggest empathizing with seemingly antagonistic team members, identifying their work styles, and

generally coming to an understanding that a difference in priorities or behavior is not personal (Toegel & Barsoux, 2019). Yet compare this to Denise being dismissed for being a Black woman in grief, or the experiences Williams documents of other Black women being scrutinized for being less than perfect, which Dasarte also experienced. These are personal experiences of suffering invoked simply by being different. Compare this to Bancroft's advice against sending the abuser to couples therapy, which demands that both partners must be willing to compromise (Bancroft, 2002). Inherently, DEI is adversely affected by dysfunctional business behavior, which also complicates how this behavior can be resolved.

The organizational behavior field simply does not empirically know much about the goal-execution gap in the workforce, which impacts change management and, of course, optimizing DEI implementation. Brien et al. (1980) performed an experiment to measure how accurately instructional designers could predict how long a project would take to complete. The results? Abysmal (Brien & Bertrand, 1980). Not only were the predictions inaccurate, the designer participants ultimately used very different amounts of time to complete each task (Brien & Bertrand, 1980). Research simply does not offer uniform, reliable estimates on how long instructional design projects will take to complete. Forty years later, in a 2010 study on task prioritization, Claessens et al. (2010) repeatedly use the phrase "little is known" in their literature review. "Little is known," they say, about the relationship between task prioritization and completion, namely how employees set work goals and pursue them in their day-to-day (Claessens et al., 2010). There is almost no empirical knowledge about the relationship between planning, prioritization, time management, and task completion (Claessens et al., 2010). In Claessens et al. (2010)'s workplace experiment, less than 3/4s of the tasks their employee participants had personally planned for the day were actually completed by the end of each day.

Perhaps even in the Digital Age, this inability among knowledge workers to accurately predict how they will execute on their own priorities causes unrealistic expectations and self-sabotages project outcomes, which has an adverse effect on DEI implementation as well.

Even if the instructional design is completed rather than derailed, training can easily result in wastefulness due to poor execution reinforced by poor structure. Without accountability controls, for example, the skills imparted as never reinforced. Take for example a failed leadership training Senior Research Adviser Robert Brinkerhoff recounts in a discussion on measuring learning transfer. It cost nearly $4 million per cohort, and required a year to complete, yet most employees were not implementing the learnings from their completed training (Cassidy, 2022). When Brinkerhoff asked the stakeholder bankrolling the leadership training whether it was necessary, "they said, 'Absolutely we need to change our managerial behaviors, we're boxed in silos, we're not collaborating across the organization, and we need to change that'" (Cassidy, 2022). This is reminiscent of the gaps between DEI need and execution as previously explored in this paper. In this non-DEI instance of an expensive training wasting time and money, it's easy to assume based on Dobbin & Kalev's logic that leadership training doesn't work. Brinkerhoff identified the real problem, however: "that expectation was never communicated to the people in the training, and [...] no one was held accountable for ever having used it" (Cassidy, 2022). Similarly, DEI training operates as a tool within a greater infrastructure. DEI training must address critical skill gaps, expectations must be clearly communicated to learners, and the DEI structure should reinforce the training through accountability controls. If these factors are absent, which Dobbin & Kalev's statistics indicate they often were in the dataset, DEI training will fail.

Literature Review, Part 7:

Diagnosis for mandatory DEI training's bad reputation: Weak instructional interventions and evaluation

Whether due to organizational failures or poor instructional design choices, modern DEI training is fraught with weak interventions. Weak instructional choices include one-size-fits-all approaches, poor tone, and short-term interventions with no long-term reinforcement. It is also alarming that many DEI interventions have no basis in empirically tested methods, but as this review will discuss, this is unfortunately unavoidable. Lastly, DEI training suffers from weak evaluations, which are in part due to poor organizational investment in resources.

A needs analysis is essential for DEI, making one-size-fits all or generic out-of-the-box methods, despite their appeal for being low-lift, an inappropriate training solution. Singal (2023) asserts that DEI needs "vary widely from organization to organization," providing examples like "disparate treatment of customers (think of Black patients prescribed less pain medication than white ones)", recruiting efforts, employee retention, or the overall dynamics between white employees and other employees of any color. Consider Williams' assessment of issues specifically affecting Black women in predominantly white workplaces: de facto social exclusion, policing behavior or even demeanor, dismissing valid emotional responses, ultimately "the assumption that Black women's actions, decisions, and agency must be in deference to and acquiescence of white people's comfort and norms" (Alvarado, 2010; Liu, 2011, as cited in Williams, 2023). Generic DEI solutions can miss the organization's critical issues entirely, presenting incredible waste.

Not all workplaces are predominantly white, and not everyone in a workplace has equal or obvious status as victim or perpetrator, which is why assuming the audience of a training is

white males and assuming what they need is an erroneous instructional approach. For example, consider the historical tension and cross-racial violence between Korean-American and African-American communities (Smith, 1994). As Williams (2023) acknowledges, "broader cultural understandings of Black women and their success remains directly tied to whiteness cross-racially, and colorism and class intra-racially, as evidenced by the promulgation of Black people who espouse white values within and beyond campus contexts" (Brown et al., 2021; Collins, 2000; Williams et al., 2022, as cited in Williams, 2023). Additionally, her work advocates for resources and support to be invested in Black women; a training that assumes a white male audience, which is very common, would miss these learners almost entirely. Therefore, one-size-fits all DEI training applied without a needs analysis is likely to be ineffective.

Resorting to external parties for this work is risky. In 2021, multiple *Forbes* contributors reported that venture capital firms were disproportionately favoring white-founded DEI firms over Black-founded DEI firms (Asare, 2021) (Bastian, 2021). Senior contributor Janice Asare (2021) also notes that large organizations tend to favor hiring "white male-led consultancies [...] I think it's based on the same idea that these are companies that unconsciously people automatically trust because they are white-led and because they are white-founded". This researcher does not have the authority to say that white people, particularly white LGBT and immigrant-founded firms like Mathison, do not belong in the DEI space. However, if the DEI training and consulting firms that survive due to better seed funding and attracting more clients are overwhelmingly white, doesn't that raise an issue with whose voices are heard the loudest?

Live DEI training also presents its own unique challenges. Recall Dirksen's example in which construction workers were not being taught how to approach an authority figure with bad

news. Consider how interpersonal skill gaps in DEI training might not just be between learner and ideal performance, but instructor and ideal instruction. Anti-oppression consultant group Lumos Transforms applies established phases of trauma recovery (Manitoba Trauma & Recovery Center, 2013) to the trauma recovery stages necessary in dismantling oppressive patterns in an organization (Magsombol, 2023). For example, during the initial phase of trauma recovery, employees with trauma from subtle hostility or discrimination need to experience safety and connection to feel emotionally stabilized (Magsombol, 2023). During the next phase, they need time to build the skills and capacity to float between experiencing mild stressors and returning to feeling safe (Magsombol, 2023). There are further stages necessary in the healing process, none of which could be meaningfully addressed in an ad-hoc live session (Magsombol, 2023). Additionally, if the facilitator has not been trained in trauma-informed techniques (Magsombol, 2023), there is a risk to any participants with workplace trauma, particularly during open discussion. Facilitators must be prepared to anticipate and effectively address defensive or virtue-signaling responses from participants during open discussion. Otherwise, particularly if the goal of the training is attitude-based and not behavior-based, the discussion risks re-traumatizing participants or allows defensiveness from privileged participants to dominate the discussion.

"What we typically see in the online training space is these one and done videos where they're like, 'hey, go watch this video. Now you're not a racist,'" Kristina Williams laments (Asare, 2021). As a learning and development professional, this researcher can confirm that out-of-the-box DEI training, which is inherently one-size-fits-all, simply misses the mark and often has no action items. Williams warns against "taking a difference-neutral and aspirational approach to workplace education, acclimation, and support" (Williams, 2023), but this approach

is unfortunately common in the out-of-the-box online market. Even by November 2020, popular LMS vendor Oncourse's self-guided inclusion elearning course was about 20 minutes long and skirted around issues of adversity such as queerphobia, racism, and sexism ("Workplace Inclusion", 2020). Instead, the training extolled the merits of including multiple perspectives in a workplace, and prompted the reader to type in non-graded reflections on prompts asking about including diverse perspectives ("Workplace Inclusion", 2020). Around this same period, BAI, a competing LMS vendor, offered a self-guided DEI elearning course with similar lack of actionable takeaways, and a California anti-harassment course from an outside vendor, VuBiz, that mischaracterized trans women as men in several exercises ("Harassment Prevention Training for Employees [California] (SB1343)"; "Harassment Prevention Training for Employees (California)", 2020). BAI has since replaced the California course with a non-transphobic version of their own creation ("Preventing Workplace Harassment for Employees (California)", 2020). It's highly likely BAI and Oncourse have updated their DEI offerings since, given each vendors' recent efforts to revamp their courses (Oncourse, personal communication, July, 2022) (H. Long, personal communication, April, 2022). Yet the limitations of out-of-the-box training without a needs analysis persist. Additionally, updating a course does not guarantee that the vendor or LMS administrator will reach out to any learners who have previously "completed" the course to revisit their allegedly "complete" skills competency.

Admittedly, the effort required to perform a needs analysis and diagnose a solution requires significant time and resources, which multiplies by the size of the audience. Singal (2023) gives the example of a practitioner aiming to increase Black and Latine managers at their company as just one example of how much investment would be necessary even to achieve one DEI outcome. The needs analysis process might involve gathering recruiting data on

demographics, conducting interviews with current Black and Latino managers to assess environmental challenges, and an instructional designer might conclude training is not the optimal intervention, such as "beefing up recruitment efforts at, say, business schools with high percentages of Black and Latino graduates" (Singal, 2023). "Even solving this one problem — and it's a fairly common one — could take hundreds of hours of labor" Singal (2023) writes, illustrating why meaningful solutions, instructional or not, are extremely difficult to achieve.

In his dissertation on public relations, Gyllenhaal (2021) makes the case for why individual "bad thoughts" or unconscious bias don't make much of a difference because they are superseded by institutional racism. If this is the case, why are attitudes and reflection emphasized in training over measurable, behavioral outcomes? "Aspirations and ad hoc interventions are not enough," assert Hunt et al., 2020. DEI training is not a baptism or some other sacrament that cleanses the soul in one ad-hoc sitting. Additionally, short-term interventions do not lead to long-term changes. "Organizational diversity training may be implemented with many goals in mind—to increase trainee knowledge about diversity, to change trainee attitudes toward diversity, or to improve trainee diversity skills and behavior" (Kulik et al., 2007). Imagine squeezing these goals into one ad-hoc training. Dobbin & Kalev (2018) write that their research showed one 12-week college DEI course offered to interested audiences seemed to yield positive results, but they compare this cost to the estimated $12 million loss for the famous one day of company-wide anti-racism training at Starbucks in 2018. It doesn't seem financially or logistically feasible, or at least not attractive for stakeholder buy-in (Dobbin & Kalev, 2018). It's hard to argue that one ad-hoc training could change anything, given the power of institutional oppression, which is why embedding training within a strong DEI infrastructure and focusing on behavioral outcomes in the training design is so important.

Additionally, there is the common practice of poor evaluation hurting the quality of DEI training design and outcomes. Dobbin & Kalev (2018) are not anti-training, but are understandably skeptical of mandatory training, particularly if it is the organization's only or primary DEI tool. In rare alignment with this review's perspective, they write that "The trick is to couple diversity training with the right complementary measures," but the problem is that "companies most often couple it with the wrong complementary measures" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2018). "Though diversity trainings have been around in one form or another since at least the 1960s, few of them are ever subjected to rigorous evaluation," Singal (2023) observes.

Admittedly, "inclusion and workplace culture are inherently difficult to measure. There is no standardized, universal metric" (Hunt et al., 2020). Companies struggle to understand what proxy DEI metrics they could use to gauge their DEI infrastructure, if they even track DEI metrics at all. As a result, DEI consultant Lily Zheng (2023) says that many of their clients erroneously assume DEI metrics begin and end with demographic data. "'Our DEI metrics are great,'" they recall a leader saying, "'Our company is 52% women'" (Zheng, 2023). Yet DEI metrics can be so much richer:

> DEI metrics allow organizations to better understand and operationalize their challenges, hold their leaders and other stakeholders responsible for making progress, and experiment with targeted interventions to reduce inequity. However, even in organizations that already recognize the importance of DEI metrics, leaders can struggle to measure the right ones. It's both hard to know where to start and challenging to draw out the most important metrics from the noise. (Zheng, 2023)

Melaco & Austin also acknowledge that organizations very commonly don't measure any Belonging metrics, which makes gauging this aspect of DEI efficacy even more elusive. If

companies' DEI infrastructure does not have reliable metrics and accountability controls, it follows that DEI training cannot be effectively evaluated as well. Without being able to measure how well the behavior is translating to the company culture or any other impact, how can the instructional designer possibly make better adjustments?

Enter the notorious "smile sheets." Post-evaluation "smile sheets," as they are called (Kinney, 2023b), bedevil both psychological research and the training industry. Prejudice reduction studies lacking in behavioral measurements, which is most prejudice reduction studies, rely on self-evaluations to measure impact (Paluck & Green, 2009). These questionnaires commonly ask participants to: describe their experiences meeting members of different groups, gauge how much they noticed or liked a treatment (such as a PSA campaign), and/or self-assess on how knowledgeable they've become about the effects of prejudice (Paluck & Green, 2009). This methodology is also commonly used in sensitivity and cultural-competence programming, mass media campaigns, and diversity training (Paluck & Green, 2009). Because learners tend to prefer passive learning methods, such as watching a video rather than active learning methods (not unlike the aforementioned "light touch" methods), this "causes a perverse incentive especially for training departments largely run on smile sheets," writes former Google instructional designer George Kinney (Kinney, 2023b).

"Smile sheets" are a flawed DEI training measure for a number of reasons. Paluck & Green (2009) criticize their validity because outside factors can influence a change in answers between pre and post assessments, and because the same questions are used to compare self-assessments before and after, the survey inadvertently helps condition and prepare participants for the questions they know they'll see again. Even when DEI surveys are anonymous, employees can be influenced by what they think their company wants to hear (Hunt

et al., 2010). In this way, surveys can further delay a solution by reinforcing the promises versus actions gap (Hunt et al., 2020). “Smile sheets” are so widely adopted because training teams are at such limited capacity. Digital Learning Portfolio Manager David Hayden describes the industry problem: “learning and development teams are very often on a treadmill of design, deliver, design, deliver” (Cassidy, 2022). As a result, effective measurement and evaluation of training outcomes tends to not happen at all because “they don’t have time to, and nobody is asking them to” (Cassidy, 2022). Thus, training teams find themselves either not measuring their outcomes at all, or employ “smile sheets” for the easy lift or even the easier data story to show their success to stakeholders.

“Smile sheets” are a unique and distracting plague to L&D. As David Hayden bluntly observes, “no other department does that” (Cassidy, 2022). For example, he says, it’s not like upon approaching the Finance department for help with expenses, they say: “‘Oh, before you disappear, rate me on the job that I’m paid to do by this organization and performance managed by my manager’” (Cassidy, 2022). Ultimately, he says, the instructor’s time and energy are better spent collecting more informative data (Cassidy, 2022).

The consequences of poor evaluation methods and “smile sheets” are serious for DEI. At the time that Paluck & Green (2009) wrote the following passage, Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner, and Breonna Taylor were still alive:

“We were unable to locate a sensitivity- or diversity-training program for police that used more than a prepost survey of participating officers. Such strategies may reflect a lack of resources for, understanding of, or commitment to rigorous evaluation.”

Literature Review, Part 8:

Despite decades of research, experts don't empirically know what works for DEI training

Paluck & Green write at length about the disturbing truth that DEI training is simply not based on research-backed methods. "Entire genres of prejudice-reduction interventions, including moral education, organizational diversity training, advertising, and cultural competence in the health and law enforcement professions, have never been tested, as well as countless individual programs within the broad genre of educational interventions" (Paluck & Green, 2009). Grimly, their conclusion in the 2009 and 2021 reviews of prejudice reduction research is the same: the need to know what actionably interventions actually reduce prejudice is at crisis level, yet "we currently do not know whether a wide range of programs and policies tend to work on average, and we are quite far from having an empirically grounded understanding of the conditions under which these programs work best" (Paluck & Green, 2009). Therefore, chillingly, "the hundreds and perhaps thousands of unevaluated antiprejudice interventions implemented yearly in schools, businesses, and governments" are based on unproven methods (Paluck & Green, 2009). Furthermore, this complicates training's function as liability control. Despite frequent public or legal demands for training as a cure to discrimination, the limited credible research available shows:

> [...] the effects shrink when the trainings are conducted in real-world workplace settings, when the outcomes are measured at a greater time distance than immediately following the intervention, and, most importantly, when the sample size is large enough to produce reliable results. (Paluck et al., 2021)

Recently, even the field of psychology has been favoring poorly measured attitude-based prejudice reduction treatments over behavioral outcomes (Paluck et al., 2021). In the over 418

experiments Paluck et al. (2021) examined between 2007 and 2019 "to assess which approaches work best and why" for reducing prejudice, almost none of them measured behavioral outcomes. Some of these studies were field experiments that showed "intergroup behaviors change without attitude change" (Mousa 2020; Scacco & Warren, 2018; Paluck & Green, 2009, as cited in Paluck et al., 2021). Given the prior evidence presented in this literature review regarding human free will and the complexity of unpacking attitudes towards DEI, psychological research and DEI practice would benefit from further empirical study into whether behavior-based outcomes are a more effective, lighter lift approach.

Most of the prejudice reduction studies Paluck & Green examine in their 2021 analysis are, to their dismay, "light touch" attitude-based interventions with bias-contaminated results (Paluck et al., 2021). Around 2009, individual ideation/awareness training was only showing "modest success" among researchers (Paluck & Green, 2009; Paluck et al., 2021). Over the next decade, this "light touch" attitude-based interventions overtook the also promising "cross-cultural and intercultural training" and "cooperative learning" interventions, leaving them studied even less than before (Paluck et al., 2021). These studies are often contaminated by leveraging the p value to enhance the apparent significance of the results: "if the current collection of studies had been conducted on a much larger scale, our analysis would have shown no reduction in prejudice" (Paluck et al., 2021). These almost *Music Man*-esque interventions typically involve "secondhand or imagined contact with outgroups" and/or asking participants to reflect on emotions, thoughts, beliefs to combat prejudice (Paluck et al., 2021). Just as they saw a decade earlier, most prejudice-reduction studies still measure outcomes through "self-report questionnaires," and "rarely test to see if the change lasts longer than the [typically 1 hour] study period" (Paluck & Green, 2009). As Paluck et al. (2021) passionately argue, "stronger medicine

is demanded by global conditions in which prejudice is expressed through violence, discrimination, and exclusion."

If research is inconclusive, is DEI training wasteful at best and harmful at worst? Researchers like Lilienfeld argue that in some cases, DEI training, namely on microaggressions, is harmful due to inconclusive research. Lilienfeld, who has published work on potentially harmful therapy treatments, compares microaggression interventions to the PTSD and bereavement treatments his research found to yield more harm than no treatment (Lilienfeld, 2007 & 2017). Indeed, critical incident stress debriefings, which are ad-hoc, facilitated group sessions to help participants process negative emotions within 1-3 days of a traumatic event, do not reduce PTSD symptoms (Lilienfeld, 2007). Despite participants reporting that they found the treatment beneficial, they made slower recovery and experienced worse PTSD symptoms than the control group (Lilienfeld, 2007). Similarly, grief counseling for patients experiencing a typical grief process, rather than a traumatic grief, results in prolonging the recovery process and risks more severe symptoms than the control group (Lilienfeld, 2007). Based on this research, Lilienfeld is concerned that microaggression trainings may also create worse mental health outcomes in already vulnerable groups, especially considering that people who experience discrimination also seem to have worse lifetime mental health outcomes (Lilienfeld, 2017).

While Lilienfeld is not at all disputing the existence of subtle prejudice, he raises concerns that the Microaggression Research Program (MRP) is not putting forth credible studies that hold up to scientific standards, which makes it harder to learn the truth about how to understand and combat subtle prejudice (Lilienfeld, 2007). Ultimately, he advocates that the MRP should of course continue its research, but that there should be a moratorium on

microaggression training, due to its potential mental health harm and that it diverts precious resources and time from other DEI programming (Lilienfeld, 2017).

It must be acknowledged, however, that Lilienfeld (2017) also uses ill-advised terms like "transgendered" and "trannsexual" (also seemingly interchangeably) and makes a regrettable use of Martin Luther King's "I Have A Dream" speech in the conclusion of one section:

> For example, many nonprejudiced participants may view the goal of a racially color-blind society as achievable in principle, if not fully in practice. [...] Ironically, conceptualizing most or all of these statements as microaggressions appears to run counter to the crux of Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.'s (1963) eloquent affirmation that "I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character."

Dubiously, Lilienfeld assumes he can define "prejudiced" versus not, asserts that nonprejudiced people objectively exist, and that ahistorical colorblindness is an ideal and achievable end state for society. *The Boston Globe* remarks that this MLK Jr quote, which Reagan appropriated to argue against affirmative action, is often used to promulgate a sanitized version of King for white people's comfort (Osterheldt, 2019). In "Martin Luther King Jr. wasn't a colorblind dreamer," Osterheldt (2019) writes that people cherry-pick the comfortably parts of the speech, particularly the "content of their character" line. Yet people also ignore his lifetime radicalness or even the next few lines of the same speech: "Instead of honoring this sacred obligation [...] America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked 'insufficient funds'" (Osterheldt, 2019). Lilienfeld fails to meaningfully address the lived experience of anxiously trying to assess, with no promise of closure, whether one is being treated differently due to racism, or some other difference. Despite Lilienfeld's commentary often seeming out of touch,

the concerns he raises are worth acknowledging in this review because his analysis is based on expertise on mental health and scientific method. However, Paluck & Green's incredible work reveals the murky truth: it's simply not possible to suggest that DEI practitioners adhere to research-based methodology, or even that they wait for it.

Paluck & Green seem averse to argue for a moratorium on any training approach, especially given that decades of research have yielded no clear answers to an abject crisis. Instructional designers do not yet have the ability to base training on irrefutable, empirical methods "supported by research of the same degree of rigor outside of the laboratory" (Paluck & Green, 2009). There remains very little research on any interventions actually used or demanded in the workplace/greater society, such as media representation or DEI training (Paluck et al., 2021). Most of the studies Paluck & Green found took place in a lab or a school, and participants are usually college students (Paluck & Green, 2009 & 2021). Among the 418 studies they examined between 2007 and 2019, only one actually tested a prejudice intervention in a real setting by partnering with a real company (Paluck et al., 2021). They note that attitude-based interventions are showing success in laboratory settings, but this may not hold in real world settings (Paluck et al., 2021). In their 2021 analysis, they practically beg researchers to conduct field tests, particularly to learn how to best reach learners resistant to DEI (Paluck et al., 2021).

In the face of the empirically inconclusive, instructional designers should note that Paluck & Green (2009) identify several approaches that seem to yield results, but have not yet been subjected to robust field testing and sufficient empirical scrutiny. Some of these interventions are attitude based, such as separating participants' self worth from prejudicial defense mechanisms, inciting participants to measure prejudice against their own values, and cognitive approaches to disrupt participants' cultural categorizations (Paluck & Green, 2009).

They also highly recommend additional research into promising behavioral-based interventions, such as cooperative learning and inter-group contact (Paluck & Green, 2009). Without conclusive evidence, particularly testing these methods in work environments, instructional designers should consider existing research on these approaches and measure it against their organizational capacity, learner audience needs, and instructors' trauma-informed facilitation skill level.

Literature Review, Part 9:

Best practices for the modern instructional designer in the face of poor empirical validity, dire need, and dubious capacity

> *But how do the stated objectives of diversity training connect with the desired longer term outcomes?*
>
> *[...] the unstated goals often include changes in mind-sets, which imply altered beliefs and values.*
>
> *[...] Is it realistic to achieve these higher levels of transformation from diversity training or is diversity training just one input among a number of experiences that are required to change one's way of thinking and being?*
>
> *Should diversity training attempt to address this level of change?*
>
> (Anand & Winters, 2018)

This section of the literature review recommends best practices for DEI training implementation based on existing research. With the understanding of how little is truly empirically known or tested in the field, much of this section relies on aligning guidance from DEI consultants and instructional professionals with peer-reviewed research.

Because a successful DEI training depends on a substantial DEI program, some recommendations in this section are directed towards the organization. These recommendations include solid DEI program infrastructure and supporting DEI employees. This foundation must be established prior to the organization's focus on mandatory DEI training. The reverse, as shown in prior sections, is disastrous. This section also, of course, provides many recommendations to the instructional designer. Instructional design recommendations include performing a needs analysis, involving the learner in their own learner analysis, embracing informal DEI learning methods' role in company culture, prioritizing behavioral outcomes for practical success, conducting postmortems, and leveraging behavioral data. Some responsibilities, such as hire forecasting, are shared responsibilities between the organization and the instructional designer. All of these recommendations support this review's overall argument for a mandatory training program as part of a broader DEI infrastructure.

Per Dobbin & Kalev in their 2018 piece criticizing training interventions, "training tends not to change workplaces unless it is part of a broader effort, involving multiple components" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2018). There is ample agreement from other researchers. Based on the pattern of shortcomings reported by the Chief Diversity Officers they interviewed, Corley et al. (2022) argue that organizations must ensure company-wide alignment and accountability towards DEI goals. Per McKinzey, the heart of these efforts should not be thrust upon employee resource groups or "HR functions," but rather upon "core business leaders and managers" (Hunt et al., 2020). Williams (2023)'s recommendations for training are embedded in broader recommendations for controls and programming to protect Black women from covert workplace hostility, indicating that training is not the sole, or even first, solution. These broader initiatives include business practices like transparent recruiting, hiring, promotion, and pay systems

designed to "interrupt bias" (Zheng, 2023) and investing in properly enforcing these internal systems (Hunt et al., 2020).

Figure 4

Dobbin & Kalev's measurements of demographic changes in managers amongst 829 midsize and large US firms to demonstrate high-impact diversity programs

% change over five years in representation among managers

Type of program	White		Black		Hispanic		Asian	
	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN
Voluntary training			+13.3		+9.1		+9.3	+12.6
Self-managed teams	–2.8	+5.6	+3.4	+3.9				+3.6
Cross-training	–1.4	+3.0	+2.7	+3.0	–3.9		+6.5	+4.1
College recruitment: women*	–2.0	+10.2	+7.9	+8.7		+10.0	+18.3	+8.6
College recruitment: minorities**			+7.7	+8.9				
Mentoring				+18.0	+9.1	+23.7	+18.0	+24.0
Diversity task forces	–3.3	+11.6	+8.7	+22.7		+16.2	+30.2	+24.2
Diversity managers		+7.5	+17.0	+11.1	+12.0	+18.2	+10.9	+13.6

*College recruitment targeting women turns recruiting managers into diversity champions, so it also helps boost the numbers for Black and Asian American men.

**College recruitment targeting minorities often focuses on historically Black schools, which lifts the numbers of African American men and women.

Note: Gray indicates no statistical certainty of a program's effect.

Source: Authors' study of 829 midsize and large U.S. firms. The analysis isolated the effects of diversity programs from everything else going on in the companies and in the economy.

HBR

From "Why diversity programs fail: and what works better" by Dobbin, F. and Kalev, A. *Harvard Business Review*, 2016, Harvard Business Publishing (https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail). Copyright © 2023 Harvard Business School Publishing.

Indeed, considering Dobbin & Kalev (2016) observe how many of their 829 companies use mandatory training yet how few use high-impact initiatives, it's likely that companies are resorting to mandatory training as a solution with no meaningful institutional reinforcement. As a

result, companies and marginalized employees miss out on substantial gains, as demonstrated by the high-impact programs' effects in Figure 4.

Accountability controls to ensure DEI program success and DEI training reinforcement include opening up opportunities for employees to enact intended DEI behavior, leadership DEI accountability incentives, going beyond demographics as DEI measurements, and openly sharing DEI measurements to compel accountability. Corley et al. (2022) recommend that executives across the organization collaborate with the Chief Diversity Officer "to craft strategies that link organizational success metrics with DEI goals." For example, one of Detroit Energy's business goals was to transition to renewable energy without layoffs (Corley et al., 2022). They tied DEI into this business initiative by recruiting from marginalized populations (Corley et al., 2022).

Much of the literature emphasizes cross-functional collaboration to identify DEI metrics and execute DEI goals. Dobbin & Kalev (2016) advocate for cross-functional teams and diversity task forces because they help to de-silo internal knowledge and dilute social segregation across race and gender lines. Melaco & Austin (2023) also recommend paying diversity focus groups or steering committees for their time, as providing input is labor. Zheng (2023) recommends that organizations choose specific DEI goals and their metrics "collaboratively with a diverse group of stakeholders" to ensure "these informed guesses are accurate to your organization" (Zheng, 2023).

Collaborative DEI decision making also translates well to establishing subsequent instructional goals, as these, too, should be tailored to the organization and its goals. Organizational measurements beyond the demographic also opens the opportunity for the instructional designer to impart specific skills that align with these goals. If the ideal behavior is

reinforced by substantial DEI infrastructure, the data can also indicate if there is a need for a refresher or remedial training. Purely demographic data cannot reveal such specific diagnoses.

While as mentioned previously, there are no "standard" DEI metrics, Zheng (2023) recommends that the organization construct them after identifying its unique DEI goals. For each DEI goal, organizational leadership must "identify tailored proxy metrics" to help them measure their progress (Zheng, 2023). This process helps to turn something abstract like "belonging" into measurable data indicators like employee retention, which can be broken down into specific demographics to indicate which groups of people aren't being pushed out. Other example measurements include "percentage of formal and informal employee reports resolved in a satisfactory way for the reporter, [...] percentage of the workforce that works when sick," or "monetary losses from legal proceedings associated with unethical behavior like fraud, insider trading, anti-trust behavior, or malpractice" (Zheng, 2023). The organization can then seek actionable means of improving measured outcomes. This can include simple actions like "adjusting job descriptions to mitigate language that filters out diverse candidates" (Melaco & Austin, 2023). Other actions based on metrics can include creating policies in the hopes of improving outcomes. For example, Hunt et al. (2020) recommend that companies should "establish norms for what constitutes open, welcoming behavior," which each organization can reinforce by monitoring how these norms manifest and "ask leaders and employees to assess each other on how they are living up to that behavior." Note that their recommendation does not rely on a self-assessment. Additionally, consider how training can be used to impart skills to support these goals, such as inclusive job description language or mutual accountability skills.

Indeed, strong DEI infrastructure benefits the DEI instructional designer in many ways. Per Cassidy (2022): "when you're getting a consistent result over and over again, it means that

you've got processes in place that are reliably producing those results." Process management and quality control from the organization reinforce the skills imparted in DEI training (Cassidy, 2022). Before turning to an instructional designer, organizational leadership must ask themselves if they have systems in place to ensure employees and their managers understand they are expected to use DEI skills and will be held accountable by their own leaders (Cassidy, 2022). Unfortunately, "that condition is rarely met, but when it is met, then we find that training transfer is more like 80%, 90%, close to 100%, so expectation and accountability really says it all" (Cassidy, 2022). This does not have to be a negative incentive. If instead, managers understand how an initiative is going to improve an output they are responsible for, and have the means to see "evidence as [to] whether it's working or not, we can get their buy in and support" (Cassidy, 2022). The instructional designer also benefits from the business aligning accountability with value: if the organization is "clear about" what it needs and expects from employees, "then we can design [training] to make a difference" (Cassidy, 2022).

Leadership's role in DEI accountability is critical, beyond simply facilitating the creation of DEI goals and metrics. Corley et al. (2022) urges that "leaders need to be held accountable for aligning their overall business strategies with the guidelines they give their DEI teams" (Corley et al., 2022). This includes ensuring that executives and managers learn inclusive leadership practices (Corley et al., 2022), but to avoid the familiar pitfalls, such as Cassidy (2022)'s wasted year-long million-dollar leadership training example, the organization cannot stop at training. They have to set mutual expectations (Cassidy, 2022) and "more emphatically hold all leaders to account" on DEI progress (Hunt et al., 2020), which can be done through monitoring progress on metrics and using leadership incentives to ensure the ideal behavior is reinforced. Similar to the comparison to typing as a job necessary skill, albeit with graver consequences, organizations also

have to be willing to "cycle out leaders who are unable to meet these expectations" (Zheng, 2023) rather than prolong neglectful or abusive behavior.

Zheng points to several examples of including measurable DEI goals in bonus plans for top leadership. Some companies "tie executive pay to the achievement of corporate DEI and Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) goals" (Zheng, 2023). The organization can even encourage leadership to opt into DEI bonus incentives: Zheng (2023) suggests a DEI metric that measures the "percentage of VP-level and above leaders" who have chosen to have "DEI-related responsibilities embedded in their evaluation, promotion, or pay." Such tactics align with Dobbin & Kalev (2016)'s suggestions to leverage vanity, peer pressure, and the social panopticon towards improving leadership's DEI involvement. These tactics seemed to make a weak case for training as shown earlier in this review, but the case for embedding incentives as part of an overall DEI strategy seems sound.

DEI accountability infrastructure is also far more likely to succeed if the organization openly shares its progress on its DEI metrics (Zheng, 2023). Accenture and Nasdaq's CEOs confirmed that sharing DEI data built trust between the company and both its shareholders and employees (Vaghul, 2022). Weak DEI numbers helped motivate Accenture's departments to find ways to improve DEI outcomes (Vaghul, 2022). Openly sharing DEI data also aligns with Dobbin & Kalev (2016)'s emphasis on the importance of the panopticon. They argue diversity task forces help to ensure accountability based on sharing and examining the data (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Diversity task forces in their data sample routinely examine "diversity numbers for the whole company, for business units, and for departments to figure out what needs attention" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). "Accountability theory suggests that having a task force member in a department will cause managers in it to ask themselves, 'Will this look right?' when making

hiring and promotion decisions" (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). As a result of this ongoing accountability, the companies that used this tactic saw a 9-30% increase of POC and white female managers (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016).

Enacting these controls and collecting this data is challenging, as this review has already explored common types of organizational dysfunction. Zheng (2023) warns of "hard-earned findings" from "data-driven DEI efforts" that somehow end up collecting "dust on a shelf." They suggest that when organizations choose their DEI goals and metrics, they also have to create a strategy "for using that data to take action, hold leaders accountable, and communicate the purpose of [their] organization's DEI efforts" (Zheng, 2023). On an ongoing basis, the organization must "effectively safeguard, use, and communicate about the data itself [...] with the same rigor and accountability [as] any serious data-driven initiative" (Zheng, 2023).

Data collection, monitoring, accountability, and instructional design are formidable tasks. To support DEI training outcomes, the organization must also ensure the team has sufficient DEI and training staffing to avoid burnout (Corley et al., 2022; Zheng, 2023). "A strong organizational culture and robust structural foundation are critical for achieving agility that comes from internal strength" (NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel, 2022), which clearly has to be factored into hire forecasting, yet Corley et al (2022)'s evidence suggest it is not. Their data shows CDOs being asked to do more without more resources and staffing, which is probably why they recommend companies invest more into their CDOs (Corley et al., 2022). Zheng, too, advocates companies make "funding and/or headcount available to the entit(ies) tasked with doing DEI work, relative to its size and the size of the organization" (Zheng, 2023).

Given the importance of measurability and accountability in overarching DEI programs, behavioral outcomes are also ideal in DEI instructional design. Forget "smile sheets," forget "hearts and minds." Instead, per Harvard bias researcher and diversity consultant Robert Livingston, designers should "focus on actions and behaviors" (Singal, 2023) in instructional outcomes. Livingston argues the ideal strategy is to "accurately diagnose an organization's specific problems with D.E.I. and to come up with concrete strategies for solving them" rather than trying to "change the attitudes of individual employees" (Singal, 2023). Cassidy (2022) echoes this point in a discussion on compliance training. Experts recommend designers prioritize trainings that have a "value proposition that requires transfer and behavior change" because "there's a lot more opportunity to explore with compliance training [...] rather than just me being able to repeat verbatim because I've done it every year for the past 20 years" (Cassidy, 2022). Maximizing the behavioral outcome over an unmeasurable attitude outcome forces the instructional designer to identify critical barriers to the behavior beyond a simple skill gap (Cassidy, 2022). Depending on the barrier, the designer can either escalate to a DEI taskforce or tailor the training to address it (Cassidy, 2022). It's hard to see how attitude-based outcomes could lead to measuring and properly addressing DEI issues that training is meant to address.

Zheng (2023) encourages methods that instructional designers may recognize as a needs analysis. They recommend identifying the specific affected employee population and looking into various causes (Zheng, 2023). They also suggest several investigative methods, including "additional qualitative data through focus groups, interviews, qualitative surveys, and exit interview data" (Zheng, 2023). Per their example, if there is a gender disparity in turnover between entry-level employees and their managers, an investigation could show this is caused by biased managers, under-resourced managers, and a lack of healthy conflict resolution culture

(Zheng, 2023). An instructional designer might look at Zheng's example and recognize the same methodologies used in a needs analysis. In the example scenario, a professional could correctly identify which of these issues can be best addressed by instruction, and which cannot. While needs analyses apply across training disciplines, tailoring an environment's DEI solutions make this method imperative.

An ideal DEI needs analysis should involve the learner, rather than passively observe and impose upon later. Dobbin & Kalev (2016) advocate for involving the manager as much as possible in DEI efforts. From an instructional perspective, this indicates that the manager is both a training stakeholder, given their status as a superior, and a learner. This point of view aligns with Williams (2023)'s recommendation for supervisor-specific education as well. To appeal to the manager as a stakeholder and learner, Cassidy (2022) advises instructional designers to "show managers what's in it for them to support the training," which will make implementation easier later once the training launches. Robert Brinkerhoff offers generic example talking points of how an instructional designer can approach the conversation with the manager (Cassidy, 2022). He suggests they acknowledge the manager's current responsibilities (ex: "I know you're accountable for driving market share in your unit"), link the training to the responsibilities ("We've got some training coming up that's supposed to help with that"), and ask for their input in maximizing the outcome to mutual benefit ("How can we make sure this isn't a waste of time and money? How can we make sure it helps you get done what you need to get done?" (Cassidy, 2022). This seems a model approach for talking to focus groups during a DEI learner analysis as well, given Zheng and Dirksen's endorsement of leveraging focus groups to involve learners in the process and maximize outcomes (Dirksen & Bozarth, 2020; Zheng, 2023). Therefore, the learner should be considered a stakeholder in a DEI analysis, even if they aren't a manager. This

is especially critical considering the training is intended to support or even protect marginalized learners.

Kulik et al. (2007) offer several suggestions for assessing employee competency to set expectations around the skill gap and even tailor the training. This researcher is skeptical the approach would work for every situation, but it is worth the instructional designer's consideration. They suggest routinely measuring skills competency. They suggest conducting knowledge assessments to measure understanding of civil rights protections (Kulik et al., 2007), but the instructional designer could also use metric outcomes as described earlier to examine behavioral outcomes.

If the score is below what is necessary for competency, such as the standards Wallace suggests establishing to define a fully productive employee, Kulik et al. (2007) recommend triggering remedial training. This is "especially important when the low-skill employees have supervisory responsibilities or occupy positions where diversity incompetence might have particularly large consequences for the organization (e.g., front-line sales employees who regularly interact with diverse customers)" (Kulik et al., 2007). The authors also acknowledge this may make the employee feel threatened, and generally risk backfiring (Kulik et al., 2007). As discussed earlier, however, one can neither neglect a failed job competency or enable harm out of fear of backlash. Regardless, to control for the employee's reaction, they suggest privately showing the employee their competency measure and diverting from a shame-based approach: "the feedback should emphasize how developing particular skills (in this case, a diversity skill set) will help the employee to be a better performer" (Kulik et al., 2007). Being able to show competency measures and involve the learner in improving their performance would simply not be possible with attitude-based instructional goals.

Given the immense scale of many organizations, there are major logistical considerations in implementing an effective training company-wide. For example, Kerry Ferwerda (2023), an ethics and compliance manager for an international manufacturing company, acknowledges that her planning process for a company-wide compliance training event takes a year of preparation. She recommends an asynchronous, flexible material approach that imparts the necessary takeaways to avoid the burden of booking thousands of employees (Ferwerda, 2023). Much of her preparation also included carefully considering how to promote the training in advance (Ferwerda, 2023). This is critical because promotional messaging can enforce the messaging around the "why" of the training. Language justice and timezone accommodation are also critical, so she customized her scheduled email launches for each office's timezone and translates both the materials and training announcements into each office's language (Ferwerda, 2023). Posters on the factory floor promoted the training, listed week-long events, and displayed QR codes (Ferwerda, 2023). She also leveraged leadership to promote the event and reinforce its importance: "Regional directors talked about Ethics and Compliance Week when issuing their own monthly business updates, encouraging their business units participation" (Ferwerda, 2023). An asynchronous approach with tailored promotional tactics and ample lead time is an ideal strategy for a large-scale training.

Rather than neglecting the toughest audience to logistically reach, she identified them: shop floor employees and their managers, whose duties do not require internet access and who have very little time[4] (Ferwerda, 2023). Ferwerda (2023) then tailored several approaches, including leveraging shift managers to make sure the voluntary training event reached them. As a

[4] Ferwerda (2023) mentions, without seeming to recognize the horrific implications, that these employees work 24-hour shifts. This again raises issues of what problems instructional designers can or cannot solve, and even their collaboration with injustice. Regardless, the general tactics to reach large international audiences with varying needs seems an ideal model for instructional designers operating in less exploitative organizations.

result of these efforts, “positive messages [came] back from the shop floor on how they were really pleased to be included and actually felt included” (Ferwerda, 2023). The instructional designer and their supporting organization must recognize that it takes ample time, resources, and consideration to launch an effective large-scale training that reaches and includes all types of employees.

While this review argues for mandatory training, it acknowledges the rich value of supplemental voluntary trainings to build on or enhance the skills covered in the mandatory intervention. Instructional designers must embrace that learning comes in many forms that can support DEI. For example, providing learners easy access to external knowledge resources allows them to “seek out more information on specific topics that [interest] them” (Ferwerda, 2023). Indeed, Kulik et al. (2007) recommend encouraging learner self-efficacy and autonomy by framing DEI skills as a multi-level skill progression beyond the minimum necessary for the job (Kulik et al., 2007). They even suggest sneaking supplemental DEI training into skills that reticent learners are more attracted to: “they may be attracted to training efforts that address particular diversity skills (e.g., training that develops interviewing skills, performance development skills, or conflict management skills within a diverse context)” (Kulik et al., 2007). This turns a DEI training program into a jungle gym: a solid foundation of mandatory skills with supplements on top for learners to explore.

Mentorships are also an excellent training supplement. “Creating formal sponsorship and mentorship programs and effective learning and development programs to promote career growth for underrepresented groups and build connection between junior and senior employees” Zheng (2023) assesses. Similarly, Dobbin & Kalev (2016) observe that mentoring programs have some of the largest impact on DEI outcomes. Employees of color and white female employees struggle

either to find mentors or to receive formal support in their career growth, which makes them usually eager for mentorship if their organization provides the opportunity (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Formal mentorship programs may also need a mandatory touch, as even Dobbin & Kalev (2016) recommend assigning mentees because research indicates "white male executives don't feel comfortable" taking initiative to offer mentorship to demographics other than their own. Instructional designers should consider implementing mentorship programs, as they are an informal yet high-impact form of DEI learning.

At the post-training evaluation stage, instructional designers benefit from qualitative and quantitative indications of behavioral change aligned with the organization's DEI goals. These indications can occur beyond preordained measurements. Other positive indicators can manifest organically. For example, Ferwerda (2023) observed that after her voluntary compliance and ethics training series, departments were "issuing ethical dilemmas each month to be discussed at plant level" and managers were using the training content year-round. Recruiting adopted some of the content in "group development programs," her company's India operations team "took the timeout with all employees and held open sessions so employees could talk freely and openly" about the training's topic (Ferwerda, 2023). After the event, plants chose to reinforce the training and its importance by printing and displaying informational posters (Ferwerda, 2023). On the quantitative level, the instructional designer can compare behavioral metrics over time after the training intervention. The designer can, as Zheng (2023) recommends, compare demographic data to organizational factors to reveal a disparity. Depending on the instruction's intended outcomes, the organizational factors can include "tenure, job level, department, role, management vs. independent contributor status, office location, pay, and remote vs. hybrid status," which are then measured against employee demographics (such as race) to reveal gaps

(Zheng, 2023). Ideally, this data collection and analysis would be performed with leadership and diversity task forces, rather than siloed.

Postmortems are also a critical part of the training evaluation process. Cassidy (2022) suggests "every so often, getting a group of people together, both either formally or informally, and just saying, 'Oh, this happened, what happened next?'" and simply listening to stakeholders' input, thereby collecting "rich data." Similarly, since Ferwerda (2023)'s organization was so large, she leveraged "Compliance & Ethics ambassadors and champions" across the company to perform postmortems in their respective offices or departments. In these postmortems, they discussed "successes and the failures within their organizations and their sites" (Ferwerda, 2023). The postmortem process is an excellent marriage of Dobbin & Kalev's recommendations for involving managers and other stakeholders in addition to leveraging the panopticon. For a mandatory training especially, postmortems "make managers and other stakeholders feel like they are part owner of the results as well" (Cassidy, 2022). This also helps everyone learn from the training's effectiveness: "Metrics bring the most value to DEI work when they're directly used to align leaders on what challenges need addressing" (Zheng, 2023). The cross-functional group can use the postmortem process to investigate gaps, develop action items, and generally rinse and repeat over time to improve instruction's impact and behavioral outcomes overall.

Literature Review Conclusion

Where can society go from here?

The statistics, the barriers, and the lack of empirically-based action items can be overwhelming. The work is necessary. The conditions facilitated by the organization are necessary to make the work possible. Yet there are no guarantees that sufficient resources will be

bestowed. There is great need for actionable items based on empirical research, yet none have yet manifested from decades of research.

Many of the recommendations in this literature review skew idealistic. DEI's importance, in the face of startling statistics, simply might not matter to stakeholders. Business dysfunction and limited capacity also threaten an organization's ability to establish and maintain proper DEI organizational structure. If a solid DEI program cannot be established, the organization cannot place DEI training on a permanent hiatus or await clear results from the perfect needs analysis and evaluation.

However, society must treat a crisis like a crisis. This begins with field experts. For example, in "Why Rent Control Doesn't Work," an episode of Freakonomics Radio, several economists discuss the pros and, ultimately cons, of rent control policy (Dubner, 2019). Per economists' long-term analysis of San Francisco housing policies, rent control results in people of color staying in their homes longer without being pushed out (Dubner, 2019). However, the professors do not place retaining local people of color as a central priority, nor do they discuss policies that can deliver similar results (Dubner, 2019). The episode never once addresses homelessness (Dubner, 2019). The episode is ultimately against rent control because it impacts the creation of new housing and risks repercussions to populations who, given context clues from the discussion, are not at risk of homelessness (Dubner, 2019).

Similarly, in a Fall 2022 lecture in the SDSU Learning Design & Technology program, the professor presented a photo of a lecture auditorium at San Francisco State University (Frazee, 2022). "Only 50% of students chose in-person learning at SFSU this semester. Why?" the caption read (Frazee, 2022). As it turned out, the answer was not a housing crisis, despite a recent SFSU study that declares "In higher education institutions across the country, within the

California State University (CSU) system, and at San Francisco State University (SF State) there is a crisis of student housing insecurity and homelessness" (Torres et al., 2019). Instead, low in-person learning at SFSU was attributed to poor classroom design (Frazee, 2022)[5].

Compare this to Ferwerda (2023)'s offhand mention that workers at her company perform 24-hour shifts. Recall that Williams (2023) proclaims that higher education workplaces cannot address a problem they cannot acknowledge exists. Crises across workplaces cannot be addressed if experts and leaders cannot acknowledge their existence or level of severity.

Due to systemic failure to even recognize, let alone meet crises, many of the recommendations in this review may not be realistically possible for many organizations and many instructional designers. For example, recall Cassidy (2022) stating that learning and development teams rarely have the opportunity to perform a needs analysis, let alone evaluate the result of their training. Still, when recognizing limitations imposed by organizational dysfunction, there is a line between compassionate intervention and compassionate enablement.

Too much is at stake. Therefore, the approach must be harm reduction, as inaction is not an acceptable response to a crisis. Instructional designers must do their best to help stakeholders understand the importance of a solid DEI infrastructure and how it improves training outcomes. Additionally, considering how common Dobbin & Kalev (2016) indicate liability avoidance DEI training is, instructional designers must recognize their own power. If the company has requested DEI training as one of its "precious few shields" in response to a lawsuit, public relations crisis, or some other adverse event, the practitioner has the power to reframe the true crisis. They can point to the controls and accountability structure necessary before they would feel comfortable embarking on an instructional design process. They can make the case that training as a first

[5] This example of an SDSU LDT class is only intended to illustrate a point about privilege in education and recognizing crises.

resort will not resolve the crisis. They can withhold business-as-usual DEI training and raise these concerns in writing, compelling a documented response from company leadership.

Consider DEI training's relatively new existence. Its current form dates back to the 1960s (Singal, 2023), making it younger than the racist land grants and homeownership policies King and Rothstein describe. It would be preposterous to say that DEI training can solve racist government policy. However, shouldn't it somehow spark hope that such a profession exists at all?

Ultimately, the crisis demands action, even if an empirically proven solution has not yet emerged. This review has presented its research and argument, however idealized, to advocate for mandatory DEI training, so long as it is embedded within a substantial organizational DEI framework to reinforce expectations and intended behavior. Any attempts to enact this structure may unfortunately only serve to cause harm reduction at best, especially considering the practical challenges in business implementation. Hopefully, further research can lead to the discovery of more effective DEI approaches.

Basis in Established Psychological Theory and Instructional Design Methodology

Separate from the literature review, this section will overview relevant established psychological theories and instructional design methodology. This section will also briefly explain each theory or method's relevance to DEI training implementation and this specific case study.

The COM-B Model

The COM-B Model of behavior theorizes that behavior is the result of capability ("C"), opportunity ("O"), and motivation ("M") (Michie et al., 2011). Capability refers to an employee's ability to do a skill. For example, if an employee doesn't know how to drive a car,

they can't be expected to transport passengers as part of their job. Opportunity generally refers to factors outside the employee's control that affect their availability to enact the behavior (Michie et al., 2011). For example, if an employee is never given enough time during their workday to complete a form they're supposed to use, they have no means to perform the behavior. Lastly, motivation refers to extrinsic and/or intrinsic stimulus to perform the behavior (Michie et al., 2011). For example, if an employee will gain a bonus for their performance or risk losing their job for failing to complete a task, their organization is imposing external motivation. Julie Dirksen provides an example of intrinsic motivation from her handwashing case. In an interview, a nurse described to her how constantly returning to the sink when she has so much to do makes neglecting her handwashing duties tempting, "but dammit, I'm a good nurse" (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Thus, the nurse performs the intended behavior to preserve her sense of integrity (Bozarth & Dirksen, 2020). Ultimately, an organization would leverage capability (skill imparted or reinforced through training), opportunity (resources, space, timeblocks), and motivation (penalties, incentives, praise) to encourage their workforce's ideal behavior.

The COM-B Model is a helpful lens for understanding dysfunctional DEI implementation. If out-of-the-box DEI training does not include specific action items, ideas rather than skills are being imparted; employees can hardly be expected to enact ideal behavior. Many of Cassidy (2022)'s examples of dysfunctionality in the instructional design profession seem to stem from poor opportunity and motivation. If low behavioral transfer from training is the result of "processes in place that are reliably producing those results" (Cassidy, 2022) that indicates the organization is not providing the necessary time and resources to perform the ideal behavior, and are perhaps unintentionally rewarding non-ideal behaviors. To provide another example from Dirksen, she describes how sales personnel will likely neglect important forms if

they are rewarded for sales volume (Dirksen & Bozarth, 2020). If there are no real penalties for ignoring or improperly using the forms and employees are being incentivized to cram their calendar with as many pitches as possible, of course the organization is unintentionally, yet reliably producing inconsistent sales forms (Dirksen & Bozarth, 2020).

Through a COM-B lens, it's easy to see where organizational intentions fail to become actions, which in turn yield abysmal results. As an example, Cassidy (2022) poses the question "If these people are to change their behavior, what's likely to get in their way, and how do we get rid of those obstacles, as well as how do we get them the skills they need to execute these new behaviors?" If instructional designers are trapped in the "design, deliver, design, deliver" cycle (Cassidy 2022) with no opportunity in their schedule to perform a needs analysis or post-training evaluation, of course they're going to favor out-of-the-box solutions and never measure their results.

Schutz Interpersonal Needs & Motivation

In *Interpersonal Underworld*, William Schutz (1958) describes how organizational dysfunction may result from a workplace failing to meet three basic interpersonal needs. Employees feel safe and stable in a social environment when they feel included, that they can control or predict their environment, and when they feel a positive connection with others (Schutz, 1958). This has many applications to DEI. Clearly, employees being treated as though they don't belong makes them feel unsafe because it deprives them of these essential needs. Additionally, these needs help to inform why so many sources from the literature review encourage autonomy. Autonomy in a training context is the result of the learner feeling included, feeling agency in their learning journey, and feeling not only encouraged, but that their results have a positive impact on their organization. Therefore, involving learners during training

development or encouraging agency in the instructional method itself would encourage autonomy by meeting these needs and result in better outcomes.

Ebbinghaus and The Forgetting Curve

"Vocabularies, discourses, and poems of any length cannot be learned by a single repetition even with the greatest concentration of attention on the part of an individual of very great ability," writes Ebbinghaus (2013), the namesake of the famous Forgetting Curve. Essentially, without context or repetition, learners are likely to forget more and more information as time goes on (Ebbinghaus, 2013). This framework supports why one-off ad hoc DEI training as a first resort is ineffective, and a solid DEI infrastructure to reinforce ideal behavior would be ideal because ongoing accountability demonstrates the context for relevant DEI training takeaways and clear messaging sparks refreshers.

The Kirkpatrick Model

The Kirkpatrick model stratifies the means of measuring a training's effectiveness into four levels (L1, L2, etc.), organized by difficulty (Kirkpatrick Partners, n.d.). Through a COM-B lens, the Kirkpatrick model illuminates why "smile sheets" are so common in learning and development.

In L1, the learners evaluate the instruction (Kirkpatrick Partners, n.d.). Think "smile sheets." Tellingly, Kirkpatrick partners call this "Reaction," indicating it only measures a short-term response.

In L2, the instructional designer evaluates the learners. Think test results (Kirkpatrick Partners, n.d.). In an established L&D program, the instructional designers can see the learner's progression over time and report results back to their manager.

In L3, the instructional designer evaluates the behavior change by looking for indications that the learners are actually using these skills (Kirkpatrick Partners, n.d.). Think internal reports from other departments, such as a demonstrable decrease in paperwork errors.

By L4, the instructional designer can finally show the business value of their training (Kirkpatrick Partners, n.d.). They can show data that indicates the training results in more revenue, for example, or that the compliance program results in employees reducing fraud risk.

As one might imagine, considering this is a model promulgated by a consulting company, there are incredible barriers to achieving L4. As previously discussed, there are fierce debates over whether DEI, let alone DEI training, is worthwhile. The relationship seems obvious in this context. The higher Kirkpatrick levels require advanced organizational infrastructure, particularly in data management, as well as a deep organizational investment in resources. If the instructional designer and/or DEI practitioner does not know where to get the data or if it is not being collected, they can't advance. This is where COM-B provides helpful context. Someone has to collect data. If the designer does not have the skills, tools, or time, it doesn't happen. Someone to analyze the data, recognize inaccurate data, and measure trends. This likely requires a whole other skillset and capacity than the data collector, a role which, as mentioned, the organization is not supporting the designer to fulfill. Lastly, someone has to tell a story with the data, a digestible version to help leadership and other stakeholders understand the situation and what it truly needs. If that can't happen, the instructional issue cannot be solved, and the dysfunction remains. If the practitioner has never learned the skills (C in COM-B) required for hire forecasting or making a business case to create a new role, nor do they have the opportunity to collect the data necessary to make a compelling business case for a new role, they are trapped. If there is no budget, no capacity, and no infrastructure, the result is "smile sheets" at best.

Methods

The researcher used a qualitative approach, gathering information from informal interviews and relevant documents. The researcher met with the Center for Inclusive Excellence, a department under Division of Student Affairs and Campus Diversity. The Center is the primary source of DEI training on campus and is also deeply involved in monitoring progress on the university's initiatives. The researcher also met with the director of JMS and reviewed syllabi, relevant SDSU DEI plans, and the 2021 Self-Study JMS submitted as a routine part of the accreditation process. Frankly, there were not enough follow-up conversations, and the researcher did not provide sufficient structure to the inquiry. The investigation was not nearly enough to understand the university's infrastructure. The methods used are highly subjective, and scrutiny is not only warranted, but welcome, given the paper's overall emphasis on the importance of measuring outcomes. There is a high risk of blind spots and misdiagnosis.

Limitations & Future Research

The researcher heartily echoes Paluck & Green's decades-long plea for field research on prejudice reduction, particularly behavioral intervention methods, with long-term study of the effects. Also, given DEI training's painfully common role to avoid liability or flatter vanity despite its rich potential, society would benefit from empirical research on the direct consequences of training assigned as a liability control or crisis response. Research comparing the outcomes of anti-harassment training, anti-discrimination training, and abuse interventions to enrichment-based DEI interventions would also benefit the field.

Additionally, a case study about something so important as DEI deserves more in-depth data collection methods. In-person shadowing would be a start to on-the-ground data collection. Social listening methods, such as those McKinzey used on anonymous employee review sites,

could yield highly illuminating findings to a responsible researcher. There are free tutorials online that teach a popular sentiment analysis framework (NLTK - Natural Language Toolkit). There are free resources available on how to pull tweets using the Twitter API via a Python library called Tweepy.

Lastly, the researcher regrets the narrow demographic focus of the literature review. Anti-Sinophobia's role in the 2020 racial reckoning and its impact on DEI deserves attention and care. Additionally, recent journalism in the *New York Times* has begun to provide statistics not just on men and women, but on non-binary people as well. Their visibility, and the disproportionate challenges they face, matter. As acknowledged in the glossary, creating a monolith can glaze over critical differences and experiences.

The JMS Dept DEI Plan: (Admittedly, Editorial) Evaluation & Proposed Solutions

San Diego State University employees comprise nearly 10% of the entire California State University system. It is the third largest university in California, with close to 40k enrolled students. The team primarily responsible for providing formal DEI training, the Center for Inclusive Excellence, consists of just four people, who are incredibly passionate about what they do. They are in the familiar "design, deliver, design" trap and have no bandwidth for evaluating the results of their trainings, except for Likert-based pre, post, and post-post (60+ days later) assessments for the student trainings. The overall training and informal learning landscape is richer than the Center for Inclusive Excellence, but it stands out due to its critical role in the university-wide DEI initiatives. Considering its lead by an economist and staffed by other talented and passionate knowledge workers, imagine what it could do for the university if it had more staffing and resources.

Similarly, more undergraduate students want to major in Journalism & Media Studies than JMS is able to accommodate, compelling workarounds in which students "pre-major" by taking the required classes. The JMS faculty reported feeling stretched thin in the department's 2015 self-study. The remedies reported in the 2021 self-study, which also acknowledge residual burnout from the pandemic, are unconvincing, and the self-study prophesizes that it will take years to reduce the strain. By the JMS Plan's own admission, the faculty are "overburdened already and short on time," a warning sign that the university should have addressed upon approving the plan. Assigning new initiatives to an overworked team, even one back to treading water, tends to be a death sentence for the initiatives. It is unsurprising that not all of the JMS Plan has been fulfilled yet, and impressive that any of it has, likely owed to the department's overwhelming enthusiasm and dedication. Additionally unsurprising, JMS has not, to date, released an annual report on its progress implementing its Plan. Considering the Center for Inclusive Excellence rarely receives any requests related to annual DEI self-reports from other departments, JMS is not the only department in this predicament. The College isn't giving guidance on how to do the annual reports and apparently no one is enforcing the report requirement, which makes the obligation fall off the radar. Once again, measuring results suffers due to low capacity. This likely indicates that annual reports are simply not the right means of measurement.

SDSU has clearly invested a lot of time, thought, and resources into its DEI initiatives. The 2018 Senate resolution seems to have been designed with excellent controls by providing clear instructions, setting expectations, providing training resources, enforcing the deadline with meaningful negative incentives, balancing a framework with self-determination, and targeting high-impact areas like hiring. The university invested "months of institutional research,

benchmarking, and community engagement and input" into developing "We Rise, We Defy." Many milestones outlined in the plan include investing more in ensuring capacity. Much of the methodology aligns with recommendations from the literature review.

However, capacity appears to be too limited, which is affecting measurements and outcomes. The university has provided support, but it needs to do more to truly see success. It must recognize that asking existing staff and faculty to support new initiatives on top of their routine job duties creates yet another role. This can be alleviated by implementing better hire forecasting and capacity measurements to ensure faculty are not in the midst of recovering from overwhelm when new and worthy responsibilities emerge.

According to Peter Drucker (1999), the 20th century's economic and social advancement were owed to society's ability to maximize manual labor output by maximizing quantity output from each worker as much as possible. The 21st century, however, will struggle until management studies can figure out how to measure and optimize the productivity of the knowledge worker (Drucker, 1999). Knowledge work, such as that of a researcher or a professor, requires reflection, planning, and forethought. It needs time and cannot be performed in reaction mode. "In most knowledge work," Drucker wrote in 1999, "Quality is the essence of the output. In judging the performance of a teacher, we do not ask how many students there can be in his or her class."

Apparently, we do, to some degree. The current apparent means of filling faculty headcount needs seems to have a meat grinder effect. SDSU primarily bases its resource distribution on how many Full-Time Equivalent Students (FTSEs) are enrolled. However, professors are not just teachers. SDSU follows a "teacher-scholar model," which it intends to leverage more as part of its "We Rise We Defy" strategy to increase its research reputation.

Under the teacher-scholar model, all tenured or tenure-track faculty are expected to pursue research as well. Some of these professors also service as advisors, causing them to also dedicate time to performing related services. It does not seem that this knowledge work's capacity is being accurately measured and accommodated. For example, by August 2022, the LDT program had close to 50 graduate students and Dr. Wang, the head of LDT, was the only available advisor. The 2021 JMS Self-Study indicates that creating new 500-level LDT courses and opening them to JMS undergrads and graduate students will hopefully launch an LDT major, all of which "should allow the opportunity to create new faculty lines and begin to build back the LDT faculty" from recent faculty reductions (which unfortunately continued after the self-study). "Since being brought into the school, the LDT program has not been well-integrated into what the school does," reads the 2021 self-report, implying that the program needed more support during a critical change management process. This all seems terribly unfair to Dr. Wang. If a program is already overwhelmed and has experienced a recent staff reduction, why is the only approach for relief at SDSU to take on even more responsibilities until it becomes apparently overwhelming, if not impossible workload?

There are indications that the rest of JMS, and even other schools, are feeling strain with no relief, which will impact their capacity to execute initiatives, like DEI, which truly requires attention and care. "Currently, the School's resource needs are met to maintain what we have done and what we are doing," the 2021 self-report reads, but it also acknowledges they need 2-3 more faculty and, as previously discussed, acknowledges in its DEI Plan that the faculty are overwhelmed. As a workaround, JMS apparently hires as many lecturers/adjuncts as they do faculty, which has the adverse effect of department announcements and decisions only reaching about half of the instructors. A remark in the 2021 Self-Study also indicates that capacity issues

are straining other schools, seeing as JMS is one of the few programs that can guarantee students seats in the classes required for their major, which “numerous other academic units on campus” cannot provide.

Therefore, the university should revisit its hiring forecast and capacity measurements, ideally by engaging a consulting company rather than by risking further burden to its own internal personnel. Assessing and meeting both for faculty and staff requirements would likely take a long time even if engaging a consulting company. However, by no means would this pause DEI initiatives, as they are greatly needed. Likely, the emerging capacity data could inform even better initiatives and more realistic timelines. For example, a four-person DEI training department seems preposterous for SDSU’s DEI-related ambitions and immense size. A realistic measure of its limitations and potential would be incredibly useful information.

Often, JMS seems stymied by lack of support from SDSU and compelled to seek its own solution. Because SDSU’s “academic planning process” is “irregularly implemented,” the JMS faculty carry on routinely discussing their department’s strategic direction on their own. Similarly, because of “previous delays in data delivery by the SDSU Office of Student Testing [...]" they opted for their own exam on Qualtrics. The LDT website can’t be updated and has out of date courses, so the program engaged students to build a separate website to accurately advertise information about the program. Also notably, “large increases in budgets or funding are unlikely” for JMS.

This creates a familiar pattern in the JMS Plan implementation. There have only been a few ad-hoc DEI trainings hosted in the JMS faculty meetings since the Plan launched, which began with a January 2022 training about how to have difficult conversations. With the Center of Inclusive Excellence’s limited bandwidth, they can only tailor the training so much based on

each internal client's needs. JMS therefore resolved to develop and deliver their own training to better tailor to their specific audience and needs. The training has not yet emerged.

Another university-wide issue impacting DEI implementation is the lack of ease in monitoring staff and faculty DEI data. Across the university, loads of staff and faculty data gets collected, both qualitative and quantitative. But it's rarely centralized, which clearly affects the ability to make sense of DEI gaps and progress. There are a variety of surveys and satisfaction measures. An anonymous staff climate survey went to all 5,000 staff members in 2022. There are focus groups. It's just that the data is kept in disparate places, and even though much of it is online, scattered data is not accessible data. Depending on who an employee asks, they might get different answers on where to find data, or whether SDSU has it at all. This siloing risks duplicative work and false starts, but it also makes it hard to see the full tapestry of needs and successes. This is a common scaling issue for large organizations, and it's unfortunate that establishing so many DEI committees to make data-driven decisions on improving staff and faculty experience is apparently not resulting in much de-silong or data centralization.

Every division across the university has a diversity strategic plan with specific goals and implementation measures, and a diversity council. All of these unit plans and the members of their councils should be listed online, but there are disconnections within the university infrastructure that prevent this. Some of the links to unit's DEI plans are blank on the Diversity and Inclusion Planning webpage, and even though the site is intended to be public-facing, one of the links on the page is a Google Doc restricted to SDSU accounts only. Almost every entry on the Diversity Councils page is empty. This is not to say that updating this information would impact DEI outcomes much. In fact, energy is better spent focusing on any initiative in any unit

Plan. This example of weak transparency online is yet another symptom of organizational size affecting implementation.

Ultimately, the lack of centralized workplace DEI data results in a lack of transparency. It's not much in the way of accountability or a panopticon. It also makes it difficult to measure outcomes. Therefore, it is the university's responsibility to invest in DEI-focused data scientist teams that specialize in unifying disparate data to truly understand staff and faculty needs. As previously discussed, even a Kirkpatrick L4, purely within the context of evaluating a training program, requires at least three data-focused roles. If the existing data is so rich and yet so disparate, the university should investigate into a reasonable estimate for the capacity and headcount of filling these new data scientist teams.

Conversely, JMS has been able to leverage the rich available data on student experiences to make data-driven DEI decisions. "JMS is exceeding the rates of graduation by considerable margins," the self-study affirms, "we are graduating our minority students at higher rates and in faster times." JMS "leads in assessment [of student knowledge] on campus, as evidenced in the University's own accreditation report." The program measures student knowledge development using numerical data (pre and post assessment "each semester") and a qualitative assessment ("via senior internship portfolio presentations"). Indeed, JMS' DEI Plan implementation seems most successful when they overcome their limitations to prioritize the student experience. The self-study notes that there was a distinct equity gap in the Econ 101 requirement for the major. "If we require that course and the performance in that class is related to getting into the major," the self-study reads, "we are using a metric we know puts certain groups at a disadvantage." As a result, JMS dropped Econ 101 and replaced it with a required course on intersectionality, which they intentionally placed early in the core curriculum to signal the topic's importance.

In yet another example of data-driven action, the department noticed that the Grammar-Spelling-Punctuation (GSP) Test admissions requirement was creating a gap that impacted marginalized students. After piloting a training intervention replacement (English Grammar Usage Mechanics Punctuation Program), and examining the results, JMS was able to implement a change. However, the self-study acknowledges a long period of "dissatisfaction" with the GSP until the "pandemic provided the necessary motivation to finally shift away," indicating a gap between intention and action that may have been impacted by overwhelm. Regardless, JMS is monitoring the results of the training. "Early data suggests that this is working [...] not only are more passing, but having a more rigorous standard (90% for pass compared to 70% for pass) was feasible."

Even apart from data-driven actions, JMS also invests time and energy into other student-focused initiatives that align with its JMS Plan. Upon noticing that JMS students were taking the required ethics course last, the department changed the course to a prerequisite to indicate its importance and impart such related critical skills early. In addition, to make the required course more accessible and more enticing to take as early as possible, the department moved it to an online, asynchronous format. The self-report asserts that many elective courses cover "significant, in-depth material related to diversity issues," and then lists seven new courses that had been added to the curriculum as a result of the diversity initiatives. The content of many of the new courses, in addition to potentially offering Bilingual Media & Reporting, is also intended to reflect SDSU's status as a Hispanic-Serving Institution. "Every one of the courses listed above do not just have modules related to diversity; rather, they have diversity and inclusion as central elements of what they do," declares the self-report.

However, the LDT program has, likely due to its dire headcount issues, fallen behind on the curriculum enhancement piece of the JMS DEI initiative. It was not until last semester that this researcher noticed any explicitly DEI-related content in an LDT course, and even then, it was just a module, contrary to the self-report's sentiment on the DEI-based curriculum revisions. The self-report does not acknowledge this discrepancy. "It is now time to act and ensure that LDT aligns with the overall vision of JMS, and that the program compliments and adds to what we are doing in a meaningful way," the self-report says, but in the context of storytelling, not explicitly DEI. In another section, the self-study reads "Just as all JMS programs will be evaluating its curriculum, LDT should evaluate its course offerings to determine if it has kept pace with the industry," missing the gap on DEI curriculum implementation.

Upon examining 10 LDT course syllabi from 2021-2023, this researcher noticed that any DEI-related content apparent in the syllabi was a module at best. Notably, Dr. Frazee's syllabi stand out as apparently having the most DEI content. For example, the only LDT course with a DEI-related core competency is her Performance Technology class. "Describe ways that PT people respond to recurrent and important challenges, such as a diverse and global workforce, new employee onboarding, and technology innovation," it reads. The LDT program is designed to teach about understanding learners and improving instruction, which makes this gap troubling. It doesn't realistically reflect the audiences that graduates will engage in their careers. Surely if the university invests more support, the program can dedicate much-needed time to keep pace with its own department's Plan.

Ultimately, the JMS Plan would benefit from changes both within and outside its control. As discussed, the university needs to do more to relieve overworked faculty, centralize DEI-related data, and properly scale in general. There is only so much success the JMS

department can achieve without this organizational support. However, there are some adjustments it can make to "balance boldness with reality," as the self-report phrases it. For one, JMS seems to be doing very well at pursuing its student-related DEI goals, even if there is aforementioned room for improvement. The Plan would benefit from including staff and faculty DEI-related goals, choosing the most important ideal outcomes besides hiring demographics, and identifying what measurements are realistically accessible, given the lack of central "truth." The Center for Inclusive Excellence would likely offer excellent support in finding helpful data sources to support ongoing monitoring.

Additionally, the annual report is clearly insufficient accountability control. If the College cannot provide clearer guidance on the report, then the College should also respect JMS' choice to switch to a different control. Because JMS already partners with other departments, such as Communications and Hospitality, to meet mutual needs, it can ask for support on self-imposing penalties. For example, if JMS has no record of reviewing its chosen DEI metrics and reviewed them with the School of Communication, the School can help to hold JMS accountable by withholding resources until JMS resumes its ideal behavior.

Lastly, though JMS seems aware that it has unique DEI training needs, it seems to be struggling to assess and deploy its own training due to overwhelm. It might be too risky or impractical to suggest DEI as a standing LDT course that performs the needed instructional design function, but regardless, LDT students could have some role in serving this need. JMS should consider a client project for LDT students in which they can be leveraged to both relieve labor and experience hands-on learning. They could perform the needs analysis on behalf of the Center for Inclusive Excellence, and then work under the direction of, or even shadow, an

experienced DEI professional like Conor Mclaughlin or Lott Hill, the instructional designers on the Center's staff.

Conclusion

The researcher is unable to find the source on a search engine, but an author recently wrote about the modern myths behind major American political parties. The one that seems to tragically applicable to DEI goes something like this:

There was this building we made together from stones.

But someone has taken the stones, and if we just put them back, everything will be okay again.

It's essentially the myth of the progressive (as opposed to radical or liberationist). For example, when Better Mortgage was developing an anti-racist appraisal program, part of the difficulty was the fact there was no non-racist version of appraisal in the past to draw from.

We can't conceptualize the full picture of DEI as an endgame because it hasn't happened. There is no past example to draw from. We are making our best guesses at what a truly inclusive workplace looks like. Sometimes these guesses are wrong, and with great consequence.

Here's to the future.

References

Alexander, M. (2010). The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. The New Press.

Alvarado, L. A. (2010). Dispelling the meritocracy myth: Lessons for higher education and student affairs educators. *The Vermont Connection, 31*(1), 2. https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=tvc

Anand, D., & Hsu, L. M. (2020). COVID-19 and Black Lives Matter: Examining anti-Asian racism and anti-Blackness in US education. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Higher Education, 5*(1), 190–.

Anand, R., & Winters, M.-F. (2008). A Retrospective View of Corporate Diversity Training from 1964 to the Present. *Academy of Management Learning & Education, 7*(3), 356–372. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMLE.2008.34251673

Anyon, J. (1980). Social class and the hidden curriculum of work. *Journal of Education, 162*(1), 67–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/002205748016200106

Asare, J. G. (2021, October 31). Why are white-led DEI firms receiving more funding than their counterparts? *Forbes*. https://www.forbes.com/sites/janicegassam/2021/10/31/why-are-white-led-dei-firms-receiving-more-funding-than-their-counterparts/?sh=2467a62c7112

Associated Press (2020, July 20). Explaining AP style on Black and white. *AP News*. https://apnews.com/article/archive-race-and-ethnicity-9105661462

Aurora Acquisition Corp. (2022, April 25). *Amendment No. 5 to Form S-4 registration statement*. https://stock.us/sec/1835856/0001193125-22-117687

Bancroft, L. (2002). Why does he do that? *Berkeley Books*.

Bastian, R. (2021, September 17). Black founders are missing out on venture funding for diversity hiring platforms. *Forbes*. https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebekahbastian/2021/09/17/black-founders-are-missing-out-on-venture-funding-for-diversity-hiring-platforms/?sh=6b5523952b98

Benns, W. (2015, September). American slavery, reinvented. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/

Bertrand Jones, T., Osborne Lampkin, L., Patterson, S., & Davis, D. J. (2015). Creating a "safe and supportive environment": Mentoring and professional development for recent black women doctoral graduates. *International Journal of Doctoral Studies, 10*, 483–499. http://ijds.org/Volume10/IJDSv10p483-499Jones1748.pdf

Blas, T. (2019, October 23). Latina, Latino, or LatinX? Here's the history, and why Latine might work better. Vox. https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/10/15/20914347/latin-latina-latino-latinx-means

BofA's Merrill reaches $160M settlement in racial discrimination lawsuit. (2013, September 2013). *Bloomberg News*. https://www.investmentnews.com/bofas-merrill-reaches-160m-settlement-in-racial-discrimination-lawsuit-53455

Bozarth, J. & Dirksen, J. (2020). Designing for behavior change: A conversation with Julie Dirksen. https://www.learningguild.com/insights/249/designing-for-behavior-change-a-conversation-with-julie-dirksen/?from=content&mode=filter&source=insights&topic=37

Brien, R. & Bertrand, R. (1980). Some facts concerning the performance time of different tasks of the systematic design of instruction. *NSPI Journal, 19*(5), 40–42. https://doi.org/10.1002/pfi.4180190522

Brown, L., Williams, B. M., & Williams, Q. 2021. Melanin messages: Black college women's experiences and reflections on navigating colorism. *Journal of Diversity in Higher Education.*

Bryant, T. (2023, March 17). Diversity is not hurting the financial sector. Inclusive organizations are getting their money's worth–and disproving DEI's expendability narrative. *Fortune*. https://fortune.com/2023/03/17/diversity-not-hurting-financial-sector-inclusive-organizations-money-worthand-disproving-dei-expendability-narrative-banks-finance-trier-bryant/?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=252168023&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--woxkNoHF-wH_p1WgktrUNo1JJSwS7PfikgmsFfGWb-aTWHA08xD1auS1WhFUVYi9YeNMUfNQu67laMFqoA8iMU93RO6SSLjgSCLt8QNWG-CIy1-A&utm_content=252168023&utm_source=hs_email

Castilla, E. J. (2015). Accounting for the gap: A firm study manipulating organizational accountability and transparency in pay decisions. *Organization Science (Providence, R.I.), 26*(2), 311–333. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0950

Cassidy, N. (Host). (2022, March 8). Evidence-based L&D: measuring learning transfer (181) [Audio podcast episode]. In *CIPD Podcast*. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. https://www.cipd.co.uk/podcasts/transfer-of-learning

Claessens, B. J.C., van Eerde, W., Rutte, C. G., & Roe, R. A. (2010). Things to do today . . . : A daily diary study on task completion at work. *Applied Psychology*, *59*(2), 273–295. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2009.00390

Collins, P. H. (2000). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment* (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Corley, T., Pamphile, V., & Sawyer, K. (2022, September 23). What has (and hasn't) changed about being a chief diversity officer. *Harvard Business Review.* Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2022/09/what-has-and-hasnt-changed-about-being-a-chief-diversity-officer

De la Torre, A. (2023, February 7). Transition for Vice President of Student Affairs & Campus Diversity. *Comms.SDSU.Edu.* http://view.comms.sdsu.edu/?qs=0f95cd12ec9ac749898ec4c9352926346055c8e4b6e6e6f3432340e9172a4ce71c7ecdc2bac76a68fec76863276966f1f4f5dbf664c32b97f49151b558f6673b00072dbc447f8c3108106c5366b001aa

De la Torre, A., Ochoa, S. H., Wood, J. L., McClish, G., Chung, Y. B., Olevsky, E., Reinig, B., Hooker, S., Shannon, P., Roberts, J., Ponce, G., McCarthy, P., Seshan, R. (2020, June 19). *Statements from the Chief Diversity Officer*. San Diego State University. https://sacd.sdsu.edu/diversity-initiatives/statements_cdo

Dobbin, F., & Kalev, A. (2016). Why diversity programs fail: and what works better. *Harvard Business Review*, *94*(7-8), p.52. https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail

Dobbin, F., & Kalev, A. (2018). Why doesn't diversity training work?: The challenge for industry and academia. *Anthropology Now, 10*, 48–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/19428200.2018.1493182

Dover, T. L., Major, B., & Kaiser, C. R. (2016). Members of high-status groups are threatened by pro-diversity organizational messages. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 62*, 58–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.006

Drucker, P. F. (1999). Knowledge-worker productivity: The biggest challenge. *California Management Review, 41*(2), 79–94. https://doi.org/10.2307/41165987

Drucker, P. F. (2007). The practice of management. *Elsevier* (Rev. ed.). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780080942360

Dubner, S. (Host). (2019, April 3). Why rent control doesn't work (373). [Audio podcast episode]. In *Freakonomics Radio*. Renbud Radio, LLC. https://freakonomics.com/podcast/why-rent-control-doesnt-work/

Ebbinghaus, H. (2013). Memory: a contribution to experimental psychology. *Annals of Neurosciences, 20*(4), 155–156. https://doi.org/10.5214/ans.0972.7531.200408

Feder, L., & Wilson, D. B. (2005). A meta-analytic review of court-mandated batterer intervention programs: Can courts affect abusers' behavior? *Journal of Experimental Criminology, 1*(2), 239–262. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-005-1179-0

Ferwerda, K. (2023, February 24). *Actionable ideas for your corporate Ethics & Compliance Week* [Interview]. Principled Podcast; Legal Research Network. https://blog.lrn.com/actionable-ideas-for-your-corporate-ethics-and-compliance-week?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

Frazee, R. (2022, September 26). Session 3.1 LDT 671 [PDF slides]. SDSU. https://sdsu.instructure.com/courses/104927/external_tools/retrieve?display=borderless&url=https%3A%2F%2Fgoogle-drive-lti-iad-prod.instructure.com%2Flti%2Fcontent-view%2Frce%2F344975126

Flynn, G. (1999). White males see diversity's other side. *Workforce*, 52–55.

Geloso, V. (2019, August 21). Slavery did not make America richer. American Institute for Economic Research. https://www.aier.org/article/slavery-did-not-make-america-richer/

Gilbert, J. A., Stead, B. A., & Ivancevich, J. M. (1999). Diversity management: A new organizational paradigm. *Journal of Business Ethics, 21*, 61–76

Global diversity and inclusion (D&I) industry: what`s new for 2022? (2022, Feb 22). *NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel.* https://www.proquest.com/wire-feeds/global-diversity-inclusion-d-amp-i-industry/docview/2631468231/se-2

Gulati, R. (2018). Structure that's not stifling. *Harvard Business Review, 96*(3), 68-79. https://hbr.org/2018/05/structure-thats-not-stifling

Gyllenhaal, A. F. (2021). *Those with a stake in the conversation: How traditionally marginalized identities impact the interpretation of corporate advocacy* [Master's thesis, San Diego State University]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Hall, S. (Ed.). (1997). *Representation: cultural representations and signifying practices* (Vol. 1997). London: Sage.

Harassment Prevention Training for Employees (California). (2020). BAI.

Harassment Prevention Training for Employees [California] (SB1343). (2020). VuBiz.

Hayes, J. (2013, September 18). Gender wage gap projected to close in year 2058: Most women working today will not see equal pay during their working lives. Institute for Women's Policy Research. https://iwpr.org/iwpr-issues/esme/gender-wage-gap-projected-to-close-in-year-2058-most-women-working-today-will-not-see-equal-pay-during-their-working-lives/

Hoffmann, A. & Otteby, K. (2018). Personal finance blogs: Helpful tool for consumers with low financial literacy or preaching to the choir? *International Journal of Consumer Studies, 42*(2), 241–254. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcs.12412

Hollis, L. P. (2018). Bullied out of position: Black women's complex intersectionality, workplace bullying, and resulting career disruption. *Journal of Black Sexuality and Relationships, 4*(3), 73–89. https://doi.org/10.1353/bsr.2018.0004

Hoffman, K. (2004, May 5). Burning down the house. *The Cleveland Scene*. https://www.clevescene.com/news/burning-down-the-house-1486320

Huang, H. (2013, October 1). *Whose 'American Dream'? Hope, fear, and loathing in the USA* [Presentation]. Tuesday Noon Academy, Claremont, CA, United States.

Hunt, S., Dixon-Fyle, V., Prince, S., & Dolan, K. (2020, May). Diversity wins: how inclusion matters. *McKinsey & Company*. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/diversity%20and%20inclusion/diversity%20wins%20how%20inclusion%20matters/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters-vf.pdf

Isaacs, J. B. (2007, November 13). Economic mobility of Black and white families. The Brooking Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-mobility-of-black-and-white-families/

Inciardi, J. A., & Harrison, L. D. (2000). *Harm reduction national and international perspectives.* SAGE.

Kaye, Beverly. (2012). The systems we build...the conversations we hold. In Tavis, A., Vosburgh, R. & Gubman, E. (Eds.), *Point counterpoint: new perspectives on people & strategy*,*1*(40-41): Society for Human Resource Management.

Kessler, A. (2023, March 12). Who killed Silicon Valley Bank. *The Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-killed-silicon-valley-bank-interest-rates-treasury-federal-reserve-ipo-loan-long-term-bond-capital-securities-startup-jpmorgan-bear-stearns-lehman-brothers-b9ca2347?mod=djemalertNEWS

Kidder, D. L., Lankau, M. J., Chrobot-Mason, D., Mollica, K. A., & Friedman, R. A. (2004). Backlash toward diversity initiatives: Examining the impact of diversity program

justification, personal, and group outcomes. *The International Journal of Conflict Management, 15*(1), 77–102. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022908

Kim, W. (2023, March 14). Why Republicans blame the Silicon Valley Bank collapse on "woke" capitalism. *Vox.* https://www.vox.com/money/23638473/silicon-valley-bank-failure-fdic-republicans?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=252168023&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_zzsyxemH5A75UAMLmBNXyzoyYvaUDwLBIeAy1fish0R8V8QuxPm2ngnCSPRn1ZGSR77VJJ10p9so4h-BfRFutPv1IzTTahwwV0SXajh_HoEGjbwk&utm_content=252168023&utm_source=hs_email

King, M. L. (2018, February). Martin Luther King Jr. saw three evils in the world. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/martin-luther-king-hungry-club-forum/552533/

Kinney, G. A. (2023, March 1)(a). Ethical training. Nerd Out. https://substack.com/redirect/2/eyJlIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9hbHluLnN1YnN0YWNrLmNvbS9wL2V0aGljYWwtdHJhaW5pbmc_dG9rZW49ZXlKMWMyVnlYMmxrSWpveE1qUTRNVFV4TWpJc0luQnZjM1JmYVdRaU9qRXdOVEUwT1RZek5pd2lhV0YwSWpveE5qYzNOamM1TkRRMExDSmxlSEFpT2pFMk9EQXlOekUwTkRRc0ltbHpjeUk2SW5CMVlpMDVNekUzTmpBaUxDSnpkV0lpT2lKd2IzTjBMWEpsWVdOMGFXOXVJbjAuaUVGS19HMmJXQ1B3UGFQWVNvZE94dUc5UWFKc3lqSnJhaE9PR3BCODhMdyIsInAiOjEwNTE0OTYzNiwicyI6OTMxNzYwLCJmIjp0cnVlLCJ1IjoxMjQ4MTUxMjIsImlhdCI6MTY3NzY3OTQ0NCwiZXhwIjoxNjgwMjcxNDQ0LCJpc3MiOiJwdWItMCIsInN1YiI6ImxpbmstcmVkaXJlY3QifQ.TjBo2P3m69mAGu_kCaNvy_RvYPJYDX_EgLWFD0lRwFM?

Kinney, G. A. (2023, February 22)(b). Quality learning. Nerd Out. https://substack.com/redirect/2/eyJlIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9hbHluLnN1YnN0YWNrLmNvbS9wL3F1YWxpdHktbGVhcm5pbmc_dG9rZW49ZXlKMWMyVnlYMmxrSWpveE1qUTRNVFV4TWpJc0luQnZjM1JmYVdRaU9qRXdNemM1TkRFMk9Dd2lhV0YwSWpveE5qYzNNRGMwTkRnekxDSmxlSEFpT2pFMk56azJOalkwT0RNc0ltbHpjeUk2SW5CMVlpMDVNekUzTmpBaUxDSnpkV0lpT2lKd2IzTjBMWEpsWVdOMGFXOXXVJbjAuM2J0a296dlZYWUtpWXY2MmlPQkNaQWdXaVctLWtIVGVjRTBuVHdUdk43QSIsInAiOjEwMzc5NDE2OCwicyI6OTMxNzYwLCJmIjp0cnVlLCJ1IjoxMjQ4MTUxMjIsImlhdCI6MTY3NzA3NDQ4MywiZXhwIjoxNjc5NjY2NDgzLCJpc3MiOiJwdWItMCIsInN1YiI6ImxpbmstcmVkaXJlY3QifQ.nUsuzDSAAMhrvYuXT7AAnt2Vz43zaoqJzR5lcoqVD7E?

Kirkpatrick Partners. (n.d.) *What is the Kirkpatrick Model?* https://kirkpatrickpartners.com/the-kirkpatrick-model/

Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay-inferences: Effects on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19*(5), 448–468. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(83)90022-7

Kulik, C. T., Pepper, M. B., Roberson, L., & Parker, S. K. (2007). The rich get richer: predicting participation in voluntary diversity training. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28*(6), 753–769. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.444

Kumar, R. S. (2020, May 7). Coronavirus turning Indians' American dream sour. American Bazaar Online.

https://www.americanbazaaronline.com/2020/05/07/coronavirus-turning-indians-american-dream-sour-440997/

Lilienfeld, S. O. (2007). Psychological treatments that cause harm. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *2*(1), 53–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00029.x

Lilienfeld, S. O. (2017). Microaggressions: strong claims, inadequate evidence. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12*(1), 138–169. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616659391

Lindemann, K. (2019). Clean copy PSFA diversity and inclusion planning final [DOC].

Liu, A. (2011). Unraveling the myth of meritocracy within the context of U.S. higher education. *Higher Education, 62*(4), 383–397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-010-9394-7

Magsombol, D. (2023, April). Resilience For Liberation [Webinar]. Lumos Transforms.

Manitoba Trauma & Recovery Center. (2013). Phases of trauma recovery. Trauma Recovery. https://trauma-recovery.ca/recovery/phases-of-trauma-recovery/

Melaco, C. & Austin, M. (2023, January 31). Use equity assessments. *The Anti-Racism Daily.* *https://the-ard.com/2023/01/31/how-equity-audit-can-build-better-organizations/?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=243850168&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--ycNMWCVdOm75-fVjoiYc01BJyKL8fppQrypb8jlvPR0JLcWts-jj6U9rpbfBdDC86r-bULAif5KkRa2C7KW0eKZXOC930n2Tk5fBVFMgZ3W7NVXQ&utm_content=243850168&utm_source=hs_email*

Michie, S., van Stralen, M. M., & West, R. (2011). The behaviour change wheel: A new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions. *Implementation Science : IS, 6*(1), 42–42. https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-6-42

Mousa S. 2020. Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq. *Science 369(*866–70).

Northup, T. & Shannon, P. (2022, February). 2021 Self-study report for accreditation in journalism and mass communications. Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:c83c5ae6-bfc4-357b-b53d-22f730074c54

Osterheldt, J. (2019, January 20). Martin Luther King Jr. wasn't a colorblind dreamer. *The Boston Globe*. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/20/martin-luther-king-wasn-colorblind-dreamer/Z1Yhlw4WVw0XnnBNuLtUrN/story.html

Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60*(1), 339–367. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163607

Paluck, E. L., Porat, R., Clark, C. S., & Green, D. P. (2021). Prejudice reduction: progress and challenges. *Annual Review of Psychology, 72*(1), 533–560. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-071620-030619

Perez, R. J., & Haley, J. D. (2021). The power of supervision in (re)socializing student affairs educators. *New Directions for Student Services, 2021*(175), 31–39. https://doi.org/10.1002/ss.20394

Preventing Workplace Harassment for Employees (California). (2022). BAI.

Rivera, L. A. (2015). Pedigree : how elite students get elite jobs. Princeton University Press.

Rossett, A., & Bickham, T. (1994). Diversity training: Hope, faith and cynicism. *Training, 31*(1), 40–46

Ross, T. (Host). (2019, October 21). Dasarte on overcoming adversity and racism in the financial industry (No. 4) [Video podcast episode]. In *The human advisor podcast*. Altruist. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFaLRp98KNU

Rothstein, R. (2017). *The color of law: a forgotten history of how our government segregated America*. Liveright.

San Diego State University. (2020, August). *We rise we defy: Transcending borders, transforming lives*. San Diego State University. https://www.sdsu.edu/strategic-plan

San Diego State University. (2022). *Campus diversity initiatives*. San Diego State University. https://sacd.sdsu.edu/diversity-initiatives/campus-diversity-initiatives

Sathiyamurthy, S. (2023, March 1). The art of unlearning. UX Collective. https://uxdesign.cc/the-art-of-unlearning-6025a7fdf56f

Scacco, A., & Warren, S. S. (2018). Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. *The American Political Science Review, 112*(3), 654–677. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000151

Schutz, W. C. (1958). Interpersonal underworld [group behavior in business]. *Harvard Business Review, 36*(4), 123–135.

Shah, A., Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2012). Some consequences of having too little. *Science, 338*(6107), 682–685.

Singal, J. (2023, January 17). What if diversity trainings are doing more harm than good? *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/17/opinion/dei-trainings-effective.html

Smith, A. D. Twilight: 1992. *Anchor Books*, *1*, 1994.

Tavis, A., Vosburgh, R., & Gubman, E. (Eds.). (2012). *Point counterpoint : New perspectives on people & strategy*. ProQuest Ebook Central https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Taylor, P., Kochar, R., Fry, R., Velasco, G., & Motel, S. (2011, July 26). Wealth gaps rise to record highs between whites, Blacks and Hispanics. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/

Thomas, K. M., Johnson-Bailey, J., Phelps, R. E., Tran, N. M., & Johnson, L. (2013). Women of color at midcareer: Going from pet to threat. In L. Comas-Diaz & B. Green (Eds.), *The psychological health of women of color: Intersections, challenges, and opportunities* (pp. 275–286). Guilford Press

Thomas, R. R., Jr. (1990). From affirmative action to affirming diversity. *Harvard Business Review, 90*(2): 107–117.

Toegel, G., & Barsoux, J. (2019). It's time to tackle your team's undiscussables. *MIT Sloan Management Review, 61*(1), 37-40,42-46. https://search-proquest-com.lib-proxy.fullerton.edu/docview/2335159080?accountid=9840

Torres, A., Campos, C., Shiang, E., Farrukh Sultan, F., Peterson, I., Meza, J., Sweazey, J., Than, M., Perez, M., Wilson, N., Lum, R., Eiseman, R., Le, T., Wolin, J., Gonzalez, D., Boyce,

K., Gardner, J. (2019). Student housing insecurity and homelessness at San Francisco State University. San Francisco State University. https://basicneeds.sfsu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/SFSU%20Student%20Housing%20Insecurity%20and%20Homelessness%20Report%20FINAL.pdf

Vaghul, K. (2022, February 6). *Just Over Half of the Largest U.S. Companies Share Workforce Diversity Data as Calls for Transparency from Investors and Regulators Grow*. Just Capital. https://justcapital.com/reports/share-of-largest-us-companies-disclosing-race-and-ethnicity-data-rises/

Van Tiem, D. M., Moseley, J. L., Dessinger, J. C., Van Tiem, D. M., & Moseley, J. L. (2012). *Fundamentals of performance improvement optimizing results through people, process, and organizations: Interventions, performance support tools, case studies* (3rd ed.). Pfeiffer.

Wallace, E., Buil, I., & de Chernatony, L. (2020). "Consuming Good" on Social Media: What can conspicuous virtue signalling on Facebook tell us about prosocial and unethical intentions? *Journal of Business Ethics, 162*(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3999-7

Wallace, G. [EPPIC - Pursuing Performance]. (2021, March 2). *Performance based lesson mapping - ISPI SoCal Webinar* [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03f6bMIwBtM

Watt, S. E., Maio, G. R., Rees, K., & Hewstone, M. (2007). Functions of attitudes towards ethnic groups: Effects of level of abstraction. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43*(3), 441–449. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.04.004

West, N. M. (2020). A contemporary portrait of Black women student affairs administrators in the United States. *Journal of Women and Gender in Higher Education, 13*(1), 72–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/26379112.2020.1728699

Williams, B. M., & Davis, T. J. (2021). Advancing the intentional praxis of supervision in student affairs. *New Directions for Student Services, 2021*(175), 83–90. https://doi.org/10.1002/ss.20399

Williams, B. M. (2023). "It's Just My Face:" *Workplace Policing of Black Professional Women in Higher Education. Journal of Women and Gender in Higher Education, ahead-of-print*(ahead-of-print), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/26379112.2023.2172730

Williams, B. M., Collier, J. N., Anderson Wadley, B., Stokes, T., & Coghill, K. B. (2022). "Should I straighten my hair?": Narratives of Black college women with natural hair. *Journal of Women and Gender in Higher Education, 15*(2), 134–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/26379112.2022.2067861

Workplace Inclusion (2020). Oncourse Learning.

Wufka, M., & Ralph, P. (2015). *Explaining agility with a process theory of change*. *Proceedings of Agile 2015.* https://doi.org/10.1109/Agile.2015.10

Vaghul, K. (2022, February 6). *Just over half of the largest U.S. companies share workforce diversity data as calls for transparency from investors and regulators grow*. Just Capital.

https://justcapital.com/reports/share-of-largest-us-companies-disclosing-race-and-ethnicity-data-rises/

Zheng, L. (2023, January 27). To make lasting progress on DEI, measure outcomes. *Harvard Business Review.* https://hbr.org/2023/01/to-make-lasting-progress-on-dei-measure-outcomes

Zhu, M., Yang, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2018). The mere urgency effect. *Journal of Consumer Research, 45*(3), 673-690. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy008