

DAVID MEDINA

Curriculum Vitae

Department of Economics
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Education

- 2018–2022 **PhD, Economics & Management**, *University of Padua*, Padua.
Advisors: Dr. Orestis Troumpounis and Dr. Roberto Bonfatti
- 2017–2018 : **Master in Economic and Business Analysis**, *University of Malaga*, Malaga.
Advisor: Dr. Miguel Angel Jimenez Melendez
- 2012–2015 : **Degree in Finance and Accountancy**, *University of Malaga*, Malaga.
Advisor: Dr. Mario Federico Rueda Narvaez

Research

Life pension and Parliamentary Effort, Job Market Paper

Abstract.

Many democracies grant their parliamentarians access to an exclusive pension system. While there has been much debate about the financial cost of such schemes, little attention has been paid to their effect on parliamentary effort. We propose a model that captures the two main features of life pension schemes: i) the pension amount is increasing with seniority, and ii) age determines parliamentarians' eligibility. Our model highlights heterogeneous incentives to exert parliamentary effort: introducing a life pension decreases the effort of eligible parliamentarians with high accumulation levels and increases or maintains the effort of all other parliamentarians. We test this model using the introduction of the life pension in Italy in 1955 where the eligibility of parliamentarians depends on their age and the amount accumulated depends on their seniority. Our empirical results show that the prospects of accumulating a higher pension stimulates parliamentarians to exert more effort, especially when parliamentarians are not eligible. In contrast, eligible parliamentarians face a trade-off between accumulating further benefits or enjoying the life pension straight away. Senior eligible parliamentarians decrease their effort while all other parliamentarians maintain or increase their effort.

The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption

Abstract.

The performance of bureaucrats and politicians is a fundamental determinant of the quality of institutions. While much attention has been paid to the incentives of bureaucrats and politicians separately, little attention has been paid to the link between them. In this paper, we show that the expectation of government turnover shapes bureaucrats' behavior. Exploiting the introduction of a term limit in the 2013 municipal elections in Portugal, we use a difference in difference approach to compare bureaucratic corruption in municipalities with higher probability of government turnover (term-limited mayors) and municipalities with lower probability of government turnover (non term-limited mayors). We find a reduction of bureaucratic corruption in municipalities with higher probability of government turnover. The reduction of bureaucratic corruption exceeds 30 per cent across the corruption variables used. The reduction of bureaucratic corruption is larger (smaller) in municipalities with a higher probability of the incumbent (challenger) being corrupt. The main mechanisms behind our empirical results are formalized in a theoretical model.

Foreign direct investment and regional independence movements (Submitted)

Abstract.

The study of independence movements is associated with the decolonization period after WWII in developing countries, but such movements have also been present in developed countries more recently. However, the number of studies on regional independence in developed countries and its influence on FDI is limited. We take a *suis generis* approach by considering the 2014 and 2017 independence referenda in Catalonia. First, we employ OLS to check for referendum effects. We consider Catalonia's FDI and construct a set of controls to capture region-specific and referendum effects. Second, we construct counterfactuals on regional FDI, per-capita GDP and inter-regional trade using the Synthetic Control Method. Overall, we find weak evidence for independence referenda effects. Robustness checks such as placebo tests also support our results. We argue that regional market size cushioned referendum effects. But we also argue that the non-binding nature of the independence referenda in Catalonia helps explain the weak evidence for referendum effects.

Politicians commitment and electoral accountability: The case of municipal elections in Brazil

Work in progress.

Life pension and political selection

Work in progress.

Presentations

- June 2022 ***The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption.***
Max Weber Programme Multidisciplinary Research Workshop. EUI Florence.
- June 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Association of Public Economic Theory. University of Marseille.
- March 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- February 2022 ***The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption.***
Seminar at the University of Malaga.
- November 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- November 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- November 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Seminar at the University of Malaga
- July 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Poster presentation, PhD Summer School on Applied Microeconomics.
- June 2021 ***The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- April 2020 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- April 2020 ***What are the economic consequences of regional nationalism? The case of Catalonia.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.

Teaching

- 2021-2022 ***Advanced Microeconomics.***
University of Malaga, B.S. in Economics.

2021-2022 **Macroeconomics.**
University of Malaga, B.S. in Business Administration.

Visiting Appointments

September **University of Malaga.**
2021- Under supervision of M. Socorro Puy Segura
February
2022

Computer skills

Programming Languages Python, R
Database Stata, SQL, GIS
Other Latex, Microsoft Office
programms

Languages

Spanish: **Native.**
English **Fluent.**
Italian **Basic.**
French **Basic.**

Membership

The Association for Public Economic Theory (APET)

Referees

Dr. Orestis Troumpounis

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Economics & Management*
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