



The Yemen Steering Initiative

An Enduring International Plan for Yemen

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What is the YSI?

The YSI is a plan of action designed to integrate and facilitate international and Yemeni efforts to end the civil war, stabilize Yemen, and improve the political, economic, and security outlook of the Yemeni people. The YSI provides a very-long-term vision for Yemen and a set of concepts and actions to help guide immediate action and very-long-term, enduring progress towards stability and human security.

Yemen is suffering from a disastrous civil war and one of the worst famines in modern history. Many Yemenis and actors across the international community—the United Nations, nation states, and non-governmental organizations—have struggled to end the war, stabilize Yemen, and begin sustainable reconstruction. Despite all of these good efforts the conflict persists.

The Yemen Steering Initiative (YSI) provides a vision for bringing enduring stability and

human security to Yemen. It constitutes an action-focused international plan for achieving that vision: It is built around specific actions that can and should be taken to support Yemen on its journey to stability and self-reliance. In the near term this plan is intended to support the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen. Together with an attached action matrix it details the set of activities that the international community can take to foster enduring, very-long-term stability, self-reliance, and human security.

The YSI recognizes that all major political decisions must be Yemeni owned. While the international community can support, facilitate, and encourage this process, the hard work and difficult choices must be made by Yemenis. All proposed international actions in the strategy are designed to support a sovereign and broadly inclusive central Government of Yemen.

An Enduring, Very-Long-Term Vision for Yemen

The YSI employs the term *enduring vision* rather than *end state*. The international commitment to Yemen will be enduring and indefinite, transitioning over the very long term—probably several decades—to the full control and responsibility of the people of Yemen. This vision, spelled out in Part II, guides the planning and implementation of the YSI. It is briefly summarized here:

In the very long term, Yemen is a stable, sovereign nation with representative federal and sub-national governance. Sub-national governments are empowered but responsible to the center. The Government of Yemen maintains a monopoly on the use of force. Threats from non-state groups are minimized to the point that local security forces can effectively suppress them. The Yemeni people enjoy all aspects of *human security* as defined by the United Nations. Yemen is at peace with its neighbors. Its economy is resilient and capable of providing sustenance and opportunity to the Yemeni people in line with human security objectives. The Yemeni government requires little to no international assistance.

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PART I.

FOCUS AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE YSI

This is a plan of action to bring stability and human security to the Yemeni people. It builds from, and depends on the intensive and often dangerous work of the Yemeni and international experts who are trying to end the civil war, bring humanitarian aid to starving families, and empower local communities. The YSI offers a centralizing platform, or framework, to tie all of these efforts together; to identify new requirements; to actively engage international donors and partners; and to give the entire international enterprise in Yemen an over-the-horizon vision at a moment when success is measured in days or even hours.

Leadership of the YSI: A Communal Effort Centering on the Special Envoy

In the near term this plan supports the United Nations Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen. However, implementation will require horizontal leadership across the international community. It will involve the United Nations, national governments, regional organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), non-governmental organizations, civil society groups, business communities, and others. Ultimately, the leadership of the YSI will transition to a United Nations country team. This step will be critical to coordinating enduring international efforts.

Enduring Objectives for Yemen: Stability and Human Security

In the context of the YSI, *stability* is generalized to mean an end to civil war; a reduction of violence to manageable criminal activity; establishment of secure and peaceful borders; development of inclusive and broadly legitimate governance; activation of a fair and evenhanded judicial system; and a resumption of routine economic activity that benefits the population.

Stability goes hand in hand with *human security*, a United Nations term describing the protection of fundamental human freedoms and the creation of a fair, inclusive, and safe environment that gives people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.

Milestones: Agreeing on and Implementing the YSI

A draft of the YSI will be made available to key stakeholders in the international community in the spring of 2019. There is a tentative plan to hold a key stakeholders symposium in early 2019.

Driven by Key Stakeholder and Expert Contributions

This plan is a product of broad community input and insight gathered over several

months. It is based on consultations with Yemeni academics and humanitarian aid leaders currently working in Yemen; with high-level security experts from several different countries; with leaders and staff across several parts of the United Nations, including those stationed in the Middle East; with highly-qualified economists, political scientists, regional experts, and others. The YSI is also informed by the literature on Yemen, stabilization, conflict resolution, stability, humanitarian aid, economic development, governance, and all aspects of human security.

Envisioning a Positive but Distant Future, and Enduring International Support

In keeping with this patient, very-long-term approach, the YSI describes an *enduring vision* for Yemen. This enduring vision will be used to help guide planning and keep international efforts on track. *There will be no quick or neat ending to Yemen's problems.* While we may together end the current crises—war and famine—Yemen will need the support of the international community indefinitely. This is an enduring mission for stability and human security.

Deliberate, Patient, and Adaptable Execution

Conflict resolution, stabilization, and development are highly complex and uncertain. Plans are most successful when they are allowed to unfold gradually and, with some necessary structure and inducements, naturally. Forcing major milestones like elections and permanent power-sharing agreements tends to result in costly setbacks. Impatience and inflexible,

externally-driven timelines portend failure. The YSI seeks to avoid these common pitfalls by stressing gradual, balanced, and conditions-based progress.

Inclusive Approach

In conflict resolution smaller or less powerful parties and groups are sometimes marginalized or left in what they perceive to be an unfair position. Focusing only on the most powerful and influential stakeholders invites future discord and threatens long-term stability. The YSI pursues an inclusive approach to represent minority stakeholders and Yemenis who may not be adequately represented in top-level power sharing agreements.

Watchwords for the YSI

Deliberate: Plan methodically for incremental short-term gains while focusing on the future.

Patient: Understand that this will be gradual and enduring process that will last decades.

Adaptable: No plan is perfect. Complex situations necessarily evolve. This plan will adapt.

Inclusive: Inclusivity reduces marginalization and disenfranchisement, improving stability.

Enduring: This is a very-long-term plan envisioning ongoing support for decades.

Central and Supporting Pillars

In the current draft the YSI focuses on three central pillars: (1) *political* resolution to the conflict; institution building; and the development of government legitimacy; (2) *economic* stability, development, and

reconstruction; humanitarian relief;
improving confidence for investment and
achieving self-reliance; and (3) *security*,

providing a safe and stable environment to
facilitate the first two pillars.

PART II.

AN ENDURING VISION FOR YEMEN'S STABILITY AND HUMAN SECURITY

The YSI enduring vision is intended to help establish realistic expectations about the necessary time horizon for implementation, while reassuring partners of the commitment to sustained international support. It can help to build and sustain enduring focus on the collaborative development of political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems necessary to guarantee the human security of all Yemeni citizens.

Applying Historical Lessons: Setting a Very-Long-Term Enduring Vision

Many previous stabilization and development efforts have suffered from ill-defined or overly optimistic time horizons which have set unrealistic expectations and imposed unhelpful policy constraints. Crises like the one in Yemen represent multi-generational challenges. Too often, though, poor expectation management leads to unrealistic demands for immediate results.

All plans must answer at least this question: What is it we seek to achieve? Most strategic plans often begin by defining an “end state”—the specific set of desired outcomes to be achieved—which is then used to guide resourcing decisions, establish interim objectives, and signal the point at which the intervening party leaves. Recent experience suggests that this expectation for a precisely defined and time-fixed ending may place unrealistic pressures on all parties.

Framed around an enduring vision, planners in recent conflicts may have made different choices that could have avoided mistakes, some of which worsened human suffering and contributed to the massive costs of ongoing military and humanitarian support.

What is an *enduring vision*?

An *enduring vision* is a set of ideal, but generally realistic, conditions that can guide both immediate and extended planning and commitments. Enduring visions are not intended to be achieved in absolute terms because political, economic, and security conditions are never ideal.

The YSI enduring vision provides an adaptable but progressive pathway to help international contributors and Yemeni leaders conceptualize a gradually-paced approach to very-long-term stability and human security. The enduring vision reflects a recognition that all states have significant and sometimes endemic problems. Unfortunately, Yemen is likely to have more problems, and worse problems than most other states. The plan should mitigate these problems through deliberate, patient, adaptable, inclusive, and enduring international programs.

An Enduring Vision for Yemen: Political, Economic, and Security Statements

The following summary and three paragraphs constitute the draft enduring vision statements for Yemen. They are designed to provide very-long-term conditions to help guide planning and commitments. These ideal goals may never be achieved in full, or they may only be achieved after many decades of gradually-paced, conditions-based progress and transition.

An Enduring, Very-Long-Term Vision for Yemen

In the very long term, Yemen is a stable, sovereign nation with representative federal and sub-national governance. Sub-national governments are empowered but responsible to the center. The Government of Yemen maintains a monopoly on the use of force. Threats from non-state groups are minimized to the point that local security forces can effectively suppress them. The Yemeni people enjoy all aspects of *human security* as defined by the United Nations. Yemen is at peace with its neighbors. Its economy is resilient and capable of providing sustenance and opportunity to the Yemeni people in line with human security objectives. The Yemeni government requires little to no international assistance.

Political

Yemen is a federation with empowered subnational governments. Both the federal and subnational governments are representative, having been determined through free and fair elections that have been carried out and monitored under secure

conditions. Yemen's post-conflict constitution expressly delineates federal and subnational responsibility for policymaking and service provision, defines basic state institutions, and provides clear procedures for iterative amendment. The political process is fully inclusive, with all citizens guaranteed the opportunity to participate in the governance system through legitimate elections and free speech. The federal government guarantees all Yemeni citizens basic human rights and constantly pursues comprehensive human security. Yemen is a sovereign state that enjoys broad legitimacy and maintains normal diplomatic relations with its neighbors.

Economic

Yemen's economy is diversified and fully integrated into global markets. Yemen effectively manages its oil, natural gas, water, and other natural resources. Yemen has either bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that ensure relatively free movement of people, goods, services, and capital with all GCC members. Property rights are formalized and enforced, and state institutions guarantee competition and free movement of people, goods, and capital within Yemen..

Government revenues are sufficient to finance federal and subnational budgets. Foreign and domestically-supplied food resources are stable and sufficient to feed the Yemeni people. Yemen is self-reliant, and not dependent on international assistance.

Security

Yemen's borders are secure and its citizens are protected by domestic security services. Yemen maintains a nationally-integrated, highly-mobile national military unit capable of preventing or, if necessary, defeating

external and internal threats. Subnational governments maintain local police forces responsible for basic policing functions and security forces responsible for protecting critical infrastructure, disrupting smuggling and other illicit flows, and supporting emergency response. The federal government is responsible for securing Yemen's ground borders, littoral spaces, and supporting the counterterrorism mission. All members of non-governmental armed groups have either been incorporated into the formal security

forces or found other reintegration opportunities within their communities. International terror groups have no substantial sanctuary in Yemen and terrorist planning and activities are readily prevented by Yemeni security services. Subnational governments do not pose a security threat to one another, or to the state. Crime is managed to the point that it does not pose a significant threat to Yemeni physical security, freedom of movement, or perceptions of physical security.

PART III.

YSI IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW

As a *comprehensive* and *international* plan, the YSI will require extensive coordination of activities, investment oversight, and management of the pace of implementation. Given the scope of this challenge, no single nation can fill this role. Instead, coordination and oversight will require an expanded UN mission and mandate that establishes the Yemen Steering Initiative Management Board (**YSI-MB**). Composition of the YSI-MB will include representatives from Yemen's national and subnational governments, the UN, and all major donor nations. The YSI-MB has four principal responsibilities:

- 1) Adjust the pace, prioritization, and synchronization of YSI activities over time, and as needed.
- 2) Conduct assessments, monitoring, and evaluation of progress.
- 3) Manage pooled financial resources provided by the Yemenis and international community.
- 4) Coordinate technical assistance at the national and subnational levels.

Pacing, Prioritizing, and Synchronizing Activities for Mutual Support and Balance

Pacing is a concept designed to replace the artificial construct of progress phasing, which can often be counterproductive. Pacing is the process of carefully monitoring, updating, and revising the speed of investments and other programs to ensure that all actions across all three pillars—security, political, and economic—are synchronized and mutually supporting.

While these efforts are all important and mutually supporting, some actions are more urgent than others. Urgent actions require deliberate prioritization. Early activities—many of which are currently underway as of early 2019—will largely support the cessation of hostilities, ongoing humanitarian efforts, and the establishment of physical security for the Yemeni people. These efforts can and should be undertaken in parallel. Later, focus will shift towards political reconciliation and inclusive institution-building, reconstruction and investment, and development of the Yemeni internal security forces. In the long term the YSI will support democratic consolidation, sustained economic development and deepening integration into regional and global markets, and securing a lasting peace for Yemen and its neighbors. This process is likely to vary across governorates and regions, requiring that the YSI carefully monitor progress throughout the country.

There is no perfect solution to imbalance across pillars and programs. Some offset is inevitable and change is rarely linear or cumulative. But the effects of imbalance between pillars and activities can be mitigated. Successful mitigation will be managed by the United Nations and the YSI-MB. Instead of artificially restricting progress by phase, the UN Special Envoy (and, after UN-approved transition, the UN Country Team) and the YSI-MB will assess pacing and transition on a recurring basis. Together, the UN and the YSI-MB, in consultation with the Government of Yemen, will use the YSI-MB to accelerate or, if needed, carefully slow

specific efforts or individual activities in order to prevent a major imbalance that could disrupt progress. The periodicity of pacing assessment and adaptation will be determined by the UN and the YSI-MB, in consultation with the Government of Yemen and international partners, upon implementation of the YSI. This effort is closely linked to the YSI concept of monitoring, inspection, evaluation, and overall assessment.

Monitoring and Strategic Assessment

YSI assessments will focus on pillars and pacing. The plan does not include and will not apply preordained benchmarks for progress by phase. Assessments will focus above the programmatic level of effort but may include some specific assessments of YSI-funded programs through the International Yemen Support Fund (IYSF, see below). Individual nationally-funded and non-governmental programs *not funded by the IYSF* will be responsible for their own assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. This applies to all international, federal, sub-national, and non-governmental programs and activities.

The UN, in consultation with the YSI-MB, the Government of Yemen, and other international partners, will be responsible for conducting strategic monitoring and assessment focused on determining progress towards phase completion, pacing, compliance, adaptation of policies and plans, and the identification of new resource requirements. This will be a dynamic and adaptive process centering on decisionmaking related to the IYSF. Specific assessment responsibilities are spelled out in Table 1.

Table 1. Assessment Activities and Descriptions

Assessment Activity	Description
Initial needs assessment	First task is to conduct an initial needs and risks assessment for Yemen
Pacing	Identify potential offsets in line of effort pacing and recommend mitigations
Compliance	Monitor federal, sub-national, and other group compliance with YSI guidelines
Adapt policies and plans	Identify policies and plans that need to be adapted to changing conditions
Identify new requirements	Identify requirements for new policies, plans, and resources that might emerge

Within the first three months of the activation of this plan, the UN will assign a YSI Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (AM&E) Coordinator. This individual will form a team with expertise across the three pillars and with specific expertise in AM&E. The AM&E team will be responsible for three interrelated tasks: (1) conduct a comprehensive needs and capacities assessment to identify baseline conditions and potential risks to programmatic interventions; (2) establish and apply a continuous monitoring program focused on field observation, inspection, verification, and data collection; and (3) establish and apply a continual evaluation program that provides periodic assessments of strategic progress across all YSI pillars. Specific details of the YSI Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Team will be described by the UN Special Envoy or Country Team.

Manage Pooled Yemeni and International Resources and Coordinate Technical Assistance

The YSI-MB will be responsible for monitoring all pooled resources provided to support the IYSF. This responsibility will include coordinating and managing international contributions—both the initial \$50 billion provided by regional donors to finance the IYSF (see Part IV) and that to support additional activities—and Yemeni contributions to support these activities. The revenue source and scale of Yemeni contributions to the YSI will be determined by the YSI-MB, with contributions financed via revenues from hydrocarbons, tariffs, and other shared national resources.

Over time, the balance of financial inputs to the IYSF and to individual programs will shift from the international community to the Government of Yemen, who will become

solely responsible. This progressive shift will be a deliberate component of YSI execution managed by the YSI-MB.

Disbursements of financial resources and technical assistance at the national and subnational level will be jointly managed by the Yemenis and a UN-led Economic Cooperation Office (ECO). This ECO will maintain local offices in an estimated six regions. The ECO's local offices, which will comprise approximately 75 percent of the ECO's total in-country staff, will (1) provide technical assistance to regional governments, (2) coordinate support to private sector actors, and (3) monitor local compliance. The ECO's national-level office will (1) oversee disbursements of funds and (2) enforce conditionality of funds. All donor nations will have permanent representation in the ECO, ensuring continuity across the 50-year mandate of the IYSF. The management cost for the ECO will be included as part of the international contributions to the IYSF.

PART IV.

THE INTERNATIONAL YEMEN SUPPORT FUND (IYSF)

Yemen will be dependent on the international community for decades to come, and the international community will need to provide substantial financial assistance to support a transition to self-reliance. This transition to self-reliance will be aided dramatically by stable, continuous, sufficient, and reliable funding, which will facilitate effective long-term planning for stability and development activities.

Regional donors have already generously committed billions of dollars to aid the Yemeni people, and both these nations and other international donors will need to sustain this financial support as Yemenis work towards self-reliance. This funding will continue be delivered both bilaterally – with national governments designing and implementing their own humanitarian assistance, development, and security sector reform activities – and multilaterally as is currently being done under the auspices of the UN's Humanitarian Response Program.

The IYSF is an international mechanism to centralize, manage, and implement general funding under the auspices of the Government of Yemen. It will manage the disbursement of funds, oversee the monitoring and capacity building activities of the ECO (introduced in Part III), and guarantee Yemen's social safety net as it builds its capability for self-reliance.

Purposes of the IYSF

International financial assistance in support of development, political, and security

objectives will be a core component of efforts to transition Yemen towards long-term stability. To be effective, this financial assistance must accomplish four core objectives:

- 1) Provide Yemenis with resources for restoring critical infrastructure and basic services,
- 2) Facilitate long-term growth of the private sector,
- 3) Ensure a robust social safety net for Yemenis until long-term growth is realized, and
- 4) Create financial incentive for fulfilling political promises agreed to during the peace accords.

IYSF Concept

A USD\$50 billion IYSF will be created, guaranteeing USD\$1.5 billion in annual assistance to the Yemeni people for a minimum period of 50 years. Donors will place funds in a risk-free interest-bearing escrow account to be jointly managed by the IMF and World Bank. The IYSF will include two previously proposed functions:

- 1) A development and reconstruction fund (referred to herein as the DRF), jointly managed by Yemenis and the international community, that directly provides funds to governorates (or regions).
- 2) Direct budget support to the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and Social Welfare Fund (SWF).

Distributions for the DRF, SFD, and SWF

Annual disbursements from the IYSF will be placed directly with the DRF, the SFD, and the SWF. The DRF will receive \$1 billion annually for 50 years, with funding to each governorate (or region) based on its population. The SFD and SWF will each receive \$250 million USD in annual funding throughout the IYSF's 50-year mandate. Annual disbursements will be held constant in nominal terms, gradually and predictably reducing the value of this support over the 50-year period. Disbursement of funds to each region (or governorate) will be conditional on that locality's compliance with the peace accords, transparency, and cooperation. The YSI-MB will be responsible for monitoring this compliance and determining consequences for noncompliance.

The scale of the proposed IYSF at \$50 billion is substantially larger than other funds that have been proposed for Yemen. However, by creating a powerful incentive for the peace accord, the long-term benefit for the anticipated primary donors for this fund will far outweigh the costs.

Discussion: A Plan for Yemen Informed by the Marshall Plan for Europe

The DRF will distribute a total of USD\$1 billion in annual assistance, throughout the IYSF's 50-year mandate, directly to governorates (or regions). Approximately one-half of the resources provided to each governorate (or region) will be dedicated to salaries for local security forces, health workers, and teachers. The other one-half will provide funds to construct or rehabilitate

economic and social infrastructure. The governorates (or regions) will be required to establish a national-level organization responsible for jointly formulating a plan for how resources will be spent. The disbursement of funds to each governorate (or region) will also be conditional on compliance with the peace accords.

This overall structure is patterned after the Marshall Plan, which supported the post-World War II economic recovery of Western Europe. The proposed annual budget of USD\$1 billion for this fund is comparable to the magnitude of the Marshall Plan, which provided annual assistance equivalent to 2.5% of the post-conflict GDP of the nations of Western Europe. And this Yemen fund will be explicitly designed to include what have been described as the "ingredients of success" of the Marshall plan, namely: (1) recipient input, (2) decentralization, (3) public-private partnerships, (4) encouragement of competition, and (5) regional coordination.

Like the Marshall Plan, the ECO will jointly manage the fund with the Yemenis, with the local-level ECO representatives sharing responsibility for the design and implementation of local plans and the national-level ECO organization responsible for reviewing, approving, and monitoring the national plan. Given the importance of rebuilding and strengthening Yemen's economic integration with its regional partners, private sector representatives from these regional and international partners will have a formal role at the ECO's national and governorate (or region) offices.

Building public-private partnerships will also be a key component of this fund. As was the case for the Marshall Plan, the domestic private sector will be stimulated by requiring that all capital improvements be procured

directly from the private sector in that region (or governorate). However, given Yemen's anemic private sector and the importance of rebuilding and strengthening Yemen's economic integration with its regional partners, private sector representatives from these regional and international partners will have a formal role at the ECO's national and governorate (or region) offices. These private sector partners will be encouraged to be "profit-seeking" for the investors they represent, and participate directly in the development of local plans. The participation of international private-sector actors will be key for diversifying local economies and encouraging competition.

Additionally, like the Marshall Plan, the IYSF will establish a Technical Assistance and Productivity Program (TAPP) to encourage investment, innovation, and improve management practices among the Yemeni private sector. The TAPP, which would receive approximately US\$20 million in annual funding, will have four components: (1) visits by Yemeni managers and owners to comparable firms in donor countries, (2) visits by experts from donor countries to Yemeni firms, (3) management training, and (4) limited funding to allow Yemeni firms to purchase equipment from donor nations. The TAPP will be managed by the local and national-level ECO that will coordinate this assistance through their local counterpart, and provide a mechanism for making Yemeni firms more competitive will encouraging bilateral private sector partnerships, building technical capacity, and facilitating long-term trade partnerships.

The fund will directly contribute to the first, second, and fourth objectives described

above. In terms of the first objective, it will provide funds to the governorates (or regions) that could be used as part of a plan appropriate for that locality. The requirement for each locality's plan to be approved by other localities and the ECO will encourage partnerships across governorates (or regions) in building economic and social infrastructure. The very-long-term participation of donor nations and private sector actors (regional and global) and the TAPP will support objective two by encouraging bilateral private sector partnerships, building technical capacity, and facilitating long-term trade partnerships. And the conditionality of the funds—which require national-level coordination, compliance with the peace accords, and transparency—will directly support the fourth objective.

Direct Budget Support to the SFD and SWF

The second primary function of the IYSF will be to provide a long-term commitment to the SFD and SWF, ensuring that a social safety net is maintained while allowing for longer-term planning toward development objectives. The SFD and SWF are widely perceived as apolitical institutions critical for supporting short- and medium-term stability objectives. These two institutions will each receive USD\$250 million in direct budget support, and both institutions have a proven capacity for efficiently and effectively disbursing funds at this scale. Direct budget support to both will ensure the viability of these institutions for the next 50 years and provide flexibility for these institutions to design and execute long-term strategies.

POLITICAL PILLAR

Yemen's most immediate political challenge is clear: negotiate a settlement and begin the long, hard process of national reconciliation. While this process must be Yemeni led, the international community can support these efforts through sustained commitment. In the near term, developing local governance structures will be critical to stabilization. As long as the central government is too weak to project state authority and lacks broad-based legitimacy, these sub-national governments will play a leading role in providing public services and assuring local security. The international community cannot afford to supplant or replace Yemeni institutions, but should empower these structures and amplify their successes. Yemenis will ultimately determine their own political future. The international community can advise and support institution building, but it cannot dictate design. Yemenis must recognize that international support is conditional. Whatever institutions and political structures

they choose must lead to a transparent, accountable, and responsible government.

Political Enduring Vision

Yemen is a federation with empowered subnational governments. Both the federal and subnational governments are representative, having been determined through free and fair elections that have been carried out and monitored under secure conditions. Yemen's post-conflict constitution expressly delineates federal and subnational responsibility for policymaking and service provision, defines basic state institutions, and provides clear procedures for iterative amendment. The political process is fully inclusive, with all citizens guaranteed the opportunity to participate in the governance system through legitimate elections and free speech. The federal government guarantees all Yemeni citizens basic human rights and constantly pursues comprehensive human security. Yemen is a sovereign state that enjoys broad legitimacy and maintains normal diplomatic relations with its neighbors.

Table 2. Political Actions and Pacing

Political	National reconciliation	Support CBMs Framework for negotiated settlement Establish transitional government
	Stable federation, empowered governorates	Convene national dialogue Monitor compliance with constitution Build sub-national governance and institutional capacity Build national governance and institutional capacity Support citizen awareness
	Human Security	Resettle IDPs Establish transitional justice Monitor progress
	Regional relations	Establish SOFAs Discourage support for malign actors Regional integration

P-1: Negotiate a Political Resolution to the Conflict

P-1.1: *Support confidence-building measures (CBMs).* Working through the UN, the international community will continue to support de-escalation efforts. This support will include (1) facilitating prisoner exchanges; (2) managing the redeployment of warring military forces; (3) helping negotiate the freedom of movement for humanitarian goods and services and UN observers; and (4) assisting in the return of IDPs. These measures will focus on providing a secure space for delivering humanitarian relief while helping to build trust in the peace process.

P-1.2: *Develop an inclusive framework for reaching a negotiated settlement.* As CBMs lead to further de-escalation, the UN, with the support of the international community, will facilitate Yemeni negotiations on a framework for transitional political and security arrangements. This process will culminate in a negotiated settlement that defines the terms of disarmament and demobilization and establishes an interim authority for peacekeeping and ceasefire monitoring forces. These arrangements will provide the foundation for achieving a durable national cessation of hostilities (CoH).

P-1.3: *Establish a transitional national unity government.* Having secured a COH and provided immediate relief throughout the country, the UN, GCC, and broader international community will establish a fully inclusive reconciliation process built around a national unity government. This reconciliation process will be Yemeni-led. The UN, with support of the international community, will facilitate negotiations to

develop a Transitional Government of Yemen (TGoY). This transitional government may take various forms, but it will be a product of intra-Yemeni negotiations. The TGoY will be broadly inclusive and based on negotiated power-sharing agreements. It will comprise a consensus-based executive committee with control shared between all represented Yemeni parties. Participation in the executive committee requires full participation in the CoH and DDR activities. To quickly restore basic public services, this executive committee will be supported by a technocratic cabinet with senior civil servants managing critical ministries. The international community will provide technical assistance to support the transitional government and these ministries.

P-2: Establish Yemen as a Stable Federation with Empowered Subnational Governments

P-2.1: *Convene a national dialogue process to draft a constitution.* Having established a durable COH and the TGoY, the UN and international partners will directly support a Yemeni-led process to draft a new constitution. This process will resemble the previous National Dialogue Conference, comprising a series of working groups on a broad set of issues. International partners will provide technical advice on constitutional design and logistics assistance to facilitate the process. The draft constitution will be a consensus-driven, Yemeni-owned document. At a minimum, the constitution will expressly delineate federal and sub-national responsibility for policymaking and service provision. These responsibilities will include jurisdictional authority over fiscal policies and sharing of resource revenues (e.g., oil and gas

sectors), as well as any devolution of administrative powers required to support local provision of services. Electoral rules will ensure that the federal and subnational governments are representative.

P-2.2: *Monitor compliance with the constitution.* The UN, with support from the international community, will coordinate a monitoring process to verify compliance by national and subnational actors with Yemen's constitution. Monitors will include representatives from the UN, the Government of Yemen, the IYSF-MB, the AM&E team, and other international partners.

P-2.3: *Support development of sub-national governments capabilities by building professional, capable, and accountable institutions.* International partners, working with UN representatives and the Government of Yemen, will expand upon existing direct investment programs to build and, where necessary, establish subnational governance capabilities as specified by Yemen's constitution. In the short-term, this support will focus on capabilities to meet basic needs – e.g., food distribution, medical care, water and sanitation – to allow sub-national governments to take over responsibility for these activities. In the medium- and long-term, this will include economic development, judicial, security, and other governance requirements.

P-2.4: *Support development, reconstitution, or adaptation of key national-level institutions mandated by Yemen's constitution.* Working from the AM&E initial needs assessment, the UN, IYSF-MB, Government of Yemen, international partners, and non-governmental organizations will support national-level institutions. This may, for example, include

reform of Yemen's national judicial system (e.g., to ensure that it is structured to support the necessary Transitional Justice Program), a federal investigation and law enforcement bureau, etc.

P-2.5: *Support citizen awareness of progress and development.* International partners will fund and assist the TGoY, then the Government of Yemen, in improving national media capabilities and content production to highlight both national and sub-national governance and development progress. Messaging efforts will also be complemented by greater outreach to civil society organizations and other local actors embedded in these communities. Yemeni-led efforts to restore public services, rebuild their communities, and provide local security will be widely broadcasted. Such concrete successes will complement CT efforts by undermining non-state armed group recruitment that depends on exploiting political vacuums and state failure.

P-3: Guarantee Human Security

P-3.1: *Support resettlement of IDPs and ensure that human security conditions are met for vulnerable communities.* Having established a durable COH, the international community, with the support of the UN, will establish an Internally Displaced Persons Resettlement Program (IDP-RP). This program will be led by an international partner and will be supported by the Government of Yemen and local civil society organizations. It will provide or expand upon existing efforts to provide: (1) humanitarian aid to IDPs; (2) temporary secure living accommodations at the site of displacement; (3) transportation to move IDPs safely, securely, and humanely to their places of origin; and (4) reconstruction

assistance to provide safe and functional permanent domicile at the point of origin.

P-3.2: *Provide assistance in developing and managing transitional, and then enduring judicial capabilities.* The international community, in consultation with, and with support from the UN and the IYSF-MB, will create a Transitional Justice Program (TJP). This program will seek to consolidate existing national and non-governmental justice programs, or to help align their efforts towards mutually agreed upon national and local objectives. It will integrate with parallel efforts to develop national and sub-national security enforcement mechanisms.

P-3.3: *Monitor progress towards human security protections.* The UN will engage non-governmental organizations and international partners to monitor Government of Yemen progress towards guaranteeing human security. Additional training and mentoring will be provided as required. These organizations and partners will provide reports to the AM&E Coordinator, with a periodicity to be determined in consultation with the UN and YSI-MB.

P-4: Ensure that Yemen is a Sovereign State at Peace with its Neighbors

P-4.1: *Negotiate agreements on the presence and legal authority of any foreign actors operating in Yemen.* After establishing the TGoY, the UN will work with the TGoY and international partners to negotiate terms for any ongoing presence and legal authority of all international actors operating in Yemeni

territory. Each international partner must negotiate bilateral terms with the TGoY. These terms will first and foremost address the presence of armed or unarmed military or intelligence personnel in Yemen. Reconstruction and development efforts will entail a large number of international actors; their presence and authority must also be negotiated with the TGoY. These negotiations will further address any security arrangements surrounding Yemen's land and maritime borders.

P-4.2: *Encourage all local parties and groups to renounce ties to any malign actors operating in Yemen.* The international community will use all tools available to ensure that malign external actors do not spoil the peace or disrupt the democratic process. All Yemeni parties committed to the peaceful and legitimate political process will disavow ties to external actors and demobilize their affiliated militias.

P-4.3: *Support Yemen's reintegration in regional affairs through closer bilateral and multilateral arrangements.* The UN will encourage international leaders to support Yemen's regional and global reintegration by opening or reopening embassies in the unified capital of Yemen. The UN will establish its headquarters in the unified capital once security conditions and freedom of movement are sufficiently established. To support regional reintegration, the UN will work with GCC leaders to extend some membership privileges for Yemen, including tariff relief on exports and labor concessions for Yemenis working in the Gulf.

PART VI.

SECURITY PILLAR

Security encompasses the physical security of Yemen's borders, government, and people, as well as those aspects of human security that relate directly to physical threats against life and freedom of movement. Initial stabilization of Yemen will necessarily focus on separating warring parties, ending the civil war, and establishing basic physical security for the Yemeni people. Long-term stability and development in this pillar will center on the progressive establishment of physical safety, security from external attack, security from civil violence and criminal activity, and freedom of movement.

Security Enduring Vision

Yemen's borders are secure and its citizens are protected by domestic security services. Yemen maintains a nationally-integrated, highly-mobile national military unit capable of preventing or, if

necessary, defeating external and internal threats. Subnational governments maintain local police forces responsible for basic policing functions and security forces responsible for protecting critical infrastructure, disrupting smuggling and other illicit flows, and supporting emergency response. The federal government is responsible for securing Yemen's ground borders, littoral spaces, and supporting the counterterrorism mission. All members of non-governmental armed groups have either been incorporated into the formal security forces or found other reintegration opportunities within their communities. International terror groups have no substantial sanctuary in Yemen and terrorist planning and activities are readily prevented by Yemeni security services. Subnational governments do not pose a security threat to one another, or to the state. Crime is managed to the point that it does not pose a significant threat to Yemeni physical security, freedom of movement, or perceptions of physical security.

Table 3. Security Actions and Pacing

Security	End Civil War	Deploy UN observers Establish Transitional Arms Control Authority Supervise destruction of NSAGs' weapons Develop interim security governance structures
	Reconstitute Security Forces	DDR of NSAGs Support subnational policing capabilities Reconstitute & support national-level security forces Establish & support sub-national security forces Establish & support JCSC
	Secure Borders & Ports of Entry	Gain and maintain border and littoral security Establish & support BSCCs and MSCC
	Malign Actors	Maintain pressure on malign actors Deploy fully-trained Yemeni CT force
	Freedom of Movement	FoM for Humanitarian Assistance Unlimited FoM Enforce internal security

S-1: Support Resolution of the Civil War

S-1.1: *Deploy UN observers.* The UN deploys observers with the intent of transitioning the initial mission into a long-term observer mission. The observers will have full freedom of movement across Yemen. The UN, in consultation with the formerly warring parties, determines the best locations for observer teams. The initial UN observer mandate will be negotiated with the warring parties and international partners. Once the Government of Yemen is fully reestablished in the capital, the UN will renegotiate an enduring observer mission that will assist the YSI-MB, which is charged with managing the plan's implementation and providing assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E).

S-1.2: *Establish the Transitional Arms Control Authority (TACA).* The UN will establish TACA to manage the disarmament process, beginning with missiles, rockets, and drones with an effective military range longer than 10 kilometers. To build trust in the process, TACA will initially allow parties to retain access to their arms under mutually agreed terms on their restricted use.

S-1.3: *Supervise the destruction or transfer of non-state armed groups' weapons.* Having built trust in this process, all parties will then transition control of the designated weapons and munitions to TACA officials at designated collection and storage points. TACA will temporarily stockpile, account for, and monitor these weapons and munitions. Over time, the UN will supervise the negotiated destruction or transfer of these weapons to the Government of Yemen or to a mutually agreed upon international party.

S-1.4: *Develop interim security governance structures.* In parallel with the political reconciliation process, the UN will assist Yemenis in establishing national and sub-national security committees to oversee implementation of and compliance with any negotiated security arrangements. The national-level security committee will be broadly inclusive. Its composition will resemble political power-sharing arrangements. At the sub-national level, the composition of these security committees will depend on the local context and needs. They will include all relevant parties and be tailored to their local threat environment. The national committee will coordinate across sub-national committees to ensure broad compliance. UN observers/advisers will be embedded with and support these security committees as needed.

S-2: Reconstitute National and Subnational Security Services

S-2.1: *Support the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of non-state armed groups.* As the civil war ends, some non-state armed groups will be integrated into either the central or sub-national security services. Integrating these ex-combatants will require additional training on civilian protection and human rights. Those individuals not incorporated into the formal security service will receive reintegration assistance to support alternative employment opportunities and broader community reconciliation. This process will center on structured DDR efforts to be managed by the UN or an appropriate international organization designated by the UN.

S-2.2: *Support subnational police services.*

Provide training and other assistance to reinforce capabilities and legitimacy of existing police structures. These police services will be responsible for: 1) investigating routine criminal activity; 2) maintaining local order; and 3) supporting the central and subnational security services, as needed.

S-2.3: *Reconstitute and train national-level security forces under the Government of Yemen.*

With international partner support, the federal government will reconstitute and train national-level security forces responsible for: (1) defending Yemen's borders; (2) preventing or ending civil warfare; and (3) supporting Yemeni and international counterterrorism (CT) activities. Pending consultation with the Government of Yemen and international partners, these reconstituted national-level security forces should consist of (1) a light, limited-armor ground combat force; (2) an air force; (3) a border and coastal security force (BCSF); and (4) a quick-response CT force.

S-2.4: *Establish sub-national security services at the appropriate level of governance.* Once the Yemeni people have decided on an enduring form of government at the sub-national level, governors in each sub-national area will form a local security force. These forces will be sanctioned by the federal government, but will receive funding from the federal and sub-national governments. While the sub-national security services will be tailored to their area's specific needs, they will be principally responsible for: (1) protecting critical infrastructure; (2) supporting the central security services in border and maritime security, as needed; and (3) disrupting and degrading non-state armed groups. The sub-national security services

will *not* be responsible for policing criminal activity. However, they may provide support to interdict smugglers and other illicit flows of goods/people.

S-2.5: *Establish the Joint and Combined Security Center (JCSC):* The international community will assist the Government of Yemen in establishing a joint and combined security center responsible for coordinating the efforts of Yemeni security forces, international partners supporting Yemen's security services, and UN observers.

S-3: Secure Borders and Ports of Entry

S-3.1: *Gain and maintain border and littoral security.* The international community establishes, monitors, and enforces ceasefire conditions around all littoral borders, ground borders, and ports of entry. This mission would begin initially as a combined mission with existing Yemeni security forces, and then transition to the Yemeni Border and Coastal Security Force (BCSF) when established and fully operational.

S-3.2: *Establish border and maritime coordination centers with Yemen's neighbors.* With the support of the UN and designated international partners, Border Security Coordination Centers (BSCCs) will be established with the governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman. A Maritime Security Coordination Center (MSCC) will be established in Yemen and will be open to participation from all regional states. These coordination centers will serve the following purposes: (1) provide a means for neighboring states to share security information; (2) establish permanent and locally-situated communications hubs to help defuse possible, future border tensions;

and (3) to facilitate UN monitoring. International support will include establishing new or refurbishing existing facilities to support international missions, including at least: (1) one coastal security base along Yemen's southern coast and; (2) facilities near the Yemen-Oman and Yemen-Saudi Arabia borders.

S-4: Maintain Pressure on Malign Actors and Establish Enduring CT Capabilities

S-4.1: *Maintain pressure on malign actors.* Working with Yemeni security forces, an international force will maintain pressure on malign actors until Yemen develops a fully-independent capability to do the same.

S-4.2: *The Government of Yemen will deploy the CT force.* In consultation with the Government of Yemen and international partners, the CT force will be formed, trained, and employed. This force may include existing Government of Yemen CT elements as well as former members of the Yemeni armed forces, non-state armed groups, and new recruits. Once trained, the CT force will deploy and, with combined support from international partners, immediately begin conducting counterterrorism operations against international terror groups operating in Yemen.

S-5: Guarantee Freedom of Movement that Improves Stability and Human Security

S-5.1: *Ensure humanitarian assistance moves into and within Yemen safely and without interference.* Warring parties, and then the Government of Yemen, with the support of the UN and international partners, will

guarantee the safe and uninterrupted entry and movement of humanitarian assistance into and within Yemen. This effort will include the tasks of securing coastal waters and airspace; securing ports of entry; establishing line-of-communication security with patrols and checkpoints; preventing criminal activity against humanitarian workers and convoys; and supporting the safe and fair distribution of humanitarian goods and services.

S-5.2: *Guarantee freedom of movement.* First the warring parties and then the Government of Yemen, with international partner assistance and UN support, will guarantee the freedom of movement for Yemeni civilians, Yemeni commerce, Yemeni government officials at all levels, central security services, lawful international commerce, lawful international personal travel, and UN observers. Freedom of movement is composed of both the physical freedom to move (i.e., the actual ability to move from place to place without fear of attack or restrictions) and the perception that movement is safe and, within legal bounds, unrestricted. The perception of threats can be as debilitating to freedom of movement as physical attacks or barriers. Establishing perceptual security requires integrating information operations into security activities; informing Yemeni civilians of threats and security improvements; and establishing general local security through effective sub-national security force activities and policing.

S-5.3: *Enforce internal security:* The Government of Yemen, with international assistance, will ensure that sub-national security forces operate only within their areas of authority and responsibility. These forces will provide security strictly within their areas of authority or responsibility unless they

are providing direct border security operations sanctioned by the Government of Yemen. While operating on behalf of, or in concert with the central government, sub-

national security forces will be escorted by liaison officers from the central security services and, as appropriate, international observers.

PART VII.

ECONOMICS PILLAR

Economics encompasses the institutions – both public and private – that manage the flow of goods, people, and capital within Yemen and between Yemen and the world. It includes the private and public actors that procure and distribute emergency assistance, sustain services in sectors that are critical for human security (e.g., health, water and sanitation), manage Yemen’s natural resources, and leverage Yemen’s strategic assets (e.g., hydrocarbons, strategic location) for the benefit of all Yemenis. Long-term stability and development in this pillar will center on building financial self-reliance, by facilitating private-sector led growth and strengthening economic institutions so that Yemen is able to leverage its own resources to ensure service provision (e.g., education, health, security) and provides employment opportunities for all Yemenis willing and able to work.

Economics Enduring Vision

Yemen’s economy is diversified and fully integrated into global markets. Yemen effectively manages its oil, natural gas, water, and other natural resources. Yemen has either bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that ensure relatively free movement of people, goods, services, and capital with all GCC members. Property rights are formalized and enforced, and state institutions guarantee competition and free movement of people, goods, and capital within Yemen.. Government revenues are sufficient to finance federal and subnational budgets. Foreign and domestically-supplied food resources are stable and sufficient to feed the Yemeni people. Yemen is self-reliant, and not dependent on international assistance.

Table 4. Economics Actions and Pacing

Economic	Food	Continue emergency food assistance Transition to Yemeni-led approaches for addressing chronic food insecurity
	Yemeni institutions	Reconstitute CBY Ensure functionality of key sectors Support Yemen's social safety net (via SFD, SWF) Finance select reconstruction/rehabilitation Transition salaries to on-budget at subnational level Transition to self-reliance for all ministries
	Natural resources	Establish and oversee apolitical corporation to manage hydrocarbon wealth Establish and oversee apolitical corporation to manage ports & rents related to strategic location Support environmentally aware economic development
	Short-term CBMs, long-term diversification	Support economic CBMs Expand regional employment opportunities for Yemeni Provide assistance to planning at sub-national level Facilitate private sector engagement in Yemen
	Private sector-led growth	Domestic institutional reform Free trade agreements Integration into GCC Customs Union
	Government revenue	Train tax authorities Transition to self-reliance with oversight

E-1: End the Famine and Support Transition to Self-Reliance in Food Security

E-1.1: *Continue and expand provision of emergency food assistance.* The UN, international partners, and non-governmental organizations will continue to provide emergency food relief to the Yemeni people. The IYSF-MB will pursue ways to accelerate food relief in the near term, building from the AM&E Coordinator's initial assessment report and leveraging trusted Yemen private sector actors whenever possible. In the longer term the IYSF-MB will focus efforts on improving Yemen's ability to: (1) maintain a steady and sufficient flow of food into Yemen; and (2) pursue strategies to move towards self-sustainability.

E-1.2: *Transition to food assistance approaches to mitigate chronic food insecurity.* The UN and international partners will facilitate efforts by the Government of Yemen and non-governmental organizations to transition Yemen towards sustainability. This will be primarily executed through subnational governments, the Social Fund for Development, and Social Welfare Fund.

E-2: Support and Develop Yemeni Institutions

E-2.1: *Reconstitute the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY).* Integration into the international financial assistance and macroeconomic stability is critical to stimulating Yemen's private sector economy, which only a reconstituted CBY can provide. The UN and international partners will assist the Government of Yemen in consolidating all branches of the CBY under a common

leadership team. Having been reunified, international partners will support the CBY by providing technical advice and capacity building.

E-2.2: *Ensure functionality of key sectors until a new government is formed.* The international community will continue to ensure access and availability of education, health, water, water and sanitation on other key sectors. The UN and the IYSF-MB will coordinate with local political authorities to ensure access and with local financial authorities (e.g., Alkuraimi, Central Bank of Yemen) to develop a rapidly deployable and apolitical approach for guaranteeing salaries to employees in key sectors.

E-2.3: *Maintain Yemen's social safety net via SFD and SWF.* The SFD and SWF will be responsible for maintaining an enduring social safety net for Yemenis throughout this necessarily long period of transition.

E-2.4: *Provide financing to subnational governments to support reconstruction of selected water and sanitation, health, and educational facilities to ensure basic access to all Yemenis.* The IYSF-MB will provide on-budget funding to subnational governments to support the rehabilitation or construction of social and economic infrastructure. Access to these funds by subnational governments will be dependent on (1) the development of a nationally-approved plan, (2) transparency, and (3) compliance with the peace accords. Funds will be executed through Yemeni private sector actors, whenever possible. The ECO and international private sector representatives will support the development of these plans.

E-2.5: *Provide technical assistance to subnational governments to effectively and*

transparently assume responsibility of salaries for local security forces and social services.

Subnational governments will assume responsibility for paying salaries of local employees of key ministries, with the IYSF providing on-budget funding to cover those salaries. The international community will provide technical assistance and oversight to the Ministry of Finance to minimize endemic historical inefficiencies (e.g., “ghost workers”) in these sectors. The international community should provide technical and financial assistance to begin auditing the public wage bill and disbursing funds for salaries. This disbursement process must be transparent and timely.

E-2.6: *Support transition to self-reliance for all Yemeni ministries.* The international community will transition from active support and capacity building to one of oversight (via the YSI-MB) for all ministries, at the national- and subnational-level.

E-3: Ensure Accountability and Effective Use of Yemeni Resources

E-3.1: *Support establishment and provide oversight of independent (e.g., parastatal) organization for managing Yemen’s hydrocarbon resources.* The YSI-MB will support the transition of the management of Yemen’s hydrocarbon wealth to an apolitical technical corporation. This corporation will be Yemeni managed, but the international community will provide oversight on how these resources are managed.

E-3.2: *Support establishment and provide oversight of independent (e.g., parastatal) organization for managing Yemen’s ports and access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.* The

YSI-MB will support the establishment of an independent, national-level organization for managing Yemen’s ports and other issues related to its strategic location (e.g., potential oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Gulf of Aden). This organization will similarly be Yemeni managed, with the international community providing oversight on how these resources are managed.

E-3.3: *Support long-term planning for managing other natural resources (e.g., land, fisheries).* The YSI-MB will provide oversight on the utilization of water, land, and other natural resources, and encourage policies that reduce overutilization of these resources. As an example, Yemen faces an acute water crisis, particularly in Sana’a and its environs, which was described as potentially destabilizing in the years before the current conflict. The international community can best reduce this pressure by encouraging the growth of economic centers outside of Sana’a, which will be achieved in part via the IYSF’s direct transfers to subnational governments. While the public sector builds institutional resilience, the private sector can support these efforts by investing in more diverse commodities, industries, and areas of the country. Economic regional development will complement these state-driven efforts to build resilience.

E-4: Provide Short-Term Economic CBMs & Facilitate Long-Term Diversification

E-4.1: *Support short-term economic CBMs to demonstrate “dividends from peace.”*

Coordinate and finance short-term, regional economic confidence building measures while the initial political process takes its course. These CBMs could include projects focused

on Yemen's strategic location (e.g., investment in ports, development of pipelines) and other regionally appropriate projects.

E-4.2: *Expand employment opportunities for Yemenis in the region.* Yemen's economic comparative advantage is labor, and Yemenis are willing and able to work in a variety of sectors. Regional partners will seek to find ways of providing preferential treatment to Yemeni labor in sectors where they are competitive. This will provide much-needed jobs, foreign earnings for Yemen, and stabilize long-term bilateral economic relations. Increasing employment opportunities for Yemenis abroad will also relieve pressure on domestic labor markets, which may be overwhelmed by the renewed demand for employment after the conflict.

E-4.3: *Support development of medium- and long-term development plans and provide financing to support construction of economic infrastructure.* The ECO will provide technical assistance to subnational governments to develop plans for execution of the IYSF's DRF, which will identify IYSF-financed economic infrastructure of greatest value for the local economy. For both these plans and the economic infrastructure, the IYSF and its ECO staff will encourage private sector participation and private-public shared investment in the development of infrastructure.

E-4.4: *Facilitate and encourage regional private sector participation in the Yemeni economy.* The IYSF-MB will encourage private sector participation in medium- and long-term development plans, and subsidize bilateral interactions between private sector actors in Yemen and in donor countries. This will encourage active participation and

investment by these actors in Yemen. International partners will provide incentives to corporate interests to encourage their investment in Yemen.

E-5: Create Enabling Environment for Private Sector-led Growth.

E-5.1: *Support domestic institutional reform.* A variety of domestic institutional reforms (e.g., improved protection, property rights, land registry, easing of restrictions on businesses, etc.) are critical for enabling private sector activity and supporting investment, both domestic and foreign. The YSI-MB and subordinate structures will oversee and encourage these reforms at the national and subnational levels.

E-5.2: *Establish preferential trade arrangements with Yemen.* Preferential trade agreements are a proven method for expanding trade, domestic and foreign direct investment, and creating economic opportunities. International partners in the EU, GCC, and elsewhere are encouraged to pursue preferential trade agreements that bolster the Yemeni economy, by providing greater access to sectors in which Yemen has a comparative advantage (e.g., coffee, agricultural products, fertilizers).

E-5.3: *Yemen is integrated into a single multilateral free trade agreement with all GCC countries.* A multilateral free trade agreement that significantly reduces restrictions on the movement of people, goods, services, and capital among the GCC would likely be the single most beneficial trade agreement for Yemen. Under such an agreement, Yemen could become a gateway for the GCC, as goods produced there will be freely sold throughout the Gulf region. A multilateral

free trade agreement of this nature will also bolster the GCC economies, increasing market opportunities and reducing transaction costs for the movement of goods throughout the region.

E-6: Assist the Government of Yemen in Establishing Sustainable Taxation Programs

E-6.1: *Establish, train, and mentor tax authorities for each subnational government.*

The long-time viability of a federal system is dependent on the capacity of subnational governments to generate revenue from local economic activity. The UN will work with international partners to support the

development of these tax authorities within each subnational government. The UN, in consultation with the IYSF-MB and international partners, will coordinate with the Government of Yemen to help implement necessary revisions to the federal taxation authority to ensure that it does not impede local revenue generation.

E-6.2: *Provide oversight of tax revenue.*

External oversight of the taxation authority, ensuring that funds are being fairly collected and placed with the appropriate authorities, will remain an ongoing challenge. The international community will provide transparency and oversight until potential local concerns attenuate.

PART VIII.

FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL ACTION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The YSI can only be effective with direct and enduring international support. Each of the steps outlined in the pillars, above, is mapped to a spreadsheet designed to structure the enlistment of support. This Action Matrix is intended to help the United Nations and international community clarify, isolate, and recruit support for each required action. It should help prospective donors and international partners identify ways they can help in the very near term, and through the very long term. The Action Matrix should also help identify gaps: There will inevitably

be tasks that must be added, as well as some that are unmet and that require additional attention from the UN staff. Appendix B of the YSI presents an example of the Action Matrix derived from the actions in the pillars. Its ultimate content will require revision and consensus.

Concluding Comments

[This space is reserved for Special Envoy comments.]

APPENDIX A.

PACING CHARTS FOR THE THREE PILLARS

Political	National reconciliation	Support CBMs Framework for negotiated settlement Establish transitional government
	Stable federation, empowered governorates	Convene national dialogue Monitor compliance with constitution Build sub-national governance and institutional capacity Build national governance and institutional capacity Support citizen awareness
	Human Security	Resettle IDPs Establish transitional justice Monitor progress
	Regional relations	Establish SOFAs Discourage support for malign actors Regional integration
Security	End Civil War	Deploy UN observers Establish Transitional Arms Control Authority Supervise destruction of NSAGs' weapons Develop interim security governance structures
	Reconstitute Security Forces	DDR of NSAGs Support subnational policing capabilities Reconstitute & support national-level security forces Establish & support sub-national security forces Establish & support JCSC
	Secure Borders & Ports of Entry	Gain and maintain border and littoral security Establish & support BSCCs and MSCC
	Malign Actors	Maintain pressure on malign actors Deploy fully-trained Yemeni CT force
	Freedom of Movement	FoM for Humanitarian Assistance Unlimited FoM Enforce internal security
Economic	Food	Continue emergency food assistance Transition to Yemeni-led approaches for addressing chronic food insecurity
	Yemeni institutions	Reconstitute CBY Ensure functionality of key sectors Support Yemen's social safety net (via SFD, SWF) Finance select reconstruction/rehabilitation Transition salaries to on-budget at subnational level Transition to self-reliance for all ministries
	Natural resources	Establish and oversee apolitical corporation to manage hydrocarbon wealth Establish and oversee apolitical corporation to manage ports & rents related to strategic location Support environmentally aware economic development
	Short-term CBMs, long-term diversification	Support economic CBMs Expand regional employment opportunities for Yemeni Provide assistance to planning at sub-national level Facilitate private sector engagement in Yemen
	Private sector-led growth	Domestic institutional reform Free trade agreements Integration into GCC Customs Union
	Government revenue	Train tax authorities Transition to self-reliance with oversight

APPENDIX B.

DRAFT ACTION MATRIX

This is a preliminary draft of the Action Matrix. It is designed to provide the organizing agency with a structured format for enlisting international action, or aligning existing actions with YSI planning. Actions

listed here are only intended to serve as examples. The final Action Matrix will be considerably revised from this exemplary draft.

Political

Pillar	Sub-Pillar	Task	Sub-Task	Pledging Nation
Political	P1: National reconciliation	P1-1: Apply CBMs to support ceasefire	1. Facilitate prisoner exchange	<input type="text"/>
			2. Manage the redeployment of forces	<input type="text"/>
		P1-2: Develop framework for negotiated settlement	1. Establish a durable COH 2. Negotiate terms and timeline for DDR and power-sharing	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
	P2: Stable federation, empowered governorates	P1-3: Establish transitional government	1. Negotiate a consensus executive committee 2. Provide technical assistance for critical ministries	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P2-1: Convene national dialogue conference	1. Provide technical advice on constitutional design 2. Facilitate the process through logistics assistance	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P2-2: Monitor compliance with constitution	1. Monitor progress toward achieving constitution at <u>national-level</u> 2. Monitor progress toward achieving constitution at <u>sub-national-level</u>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P2-3: Build sub-national governance and institutional capacity	1. Conduct a needs and capacity assessment 2. Provide institutional capacity building for sub-national governments	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P2-4: Build national governance and institutional capacity	1. Conduct a needs and capacity assessment 2. Provide institutional capacity building for sub-national governments	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P2-5: Support citizen awareness	1. Support Yemeni/regional media to increase coverage of local progress	<input type="text"/>
	P3: Human Security	P3-1: Resettle IDPs	1. Create Internally Displaced Persons Resettlement Program (IDP-RP) 2. Coordinate and provide food, housing, and relocation aid for IDPs	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P3-2: Establish an enduring Transitional Justice Program	1. Provide technical assistance and legal advice on transitional justice issues	<input type="text"/>
	P4: Regional relations	P3-3: Monitor progress	1. Conduct monitoring through AM&E team 2. Finance and coordinate NGO programming on human security training	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P4-1: Establish SOFA for all foreign nations	1. Negotiate terms for legal authority of foreign military/intel actors in Yemen 2. Negotiate security arrangements near borders	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		P4-2: Discourage support for malign actors	1. Disavow ties to external actors	<input type="text"/>
		P4-3: Support regional integration	1. Extend some membership privileges of regional bodies	<input type="text"/>

Security

Pillar	Sub-Pillar	Task	Sub-Task	Pledging Nation
Security	S1: End Civil War	S1-1: Deploy UN observers	1. Deploy UN observer with nation-wide mandate	<input type="text"/>
			2. Establish enduring mission	<input type="text"/>
		S1-2: Establish Transitional Arms Control Authority	1. Establish and oversee TACA	<input type="text"/>
		S1-3: Supervise destruction of NSAGs' weapons	1. Monitor stockpiling	<input type="text"/>
			2. Destroy weaponry	<input type="text"/>
	S2: Establish Security Forces	S2-1: DDR of NSAGs	1. DDR programming	<input type="text"/>
			2. Human rights and other training	<input type="text"/>
		S2-2: Support subnational policing capabilities	1. Financing of local police forces	IYSF
			2. Training for local police forces	<input type="text"/>
		S2-3: Reconstitute & support national-level security forces	1. Train, mentor, equip <u>ground combat force</u>	<input type="text"/>
			2. Train, mentor, equip <u>air force</u>	<input type="text"/>
			3. Train, mentor, equip <u>BCSF</u>	<input type="text"/>
			4. Train, mentor, equip <u>CT force</u>	<input type="text"/>
		S2-4: Establish & support sub-national security forces	1. Train, mentor, equip sub-national security services	<input type="text"/>
		S2-5: Establish JCSC	1. Establish JCSC infrastructure	<input type="text"/>
			2. Mentor JCSC	<input type="text"/>
	S3: Secure Borders & Ports of Entry	S3-1: Gain and maintain border and littoral security	1. Monitor and enforce ceasefire along borders	<input type="text"/>
			2. BCSF <u>coastal element</u> : Train, mentor, equip	<input type="text"/>
		S3-3: Establish & support BSCCs and MSCC	1. Establish and finance BSCC	<input type="text"/>
			2. Establish and finance MSCC	<input type="text"/>
			3. Build infrastructure for supporting border & littoral missions	<input type="text"/>
	S4: Malign Actors	S4-1: Maintain pressure on malign actors	1. Constitute international CT force	<input type="text"/>
			2. Conduct operations to maintain pressure on VEOs	<input type="text"/>
		S4-2: Deploy fully-trained Yemeni CT force	1. Train and equip CT force	<input type="text"/>
			2. Combined operations with CT force	<input type="text"/>
	S5: Freedom of Movement	S5-1: FoM for Humanitarian Assistance	1. Ensure ports of entry are open to HA	<input type="text"/>
			2. Protect HA convoys within Yemen	<input type="text"/>
		S5-2: Unlimited FoM	1. Influence security partners to guarantee FoM	<input type="text"/>
			2. Information campaign to encourage Yemenis to move	<input type="text"/>
		S5-3: Enforce internal security	1. Oversee subnational security forces	<input type="text"/>

Economics

Pillar	Sub-Pillar	Task	Sub-Task	Pledging Nation
Economics	E1: Food	E1-1: Continue and expand provision of emergency food assistance	1. Guarantee security for food convoys 2. Design and manage food financing scheme	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E1-2: Transition to food assistance approaches appropriate for chronic food insecurity.	1. Technical assistance to subnational governments	<input type="text"/>
	E2: Social services	E2-1: Reconstitute the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY).	1. Technical assistance 2. Recapitalize CBY	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E2-2: Ensure functionality of key sectors	1. Provide financing for salaries 2. Coordinate logistics of financing.	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E2-3: Maintain Yemen's social safety net (via SFD, SWF)	1. Funding of SFD & SWF via IYSF.	IYSF
		E2-4: Finance select reconstruction/rehabilitation	1. On-budget funding for activities via IYSF. 2. Technical assistance via ECO.	IYSF IYSF
		E2-5: Transition salaries to on-budget at subnational level	1. Funding of salaries via IYSF. 2. Technical assistance via ECO.	IYSF IYSF
	E3: Natural resources	E3-1: Establish and oversee independent corporation for hydrocarbons.	1. Establish independent corporation 2. Provide ongoing oversight	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E3-2: Reconstitute the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY).	1. Establish independent corporation 2. Provide ongoing oversight	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E3-3: Mitigate potentially destabilizing environmental pressures	1. Regionally disaggregated transfers via the IYSF	IYSF
	E4: Short-term CBMs, long-term diversification	E4-1: Economic CBMs	1. Design and implement regionally-aligned economic CBMs	<input type="text"/>
		E4-2: Expand employment opportunities for Yemenis in the GCC.	1. Develop and implement vetting process for Yemeni workers 2. Expand number of visas available to Yemeni	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E4-3: Provide technical assistance to help Yemeni national and subnational governments develop medium- and long-term development plans.	1. Technical assistance via IYSF's ECO	IYSF
		E4-4: Facilitate and encourage regional private sector participation in the Yemen economy.	1. Funding for TAPP (via IYSF) 2. Participation of international private sectors in ECO, TAPP	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
	E5: Private sector-led growth	E5-1: Facilitate domestic institutional reform	1. Technical assistance to improve business client	<input type="text"/>
		E5-2 Establish trade arrangements with Yemen.	1. Establish preferential trade agreements with Yemen 2. Technical assistance to prepare for and comply with trade agreements	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		E5-3: Yemen is integrated into GCC customs union	1. Yemen allowed to join GCC customs union 2. Technical assistance to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade	GCC <input type="text"/>
	E6: Government revenues	E6-1: Establish, train, and mentor tax authorities for each subnational government.	1. Train subnational tax authorities 2. Deconflict with national tax authorities 3. Mentor tax authorities	<input type="text"/> IYSF IYSF
		E6-2: Provide oversight of tax revenue.	1. Provide technical oversight and monitoring of revenue	IYSF