

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(Dis)Qualified Bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and 'Identity Management'

BENJAMIN J. MULLER

This article attempts to think citizenship politics in the international security context of a post-September 11th world. Considering specifically the introduction of biometric technologies, the article reveals the extent to which contemporary citizenship is securitized as a part of the wider post-September 11th 'securitization of the inside'. This securitization contributes directly to the intensification of conventional citizenship practice, as biometric technologies are employed to conceal and advance the heightened exclusionary and restrictive practices of contemporary securitized citizenship. The intensified restriction and preservation of particular rights and entitlements, vis-à-vis *the application of biometric technologies, serves both private and public concerns over 'securing identity'. This overall move, and the subsequent challenges to conventional notions of citizenship politics and agency, is referred to here as 'identity management'. To then ask 'What's left of citizenship?' sheds light on these highly political transformations, as the restricted aspects of citizenship—that is, its continued obsession with the preservation and regulation/restriction of specific rights and entitlements—are increased, and the instrument of this escalation, biometrics, dramatically alters existing notions of political agency and 'citizenship/asylum politics'.*

> If *the* political is to exist, one must know who everyone is, who is a friend and who is an enemy, and this knowing is not in the mode of theoretical knowledge, but in one of *practical identification*: knowing consists here in knowing how to identify the friend and the enemy. (Carl Schmitt, in Derrida, 1997)

> Doubters call the digital age dehumanizing, but the joke is on them: the human body lies at the heart of plans to wire banks, streamline government handouts, secure the workplace, even protect your PC. (Davis, 1997)

What's Left of Citizenship?

The broad question motivating this discussion—'What's left of citizenship?'—fits well with the general rhetoric of globalization, and the propensity within this

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discourse to ask 'what's left' of many things, be it sovereignty, authority, or even the political itself. To some extent, it plays to the preoccupation with prosaic debates about the re-entrenchment of sovereign power versus the withering away of the territorial state in light of the fluidities and simultaneities of contemporary political life. To ask 'what's left?' is to suggest some process of decomposition, where the original 'citizen' or 'sovereign' or 'authority' has decayed, leaving the slightly recognizable carcass to be contorted to suit contemporary political ends. Particularly in light of the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath, this carcass of citizenship seems like the Iceman: withered, but preserved, skin stretched on bones, from which we weave myriad stories about the myth of origins, contemporary challenges, and future rearticulations. What was the Iceman's last meal? Was he killed in a brutal struggle for supplies, territory, supremacy, or lost in an inclement storm? And, what might this mean for the mortality of contemporary humanity? Similarly, we ask what has happened to citizenship? Who or what is responsible for its demise? Is 'what's left' sufficient for rising to one if not *the* fundamental political moment of inclusion and exclusion: the discrimination between friends and enemies? And finally, how does 'what's left' manage the preservation of rights and entitlements that is central to conventional citizenship with emerging forms of agency and citizenship/asylum politics?

In this article, I contend that this carcass of citizenship is 'identity management'. Allegedly purged of the ugly politics of us and them, friends and enemies, inclusion and exclusion, the securitized, bureaucratized and 'scientized' realm of identity management—epitomized by the (impending) introduction of biometric technologies[1]—provides a seemingly sanitary means of identifying/authenticating threats. In other words, through digitized fingerprints, facial recognition, retinal scans and so on, a 'template' is created and evaluated: threat or no threat. While the question of entitlement and rights, or what we might refer to as 'citizenship practice' (Wiener, 1998) does not melt away, the way in which contemporary citizenship or identity management conceptualizes and negotiates such challenges is novel. Beginning from Carl Schmitt's contention that *the* political decision is the discrimination between friend and enemy, I contend that this shift from citizenship to identity management is at once both politicizing and depoliticizing. Identity management *vis-à-vis* biometrics attempts to transform citizenship into a quest for verifying/authenticating 'identity' for the purpose of access to rights, bodies, spaces, and so forth, thus (purportedly) stripping away the cultural and ethnic attributes of citizenship. By concealing such matters in the technological and scientific discourses of biometrics, the ethnic/racial characteristics of contemporary citizenship practice—insofar as it is obsessed with restricting access to specific spaces (that is, airports) and rights (that is, free movement)—are stripped away. Although knowledge of one's identity is critical, the question of 'authorizing access', and thus, authenticating, becomes much greater in this epoch of 'homeland security' and 'domestic terrorists'.

Contemplating what it means to speak of citizenship in terms of security, the article begins with a brief discussion of securitization and broader critical understandings of security. It draws primarily on recent scholarship that connects the sovereign politics of the exception, and the challenge of what Michel Foucault refers to as 'governing the *whole* state' (quoted in Burke, 2002, p. 8), with questions of security and securitization. The analysis begins to consider the

politicizing and depoliticizing impact that the introduction of biometric technologies has on the contemporary securitized politics of citizenship. In one sense, it would seem that identity management is 'depoliticizing' as it draws aspects of citizenship away from the spaces of conventional politics, towards sites of private authority and governmentalities. However, the resilience of political agency and the aggressive politics of inclusion/exclusion with its ethnic and racial framework still intact suggests the move is equally politicizing. Following this, the article draws on Michael Williams' recent work on securitization and the links to Carl Schmitt's concept of the political. Here, Williams reinforces claims that the introduction of biometrics and the subsequent transformation of citizenship into identity management is intensely political, persistently fixed on the Schmittian discrimination between friends and enemies, merely disguising (or 'sanitizing') the exclusionist politics of citizenship and its connection with 'sovereign discriminations' (see Walker, 1999). Before concluding, the paper reflects on limits and possibilities of political action/resistance, or what we might call 'bio-agency', in the context of identity management and contemporary post-September 11th politics of citizenship and migration.

Sovereign Discriminations: Friends, Enemies, and the Securitization of Citizenship

Particularly since the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent 'wars on terror', there has been a dramatic—and often draconian—securitization of the politics of borders and bodies (Huysmans, 1995; Bigo, 2001, 2002; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Nyers, 2003). In this context, securitization is often associated with criminalization, and a heightened use of what Peter Nyers terms 'technologies of control (such as detention) and strategies of exclusion (such as deportation)' (Nyers, 2003, p. 169). Critical security studies, whether engaging notions of 'securitization' and societal security (see Wæver *et al.*, 1993; Wæver 1995; Buzan *et al.*, 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2003), or broader critical understandings of security (see Lipschutz, 1995; Krause and Williams, 1997), are astute to question security's dependence on insecurity, and its role in claims about the possibility or impossibility of politics itself (Walker, 1997). In his critical reflection on security's claim to universality, Anthony Burke suggests:

> It is to see security as an interlocking system of knowledge, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces and flows in certain ways—to see security not as an essential value, but as a *political technology*. (Burke, 2002, p. 2)

For Burke, security as a political technology is also a technology of subjectivity, as 'both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise' (p. 22), attempting to cope with the emerging problem of governing society as a whole. 'Governing of society as a whole' refers directly to Foucault's claim that all modern politics are biopolitics; biopolitics being the transformation of state power from the power over death to the management of populations and power over life (see Foucault, 1976, 1991, 1995). However, in order to further

contextualize claims that citizenship is being 'securitized', some analysis of security/securitization and its relation to governmentality and the Schmittian distinction between friends and enemies is necessary.

As this article suggests, the nature and meaning of 'security' is itself in question. Coming to terms with this, and actively broadening the agenda of security beyond more conventional preoccupations with the state and its military—most notably towards questions of identity—is what concerns the majority of critical security studies. Securitization theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School, understands security to be a social construct (see Waever *et al.*, 1993; Waever, 1995; Buzan *et al.*, 1998; Huysmans, 2002; Buzan and Waever, 2003). As a result, security is not merely a material or objective 'reality', such as the arms race during the Cold War, but is the outcome of social processes, or the sort of 'interlocking system of knowledge, representation, [and] practices' to which Anthony Burke refers. Through speech acts, particular issues or practices are represented as threats; ergo, security only exists in relation to insecurity (Burke, 2002, p. 20). This critical notion of security and/or securitization enables us to consider how citizenship becomes 'securitized'.

The events of 11 September 2001 led to a significant increase in the use of discourses (and images) of threat and (in)security in the politics of citizenship and migration, as well as an expanding assault by both governments and media outlets on the citizenship and immigration policies of certain states regarded as 'soft' on such matters (UK Home Office, 2002; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Salter, 2004). As Michael Williams notes, media and government increasingly construct the migrant, refugee, alien, and 'Other' as threats to security, or what one might call 'insecure bodies', preserving the high status of migration on most states' security agendas (Williams, 2003, p. 526; see also Isin, 2002). Admittedly, the character of this threat as expressed in the post-Cold War European context by the Copenhagen School has changed (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993). Conceptualizing migration as a 'societal threat' that challenges existing social, economic and political values of a society remains in the foreground of securitized citizenship and migration politics (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993, p. 148). However, these considerations increasingly stand alongside more conventional security concerns, as governments and media outlets continually represent the (alleged) links between 'slack' migration and citizenship policy and terrorism.[2] The example of asylum in Britain is one among others, such as the Kosovo War (see Ignatieff, 2000), from which Williams draws in order to argue that securitization is no longer constructed exclusively through linguistic legitimation, but also by 'acceptable image-rhetorics' (Williams, 2003, p. 527). Here the mediated representation of the events of 11 September 2001 is exemplary, consistently evoked as justification for the expansive securitization of contemporary political life. In fact, as the discussion of biometrics will indicate, mediated representations of biometric technologies often act as their own justification and explanation. These visual securitization acts are a form of 'cultural governance' that serve to reinforce the current 'state of exception' as the norm (see Shapiro, 2004). Moreover, while these visual securitization acts serve to limit the space of possible politics, images of (bio)agency can also have an important role in the politics of resistance, which I discuss later (see

Campbell, 2003). Before moving forward, however, Williams' concern with Carl Schmitt's legacy in securitization theory deserves further inquiry.

According to Carl Schmitt, the political is about antagonism; at its core, the discrimination between friend and enemy. In *The Concept of the Political*, Schmitt contends that:

> A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without distinction of friend and enemy, and hence a world without politics. (Schmitt, 1996, p. 35)

Furthermore, this discrimination that is *the* political moment is bound up with the state, as Schmitt notes:

> In its entirety the state as an organized political entity decides for itself the friend–enemy distinction. (Schmitt, 1996, pp. 29–30)

Elsewhere, Schmitt reaffirms the role of the state in making such discriminations:

> Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. (Schmitt, 1985, p. 5)

The closer antagonisms get to the discrimination between friend and enemy, the more political issues become. According to Williams, securitization theory moves in a similar fashion: any issue can be 'securitized' or made into a 'security issue', 'if it can be intensified to the point where it is presented and accepted as an existential threat' (2003, p. 516). Williams argues further that securitization theory borrows from classical realism's preoccupation with *survival*, and it is this logic of security—a logic of existential threat and extreme necessity—that securitization theory shares with Schmitt's concept of the political (Williams, 2003, p. 516). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Williams links Schmitt's decisionist politics of the sovereign with securitization's break from 'normal politics'. Moreover, this suggests the move to securitize or make an issue into a 'security issue' is to draw it into exceptional politics. As Giorgio Agamben points out, politics as the state of exception—that is, the desertion of subjects to a condition of bare life, where their political rights are stripped from them—is increasingly *becoming* the norm (Agamben, 1998; see Diken, 2004). In fact, Agamben himself confronted (or more precisely, decided to avoid) this 'state of exception' in the shape of the United States' relatively new policy towards foreign citizens, requiring 'data registration' upon arrival (Agamben, 2004).[3] This policy, which Agamben refers to as a 'biopolitical tattoo', is part and parcel of the increasingly scarce spaces of politics in this epoch of exceptionalism (Agamben, 2004, p. 169).

The importance of the ever-encroaching politics of exception as the norm is the extent to which the 'problem' of the contemporary securitization of citizenship can be read as an attempt to come to terms with the discrimination between friend and enemy. As Didier Bigo points out, another important contribution of securitization theory is highlighting the assimilation of internal and external security or the 'securitization of the inside' (Bigo, 2000). Particularly in the

context of post-Cold War Europe and the construction of 'Schengenland'—sometimes referred to as 'Fortress Europe'—the use of 'external security agencies' to cooperate with police looking 'inside' for threats further reinforces claims that the space of citizenship is securitized (Bigo, 2000, p. 171). In the context of regional security strategies (see Buzan and Wæver, 2003), and ongoing so-called 'wars on terror', the threat is constructed as a stateless, faceless enemy, for which we (must) search both inside and outside. Furthermore, as Derrida's examination of Schmitt insists, the existence of the political is premised upon the *practical identification* of the enemy (Derrida, 1997, p. 116). This article proceeds by suggesting that faced with the contemporary challenges of making this practical identification, the securitization of citizenship, or what I call identity management, creates the conditions of possibility for introducing biometric technologies into contemporary citizenship.

Biometrics: Towards Identity Management?

On 28 January 2001, the National Football League culminated in Super Bowl XXXV: Baltimore Ravens 34, New York Giants 7; computer matched facial recognitions 19.

> Using an existing infrastructure of about 20 surveillance cameras, the facial recognition system took pictures of attendees as they entered the Raymond James Stadium through the turnstiles at the four main gates. Cables carried these images to computers, and the software did its work. Algorithms measured facial features from these images—such as the distances and angles between geometric points on the face like the mouth extremities, nostrils, and eye corners—to digitize the image into a record known as a template or what is sometimes called a *faceprint*. (Woodward *et al.*, 2003, p. 248)

The context of ongoing 'wars on terror', and the difficulties associated with differentiating the enemy, provides the demand for which the biometrics industry is only too happy to supply. To coin a phrase, biometric technologies, in part, attempt to give enemies a face. Or more importantly, not unlike earlier eugenics or social Darwinist projects, biometric technologies *mask* the often 'discriminatory' character of this exclusionary move behind its objective, technological, and scientific discourse. In an attempt to cope with the alleged challenges of making the Schmittian discrimination between the 'aesthetically ugly friend' and the 'morally good enemy', 'identity management' fills the breach, offering a material manifestation of securitized citizenship *vis-à-vis* biometric technologies. Coming to terms with biometric technologies themselves, and the challenges they represent to existing accounts of citizenship/asylum politics and identity, help to express the transformation from citizenship from identity management.

Identity management has done little to challenge the integral status of rights and entitlements in modern citizenship. In fact, identity management seems to have intensified the restriction and preservation of certain rights and entitlements. As others who focus on the importance of the passport to citizenship and

migration politics/policies have clearly suggested, citizenship has always been about access, entitlement, and even the biopolitical maintenance or regulation of the health and welfare of citizens (see Torpey, 2000; Salter, 2003). Therefore, while questions of access, the maintenance of border control, and the increasing employment of technologies of exclusion seem prolific, both in terms of the construction of EU citizenship and 'Fortress Europe', and a general 'wall around the west' (see Wiener, 1998; Andreas and Snyder, 2000; Walters, 2002; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003), identity management only implies the intensification of such measures. Similarly, while there has been a qualitative shift towards increasing technologies of identification/verification, these trends are also long standing, and not wholly separate from the sorts of inclinations already embedded in modern citizenship. As David Lyon maintains, while the events of 11 September 2001 can be read as 'a golden opportunity [to] give some already existing ideas, policies, and technologies their chance' (Lyon, 2003, pp. 4–5), it is also important to understand it as bringing pre-existing issues and trends, such as the establishment of 'surveillance societies', to the surface (Lyon, 2003; see also Lyon, 2001). In doing so, the role the events of September 11th and its aftermath constitute the amalgamation of contemporary social and political realities (Lyon, 2003, p. 5). Interestingly, this is not lost on the biometrics industry itself, as most biometrics texts refer to 11 September 2001 as an event that 'forever changed our lives',[4] marking the beginning of the age of 'identity assurance'. With this in mind, how does the introduction of biometric technologies and the construction of identity management differ from existing citizenship regimes? And furthermore, how does this relate to the earlier discussion of securitization?

One way into this discussion is with some definition of biometrics. Industry researchers generally define biometrics as: 'the use of a person's physical characteristics or personal traits to identify, or verify the claimed identity of that individual' (Woodward, 2001a, p. 3). Enter the world of retinal scans, digitized fingerprints, voice recognition, gait measurement, and so on. If this seems a bit 'sci-fi', it is; but if we are to believe industry analysts, it is much more science than fiction. As a recent manual on 'Implementing Biometric Security' points out, Hollywood is responsible for familiarizing us with the tools of biometrics:

> If you've ever watched high-tech spy movies, you've most likely seen biometric technology. Several movies have depicted biometric technologies based on one or more of the following unique identifiers: face, fingerprint, handprint, iris, retina, signature, and voice. (Chirilo and Baul, 2003, p. 1)

Such sentiments, however, are not confined to industry analysts but also a part of policy discourse as well. In 2004, Australia's Immigration Minister, Amanda Vanstone, confessed that she understood peoples concern about the use of biometrics, but blamed Hollywood for their misperceptions: 'I don't think I have ever heard of a movie being made that's demonstrated where biometrics have in fact saved people from improper persecution'.[5] Moreover, by exposing the painful procedures necessary for cheating biometrics, films like *Minority Report* only strengthen the resolve to introduce such technologies into the contemporary

politics of discriminating friend from foe. Like Williams' 'image rhetorics', it would seem biometrics is astutely aware of the power of images in 'securitization'. *Minority Report*, *Mission Impossible*, and other films, become the space in which the merits, dilemmas, and even considerations of political agency are evaluated. In this sense, it would seem that industry representatives and policy advocates consistently evoke Hollywood representations of biometric technologies in order to justify the introduction of such measures and even extol their virtues. Following on Shapiro's notion of cultural governance raised earlier, it would also seem that such visual securitization acts—that is, Hollywood representations of biometrics—also serve to reinforce the current state of exception as the norm. As a part of contemporary 'identity management', biometric technologies already seem 'securitized', not benign technologies for corporate executives to access bank vaults and monitor employee's movements, but integral tools for the post-September 11th world in which identity is itself securitized. However, in addition to being subjected to particular visual securitization acts, biometric technologies also begin to alter the relationship between the concept of identification and authentication or verification.

While still interested in questions of identity, access, and entitlement, the way in which biometrics, ergo identity management, addresses these issues is dramatically different from conventional citizenship. Perhaps most important is the subtle but important distinction made between identification and authentication in identity management, *vis-à-vis* biometric technologies. In addition to this, identity management responds to the increasing deterioration of the public–private divide. Together, these issues constitute a decided shift from the conventional politics of citizenship, and move us ever closer towards identity management.

When leaders in the biometrics industry tell us to 'imagine a world where your stereo and TV know who you are',[6] many conjure up sci-fi images of cyborg organisms and talking toasters. One of the most crucial contributions of biometric technologies is its role in shifting the emphasis of identity politics from identification to authentication and authorization. In practice, biometrics works through an authentication mechanism, verifying identity while a separate authorization mechanism ties appropriate entitlements or access to that identity (Woodward *et al.*, 2003, p. 3). Partially why biometrics is so successful in concealing its exclusionary and discriminatory character is the way in which it tries to hide the question of identity behind the preoccupation with authenticity. In some sense, we need not *know* the friend, but merely authorize access to particular resources, rights and entitlements to the authenticated friends, while blocking access to the unverifiable. One might also consider this in terms of what Didier Bigo calls a 'governmentality of unease' and the 'banopticon', which, unlike the panopticon, discriminates between those with access, and those to be monitored for possible detention or removal (Bigo, 2002, p. 82). Unlike the ubiquitous gaze of the panopticon, the banopticon has a predestined focus. Each and every individual crossing the US border is not digitally fingerprinted and registered, but certain foreign citizens with particular passports are 'tagged'. The very notion of 'smart borders' is introduced to unfetter access for some while

increasing restrictions on 'Others' (Salter, 2004). Herein we see the shift from citizenship to identity management *vis-à-vis* biometric technologies.

In the context of the contemporary securitization of citizenship politics, identity management seemingly circumvents the complications associated with identifying the enemy and the friend, and simply makes the discrimination between the authentic and the inauthentic. No longer capable of *knowing/identifying* the enemy, identity management shifts its focus to authentication and authorization. Relying on complex algorithms and electronic referencing through databanks, biometrics is capable of verifying and discriminating between the qualified and the unqualified bodies, as the politics of (inclusion) exclusion sees itself moving beyond the imprecision of racial profiling and towards the technologically advanced sanitary discriminations of identity management. This transformation is advanced further by identity management's exploitation of the increasingly blurred distinction between public and private *vis-à-vis* the increasing problem of 'identity theft'.

The rising obsession with so-called 'identity theft' or 'identity fraud' is an important link in the securitization of citizenship and the shift towards 'identity management'. Recent high profile advertisement campaigns, such as Citibank's television and magazine ads, employ discourses of threat and insecurity.[7] Similarly, websites like 'Identity Theft 911' ask:

> Do you have a bank account? A credit card? A social security number? If so, you're a target. Fortunately, there's a lot you can do to defend yourself.[8]

In what amounts to a 'securitization of identity', this shift to diffuse and deterritorialized notions of authority further challenges the distinction between public and private. The securitization of 'private' identity happens in much the same way as securitization more generally. Citibank's high profile advertisement campaign is exemplary in 'securitizing private identity' through both textual/speech acts, and image rhetorics. Representing fictional episodes involving large-scale fraudulent credit card use, these Citibank ads reinforce (or introduce) the need to 'secure' private identity in everyday consumer transactions. Here, biometrics' ability to amalgamate the security concerns of the state and those of private industry are ideal. Stressing concerns of authentication and authorization over those of identification, biometric technologies allow the state to 'save face' while amalgamating the concerns of private industry. Perhaps the most significant outcome of this move is the use of effective ad campaigns, which help construct the integral concerns of the new hybrid 'consumers-citizens'.

Whether dealing with access to public healthcare, border crossings, or bank accounts and credit cards, biometrics begins to transform the question from 'who are you?' to 'are you authorized?' In material terms, this involves what those in the biometrics industry have referred to as the creation of 'body as password' (Woodward *et al.*, 2003, p. 198). In this biopolitical move in the extreme, the biological body—or some portion thereof—becomes the single most important 'authenticator'. Negotiating the alleged challenges associated with discriminating between friends and enemies, biometrics constructs identity management as a sort of 'asylum politics' writ large, obsessed with differentiating the authentic

from the inauthentic. Like asylum politics' preoccupation with discriminating the 'bogus fraudster' from the legitimate claimant through its verification of a 'well founded fear', identity management places citizenship in a similar predicament of discriminating authentic from inauthentic. Like asylum politics, the question in identity management becomes one of (dis)qualified bodies, where the body as password enables acts of inclusion of exclusion in both public and private contexts. The link between the securitization of citizenship and the shift to identity management *vis-à-vis* biometric technologies becomes clear, as the primary concern of asylum politics is taken up in the contemporary politics of 'identity management'. Moreover, the distinction between migration, asylum, and citizenship is blurred, as identity management strives to authenticate/discriminate between qualified and disqualified bodies.

Bio-agency and the Politics of Resistance[9]

The contemporary transformation of concerns over identification into more rationalized preoccupations with authorization and access to particular spaces/places/bodies/resources raises some rather complicated questions about agency and the politics of resistance. Lon Troyer's article 'Counterterrorism: sovereignty, law, subjectivity' probes a similar terrain, asking:

> Does surveillance seek to transform the space of appearance into a smooth surface of uniform behavior? And what is the space of the database? Does the space between people that makes the enactment of freedom possible vanish into the databanks of counterterrorist authorities? (Troyer, 2003, p. 270)

Is this related to the already existing space of 'asylum politics' where the question of authorization/verification, and indeed *protection*, is called into question in compelling and novel ways (see Nyers, 2003)? Might this transformation from citizenship to identity management open up the space of asylum politics for possible (bio)agency and the politics of resistance? It is well worth considering the potential political implications of this shift in subjectivity from that of the citizen to the refugee (or a shift from citizen subjectivity to refugee abjectivity) (see Nyers, 2003). As noted earlier, Giorgio Agamben contends that 'in between two extremes—a word without body and a body without word—the room that was referred to as politics is increasingly becoming scarce and narrow' (Agamben, 2004, p. 169). The compelling and even radical implications of such shifts, which I only begin to reflect upon here, deserve sustained consideration. Perhaps one point at which this story might be picked up is in the shifted/shifting notion of the political itself, particularly *vis-à-vis* the transforming spaces/zones of public and private.

The very definition of 'private' already requires a dramatic rethink in light of surveillance in modern societies (see Lyon, 2001). The very distinction between citizens, Others, enemies, criminals, and so on is dramatically transformed not only because of the contemporary aim of 'maximum security', but due to the spatial and cultural implications of such a move. In particular, as Lon Troyer notes, 'counterterrorism … comprises a variety of incentives, impediments, and

mechanisms that increasingly guide the development of political subjectivity as they delimit the zone of the politically possible' (2003, p. 272). In other words, the very space of politics is refashioned in particular ways, which involves countless 'redefinitions' of the citizen. If not docile, the citizen becomes spy (or neurotic) (see Isin, this issue), taking an active role in the maintenance of order and the state itself that is responsible for breathing life into the citizen. Similarly, under such conditions the criminal becomes the terrorist, in an overall geopolitics of exceptionalism (see Bigo, 2002). The active role of the citizen as a part of the apparatus of the state is not new, but a return to ancient Greece, where particular active responsibilities such as jury duty, or even the hoplite armies and the notion of 'warrior citizens', made citizenship as much about responsibility as entitlement (on hoplites, see Coker, 2002, esp. Chapter 2). The new zone of the politically possible, however, is a 'zone of indistinction' (see Agamben, 1998; Edkins, 2000; Diken, 2004), a state of exception, where the citizen-cum-spy (-warrior) is robbed of political subjectivity to the extent that subversion is outside the zone of the possible (political), and in the case of the criminal-cum-terrorist, the treatment shifts from rehabilitation to elimination (Troyer, 2003, p. 272). What then for the question of agency and the politics of resistance?

It would seem that the post-September 11th world of anti-terror legislation, menacing notions of patriotism, and brazen demands for a Hobbesian 'Daddy State' (see Starobin, 2004), have through institutional, social, and technological means created an ever increasing zone of the politically impossible (Troyer, 2003, p. 272). According to David Lyon, in a post-September 11th world, '… an appropriate ethic begins by hearing the voice of the Other' (Lyon, 2003, p. 166). However, the Other, and increasingly the citizen, has become voiceless or speechless, even inhuman, not unlike the refugee. As spaces and bodies find themselves disciplined in particularly totalitarian modes, one must consider altered forms of speech, agency and resistance. Refugees (and their advocates) have shown themselves to be savvy enough to engage in a politics of resistance, whether through legal means, acts of civil disobedience (see Nyers, 2003), and even overt acts of 'bio-agency', often involving self-mutilation.[10] For example, a number of asylum seekers in Sweden chose to engage in a politics of resistance against the European Union's joint-database on asylum seekers, by mutilating their fingers, making fingerprints illegible.[11] While such acts of 'bio-agency' are undoubtedly extreme, one can see how the mere representation of such acts makes an impressive contribution to the contemporary politics of resistance. In much the same way that cinematic representations of biometric technologies are vital to informing public perceptions of biometrics, visual representations of such distressing forms of bio-agency also have a powerful impact in the contemporary politics of resistance.

As discussed earlier regarding Michael Williams' affirmation of the importance of visual securitization acts, visual representations in art, photography, cinema, and so on might also be productive sites of resistance. For example, rather than strengthen our resolve for maximum security, a film such as *Dirty Pretty Things* tells the story of asylum seekers in London's underworld: a disturbing tale of bio-agency, where the zone of political possibility involves trading human organs for passports and providing oral sex in exchange for job

security (Frears, 2003). The film itself then has a role to play in the politics of resistance, providing contradictory images to those supposed 'floods' of asylum seekers flowing through the UK channel tunnel, manifest as a visual securitization act on the nightly news. Consider also the UK's Refugee Council's decision include, for the first time ever, a film festival as an integral part of the 2004 'Refugee Week'. According to the Refugee Council, the film festival is an important addition to 'Refugee Week' as it will serve to 'raise awareness about why people seek sanctuary in the UK and to celebrate the valuable contribution refugees make to our society'.[12] Although visual securitization acts serve to securitize migration (and citizenship), the same sorts of cinematic and mediated representations of migration might also be productive sites for agency and resistance.

Conclusion: Identity Management and the 'Body as Password'

In considering the question 'What's left of citizenship?', this article maintains that the politics of citizenship is undergoing a transformation into identity management. The securitization of citizenship, which is the principal facet of this transformation, involves not only the heightened exploitation of discourses and images of threat, but also a break from 'normal politics' to the Schmittian decisionist politics of the exception. Consequently, the fundamental issue in securitized citizenship politics (read: identity management) is the discrimination between 'friend and enemy'. Biometric technologies and the use of the 'body as password' are considered constitutive of this transformation from citizenship to identity management, raising questions about the nature of citizen subjectivity and agency in contemporary citizen/asylum politics. Such transformations, however, have not challenged the endurance of citizenship practice, as 'identity management' remains committed to the protection and restriction/regulation of specific rights and entitlements. Responding to the alleged challenges of discriminating between friends and enemies in post-September 11th politics, identity management *vis-à-vis* biometric technologies introduces an obsession with authentication rather than identification, endeavoring to conceal traditional methods of inclusion/exclusion such as racial profiling. Finally, this article contends that the intensified protectionist strategies of identity management, combined with the subsequent challenges these transformations present to the (im)possibility of certain forms of agency and citizen/asylum politics, make the question 'what's left of citizenship?' deeply political.

Responding the to alleged challenges of discriminating between friend and enemy in the context of the assimilation of internal and external security, and the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath, the article conceptualizes securitized citizenship as identity management. Biometric technologies and the use of the 'body as password' are considered constitutive to the transformation of citizenship to identity management. Challenging conventional citizenship's focus on identification, identity management *vis-à-vis* biometrics introduces a preoccupation with authentication and authorization. Less concerned with your identity or origin, identity management is preoccupied with discriminating between qualified and disqualified bodies. Oddly, the politics of identity manage-

ment becomes less about identity in the sense of identification, and more about authorized access to resources, privileges, and spaces/places. This transformation is both politicizing and depoliticizing, as it intensifies the traditional preoccupations of citizenship rights and entitlements, while altering the space of 'citizen/asylum politics', narrowing the field of (bio)agency and possibilities for resistance.

This article has framed citizenship politics in the context of post-September 11th international security. Considering specifically the introduction of biometric technologies, it reveals the extent to which contemporary citizenship has been securitized as a part of the wider post-September 11th 'securitization of the inside'. This securitization contributes directly to the intensification of conventional citizenship practice, as biometric technologies are employed to conceal and advance the heightened exclusionary and restrictive practices of contemporary 'securitized citizenship'. The intensified restriction and preservation of particular rights and entitlements, *vis-à-vis* the application of biometric technologies, serves both private and public concerns over 'securing identity'. This overall move, and the subsequent challenges to conventional notions of citizenship politics and agency, are introduced in this paper as 'identity management'. To then ask 'What's left of citizenship?' has helped to shed light on these highly political transformations, as the restricted aspects of citizenship—that is, its continued obsession with the preservation and regulation/restriction of specific rights and entitlements—are increased, and the instrument of this escalation, biometrics, dramatically alters existing notions of political agency and 'citizenship/asylum politics'. In some sense, it has been suggested here that both more *and* less remains of conventional citizenship.

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Notes

1. I refer to the 'impending introduction' of biometrics not without motive. Although biometrics have been introduced in various aspects of citizenship and migration politics (notably certain border controls and identity cards), the cost and complexity associated with introducing biometrics remain to some extent

prohibitive. Relatively widely used in certain components of the private sector for the purposes of identification, authentication, and encryption (finance and banking industry, medicine and pharmaceuticals, to name a few), the wide use of biometric technologies by state governments is less certain. However, recent anti-terror policies and citizenship and immigration policies in a variety of states have specifically mentioned the benefits and possible future uses of biometric technologies. See USA Patriot Act October 2001; UK White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain* (2002); Canada–US Smart Border Declaration (December 2001); and Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration Forum, *Biometrics: Implications and Applications for Citizenship and Immigration* (October 2003).

2. A specific example of this was the shooting death of Manchester Detective Constable Stephen Oake by an Algerian asylum applicant during an anti-terrorist operation. Partisan political actors and media made every effort to capitalize on this incident, highlighting the links between the so-called 'asylum problem' in Great Britain and terrorism (see Muller, forthcoming).
3. Giorgio Agamben was invited to New York University to deliver a series of guest lectures in 2004, which he decided to decline, not willing to submit himself to the new US policy of 'data registration' for all foreign citizens.
4. There is little if any sustained social science commentary on 'biometrics', and as a result, when referring to biometrics texts here, I refer to the most recent and influential texts in the scientific field of biometrics (see Chirillo and Baul, 2003, preface; for some examination of the political and policy implications of biometrics, see also Woodward, 2001b; Woodward *et al.*, 2003).
5. 'Biometrics to be used to identify illegal immigrants', *Herald Sun*, 11 February 2004.
6. Ted Dunsonte of Biometix quoted in Jeanne-Vida Douglas, '*Biometrics: The Body and Soul of Security*', 20Net Australia, 14 February 2004. http://2dnet.com.
7. To promote 'Citi Identity Theft Solutions', Citibank has begun an advertisement campaign, showing the victims speaking with the voices of the identity thieves, who speak about how much fun they had with the victims' bank balance and credit cards. These ads are also run in magazines, showing photos of what can only be described as 'innocuous' looking people, with captions noting some rather 'questionable purchases'.
8. http://www.identitytheft911.com/
9. The inclusion of this section and the discussion therein owes much to thorough and productive comments on an earlier draft by Peter Nyers.
10. The Woomera Detention Centre in Australia has arguably been the most highly publicized case to date, where detainees sewed their own mouths shut. Recent events in Scotland where refugee claimants have taken a similar course of action suggests that this is now a stable part of the refugees' arsenal of 'bio-agency'.
11. 'Sweden refugees mutilate fingers', *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3593895.stm (accessed 3 May 2004).
12. http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/june04/curr68.htm

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