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Unsafe at any speed? Borders, mobility and ‘safe citizenship’

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To what extent are emerging strategies to manage and secure the US border contributing to a redesign of citizenship? This article considers the specific architecture of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), the panoply of compliant programs and documents, primarily trusted traveller programs such as NEXUS, and the accompanying commitments to ‘governing through risk’ as conditions of possibility for contemporary citizenship (re)design. In particular, the article considers borders and the politics occurring there to be critical sites where ‘designing safe citizens’ is worked out on the ground. The article asserts that to a certain extent, the border and contemporary bordering practices are designed into contemporary citizenship, as both borders and related practices proliferate far beyond the spatial coordinates of the geographic border. The emerging redesigned citizenship shares much with conceptions of ‘netizens’ raised in relation to the effects networks have on economy, society and politics. Specifically, it feeds on a similar ‘naïve instrumentalism’ that presents the implementation of surveillance and biometric technologies, to name just two, that are integral to contemporary bordering practices, in distinctly ahistorical and apolitical manners. Moreover, citizenship is (re)designed as ‘safe’ according to the logic of ‘governing through risk’, where one’s integration into the database renders the citizen ‘safe’ insofar as they are a knowable, manageable and governable subject, thus mitigating potential risk.

Keywords: citizenship; border security; Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; trusted travellers; netizens

When I first read that in the newspaper, about the need to have passports . . . I said, what’s going on here? I thought there was a better way . . . to expedite [the] legal flow of traffic and people . . . if people have to have a passport, it’s going to disrupt [the] honest flow of traffic. I think there’s some flexibility in the law. And that’s what we’re checking out right now. (President George W. Bush, 14 April 2005)

I didn’t cross the border, the border cross me. (Los Tigres del Norte)

The Canada/US border has for much of its history been associated more with liberty and mobility than with security. As a result, the sentiments expressed by former president George W. Bush, among many others, regarding the looming ‘securitization’ of the Canada/US border are unsurprising. Almost immediately following the inauguration of President Obama, his new homeland security secretary Janet Napolitano made it abundantly clear that, in large part due to the alleged necessities of enhancing border security and Mexican perceptions of favoritism towards Canada by the US, further

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deferrals in the full implementation of the 'Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative' (WHTI) – a comprehensive US border security scheme – were no longer an option. Therefore, as of 1 June 2009, a passport or other 'compliant document' is required for crossing into the US from Canada, and mobility across the so-called longest undefended border in the world was changed forever. For many citizens on both sides of the Canada/US border, the sort of complications and inconvenience foreshadowed by President Bush's comments gave the impression that rather than crossing the border, the border was crossing the citizens.

Since the events of 9/11, borders across the globe, and North American borders in particular, have undergone significant transformation. Although Peter Andreas astutely notes that much of this transformation 'has involved repackaging pre-September 11 border control ideas and instruments as "new" antiterrorism programs and initiatives' (Andreas 2009, p. vii), the current impact of these initiatives is nonetheless significant. The dramatic increase in surveillance of various sorts, including the use of unmanned PREDATOR Drones over the Canada/US border, increasing regimes of compliance and an institutional transformation of border management on both sides of the Canada/US border, away from a visa/immigration regimes and towards surveillance/security regimes, are just some examples outside of the regular anecdotes regarding heightened security, more frequent inspections, and overall 'unease'.

Schemes focused on the securitization of borders, and debates surrounding the so-called 'thickening' of the Canada/US border are relatively well documented and researched (among many others, see Andreas and Biersteker 2003, Drache 2004, Konrad and Nicol 2008, Salter 2004, Tirman 2004). In terms of the specific impact of these measures on contemporary citizenship, however, far less has been said (see Jacobsen 2010, this issue, Muller 2004, Nyers 2009). The sheer volume of scholarship on contemporary citizenship speaks of the persistent preoccupation with, as Nyers and others ask 'What's left of citizenship?' (Nyers 2004, also see Brown 2003, Muller 2004, Ong 2006). Along similar lines, Weber has prompted reflections on modern liberal citizenship through the concept of 'design', with the insightful and productive prompting the question 'What was modern liberal citizenship designed to do in the first place?' (Weber 2008, p. 127). The argument presented here is well situated within Weber's answer to her research question, which draws attention to how citizenship has been designed and packaged as a part of 'safe living' (Weber 2008). Drawing on the well worn ontological lineage from Hobbes onwards, Weber exposes the extent to which contemporary US citizenship is proposed to resolve the problem of how to design a safe relationship between citizens, states and violence (Weber 2008, p. 126). In a post-9/11 era, in the specific context of borders, which as Sparke and others argue are 'consequential condensation points where wider changes in state making and the nature of citizenship are worked out on the ground' (2006, p. 151), a specific redesign of contemporary citizenship is currently underway. To some extent, the answer to what contemporary citizenship is designed to do is to make citizens/bodies visible, and thus knowable and governable, and contemporary bordering practices are instrumental in this.

This article considers to what extent emerging strategies to manage and secure the US border are contributing to a 'redesign' of citizenship, both in the abstract, but more specifically in the Canada/US case. Borders, and the politics occurring there are considered critical sites where a specific notion of 'safe citizens' is worked out. I contend that trusted traveller programs such as 'NEXUS' – which is the most celebrated 'trusted traveller' program that is part of WHTI although it predates the initiative and is managed bi-nationally by Canadian and US officials – and related commitments to 'governing

through risk' (see Aradau and van Munster 2007) are essential to the emerging (re)design of contemporary citizenship. Rather than citizens experiencing borders as they cross these spatial coordinates, contemporary articulations of borders and bordering practices are integral to contemporary citizenship, as the management of bodies emerges as a central preoccupation of post-9/11 border security. This emerging redesigned citizenship shares much with conceptions of 'netizenship' – a conception of the notion of citizenship and/in networks – raised in relation to the effects networks have on economy, society, and politics. Alleged 'naïve instrumentalism' appears equally ubiquitous to the contemporary redesign of citizenship, specifically when it comes to how the implementation of surveillance and biometric technologies are represented and articulated in apolitical and ahistorical ways. In this case, citizenship is (re)designed as 'safe' to the extent that the citizen is 'becoming digital' and thus 'knowable' to the state and non-state authorities allied with the state. Moreover, the focus of this 'safe citizenship' is from the perspective of the state and its allies, compelled by logics of 'governing through risk', and the alleged need (and possibility) of measuring, preventing, and preempting all imagined sources of harm. As Ericson puts it, current security strategies are saturated with the desire and motivation to 'cast the net as widely as possible, identify suitable enemies, [and] not worry about false positive identifications' (Ericson 2007, p. 48; on preemption and risk also see De Goede 2008). Oddly, this notion of 'safe citizenship' is potentially terribly *unsafe* for the citizen herself.

The article introduces the notion of 'governing through risk' as it applies to the argument, and develops the specific notion of 'safe citizenship' that is linked directly to emerging border security strategies along the Canada/US border that have redoubled efforts to manage the bodies that cross the border. Moreover, the 'redesign' of the Canada/US border is connected (and to some extent is a constitutive element in) the contemporary (re)design of 'safe citizenship'. However, before developing this argument, I discuss the material developments along the Canada/US border, namely the implementation of WHTI and the NEXUS program. The article concludes by considering the concept of 'netizenship' and the extent to which it is helpful in coming to terms with the contemporary (re)design of citizenship vis-à-vis border security strategies, wherein rights and responsibilities are repackaged under the logic of product design, informed by an overarching fixation with safety. Rather than citizens crossing borders, the (re)design of contemporary citizenship involves the border coming to the citizen.

WHTI, risk and post-9/11 (re)bordering

Particularly during the 1990s in the wake of a collapsing Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union, multiple hubris-laden accounts of the emerging 'new world order' were used to describe the withering away of borders and McLuhanesque accounts of a 'global village'. For some, borders seemed passé; a new openness was perceived to be emerging, where mobility of all sorts was embraced in the wake of a divided bipolar world, even in the wake of 'the end of history itself' (most notably see Ohmae 1999 and Friedman 2000). The events that took place on the morning of 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, and the subsequent US-led response that followed, (re)placed borders at the centre of many political agendas as the newly minted mammoth 'Department of Homeland Security' and its 'threat assessments' became ubiquitous in the post-9/11 epoch. After an approximately decade-long hiatus, the rigid conceptions of borders that preceded 1989 seemed to have returned.

Although not altogether obvious, US border security rose on the political agenda in the US almost immediately. The 19 individuals that perpetrated the events of 9/11 did not slip across unguarded US border crossings, nor did they expose a generally lax US, or even inadequate continental border security strategy. However, as is often the case, rhetoric, discourse and imagination is of far greater weight than what is considered to be 'reality' in politics. Almost immediately, false but nonetheless politically expedient and false claims that some of the terrorists had crossed into the US from Canada were voiced (and periodically continue to find some audience), even by high level political actors such as former NY senator Hillary Rodham Clinton. Indeed, even among those considered to represent a more measured approach to post-9/11 US Homeland Security, such as Stephen Flynn, the linkage between the Canada/US border and terrorism is made, as 'Canada's liberal asylum policy' (Flynn 2004, p. 24) makes its way into Flynn's widely cited *America the vulnerable: How our government is failing to protect us from terrorism*. Propped up by persistent misinformation, lackluster efforts by the Canadian government at countering such false claims, and a reinvigorated interest in the capture of Ahmed Ressaam, the so-called 'Millennium Bomber' by US Customs officials in December 1999 during an attempt to enter the US from Canada, plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the new millennium, created a perfect storm for the further securitization and/or 'thickening' of the Canada/US border.¹

Interestingly, one might have come to altogether different conclusions in the wake of 9/11. The total suspension of movement across the Canada/US border as part of the immediate response to the events of 9/11 by US officials proved economically catastrophic to the auto-industry in particular and emphasized the economic and industrial interdependency between the US and Canada. However, almost a decade after 9/11, the push and pull relationship between security and liberty (trade) persists as a cornerstone to most debates about the contemporary management of the Canada/US border.² What has come to be the centerpiece of US border security is the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which allegedly satisfies the tension between liberty and security by facilitating the movement of 'legitimate' trade and travel and intensified the surveillant gaze on the 'others'.

The stated aim of WHTI is to enhance US border security. Resulting from requirements set down in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which obliges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a requirement for all US citizens and foreign nationals to present a passport or other document or combination of documents to indicate identity and citizenship for all travel into the US, WHTI is an 'initiative' that provides a program with deadlines and compliant documents to satisfy these objectives. In other words, WHTI sets out the rules, framework and architecture, in which various branches of the US government (and specifically DHS) are charged with maintaining US border security. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are the central organization charged with maintaining security and compliance of entry requirements for US citizens and foreign nationals.

WHTI is a US policy, but as its name connotes, the ramifications of WHTI are 'hemispheric' rather than domestic. The implementation of WHTI, for example, has necessitated de facto changes to how the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) operates (and indeed to a large extent, the transformation from Canada Customs and Immigration to the CBSA is a result of US pressure, and the change in name connotes changes in the function of the institution away from visa and customs towards security and surveillance), what documents it accepts for entry into Canada, and so on. If, for example, a US citizen is travelling into Canada, even though Canadian regulations do not currently

demand a passport or compliant document for entry, the fact that re-entry into the US by US citizens does require such documents compels CBSA agents to request such documentation for entry into Canada. Similarly, although a passport is not required for re-entry into Canada by Canadian citizens and residents, the fact that such documentation is required by US officials means many Canadians simply produce such documentation upon re-entry into Canada. This, together with the bi-national management of trusted traveller programs such as NEXUS, contributes to the contemporary redesign of citizenship, where the experience of one's national border and the documentation required for one to 'fully function' as a citizen is not at the sole discretion of one's home state. Framed in discourses of convenience and efficiency, WHTI provided the panoply of compliant documents, as potential 'options' allegedly simplifying the process of border crossing. Or more nefariously read, this strategy provides the design template for the emerging multi-speed citizenship.

The compliant documents and schemes under WHTI currently require citizens who wish to travel outside of the US to obtain one of the following:

1. A passport or passport card
2. Trusted Traveller Card (NEXUS for Canada/US border crossings, SENTRI for US/Mexico border crossings, FAST for commercial vehicle crossings)
3. State or Provincial 'enhanced' driver's license
4. Enhanced Tribal Cards
5. US Military Identification with Military travel orders
6. US Merchant Marine Document
7. Native American Tribal Photo Identification Card
8. Form I-872 American Indian Card³

While some compliant documents clearly link with particular portions of one's identity, others are portrayed simply as options for which enrollment is wholly up to the participant. In these latter cases then, by appealing to discourses of convenience and efficiency, these strategies contribute to a re-articulation of the conventional discourse of rights and responsibilities so beholden to staid notions of citizenship. Moreover, the logic of cost-benefit analysis is introduced, in which one is willing to undergo the 'safe redesign' in order to obtain a broader range of privileges, and/or reduce the long lines and hassle of crossing 'thickened', securitized borders.

The decision taken by the US government, led by the Department of Homeland Security, to introduce WHTI is rebuked far more often than it is applauded. Public officials on either side of the Canada/US border, particularly representatives from northern US States, transnational business and commerce stakeholder groups such as the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), and citizens who inhabit the borderlands and whose identity is closely linked to the liberty of mobility and regular border crossings for shopping, leisure, work and so on, have sharply criticized WHTI as disrupting border flows and 'thickening' the Canada/US border.⁴ Many critics cited a lack of intimate local knowledge regarding how the border 'really works' on the part of officials in both Washington and Ottawa, suggesting that the concerns of business and residential communities along the Canada/US border were not consulted in the construction of this policy. Indeed, as the quotation that began this article highlights, President Bush himself claimed to be both unclear and apprehensive about this initiative. This sentiment was echoed in 2009 during the full implementation of WHTI, when both former presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton were questioned in Toronto at a public speaking engagement and were largely unaware of the nature of the policy and its ramifications.

WHTI does not sit alone but fits within complimentary initiatives motivated in part by the broader Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America such as the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan, Registered Travel Program and associated passenger prescreening programs, such as Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS I & II) and 'secure flight' and various 'no-fly lists' all managed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (on passenger prescreening and no-fly lists, see Bennett 2008). Aside from the endless accumulation of acronyms that this provides for the analyst, these programs constitute the emerging assemblage of identity management strategies that are part and parcel of contemporary efforts to enhance border security vis-à-vis the management of the bodies that cross borders.

These strategies contribute directly to a redesign of citizenship, which as it is materially manifest, satisfies the pressures of 'governing through risk'. In particular, as Aradau and van Munster note, 'governing through risk', is preoccupied with 'taming limits' and 'governing the ungovernable' (Aradau and van Munster 2007). In terms of (re)designing citizenship, risk management has a fundamental role to play, as it underlies the governmental logic that leads to the evolution of trusted or registered traveller programs, passenger prescreening, WHTI and so on. As is discussed later, those categorized as 'trusted' or 'registered' or deemed 'safer' are defined as such only to the extent that they are more 'readable' and knowable, and thus tamed or governable, from the perspective of the state. For border officials in particular, the digitally registered, biometrically identifiable citizen is the safe citizen only because the capacity to know, govern and 'tame' is dramatically enhanced vis-à-vis these border security strategies, not unlike attempts to render vulnerable populations 'safe' through schemes that fall under the heading of humanitarian interventions (see Jacobsen 2010, this issue).

At the heart of this redesigned citizenship, or at least its 're-packaging', are market logics – perceptions by the state that move the citizen beyond simply being a consumer and towards the investor (see Martin 2007, see also Muller 2008) and overt applications of cost-benefit analysis associated both with the rollout of the schemes/redesigns themselves and the decision-making involved in the individual citizen's choice to enroll, in the same manner one might choose to invest in a particular stock. Capturing the sentiment of many of the managers of these public and private border assemblages, Stone and Zissu blithely ask 'How much are you willing to pay to reduce hassle . . . be pooled with a group of people who are considered low security risks, . . . [receive] preferential treatment by security personnel, . . . [and] lower the uncertainty associated with airport security?' (Stone and Zissu 2007, p. 449). Similarly, Matt Sparke cites the Canadian Border Services Agency's pitch for NEXUS (one of the primary trusted traveller programs compliant with WHTI) of 'Cross often? Make it simple, use NEXUS' (Sparke 2006, p. 151), as something more akin to an advertisement for a travel agency rather than a government-issued travel document. What emerges is a redesigned citizenship that is multi-speed: where access, convenience and/or hassle are the direct result of one's own (consumer) choices, with your passport allowing you into the slow lane, your enhanced driver's license into the somewhat faster lane and your trusted traveller program membership card allowing you into the most accelerated lane. And most importantly, your enrollment in these ever-accelerating border-crossing programs renders you a 'safe' citizen in the eyes of the state – as a citizen who has become readable, knowable data, and in some cases, disciplined. Specifically among those who cross the border with some regularity, and among those, enrollment in trusted traveller programs such as NEXUS is relatively high, the routine and regime of crossing the border, producing the necessary documentation, and 'behaving' in a particular

way, are to a certain extent along the lines of the disciplinary regimes of various state institutions discussed by Foucault.

NEXUS and safe citizens: Multi-speed citizenship or ‘unsafe at any speed’?

While the primary travel document of choice under WHTI is a government-issued passport, the trusted traveller program ‘NEXUS’ is generally framed as the centerpiece of WHTI. Although security is paramount to WHTI, its goals are framed as not only facilitating security but also the facilitation of the (re)entry of citizens and legitimate travellers into the US. To this end, NEXUS is a key strategy to contemporary border management and central to the transformation of border security towards the further management of the bodies that cross it.

The panoply of programs and strategies that are a part of WHTI and associated with it, such as no fly lists, passenger prescreening and other such programs, are easily implemented at the ‘virtual border’ in airports. Few (if any) citizens are able to fly without entering some sort of ‘system’ or network wherein airline tickets are booked and purchased, bags are checked, meal choices are made and so on, providing a series of potential sites for pre-screening digital bodies. The challenge of border security at land crossings is that generally people simply show up at the border wanting to go shopping, visit relatives, pursue leisure activities, etc., thereby depriving border officials of the advanced check-in information provided by air travellers. Trusted traveller programs such as NEXUS, however, allow border officials to pre-screen travellers in both micro and macro ways. In the micro, the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips on the NEXUS Cards (see Figure 1) allow agents at the border to preview a traveller’s personal data moments before they actually come up to the booth at the land border crossing. A traveller simply removes their NEXUS card from its foil slipcover in its vehicle (which stops the RFID from transmitting and being readable), and an RFID reader is able to decipher the information on the card and transmit it to the border agent in their booth. In the macro, in-depth background checks, verification of personal identification vis-à-vis birth certificate, passport, applicable visas, input of biometric fingerprints, (and in the case of NEXUS Air, Iris Scan) and a general risk assessment on travellers, is carried out at the time of enrollment into the NEXUS program, and every five years at renewal. The nominal cost of \$50 for the entire five-year period makes financial concerns for most rather non-existent. Privacy concerns regarding the lack of transparency in the entire enrollment



Figure 1. Peace Arch Crossing into Canada from Blaine, Washington, two lanes for regular traffic, one NEXUS lane. (Photograph courtesy of Whatcom Council of Governments).

and renewal process and serious questions regarding the integrity and security of RFID technology, however, are legitimate and oft cited as reasons for non-enrollment.

Of relevance here is not only the way in which the process of enrollment into the NEXUS program renders one a 'safe citizen' from the perspective of state officials (and potentially jeopardizes one's safety in other ways, regarding privacy, identity theft, false internment, etc.), but also the extent to which holders of this card enjoy enhanced rights and responsibilities as redesigned 'safe citizens'. The most obvious enhancement is the far less fettered experience of border crossing. As shown in Figure 1, special NEXUS lanes that run parallel to 'regular' lanes allow NEXUS card holders to bypass wait times sometimes in excess of two hours, occasionally causing feelings of contempt among non-NEXUS holders. Interestingly, the experience of the NEXUS cardholder also figures into the marketed and packaged experience of 'safe citizenship', as the border generally seems smooth, if not altogether absent. Indeed, at non-peak times, the pre-screening methods used for NEXUS often mean those in the NEXUS lane do not even come to a complete stop at the border, but instead simply slow down for a cordial greeting.

However, as the model of redesigned 'safe citizenship', NEXUS is exemplary for highlighting how the vision of 'safety' it promotes is not one offered from the perspective of the citizen, but that of the state. In other words, citizenship is (re)designed as 'safe' through such schemes in much the same way that the widespread use of biometric identification technology in Iraq and Afghanistan renders identities 'visible' and thus knowable and governable people to occupying forces (see Jacobsen 2010, this issue, and Measor and Muller forthcoming). Travellers using NEXUS cards are, of course, not exempt from secondary inspection. In fact, the rate of secondary inspection is higher among NEXUS users, simply because the general pool of people using NEXUS is far smaller, making the potential for random inspection higher. Following a similar logic that suggests 'trusted travellers' are in fact anything but 'trusted', General Electric's 'Secure Registered Traveller Kiosk' not only verifies the identity of travellers using so-called 'clear lanes', but also provides scans of shoes so the inconvenient removal of shoes is not required. While providing biometric information for fingerprints to verify one's own identity, the biometric fingerprint scanners are integrated with 'quadrupole resonance and



Figure 2. Example of a NEXUS card.

trace (ITMS) explosives detection technologies' (Securityinfowatch.com 2007). Moreover, this redesigned 'safe citizen' is not necessarily 'safe' in the abstract, but the potential for harm is mitigated. The 'Secure Registered Traveller Kiosk' and the increased secondary inspections among NEXUS users emphasize not only the extent to which enhanced speed comes at a cost, but also the extent to which the notion of 'safe citizenship' is very clearly designed from the perspective of the state, equating 'safety' with wider surveillance, verification and often intrusive practices. These programs and technologies underscore the extent to which the (re)design of contemporary citizenship is less about accelerating the movement of some over others and promoting general notions of 'safety' *per se* than they are instead motivated by the assumption that increasingly in the eyes of the state, citizenship is, to echo Ralph Nader's infamous statement, 'unsafe at any speed'.

Netizenship and re-bordering citizens

The lack of irony is stunning in the emerging redesign of 'safe citizenship' as it is throughout much of the biometrics security industry that is an integral element in this redesign. However, of relevance here is the extent to which what Tim Luke refers to as 'netizenship' – a concept that captures how the contemporary citizen is 'networked' and simultaneously 'digitized' – (Luke 1998, 1999) is expanded in this dramatic redesign of safe citizenship, with an obsession with safety and a zero tolerance for risk making travellers' acquiescence towards enrollment in the NEXUS database and the self-transformation from 'atoms' to 'bits' applauded and yet insufficient.

As Luke argues in his discussion of how citizenship and networks meet, the netizen is more about 'bits' rather than 'atoms', reflecting distinctions between 'have nows' and 'have laters' rather than more conventional 'haves' and 'have nots' (Luke 1999). Lines of inclusion, exclusion and socio-economic divisions are based more on assumptions about access to information or the lack thereof. In fact, as Luke argues, the netizen is increasingly an 'eBourgeois' as data indicates a relatively minimal proportion of the global population (and even the global north) actually accesses the internet and potentially takes advantage of recognized shifts in political participation, action, etc (Luke 1999). Similarly, Weber's account of designing safe citizens takes account of the emerging 'netizen' but raises cogent questions regarding what considerations would factor into individuals' decision to take on the mantle of netizenship over citizenship (Weber 2008, p. 137). Furthermore, the additional but related risk of the 'data double' is relevant when considering the potential of non-citizens choosing netizenship over citizenship, as the 'data double' brings with it an entirely separate series of potential risks, dangers and insecurities for citizenship (see Haggerty and Ericson 2000). What seems specifically troubling is the extent to which the contemporary template of (re)designing citizens(hip) is premised on the notion of the netizen, embracing 'being digital' and valorizing notions of power and socio-economic mobility associated directly with narrow accounts of technology and one's ability to use and access it. To some extent, the experience of the transforming Canada/US border is a case in point: where suspicion is altered (but by no means transferred to those not enrolled in the program *du jour*) once one accepts the cloak of the biometric netizen and the claimed necessity of rapid crossings as a reconstituted digital body.

Although this differential experience at the border vis-à-vis WHTI and strategies associated with the implementation of WHTI begs serious questions about the sort of redesigned citizenship we are currently witnessing, these differential experiences do not

stop at the enhanced driver's license or the NEXUS card. Indeed, material border crossings themselves are currently undergoing redesign to reflect this emerging 're-designed' multi-speed citizenship. In much the same way that the automobile had very material consequences for urban planning and the now ubiquitous 'drive', WHTI and the compliant traveller programs have contributed to re-conceptualizing the border as a series of lines with differential forms of surveillance, security, and access (speed) (see Figure 1). The invocation of netizenship speaks to what Luke refers to as the 'naïve instrumentalism', in which most studies of the effects of networks on economy, society and politics are captivated (Luke 1999). The contemporary (re)design of citizens vis-à-vis (re)bordering strategies in North America and elsewhere tends to follow the naïve instrumentalism to which Luke refers; enrollment in the biometric database is framed in terms of access, convenience, power, and ultimately, first class citizenship.

On a visit to the Canada/US border between British Columbia and Washington state, DHS Secretary Napolitano reinforced many of these assumptions when viewing the over-\$100 million expansion of the US border crossing, mirroring similar improvements made on the Canadian side to cope with increased traffic, particularly during the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver Whistler. Secretary Napolitano stated that:

There's always this tendency to fight security and trade. My goal is to say, 'You know what, they can go together'. If you use technology and manpower the right way, they can and will. (quoted in Banse 2009)

Reflecting an all but ubiquitous assumption that the harnessing of technology by 'good people' will lead to 'good outcomes' motivates much of contemporary border security strategies. The redesign of citizens vis-à-vis biometric and surveillance technologies as managed, tamed and 'known' digital bodies is perceived to be the solution to the general framing of liberty and security as opposing ideals. Oddly, the citizens themselves are often outside of this process, only emphasizing the extent to which this (re)design of 'safe citizenship' is safe from the perspective of the state and associated stakeholders, and not necessarily for the citizen.

Although taking the concerns of tourists, casual travellers and citizens in general is generally situated by the state (and various related interest groups) within the rubric of commerce and efficiency, deeper questions regarding the implications for citizens of these evolving strategies at the border are not taken into account by the public-private partnership that is emerging as a significant authority in border management. Simply put, citizens *as* citizens are not deemed to be 'stakeholders' in contemporary border management in this framework, which is touted as a model for regional coordination on border issues, and has over the last 10 years secured over \$38 million (US) from US and Canadian partners to pursue its stated goals (Whatcom Council of Governments 2007, p. 1).

The emerging management of the Canada/US border by a public-private partnership and the need to map this assemblage of authorities and powers involved in contemporary border management is deeply significant (see Muller 2008). Indeed, as fast-tracking and convenience slowly trump all other concerns, netizenship would seem one apt description – and almost a 'solution' from the state's point of view to the problem of nearly ubiquitous suspicion. 'Immersion into the network' as both Weber and Luke put it, appears to be prized above all else, interestingly by both the user – the contemporary (re)designed citizen – and the state. On the side of the user, convenience is highly prized, even when presented as coming at the cost of one's privacy. And from the perspective of state and corporate authorities, data collection is increasingly regarded as synonymous with greater security, as the logics of governing through risk valorize 'governing the

ungovernable' and 'taming the limit'. By repackaging technologies, transport systems and travellers to differentiate between first and lower-class travellers who can cross borders at different speeds, not only are safe citizens redesigned and repackaged as netizens, but citizenship itself would appear to be altered. By abiding by this logic of product design, their citizenship rights and responsibilities are also redesigned through this repackaging. As such, citizenship becomes less about 'home' and more about which 'package' or compliant program one chooses to enroll.

Contemporary redesigned citizenship (re)packages rights and responsibilities under the logic of product design: informed by an overarching fixation with safety and the self-disciplining citizen/subject, citizenship is less about 'home', particularly in the context of borderland identities (see Donnan and Wilson 1999) and a general commitment to governing through risk that invokes an imagination of uncertainty and strategies focused on 'governing the ungovernable'. Redesigned citizenship becomes a product wherein the question of what sort of citizenship you would like – regular or accelerated – becomes particularly significant at the state border.

Safe citizenship for whom?

Although much of the discussion of the Canada/US border since 9/11 has raised the issues of a 'thickening border', how that border has been 'thickened' through the specific securitization practices and the proliferation of borders not only at air and land crossings but within citizens themselves have received less attention. In this sense, borders are not so much 'thickening' as they are deterritorializing as they become increasingly entrenched as virtual borders in transportation nodal points such as airports and in travellers themselves who have been digitally transformed into netizens, all thanks to the application of risk models to border management that design citizens as 'safe'. In this sense, the redesigned border is not only a critical 'thickening' site where the contemporary politics of citizenship redesign plays itself out. Rather, the border itself redesigns contemporary citizens and citizenship. It is in this way that citizens become defined as 'safe' by virtue of their being digitized, managed and tamed by a panoply of technologically driven programs such as NEXUS.⁵

In sharp contrast to the original liberal design of safe citizenship, which provided a mode of managing and mitigating the state and violence (or at the very least, gave the perception of doing this – see Weber 2008), this new relationship between the state and the 'safe' travelling citizen is increasingly concealed in discourses of efficiency, fast tracking and privilege. In very much the same way as the discourses of network society and netizenship extol the virtues of information, access, convenience and the importance of such in emerging social, economic and political differentiations of the day, the proliferation of technology, information and so on makes 'knowledge' claims of a sort unattainable. This leaves contemporary travellers always struggling to enroll in the newest program to ensure convenience and, as an effect, prove to the state that they merit the distinction of 'safe' citizen. The irony here, of course, is that not only do such schemes fail to guarantee that a citizen will be regarded as safe by the state; they also ignore the fact that citizens might well be compromising their safety by enabling the state to transform them into a digital identity – a netizen. Oddly, then, in order to satisfy the state's obsession with knowing unknowns and governing the ungovernable, citizens/netizens often choose to surrender themselves to the eyes/networks of the state and its intrusions so that they might avoid being categorized as deeply suspicious by the state and, ironically, protect themselves against future intrusions by the state. But such 'free choices' on the part

of citizens constitute part of the state's strategy of neoliberal governance, which so often privileges the state's security over the citizen's freedom, cloaked in seductive discourses of freedom and liberty (see Rose 1999).

Not unlike a range of other developments under neoliberalism, opportunities such as those provided by trusted traveller programs for states to engage in 'governing through freedom' are prolific, as individual choice remains the brand of choice in the contemporary neoliberal redesign of safe citizenship. Packaged as netizenship, the decision to immerse oneself in the database reifies the tired discourse of liberty versus freedom that would appear to have outlived its utility, yet nevertheless trudges on under successive governmental authorities and administrations. Rather than simply enhancing access to information and convenience at the cost of particular forms of privacy, safety under conditions of broadened and almost universal suspicion emerges as the new core of citizenship. In fact, it is their newly re-entrenched exclusivity that is central to this design and its packaging. While ostensibly still designed to 'keep us safe', what we're being kept safe from has become obfuscated, complicated and rearticulated. In some sense, it feeds back on itself, as failure to enroll in the most prominent trusted traveller programs only marginally preys on fear of being under suspicion. To a far greater extent, denied convenience, access to information, commerce and specific visions of prestige and power are perceived to be integral to the emerging redesigned citizenship. In an almost bizarre display of function following form, the contemporary redesign of citizenship contributes to particular behaviors among those for whom the popular mythology (or more bluntly put, what Luke refers to as the naïve instrumentalism of many accounts of contemporary networks and technologies) is convincingly mimicked. Recalibrating older designs of citizenship, contemporary (re)design citizenship, while certainly preoccupied with safety, is more intensely focused on internalizing and performing state power. To this end, the contemporary logic of borders and border practices are designed into contemporary citizenship and into contemporary citizens.

As the commitment to 'governing through risk' deepens and the accompanying attempts to govern uncertainty and 'tame the limit' proliferate, strategies to assess risk expand outwards and the border becomes virtual and ubiquitous. Although contemporary redesigned citizenship maintains the appearance of some articulation of the mythical 'authentic citizen', it never decays, changes or alters but simply lingers, like some botoxed cyborg citizen. The risk assessment is ubiquitous and the border and the body merge.

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Notes

1. Ahmed Ressay attempted to enter the US through Portland, Washington, aboard a ferry that departed from Victoria, British Columbia. Mr Ressay allegedly planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve 1999. However, at the port of entry in the US, customs officials noticed Mr Ressay was nervous, and he subsequently attempted to flee after being asked for further identification. Of particular interest is the fact that the Ressay case stands as both a successful interdiction of a potential threat by US officials in a pre-9/11 context, and the media and political officials took rather little interest in the case at the time. However, after 9/11,

the story of Ressayr found a sort of renaissance, as it was regularly touted as rationale for increased border security between Canada and the US.

2. Nearly all of the research reports, working papers and briefs produced by one of the more productive and prominent US institutes which focuses on the Canada/US border focus on some aspect of this relationship between increased security and trade. See <http://www.wvu.edu/depts/bpri/>
3. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, US Department of State. Available from: http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc_2223.html [Accessed 13 June 2009].
4. One of the metrics that has emerged from both PNWER, with the aid of the Border Policy Research Institute (BPRI) at Western Washington University, is the 'Border Report Card'. This is intended to act as a straightforward critique (and potentially applaud and support in some cases) the current border management strategies pursued by both Canadian and US officials.
5. The protection, support, and even valorization of particular 'forms of life' (Foucault 1990) is significant in the contemporary redesign of citizenship vis-à-vis border management, but it is important to note that this redesign does not malign the already existing distinctions of race, class, and gender. Indeed, these divisions are regularly reinforced, as the contemporary redesign of safe citizenship is preoccupied with mitigating to nil the panoply of imagined dangers, risks, and catastrophes, attempting to 'govern the ungovernable'.

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