Discrimination, Disenfranchisement and African American WWII Military Enlistment[*] (Incomplete)

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Abstract

This paper documents that disenfranchisement and discrimination discouraged WWII volunteer military participation of African American men, relative to Caucasian men, after the Pearl Harbor attack. The race-gap in volunteer enlistment is most pronounced in regions where discrimination was particularly severe. There is no gap in draft enlistment anywhere. Consistent with the notion that disenfranchisement and discrimination discourage military participation, we document that forcibly interred Japanese Americans were much less likely to serve in the U.S. military than those not interred.

Keywords: World War II, Race
JEL: D72, J15, N92, P16

1 Introduction

"Should I sacrifice my life to live half American? ... Will things be better for the next generation in the peace to follow?... Is the kind of America I know worth defending?" James G. Thompson, 26-years-old African American man, wrote in a letter published in the Pittsburgh Courier in January 31, 1942.

Discrimination and disenfranchisement can be harmful in many ways. Economists typically focus on wages and productivity, where the standard Beckerian framework predicts direct costs on the oppressed individuals and indirect costs for the economy as a whole through the misallocation of resources (Becker, 2010).[1] An equally important but less studied channel through which discrimination can affect social welfare is via its effects on citizens' willingness to contribute to public goods.

We aim to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the effect of discrimination and disenfranchisement on the private provision of public goods in the historical context of African American military participation during World War II (WWII). By the end of the war, a higher share of African Americans had enlisted than Caucasians, and their valor was renowned.[2] However, African American participation was very controversial at the outset of the war, when many saw little difference between the U.S. government and what was then known about the Facist regimes. African American poet and social activist Langston Hughes wrote "..You tell me that Hitler / Is a mighty bad man / I guess he took lessons from the Ku Klux Klan [...] I ask you this question / Cause I want to know / How long I got to fight / BOTH HITLER — AND JIM CROW."[3] George Schuyler asked "Why should Negroes fight for democracy abroad when they are refused democracy in every American activity except

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[1]See also Aigner and Cain (1977) and Phelps (1972) among others for seminal contributions on the literature on discrimination.

[2]For example, the Tuskegee Airmen, an all African American unit, received over 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and flew more than 150,000 sorties over two years. The 761st Tank Battalion, known as the "African American Panthers", saved the city of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, and earned four campaign ribbons, 11 Silver Stars, 69 Bronze Stars, and around 300 Purple Hearts, as well as the Presidential Unit Citation for exceptional heroism in action.

[3]Hughes (1943).

tax paying?" Partly in response to this ambivalence, the U.S. government enacted a large campaign to recruit African American soldiers in the second half of 1942.

We study the period before the said campaign, immediately after the surprise attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which prompted the United States to fully enter WWII on the side of the Allied Forces. Using weekly data, we use a *difference-in-differences* strategy to compare volunteer enlistment rates right before and after Pearl Harbor between African American and Caucasian men. The granularity of the data and the short event window allow for sharp identification and avoid the confounding influences of other (race-specific) changes over time.

We find that volunteer rates evolve similarly for African American and Caucasian men until the attack on Pearl Harbor, after which they increased dramatically, with the increase being larger for Caucasian than African American men. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls that account for time-varying differences across counties and races (e.g., county by week fixed effects, as well as a large number of demographic, geographic and economic controls).

The main alternative explanation to our supply-side interpretation is a demand-side mechanism: the U.S. military may have been reluctant to accept African American volunteers.[4] To investigate this alternative, we examine enlistment rates of draftees, which was controlled by the U.S. military and did not depend on the willingness of men to participate. We find no difference in enlistment rates between African American and Caucasian men either before or after Pearl Harbor. These results support our preferred interpretation that the race-gap in volunteer rates is supply-driven.

To provide additional evidence for our mechanism, we exploit heterogeneity in the degree of discrimination in the home county of enlisted men. We find that the race gap in volunteer enlistment rates after Pearl Harbor was most pronounced for men from counties with high levels of discrimination. This supports our interpretation that willingness to volunteer was

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[4]See Section 2 for a detailed discussion of the historical background.

partly determined by the degree of discrimination and disenfranchisement that individuals had experienced.[5]

Given the recent work on the intergenerational transmission of military participation by Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2018), we investigate whether intergenerational transmission occurs in our context. We find that the presence of WWI veterans in the household moderates the discouragement effect of discrimination, while the presence of veterans in the county has little effect. Interpreted through the lens of Bisin and Verdier (2001), these results suggest that the motivations for military participation in our context are transmitted vertically (e.g., elder male to a younger male in the same household), and not horizontally (i.e., through one's networks of friends and neighbors). In line with the latter, we find that the presence of an NAACP chapter and "African American churches", both of which can be viewed as platforms for horizontal information transmission, has little influence.

Examining the characteristics of enlisted individuals, we find that African American volunteers enlisting right after Pearl Harbor were less likely to have at least a high school degree, more likely to enter at the rank of Private (the lowest rank), and less likely to have been employed in the manufacturing sector. This is consistent with the recent findings that education is positively associated with political engagement (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017).

Finally, we study the effects of disenfranchisement of another minority group – Japanese Americans – on their willingness to serve in the U.S. military. After Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans were declared to be enemy citizens and largely barred from military service until early 1943, when they were recruited conditional on their willingness to swear loyalty to the United States. Japanese-American civilians on the U.S. mainland had been forcibly interred. Hawaii was exempted from this policy. Thus, we compare the willingness of

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[5]Note that once enlisted, the treatment and the opportunities faced by African American soldiers did not vary depending on their county of origin.

A closely related and complementary mechanism is that the history of political, social, and economic discrimination reduced African American men' sense of self-efficacy, and discouraged their political and civil engagement. This mechanism is consistent with a branch of the political psychology literature (see, for instance, Komisarchik et al. 2019, and Oskooii 2016, 2018). Our study does not aim to distinguish this theory as a potential explanation for our results from other mechanisms for discouragement.

Japanese Americans to join the U.S. military before and after they were allowed back into service, between the mainland and Hawaii. We find a large increase in enlistment from Hawaii, and a negligible increase from the mainland. These results are consistent with our main findings. In addition, we document the patterns of volunteer enlistments for all of the racial minorities that we can identify in the data, and show that the increases in volunteer enlistment rates after Pearl Harbor are broadly consistent with the differences in incentives across groups.

Our paper adds to recent works on the determinants of military participation. In studying the historical U.S. context, we are related to Fouka (2020), which finds that anti-German sentiments during WWI was negatively associated with WWII German-American enlistment rates; Caprettini and Voth (2020), which finds that medals won during the war and War Bond purchases were positively associated with New Deal spending (for all races); and Hall et al. (2019), which documents that Caucasian slave owners were more likely to fight for the Confederacy during the Civil War.

In examining the social costs of discrimination in the historical context, we are also related to Moser and San (2020), which documents that the introduction of stringent immigration quotas in the 1920s reduced innovation rates in the United States, even though scientists were not the direct target of the restrictions. Huber et al. (2018) estimates that the expulsion of Jewish managers in Nazi Germany reduced the market valuation of German firms, with long-lasting effects that persisted well after 1933. Waldinger (2010) finds that the expulsion of high quality mathematics professors across German universities during the Nazi period had a very negative effect on the productivity of their Ph.D. students.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical background. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 examines Japanese Americans and other ethnicities. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 Pearl Harbor

The Japanese conducted a surprise military strike against the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, at 7:48am on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. The attack happened without a declaration of war and without explicit warning, amidst ongoing peace negotiations. Japan declared war on the United States later that day. U.S. Congress declared war, and the U.S. formally entered WWII the next day.

2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded. 188 U.S. aircrafts were destroyed. The naval fleet sustained significant damage, although some of it was temporary. For example, of the eight U.S. Navy battleships that were damaged or sunk, all but one were later raised and six were returned to service in the war. Important base infrastructure such as the power station, dry dock, shipyard, fuel storage facilities and submarine piers were untouched.

The attack was immediately reported by American news outlets. Pearl Harbor transformed America's involvement in WWII from one that was relatively detached, about abstract values such as democracy versus Fascism in distant foreign lands, into an immediate and urgent defense of the United States. Pearl Harbor became a rallying point for the war effort, and was used in American propaganda throughout the war. For instance, a well-known battle cries included "... we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain..." and "Remember December 7th!". The Japanese conducted additional and highly damaging strikes against the U.S. Pacific fleet in the following days, adding to a sense of a nation under attack in the United States.

2.2 Racial Discrimination Between 1880 and 1940

When the U.S. entered WWII, African Americans had very limited civil and political liberties, due to both formal and informal discrimination that severely restricted their political,

economic, and social opportunities relative to the Caucasian population. This had been true for decades. Starting from the late 1890s, many southern states passed laws intended to disenfranchise the African American population (Woodward, 2002). As discussed in Naidu (2012) and Cascio and Washington (2014) among others, these changes significantly reduced the number of African American voters. For example, in Louisiana, the number of African Americans registered to vote decreased from approximately 130,000 in 1896 to 1,342 by 1904. In Mississippi, less than 9,000 out of 147,000 voting age African American men were registered to vote. In Georgia, only four percent of all African American males were registered to vote (Keyssar, 2000).

The African American population faced restrictions such as the complete segregation of Caucasian men and non-Caucasian men in all facilities (e.g., restaurants, schools, water fountains, buses), with facilities provided to non-Caucasian men being of lower quality relative to those provided to Caucasian men. Many states practiced strict neighborhood segregation, where public services such as sewers and electricity ended at the boundaries of the Caucasian neighborhoods. In other places, particularly urban areas, there was segregation even within buildings (e.g., across floors). Interracial marriages and sometimes even non-marital sexual relationships were made illegal (Packard, 2003). Discrimination was often enforced informally by organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, and more generally by coordinated actions of Caucasian citizens. Non-Caucasian men seen as violating Caucasian supremacy were regularly harassed, and sometimes murdered. Between 1882 and 1968, approximately 3,446 African Americans were lynched (TuskegeeInstitute, 2010). Caucasian residents vehemently opposed African American pioneers who tried to move to their neighborhoods in northern cities: in many cases, African Americans were verbally and physically assaulted, and sometimes had their houses bombed (Sugrue, 2014). Moreover, African American men had to pay a substantial premium when moving to a predominantly Caucasian block; however, as soon as the neighborhood turned to majority African American, that same house substantially lost value, contributing to the erosion of African American wealth (Akbar et

al., 2019).

African Americans pupils had to attend – *de jure* or *de facto* – separate (and unequal) schools, which were severely under-funded and were responsible for the large racial gap in educational attainment (Margo, 1990; Collins and Margo, 2006). Partly because of worse educational opportunities and partly because of rampant labor market discrimination, African American men earned significantly less than Caucasian men.[6] African American men and women were shut out of most non-menial jobs (Sharfstein, 2011). Sundstrom (1994) shows that the large differences in occupational choices between African Americans and Caucasians were driven in part by social norms that rejected African American workers as supervisors over Caucasian workers.[7]

There was substantial geographical variation in the degree of discrimination. Although discrimination and disenfranchisement were institutionalized in the South, due to Jim Crow laws, racism was everywhere. For example, the Ku Klux Klan was based in Indiana during the early 20th Century, and had large memberships in Maine and Oregon. California, which had introduced laws to restrict property ownership of Asian individuals during the 19th Century, extended them to include other non-Caucasian races such as African Americans (Packard, 2003). When Woodrow Wilson became president, he segregated the District of Columbia's federal agencies, which had been integrated for the previous fifty years (Packard, 2003). Between 1913 and 1948, 30 out of the then 48 states enforced anti-miscegenation (mixed-race marriage) laws (Vile, 2003). Many schools in Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey were completely segregated, even though it was *de jure* illegal. Similarly, as

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[6]Margo (1990) discusses the striking stability of the African American-to-Caucasian earnings ratio from 1900 to 1940 and the potential causes of these gaps, with African American men earning between 45%-48% the income of Caucasian American men over this entire period. See also Carruthers and Wanamaker (2017b), Collins and Margo (2011) and Card and Krueger (1992). Wright (2013) discusses how the civil rights movement eliminated many of the barriers to African American economic success that existed until the 1950s, and led to large economic gains for African American men and women. Returns to skin color are discussed in more depth in Bodenhorn (2015).

[7]There was also significant variation in the formal laws which affected the rights and opportunities facing African American men within states, as well as in the informal enforcement of state or federal laws. For example, Carruthers and Wanamaker (2013) document substantial variation in the relative quality of schooling for African American students across counties. Keyssar (2000) notes that the economic qualifications for voting varied across municipalities in New York state.

noted above, Caucasian residents *de facto* enforced racial residential segregation in most northern and western cities (Shertzer and Walsh, 2019).

2.3 The U.S. Military

2.3.1 African American Soldiers

Race relations within the U.S. military mirrored those of the nation. African American soldiers and Caucasian soldiers were segregated until 1948. During WWII, they had separate canteens, barracks, nurses and even blood banks. African American soldiers served under African American or Caucasian officers, whereas Caucasian soldiers served under Caucasian officers only. Enlisted African American men mostly served in non-combat units. The marines had no African American enlisted men in combat infantry, while the Navy Seabees and the United States Air Force had very few of them. One notable exception was the Tuskegee Airmen. The Army had only five African American officers.[8]

2.3.2 Draft and Volunteer Enlistment

Our main analysis focuses on the weeks right before and right after Pearl Harbor, when both volunteer and draft enlistment were in place, and when changes in the policies regarding military recruitment or its implementation were very limited. For brevity, this discussion focuses on the recruiting policies for draftees and volunteers within this narrow time frame.

The Selective Training and Service Act (STSA), signed by President Roosevelt on September 16, 1940, established the first peacetime draft in the United States. It required the registration of all men between 21 and 35, with selection for one year's service by a national lottery. The STSA became the basis for WWII conscription programs, but was relatively limited in scale before Pearl Harbor. The act set a cap of 900,000 men to be in training at any given time, and limited military service to 12 months unless Congress deemed it nec-

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[8]For a detailed description of race relations and African American enlistment in WWII see Lee (2000), available at this link, and Flynn (1984).

essary to extend such service in the interest of national defense. The STSA also assigned state governors the task of dividing states into local board areas. While the exact date in which local boards were introduced is not consistently available for all states, by the summer of 1941 the Selective Service System moved away from a national lottery to administrative selection, conducted by more than 6,000 local boards. The WWII draft operated from 1940 until 1946, when further inductions were suspended.

After Pearl Harbor, the STSA extended the term of service to the duration of the war plus six months, and expanded the ages required to register to all men from 18 to 64 years of age.[9] Volunteers were allowed until December 5, 1942, when an executive order banned them so as to have full control over the labor force. The criteria for accepting volunteers (e.g., health test) were similar for draftees.[10] Once inducted, an enlisted man's occupation in the military depended on factors such as education and occupation prior to enlistment, and on race. It did not instead depend on either volunteer status or the county where the soldier was coming from.[11] This is an important feature to keep in mind for our analysis later, when we compare enlistment of volunteers to that of draftees.

During WWII, 49 million men were registered and almost 10 million of them, including volunteers and draftees, were inducted.

2.4 Contemporary Discussion about African Americans' Involvement in WWII

When WWII erupted, a heated debate emerged within the African American community concerning the involvement of African American men in the war. On the one hand, there was much disappointment due to the lack of social progress following WWI, when 350,000

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[9]These changes became effective on December 20, 1941, when U.S. Congress passed Public Law No.360.

[10]Acemoglu et al. (2004) discuss the most common individual characteristics typically considered by local boards for deferrals or exemptions, such as marital status, fatherhood, farm status, or German, Asian, and Italian ancestry.

[11]Although evidence suggests that volunteers had some degree of discretion when choosing between branches in the U.S. military (Ferrara, 2018; Flynn, 1993), there was no discretion within the Army – the focus of our empirical analysis.

African American men enlisted, and there was hope that Caucasians would observe the value and patriotism of their compatriots and reduce racial discrimination afterwards. An example of such disillusionment can be seen in Langston Hughes's "The Colored Soldier" (1919):[12]

> ..We were just two colored boys, brown and African American,
>
> Who joined up to fight for the U.S.A...
>
> And that our dark blood would wipe away the stain
>
> Of prejudice, and hate, and the false color line—
>
> And give us the rights that are yours and mine.
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> They told us America would know no African American or Caucasian:
>
> So we marched to the front, happy to fight.

The lack of abatement in discrimination led to public outcries from the African American community, which motivated African Americans' reluctance to volunteer during WWII. Prior to Pearl Harbor, in 1937, The New York Amsterdam wrote "[Nazis' plan to segregate Jews on German railways was] taking a leaf from United States Jim Crow practices ." Earlier, in 1935, it wrote "If the Swastika is an emblem of racial oppression, the Stars and Stripes are equally so....". "Why should Negroes fight for democracy abroad when they are refused democracy in every American activity except tax paying?" wrote George Schuyler, columnist for the Pittsburgh Courier. "Why should I shed my blood. . . for the whole Jim Crow, Negro-hating South, for the low- paid, dirty jobs for which Negroes have to fight, for the few dollars of relief and insults, discrimination, police brutality, and perpetual poverty to which Negroes are condemned even in the more liberal North?" wrote African American writer , C. L. R. James in 1939.

On the other hand, after Pearl Harbor, African American leaders emphasized the complementarity of fighting for the U.S. in WWII and the fight against discrimination at home. This was best captured in the Double V campaign. On January 31, 1942, the Pittsburgh

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[12]See Langston Hughes, The Colored Soldier (1919) in *The Collected Poems of Langston Hughes*, pp. 147-48 (Rampersad, 1995).

Courier – one of the most read African American newspapers at the time – published a letter to the editor from James G. Thompson: "Being an American of dark complexion and some 26 years, these questions flash through my mind: 'Should I sacrifice my life to live half American?' 'Will things be better for the next generation in the peace to follow?' 'Would it be demanding too much to demand full citizenship rights in exchange for the sacrificing of my life?' 'Is the kind of America I know worth defending?' 'Will America be a true and pure democracy after this war?' 'Will colored Americans suffer still the indignities that have been heaped upon them in the past?' These and other questions need answering." Then he proposed what he called "the double V V for a double victory ... The V for victory sign is being displayed prominently in all so-called democratic countries which are fighting for victory over aggression, slavery, and tyranny. If this V sign means that to those now engaged in this great conflict, then let we colored Americans adopt the double V V for a double victory. The first V for victory over our enemies from without, the second V for victory for our enemies from within. For surely those who perpetuate these ugly prejudices here are seeking to destroy our democratic form of government just as surely as the Axis forces."

On February 7, 1942, two months after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Courier published on its front page an insignia announcing "Democracy – Double Victory, at Home – Abroad". The following week, the paper announced that it had published the insignia "to test the response and popularity of such a slogan with our readers. The response has been overwhelming." Henceforth, "this slogan represents the true battle cry of colored America." As the editors concluded, "we have adopted the Double 'V' war cry — victory over our enemies on the battlefields abroad. Thus in our fight for freedom we wage a two-pronged attack against our enslavers at home and those abroad who would enslave us. WE HAVE A STAKE IN THIS FIGHT ... WE ARE AMERICANS TOO!" The Double V campaign ran weekly at least until the summer of 1942. Since then, most African American newspapers' involvement with the campaign declined, but their initial excitement was key to spread the message among

African American communities throughout the country (Washburn, 1986). For instance, to promote patriotism, the Courier included an American flag with every subscription, and encouraged its readers to buy war bonds. Historian Clarence Taylor surmises that "Although the Courier could not claim any concrete accomplishments, the Double V campaign helped provide a voice to Americans who wanted to protest racial discrimination and contribute to the war effort."

The efforts of the U.S. government and African American community leaders to reduce discrmination in the U.S. military had limited success. Nevertheless, coupled with the widespread propaganda, the effort to increase African American enlistment rates was very successful. African American volunteer and draft enlist rates began to increase around four months after Pearl Harbor, with African American volunteer enlistment rates exceeding Caucasian rates by the middle of 1942 and until the end of the year, when volunteer enlistment was abolished.

Our study will focus on the period right before and after Pearl Harbor, before the said recruitment efforts.

3   Empirical Strategy

We implement a difference-in-differences strategy to examine whether disenfranchisement affected African Americans' volunteer rates in the military. We compare volunteer rates of African American men, who were (more) disenfranchised, to those of Caucasian men, who were not; before and after Pearl Harbor.[13] Intuitively, our strategy exploits the fact that the unanticipated surprise military strike transformed WWII into a war of national defense, allowing us to examine the differential response of African American men – versus Caucasian men – volunteer rates to this event. Ideally, one would estimate individual level regressions. However, since the data on WWII enlistment include only those individuals who served

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[13]We restrict attention to African American men and Caucasian men, who, taken together, account for more than 93% of all individuals in the enlistment data (see Section 4).

(see Section 4 below), it is not possible to conduct the analysis at the individual level. We thus aggregate volunteer and enlistment at the race level, computing the share of enlisted individuals relative to the population "at risk", as we explain in the next paragraph. The baseline specification is the following:

$$enlist_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta PearlHarbor_t \times Black_{ij} + \gamma_i + \delta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}. \tag{1}$$

The dependent variable, $enlist_{ijt}$, is the share of eligible men of race i in county j who enlisted as volunteers in the U.S. Army during week t. Since U.S. Congress increased the registration age range on December 20th of 1941, we adjust the denominator (i.e. the population eligible for service) accordingly.[14] Throughout our analysis, we multiply the enlistment share, $enlist_{ijt}$, by 100,000 to ease the visualization of results.[15] Equation (1) models the enlistment rate as a function of: a dummy equal to 1 for weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, $PearlHarbor_t$, a dummy equal to 1 if group i is African American, $Black_{ij}$, and the interaction between the two; race fixed effects, γ_i; and, the interaction of county by week fixed effects, δ_{jt}. The county-week fixed effects control for all differences across counties in a time varying way (e.g., economic conditions, historical racism). Regressions are weighed by the race-specific population of eligible men in each county to be representative, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

The effect of disenfranchisement on volunteering behavior is identified exclusively from the interaction term. All time invariant differences across races or across counties are absorbed by race and county fixed effects. Moreover, any time-varying trend that affects both races and all counties in the same way is controlled for by the inclusion of week fixed effects. The first set of fixed effects rules out the possibility that African American men had different opportunities outside or within the military due to discriminatory practices and culture, as

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[14]In particular, until that date, corresponding to weeks -8 to +1 in our analysis, individuals of age 21 to 35 were eligible for service. Following the passage of Public Law No.360, this age range was expanded to 18-64.

[15]Clearly, this does not affect either the interpretation or the statistical significance of our results.

long as such different opportunities do not vary over time. Week fixed effects deal with the possibility that Pearl Harbor affected the salience of the war for all Americans. Notably, the interaction between week and county fixed effects, which we include in our most preferred specification, controls for any county characteristic that might have varied weekly, influencing the decision to volunteer of African American men and Caucasian men.

The main caveat to our strategy is that an omitted factor that influenced volunteer enlistment also coincided with the attack on Pearl Harbor and differentially affected African American men and Caucasian men. To minimize this concern, we exploit the granularity of our data, focusing on enlistment at the weekly level, and narrow the time window to be only eight weeks before and after Pearl Harbor, when the government had not yet had time to adapt its recruiting policies or announce other important changes. We discuss potential alternative mechanisms and identification concerns – as well as the strategies implemented to deal with them – after presenting the main results.

4   Data

Our main source of data is the World War II Army Enlistment Records (NARA-AAD), 1938-1946 (NARA, 2002). This dataset, also used in Caprettini and Voth (2020) and Fouka (2020) among others, includes 9,039,840 individual service records of American soldiers who served in the Army from 1938 to 1946, and were digitized by the National Archives. The individual level data include information about the date of induction, birth year, education, occupation, marital status, race, citizenship, volunteer status, branch, and rank at the time of induction.

The main analysis focuses on the 48 mainland states for which the data can be disaggregated to the county level.[16] Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the enlistment

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[16]As noted also in Caprettini and Voth (2020), a number of enlistment records in Service Command 7 are missing (NARA, 2002). Service Command 7 included the following states: Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. In our baseline analysis, we include all mainland states. However, in unreported results, we replicated the analysis dropping these states.

data of 382,092 individuals, reporting them for the full sample in Panel A, and for African American and Caucasian soldiers in Panels B and C respectively.[17] 7%, or 26,432, of the enlisted individuals were African American men, whereas 93%, or 355,660, were Caucasian men.[18] The table reveals that 39% were volunteers, while 61% were drafted. On average, half of the enlisted individuals had at least a high school degree, 10% (resp. 55%) were employed in agriculture (resp. manufacturing) before serving in the Army, and 95% were in private grade (the lowest possible position in the military). Turning to the statistics by race, we note that 41% of Caucasian men and 10% of African American men in our dataset were enlisted as volunteers. Not surprisingly, and reflecting unequal access to education, only 20% of African American soldiers had at least a high school degree, compared to 53% of Caucasian men. Finally, consistent with widespread discrimination in the Army, more than 99% of African American men were enrolled in private grade, as opposed to 94% of Caucasian men. Median age was 23 for both races.[19]

We combine data on volunteering with the 1940 full count U.S. Census of population to construct the number of eligible men for each race in each county (Ruggles et al., 2020). This is then used as the denominator for calculating our dependent variable, the share of enlisted men for each race in each county in each week. We also use the 1940 U.S. Census to construct a number of county controls, which we describe during our analysis as we introduce them.[20]

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[17] Restricting attention to the 8 weeks before and after Pearl Harbor, but including soldiers of all races, increases the number of observations to 392,875. See Table A1 for the summary statistics reported for the full NARA dataset.

[18] For a handful of individuals, information on high school degree and age is missing – this explains why the number of observations is slightly lower for these variables.

[19] The minimum and the maximum ages are unreasonably low and high respectively due to mistakes in the original data. There are 187 individuals whose age is either above 64 or below 15. Reassuringly, all our results are robust to excluding them from the analysis.

[20] As described in detail below, we use the 1930 U.S. Census to construct proxies for the presence of WWI veterans both in the county and in the household of individuals who, given their age in 1930, would be eligible to serve during WWII.

5 Results

5.1 Volunteers

We begin with a visual examination of volunteer enlistment rates by race, before and after Pearl Harbor. Figure 1 plots the enlistment rate by race and week, per 100,000 enlistable individuals. It shows that Caucasian volunteer enlistment rates (gray, dashed line) were always higher than African American ones (black, solid line), both before and after Pearl Harbor. In the two weeks after Pearl Harbor (week 0 and week 1 on the x-axis), Caucasian volunteer enlistment rates spiked up, rising by more than 400% relative to the week before the attack, and. Afterwards, they decline, but are always higher than pre-Pearl Harbor rates. These patterns are consistent with anecdotal and historical accounts that describe the immediate rush to volunteer in response to the Pearl Harbor attack.

African American volunteer enlistment rates were negligible prior to Pearl Harbor, and did not increase during the first week after the attack (week 0 on the x-axis). They increased significantly the next week (week 1 on the x-axis). However, the magnitude of the increase was an order of magnitude smaller than for Caucasian men. In subsequent weeks, African American volunteer enlistment rates followed the same temporal pattern as those for Caucasian men, but the level always remained significantly lower. This is consistent with the view that the surge in patriotism for African American men was dampened by the discrimination they faced in society and the U.S. military.

Figure 1 illustrates the variation exploited by our difference-in-differences strategy, which compares the average African American-Caucasian difference between the post-Pearl Harbor enlistment and pre-Pearl Harbor enlistment rates. Since the vertical gap in enlistment rates is larger for the post period, we know that the interaction coefficient from the baseline equation, equation (1), will be negative.

Column (1) in Table 2 only includes state fixed effects and reports coefficients for both the African American and post-Pearl Harbor dummy variables, as well as their interaction.

The dependent variable is the enlistment rate by race and week per 100,000 enlistable individuals. The coefficient on the African American dummy indicates that before the attack on Pearl Harbor, African American men were 13.7 percentage-points less likely to volunteer than Caucasian men. The coefficient on the post-Pearl Harbor dummy implies that Caucasian volunteer enlistment rates rose by almost 25 percentage-points after the attack. The interaction term shows that the attack increased African American volunteer enlistment by 16.6 percentage-points less than it did for Caucasians. The sum of the interaction coefficient and of the uninteracted African American coefficient at the bottom of the table shows that after Pearl Harbor, African American men were thirty percentage-points less likely to enlist than Caucasian men. All of the estimates discussed so far are statistically significant at the 1% level.

Given that the average enlistment rate in our sample is 26.7 per 100,000 eligible individuals, the interaction coefficient implies that African American men were almost two-thirds less likely to volunteer than Caucasian men after the attack. For comparison, Fouka (2020) finds that exposure to anti-German language laws during WWI lowered Germans' propensity to volunteer during WWII by 2.6 percentage-points (11%) relative to cohorts of Germans who were not directly exposed to these laws. Caprettini and Voth (2020) documents that doubling New Deal expenditures in a county raised volunteering by 8%.

Subsequent columns of Table 2 gradually add more stringent controls. First, we consider the possibility that the estimates in column (1) may be confounded by time-invariant, county-specific characteristics that differentially affected the decision to volunteer for Caucasian and African American men. For example, exemptions and deferrals were given to individuals based on farm ownership, fatherhood, marital status, and ancestry (Acemoglu et al., 2004). For this reason, in column (2), we augment our baseline specification by including the 1940 share of farmers and farmland, and the share of the population with Italian, German and Japanese ancestry in the county. In order to deal with the possibility that patriotism varied (across races before and after Pearl Harbor) with population size or density and with

educational attainment, we also control for 1940 county population, population density, and the average number of years of education.[21] In addition, since the desire to fight might be correlated with distance from Axis powers, we control for distance to Germany, Japan and Pearl Harbor. Finally, we include per capita government spending on WWII-related contracts and facilities, as these may have altered the opportunity cost of volunteering.[22] Our estimates remain nearly identical to those reported in column (1). Column (3) further includes per capita New Deal relief spending – an important determinant of volunteering behavior (Caprettini and Voth, 2020).[23] While the number of observations falls by one-third, due to limited data availability, the coefficients are similar to the baseline.

From column (4) onwards, we include county and week fixed effects. Thus, the estimates are driven by within county variation in volunteer enlistment across races in a given week.[24] In column (5), we interact county fixed effects with the post-Pearl Harbor dummy to allow county characteristics to differentially influence Caucasian and African American volunteering behavior before and after the attack. Finally, in column (6), we present the baseline specification with the full set of interactions between week and county fixed effects. This controls for all county specific factors varying across weeks. In other words, the interaction coefficient in column (6) reflects the difference in African American and Caucasian volunteer enlistment within the same week in the same county.

The coefficient on the African American dummy indicates that, before the attack on Pearl Harbor, African American men were 16.9 percentage-points less likely to volunteer than Caucasian men. The interaction term shows that the attack increased African Americans' volunteer enlistment by 11.3 percentage-points less than it did for Caucasians. The sum of the interaction coefficient and of the uninteracted African American coefficient at the bottom of the table shows that after Pearl Harbor, African American men were 28.2 percentage-points

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[21]All county socio-economic and demographic variables are measured in 1940, and are aggregated from the full count, individual level U.S. Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2020).

[22]Data on WWII contracts and facilities is taken from the County and City Data Books (ICPSR Study 7735).

[23]Data on New Deal spending come from Fishback et al. (2003).

[24]The post-Pearl Harbor dummy is absorbed by week fixed effects.

less likely to enlist than Caucasian men. All of the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.

5.2 Demand-Side Changes

We interpret the differential volunteer enlistment rate as a supply-side mechanism: severe historical discrimination and disenfranchisement discouraged African Americans from volunteering after the Pearl Harbor attack. Our effects may partly capture African American men's decision of "passing" for Caucasians in response to discrimination (Dahis et al., 2019). However, the magnitudes estimated in Table 2 are too large to be substantively affected by this possibility. Instead, the main alternative explanation to our supply-side channel is a demand-side mechanism. The relatively low rates of African American volunteers may be due the the military turning down a higher share of African American volunteers, either because they wanted to keep African American soldiers out of the military or because the supply of facilities for segregated African American soldiers was insufficient right after the attack (or, both).[25] We investigate this alternative mechanism by examining draft enlistment. Draftees faced the same policies and discrimination as volunteers. However, draft rates were directly controlled by the military. Thus, demand side forces should be captured by the rate of drafts right after Pearl Harbor.

Figure 2 plots draft enlistment rates before and after Pearl Harbor. There is no difference between Caucasian and African American men before or after Pearl Harbor. This is consistent with the race gap in the volunteer enlistment rates being driven by supply forces.

Interestingly, draft enlistment rates were very low for both races in the month after Pearl Harbor. This is consistent with claims that limited facilities made it difficult for the military to house the dramatic surge in volunteers immediately after Pearl Harbor. This observation might raise the concern that the military may have been more willing to give the limited slots to Caucasian volunteers, while turning away African American volunteers. However,

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[25]Prior to Pearl Harbor, the military had been reluctant to accept African American soldiers, or to build adequate facilities for the segregated African American soldiers (Lee, 2000).

Figure 2 shows that draft rates return to pre-Pearl Harbor levels by one month after the attack. In contrast, Figure 1 shows that African American volunteer enlistment continued to be lower than Caucasian volunteer enlistment after one month. Thus, space constraints seem unlikely to explain the race gap in volunteer rates.

Table 3 presents the regression estimates, where the dependent variable is the number of drafted individuals (by race) per 100,000 eligible men. For brevity, we focus on the baseline estimate shown in column (6). The coefficient on the interaction between the African American and the post Pearl Harbor dummies is positive and statistically insignificant.

5.3 Heterogeneous Effects

5.3.1 Discrimination in the County of Origin

To further delve into the mechanisms of the relatively low supply of African American volunteers, we investigate whether the Caucasian-African American gap in volunteering varied with levels of discrimination across counties. We construct the first principal component (PCA) of political and social discrimination for the county of enlistment.[26] The PCA index is constructed using the following variables: presence of the Ku Klux Klan from 1915 to 1940; the number of lynchings until 1939; the Democratic vote share in Congressional and Presidential elections between 1900 and 1930; and, the measures of racial residential segregation and isolation constructed in Logan and Parman (2017).[27]

In principle, severe discrimination at home can produce two opposing effects on African American men's willingness to enlist. On the one hand, it can discourage them, reducing their incentives to volunteer. On the other hand, enlisting may have a lower opportunity cost for those who face more discrimination at home. This is because military assignment did not

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[26]We only observe the county from where a man enlists. This does not necessarily need to be the county of his birth. Our interpretation will only assume that the migration patterns of African American men (relative to Caucasian men) did not change immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack.

[27]See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion on the construction of the PCA index, and Table A2 for the list of variables (with corresponding sources) included in the index.

systematically depend on a soldier's geographic origin.[28] In addition, based on the earlier discussion about the Double V campaign, disenfranchisement may have increased African American men's willingness to volunteer, in order to signal their value. Our analysis in this section estimates the net effect of these opposing forces.

Figure 3 shows that volunteer enlistment increases less for African American men from counties with a higher PCA. This is consistent with our preferred interpretation that severe discrimination and disenfranchisement lowered the incentives of African American men to volunteer right after Pearl Harbor. In other words, these results imply that the discouragement effect of discrimination was so strong that it prevailed over both the opportunity cost and the signaling channels. For comparison, Figure 3 shows that Caucasian volunteer enlistment rates are very similar in counties above and below the median of the PCA index. This weighs against the possibility that lower volunteer rates for African American men from more discriminatory places were driven by differences in, for example, accessibility of military recruiting offices. Moreover, we can rule out the possibility that results are driven by differences in demand-side factors that were specific to African American soldiers in counties of high discrimination by replicating Figure 3 for draftees. When we do this, in Appendix Figure A1, we find no difference across the two types of counties for either race.

Table 4 presents the regression results where we add a triple interaction between the PCA index and the race and Post dummies, and all the lower order interaction terms to the baseline. As before, we gradually introduce more stringent controls. The first six columns mirror the specifications estimated in Tables 2 and 3, while columns (7) and (8) add interactions between race and, respectively, week and county fixed effects – something that could not be done in the baseline difference-in-differences specification. Crucially for the purposes of identification, the inclusion of race by week fixed effects addresses the possibility that the Pearl Harbor attack differentially changed economic opportunities outside the military for

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[28]Relatedly, African American men may have perceived that discrimination in the military was more severe than outside the military, or that they would have had poor job opportunities within the military. Both of these possibilities imply that African American men from counties with more discrimination would have been more willing to volunteer.

African American and Caucasian men. One may be concerned, for instance, that after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government immediately scaled up war-related industrial production in a way that disproportionately increased labor demand for African Americans, which, in turn, increased their opportunity cost of volunteering (relative to Caucasian men). The inclusion of week by race fixed effects rules out this explanation.

For brevity, we focus on the most stringent specification, reported in column (8). The coefficient on the triple interaction is negative and highly statistically significant. Comparing a county at the 75th percentile of the PCA index with one at the 25th percentile, African American men living in the latter were 7.2 percentage points more likely to volunteer than those living in the former. Given the sample mean of 26.9%, this implies that reducing the level of discrimination from that prevailing in a county at the 75th percentile to that of a county at the 25th percentile of the PCA index would have increased African American volunteer rates by more than 25%.[29] Appendix Table A3 presents analogous results for draft enlistment rates, showing that there was no significant difference by PCA in the draft enlistment of African American men and Caucasian men. In Appendix B, we discuss additional estimates of the heterogeneous effects with respect to PCA, such as different measures of the index, the horse-race between different components, and geographic splits (e.g. results for Southern and non-Southern states separately). We report these results in Appendix Table A4.

5.3.2 NAACP and African American Churches

We now examine the mediating effects of two important organizations for the African American community. The first is the NAACP, which was very active during the Double V campaign, and was instrumental to the diffusion of the latter.[30] Thus, the presence of a local NAACP chapter in the county may have increased volunteer rates. The second is the

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[29]This number is obtained by multiplying the coefficient in column (8) by the interquartile range of the PCA index, or 2.38, and dividing it by the sample mean for volunteer enlistment (26.9).

[30]The NAACP provided direct and open support to the Double V campaign, while also pushing for more equal treatment of African Americans in the Army (Topping, 2004).

county-level membership rate in African American churches, which represented an important platform for communication and organization within the African American community (Chay and Munshi, 2015). The effect of churches is ambiguous ex ante. On the one hand, some churches may have cooperated with the Double V campaign, thereby encouraging African American volunteers to enlist. On the other hand, African American churches were often a meeting place for anti-establishment African American leaders;[31] moreover, religious persons may have been more likely to be conscientious objectors.

We measure NAACP presence as an indicator variable that equals one if a county had at least one NAACP chapter between 1919 and 1940. Membership in African American churches is the share of the county population that has membership in a African American church in 1936.[32] We estimate fully saturated triple interaction specifications similar to those reported in Table 4 above. For brevity, Table 5 focuses on the most stringent specification, where we include county and week fixed effects, the interaction between the two, and inter-actions between race and both county and week fixed effects. The dependent variable is the enlistment share (per 100,000 individuals) in county j, for race i, during week t.

Consistent with our conjecture, column (1) shows that, after Pearl Harbor, African American men were more likely to volunteer if they came from a county with at least one NAACP chapter. Instead, column (2) documents that a higher membership in African American churches reduced volunteering behavior of African American men. As just noted, this may have been either because African American churches were more likely to encourage individuals to be conscientious objectors or because African American church leaders may have been more vocal in emphasizing the history of violence and disenfranchisement suffered by the African American community (or, both).[33] In column (3), we include simultaneously the

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[31]For instance, well-known leaders like Martin Luther King, Fred Shuttlesworth, and Wyatt Tee Walker were all pastors in African American churches.

[32]Data on the local presence of NAACP chapters come from Gregory and Estrada (2019). See also Calderon et al. (2019) for a more detailed description of this source. Data on African American churches are taken from the Census of Religious Bodies. We define membership in African American churches as the number of members of African American churches relative to county population.

[33]However, the second possibility seems more likely, given that only 11,896 men registered as conscientious objectors out of the 40 million men assessed by local boards (Flynn, 1993).

triple interactions with the NAACP presence and the African American church membership. Results of the previous two columns remain largely unchanged: the volunteering behavior of African American men was higher in counties with NAACP chapters and lower in areas with a higher membership in African American churches. Finally, in column (4), we also add the triple interaction with the PCA index. As one can see, once the index of discrimination is included, both the NAACP and the African American church results disappear, while the only statistically significant coefficient is that associated with the PCA triple interaction. This result indicates the strength of the effects that disenfranchisement and discrimination had on volunteering behavior of African American men.

Reassuringly, and consistent with our previous results, when we replicate this analysis for draft enlistment, we find no effects.[34]

5.3.3 WWI African American Veterans

In this section, we investigate the influence of African American participation in WWI on African American volunteer enlistment after Pearl Harbor. On the one hand, disappointment with the lack of progress in race relations after WWI, during which many African Americans served, may have exacerbated the discouragement of the next generation of African American men. On the other hand, African American veterans may have been more active during the Double V campaign, encouraging young men to volunteer after Pearl Harbor. Moreover, there may have been intergenerational transmission in the willingness of joining the military (Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2018).

We begin by considering the share of African American veterans who served in WWI and who were living in the same county as the enlisted man in 1930.[35] We estimate fully saturated regressions, where we control for the most stringent set of fixed effects, as before. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the triple interaction of the share of WWI African American veterans with the African American and the post Pearl Harbor dummies is positive, large,

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[34]These results are not presented for brevity, but are available upon request.

[35]See Appendix C for a detailed description of the data sources and how this variable was constructed.

and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the presence of WWI African American veterans in a county increased volunteer rates of African American men after Pearl Harbor. A ten percentage points increase in the share of WWI African American veterans – roughly equivalent to the sample median – raises volunteer enlistment by 5.9 percentage points, or 25%.[36] For robustness, we replicate these results by interacting the African American and the Post Pearl Harbor dummies with the share of WWI Caucasian veterans. Reassuringly, the triple interaction is negative and not statistically significant (see column (3) of Appendix Table A5).

Next, to capture the within-household effect of WWI veterans, we compute the share of African American men eligible to serve in WWII who (in 1930) were living with a WWI veteran.[37] Table 6 column (2) shows that the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of this effect is larger than that obtained in column (1) for the share of WWI veterans in the same county. In particular, results in column (2) imply that one percentage point increase in the share of individuals living with a WWI African American veteran in 1930 increases volunteering behavior of African American men after Pearl Harbor by 0.72 percentage points. As a placebo exercise, we estimate a specification where we interact the African American and the Post dummies with the share of individuals eligible to serve in WWII living with a WWI Caucasian veteran in 1930. Reassuringly, we obtain a negative and statistically insignificant estimate (see column (4) of Appendix Table A5).[38]

The remaining columns of Table 6 present additional results for the mediating effects of the presence of WWI veterans on volunteering behavior of African American men. In

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[36]The share of WWI African American veterans in column (1) of Table 6 is constructed using the share of individuals that were eligible to serve in WWI based on the age eligibility criterion (18-45). However, results are unchanged when using the more stringent age window (21-31). See Appendix C for more details, and column (1) of Appendix Table A5. We also show that results are not statistically significant and smaller in magnitude when focusing on draft – rather than volunteer – enlistment (see column (2) of Appendix Table A5).

[37]Appendix C describes in detail the construction of this variable.

[38]In column (5) of Appendix Table A5, we also check that the coefficient on the triple interaction between the African American and the Post dummies and the share of individuals living with a WWI African American veteran is negative and not statistically significant.

columns (3) and (4), we show that the effects of the WWI veteran is present both when the veteran was the household head (column (3)) and when he was not the head (column (4)). However, the triple interaction is one third larger when the WWI veteran was the household head (relative to when, instead, the person was another household member). Column (5) runs a horse-race, including simultaneously the head and the non-head WWI veteran in the household, and documents that only the coefficient on the former remains statistically significant, and is more than twice as large as the coefficient on the latter. Finally, in column (6), we run a similar horse-race, by including simultaneously the share of individuals eligible to serve in WWII living with a African American veteran and the share of African American veterans in the same county. The former remains positive, large, and statistically significant. The latter becomes negative, small, and imprecisely estimated.

Interpreted through the lenses of "vertical" versus "horizontal" transmission of values and beliefs as theorized by (Bisin and Verdier, 2001), these results indicate that vertical transmission (i.e. within the household) mattered more than horizontal transmission (i.e. in the county, through friends and neighbors). These patterns resonate with results in Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2018), who find that incentives to fight are largely transmitted within the household, from one generation to the next.

5.4   Volunteers' Characteristics

Table 7 investigates the characteristics of the volunteers that enlisted, before and after Pearl Harbor. We re-estimate our baseline specification (equation (1)), using the share of volunteers (of each race in each week) with a given characteristic as the dependent variable. In column (1), the dependent variable is the share of volunteers with at least a high school degree. Our results show that, prior to Pearl Harbor, African American volunteers were 18.43 percentage-points less likely to have a high school degree than Caucasian volunteers. This gap increased by an additional 16.34 percentage-points after Pearl Harbor. Although these estimates are only statistically significant at the 15% level, their magnitudes are large,

given that the sample mean for the share of volunteers with at least a high school degree was 61.92%. One interpretation of these findings is that, consistent with recent empirical evidence, educated citizens have higher political participation rates and less noisy mappings between politicians' efforts and outcomes (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017). The results are also consistent with the notion that educated African American men were more engaged in the discussion about political and civil rights. For instance, according to a survey conducted by a African American college in the U.S. South in 1942, 83% of the 150 African American students interviewed thought the African American men should have not participated in WWII, given the rampant discrimination and violence against them (Farrar, 2005, pages 372-373).

In column (2), we turn to the share of volunteers that were inducted in Private rank – the lowest rank in the U.S. Army. The estimates show that, prior to Pearl Harbor, the difference in the share of Privates between Caucasian and African American soldiers was statistically zero. After Pearl Harbor, the share of African American volunteers entering as Privates increased by 20.14 percentage-points. The estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. These results are consistent with our previous findings for education, since educational attainment was a key determinant of the entry rank.

Next, we explore whether African American volunteers were more likely to be older (or younger) than Caucasian ones. We define the dependent variable as the share of volunteers who were "young" , which is a dummy equal to 1 if an individual's age is below the sample median of 23. Column (3) shows that there is no statistically significant difference between African American and Caucasian volunteers.

Finally, we examines occupation. The NARA dataset reports the sector where enlisted men were employed before joining the military. Most African American men in the 1940s, worked either in agricultural or in manufacturing. Increased demand for labor in war-related industries pulled a large number of African Americans outside of the U.S. South and of agriculture between 1942 and 1945 (e.g., Boustan, 2016; Sugrue, 2014). This may be an alter-

native (or, an additional) reason for reduced enlistment of African American men, relative to Caucasian men, after Pearl Harbor. In column (4), we focus on the share of volunteers who were employed in the manufacturing sector at the time of enlistment as the dependent variable. Our estimates indicate that, while African American volunteers were less likely to be employed in manufacturing prior to Pearl Harbor, the pattern switched after December 7, 1941. These findings are consistent with the fact that the Double V campaign was more active in urban areas and, in particular, in sectors like manufacturing, where unions were more prevalent and political engagement was higher (Schickler, 2016). These patterns are also consistent with our previous results on the (positive) effect of the NAACP presence on African Americans' willingness to volunteer, since NAACP chapters tended to be concentrated in areas where the manufacturing sector was more important.

6   Additional Results

This section enriches the main analysis with two additional investigations. First, we study the effect of disenfranchisement for Japanese Americans on their volunteer enlistment. Second, we examine volunteer and draft enlistment of other minority groups for the weeks around the attack on Pearl Harbor.

6.1   Japanese American Disenfranchisement

Another notably disenfranchised group asked to fight for the United States during WWII was that of Japanese Americans. To be comprehensive in our exploration of the relationship between disenfranchisement and volunteer rates, this section examine this second group.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, 5,000 Japanese Americans had been inducted into the U.S. Army (McNaughton, 2003). Most of them were removed from active duty immediately after the attack. Individual commanders were given the option of discharging Japanese American soldiers or assigning them to "harmless duties". Some 600 Japanese Americans were given

honorable discharges; others were given less than honorable discharges. Most of those already in the Army were sent to Camp Robinson in Arkansas, where their guns were taken away, and they were made to perform menial tasks. Selective Service stopped accepting Japanese Americans in early 1942 on the grounds that they were "not acceptable to the armed forces because of nationality or ancestry."[39]

Japanese Americans not already in the military were deemed to be an "enemy race". Executive Order 9066, signed on February 19, 1942, authorized the forced internment of Japanese Americans.[40] Army-directed evacuations began on March 24, 1942. People had a six days notice to dispose of their property other than what they could carry, leading to enormous economic losses. Anyone who was at least 1/16th Japanese was evacuated. Between 110,000 and 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry were subject to forced internment, including approximately 80,000 second generation and third generation Americans, 17,000 children under ten years of age, as well as several thousand elderly and handicapped.[41] Internment was implemented much more rigorously on the U.S. mainland. In Hawaii, a territory at the time, only 1,500 individuals of Japanese descent – or, about 0.9% of the Japanese American population in Hawaii – were sent to the mainland for internment. Broader internment of Japanese Americans, which comprised approximately 30% of total Hawaiian population, was seen as practically infeasible.

On February 1, 1943, President Roosevelt announced the creation of a segregated battalion composed of Japanese American soldiers and commanded by Caucasian officers. With very few exceptions, they were allowed to join only the Army, and fought primarily in Europe. As with African American combat troops, they were known for exceptional bravery.[42]

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[39]See, among others, Castelnuovo (2008) and McNaughton (2003).

[40]Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, suggested the creation of the military zones and Japanese detainment to Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Attorney General Francis Biddle. His original plan included Italians and Germans, though the idea of rounding-up Americans of European descent was not as popular (see this *link*).

[41]The internment camps ended in 1945 following the Supreme Court decision, Endo v. the United States. It was ruled that the War Relocation Authority "has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure". The Supreme Court allowed FDR to end internment one day before they publicly announced the decision (see this *link*).

[42]The most well-known is probably the 100th Infantry Division of the 442nd Infantry Regimental Combat

We exploit the recruitment of Japanese American men for the military in 1943 together with variation in internment as another quasi-natural experiment for testing the role of disenfranchisement in a similar, albeit distinct setting to the one considered above for Pearl Harbor. The first cohort to be affected was inducted in March 1, 1943. We thus compare Japanese American enlistment before and after March 1, 1943, between Hawaii and the mainland. The War Department aimed to create an all Japanese-American combat unit with at least 2,000 initial volunteers. To be eligible for selective service (i.e., the draft), loyalty questions were administered to all Japanese American men.[43] Only those who provided acceptable answers were inducted into the military. Since Japanese American men had discretion over whether they were drafted, historians often refer to Japanese-American draftees during WWII as "volunteers".[44] For consistency with our previous analysis, we restrict attention to the 8 weeks before and after March 1, 1943.

Figure 4 shows that Japanese-American enlistment was almost zero prior to March 1st, consistent with the fact that, with very few exceptions, Japanese Americans had been banned from service. After the reform, there was a large spike in enlistment in Hawaii, but no noticeable change from the mainland. These patterns are consistent with less disenfranchised Japanese Americans living in Hawaii being more willing to volunteer. The reduction in enlistment in the last few weeks of the figure corresponds to the War Department's temporary pause in Japanese-American recruitment, introduced in order to assess the causes of low mainland enlistment rates (Castelnuovo, 2008).

Team. Because of the high rate of casualties the 100th Infantry Battalion sustained, it became known as the "Purple Heart Battalion". For its service during WWII, the 442nd (including the 100th prior to becoming part of it) received 21 Medals of Honor – America's highest military honor; in addition, it received 9,486 Purple Hearts, 8 Presidential Unit Citations, 559 Silver Stars, and 52 Distinguished Service Crosses among many other decorations. In 2012, the surviving members of the 442nd were made chevaliers of the French Légion d'Honneur for their actions, which contributed to the liberation of France during WWII and their heroic rescue of the Lost Battalion outside of Biffontaine (e.g. Congress, 1982; Kashima, 1997).

[43]The two most controversial "loyalty" questions were numbers 27 and 28. Question number 27 asked if second generation Japanese Americans (i.e. those born in the United States) were willing to serve in combat duty wherever they were ordered. Question number 28 asked if individuals would swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and forswear any form of allegiance to the Emperor of Japan. 17% of all registrants and approximately 20% of all second-generation Japanese Americans answered "No" to loyalty questions 27 and 28 (see, for instance, Lyon, 2012, and the following *link*).

[44]For a more detailed discussion, see also Hayashi (2010), Muller (2007), Omori (1999), Weglyn (1996).

For comparison, Figure 5 plots the analogous patterns for Chinese-Americans, who faced broadly similar degrees of formal and informal racial discrimination as Japanese-Americans prior to WWII but who were the target of much lower post-Pearl Harbor backlash. Reassuringly, we see no change in the mainland-Hawaii enlistment gap before and after March 1, 1943 for Chinese-Americans.

We are unable to fully replicate the analysis for African American enlisted men with the sample of Japanese enlisted men because of the lack of variation in the latter. In particular, this is because there are no county identifiers for Hawaii, and this prevents us from formally controlling for county (and other sets of) fixed effects. Nevertheless, the patterns in this section are consistent with the main result that disenfranchisement and discrimination discouraged volunteer enlistment.

6.2   Other Races after Pearl Harbor

Minority groups in the United States faced varying degrees of discrimination. Figure 6 plots volunteer enlistment rates for all races that our data allow us to identify – Caucasian, African American, Native American, Japanese, and Chinese – during the eight weeks before and the eight weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack.[45] It shows that enlistment rates were similar between Native American, Japanese American and Caucasian men. They were lower for Chinese men, and the lowest for African American men. As we discuss below, this is broadly consistent with the incentives faced by each group.

The U.S. government had a long history of discriminatory and often violent policies against Native Americans. By the eve of WWII, 92% of Native Americans lived in rural areas – most of them in reservations, where conditions and opportunities were much poorer than other parts of the country.[46] Native Americans had lower outside opportunities than Caucasian men, with median income being only 25% of those of Caucasian men at the time

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[45]For consistency, we use the same sample as in Section 5: the 48 mainland states.

[46]No precise figure on the share of Native Americans living in reservations around 1940 is available. We thus take the share of individuals in rural areas as a (admittedly crude) proxy for the share of Native Americans living in reservations.

(Sorkin, 1974). At the same time, there were few formal discriminatory policies against Native Americans outside reservations. The U.S. military treated Native American men in the same way as Caucasian men and the image of Native American soldiers was very popular across the country (Bernstein, 1986). Military service during WWII might have offered to Native Americans the opportunity to achieve a more equal status relative to Caucasian men.

Chinese Americans faced significant discrimination too. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) was the first immigration law that excluded an entire ethnic group from the United States. The Scott Act (1888) further prohibited reentry of U.S. citizens who were ethnically Chinese back to the country. The National Origins Act of 1924 effectively banned all Asian immigration.[47] These restrictions were in place throughout WWII. In addition to these national laws, local racist efforts to limit U.S. citizens and civil rights of Asian Americans were widespread.[48] During WWII, Chinese and Japanese served in segregated units. However, since the attack was conducted by Japan, some Japanese-Americans may have felt that volunteering was a proof of loyalty, or as a way to signal their American identity.[49] The segregation of Chinese soldiers was not as extreme as that for African American soldiers or Japanese soldiers. For example, as many as 75% of Chinese Americans served with Caucasian units, whereas all African American and Japanese American men served in separate units.[50]

There is no difference across groups in the rates of draftees before and after Pearl Harbor (Appendix Figure A2). This pattern is consistent with our interpretation that differences across groups in volunteer rates were largely driven by supply-side willingness on the part of the men, rather than by demand-side forces on the part of the military.

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[47] Japanese immigration was restricted in 1908 with the introduction of the Gentleman's Agreement (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).

[48] See Soennichsen (2011) for a detailed discussion.

[49] For instance, Saavedra (2018) shows that Japanese-Americans born right after Pearl Harbor had more American sounding names, relative to kids born just a few days before, as Japanese-American parents responded to concerns about heightened anti-Japanese sentiments. Also, note that the ban of Japanese-Americans from the military and forced internment discussed in the previous section had not yet taken place.

[50] See, for instance, the discussion available from the U.S. Department of Defense at this *link*.

7 Conclusion

The United States entered WWII during one of the worst periods of post-Civil War history in terms of racial discrimination. Jim Crow in the U.S. South and more subtle, but equally coercive forms of discrimination in other parts of nation had deprived African Americans of most of their civil and political rights for decades. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the entire generation of African American men needed by the U.S. military had grown up in such an environment.

Our paper documents that the disenfranchisement and discrimination towards African Americans countered their patriotism and discouraged their enlistment in the U.S. military. We provide similar supporting evidence for Japanese Americans, who were forcibly interned on the U.S. mainland.

These findings highlight a new dimension of the social costs of discrimination and disenfranchisement. For policymakers, the implications are obvious: a state which requires equal contributions from its citizens should treat its citizens equally.

This study suggests several topics for future research. Did participation in WWII influence activism in the civil rights movement, as the Double V campaign intended? To what extent did African American participation in WWII influence the value of Caucasians for their African American countrymen? What was the long-run consequence of Japanese internment on trust between Asian Americans (and other small minority groups) and the U.S. government?[51] The answers to these questions are not only of historical importance. They will also help us to better understand the dynamics of discrimination, social attitude change and the political economy today.

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[51]These investigations will complement recent studies about the relationship between participation in war and later consequences. Mazumder (2019) finds that European immigrants who fought in WWI were more likely to assimilate into the American society after the war. Schindler and Westcott (2017) and Indacochea (2019) document that inter-racial interactions in the Army during WWII and the Korean War had a positive, long-lasting impact on race relations in the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Ferrara (2018) finds that the WWII-induced labor shortage was an important factor behind the decline in the racial income gap during the 1940s and 1950s.

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Figure 1: Volunteer Enlistment by Race

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of volunteers per 100,000 enlistable individuals (by race and week). The x-axis reports the week since the Pearl Harbor attack (coded as week 0). Gray dashed (resp. black solid) line refers to the share of Caucasian (resp. African American) volunteers.

Figure 2: Draft Enlistment by Race

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of draftees per 100,000 enlistable individuals (by race and week). The x-axis reports the week since the Pearl Harbor attack (coded as week 0). Gray dashed (resp. black solid) line refers to the share of Caucasian (resp. African American) draftees.

Figure 3: African American-Caucasian Volunteers, by PCA

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of volunteers per 100,000 enlistable individuals (by race and week). The x-axis reports the week since the Pearl Harbor attack (coded as week 0). Gray (resp. black) line refers to the share of Caucasian (resp. African American) volunteers. Solid (resp. dashed) lines refer to counties with PCA above (resp. below) the median.

Figure 4: Japanese Americans: Hawaii vs Mainland (1943)

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of draftees per 100,000 enlistable individuals (by race and week). The x-axis reports the week since the March 1st, 1943 enlistment (coded as week 0). Solid (resp. dashed) line refers to the share of draftees in Hawaii (resp. mainland U.S.).

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Figure 5: Chinese Americans: Hawaii vs Mainland (1943)

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of draftees per 100,000 enlist-able individuals (by race and week). The x-axis reports the week since the March 1st, 1943 enlistment (coded as week 0). Solid (resp. dashed) line refers to the share of draftees in Hawaii (resp. mainland U.S.).

Figure 6: Minorities vs Caucasian Men: Volunteers before-after Pear Harbor (8 weeks)

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of volunteers per 100,000 enlist-able individuals (by race and week), the y-axis in the right is for Caucasian, the y-axis in the left is for other races. The x-axis reports the week since the Pearl Harbor attack (coded as week 0). Solid black line refers to African Americans, long dash dark green line refers to Japanese Americans, short dash blue line refers to Chinese Americans, long dash with dot red line refers to Native Americans, and dash gray line refers to Caucasians.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St. Dev	Median	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A. Full sample						
Volunteers	0.390	0.490	0	0	1	382,092
Draftees	0.610	0.490	1	0	1	382,092
African American men	0.070	0.250	0	0	1	382,092
Caucasian men	0.930	0.250	1	0	1	382,092
At Least High School Degree	0.500	0.500	1	0	1	382,088
In Agriculture	0.100	0.300	0	0	1	382,092
In Manufacturing	0.550	0.500	1	0	1	382,092
In Private Grade	0.950	0.230	1	0	1	382,092
Age	23.78	3.170	23	13	70	381,937
Panel B. African American men						
Volunteers	0.100	0.300	0	0	1	26,432
Draftees	0.900	0.300	1	0	1	26,432
At Least High School Degree	0.200	0.400	0	0	1	26,431
In Agriculture	0.140	0.350	0	0	1	26,432
In Manufacture	0.580	0.490	1	0	1	26,432
In Private Grade	0.990	0.110	1	0	1	26,432
Age	23.70	3	23	13	53	26,422
Panel C. Caucasian men						
Volunteers	0.410	0.490	0	0	1	355,660
Draftees	0.590	0.490	1	0	1	355,660
At Least High School Degree	0.530	0.500	1	0	1	355,657
In Agriculture	0.100	0.300	0	0	1	355,660
In Manufacture	0.550	0.500	1	0	1	355,660
In Private Grade	0.940	0.230	1	0	1	355,660
Age	23.79	3.180	23	13	70	355,515

Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the sample used in our analysis, which restricts attention to African American and Caucasian enlisted individuals during the 8 weeks before and the 8 weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941).

Table 2: DD Regression: Volunteer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
						Baseline
Dep Var Mean			26.999			
Black x Post	-16.551***	-16.516***	-18.202***	-16.516***	-11.300***	-11.300***
	(1.010)	(1.018)	(1.706)	(1.018)	(0.986)	(0.986)
Black	-13.724***	-13.099***	-10.231***	-14.418***	-16.872***	-16.872***
	(0.833)	(0.862)	(1.338)	(0.918)	(0.673)	(0.673)
Post	24.871***	24.902***	26.347***			
	(0.744)	(0.751)	(1.252)			
Black + Black x Post	-30.275	-29.615	-28.433	-30.934	-28.172	-28.172
p value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	94,367	92,106	39,423	92,106	92,106	82,348
R-squared	0.181	0.198	0.219	0.417	0.470	0.825
Controls:						
State FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Demographic and Economic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
Economic and Geographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
WWII Spending	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
New Deal Spending	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County FE	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Week FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
County FE x Post	N	N	N	N	Y	N
County FE x Week FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Dependent Variable: # Volunteers (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. Column 1 includes state fixed effects. Column 2 adds also county-specific controls. Demographic and Economic Controls are constructed at the county level for 1940, and include: share of farmers, share of farmland, the share of the population with Italian, German and Japanese ancestry, county population, population density, average educational attainment, and per capita WWII government spending (relative to 1940 population). Geographic controls include: distance from Germany, Japan, and Pearl Harbor. Column 3 replicates column 2 also including New Deal Spending from Fishback et al. (2003). Column 4 includes county and week fixed effects. Column 5 includes week fixed effects, and interacts county fixed effects with the Post Pearl Harbor dummy. Column 6 interacts week fixed effects with county fixed effects. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: DD Regression: Draft

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent Variable: # Draftees (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)					
						Baseline
Dep Var Mean			94.52			
Black x Post	16.926*	17.249*	-9.365	17.249*	13.244	13.244
	(8.768)	(8.850)	(12.831)	(8.850)	(9.144)	(9.145)
Black	-2.429	-4.679	17.657	-4.392	-2.507	-2.507
	(7.833)	(7.537)	(10.745)	(7.841)	(7.999)	(8.000)
Post	-76.919***	-76.959***	-61.971***			
	(5.705)	(5.759)	(9.061)			
Black + Black x Post	14.497	12.57	8.292	12.857	10.737	10,737
p value	<0.001	<0.001	0.131	<0.001	0.003	0.003
Observations	94,367	92,106	39,423	92,106	92,106	82,348
R-squared	0.093	0.098	0.081	0.169	0.217	0.815
Controls:						
State FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Demographic and Economic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
Economic and Geographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
WWII Spending	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
New Deal Spending	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County FE	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Week FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
County FE x Post	N	N	N	N	Y	N
County FE x Week FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. Column 1 includes state fixed effects. Column 2 adds also county-specific controls. Demographic and Economic Controls are constructed at the county level for 1940, and include: share of farmers, share of farmland, the share of the population with Italian, German and Japanese ancestry, county population, population density, average educational attainment, and per capita WWII government spending (relative to 1940 population). Geographic controls include: distance from Germany, Japan, and Pearl Harbor. Column 3 replicates column 2 also including New Deal Spending from Fishback et al. (2003). Column 4 includes county and week fixed effects. Column 5 includes week fixed effects, and interacts county fixed effects with the Post Pearl Harbor dummy. Column 6 interacts week fixed effects with county fixed effects. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 4: DDD Regression: Volunteer Rates, by PCA

	Dependent Variable: # Volunteers (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dep Var Mean				26.999				
PCA x Black x Post	-1.868***	-1.857***	-0.620	-1.857***	-3.044***	-3.044***	-3.044***	-3.044***
	(0.585)	(0.588)	(0.913)	(0.588)	(0.608)	(0.608)	(0.608)	(0.608)
PCA x Black	-0.026	-0.500	-0.200	-1.114*	-0.555	-0.555	-0.555	
	(0.448)	(0.477)	(0.660)	(0.585)	(0.456)	(0.456)	(0.456)	
Black x Post	-11.125***	-11.009***	-12.618***	-11.009***	-7.208***	-7.208***		
	(1.325)	(1.332)	(2.088)	(1.332)	(1.157)	(1.157)		
Black	-15.544***	-14.178***	-12.839***	-14.492***	-16.281***	-16.281***		
	(0.743)	(0.734)	(0.970)	(0.854)	(0.652)	(0.652)		
Black + Black x Post	-26.669	-25.187	-25.457	-25.501	-23.489	-23.489		
p value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001		
PCA x Black x Post + PCA x Black + Black x Post + Black	-28.563	-27.544	-26.277	-28.472	-27.088	-27.088		
p value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001		
Observations	92,497	90,406	38,420	90,406	90,406	80,852	80,852	80,852
R-squared	0.181	0.199	0.220	0.418	0.470	0.826	0.833	0.853
Controls:								
State FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Demographic and Economic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Economic and Geographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
WWII Spending	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
New Deal Spending	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
County FE	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Week FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
County FE x POST	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County FE x Week FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Race x Week FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Race x County FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. All regressions control for lower order interaction terms (including the direct effect of PCA, not reported to save space). See Appendix A for the construction of the PCA, and Table A2 for the variables included in the index. Column 1 includes state fixed effects. Column 2 includes also county-specific controls. Demographic and Economic Controls are constructed at the county level for 1940, and include: share of farmers, share of farmland, the share of the population with Italian, German and Japanese ancestry, county population, population density, average educational attainment, and per capita WWII government spending (relative to 1940 population). Geographic controls include: distance from Germany, Japan, and Pearl Harbor. Column 3 replicates column 2 also including New Deal Spending from Fishback et al. (2003). Column 4 includes county and week fixed effects. Column 5 includes week fixed effects, and interacts county fixed effects with the Post Pearl Harbor dummy. Column 6 interacts week fixed effects with county fixed effects. Column 7 replicates column 6 by interacting week fixed effects with race fixed effects, and column 8 adds county fixed effect with race fixed effects. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: DDD Regression: NAACP and African American Churches

	Dependent Variable: # Volunteers (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep Var Mean		26.999		
NAACP x Black x Post	7.608***		5.285**	0.968
	(2.112)		(2.338)	(2.631)
Church x Black x Post		-37.698***	-27.664***	-12.318
		(8.435)	(8.729)	(10.236)
PCA x Black x Post				-2.400***
				(0.844)
Observations	82,348	66,742	66,742	65,892
R-squared	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854
Controls:				
County FE x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. All regressions control for lower order interaction terms, and include interactions between county and week, race and week, and race and county fixed effects. See Appendix A for the construction of the PCA, and Table A2 for the variables included in the index. NAACP refers to the presence of a chapter from NAACP in the county between 1919 and 1940. Church is the membership in African American churches in the county in 1936. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: DDD Regression: WWI Veterans

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Dependent Variable: # Volunteers (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)			
Dep Var Mean			26.999			
Share of African American Veterans x Black x Post	59.773***					-3.509
	(14.756)					(22.245)
Share Living with African American WWI Veteran x Black x Post		71.660***				74.373***
		(15.028)				(22.864)
Share Living with African American WWI Veteran Household Head x Black x Post			126.320***		91.645**	
			(27.269)		(37.778)	
Share Living with African American WWI Veteran not Household Head x Black x Post				95.153***	40.133	
				(22.635)	(30.295)	
Observations	80,920	78,914	78,914	78,914	78,914	78,914
R-squared	0.853	0.852	0.852	0.852	0.852	0.852
Controls:						
County FE x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. All regressions control for lower order interaction terms, and include interactions between county and week, race and week, and race and county fixed effects. See Appendix C and Table A6 for the definition and the construction of the variables used in the triple interactions. Share of African American Veterans refers to the share of African American veterans in the county. Share Living with African American WWI Veteran refers to the share of individuals living in the same household of a WWI African American veteran. Columns 3 and 4 report results, respectively, using the share of individuals living with a WWI African American veteran who was and who was not the household head. Column 5 presents results for a horse-race between the share of individuals living with a WWI African American veteran who is, respectively, household head and not household head. Column 6 presents results including simultaneously the share of individuals living with a WWI African American veteran and the share of WWI African American veterans in the county. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 7: DD Regression: Different Characteristics of Volunteers

	Dependent Variable: # Volunteers (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	High school	Private grade	Young	In Manufacture
Dep Var Mean	**61.92**	**86.93**	**68.38**	**51.33**
Black x Post	-16.341	20.141*	2.209	33.274***
	(11.659)	(10.842)	(11.382)	(7.199)
Black	-18.432	-9.895	9.332	-19.117***
	(11.731)	(10.785)	(11.260)	(6.512)
Black + Black x Post	-34.773	10.246	11.541	14.157
p value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	1,676	1,676	1,676	1,676
R-squared	0.770	0.888	0.682	0.679
Controls:				
County FE x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level, and include County and Week fixed effects as well as the interaction between the two. The dependent variable is the share of volunteers with each of the characteristics reported at the top of the corresponding column, relative to all volunteers (in a week, county, race). Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix

A   Discrimination PCA

Appendix Table A2 presents the full list of variables included in the PCA index, with the corresponding source. We briefly discuss the rationale for the inclusion of each of them. First, KKK presence and the number of lynchings represent direct measures of violence perpetuated by Caucasian men against African American men. Second, relying on the Democratic vote share over the period 1900-1930 is consistent with historical evidence that, at least until the New Deal, the GOP was the party closer to African American men' interests (Calderon et al., 2019; Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016). Third, an extensive literature documents that disenfranchisement and discrimination against African American men were often reflected in higher residential segregation (Ananat, 2011; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019), and in inequality of opportunities in education (Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2017a; Margo, 1990) and in the labor markets (Naidu, 2010; Sugrue, 2008).

B   Discrimination in the County of Origin

In Appendix Table A4, we perform three additional exercises. First, in column (2), we replicate our most preferred specification (reported in column (1) to ease comparisons), by adding to the county-specific variables used to compute the PCA index also a number of state-level indicators for the presence of: i) poll taxes; ii) literacy tests; and, iii) miscegenation laws before 1940.[52] Adding these more formal measures of disenfranchisement leaves our main estimate unchanged. This is consistent with the idea that informal, but coordinated, actions of Caucasian men were at least as important as more formal institutions to limit African American men' political, social, and economic participation (Lawson, 1976; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019; Sugrue, 2008). Second, we split the PCA index into its "political" (column (3))

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[52]While poll taxes and literacy test requirements were almost entirely concentrated in southern states, miscegenation laws were more widespread across the entire country (Vile, 2003).

and "social" (column (4)) components. The former is composed of the Democratic vote share and dummies for the presence of poll taxes, literacy tests, and prohibition of miscegenation, whereas the latter includes all remaining variables mentioned above. Interestingly, the effects seem to be entirely driven by the political component of the PCA. Finally, in the remaining columns of Table A4, we verify that our results are similar when restricting attention to non-southern states (column (5)) and when focusing on the U.S. South only (column (6)), or when considering only individuals in the age range 21-35 (column (7)), who had registered already before the attack on Pearl Harbor.[53]

C   WWI Veterans

African American Veterans in the County   Similar to Mazumder (2019), we first calculate, for each African American men in the U.S. Census of 1930 his age in 1917. We then count the number of African American men according to two eligibility groups: (1) age 21-31 in 1917, and (2) age 18-45 in 1917.[54] Second, we count the number of WWI African American veterans by county. Third, we generate the share of WWI African American veterans in 1930 by scaling the number of veterans by the number of "enlistable" individuals, according to both eligibility criteria (i.e. 21-31 and 18-45). We use the wider (18-45) age range eligibility criterion, but results are similar when using the more stringent (21-31) one. Note that both measures are built under the assumption that African American individuals living in a given county in 1930 were still residing in that same county at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. While this assumption may not hold in practice, African Americans' geographic mobility should add noise to our results, unless it was systematically correlated with both

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[53]Focusing on individuals already registered prior to the Pearl Harbor attack reduces concerns of selective migration, potentially induced by labor demand, since individuals had to volunteer in the county of enlistment.

[54]The choice of these two eligibility groups is motivated by the draft requirements. The first draft (June 5, 1917) included all men between the ages of 21 and 30. The second draft (June 5, 1918) registered men who attained age 21 after June 5, 1917. A supplemental registration, included in the second registration, was held on August 24, 1918, for men turning 21 after June 5, 1918. Finally, a third registration was held on September 12, 1918, for men age 18 through 45. See Mazumder (2019) and Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2018) for more details on the WWI draft.

WWI veteran shares and patterns of African Americans' volunteering behavior during WWII – something that seems unlikely to us. The results remain similar when constructing the WWI African American veteran share using the 21-31 age eligibility criterion (see column (1) of Table A5).

Table A1: Summary Statistics: Full Sample

	Mean	St. Dev	Median	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A. Full sample						
Volunteers	0.200	0.400	0	0	1	9,039,840
Draftees	0.800	0.400	1	0	1	9,039,840
African American men	0.100	0.300	0	0	1	9,039,840
Caucasian men	0.830	0.370	1	0	1	9,039,840
At Least High School Degree	0.380	0.480	0	0	1	9,038,126
In Agriculture	0.120	0.330	0	0	1	9,039,840
In Manufacturing	0.600	0.490	1	0	1	9,039,840
In Private Grade	0.910	0.290	1	0	1	9,039,840
Age	24.95	6.620	23	10	75	8,749,160
Panel B. African American men						
Volunteers	0.140	0.340	0	0	1	894,897
Draftees	0.860	0.340	1	0	1	894,897
At Least High School Degree	0.140	0.350	0	0	1	894,622
In Agriculture	0.170	0.380	0	0	1	894,897
In Manufacture	0.610	0.490	1	0	1	894,897
In Private Grade	0.910	0.280	1	0	1	894,897
Age	25.13	6.760	23	11	75	859,621
Panel C. Caucasian men						
Volunteers	0.190	0.390	0	0	1	7,527,105
Draftees	0.810	0.390	1	0	1	7,527,105
At Least High School Degree	0.410	0.490	0	0	1	7,526,859
In Agriculture	0.120	0.320	0	0	1	7,527,105
In Manufacture	0.590	0.490	1	0	1	7,527,105
In Private Grade	0.920	0.260	1	0	1	7,527,105
Age	24.72	6.150	23	11	75	7,477,518

Note: This table presents the summary statistics for the full sample of enlisted individuals in the NARA dataset.

Table A2: PCA Components

Variable Name	Source	Construction
Poll Tax 1940	Naidu (2012)	Dummy equal to 1 if a state introduced a poll tax between 1890 and 1940.
Literacy Test 1940	Naidu (2012)	Dummy equal to 1 if a state introduced the literacy test requirement between 1890 and 1940.
Miscegenation Prohibited 1940	Dahis, Nix and Qian (2019)	Dummy equal to 1 if a state introduced laws to prohibit inter-racial marriages between 1890 and 1940.
Dissimilarity Index 1940	Logan and Parman (2017)	Dissimilarity index at the county level constructed by LP
Isolation Index 1940	Logan and Parman (2017)	Isolation index at the county level constructed by LP
President Vote Share Democrat 1900-1930	Clubb et al. (1990)	Average vote share in Presidential elections at the county level, for each election between 1900 and 1930.
Congress Vote Share Democrat 1900-1930	Clubb et al. (1990)	Average vote share in Congressional elections at the county level, for each election between 1900 and 1930.
Presence of KKK	Kneebone and Torres (2015)	Dummy for presence of KKK in any year between 1915 and 1940, in each county.
Number of Lynching cases up to 1939	Monroe Work Today (MWT)	Total number of lynching episodes in a county against African Americans between 1803 and 1939

Notes: this table reports the variables used to construct the PCA discrimination index (see Appendix A). Column 2 reports the reference for which the variable is taken.

Table A3: DDD Regression: Draft Rates, by PCA

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Dependent Variable: # Draftees (per 100,000 enlistable individuals)							
Dep Var Mean				94.52				
PCA x Black x Post	5.700	5.452	10.168*	5.452	0.419	0.419	0.419	0.419
	(4.990)	(5.017)	(5.718)	(5.017)	(4.105)	(4.106)	(4.106)	(4.106)
PCA x Black	-16.970***	-14.605***	-17.132***	-13.497***	-11.128***	-11.128***	-11.128***	
	(4.224)	(3.923)	(5.201)	(4.135)	(3.846)	(3.846)	(3.847)	
Black x Post	2.731	2.714	-32.051**	2.714	18.531	18.531		
	(13.708)	(13.813)	(15.947)	(13.814)	(12.829)	(12.830)		
Black	20.569*	17.183	41.391***	15.759	8.316	8.316		
	(11.682)	(11.190)	(13.932)	(11.673)	(10.753)	(10.754)		
Black + Black x Post	23.3	19.897	2.376	18.473	26.847	26.847		
p value	<0.001	<0.001	0.05	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001		
PCA x Black x Post + PCA x	12.3	10.744	9.34	10.482	16.138	16.138		
Black + Black x Post + Black								
p value	<0.001	<0.001	0.51	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001		
Observations	92,497	90,406	38,420	90,406	90,406	80,852	80,852	80,852
R-squared	0.096	0.100	0.085	0.170	0.218	0.824	0.826	0.836
Controls:								
State FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Demographic and Economic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Economic and Geographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
WWII Spending	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
New Deal Spending	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
County FE	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Week FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
County FE x POST	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County FE x Week FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Race x Week FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Race x County FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. All regressions control for lower order interaction terms (including the direct effect of PCA, not reported to save space). See Appendix A for the construction of the PCA, and Table A2 for the variables included in the index. Column 1 includes state fixed effects. Column 2 includes also county-specific controls. Socio-demographic controls include: share of farmers, share of farmland, the share of the population with Italian, German and Japanese ancestry, county population, population density, average educational attainment, and per capita WWII government spending (relative to 1940 population). Geographic controls include: distance from Germany, Japan, and Pearl Harbor. Column 3 replicates column 2 also including New Deal Spending. Column 4 includes county and week fixed effects. Column 5 includes week fixed effects, and interacts county fixed effects with the Post Pearl Harbor dummy. Column 6 interacts week fixed effects with county fixed effects. Column 7 replicates column 6 by interacting week fixed effects with race fixed effects, and column 8 adds county fixed effect with race fixed effects. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A4: Heterogeneity PCA Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Baseline	State and County PCA	Political PCA Components	Social PCA Components	Non-southern States	Southern States	Registered before PH
Dep Var Mean	**26.999**	**26.999**	**26.999**	**26.999**	**28.11**	**23.429**	**35.3**
PCA x Black x Post	-3.044***	-2.307***	-3.299***	-0.221	-3.347**	-2.272**	-3.500***
	(0.608)	(0.424)	(0.615)	(0.517)	(1.640)	(0.893)	(1.092)
Observations	80,852	80,852	81,770	81,328	38,760	42,092	80,852
R-squared	0.853	0.853	0.853	0.853	0.848	0.862	0.817
Controls:							
County FE x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: the dependent variable is the share of volunteers per 100,000 enlistable individuals (for each race, county, and week). The table replicates Table 4 using different versions of the PCA index and different samples. All regressions control for lower order interaction terms, and include interactions between county and week, race and week, and race and county fixed effects. Column 1 reports the baseline result (reported in column 8 of Table 4; column 2 presents results obtained when constructing the PCA index using both county and state level variables; columns 3 and 4 present results when decomposing the PCA index in political factors (Average Presidential Vote Share Democrat 1900-30, Average Congressional Vote Share Democrat 1900-30, Dummies for poll, taxes, literacy tests, and prohibition of miscegenation in 1940) and social factors (Dissimilarity Index, Isolation Index (from Logan & Parman 2017), KKK presence, count of African American, lynchings up to 1939) respectively. Columns 5 and 6 use the baseline PCA index and present results for non-southern and for southern states respectively. Column 7 restricts attention to people registered before Pearl Harbor Shock. Regressions are weighed by enlistable individuals in 1940. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A5: WWI Veterans: Additional Results

| Dep Var	Volunteer	Draft	Volunteer	Volunteer	Draft
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dep Var Mean	**26.999**	**94.52**	**26.999**	**26.999**	**94.52**
Share x Black x Post	36.544***	25.737	-24.934	-6.384	-176.896
	(8.987)	(163.954)	(19.014)	(23.682)	(168.043)
Observations	80,920	80,920	82,348	82,348	78,914
R-squared	0.832	0.827	0.854	0.854	0.825
Share is	African American Veteran (age range 21-31)	African American Veteran (age range 18-45)	Caucasian Veteran (age range 18-45)	Living with Caucasian Veteran	Living with African American Veteran
Controls:					
County FE x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x Week FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race x County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Observations are at the race, county and week level. All regressions control for lower order interaction terms, and include interactions between county and week, race and week, and race and county fixed effects. See Table A6 for definition of variables. Column 1 constructs the share of WWI African American veterans using the age range (21-31). Column 2 replicates results in Table 6, column (1) (which uses the share of WWI African American veterans in the county constructed using the age range 18-45) focusing on draft enlistment rate as outcome. Column 3 presents results when using the county share of WWI Caucasian veterans (age range 18-45) in the triple interaction. Column 4 presents results when using the share of men living with a WWI Caucasian veteran in 1930 for the triple interaction. Column 5 focuses on draft enlistment as outcome, and considers the triple interaction constructed using the share of enlistable men living with a WWI African American veteran in 1930. Regressions are weighed by enlistable men of each race in 1940. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Variables Used for Heterogeneity

| Variable Name	Description	Source
PCA	See Appendix A and Table A2 for a detailed description of the variable	Authors' calculation from multiple sources (described in Table A2)
NAACP	Presence of NAACP chapters in the county between 1919 and 1940	Gregory and Estrada (2019)
Church	Number of members of African American churches in 1936 relative to county population	Census of Religious Bodies
Share of African American Veteran	Share of WWI African American veterans living in the county in 1930	Authors' calculation from the 1930 U.S. Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2020)
Share Living with African American WWI Veteran	Share of African American individuals eligible to serve in WWII, according to their age in 1930, who were living in a household with a WWI veteran in 1930	Authors' calculation from the 1930 U.S. Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2020)

Note: This table describes the variables (and their source) used in the heterogeneity analysis of Section 5.3.

Figure A1: African American-Caucasian Draftees, by PCA

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of draftees per 100,000 enlistable individuals (by race and week). The x-axis reports the week since the Pearl Harbor attack (coded as week 0). Gray (resp. black) line refer to the share of Caucasian (resp. African American) draftees, solid lines refer to those counties have PCA above the median, and dash lines refer to those counties have PCA below the median.

Figure A2: Minorities vs Caucasian Men: Draft Enlistment Around Pearl Harbor (8 weeks)

Notes: The y-axis reports the share of draftees per 100,000 enlistable individuals (by race and week), for each panel, the y-axis in the right is for Caucasian, the y-axis in the left is for other races. The x-axis reports the week since the Pearl Harbor attack (coded as week 0). The top left panel is for African American-Caucasian, the top right panel is for Japanese-Caucasian, the bottom left panel is for Chinese-Caucasian, the bottom right panel is for Native American-Caucasian. Solid black line refers to African American, solid dark green line refers to Japanese, solid blue line refers to Chinese, solid red line refers to Native American, and dash gray line refers to Caucasian.