

INSTITUTES
OF
ELENCTIC THEOLOGY



FRANCIS TURRETIN

Photograph from the frontispiece of volume 1 of
Turretin's *Institutio theologiae elencticae* (1696),
courtesy of *La Bibliothèque publique et universitaire de Genève*.

INSTITUTES OF ELENCTIC THEOLOGY

BY

Francis Turretin

*Pastor in the Church and Academy of Geneva
and Professor of Theology*

TRANSLATED BY

George Musgrave Giger

Princeton University

EDITED BY

James T. Dennison, Jr.

*Westminster Theological Seminary
in California*

VOLUME 1
FIRST THROUGH TENTH TOPICS



P U B L I S H I N G

P.O. BOX 817 • PHILLIPSBURG • NEW JERSEY 08865-0817

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The editor acknowledges permission from the following publishers to use excerpts from their publications:

Baker Book House, for material from Francis Turretin, *The Doctrine of Scripture*. Translated and edited by John W. Beardslee III. 1981.

Harvard University Press, for material from the Loeb Classical Library.: *Horace: Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica*. Translated by H. Rushton Fairclough. 1929. *Juvenal and Persius*. Translated by G. G. Ramsey. 1979. Ovid, *Fasti*. Translated by James G. Frazer. 1976. *Prudentius*. Translated by H. J. Thomson. 1949. *Hesiod*. Translated by Hugh G. Evelyn-White. 1914. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*. Translated by H. Rackham. 1972. Cicero, *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*. Translated by William A. Falconer. 1971. Pliny, *Natural History*. Translated by H. Rackham. 1967. *Virgil*. Translated by H. Rushton Fairclough. 1974. Seneca, *Moral Essays*. Translated by John W. Basore. 1970.

Typesetting by Thoburn Press, Reston, Virginia

Cover design by Francisco Adolfo Hernández Aceves

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 979-8-88779-226-2 (3-volume casebound set)

ISBN: 978-1-62995-865-1 (vol. 1 ePub)

ISBN: 978-1-62995-886-6 (vol. 2 ePub)

ISBN: 978-0-87552-453-5 (vol. 3 ePub)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Turretini, François, 1623–1687.

[Institutio theologiae elencticae. English]

Institutes of elenctic theology / by Francis Turretin ; translated
by George Musgrave Giger ; edited by James T. Dennison, Jr.

Translation of: Institutio theologiae elencticae.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Contents: v. 1. First through tenth topics.

— v. 2. Eleventh through seventeenth topics.

— v. 3. Eighteenth through twentieth topics.

1. Reformed Church—Doctrines—Early works to 1800. 2. Theology,
Doctrinal—Early works to 1800. 3. Catholic Church—Controversial
literature—Early works to 1800. I. Giger, George Musgrave, 1822–1865.

II. Dennison, James T., 1943— III. Title.

BX9421.T7913 1992

230'.42—dc20

92-10128

To

SHARON LYNN

Quam pulchra es amica mea!
Quam pulchra es!
Quam pulchra es, et quam decora,
Carissima, in deliciis!

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TABLES OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION

GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|---|
| * | Corrected citation |
| + | Citation cannot be identified or located as cited by Turretin |
| AA | Josephus, <i>Against Apion</i> . Translated by H.St.J. Thackeray. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926. |
| ACW | <i>Ancient Christian Writers</i> . New York: Newman Press, 1946- . |
| AJ | Josephus, <i>Antiquities of the Jews</i> . Translated by H.St.J. Thackeray, R. Marcus and L.H. Feldman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928-31. |
| ANF | Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds. <i>Ante-Nicene Fathers</i> . Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1969-73. |
| BT | I. Epstein, ed., <i>The Babylonian Talmud</i> . London: Soncino Press, 1935-52. |
| CCSL | <i>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</i> . Turnholt: Brepols, 1953- . |
| CG | Augustine, <i>City of God</i> . Translated by Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1950-54. |
| CI | Augustine, <i>Christian Instruction</i> . Translated by John J. Gavigan. New York: Cima Publishing Co., 1947. |
| CR | <i>Corpus Reformatorum</i> . Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke, 1834- . |
| CSCO | <i>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium</i> . Paris: Reipublicae, n.d. |
| Cochrane | A.C. Cochrane, <i>Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century</i> . Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966. |
| FC | <i>Fathers of the Church</i> . Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. |
| Hefele | Charles J. Hefele, <i>A History of the Councils of the Church</i> . 5 vols. New York: AMS Press, 1883/1972. |
| ICR | John Calvin, <i>Institutes of the Christian Religion</i> . 2 vols. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by Ford L. Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. |
| JW | Josephus, <i>The Jewish War</i> . Translated by H.St.J. Thackeray. Cambridge University Press, 1926-29. |

- LCC John Baillie, John T. McNeill and Henry P. Van Dusen, eds. *Library of Christian Classics*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953-66.
- Lauchert Friedrich Lauchert, *Die Kanones der Wichtigsten Altkirchlichen Concilien*. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1896/1961.
- Mansi Giovan D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum*. Paris: H. Welter, 1901-27.
- NPNF1 Philip Schaff, ed. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956.
- NPNF2 Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1952.
- PG Jacques Paul Migne. *Patrologiae . . . series Graeca*. Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1857-87.
- PL Jacques Paul Migne, *Patrologiae . . . series Latina*. Paris: Garnieri Fratres, 1878.
- ST Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*. 3 vols. New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947-48.
- Schaff Philip Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*. 3 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1931.
- Schroeder *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*. Translated by Henry J. Schroeder. St. Louis: Herder, 1941.
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HEBREW TRANSLITERATION TABLE

| | | | |
|----|----|----|----|
| א | ' | ל | l |
| ב | bh | מ | m |
| בּ | b | נ | n |
| ג | gh | ס | s |
| גּ | g | ע | ' |
| ד | dh | פ | ph |
| דּ | d | פּ | p |
| ה | h | צ | ts |
| ו | v | ק | q |
| ז | z | ר | r |
| ח | ch | ש | s |
| ט | t | שׁ | sh |
| י | y | ת | th |
| כ | kh | תּ | t |
| כּ | k | | |

GREEK TRANSLITERATION TABLE

| | | | |
|---|----|------|-----|
| α | a | σ, s | s |
| β | b | τ | t |
| γ | g | υ | y |
| δ | d | φ | ph |
| ε | e | χ | ch |
| ζ | z | ψ | ps |
| η | ē | ω | ō |
| θ | th | ρ | rh |
| ι | i | ῥ | h |
| κ | k | γγ | ng |
| λ | l | γκ | nk |
| μ | m | γξ | nx |
| ν | n | γχ | nch |
| ξ | x | αυ | au |
| ο | o | ευ | eu |
| π | p | ου | ou |
| ρ | r | υι | yi |

SCRIPTURE ABBREVIATIONS

OLD TESTAMENT

| | |
|-----------------|-------|
| Genesis | Gen. |
| Exodus | Ex. |
| Leviticus | Lev. |
| Numbers | Num. |
| Deuteronomy | Dt. |
| Joshua | Jos. |
| Judges | Jdg. |
| Ruth | Ruth |
| 1 Samuel | 1 S. |
| 2 Samuel | 2 S. |
| 1 Kings | 1 K. |
| 2 Kings | 2 K. |
| 1 Chronicles | 1 Ch. |
| 2 Chronicles | 2 Ch. |
| Ezra | Ezr. |
| Nehemiah | Neh. |
| Esther | Est. |
| Job | Job |
| Psalms | Ps. |
| Proverbs | Prov. |
| Ecclesiastes | Ecc. |
| Song of Solomon | Cant. |
| Isaiah | Is. |
| Jeremiah | Jer. |
| Lamentations | Lam. |
| Ezekiel | Ezk. |
| Daniel | Dan. |
| Hosea | Hos. |
| Joel | Joel |
| Amos | Am. |
| Obadiah | Ob. |
| Jonah | Jon. |
| Micah | Mic. |
| Nahum | Nah. |
| Habakkuk | Hab. |
| Zephaniah | Zeph. |
| Haggai | Hag. |
| Zechariah | Zech. |
| Malachi | Mal. |

APOCRYPHA

| | |
|-------------------|-----------|
| Tobit | Tob. |
| Judith | Jud. |
| Wisdom of Solomon | Wis. Sol. |
| Baruch | Bar. |
| 1 Maccabees | 1 Mac. |
| 2 Maccabees | 2 Mac. |

NEW TESTAMENT

| | |
|-----------------|----------|
| Matthew | Mt. |
| Mark | Mk. |
| Luke | Lk. |
| John | Jn. |
| Acts | Acts |
| Romans | Rom. |
| 1 Corinthians | 1 Cor. |
| 2 Corinthians | 2 Cor. |
| Galatians | Gal. |
| Ephesians | Eph. |
| Philippians | Phil. |
| Colossians | Col. |
| 1 Thessalonians | 1 Thess. |
| 2 Thessalonians | 2 Thess. |
| 1 Timothy | 1 Tim. |
| 2 Timothy | 2 Tim. |
| Titus | Tit. |
| Philemon | Philem. |
| Hebrews | Heb. |
| James | Jam. |
| 1 Peter | 1 Pet. |
| 2 Peter | 2 Pet. |
| 1 John | 1 Jn. |
| 2 John | 2 Jn. |
| 3 John | 3 Jn. |
| Jude | Jd. |
| Revelation | Rev. |

EDITOR'S PREFACE

George Musgrave Giger's translation of Francis Turretin's *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae* was a labor of love. In response to a request from his friend Professor Charles Hodge of Princeton Theological Seminary, Giger wrote out an English translation of the *Institutio* which spanned eight thousand handwritten pages. Giger had served as classics professor at Princeton University (College of New Jersey) from 1847 to 1865. Here he labored in Greek and Latin. His Turretin manuscript was placed at the desk in the library of the seminary in order for students to examine the appropriate pages assigned in Dr. Hodge's systematic theology classes. Portions of the Giger translation have appeared in typescript previously. Yet the entire translation has never been printed, although numerous persons have pleaded this cause over the years. The present project is an attempt to give Giger his due.

Giger's translation is quite literal and faithful to the original. The strength of his work is the strict adherence to Turretin's style. There is not much periphrastic translating here. The scholastic style with its awkward phrasing, bulky subordinate clauses and stilted form is evident in Giger's rendition. For readers who wish to explore scholastic Latin terms as an aid to understanding Turretin's technical vocabulary, I heartily recommend Richard A. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology* (Baker, 1985) and the "Glossary" compiled by Richard McKeon, *Selections From Medieval Philosophers* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 2:422-506. Turretin was fond of using sentence fragments particularly when summarizing a series of points or subdividing several explanations of a main thought. Hence the reader should expect incomplete sentences throughout the translation. My editorial work on Giger's manuscript has attempted to preserve the fidelity of his translation while, at the same time, improving upon its readability. To that end, sentences have been shortened where possible, parentheses have been used (for what appear to be obvious asides in Turretin's arguments), some archaic phrases have been revised and more modern terms chosen. The reader must understand that some of the tinkering is subjective, based on my judgment of readability. However, I have always attempted to remain faithful to both the spirit of Giger's English and Turretin's Latin.

In the course of editing the English version, it became obvious that several matters needed to be addressed. First, the version Giger was using was the 1847 Edinburgh/New York edition. This was a reprint of the 1688-90 version with corrections in a few Scripture citations. So far as I have been able to determine, the text of this nineteenth-century version does not differ from the 1696 printing (which, in turn, was a reprint of the 1679-85 original version in three volumes), except in the matter of a few Scripture citations (this is also valid for the 1688-90 version which I have been able to examine). The 1679-85 version was reprinted in 1680-86 (also in three volumes). A "new edition checked for accuracy and enlarged in many places" appeared in 1682-88 (three volumes). This corrected

and enlarged version was reprinted in three volumes in 1688-90. The 1696 reprint of the 1679-85 version was the first to include the *encomium* of Melchoir Leydekker and the ode of Adrian Reeland. This version was again reprinted in 1701 (three volumes). There was another printing in 1734: a three-volume set of the *Institutio* and a four-volume set which added Turretin's *Disputationes* (as volume 4) in order to make up an *Opera*. This *Opera* was the basis of the complete Edinburgh/New York printing—volume 4 being released in 1848.

The version you are holding represents corrections and additions of various kinds to the 1847 edition. All Scripture quotations have been checked and corrected where necessary (* indicates a correction to the 1847 edition). In addition, Turretin frequently cites Scripture passages by chapter only. Hence, I have attempted to provide the appropriate verses of the chapter from the context of Turretin's remarks. Scripture quotations are based on the King James Version.

The second major consideration was the matter of Turretin's quotations from other authors. In view of Turretin's voluminous knowledge of classical authors, early church fathers, medieval Scholastics, Reformation authors, Arminians, Socinians and counter-Reformation Roman Catholic polemicists, it seemed wise to attempt to examine his citations and provide full bibliographical data for his sources. I felt that this would make Turretin even more useful to the reader who wishes to pursue the great Genevan's argument by means of the references cited.

Consequently, I have attempted to identify, verify, correct and fully cite all quotations (and some allusions) Turretin makes from other authors. The process of identification has generated a dictionary catalogue of personalities which numbers more than one thousand individuals. This dictionary, which will be included in volume 3 of our set, contains first name, last name, alternate names (if any), dates of birth and death, and reference to a dictionary or encyclopedia which contains an article on the career of that individual.

Verification of Turretin's quotations has necessitated extensive use of on-line bibliographical databases (i.e., the Library of Congress via OCLC), indexes and concordances (especially the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* [TLG] produced by the University of California at Irvine and the Latin language database developed by the Packard Humanities Institute of Los Altos, California) and the cooperation of numerous libraries. In the process of examining his citations, it became evident that Turretin sometimes paraphrased his source or perhaps quoted the source from memory. Hence, a minority of the citations are not literal quotations from the work cited. This has led to some problematic identifications on my part (noted with a ? in the citation).

Where possible, I have cited Turretin's sources with English editions of the work. For citations from the church fathers, the appropriate section of Migne's *Patrologiae Graecae* (PG) or *Patrologiae Latinae* (PL) have been provided. As per the original, citations have been incorporated into the body of the text, not relegated to footnotes. Corrections of Turretin's citations are indicated by an *. No doubt, many of these errors are due to typesetting mistakes, i.e., the result of transposition, misreading or outright error on the part of the original typesetter(s).

Citations have been entered in a way which accurately locates Turretin's quotation. Sometimes I have provided more information about book, chapter and section than he does, thus enabling the reader to find the precise location of the quotation. Greek and Hebrew words and phrases have been transliterated

according to the table in the front of this volume. Turretin used only unpointed Hebrew expressions. I have followed his custom in this regard and have not attempted to supply vowel points. Abbreviations for series, frequently cited works, books of the Bible, etc. will be found in the table of abbreviations.

About 4 percent of the citations have not been identified (indicated by a + beside Turretin's allusion). In some cases, I have not been able even to identify the work Turretin is citing from standard American, British and foreign union catalogues (i.e., National Union Catalogue, British Museum Catalogue, etc.). In other cases, I have not been able to locate the words he is citing (or a reasonable paraphrase thereof) in the place he indicates. In these cases, I have inserted the citation exactly as it is found in the 1847 edition. If any of my readers discovers sources (or corrections) for these citations, please contact me at Westminster Theological Seminary, 1725 Bear Valley Parkway, Escondido, CA 92027.

The publication of the *Institutio* will take three volumes. We will be following the divisions of the 1847 edition: topics 1-10 (volume 1), topics 11-17 (volume 2), topics 18-20 (volume 3). The third volume will also include indexes of subjects, Scripture, Hebrew, Greek, and proper names, as well as a translation of Benedict Pictet's "Funeral Oration"—one of the primary sources of information on the life of Turretin. I also plan to add a sketch of Turretin's remarkable career with comments on his influence. Finally, a complete bibliography of works cited by Turretin will be included together with OCLC numbers for ease of location. In this way, what Hodge, Giger and old Princeton found to be so useful may, by the grace of God, be made all the more so to the church and academy today.

Anno Domini 1992 Dei Gratia

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First mention is due Dr. John H. Gerstner. While I was a student at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, Dr. Gerstner introduced me to Francis Turretin. The excerpts from the *Institutio* which Dr. Gerstner had prepared for his course on Turretin were sufficient to whet my appetite. It took many years for plans for the present project to mature and come together in the providence of God. Sharon Taylor, at the time Assistant to the Librarian at Princeton Theological Seminary, arranged for a photocopy of the Giger translation. Judy Ashcraft first labored to reduce the handwritten version to typescript via word processor. Anna Whitten completed the task and has continued to input corrections and additions. The Board and Faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary in California granted a study leave in 1988 enabling me to make significant progress in preparing the manuscript for publication. Bryce Craig and Thom Notaro of Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company have provided encouragement, equipment and needed advice. Catherine Drown has given her time in order to help with proofreading.

But a very special lady has aided in ways which can never be fully estimated. Grace Mullen, Archivist and Acting Director of the Montgomery Library of Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, has provided answers, searched through reference collections, sent books and microfilm and done numerous other chores cheerfully and accurately. I have appropriately dubbed her America's equivalent to Sherlock Holmes. Thanks so much, Gracie!

Many others have given their time and energy to this project. I shall attempt to acknowledge them more fully in the index volume to this set (projected to be volume 3).

SOLI DEO GLORIA!

TURRETIN'S DEDICATION

Most magnificent, noble and honored men of the consul and all the Senate of the celebrated Republic of Geneva, health and all happiness is desired for you from Francis Turretin.

As often as I think of the state of this republic, at whose helm God has stationed you, most distinguished nobles, so many great miracles occur to me by which it has become famous that what the divine poet formerly sung concerning Jerusalem, no one will deny can be predicated not undeservedly concerning it: "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God." Small indeed, I confess, and scarcely another less among the thousands of Judah, if the advantages of nature are regarded; great, however, and scarcely another greater if the gifts of God are attended to. But although the blessings are innumerable which God, with a liberal hand, has thus far poured out and this day pours out upon it; yet there are two illustrious above the others which commend its dignity: religion, than which nothing is more holy, and liberty, than which nothing is sweeter. This is, as it were, another Goshen, which the rays of the sun of righteousness illumine, while the Egypt of the world is covered with the more than Cimmerian darkness of errors; another Tsohar, small, but secure, in which the pious find a pleasing asylum, while the destructive fire of the divine judgment burns and feeds upon many other regions of the world; a true Bethshemesh and Heliopolis, house and city of the sun, where that visible sun is no longer worshipped (which is reported to have been done here in Gentilism by a tradition no less constant than concordant).

But the divine dayspring from on high is adored, Christ the Lord, who is our sun and shield; the sun of every blessing, asserting the glory of religion; the shield of the most safe protection, affording an invincible and inexpugnable guard to liberty. Both of these (the greatest glories of Geneva) supply the most just argument for celebrating the admirable providence of God towards us. For who is not amazed that in those most serious convulsions of almost the whole of Europe in which scarcely any region has been free from war (none of which has not felt its most dreadful effects), yet we thus far almost alone in this corner of the earth enjoying a halcyon peace have remained untouched and unrestrained. Meanwhile others are compelled with deepest grief to behold devastated fields, cities taken and sacked, villages burned, provinces cut off and other lamentable, direful and dreadful concomitants of war. Torn away from their paternal habitations they miserably wander as exiles and stragglers. Under our own vine and fig tree, we tranquilly eat our bread and enjoy the profoundest peace.

Truly we would be the most ungrateful of mortals did we not consider this liberty and peace to be the pure blessing of God, who watches for our salvation. He alone has produced and produces this ease for us. He who was first the author of so great a gift, willed afterwards to be the supporter and conservator of the same. For who else could have unveiled the artifices of so many conspirators and traitors beyond all expectation of men? Who else could have expelled and frustrated so many incursions and nefarious attempts? The lovers of hiero-

glyphics, when about to represent providence sustaining all things, were accustomed ingenuously to paint a city supported by no prop, pendulous in mid air, sustained by a large arm stretched out of heaven. Our Geneva, not shadowy and emblematically but truly, is that city sustained by the hand of God alone; not by human means or assistance: "Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord" (Zech. 4:6).

But far greater and more illustrious ought that other benefit to be regarded which is the principal foundation of the divine protection under whose shade we thus far safely repose (viz., heavenly truth and the deposit of a purer religion with which inestimable gift God willed to bless us). Through it—the tyranny of the Roman Antichrist having been cast down, error triumphed over, superstition put to flight, idols overthrown, darkness scattered—that saving light which even long ago was hoped for after the darkness, has happily arisen upon those who were lying in the darkness of the shadow of death. Happy hills which God has loved so much as to place the golden candlestick of truth—from these the rays of divine truth diffused in every direction have lit up a great part of the world; favored state and church which Christ has thought worthy of so great honor as to consecrate it for the resting place of the ark, the seat of the gospel and the sanctuary of his name. However hated by the world, she may perceive the fury and rage of the devil and of Antichrist more and more excited against her. Yet beloved by God and dear to him as the pupil of his eye, she sweetly takes refuge under the shadow of his wings, joyfully rejoicing not only in her own good things, but imparting these favors to many others also so that she deserved the appellation of either the mother or the nurse of these who professed that they owed to this our state after God their own origin or increase. But in this respect she is most especially happy—that by the special favor of God she always enjoys the wonderful privilege of the Reformation and has preserved thus far unimpaired the most precious of religion (*keimēlion*) committed to her. This is our glory, this our crown, by which we are well distinguished above many other people of the earth to whom he has denied similar grace: we are marked by the glorious name of the property of God and the Holy Lion.

Since, in truth, nothing should be more important to us than the constant and faithful custody of so great a benefit (with a grateful commemoration of it towards God the bestower), it was, most distinguished nobles, the unwearied desire of your pious ancestors, who, as the best nurses of the church, always held it among their first cares to support strenuously the cause of religion no less than that of liberty, that it might be preserved pure and free from all contagion of errors: most wisely judging it to be not so much the palladium in which Troy nor the heaven descended (*ouranopetes*) shield in which Rome formerly gloried, as the ark of the covenant, the indubitable pledge of God's presence (upon the retention and conservation of which the security and happiness of the republic as well as of the church depend).

It would be a long story to recount with what monstrous errors that most base enemy of the human race, in a former age, strove to obscure and at the same time to extinguish the light of the nascent gospel—not only by sworn foes of the Reformation, who endeavored to draw it back under the pristine yoke of Anti-Christian bondage, but also by perfidious Sinons, who, living in its bosom under the plausible but false pretext of cherishing and illustrating religion, at-

tempted to introduce into doctrine the faith of deadly opinions. With wonderful felicity by the vigilance of your ancestors, the Lord liberated it. Your annals testify by what numerous and great stratagems the divine work of the Reformation was attacked almost from its cradle; with what rage of profane and factious persons the holy discipline of morals was besieged and how often the purity of evangelical truth was assailed.

At one time, this was attempted by the fanatical rabble of the Anabaptists, who in the year 1536, immediately after the commencement of the Reformation, made a disturbance here. Afterwards it was the deceitful arts (more changeable than Proteus) and most iniquitous calamities of Peter Caroli, the impudent Sophist. Then again the destructive corruptions of the word of God and orthodox doctrine by Sebastian Castellio, the leader of modern semi-Pelagians; by the most base contrivances of Gruet, a turbulent man, throwing together into the same hodgepodge of errors Samosatenianism with Manichaeism. After that, in the year 1551, by the impiety of Jerome Bolsec who labored to corrupt the sacred doctrine of predestination and saving grace with Pelagian poison. At length, it was attempted by the horrible blasphemies of Michael Servetus, not a man, but a monster of all wickedness, in reference to the adorable mystery of the holy Trinity. This most abandoned man, although often warned, did not cease disgorging the most pestiferous poison among the common people, which he had already scattered for many years in the celebrated places of Europe. At length being thrown into prison and persevering in his diabolical obstinacy, he suffered the most just punishment of execrable impiety in the year 1553. Still Satan (so often vanquished) did not cease to renew the strife and to excite new masters of impiety afterwards: such as Valentine Gentilis, Paul Alciatus and other disciples of the same fraternity with the most impure Servetus. In the year 1558, these joined together the error of the Tritheists with Samosatenianism and Arianism (i.e., monsters with monsters). These the authority of your predecessors firmly restrained and happily put to flight, so that always with great praise, they approved themselves to be "strenuous and hearty defenders of the cause of piety," the honorable utterance which that most distinguished man of God, Calvin, formerly used concerning them.

That this is also your principal care, most watchful fathers of your country, your zeal and piety do not suffer us to doubt. For indeed you have remembered that dominion is strengthened by piety and righteousness according to the oracle of the wisest of kings; and that your rule never could be happy and well ordered unless you took care that by the word of God, his authority should always avail with you and that Christ himself should reign through you. You have remembered that here might be not so much an aristocracy as a theocracy, having God always for its president and ruler; and that the safety of the republic, which should always be the supreme law, could not be better consulted than by defending those two impregnable ramparts—the culture of pure religion and the pious care of nurturing the church, which God has committed to the protection of your wings. This has been so accomplished thus far by you that not only has religion remained here uncontaminated by any corruption of error and superstition through the special favor of God, but nothing besides has been changed in the purer doctrine once received here, which you have bound yourselves always religiously to be retained. Go on, Lords, constantly in this sacred purpose and cause, by your pious and unwearied vigilance, these good things to be perpetual

to us; so that under your auspices this republic may always be happy and flourishing in piety even to the latest posterity. This undoubtedly you can hope from God, who has promised to be a guard of those cities which would be the seats of truth and the refuge of the pious as long as you will always be solicitous about religiously worshipping and retaining him and promoting his glory above all things; as long as you will take care that among your citizens piety and justice, the love of religion and of country, love and the holy concord of souls shall flourish, and vices (too many in this most corrupt age even in the growing church) be severely repressed; as long as by our zeal this city shall truly correspond to her name "Reformed," as much with respect to integrity of morals as to purity of doctrine (and, that I may speak the word, the "city of God" and true *chptsybh*, in which shall be the good pleasure of God).

However because this care belongs not only to the rulers of the republic and the chief men, but more closely touches those who minister in sacred things (whom the supreme arbiter of things employs for his work), we cannot sufficiently admire his provident care over us in choosing here for himself a seat of truth. So he never forsook his own work, sending faithful and energetic laborers into his harvest who, furnished with eminent gifts, should begin courageously the divine work of purging religion and when begun should carry it forward unto perfection. Everyone knows how much Geneva owes to the labors of those remarkable servants of God, William Farel and Peter Viret, whom God willed to use in laying the foundations of the Reformation; but especially to the most fervent zeal and indefatigable diligence of that greatest and never-to-be-sufficiently-praised theologian, John Calvin. He was well known (*tou pany*) by his most ardent zeal and unwearied diligence. Furnished wonderfully with a heroic spirit, a most acute judgment and profound erudition, God unexpectedly called him to his work at Geneva in the most difficult times. God willed his labor to be happily expended in establishing a purer doctrine and discipline of morals (yet not without great contests).

Their followers, who held the lamp after them, always proposed this to themselves before other things, that "impure babblings" (*bebēlois kainophōniais*) and "erroneous teaching" (*heterodidaskaliais*) being rejected (which the apostle denounces) that most sacred trust (*parakatathēkēn*), which they have received unimpaired from their ancestors, they also might religiously preserve unimpaired and transmit to their successors. Since we, by the grace of God, even now enjoy this singular benefit, we could not escape the guilt of the heaviest crime if we should suffer this glory and crown to be snatched from us and if those who succeed to the labors of such men should not be solicitous to press faithfully in their footsteps. Indeed let me say something about myself.

From the time that God wished me by your remarkable favor to be elevated to the honorable position which I have occupied for about thirty years (although I always felt myself far unequal to such a burden, and the consciousness of my own feebleness easily persuaded me how inferior I was to those great men who preceded us here), yet I can solemnly testify before God that no other object was ever proposed to me than that I might always follow my predecessors, not with the same steps, but in the same way and according to my ability tread in their footsteps, though not with equal paces. Nor did I believe that I could better adorn the place which I have found and satisfy the conscience of the oath by which I was

bound in the office entrusted to me than if I should strive solely for this—that the youth committed to me might be imbued with a purer theology and with the sober and solid doctrine here.

To this course (although of my own accord disposed), the domestic example of the two faithful servants of Christ connected with me by blood also impelled me. I mean the great theologian John Diodati, my maternal uncle, whose name (most celebrated through the whole world) and work on the sacred Scriptures (most praised and most worthy of the cedar, to mention no other) demonstrate the illustrious man. Also Benedict Turretin, my most dear parent, of blessed and most beloved memory who, snatched away by a premature and most regretted death, obtained the praise of an accurate and solid theologian, as both fame (I being silent) proclaims and his writings testify. Excited by these more and more to duty, I have always considered that this one thing should be done by me—that vain and useless questions being dismissed (which feed curiosity, but do not minister to faith), I should compose all my works after the sacred cynosure of the word and set before the youth consecrated to God the “pure rational milk” (*logikon adolon gala*) by which they might advance every day in the truth which is according to piety and prepare themselves for the work of the ministry. Such is the object of this production, the first part of which comes into light. At first, it was intended for the use of our scholars and rudely sketched. I am not so much voluntarily moved as in certain measure compelled to give it to the public in order to satisfy the frequent and reiterated demands of those who supposed that some advantage would thus be given to the guardians of sacred things in the easier development of the controversies waged with our adversaries. Whether their expectation will be confirmed, the event in its own time (with the favor of God) will teach us.

In the meantime, I have determined with all suitable submission to present and to dedicate to you, most illustrious men, this work (such as it is). For although I hesitated not a little whether I ought to approach you with this slight gift (nor were there wanting various reasons to deter me from my purpose), yet the persuasions of your kindness and the consideration of my duty effected that (all fear being shaken off) I should not doubt to write your splendid names before this work of mine; that under your auspices it might come before the public more happily and safely, being persuaded that the argument would not be ungrateful to you, which contains the claims of saving doctrine (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us). Nor that you would deny your patronage to this little work which aims at nothing else than the promotion of the cause of God and heavenly truth, of which he has willed you to be the defenders against the vain inventions of men. Besides nothing was more just than to make these fruits (although poor) of my studies, yours. They were already yours by right, since they sprang up and were cultivated on your soil. Thus I might prove to you even from this specimen, my, if not erudition, at least fidelity in the discharge of the office entrusted to me. Nor without the crime of ingratitude (*acharistias*) could that singular benevolence have suffered me to act otherwise, by which that most pious and most virtuous man, Francis Turretin, my grandfather, came here from the city of Lucca about a hundred years ago. All the blessings of a most sweet country being left, impelled by the sacred zeal of professing a purer religion, under the protection of the most renowned senate, he fixed his seat here with his family delighting in the enjoyment of the most desired light of the gospel with

many neighbors and relatives of the Italian nation and other pious men whom the love of the truth and the sweet savor (*euōdia*) of Christ had attracted here. From the year 1552, an Italian church was founded by the efforts of John Calvin under the protection and authority of a Christian magistrate, which even now at this day by the singular grace of God is preserved under your protection. The memory of this kindness, as it will remain fixed in our minds for ever, so it demands that in testification of a grateful mind it should be declared unto all.

And on this account you have not ceased to give not obscure proofs of the same favor towards me chiefly, whom you have honored with many distinctions; not only by committing to me above all my merit the sacred office which I perform both in the church and in the academy, but also by always cherishing me in a kind manner and approving thus far all my attempts. Thus often being invited elsewhere, although thinking nothing less than about the change of my position (and especially some years before being honorably called by the most noble and mighty senators both of confederated Belgium and of Holland to the theological profession in the most flourishing Athanaeum in Batavian Lugdunum [Leiden]) with a benevolent affection towards me you wish to retain me here. This being done you have so more and more bound my faith and service to you (already devoted) that I would deservedly acquire a bad name if, while I could not discharge the debt, I would not at least ingenuously acknowledge it; nor take care that some constant monument of my regard for you and of a grateful mind should always exist. Accept therefore with serene countenance, most distinguished nobles, this little pledge, not of a little but of my most devout respect and most ardent zeal towards this your seat of gospel light. And proceed to favor him as he willingly acknowledges that he is now under the highest obligations to you; so he professes and promises to be wholly yours by service and reverence. As to what remains, as a suppliant, I entreat the most good and most great God, by whom kings reign that he may always be propitious to you, eminent rulers. May he preserve safe the republic as long as possible and enrich you with all manner of blessings, so governing you by his leading (*hēgemonikō*) spirit of wisdom and strength, of piety and justice, that all your counsels may contribute to the glory of his most holy name, the advantage of the republic and the happiness of the church. Amen.

Geneva, February 10th, A.D. 1679.

TURRETIN'S PREFACE TO THE READER

Kind reader, I cannot avoid briefly stating to you here at the threshold, my reasons and design in publishing this work, lest you should think erroneously of it or ascribe to me in relation to it something from which I have always been free. For since so many highly approved writings of this sort have been published by theologians (the abundance of which often confuses the studious, uncertain to whom they ought most especially to devote themselves), I hardly seem to have been able to avoid the mark of foolhardiness and imprudence. Meanwhile I (who ought to be compared with them in neither talent nor teaching) recognize that I am unprepared from all these things which require of such a work that it ought to be executed with excellence (*cum laude*). Yet I would dare to put forth my efforts for the public in this kind of writing, as if I could brighten the light of the sun or as if I desire to write an Iliad after Homer. It was not from private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public call. But besides the fact that the obligation arising from the office imposed upon me could alone sufficiently and more than sufficiently defend me here, it prescribes the duty of assisting the studies of the youth consecrated to God by teaching or by writing. As in erecting the tabernacle of the Lord, their diligence was also praiseworthy who, not being able to contribute gold, silver, scarlet and other more precious things, at least did not hesitate to offer brass and iron and the cheaper things in their possession; yea, even skins and the hairs of goats, God not estimating the gifts according to their price, but according to the affection of their mind. The very occasion of the undertaken work, not sought but offered (yea thrust upon me) will abundantly testify what has been done by me and my intention. For while I was endeavoring according to my strength to inform the youth from the requisitions of the entrusted office (not only publicly but also privately), among other things I proposed for their investigation the *Decades* of the most celebrated Maresius. And that this might be to them a more useful exercise, I thought that the state and foundation of the controversies treated there should be explained in a few words (some distinctions and observations also being added) by which the *prōton pseudos* ("principal falsehoods") of opponents might be revealed and the principal objections solved. Nor content with the living word, I wished these to be committed also to writing that they might be fixed more deeply in the memory.

Thus the work gradually grew; nor was it consulted without some fruit by the studious. I proposed to myself only this scope of my labor and never would have thought of publishing the hurried work, had not both the prayers of the studious and the wishes of friends and the well-founded rumors reached my ears concerning the design entertained by others of publishing it without my knowledge (not so much obtained as extorted from me). Therefore, that a rude and unformed production (defiled by many blemishes and errors) might not be sent forth, I at length determined ("willing yet with an unwilling mind," *hekōn aekonti ge thymō*) to yield to the wishes of those demanding this of me and to publish this little work whatever it may be, reviewed and increased with a little more diligent care and

digested into a more accurate method (as though not able to prove my erudition, I might at least prove to all regard for friends and my desire to defend the truth). Hence if anyone desires more in these pages and calls this a crude and immature foetus, he will have me confessing the same (who professed it first). I add this also—that it ought rather to be kept back, than to be published.

Thus also as to the name, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*. Let no one think that a full and accurate system of theology is delivered here. For this was not indeed the design proposed to me, but only to explain the importance of the principal controversies which lie between us and our adversaries (ancient and modern) and supply to the young the thread of Ariadne, by the help of which they may more easily extricate themselves from their labyrinth. For since in this fond-of-wrangling age it becomes the man of God not only to be imbued with a deeper knowledge of truth for rightly dividing the word of God (*pros to orthotomein ton logon tou theou*), but also to be equipped with the powerful armor of righteousness and especially with the shield of faith, to convict antagonists (*pros to tous antilegontas elenchein*), to quench the fiery darts of Satan and destroy the fortification and reasonings opposed to the knowledge of God, so that every thought may be brought captive in obedience to Christ—the progress of the studious cannot be better provided for than by teaching them to handle the sword with the trowel (which sacred history tells us the Jerusalem builders formerly did); that is, with instruction (*paideia*) in the truth, upon which faith may be built, to join the conviction (*elenchon*) of the false by which the errors (either directly or indirectly impugning it) may be solidly refuted, so that they can be successful in setting right the many and weighty controversies which at this day and to our grief prevail extensively among Christians and miserably lacerate the church of the Lord.

But because it is evident dangerous errors are concerned and occur chiefly and most frequently about the state of the controversy, which being unknown, it happens that the contest (*astochōs*) is unhappily carried on with masks and at random like blinded gladiation. I have given attention to this above all things, that discarding everything irrelevant I might diligently bring out (*exagōnia*) and explain as far as possible the state and main hinge of the questions according to the opinion of the parties. Thus this being once rightly posited and explored, the way might be rendered easy to the rest, whether the truth was to be constructively (*kataskeuastikōs*) erected or error to be destroyed (*anaskeuēn*) by refutation. These two additional things I proposed to accomplish, not that I might laboriously bring together all the reasons usually adduced for the confirmation of the truth (because here we must contend not so much by number as by weight), but that I might select with judgment the better and more solid by which it can be supported, strength also being added to them where there was need and the principal objections (*exceptionibus*) of adversaries (*tōn ex enantias*) answered. To these I thought sources of solution (*fontes solutionum*) should be subjoined so that the prolix series of arguments being dismissed, distinctions might be present briefly and as it were at one glance by which the weapons of the adversaries might be blunted and the nerves of the principal objections be easily cut.

All this I have endeavored to execute with brevity and perspicuity so that neither too great conciseness should produce obscurity, nor too great prolixity tedium. Hence content with a bare and simple exposition of things, a wearisome citation of testimonies which might have been heaped together being omitted

and all parade of emotion avoided, I have thought it sufficient to indicate by brief references what I might otherwise have drawn out in a just handling of the argument. But no one ought to be surprised either at my touching upon various common questions because I here desire to profit not the erudite and the intractable (*epoptais*) who have no need of these writings, but catechumens (*tois katēchoumenois*) and initiates who wish to be instructed. For their education, we ought to accommodate the word in speaking as also the style in writing. I leave others untouched which in common places (*loci communibus*) mention is often wont to be made. For our theology already labors with too great a mass of controversies, and our theology is overwhelmed (of which not a few are less necessary, many also rashly agitated by unwise man). These persons, either by an unhappy curiosity, disdaining the open things in the Scriptures, search into the sealed and closed heaven and strive to break into the secret recesses of God (*embateuontes eis ha mē heōrakasi*, cf. Col. 2:18). By a liberal gathering of straws (*karpologia*), they follow up the inane apices of words, and seek to know a bulrush (i.e., find difficulties where there are none). For the most part I have thought it always to be important for the progress of learners and the increase of piety, to diminish rather than to increase the questions, as much as the truth would admit. Therefore I wished to select those which seemed either of greater moment or more necessary at this time, others being dismissed which are either too difficult and curious or inane and jejune, which the apostle calls *zētēseis mōras kai aperantous* (cf. 2 Tim. 2:23—"but foolish and unlearned questions avoid") which neither hurt those ignorant of them nor profit those who know them. As the golden rule of the apostle always maintains: "to know in order to be wise" (*phronein eis to sōphronein*). And so I judged that the profane caprice of crafty men for the new and curious interests of the prurient ought to be carefully avoided, and I did nothing more zealously than that I should not turn away from the form of sensible speech as well as from the simplicity and purity (*eilikrineia*) of the pristine faith which our pious predecessors after Christ and the apostles passed down to us and which was constantly maintained here as much as ever could be preserved by me undefiled.

Of course, I am aware that this will by no means suit the taste of many people who think that this age is so fertile; to whom old truths appear worthless and who esteem nothing but mysterious and modern thinking; who are "wise in their own conceit" (*idiognōmones*) and "cherish their own opinion" (*dokēsisophoi*) as if this were the standard of truth. Under the front of greater light and of a deeper dragnet for truth displayed before the ignorant, the traditions are cast down, the good constitutions are destroyed, "their own interpretations and their own decisions are esteemed" (*idias epilyseis* and *kurias doxas*, cf. 2 Pet. 1:20). They take care to take on the resemblance of prophecies and just as if they were in good mind they do not blush to proclaim that those who differ with them are empty-headed, ignorant and slavishly addicted to old forms.

But whatever they ascribe or judge to be foolish because of this vice, I consider it with true, heartfelt praise and judge this fact to be special evidence of commendation. For since each of the oldest things is most true, no description of better stamp can be given especially in sacred argument than that something has less novelty. Old is best here and that which goes back to earliest antiquity. It was discovered through much sad experience that they always dangerously go

astray who spurn the well-known and well-worn paths in order to cut new ones which lead off as much as possible into the pathless heights and precipices.

I admit that we ought not to despise the diligence of those who recently have done justice to their brilliant gifts from God powerfully displaying a special genius for acumen honorably taken up with examination of the Scriptures and in bringing the truth to light. And it would be sheer ingratitude against God, the author of such great gifts, to willfully defraud them of their due praise or to refuse to profit from them. But they are indeed rejected under that old, pernicious pretense, and novel doctrines are introduced into the church as if those who preceded us lived in a fog and in shadows until now, and they were unable to purge religion from their own errors. This certainly is injurious to the reputation of such great men and harmful to religion—it ought not to be tolerated by pious ears!

Let other books, then, be commended by their novelty. I do not want this statement to justify mine. I avoided it most diligently lest it should contain anything new, a stranger from the word of God and from the public forms received in our churches, and nothing is built up there that is not confirmed by the vote of our most proven theologians of highest reputation.

I do not expect or ask for any praise in the future from my little work, but I will consider my labor to be well satisfying if you soberly and favorably regard that this work of mine, such as it is, renders service to the church of God. If any fruit is returned from hence, it will come through divine blessing for illumination of the truth and edification of the saints. But if this main portion of my labor be neither unhelpful for you nor clearly useless—which I alone have reluctantly brought into the light—were I to perceive this to be the case, I would proceed to another part more eagerly and act with the aid of a good God if he would see fit to bestow to me strength and life that I might more swiftly deliver the faith once given.

Meanwhile, since I am a man (and I do not suppose that I am free from any human limitations), if anything would be said by me here that would correspond little with Scripture united with the rule of our faith, not only do I want it to be unsaid, but even to be stricken out.

You then, dear reader, when you kindly express appreciation and are lenient toward my errors: "If you know something better than these precepts, pass it on, my good fellow. If not, join me in following these" (Horace, *Epistles* 1.6.67-68 [Loeb, 290-91]).

May the God of truth and of peace cause us to walk always in truth and charity; may we grow every day in him who is the head, until we all arrive at the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, perfected in power and to the measure of the maturity of Christ. Amen.

THEOLOGY

FIRST QUESTION

Should the word "theology" be used in the Christian schools, and in how many ways can it be understood?

**The word
"theology" is
rightly used.**

I. Since, according to the laws of accurate method, the use and true sense of terms (*prōton exetazein ta onomata*) are first to be explained (as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has it), for words are the types (*typoi*) of things, some things must be premised concerning the word "theology"

before we come to the thing itself. But although the proposed question may seem hardly necessary (in the common sense and in that received by almost all who think it should be retained as a technical [*technikon*] word properly and emphatically declaring its subject), yet we must meet the opinion of those who dislike it because it does not occur in Scripture and is used to denote the false system of the heathen and who judge that it would be more suitable to use other words drawn from Scripture.

II. Although the word "theology" is not in so many words in-written (*engraphos autolexei*), yet it is not altogether un-written (*agraphos*). The simple words of which it is composed often occur there: as *logos tou theou* ("word of God") and *logia tou theou* ("words of God"; cf. Rom. 3:2; 1 Pet. 4:11*; Heb. 5:12). Therefore it is one thing to be in Scripture as to sound and syllables (or formally and in the abstract); another to be in it as to sense and the thing signified (or materially in the concrete). Theology does not occur in Scripture in the former manner, but in the latter.

III. Although it is not lawful to form any doctrines not in Scripture, yet it is lawful sometimes to use words which are not found there if they are such as will enable us either to explain divine things or to avoid errors. For this purpose, the words "triad," *homoousiou*, "original sin" and the like have been used by theologians.

IV. Although the heathen often abused this word to designate their false system, yet this does not prevent applying to our true and saving science what was wrongly given by them (falsely and falsely so-called [*pseudōnymō*]) the name of theology. Just as the word "God" (which among the Gentiles denoted a false and fictitious god), and the word "church" (which was applied to a secular assembly) are used in the Scriptures in a sounder sense for the true God and the assembly of the saints. The word "theology" (of Greek origin) was transferred from the schools of the Gentiles to sacred uses, just as the vessels of the Egyptians were appropriated to sacred purposes by the Israelites.

V. We do not deny that there are various synonyms in the Scriptures by which the heavenly science might be designated; as when it is called "wisdom in a mystery" (1 Cor. 2:7), the "form of sound words" (2 Tim. 1:13), the "acknowledging of the truth which is after godliness" (Tit. 1:1), "doctrine" (Tit. 1:9) and is expressed by other like words. But nevertheless this name can and ought to be retained because it has been used so long and is the most appropriate for expressing this saving science.

VI. It is evident that the word "theology" was used by the Gentiles. For they who discoursed sublimely of God, or settled the worship of the gods, or set forth their birthdays, marriages, offspring, dominion and achievements were called "theologians" and their science "theology" (see Lactantius, *The Wrath of God* 2 [FC 54:85-88]; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 3.3 [ANF 2:384; PG 8.1119-20]; Isidore, *Etymologiarium* 8*.6.18 [PL 82.307]; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.4.9 [Loeb, 1:126-27]).

VII. Among Christians, the word "theology" is used either inadequately (with reference to the efficient to mean a discourse of God [*Theou Logon*], and with reference to the object, a discourse about God [*logon peri tou Theou*]) or adequately inasmuch as it denotes both a discourse of God and a discourse about God. These two must be joined together because we cannot speak concerning God without God; so that it may be termed the science which is originally from God, objectively treats concerning and terminatively flows into and leads to him, which Thomas Aquinas aptly expresses, *Theologia a Deo docetur, Deum docet, et ad Deum ducit* ("Theology is taught by God, teaches God and leads to him," ST, I, Q. 1, Art. 7+—not in Thomas, but a medieval scholastic adage). So this nomenclature embraces the twofold principle of theology: one of being, which is God; the other of knowing, which is his word.

VIII. Again it is used by authors in three ways: (1) broadly; (2) strictly; (3) according to the true extent of its signification. In the first way, it is accommodated to metaphysics, and in this sense Aristotle calls the first philosophy "theology" (*Metaphysics* 6.1.10-11 [Loeb, 1:296-97] and 11*.7.8-9 [Loeb, 2:86-89]). He divides theoretical philosophy into three parts: physical (*physikēn*), mathematical (*mathēmatikēn*) and theological (*theologikēn*). In the second way, the fathers designate particularly that part of the Christian science which treats of the divinity of Christ by the word "theology." In this sense, John is with emphasis styled "Theologian" because he boldly asserted the deity of the Word (*tēn tou logou theotēta*, cf. Rev. 1:2). The other fathers applied to Gregory Nazianzus the name of "Theologian" because he demonstrated the divinity of Christ in various orations. Hence a distinction was made by them between theology (*theologias*) and economy (*oikonomias*). By the former, they meant the doctrine of the divinity of Christ; by the latter, the doctrine of his incarnation. *Theologeîn Iēsoun* is with them to discourse of the divinity of Christ (Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 5.28 [FC 19:343; PG 20.512]; Basil the Great, *Adversus Eunomium* 2 [PG 29.601]; Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 31*.26, "On the Holy Spirit" [NPNF2, 7:326; PG 36.161] and Oration 38*.8, "On the Theophany" [NPNF2, 7:347; PG 36.320]). In the third and most proper sense, it denotes "a system or body of doctrine concerning God and divine things revealed by him for his own glory and the salvation of men." In this sense, we use it here.

IX. The use of the word "theology" is either equivocal and abusive (when it is applied to the false theology of the heathen and heretics); or, less properly, when it is referred to the original and infinite wisdom which we conceive to be in God knowing himself in an unspeakable and most perfect manner (for the word cannot reach the dignity of the thing itself); or to the theology of Christ and to angelic theology; or, more properly, when it is applied to the theology of men on earth which (as we shall see hereafter) is divided into natural and supernatural.

SECOND QUESTION

Whether there is a theology and its divisions.

Theology is proved to be.

I. Many things prove that there is a theology. (1) The nature and goodness of God who, since he is the best, is most communicative of himself. He cannot communicate himself more suitably to a rational creature and in a manner more fitting to human nature than by the knowledge and love of himself. (2) The consent of people and the universal, innate desire to know God which must be for some purpose. For although they have shamefully wandered from true theology, yet the very fact of their seeking it proves the existence of such a theology. Hence no nation has ever been found so barbarous as not to have its hierophants engaged in gaining the knowledge of and in teaching divine things. (3) The design of creation; for God made rational creatures with this intention—that he might be recognized and worshipped by them, which cannot be done without theology. (4) The nature of the thing because the two things requisite for the making up of a system (the *to gnōston* or knowable object, and the *to gnōstikon* or knowing subject) are found here (viz., God, the most capable of being known of knowable things [*tōn epistētōn epistētōtaton*], and rational creatures endowed with intellects capable of gaining the knowledge of him). (5) The necessity of salvation; for as man is appointed for a supernatural end, he must necessarily have presented to him supernatural means for reaching that end. Now this is no other than faith which absolutely requires the knowledge of God.

II. All entities discussed in philosophical systems are not discussed with reference to all that can possibly be known of them, but only with reference to that which can naturally be perceived of them. Hence from the extent of the object of philosophy no prejudice can justly be occasioned to supernatural theology which treats certain entities not as they are known by nature, but by revelation. (2) Although all natural entities form the subjects of the inferior sciences, this does not take away the necessity of theology, where different supernatural mysteries are taught and to which no human science has ever extended.

III. The senses do not stand in need of any supernatural knowledge in order to their perfection. It would be wrong to infer from this that the intellect does not need it because the intellect is ordained to a supernatural end, surpassing the comprehension of the reason. This is not by any means the case with the senses. But although this need of the intellect is a mark of imperfection with regard to an end not as yet attained and as denoting the absence of the end, yet it indicates perfection with regard to its capacity for reaching that end.

IV. Metaphysics is the highest of all sciences in the natural order, but acknowledges the superiority of theology in the supernatural order. The expression of philosophers—that sciences are distinguished by their greater or lesser abstraction and therefore the science which has least to do with matter as metaphysics is superior to all—must be understood of sciences merely theoretical, occupied with universal things only and belonging to the natural order. For these form their own objects by an abstraction of the mind, and their superiority is regulated by the degree of abstraction. However, this cannot apply to theology, being partly theoretical and partly practical and therefore superior to all in the natural order and not forming its own object by any abstraction, but receiving it from revelation already formed and distinct.

**Different kinds
of theology.**

V. Theology is wont to be distinguished in diverse ways into true and false. The false and equivocally so-called (applied to an erroneous system concerning God and his worship) is of various kinds. First, that of the Gentiles which evidently has been manifold. Thus Plato (*The Republic* 2+) makes it twofold: symbolical (*symbolikēn*) or mythical (*mythikēn*) (consisting of things wrapped up in a covering of signs under which the Gentiles and especially the Egyptians were accustomed to teach divine mysteries); and philosophical (*philosophikēn*) or demonstrative (*apodeiktikēn*) (occupying itself in the contemplation of divine things). Marcus Varro makes it threefold: mythical (*mythikēn*) or fabulous (of the poets, which was intended for the stage and theaters); political (*politikēn*) or civil (of the priests and people, which was publicly used in the temples according to the rites of each city and nation); and physical (*physikēn*) or natural (of the philosophers, which was taught in the schools; cf. Augustine, CG 6.5 and 8.1 [FC 8:314-17 and 14:21-22]). Thus both the poets (on account of their fabulous discussions on the nature of god and divine things [*theologoumenous mythous*]) and the philosophers and priests are called “theologians” by Justin Martyr (*Hortatory to the Greeks* 3 [ANF 1:274; PG 6.247-48]) and Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 5.8 [ANF 2:454-57]). However the principal part of their theology was a setting forth of the generation of the gods (*theogonias*) because they believed that the gods were generated. Second, that of infidels and heretics who either openly rejected Christ (as the Jews, Mohammedans, etc.), or who, while they retain the name of Christ, are in fundamentals at variance with the word of God (as the theology of papists, Socinians and other like heretics). For although their theology may contain some truth, yet because the greater part is false and the errors fundamental, it is properly called “false” (the denomination being taken from the larger part).

VI. True theology is divided into: (1) infinite and uncreated, which is God’s essential knowledge of himself (Mt. 11:27) in which he alone is at the same time the object known (*epistēton*), the knowledge (*epistēmōn*), and the knower (*epistēmē*), and that which he decreed to reveal to us concerning himself which is commonly called archetypal; and (2) finite and created, which is the image and ectype (*ektypon*) of the infinite and archetypal (*prōtotypou*) (viz., the ideas which creatures possess concerning God and divine things, taking form from that supreme knowledge and communicated to intelligent creatures, either by hypostatical union with the soul of Christ [whence arises “the theology of union”]; or by beatific vision to the angels and saints who walk by sight, not by faith, which is called “the theology of vision”; or by revelation, which is made to travellers

[viz., to those who have not yet reached the goal and is called "the theology of revelation"] or the stadium).

VII. Second, the theology of revelation is again divided into natural and supernatural. The natural, occupied with that which may be known of God (*to gnōston tou Theou*), is both innate (from the common notions implanted in each one) and acquired (which creatures gain discursively). This was exquisite in Adam before his fall, but is highly disordered in corrupted man. The supernatural (which transcends our reason and is communicated to us by God by the new light of grace so that we may obtain the enjoyment of the highest good, which was revealed to the patriarchs before as well as after the flood, and through Moses delivered by God to the people of Israel, and is called the Old Testament or the New Testament, which is called by way of eminence "Christian" because it has Christ for its author and object) is from Christ (Jn. 1:18) and speaks of him (Acts 1:1; 1 Cor. 2:2). It is strictly called "revealed" because its first principle is divine revelation strictly taken and made through the word, not through creatures.

VIII. Supernatural theology may be considered either systematically, as denoting the system of saving doctrine concerning God and divine things drawn from the Scriptures (the doctrines with their subdivisions being arranged in a certain order which is called both abstractive and objective); or habitually and after the manner of a habit residing in the intellect, and is called "concretive" and "subjective." Again, habitual theology is either the habit of principles (by which each believer perceives things foreign to and remote from reason) or the habit of conclusions (by which from principles known by the light of faith we unfold and confirm the saving doctrine).

IX. As there is a threefold school of God (that of nature, grace and glory), and a threefold book (of the creature, of Scripture and of life), so theology has usually been divided into three parts: the first of which is natural, the second supernatural and the third beatific; the first from the light of reason, the second from the light of faith, the third from the light of glory. The first belongs to men in the world, the second to believers in the church and the last to the saints in heaven.

The unity of theology. X. Although theology treats diverse things and those pertaining to different sciences, it does not cease to be one because it considers them under the same formal aspect, inasmuch as they are divine things revealed to us by the word of God. Now unity of doctrine depends upon the unity of the object considered not materially, but formally. Hence if other sciences discuss various things contained in theology, they do not handle them in the same manner or under the same formal aspect. For theology discusses them as they are revealed to us by the word of God. Again, it considers them in relation to remote causes (viz., the first efficient from which they flow and the ultimate end to which they are referred) and not however in relation to the proximate causes; and according to supernatural, not natural accidents.

XI. It is one thing for theology to be one as to substance and kind of doctrine; quite another to be one as to manner of treatment. In the latter sense, it can be called "multiple" according to the various modes of teaching (*paideias tropon*). Thus it is divided into didactic, problematic, elenctic, casuistic, etc. But in the former sense it neither is nor can be multiplex because it always contains one and the same kind of doctrine.

XII. Hence it is evident that it can differ as to more and less in relation to the different degrees of revelation (as it was more obscure under the Old Testament or clearer under the New); either more perfect or imperfect with regard to the subjects. But it does not follow that it differs as to kind because the same substance of doctrine is retained in both, Christ being the same yesterday, today and forever (Heb. 13:8).

XIII. Theology does not lose its unity although it may be called partly theoretical, partly practical. Any science is called one not by a simple and absolute unity (that is, a numerical and individual as if it were one and a simple quality like whiteness in a wall), but by an aggregative unity which is termed the unity of collection (inasmuch as many special habits are brought together and arranged so as to make up one total habit of science). Thus the image of God is one although it embraces newness of mind and of the affections; and free will is one, although it resides in the intellect and will.

THIRD QUESTION

Whether natural theology may be granted.

Statement of the question.

I. The question does not concern theology in general, but natural theology in particular. Nor does it concern this as it was in Adam before the fall (for that it was in him is sufficiently evident from the image of God after which he was made); rather it concerns this as it remained after the fall.

II. The question is not whether natural theology (which is such by act as soon as a man is born, as the act of life in one living or of sense in one perceiving as soon as he breathes) may be granted. For it is certain that no actual knowledge is born with us and that, in this respect, man is like a smooth tablet (*tabulae rasae*). Rather the question is whether such can be granted at least with regard to principle and potency; or whether such a natural faculty implanted in man may be granted as will put forth its strength of its own accord, and spontaneously in all adults endowed with reason, which embraces not only the capability of understanding, but also the natural first principles of knowledge from which conclusions both theoretical and practical are deduced (which we maintain).

III. The question is not whether this knowledge is perfect and saving (for we confess that after the entrance of sin it was so much obscured as to be rendered altogether insufficient for salvation), but only whether any knowledge of God remains in man sufficient to lead him to believe that God exists and must be religiously worshipped.

IV. Our controversy here is with the Socinians who deny the existence of any such natural theology or knowledge of God and hold that what may appear to be such has flowed partly from tradition handed down from Adam, and partly from revelations made at different times (Faustus Socinus, *Praelectiones theologicae* 2 [1627], pp. 3-7; Christopher Ostorodt, *Unterrichtung . . . hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion* 3 [1612], pp. 23-28). The orthodox, on the contrary, uniformly teach that there is a natural theology, partly innate (derived from the book of conscience by means of common notions [*koinas ennoias*]) and partly acquired (drawn from the book of creatures discursively). And they prove it by the following arguments.

**Natural theology
is proved by
Rom. 2:14.**

V. We find in man a natural law written upon each one's conscience excusing and accusing them in good and bad actions, which therefore necessarily implies the knowledge of God, the legislator, by whose authority it binds men to obedience and proposes rewards or punishments.

"The Gentiles, which have not the law" (i.e., the law of Moses) "do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another" (Rom. 2:14, 15). This could not be said if conscience did not dictate to each one that there is a deity who approves of good actions and disapproves and punishes evil deeds. Nor are these objections of force: (1) the work of the law and not the law itself is said to be inscribed because with the apostle these are synonymous—"to be a law unto themselves" (v. 14) and "to have the work of the law written in their hearts" (v. 15). Also the nature of the thing proves it because such a work of the law is meant by whose instinct man not only distinguishes between good and evil, but is prompted to perform the one and avoid the other. (2) The law is not said to be innate but inscribed (i.e., known), as the law of Moses was made known to the Jews by revelation. For the inscription implies a natural revelation of that law to the conscience opposed to the external revelation made to the Jews by the writing upon stony tables. Hence it is expressed by the conscience which exerts itself both in observation (*syntērēsei*) and in consciousness (*syneidēsei*) (v. 15).

VI. God has given to man both an innate and acquired knowledge of himself as the following passages prove: Ps. 19:1; Acts 14:15-17; 17:23; Rom. 1:19, 20. Nor can the bold corruption of Socinus be tolerated who refers the words of Paul to the second creation made by Christ, as if the apostle meant to say that the things which had been invisible and unknown to men even from the creation were now clearly seen and understood by the works of God and divine men (viz., of Christ and his apostles). For the words of Paul and the entire context loudly declare that he speaks of the first creation (as he wishes to prove that the wicked against whom the wrath of God is revealed from heaven [v. 18] hold the truth in unrighteousness, viz., the true notions of God contained in the natural revelation, which is shown by v. 19 where he says "that which may be known of God is manifest in them [*en autois*], for God hath shewed it unto them"—partly in their hearts and partly in the works of creation). (2) The design of Paul teaches the same things. He wants to demonstrate that neither the Gentiles by nature (chap. 1) nor the Jews by the law (chap. 2) could be justified (because all are sinners), but only by the gospel revealed by Christ. (3) *Poiēmata* here cannot be applied to the miracles performed by the apostles because they are never so called in Scripture, nor were they known to the Gentiles of whom he speaks. *Poiēmata* refers to the works of the creation of the world because the invisible things of God are said to be made manifest in them from the creation of the world (*apo ktiseōs kosmou*).

**From universal
experience.**

VII. Universal experience confirms it. For what is commonly and immutably in all men without exception must be in them naturally because natural things agree in all and are immutable. But the knowledge of the deity is immutably in all because there is no nation so barbarous upon whom this persuasion of deity does not rest (Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.23 [Loeb, 19:61]). So

that rather than have no god, they have worshipped almost anything, even the filthy Devil himself. And none have been able to shake off this impression, the fear of God still returning (especially in adversity), although for a time they may seem to have divested themselves of it.

**By the institution
of religions.**

VIII. The institution of religions in the world most clearly proves natural theology. For whence that hidden propensity of men towards religion which induced Plato to call man the most religious animal (*zōon theosebestaton*, *Timaeus* 41 [Loeb, 9:90-91]), unless from the sense of a deity whom they ought to worship. Nor would the people have been disposed to embrace idolatry even in its most shocking forms and to receive so readily false and counterfeit religions which impostors by political contrivance devised to keep men under subjection, unless they had been impelled by some natural instinct to religion and the worship of some deity. Nor can it be said that the Gentiles did this not so much by instinct as by imitation. If there had been no natural instinct, man (a creature of glory) would never have bowed down to the most debased creatures, that he might not be thought to be destitute of any sense of deity; nor could what arises only from imitation be so common and universal.

**Sources of
solution.**

IX. Although there may be some nations so savage as to appear to have no sense of deity, yet they are not destitute of all knowledge of him. There can indeed be barren seeds of religion lying dormant in them (on account of their gross blindness and lust) by which they seem to resemble beasts and brutes, but yet they do remain in them (as in the Americans and Brazilians adduced here by Socinus). Although Jean de Lery (of Burgundy) observes that no gods are acknowledged among them, yet he not obscurely intimates that there are traces of the deity in them, when he informs us that they have their caribs or priests whom they believe to be able to impart warlike bravery and to produce all fruits from the earth; by their supposed intercourse with spirits; and by their holding that the souls of the virtuous (after flying over lofty mountains) would lead a joyful life with perpetual delights in the most pleasant gardens, while, on the contrary, those of the wicked would be snatched away to Stigna [Aygnan] (their name for the Devil) and live with him in eternal torments (*History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil* 16 [ed. J. Whately, 1990], p. 136). The same author in *Historia Navigationis in Brasiliam* 6+ (1594) narrates that the supreme being of the Mexicans is Hoizili Pochtli. Joseph Acosta (*Natural and Moral History of the Indies* 5.3* [ed. C. R. Markham, 1880], 2:301) says that the Peruvians have their gods, and among them their Piracocha whom they call Pachacamak, creator of heaven and earth. Similar accounts occur in Girolamo Benzoni (*History of the New World* [trans. W.H. Smyth, 1857]) and Bartolo de las Casas and others.

X. It is not repugnant that one and the same thing in a different relation should both be known by the light of nature and believed by the light of faith; as what is gathered from the one only obscurely, may be held more certainly from the other. Thus we know that God is, both from nature and from faith (Heb. 11*:6); from the former obscurely, but from the latter more surely. The special knowledge of true faith (by which believers please God and have access to him, of which Paul speaks) does not exclude, but supposes the general knowledge from nature.

XI. The mind of man is a *tabula rasa* not absolutely, but relatively as to discursion and dianoetical knowledge (which is acquired necessarily by inferring one thing from another); but not as to apprehensive and intuitive knowledge. For even according to Paul, the work of the law is in such a manner written in the hearts of the Gentiles that they do by nature the things contained in the law. Hence is a twofold inscription upon the heart of man: the one of God in the remains of his image and the natural law; the other of the Devil by sin.

XII. What is natural, subjectively and constitutively, always exists in the same manner, but not what is such qualitatively and consecutively (for qualities admit of increase and diminution). Natural theology is so called not in the first, but in the second sense. Hence it is not surprising that it should vary as to degree in relation to its subjects, who differ in intellectual acumen.

XIII. Although we do not deny that natural theology depends also upon the institution of men, yet certainly that mode would have been insufficient, if the natural knowledge of God (both innate and acquired) had not been supplied.

XIV. Although the knowledge of God is natural, it does not follow that no mortal can deny his existence. For if any have denied him, they have done so not so much through ignorance as through perverseness, their own consciences convicting them (as David testifies of the atheists who poured contempt upon the people of God [Ps. 14:4, 5], and Paul asserts of philosophers [Rom. 1:18, 19], teaching that they held the truth [viz., the true notions of God] in unrighteousness). Therefore the reason for the denial was not so much an absolute ignorance of God as their corruption and wickedness choking the implanted knowledge and all but destroying it in order that they might sin more freely.

FOURTH QUESTION

Is natural theology sufficient for salvation; or is there a common religion by which all promiscuously may be saved? We deny against the Socinians and Remonstrants.

Occasion of the question.

I. The impious doctrine of the Pelagians that everyone well grounded in whatsoever religion will be saved gave occasion to this question. Not only the Libertines, David-Jorists and the like (who, content with an honest and civil life, hold religion to be a matter of indifference) retain it, but also the Socinians of the present day approve it. They do this in part directly, teaching that those who worship God according to the light of nature as a kind of more hidden word, appease and are pleasing to him and find him their rewarder (Socinus, *Praelectiones theologicae* 2 [1627], pp. 3-7); in part indirectly and obliquely, reducing the doctrines of religion absolutely necessary to salvation to the very lowest number and making these common to all in their mode and degree (of which hereafter). The Remonstrants evidently agree with them: some more openly as Curcellaeus and Adolphus Venator (Adolf de Jager) who, in his defense against the ministers of Dort (cf. *Een besonder Tractaet . . . der Predicanten der Stadt Dordrecht* [1612]), expressly denies the proposition "no one can be saved who is not placed in Christ by true faith"; others more cautiously, as Arminius, Corvinus, Episcopius (who, not immediately indeed, but mediately), admit the Gentiles and others to salvation, holding that by a right use of the light of nature, the light of grace can

be obtained and by grace admission to glory (Arminius, "The Apology or Defence of James Arminius Against Certain Theological Articles," 15, 16, 17 in *The Writings of James Arminius* [1956], 1:322-29; and Arnoldus [Johannes Arnoldus Corvinus], *Defensio sententiae . . . I. Arminii* [1613] against Tilenus). Many of the papists hold the same error, scrupling not to defend the salvation of the heathen without the knowledge of Christ; as Abulensis, Durandus, Capreolus, Andradius, Vega, Soto, Erasmus and others.

II. On the other hand, the orthodox constantly maintain that the theology or true religion by which salvation can come to man after the fall is only one (i.e., that revealed in the word of the law and gospel), and that all other religions except this one are either impious and idolatrous or false and erroneous. Although retaining some obscure and imperfect notions of the law and that which may be known of God (*tou gnōstou Theou*), yet these false and erroneous religions are of no further use than to render men inexcusable (*anapologēton*).

III. The question is not Are the certain first principles of religion common to all men? For we grant that in natural theology by the light of nature some such do exist upon which supernatural theology is built (for example, that there is a God, that he must be worshipped, etc.). Rather the question is Are first principles (adequate and proper to true religion) held among all? This we deny.

Statement of the question.

IV. The question is not whether natural theology is useful to men, for we acknowledge its various ends and uses: (1) as a witness of the goodness of God towards sinners unworthy even of these remains of light (Acts 14:16, 17; Jn. 1:5); (2) as a bond of external discipline among men to prevent the world from becoming utterly corrupt (Rom. 2:14, 15); (3) as a subjective condition in man for the admission of the light of grace because God does not appeal to brutes and stocks, but to rational creatures; (4) as an incitement to the search for this more illustrious revelation (Acts 14:27); (5) to render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20) both in this life, in the judgment of an accusing conscience (Rom. 2:15) and, in the future life, in the judgment which God shall judge concerning the secrets of men (Rom. 2:16). Rather the question is Is it by itself sufficient for salvation, and was the design of God in that revelation the salvation of those to whom it is made? This we deny.

Proof that natural theology is insufficient to salvation.

V. The reasons are various. (1) There can be no saving religion without Christ and faith in him (Jn. 3:16; 17:3; Acts 4:11, 12; 1 Cor. 3:11; Heb. 11:6). But Christ is revealed nowhere except in the gospel; nor is faith given without the word, since it comes by hearing (Rom. 10:17). Nor is it a valid objection that it merely follows from this that the Christian religion is the only ordinary way of salvation, and not that God could not extraordinarily grant salvation to those who might live in a holy manner according to the law of nature, although they had never heard of Christ. For since the Scriptures testify that Christ is the only way of salvation (without whom no one can come to the Father), it is criminal to suppose an extraordinary way without him. (2) The state of the Gentiles and all those destitute of the word of Christ is called the "time of ignorance" (Acts 17:30), when God as it were winked at them, suffering them to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16), and when they worshipped the unknown God (Acts 17:23) and were without God

(Eph. 2:12) in the world (which could not be said if the natural revelation was sufficient for salvation). (3) If salvation could have been obtained by a common religion, there would have been no need of the gospel and the preaching of the word. However Paul testifies, "After that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching [i.e., by the word of the gospel which is foolishness to the wicked] to save them that believe" (1 Cor. 1:21).

Sources of solution.

VI. It is one thing to allow some knowledge of God as Creator and preserver however imperfect, corrupt and obscure; another to have a full, entire and clear knowledge of God as Redeemer and of the lawful worship due to him. Natural theology has the former in that which may be known of God (*gnōstō tou Theou*). Revelation alone has the latter in the faith (*tō pistō*) which is gained only from the word. Nor (if God has not left himself without witness [*amartyron*] in nature by doing good to men as to temporal things [*ta biotika*, Acts 14:17] which he often bestows upon those whom he hates and has devoted to destruction) does it follow that the external calling is objectively sufficient for salvation because it is said "he suffered the nations to walk in their own ways" (v. 16) and it is called that "time of ignorance" (Acts 17:30, referring plainly to a defect in the external calling because he opposes it to the time of the New Testament in which he calls men to repentance by the word).

VII. It is one thing to seek the favor and grace of God revealed through his word in virtue of his promises in Christ; another to seek an unknown god in the works of nature and providence, if haply by feeling after they may find him. The latter is properly applied to the Gentiles (Acts 17:26, 27), but not the former. Nor (if elsewhere in the Scriptures the phrase "to seek God" signifies to fly to his faith and to seek the guardianship of his grace, and "to find him" denotes to obtain the protection sought and to experience the propitious presence of his most holy deity) does it follow that it must be understood in the same sense here; both because the objects are different and the manner of seeking manifestly so. The other passages adduced refer to the covenanted people of God, but this only to those who were strangers from the covenants of promise. The former to those who knew God by the word and detested idols; the latter to idolators ignorant of God. The former to seeking and finding God known favorably through Christ; the latter to seeking an unknown God through the works of nature and providence so that he might be known and be distinguished from idols. Finally, in the former it is simply and absolutely said that believers ought to seek God that they may find him for salvation, but in this that God had given in the creation and government of the world such proofs of his power and divinity as that by them they might be induced to seek the Creator of all things in that manner (viz., if by "feeling after" they might find him). No one will say this applies to those saints mentioned in the Old Testament who were accustomed to approach him relying on his most sure promises in Christ.

VIII. Rom. 1:19, 20 (concerning that which may be known of God, *gnōstō tou Theou*) does not favor a common religion by which all may be saved and which is sufficient for salvation. (1) Only that which may be known (*gnōstō*) is there spoken of and not that which is to be believed (*pistō*), which alone is saving. (2) Paul says the knowledge (*to gnōston*) of God is manifest in the Gentiles, but not

all knowledge (*pan gnōston*) (viz., what may be learned from the book of nature, but not all that may be known of him from his word and which must be known in order to salvation, such as the mystery of the Trinity, and of Christ the Redeemer, etc.). (3) This knowledge (*gnōston*) which is restricted by the apostle to his "power and godhead" (i.e., to the knowledge of his existence and of those attributes which strike our senses in the works of creation and providence) is usually referred to natural theology; but is not extended to the knowledge of his will and mercy in Christ which can be derived only from his word, and not at all from his works and without which there can be no salvation. (4) This knowledge (*gnōston*) is only such as to render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20). Nor should the words *eis* to here be understood only eventually to denote that the thing turns out so accidentally, but also intentionally as to the purpose of God because this event must have been intended by him since it refers to a work which he performed by his decree, not to that which he commands only by the law.

IX. That which is sufficient to render inexcusable does not therefore suffice for salvation if used properly; for more things are requisite for the obtainment of salvation than for incurring damnation justly and without excuse (*anapologetōs*). For evil arises from some defect, but the good requires a whole cause. For example, he who offends in one point is guilty of all (Jam. 2:10); but not, therefore, he who does well in one point is just in all. The commission of one sin can render a man inexcusable, but the performance of one good work is not sufficient to save him. Thus the Gentiles were inexcusable because they substituted gods without number in place of that one God whom they could know from the light of nature; but we cannot infer from this that the knowledge of the one God is sufficient absolutely for salvation. Thus this inexcusableness must be restricted to the subject matter of which the apostle treats (viz., to idolatry), which was sufficient for their condemnation, although the avoidance of it would not suffice for their salvation.

X. It is one thing for a man to be excusable or excused; another to be savable or saved, if he is excusable only from a part and not from the whole (which would be the case with the heathen if they would use aright the light of nature, which is impossible). Although they might properly regulate their external actions by abstaining from subsequent sins, still they could not obtain the pardon of previous and especially of original sin, and change their corrupt state and nature. For the actions which they would perform would be only external and good as to substance, not also as to the manner and source (being destitute of the Holy Spirit); and, if profitable, would be so only as to the present or future, but not as to the past in removing former guilt (without which, however, no one can be saved).

XI. It is falsely asserted that in that which may be known of God (*gnōstō tou Theou*) there is given objectively a revelation of grace, and a Redeemer sufficient for salvation, if not clear and explicit, at least obscure and implied, inasmuch as in it God is known as merciful and therefore, in a certain although confused manner, as a Redeemer who will accept a satisfaction, may call to repentance and promise remission of sin. For in the first place, to be able to know God as merciful by a general mercy tending to some temporal good and the delay of punishment is far different from being able to know him as merciful by a mercy special and saving in Christ after a satisfaction has been made. To be able to know him as placable and benign is different from being able to know him as actually

appeased or certainly to be appeased. We grant that the heathen could have the former from the light of nature, but not the latter which nevertheless is necessarily required to tranquilize the conscience. For what advantage would there be in knowing that God could be appeased unless it was evident that he was willing to be appeased and the means of such a propitiation were well ascertained? For when the conscience is weighed down by the guilt of sin and a sense of the divine justice, it could never be tranquilized unless both the goodwill of God, and the manner of satisfying his justice became known. Now who will say that this could be derived from the book of nature where God manifests himself only as the Creator and preserver? On the contrary, who does not confess that it can be sought for only in the word of the gospel, which reveals to us the mercy of God in Christ? Otherwise why should Paul call this a mystery which was kept secret since the world began (Rom. 16:25)? Why should he say that the Gentiles were strangers from the covenants and without Christ (Eph. 2:12), if they had always been in some manner under the covenant of grace and professed a certain (although a confused and implied) knowledge of saving mercy in Christ?

XII. No better do they disentangle themselves who seek another incrustation and distinguish between a mediate and an immediate sufficiency. As if the Gentiles who could not have a revelation immediately sufficient might yet have one mediately sufficient, inasmuch as they suppose that if anyone had made a good use of the light of nature, God would have superadded the light of grace (since this is agreeable to his mercy and can be gathered from the saying of Christ, "Whosoever hath, to him shall be given," Mt. 13:12*). For besides the absurdity of calling a revelation sufficient which requires another additional revelation (in which sense we strongly ridicule the opinion of the papists who maintain that the Scriptures may be called mediately sufficient because, although they do not contain all things, they refer us to tradition from which they can be gained), the very thing to be proved is here taken for granted— that God would superadd the light of grace to one making a good use of the light of nature as if he had bound himself to anyone or owed something to man, or as if this connection could be proved from some passage of Scripture. Indeed this seems to have been drawn from the fountains of Pelagians who held that "God would not withhold grace from one who did what he could." Mt. 13:12* cannot be adduced here because it refers to the gifts of grace which God is accustomed to crown with new gifts, not to the gifts of nature.

XIII. Rom. 2:4 (*to chrēston tou Theou eis metanoian agein*, "the goodness of God leadeth to repentance") does not apply here because Paul is not speaking of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, whom in this chapter he wishes to convict of sin, as in chapter 1 he had proved the Gentiles to be guilty. This appears: (1) from the things which he attributes to the person addressed which properly belong to none but a Jew, as that he judges others in those things which he does himself, etc.; (2) from v. 17, where he mentions the Jew by name as the very man with whom he speaks, "behold, thou art called a Jew." These words are not the beginning of a new discourse to a person different from the preceding, but the continuation of the former discourse with a clearer designation of the person. Therefore the goodness (*chrēstotēs*) here spoken of denotes the revelation made to the Jews and the benefits bestowed upon them, and has no reference to the works of general providence.

XIV. Although the conscience of the Gentiles may be said to excuse them sometimes (Rom. 2:14, 15), it does not follow that they can, in that state, enjoy true and solid peace, and the perfect salvation which follows it. It is one thing to excuse in some things or from a part, which it does; another, to excuse in everything and from the whole, which it cannot possibly do. It is also one thing to excuse from the more serious crimes (comparatively to others more iniquitous), and quite another to bestow upon us that sure and lasting peace flowing from a sense of the love of God and of our reconciliation with him, which the Gentiles do not have.

XV. A difference exists between a furnished and destitute state. The one is of the law considered in itself and its own nature; the other, in relation to us. The law was given to man in the beginning (before the fall) for life and by itself also led to life according to the sanction "do this and thou shalt live" (cf. Rom. 2:13). But after the fall, being destitute of strength through the flesh, it is not given for life, but for a mirror of sin and misery to render the sinner inexcusable (Rom. 3:19, 20).

XVI. The work of the law is used in two senses: either formally for that which the law itself does; or imperatively for that which it enjoins upon man. The former is the work or duty of the law with regard to men in teaching, promising, forbidding and threatening. The latter is the work of man in reference to the law. The former is the proposition and revelation of the law; the latter its observance and fulfillment. The Gentiles are said to do the things "contained in the law" (Rom. 2:14) not in the latter, but in the former sense; not by complying with the law's demands, but by doing what the law itself does—prescribing the good and forbidding the bad. This is evident: (1) from the general scope of Paul which is to prove that the Gentiles are exposed to death by the natural law even without the written law; (2) from the exegetical (*exēgētika*) words which follow because these, "having not the law" are "a law unto themselves." Therefore to do the things contained in the law is equivalent to being a law unto themselves.

XVII. Although some of the heathen (comparatively considered and in relation to each other) may have been better than others; although their works civilly and morally speaking may be called virtues, and so followed by the double reward of a well-regulated life, both positive (as productive of some temporal good and peace of conscience in this world) and negative (as making their punishment more tolerable), nevertheless (theologically speaking and relatively to God) their works best in form were nothing else than more splendid sins and in the sight of God worthy of no reward.

XVIII. The examples of Melchizedek, Job, the centurion and the like adduced here are not to the point because they all did the things for which they are praised in the Scriptures by the aid of special grace and revelation, not by the mere light of nature.

XIX. Although a Gentile by birth, Cornelius, was yet a proselyte by religion. Although he could not believe that the Messiah had come and was that Jesus whom Peter preached, yet he could believe with the Jews from the oracles of the prophets that he would come. Thus he is not to be reckoned among the Gentiles, but among the patriarchs who looked for salvation from a Redeemer not yet manifested. Hence by the advent of Peter, he did not receive a beginning, but an increase of faith.

XX. The two articles mentioned in Heb. 11:6 must not be understood physically, as if they could be perceived by the light of reason, but hyperphysically and theologically, to denote their manifestation to us by a saving knowledge, assuring us not only that God is, and is the omnipotent Creator of all things, but who he is (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), and after the fall a Redeemer and a rewarder not only of those seeking him legally by merit, but of those seeking him by grace evangelically through faith in the Mediator. The following arguments prove that this is the meaning of the apostle: (1) the adjunct of saving faith, which he sets forth throughout the whole chapter; (2) the examples of the saints mentioned there, so that the faith in God of which the apostle speaks is not the general knowledge of God diffusing his goodness in any way, but the knowledge of the true God bestowing heavenly blessings on account of Christ. By "approaching to God" the apostle means nothing else than to obtain communion with him in Christ (as everywhere else in the same epistle, Heb. 4:16; 7:25; 10:22). Hence Curcellaeus makes a false distinction between faith in God and faith in Christ, making the former absolutely necessary to salvation, the latter so only after a divine revelation. For no faith in God can be true and saving which is not connected with faith in Christ (Jn. 14:1), since we cannot believe in God except through Christ.

XXI. We do not deny that some of the fathers cherished a hope of the salvation of those Gentiles and philosophers who regulated their lives in accordance with reason (as Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 6.5, 17 [ANF 2:490, 517-18; PG 9.264, 392]; Justin Martyr, *First* Apology* 46 [FC 6:83-84; PG 6.397]; John Chrysostom, "Sermon 36 [37]," *Homilies on the Gospel of Matthew* [NPNF1, 10:241; PG 57.416] and others cited by Isaac Casaubon, *De rebus sacris et . . . exercitationes . . . Baronii* 1* [1614], pp. 2-4). But the error of those who could speak more safely before the rise of Pelagianism is less to be wondered at than that of many of the Scholastics who struck upon the same rock, after the strong defense of the necessity of grace in Christ made by Augustine and his followers.

XXII. Zwingli assigned a place in heaven to Hercules, Theseus, Numa, Aristides, Socrates and similar distinguished men ("A Short and Clear Exposition of the Christian Faith," 12 in *On Providence and Other Essays: Ulrich Zwingli* [1922/1983], p. 272). In this work (after mentioning the saints of the Old and New Testament in his description of the heavenly hosts), he adds, "Here you will see Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Numa, etc. Here you will see your predecessors and as many of your ancestors as have departed this life in faith." Besides not being approved by us, it is certain that he erred rather in fact than in right, not as if he thought the gate of salvation stood open without Christ and faith, but because he hoped that divine mercy had (in a manner hidden from us, but known to himself) wrought faith in some of those whom he had so illustriously endowed with heroic virtues. This is evident from his speaking expressly of those who departed in faith, which ought not to be restricted to the ancestors of the king, but extended to all those of whom he had just spoken. That this was his opinion, we gather from his declaration concerning original sin to Urbanus Rhegius where, after saying that they erred who adjudged to condemnation all whom we call Gentiles, he adds, "Who knows how much faith the hand of God had written

upon each of their hearts?" (*De peccato originali declaratio, ad Urbanum Rhegium* [1526], CR 92.379).

XXIII. The various sacrifices of the Gentiles do not prove that they had a knowledge of God's mercy in Christ. For they were not offered so much to obtain his saving grace (which cannot become known to man without a revelation since its exercise is altogether free) as to appease his justice (which is known by nature and its exercise necessary).

FIFTH QUESTION: THE OBJECT OF THEOLOGY

Are God and divine things the objects of theology? We affirm.

The object of theology.

I. The object of any science is everything specially treated of in it, and to which all its conclusions relate; but it may be viewed either materially (as to the thing considered) or formally (as to the mode of considering).

God and divine things.

II. Although theologians differ as to the object of theology, the more common and true opinion is that of those who refer it to God and divine things (God as the primary and divine things the secondary, whether done

by God or to be believed and done by men), i.e., God directly and indirectly (viz., God and the things of him [as his works] and subject to him [as creatures] and tending to him [as the duties of man]). Thus that all things are discussed in theology either because they deal with God himself or have a relation (*schesis*) to him as the first principle and ultimate end.

III. That God is the object of theology is evident both from the very name (*theologias* and *theosebeias*), and from Scripture which recognizes no other principal object. It is also evident from the conditions of an object which are found in him. (1) It must be something uncompounded. (2) Certain things may be predicated of it denominatively, such as affections and properties. (3) Everything belonging to the system should have a relation to it for God is an uncompounded and most simple being. Certain things are predicated of him denominatively such as his attributes. To him all things are referred and have the relation of origin, preservation and dependence.

God as revealed and covenanted.

IV. But when God is set forth as the object of theology, he is not to be regarded simply as God in himself (for thus he is incomprehensible [*akatalēptos*] to us), but as revealed and as he has been pleased to manifest himself

to us in his word, so that divine revelation is the formal relation which comes to be considered in this object. Nor is he to be considered exclusively under the relation of deity (according to the opinion of Thomas Aquinas and many Scholastics after him, for in this manner the knowledge of him could not be saving but deadly to sinners), but as he is our God (i.e., covenanted in Christ as he has revealed himself to us in his word not only as the object of knowledge, but also of worship). True religion (which theology teaches) consists of these two things.

**Sources of
solution.**

V. The unity of a science and its distinction from any other is not always taken from the unity of the material object (or thing considered), but from the unity of the formal object (or mode of considering). Although physics, ethics and medicine treat of the same subject, they do not cease to be distinct sciences because they consider man in different relations: physics as a species of natural body; ethics as capacious of virtue and happiness; medicine as curable from diseases and restorable to health. Thus although theology treats of the same things with metaphysics, physics and ethics, yet the mode of considering is far different. It treats of God not like metaphysics as a being or as he can be known from the light of nature, but as the Creator and Redeemer made known by revelation. It treats of creatures not as things of nature, but of God (i.e., as holding a relation and order to God as their Creator, preserver and Redeemer) and that too according to the revelation made by him. This mode of considering, the other sciences either do not know or do not assume.

VI. Theology labors to prove the existence of God not from a primary and proper intention, but, as it were, incidentally from an adventitious necessity (viz., for the purpose of confuting the profane and atheists who without shame and with seared consciences deny it). (2) The axiom—"science does not prove its subject, but takes it for granted"—is true in human and inferior sciences, but not in theology. Theology is of a higher order for it extends itself to the proof of all things which can be proved by the means peculiar to itself (viz., by divine revelation). It does this, not instrumentally, but authoritatively.

VII. It is not necessary for the habit of a science so to comprehend its object as to have a perfect knowledge of whatever belongs to it. It is sufficient if it knows many things concerning it and can draw deductions from its principles. Therefore, a science need not necessarily be equal to its subject by an exact and arithmetical equality. It suffices if it is equal according to some proportion of equality which is found in theology. For theology treats of God and his infinite perfections, not as knowing them in an infinite but in a finite manner; nor absolutely as much as they can be known in themselves, but as much as he has been pleased to reveal them. So theology may be properly said to equal its object according to the formal relation of revelation, not by equalling God himself, but only the revelation given by him.

VIII. The common saying—"science is not of particulars, but of universals"—must be received with limitation. For metaphysics, physics, etc. are sciences and yet they treat not the less on that account of singulars, of God and the world. Therefore the axiom must be understood as singulars composed of matter and constituted under the lowest species. For if theology treats of such (as of Adam, Noah and others), it does this not principally, but only to unfold the origin of things or for an example of life and a testimony to divine providence (and therefore on account of general causes). But if any singular, immaterial and in the pure act is presented, science can undoubtedly appropriate it because being is an object of intellect. Therefore the more perfect a being is, the more can he be known and apprehended; and he is the more perfect, the more he is in act and the less in potency. God can with great propriety be reckoned among universals for he is universal in causation, since he is the universal cause of all things also in predication; not indeed directly, but indirectly for though all things are not God,

they are nevertheless of God, or to or from him. Accordingly every relation of universality is not wanting in this part in the subject of theology.

IX. In the lower sciences, the principles differ from the subject as demonstrating the qualities and properties of the subject by proper principles because as the subject of every human science is of a finite essence and power, there must necessarily be certain principles from which it may flow or be constituted. But in theology (which is of a higher order), the subject is truly divine and infinite in nature and potency, and accordingly before everything, so that it can have no relation of dependence. Hence, by reason of this infinity, it contains at the same time these two relations: it is both the subject concerning which theology treats and also at the same time its principle.

X. Theology treats of sin not as belonging to God, but as holding a certain relation (*schesis*) to him (either that of opposite and contrary or as coming under his providence and justice); just as medicine treats of diseases and their remedies although its principal subject is man as curable.

SIXTH QUESTION: THE GENUS OF THEOLOGY

What is the genus of theology?

The genus of systematic theology.

I. Theology may be considered either systematically and objectively (with regard to that which is taught) or habitually and subjectively (with reference to a habit residing in the intellect). In the first sense, no other genus than doctrine can be more accurately assigned to it because it is taught by God and learned in the church. But doctrine (literally such) is far superior to every human doctrine, both in origin and matter and form and end. So it is described in Scripture by *didachēn* (Jn. 7:17; 1 Tim. 4:6; 6:3); by form of doctrine (*typon didachēs*, Rom. 6:17), as in the Old Testament *thvrvh* denotes the whole doctrine of salvation. In the latter sense, it is properly described by a certain habit of mind.

What habit should be assigned to it?

II. In order to understand better what habit of mind should be assigned to it, we remark that every habit of mind is either a habit of knowing or believing or supposing. These answer the three assents of the mind: the act of knowing, believing and supposing. For every assent of the mind is founded either upon testimony or reasoning. If upon testimony, it is faith; if upon reason sure and solid, it is knowledge; if upon reason only probable, it is opinion.

Whence arose the fivefold distinction of habits?

III. The habit of knowing, in contradistinction to that of believing and supposing, embraces the five intellectual habits enumerated by Aristotle—intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, prudence, art (*Nichomachaen Ethics* 6 [Loeb, 325-73]). It is then taken in a general sense for every kind of certain and evident habitual knowledge, whether of things necessary and speculative or contingent and practical. Now this fivefold distinction arises from the fivefold variety of objects about which the mind may be occupied. For it may be occupied with things necessary which

are either principles to which we at once give assent without demonstration (the knowledge of these is called "intelligence"); or conclusions to which we assent when demonstrated (which constitute knowledge); or conclusions connected with principles (which signify wisdom); or about contingent things which, again, are either things to be done (*prakta*, whose sole end is good conduct), *eupragian* (about which prudence is occupied), or things to be made (*poiēta*, which have for their end the production with which art is concerned).

It cannot be referred to any of the habits properly.

IV. None of the intellectual habits (treated in ethics and mutually contradistinguished) can constitute the true and proper genus of theology because they are all habits of knowing and theology is not a habit of knowing, but of believing. (2) They are natural habits, invented and improved by the ingenuity of men, while theology (whose principle is not human reason, but divine revelation) is supernatural and God-given (*theosdotos*). (3) They are all either theoretical or practical simply, while theology is of a mixed genus partly theoretical and partly practical.

V. As to the species, theology cannot be intelligence because this is only the knowledge of principles and not of conclusions. Theology is the knowledge of both. Again, the former is concerned with principles known by nature and clear by its own light, but theology is concerned with principles revealed in the word of God. It is not knowledge because it is not founded upon the evidence of reason, but only upon testimony. It does not rest in mere knowledge, but directs and ordains it to operation. It is not wisdom because all the parts of wisdom are denied it (viz., the intelligence of principles known per se and the knowledge of conclusions). It is not prudence because it relates not only to things to be done, but also to things to be believed and is a power directive of spiritual not civil actions. Finally, it is not art because it is not an effective habit belonging to those which are terminated out of the efficient on some work.

Still it embraces them all eminently.

VI. Although theology can properly and strictly receive its denomination from no one of these habits, yet it may well be said eminently to include them all. For inasmuch as it treats of God as the first cause, it is like wisdom. Inasmuch as it contains first principles, it is like intelligence. Inasmuch as it demonstrates conclusions, it is like knowledge. Inasmuch as it directs actions, it is like prudence. Inasmuch as it is edifying to the church, it is like art. Hence in Scripture these terms are promiscuously applied to it: "intelligence" (Ps. 119:34, 73*), "knowledge" (Ps. 119:66; Is. 5:13), "wisdom" (1 Cor. 2:6, 7), "prudence" (Ps. 119:98*). And frequently in the book of Proverbs (chaps. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), it is called "art" since the doctrine of faith is called a work and building upon which we ought to labor (1 Cor. 3:11; 2 Cor. 6:1).

Of all these, wisdom comes nearest to it.

VII. If any genus of these habits must be attributed to theology, wisdom is most analogous to it and approaches its nature the nearest. Not exactly in the Aristotelian sense because it does not differ much from intelligence and knowledge, but rather in the Stoical sense, as a collection of all habits, intellectual as well as moral (Stobae, Sermon 1, "De Virtute," *Ioannis Stobaei Sententiae* [1609], pp. 1-29). Hence Suidas says that wisdom is "the learning and the skillful use of contemplation, knowledge and recog-

nitio" (*hapantōn mathēsin kai tēn technēn kai phronēsin, kai epistēmēn kai noun, Suidae Lexicon: Graece et Latine* [repr. 1986], 4:835). Thus the doctrine of faith is often designated in Scripture by the name of "wisdom" (as in the book of Proverbs and 1 Cor. 2:6, 7). Reason also confirms this because: (1) Wisdom is the knowledge of things most excellent. Now theology treats of God and his works, and our eternal happiness (things important above all others). These it treats of in the most excellent manner, not according to reason but from divine revelation. (2) Wisdom is an architectonic system commanding and directing all others. Now this is most peculiar to theology, which is so far the arbiter and mistress of all sciences that it judges of them and cannot itself be judged by another. For all other systems must be referred to it as a standard, and whatever does not agree with theology must be rejected from them. So although it does not prescribe to other systems principles and objects, yet it so far rules over them (because it establishes their limits) that they neither dare to hold any object opposed to theology, nor to use their principles against it. And also with respect to the ultimate end (*viz.*, the glory of God) which although they do not immediately attain, yet they are bound to have such a direction.

VIII. If theology takes some things from other systems, it is not as an inferior from superiors, but as an superior from inferiors (as a mistress freely using her handmaids). Theology does not so much take from others, as presupposes certain previously known things upon which it builds revelation.

SEVENTH QUESTION

Is theology theoretical or practical?

Origin of the question.

I. The Scholastics first broached this question, among whom it was formerly agitated a great deal and for a long time. Some maintained that theology is simply speculative (as Henry of Ghent, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinarium*, Art. 8, Q. 3 [1520/1953], 1:fol. lxx; Durandus, "Prologi Sententiarum Quaestio Sexta," in *Sententias Theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum libri quatuor* [1556], pp. 9-10; Joannes Rada, *Controversiarum theologiarum* 3 [1620], pp. 62-93). Others maintained that it is simply practical, as Scotus and his followers. Others maintained that it is neither theoretical nor practical, but rather affective or dilective (*viz.*, higher than theoretical and practical systems) since its end is love, which does not come under practice (as Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Aegidius Romanus). Finally, others maintained that it is mixed (*viz.*, speculative and practical at the same time), but more speculative (as the Thomists) or more practical (as Thomas de Argentina).

II. The question is necessary not only for the understanding of the true nature of theology, but also on account of the controversies of this time; especially with the Socinians and Remonstrants who say that theology is so strictly practical that nothing in it is positively necessary to salvation, unless it is that which pertains to moral precepts and promises. Hence (resting in obedience to the precepts and confidence in the promises) they let go the whole of religion as to fundamentals, the knowledge of mysteries being excluded. Evidently their object is this: to take away the necessity of the knowledge of the doctrines of the Trinity, incarna-

tion, etc. and thus more easily to pave the way to a common religion (i.e., to atheism) by which all promiscuously may be saved. Among the orthodox, some hold it to be merely practical, more hold that it is of a mixed nature; but some hold that it is more speculative, others that it is more practical. We consider theology to be neither simply theoretical nor simply practical, but partly theoretical, partly practical, as that which at the same time connects the theory of the true with the practice of the good. Yet it is more practical than theoretical.

**Definition of a
theoretical and a
practical system.**

III. A theoretical system is that which is occupied in contemplation alone and has no other object than knowledge. A practical system is that which does not consist in the knowledge of a thing alone, but in its very nature and by itself goes forth into practice and has operation for its object. Again, knowledge can be directed to operation as an object in two ways: either absolutely and by itself or relatively and accidentally. That knowledge is by itself directed to practice which is referred to operation according to the nature of that system to which it belongs. The knowledge of ethics is practical because the nature of ethics demands that whatever things are treated of in it should be referred to operation and use. That knowledge is accidentally referred to operation which is not practical according to the nature of the system to which it belongs, but only with regard to the end which he who is possessed of this knowledge proposes to himself. Thus physics is practical accidentally, when he who is furnished with this knowledge directs it to operation and use. Theology is called practical in the former and not in the latter sense.

IV. A science practical per se is not only that which is concerned with an operable thing and is regulative and directive of some operation. Otherwise that part of medicine which considers the parts of the human body and their diseases (and the signs and causes of diseases) would be speculative and not practical, which is absurd. For the ultimate and principal object of that branch of medicine is not the knowledge but the cure of diseases. Also that which is either impulsive to operation (as the knowledge of the good or evil consequences which follow virtue or vice), impels to right actions or is prerequisite to a better operation and action, as pathology (*pathologikē*) in medicine. Theology is called practical not only in the first sense, but also in the second and third. There is no mystery proposed to our contemplation as an object of faith which does not excite us to the worship of God or which is not prerequisite for its proper performance.

V. The arguments which prove that theology is either theoretical or practical (if they are understood exclusively of one or the other) fail and restrict it too much, but if they are understood inclusively are equally true. Theology is not of a simple kind (i.e., either only theoretical or only practical) as physics and ethics in philosophy, but of a mixed kind including both relations (*schesis*).

**Theology is
theoretico-
practical.**

VI. That theology is mixed (i.e., partly theoretical and partly practical) the following proofs may be given. (1) The object to be known and worshipped as the first truth and the highest good is God. (2) Man is the subject to be made perfect in the knowledge of the truth (by which his understanding may be enlightened), and in the love of good (by which the will may be adorned); in faith (which is extended to the credible [*pista*]); and in love (to practical [*prakta*] things). (3) The principle is both external (the word of God

which embraces the law and the gospel—the former setting forth the things to be done, the latter those to be known and believed, hence called the “mystery of godliness” and “the word of life”)—and internal (the Spirit who is a Spirit of truth and sanctification, of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, Is. 11:2). (4) The form embraces the essence of true religion, and demands the knowledge and worship of God which are connected together inseparably (as in the sun, light and heat can never be separated from each other). So neither can that knowledge of God be true unless attended by practice (Jn. 13:17; 1 Jn. 2:5). Nor can that practice be right and saving which is not directed by knowledge (Jn. 17:3). Hence Lactantius says, “Religion should not be received without wisdom, nor is wisdom without religion to be approved” (Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 1.1 [FC 49:20; PL 6.119]; and “all the wisdom of man is in this one thing, that he may know and worship God” (ibid., 3.30* [FC 49:243; PL 6.444]); and “religion cannot be separated from wisdom nor wisdom from religion because it is the same God who ought both to be known (which is wisdom) and to be worshipped (which is religion); but wisdom precedes and religion follows because we must first know God in order to worship him. So in the two words there is the same force, although they may seem to be different; for the one is placed in the sense, the other in acts, yet they are like two streams flowing from one fountain” (ibid., 4.4 [FC 49:251-52; PL 6.456-57])). (5) The end is the happiness of man which consists partly in the vision and partly in the fruition of God, from each of which arises assimilation to him (Jn. 13:17).

**Sources of
explanation.**

VII. That any science may be merely practical, it is requisite for its object to be practicable (*prakton*) and operable. That it may be theoretical-practical, it is sufficient not that the object should lead to practice, but that the practice should operate about it. So God is not indeed practicable (*praktos*), but practice should be occupied about the love and worship of him. Again, although a material object is not practicable (*prakton*), yet a formal object (viz., God as supernaturally revealed in his word) may be called partly theoretical (*theōrētos*) and partly practical (*praktos*) because he is revealed as an object both to be known and to be worshipped.

VIII. The speculative and practical can be specific differences of the lower sciences to which the natural faculty of the understanding can pertain. Thus the object cannot be determinative both to contemplation and to practice at the same time. But since theology is of a higher and more excellent order, it is not confined within these narrow limits of nature, but can easily embrace the speculative and practical (as the common sense perfectly contains the specific differences of the external sense, and the rational life the vegetative and sensitive life in man).

IX. When life eternal is said to consist in the knowledge of God (Jn. 17:3) and happiness in his vision, this indeed shows that theology is also speculative, as having many theoretical (*theōrēta*) objects. But we cannot from this infer that it is merely speculative because this knowledge itself is not only theoretical but practical (1 Jn. 2:5). Vision denotes not only knowledge but also enjoyment (according to Scripture usage).

X. A system may be called practical either with respect to its ultimate end (because it is directed to some operation as its end) or also with respect to its object (because it is occupied with a practical [*prakton*] object falling within the will

and action of man). In the former sense, theology may be called practical, not in the latter. For besides matters merely practical, it has also many theoretical matters which constitute the doctrines of faith.

XI. Although the knowledge of God and his attributes is not strictly practical (when we understand by practical that which is regulative of some operation so that the thing known may be done—as the knowledge of the law is the rule of obedience and of acts morally good); yet it is practical so far as practical means that which both excites and impels to action, so that if the thing known is not done, yet it incites to moral action. For this very reason, God has made himself known to us that we may worship him. Therefore he has manifested to us his power (that we may stand in awe of it) and his goodness (that we may love it).

XII. Theology may be considered either abstractly in the object or concretely in the subject. Although an impious theologian does not carry his system into practice, it does not cease to be practical in itself because the abuse of the subject does not overthrow the legitimate use of the object.

XIII. The theology of the saints in heaven cannot be termed merely theoretical because their happiness embraces not only an apprehension of the highest good by vision (which is in the intellect), but also an enjoyment of it by love (which is an act of the will).

XIV. Theology is so far theoretical-practical that it cannot be called merely practical, but also theoretical, as the knowledge of mysteries is an essential part of it. (1) For God commands and enjoins upon us the knowledge of the truth no less than obedience to the precepts (Jer. 31:34). Even life eternal is placed in the knowledge of God (Jn. 17:3). Nor can it be said with Schlichtingius that this has reference to a knowledge of his will manifested by Christ in the gospel and not to a knowledge of his nature. John 17:3 teaches us that it refers not only to his will, but especially to his nature: “that they may know thee” (viz., to be the true God, which denotes the nature, not the will). (2) From knowledge arises faith on which religion depends (Rom. 10:17). (3) The Apostles’ Creed which, according to the Socinians, contains a compendium on religion and its articles, treats only of things to be believed, not of those to be done. (4) The knowledge of God is put for his whole worship in Jer. 31:34; Is. 53:11; 1 Jn. 2:3.

XV. Nevertheless, that theology is more practical than speculative is evident from the ultimate end, which is practice. For although all mysteries are not regulative of operation, they are impulsive to operation. For there is none so theoretical (*theōrēton*) and removed from practice that it does not incite to the love and worship of God. Nor is any theory saving which does not lead to practice (Jn. 13:17; 1 Cor. 13:2; Tit. 1:1; 1 Jn. 2:3, 4; Tit. 2:12).

EIGHTH QUESTION

Is human reason the principle and rule by which the doctrines of the Christian religion and theology (which are the objects of faith) ought to be measured? We deny against the Socinians.

Statement of the question.

I. That the state of the question may be perceived more clearly, before all things, the terms must be explained, and some previous principles laid down. (1) Human reason is taken either subjectively for that faculty of the rational soul by which man understands and judges between intelligible things presented to him (natural and supernatural, divine and human); or objectively

for the natural light both externally presented and internally impressed upon the mind by which reason is disposed to the forming of certain conceptions and the eliciting of conclusions concerning God and divine things. Again, reason can be viewed in two aspects: either as sound and whole before the fall or as corrupt and blind after it. The principle which here comes into question should be the first and self-evident (*autopiston*) from which all the truths and articles of faith are primarily drawn, and into which they are at last resolved. As in all the arts, those are the principles by which they are erected and demonstrated, and upon which it is not lawful for them to rise. The object of faith (meant here) is formal, not presupposed (i.e., the articles of saving faith, peculiar [*oikeioi*], properly and strictly so called); not the presupposed which are common to natural theology and sound reason such as these: that God exists; that he is just, wise, good; that the soul is immortal; etc.

II. In this controversy, there is an error on both extremes. They err in excess who attribute to reason in matters of faith more than its due (as the Socinians). They err in defect who underrate it (as the Anabaptists, Lutherans and papists). Here we dispute against the first; afterwards we will engage the others.

III. The question is not whether reason has any use in theology. For we confess that its use is manifold both for illustration (by making clear divine mysteries from human and earthly things); for comparison (by comparing old things with new, versions with their sources, opinions of doctors and decrees of councils with the rule of the divine word); for inference (by drawing conclusions); and for argumentation (by drawing forth reasons to support orthodoxy [*orthodoxian*] and overthrow heterodoxy [*heterodoxian*]). But the question is simply whether it bears the relation of a principle and rule in whose scale the greatest mysteries of religion should be weighed, so that nothing should be held which is not agreeable to it, which is not founded upon and cannot be elicited from reason. This we deny against the Socinians who, the more easily to reject the mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation and the satisfaction of Christ (and others of the same kind clearly revealed in Scripture), contend that reason is the rule of religion of things to be believed, and that those things are not to be believed which seem to the mind to be impossible (Ostorodt, *Unterrichtung . . . hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion* 6 [1612], p. 42, "Man is not bound to believe what reason dictates to be false"; and Smaltzius: "If religion should be opposed to reason, by that very thing it would not be religion, for religion is the highest reason; yea, even reason itself," *Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, Disp. IV [1614], p. 137).

IV. The question is not whether reason is the instrument by which or the medium through which we can be drawn to faith. For we acknowledge that reason can be both: the former indeed always and everywhere; the latter with regard to presupposed articles. Rather the question is whether it is the first principle from which the doctrines of faith are proved; or the foundation upon which they are built, so that we must hold to be false in things of faith what the natural light or human reason cannot comprehend. This we deny.

V. The reasons are: (1) The reason of an unregenerate man is blinded with respect to the law (Eph. 4:17, 18; Rom. 1:27, 28; 8:7). With respect to the gospel, it is evidently blind and mere darkness (Eph. 5:8; 1 Cor. 2:14).

Therefore, it must be taken captive that it may be subjected to faith, not exalted that it may rule it (2 Cor. 10:3-5*). (2) The mysteries of faith are beyond the

Reason is not the principle of faith.

sphere of reason to which the unregenerate man cannot rise; and, as the senses do not attempt to judge of those things which are out of their sphere, so neither does reason in those things which are above it and supernatural. (3) Faith is not referred ultimately to reason, so that I ought to believe because I so understand and comprehend; but to the word because God so speaks in the Scriptures. (4) The Holy Spirit directs us to the word alone (Dt. 4:1; Is. 8:20; Jn. 5:39; 2 Tim. 3:15, 16; 2 Pet. 1:19). (5) If reason is the principle of faith, then first it would follow that all religion is natural and demonstrable by natural reason and natural light. Thus nature and grace, natural and supernatural revelation would be confounded. Second, it would follow that reason is nowhere to be made captive and to be denied, against the express passages of Scripture; and that those possessed of a more ready mind and a more cultivated genius can better perceive and judge the mysteries of faith against universal experience (1 Cor. 1:19, 20; Mt. 11:25). (6) Reason cannot be the rule of religion; neither as corrupted because it is not only below faith, but also opposed to it (Rom. 8:7; 1 Cor. 2:14; Mt. 16:17); nor as sound because this is not found in corrupt man, nor in an uncontaminated man could it be the rule of supernatural mysteries. Nor now when it is corrected by the Spirit must it be judged according to itself, but according to the first principle which illuminated reason now admits (*viz.*, the Scriptures).

**Sources of
explanation.**

VI. A ministerial and organic relation is quite different from a principal and despotic. Reason holds the former relation to theology, not the latter. It is the Hagar (the bondmaid which should be in subjection to Scripture); not the Sarah (the mistress which presides over Scripture). It ought to compare the things proposed to be believed with the sacred Scriptures, the inflexible rule of truth. As when we refer the things we wish to measure to the public standard with the hand and eye. But reason itself neither can nor ought to be constituted the rule of belief.

VII. We must observe the distinction between an instrument of faith and the foundation of faith. It is one thing to introduce something to be believed and another to educe what may be understood and explained from the words; not by forcing a sense on a passage, but by unfolding that which seems involved. Reason is the instrument which the believer uses, but it is not the foundation and principle upon which faith rests. If in various passages of Scripture the use of reason is mentioned, this is not to make it the foundation of faith (as if I ought to act according to reason as a rule), but its office only is designated that believers may work conformably with and by it, as an instrument.

VIII. Rational worship is used in two senses: either originally, from reason as its origin and principle; or subjectively and organically, in reason as its subject and working by reason as an instrument. In Rom. 12:1, Paul does not use the reasonable service which he prescribes to believers in the first sense, for this would be to approve of will worship (*ethelothrēskeias*, which he elsewhere condemns); but in the second, for that which is founded on reason and is exercised by reason. That is, Paul uses that which is spiritual and inward, not carnal and outward, by antithesis to the Levitical and Old Testament ceremonial service which was carnal in the offering up of beasts; whereas God now no more requires brutes, but rational and spiritual sacrifices, as Peter calls them (1 Pet. 2:5).

IX. Christ's teaching may be called rational either as to the kind of doctrine or as to the mode of teaching. If we take it in the first sense (which is the question here), it is false; yea, he introduced a doctrine opposed and unknown to blind reason (Mt. 16:17). But the second sense has no pertinence here, since we confess that reason stands in the relation of an instrument.

X. There is a difference between deriving a doctrine from nature, and illustrating in a certain manner a doctrine already known; or to seize from nature the opportunity of teaching. The latter we recognize in the parables of our Lord, but not the former. For he did not expressly prove his mysteries by parables, but only illustrated them that under these representations they might be more easily understood.

XI. There is a difference between the "truth of propositions" and the "truth of conclusions," as Augustine remarks (CI 2.32 [FC 2:104-5; PL 34.59]). The former answers to the axiomatic judgment, the latter to the discursive (*dianoetic*). Divine revelation dictates axioms or sentences of faith to us in the Scriptures. Therefore, when these are beyond our comprehension, we ought simply to believe them on the authority of that infallible master of sentences whose *ipse dixit* (*autos epha*) is in all things sufficient. But right reason apprehends the truth of conclusions, and of itself determines what may be inferred from some other thing.

XII. To ascertain the reason of a consequence is different from ascertaining the consequent itself. Often the reason of a consequence is perceived when neither the antecedent is discerned nor the consequent comprehended. It is only understood that this thing follows from that. Faith perceives the consequent, but reason the consequence. To reason belongs the perception of the reason of a consequence, whether it be right and necessary or otherwise. Nor does it follow from this that faith which perceives the consequent is founded upon reason because reason is not an argument here, but an instrument. As when faith is said to be by hearing, hearing is not an argument of faith, but an instrument because reason does not put upon the text a sense which was not there, but brings forth by legitimate consequence something which was concealed in it and thus was taught implicitly by it.

XIII. In matters of faith reason stands not only in the relation of an instrument by which, but also sometimes from a means and argument from which the theologian argues (*viz.*, when from his own treasury he draws arguments for the faith; or contends for principles by showing their credibility to those who do not acknowledge it; or treats from principles by drawing arguments from nature either to prove or confirm theological conclusion). Hence the same conclusion may be of faith (inasmuch as it is proved from Scripture) and of knowledge (inasmuch as it is demonstrated by reason). Yet we must not from this infer that reason is the principle and rule by which doctrines of faith should be measured.

**Mixed syllogisms
are of faith.**

XIV. In mixed syllogisms (where one proposition is of faith, another of reason) reason is not the foundation and rule upon which the conclusion rests, but only the means and instrument by whose aid the truth virtually concealed in the other premise is elicited. Therefore in syllogisms of this kind the middle term is not taken from reason, but from Scripture. The connection however of the middle with the major extreme when it is denied by the adversary is shown by the principles of reason not to strengthen the truth of the mean,

but of the connection. For example, I deny that the glorified body of Christ is everywhere, having taken from Scripture this mean, that it is a real body. But the major (that no body is everywhere) is drawn from reason. Hence in such arguments the theological conclusion follows from the mean inferring, and the logical from reason which connects the consequence. One of the premises which is of faith communicating its force to the conclusion rests (as to the matter of consequent) upon revelation alone; although (as to the form and mode of consequence) it depends upon reason.

XV. It should not be replied here that the conclusion always follows the weaker part (i.e., reason which is weaker than divine revelation). For (1) that axiom must not be pressed beyond quantity and quality, so that if one of the premises is universal, the other particular, one affirmative, the other negative, the conclusion should always be particular and negative. (2) According to many, the conclusion ought to follow the weaker part, while it follows revelation which is inevident (at least philosophically speaking), where a proposition founded upon authority is considered weaker and more evident than one founded upon reason because it is farther removed from a scientific demonstration.

XVI. Hence we may safely infer that in mixed syllogisms of this kind the conclusion is theological and of faith because every proposition takes its denomination from the subject, not from the predicate. Therefore, since the subject is theological, the proposition is theological, although it may have a predicate philosophical or from the light of nature. Hence the assent given to conclusions of this kind is the assent of faith rather than of knowledge because the assent follows the nature of the proposition to which it is given. Therefore if the proposition is philosophical, it has an evident assent to which the mind is moved by the light of reason and knowledge. But if it is theological, it has the assent of faith to which it is moved by the light of revelation. Therefore although the assent to the conclusion may come from each proposition, yet because the weight of the proposition derived from theology is greater than that from philosophy, the assent itself may be said to belong simply to theology and not to philosophy.

XVII. Reason is taken either materially for the kind of doctrine derived from the light of reason, or formally for the manner of delivering it which is commonly called the mode of instruction (*tropos paideias*). But in neither sense can it be called the principle of theology; not in the former sense because theology is neither built upon reason nor resolvable into it; not in the latter sense because although it is in this sense an instrument (as has been said), yet it cannot be considered as the principle.

XVIII. For a thing to be contrary to reason is different from its being above and beyond it; to be overthrown by reason and to be unknown to it. The mysteries of faith are indeed contrary to corrupt reason and are assailed by it, but they are only above and beyond right reason and are not taught by it. So in neither of these senses can it be called their principle.

XIX. Although things of faith agree with reason and doctrine can be at variance with sound enlightened reason, it does not follow that they agree with corrupted and blind reason, or that even sound reason is its principle. For not only agreement, but also dependence constitutes a principle, such as exists between cause and effect.

XX. The proper rule of things to be believed and disbelieved is not the apprehension of their possibility or impossibility, but the word of God. Nor are those things only possible to God which seem so to men, for he can do above all that we can think (Eph. 3:20; Mt. 19:26), and it would be impious for a finite mind to circumscribe within narrow limits the infinite power of God.

XXI. Although light is not contrary to light, and natural and revealed truths are not at variance with each other, yet natural truth itself is often not what human reason dictates, which is often mistaken by an abuse of natural and revealed light. Therefore revealed truth can be opposed to ratiocination and human conceptions, although it may agree with natural truth which reason often does not see or apprehend. Thus here the first principles of nature (known of themselves) must be distinguished from the conclusions and conceptions of reason which are deduced from those principles. The former are true and sure; the latter obscure, often erroneous and fallible.

XXII. A small and a great light may differ in degree and species: in degree, as to a natural object; in species, as to a supernatural. Reason may be a small light; but in things civil and natural, not in things supernatural.

XXIII. Although reason is not the principle of faith, it does not follow that atheists cannot be converted. The manner of dealing with them can be either theological (by arguments founded on Scripture) or philosophical, so that by the principles of reason the prejudices against the Christian religion drawn from corrupt reason may be removed.

XXIV. The Lutherans falsely object to us that we hold reason to be the principle and rule of demonstration in controversies because we sometimes draw arguments from reason, and argue from reason against the ubiquity of Christ's body. For we assign to reason only a ministerial and instrumental, not a principal office. And if, in compound questions, we use reason for the purpose of proof, it bears the relation not of a principle but of a means from which the theologian argues; and they are not with us primary arguments, but only secondary and auxiliary forces. Besides, while the theologian uses arguments drawn from reason, he does it rather as a philosopher than as a theologian. As to the ubiquity of the body of Christ, we reject this doctrine, both philosophically and theologically, because it is absurd and contradicts the first principles of theology and philosophy.

NINTH QUESTION

Does any judgment belong to reason in matters of faith? Or is there no use at all for it?

Statement of the question.

I. We must avoid two extremes here: the one of those who sin in excess attributing too much to reason, and regarding it as the rule of religion and faith (which the Socinians do against whom we argued in the preceding question); the other of those who err in defect, who (lest they might appear to consider reason as the rule of faith) attribute little or nothing to it. Of this way of thinking are not only the Anabaptists and Weigelians, but also the Lutherans and papists. These hold that the testimony of reason is not to be heard when it judges of certain mysteries of faith. For example, when it refuses to admit the doctrine of transubstantiation or ubiquity because it is repugnant to the light of

right reason. And because we do not repudiate entirely the use of reason, they write about us as if we made ourselves the judges and final arbiters in matters of faith, and thus deceive the world by a fair pretence, while we glory in acknowledging Scripture as the only judge.

II. The question does not concern the judgment of decision by which controversies are publicly determined. No one of us attributes this to reason, but either to God alone speaking in the Scriptures (if we speak of the supreme) or to pastors appointed in the church (if we treat of the subordinate judgment). Rather the question concerns the judgment of private discretion by which truth is distinguished from falsehood and this we think should be attributed to reason rightly instructed. (2) In a judgment we must distinguish between the subject (or intellectual power) and the rule (or law and foundation upon which the intellect rests) in order to judge from its prescriptions. (3) The rule with regard to the object to be judged, respects the truth either of sentences or of conclusions. Again, sentences are of things known either by nature or known only by supernatural revelation.

III. Having established this point, I say that to reason belongs the judgment of discretion in matters of faith, both subjectively (because it belongs to the intellect alone to know and distinguish these matters of faith) and normally; and indeed with respect to the truth of conclusions in all propositions (whether known by nature or by revelation), but with respect to the truth of propositions only in those known by nature and even then with this threefold caution. (1) That the judgment of reason not be considered as necessary, as if theology could not do without it. (2) That the word of God (where also these truths are revealed) be considered always as the primary rule and reason as the secondary. (3) That when the word adds something unknown to nature to a thing known by nature, then we should not judge of it by nature or reason, but by the word (not that the word and reason are at variance, but because reason is perfected by the word). But in things known only by revelation (as the mystery of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc.), the only rule is the word of God, beyond or above which we must not be wise.

IV. The question is not whether the mysteries of faith are above reason or whether reason can reach them. For we readily grant that there are things which far surpass the comprehension not only of men, but even of angels the disclosure of which was a work of supernatural revelation. We also grant that reason is not only incapable of discovering them without a revelation; not only weak in comprehending them after being revealed; but also slippery and fallible (readily pursuing falsehood for truth and truth for falsehood), and never believing the word of God and its mysteries unless enlightened by the grace of the Spirit. Rather the question is—Is there no use at all for it, and should we entirely reject the testimony of reason, as often as the truth or falsity of any doctrine is to be judged? This our opponents hold and we deny.

V. Although the human understanding is very dark, yet there still remains in it some rays of natural light and certain first principles, the truth of which is unquestionable: such as, the whole is greater than its part, an effect supposes a cause, to be and not to be at the same time are incompatible (*asystatous*), etc. If this were not the case, there could be no science, nor art, nor certainty in the nature of things. (2) These first principles are true not only in nature, but also in

grace and the mysteries of faith. Faith, so far from destroying, on the contrary borrows them from reason and uses them to strengthen its own doctrines. (3) Although reason and faith are of different classes (the one natural, the other supernatural), they are not however opposed, but hold a certain relation and are subordinate to each other. Reason is perfected by faith and faith supposes reason, upon which to found the mysteries of grace.

VI. Reason cannot and should not draw mysteries from its own treasury. The word of God alone has this right. Unless derived from this source, they are on that very account to be discarded (Gal. 1:8). (2) Reason must not be listened to when it complains of not being able to comprehend the mysteries of faith. For how can the infinite be comprehended by the finite? Therefore the wish to reject mysteries because they cannot be comprehended by reason is a sin not only against faith but also against reason which acknowledges itself to be finite and far inferior to those sublime mysteries. (3) It must not be heard when it wishes, by overturning the questionable truth of the first principles of natural religion, to establish its own errors under the pretext of their being mysteries of faith (either as to things merely natural or supernatural or mixed) which grace borrows from nature for its own use. Hence right reason ought to reject these fictions as incompatible (*asystata*) with the indubitable first principles of natural religion.

**The use of
reason proved.**

VII. That the use of reason is manifold was seen before (viz., for illustration, comparison, inference and proof). It may be further proved: (1) by 1 Cor. 10:15 where the apostle appeals to the judgment of the Corinthians, both of the common people and wise men; (2) from the examples of Christ, the apostles and prophets who always employed reason in teaching the mysteries of faith. Nor should it be considered unfair to argue from those inspired (*theopneustoi*) persons to ourselves who are fallible because the force of reasoning does not depend upon the infallibility of the person using it, but upon the evidence of the thing. (3) From 1 Jn. 4:1 where we are commanded "to try the spirits," which could not be done without the help of reason. (4) The testimony of the senses is not to be entirely rejected in matters of faith (as we shall hereafter prove); therefore neither is reason because the senses are far inferior to reason.

**Sources of
explanation.**

VIII. There is a difference between knowing the meaning of a proposition and knowing its truth. In the former manner, the gospel is regarded simply as the word, but in the latter, as the divine and infallible word. Reason is occupied with the former, but faith alone with the latter.

IX. An incomprehensible thing (which cannot be grasped) is different from an impossible (which cannot be conceived). The mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation and predestination are incomprehensible, as we have only an obscure and imperfect knowledge of them. But the fiction of transubstantiation or of ubiquity cannot be conceived, on account of the natural repugnance of our intellect to the conception of a thing altogether impossible.

X. Reason as corrupt and in the concrete may be at variance with theology, but not reason as sound and in the abstract (which possibly may be ignorant of mysteries and may not teach them, but must not therefore be considered as denying them). As you would improperly gather that the physician is at variance with the lawyer because he does not quote laws, so neither does the philosopher con-

tradict the theologian, although he does not treat of his mysteries, and acknowledges them to be out of his sphere.

XI. Those are called human things which either spring from carnal corruption (in which sense Christ opposes human to divine things, Mt. 16:17) or are the remains of the image of God, and so are not repugnant but subordinated. Nor does light oppose light, nor truth oppose truth because God is the author of both.

XII. Although we allow the judgment of discretion to reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit, we do not by this constitute ourselves the ultimate arbiters and judges in controversies of faith or take away from Scripture the supreme and decisive judgment (for these are subordinate, not contrary). Reason in this sense always judges according to Scripture as the first and infallible standard.

XIII. Because the mysteries of faith surpass the comprehension of reason, it follows that it should not be used as the first principle and foundation for exhibiting the truth of axioms of faith. But it does not follow that it cannot be used to exhibit the truth or falsity of conclusions in controversies of faith. For the truth of conclusions is perpetual in the nature of things and can be learned in those schools also which are out of the church, as Augustine frequently tells us (CI 2.31.49 [FC 2:104]).

XIV. When we allow a certain judgment to reason in things of faith, we do not mean reason as blind and corrupted by sin (in which sense we confess the natural man cannot receive the things of God [1 Cor. 2:14] and that "the carnal mind [*phronēma*] is enmity against God," Rom. 8:7), but we speak of reason as sound and healed by grace (in which sense "the spiritual man is said to judge all things" [1 Cor. 2:15], and Paul often appeals to the judgment of believers, 1 Cor. 10:15; 11:13; Heb. 5:13, 14).

XV. The "captivity of thought" which the apostle recommends (2 Cor. 10:5) does not exclude all liberty of judgment, but only the desire of contradiction when it exalts itself against Christ and his gospel. Not that reason cannot discern, but that it ought not to oppose (although the mysteries proposed do surpass its comprehension and cannot be reached by it). He does not therefore mean to take away reason entirely because grace does not destroy, but perfects nature. He only wishes it to serve and be a handmaid to faith and as such to obey, not to govern it as a mistress; that it may be in subjection and not entirely discarded, that it may be not the foundation, but the defender of faith and embrace, contend for and adorn the faith already established.

XVI. To deny or oppose an article of faith because it does not seem to agree with reason is different from opposing erroneous opinions respecting it and false expositions of Scripture. Not because philosophical rules do not admit of them, but because they are contrary to the word of God to which the natural truth of conclusions conforms.

XVII. Although we use reason and its principles in theological controversies, it does not follow that we make a mixture of philosophy with theology and of human with divine things. They are not used as the foundation and principle of faith (from which we prove these mysteries), but only as instruments of knowledge (as when with the eye of the body and the light of the sun we see any visible object, there is no mixture of the eye with the sun because they do not concur in the same, but in a different manner).

XVIII. The transition from a genus to a genus then occurs when that which belongs to one system is taken to demonstrate the conclusion of another. But this is by no means our method in this subject because the middle term is not drawn from philosophy to prove a conclusion of faith, but from Scripture. (2) The principles or axioms drawn from reason or philosophy in order to prove some article of faith are not so peculiar to philosophy as that they cannot be supposed to belong also to natural theology (which ought to come before supernatural and revealed). Thus they can be said to have a reference to articles of faith, if not formal at least presupposed.

TENTH QUESTION

May the judgment of contradiction be allowed to human reason in matters of faith? We affirm.

Origin of the question.

I. This controversy is conducted by our party against the Lutherans (especially the Ubiquitarians) who (when we say that their opinion about Christ's body being in many places [*polytopia*] or everywhere [*pantachousia*] is contradictory) usually reply that the judgment of contradiction in matters of faith does not belong to reason, but to the sacred Scriptures (Lucas Osiander [the elder], *Enchiridion controversiarum . . . Calvinianus* 1.3 [1608], pp. 25-45; Balthasar Mentzer, *Elencheus errorum Antonii Sadeelis*, Arg. 6 [1609], pp. 75-76; Josua Stegmann, *Photinianismus hoc est succincta refutatio errorum Photiniarum* [1643], disp. 2, q. 3, pp. 17-19). Hence Balthasar Meisner says that this axiom ("contradictory things are therefore impossible because for the same thing to be and not to be is impossible [*adynaton*]") is extremely dangerous in divine things (*quaest. metaph.* 3. *contra Calvin.* +). For a proper knowledge of the state of the question, three things must here be distinguished: the reason judging, the principle from which the judgment is formed, and the rule of consequence by which it is formed. (1) Reason here does not mean that which is blind and corrupted by sin, but that which is restored and enlightened by the Holy Spirit. (2) The principles are axioms not known by nature or founded upon human authority, but given in the Scriptures. (3) The rule by which reason directed and strengthened in tracing and applying the truths of Scripture is the rule of just consequence impressed upon the rational creature by God. This rule is not the rule of the truth itself (which is the word of God alone and the first normal truth), but only the rule of consequence by the assistance of which we may know and discern with greater certainty what follows from a truth and what does not.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not whether reason can of itself reach into the mysteries of faith (for no one doubts that many of them far surpass the comprehension of reason), but whether it can judge of the contradiction of propositions (which can be discerned only by the laws of nature and reason). (2) The question does not concern the absolute and unlimited judgment of decision, but concerns the judgment of discretion which is bound and limited by the word and must always be proved by it (1 Thess. 5:21; 1 Jn. 4:1). This, if not always producing conviction in others, nevertheless suffices for our own.

III. Thus we decide that the judgment of contradiction belongs to reason; but (1) a revelation always being supposed, and its truth worthy of faith per se; (2) organically and ministerially, not despotically and authoritatively; (3) with conformity to Scripture itself which clearly interprets itself and requires no other interpreter to establish its sense. Thus reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the word is able to consider and to judge from the word (according to the rules of good and necessary consequence) how the parts of a doctrine cohere, and what may or may not follow from them.

Proof that the judgment of contradiction belongs to reason.

IV. The reasons are: (1) the Scriptures frequently enjoin this judgment (Mt. 7:15; 16:6; Col. 2:8; 1 Thess. 5:21; Heb. 5:14); (2) the examples of the saints confirm it, as the Bereans (Acts 17:11) and the Corinthians (1 Cor. 10:15); (3) the design of Scripture teaches it (which is the perfection of the man of God in the knowledge of the truth and the conviction of gainsayers [2* Tim. 3:16; Tit. 1:9], which cannot be accomplished without it); (4) the use of reason is a strong proof because as the knowledge of the affirmation and negation of propositions and the doctrine of contradiction belong to it, so also must such a judgment. And unless we allow this, the widest door will be thrown open to all kinds of heretics and fanatics for introducing their fictions and monstrous opinions and we can never use any true contradiction.

Sources of explanation.

V. Although this judgment is made subjectively by man, it must not be considered as human (formed in the manner of men originally from human reason and affections), but divine (proceeding from the light and influence of the Holy Spirit). In this sense, Paul says "he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (viz., spiritually) by the light of grace and not of natural reason (1 Cor. 2:15*).

VI. Reason cannot judge of the power of God from natural principles, but this is not to say that it cannot judge of it from the word (Mt. 19:26; 2 Tim. 1:12; Ps. 115:3). Thus the judgment of contradiction as to a perfectly blind reason is dangerous when the judgment is formed from corrupt principles. But we speak of enlightened reason giving its decisions from the word.

VII. Reason is to be brought into captivity (2 Cor. 10:5) when it exalts itself against Christ and his gospel, but it can be heard when it is obedient and judges from it.

VIII. The darkness of the human intellect does not hinder sound reason from judging of the truth of connections and so contradictions. We allow indeed that it cannot judge of the truth of propositions (as ignorant of it per se and which it must seek from the law and testimony). But it does not follow from this that it cannot judge of the contradiction of the expositions, opinions and interpretations which men give of these mysteries.

IX. Reason can judge not only of a direct and formal contradiction (containing in the same terms both an express affirmation and negation), but also of an indirect and implied (deduced by necessary consequence). Such are these: the blood of Christ cleanses us from all sin, therefore there is no purgatory; Christ ascended into heaven, therefore he is not everywhere.

X. It is not necessary in order to ascertain a contradiction to know distinctly the things themselves and their essence. It is sufficient if the truth of conclusions is known from which we can readily form a judgment of the contradiction of a proposition.

XI. Although many things may seem contradictory to a number of persons which are not really so, it does not follow that something of the kind ought to appear so which is not, to men rightly using reason and thought.

XII. It is one thing to speak of sound and renewed reason in the abstract; quite a different thing to speak of the same in the concrete and as it is in this or that corrupt subject. We allow a judgment to reason not in the latter, but only in the former sense.

XIII. To take away from reason every judgment and to maintain that we must not confide in it absolutely is different from maintaining not only that those things must be believed which reason knows, but that in a more perfect school those things are to be learned which reason cannot attain unto or teach. We do not hold the former, but the latter.

XIV. Although the judgment of contradiction is allowed to reason in matters of faith, it does not follow that the human intellect becomes the rule of divine power (as if God could not do more things than human reason can conceive). God's being able to do something above nature and human conception (which is said with truth in Eph. 3:20) is different from his being able to do something contrary to nature and the principles of natural religion (which is most false). Nor is the power of God in this manner limited by the rule of our intellect, but our mind judges from the word what (according to the nature of a thing established by God) may be called possible or impossible.

XV. Reason cannot judge of the power of God so as to comprehend it most perfectly, or to think those things impossible which are above nature, or to introduce something into theology under the pretext of divine power unless it has gathered it beforehand from the word; much less that when the word of God certainly and clearly establishes anything can it have recourse to the omnipotence of God to overthrow it. But so far it judges well of the power of God when it estimates it according to the nature of things and his word, so as to call that impossible and contradictory to this or that person, but which is really such because it opposes the nature of the thing and the truth revealed in the word.

XVI. It is one thing for reason to be able to be a judge of what is false, contradictory and repugnant both to the universal principles of reason and thus revelation (for instance in the subjects of transubstantiation, ubiquity, the adoration of creatures and the like); another thing that reason ought to be the judge and the standard too of a revealed and mysterious (*mystēriōdous*) truth which is infinitely exalted above its sphere and delivered by God whose thoughts (how immense!) are far above human thoughts and who wishes reason to be brought into captivity to the obedience of faith (2 Cor. 10:5). This we deny, but that we affirm.

ELEVENTH QUESTION

Is there any use of the testimony of the senses in mysteries of faith; or ought it to be entirely rejected? We affirm the former and deny the latter.

Statement of the question.

I. This question is put forth against us by papists who (to weaken the argument which we draw from the testimony of the senses to overthrow the fiction of transubstantiation and of the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist and establish the reality of the substance of the bread and wine because the senses see, touch and taste nothing but bread and wine) have gone so far as to say

that the testimony of the senses is not to be regarded in mysteries of faith because mysteries are above the senses, and faith must consist in believing what we do not see.

II. Although the orthodox are unwilling that the testimony of the senses should be heard in all mysteries, they nevertheless maintain that a proper regard should be paid to their testimony when the discussion concerns sensible and corporeal things which come within the sphere of their activity.

III. As to the state of the question, it must be noted that as there are three kinds of things which may be known (viz., those known by faith [*pistai*], by the senses [*noētai*] and by the intellect [*aisthētai*]), so there are three faculties answering to them (viz., the senses, reason and faith); and that the senses perceive sensible things, reason intelligible things, and faith spiritual and supernatural things. But as the senses do not claim for themselves the judgment of things which are the objects of reason, so much less can reason and the senses judge of things of faith; but each faculty is occupied with its own objects, and as they ought not to be confounded, so they ought not to be mutually opposed.

IV. The question is not therefore whether the testimony of the senses is in every case to be regarded, so that we should grant nothing except what the senses can seize. For we grant there are many mysteries to which reason and much less the senses cannot rise, such as the mysteries of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc. Rather the question is when the senses judge of an object belonging to them and do not go beyond their proper sphere, must their testimony be rejected or admitted? The question is whether faith may be opposed to a well-directed judgment of the senses and overthrow it. This we deny.

V. Some mysteries are entirely spiritual and placed far beyond our comprehension; such as the mysteries of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc. But others are placed in sensible and corporeal things (i.e., whether God uses them as instruments and means for carrying out his purposes, or wishes to lead us along by them to a clearer knowledge of more sublime mysteries, such as the miracles of Christ, the types and figures of the Old Testament and the sacraments of the New). The former are properly the objects of our faith and in no way strike the senses. But as to the latter (in which a spiritual is joined with a corporeal thing) the spiritual thing always remains an object of faith, but the corporeal an object of sense. Therefore the question is whether faith may use the testimony of the senses in corporeal things. For instance, when it judges of the substance of the bread and wine in the Eucharist, and the absence of the body of Christ, must we reject it?

***The testimony
of the senses
proved.***

VI. That the testimony of the sense should not be rejected is proved: (1) by the example of Christ who, to prove the reality of his body after the resurrection, appeals to the senses—"handle me and see" (Lk. 24:39).

This he would never have done if their testimony was false and uncertain. Thus the angel uses this argument: "He is not here; for he is risen, as he said. Come, see the place where the Lord lay" (Mt. 28:6*). In Acts 1:11, the apostles used the same proof when they promised that Christ should come in like manner as they had seen him go; so in 1 Jn. 1:1, 2 and 2 Pet. 1:17, they found the principal proof of the truth and divinity of the gospel upon the testimony of the senses. (2) God makes use of the preaching of the word and the con-

templation of his works to lead us to faith. Now these means unquestionably presuppose not only the use of the senses (without which both the word and works of God would be unknown), but also the fidelity and truth of their testimony. For if the senses can be deceived, what certainty could be produced in us either by the word or works of God? (3) The Holy Spirit employs the exercises of the senses in describing intellectual actions (as seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.) which could not be done unless their testimony were certain and not slippery. (4) The faithfulness of God will not suffer us to believe that he wished to trifle with men by referring them to a testimony which could deceive and be false.

**Sources of
explanation.**

VII. Although the senses are not absolutely infallible, it does not follow that their testimony is worth nothing. For there are certain conditions in which (being answered) they are not deceived: (1) that the object be at a proper distance; (2) that the medium be pure and free from everything which could distort the image; (3) that the organ be rightly disposed; (4) that all the senses (at least those which can take cognizance of the particular object) be consulted and make the same judgment; (5) that the senses act carefully and not hastily, otherwise they might be deceived; (6) that the fancy be free and without fevers or delirium, otherwise we would often think we saw and heard things which we did not see or hear. If we pay attention to all these conditions, it will be evident that they all so concur in testimony about the reality of the bread and wine in the Eucharist that it can by no possibility be fallacious or doubtful.

VIII. The senses were not deceived in the case of Mary Magdalene who supposed Christ to be the gardener (Jn. 20:15) because she was deceived by a precipitancy of judgment which she immediately corrected when (her ears assisting the eyes) she recognized the Savior by his voice; or in the case of the disciples at Emmaus who did not know Christ (Lk. 24:31). This passage testifies that their knowledge was imperfect and obscure, but not false, since they believed him to be a real man who walked with them, but did not think he was Christ. Or in the case of the angels' appearing in human form; for although they were not true men, yet they were true bodies and not phantasms in which they appeared, and something supernatural was always connected with them. Hence persons could tell that they were not mere men; rather there was something supernatural, such as the light which surrounded the angel announcing the birth of Christ, and the shining garments in which the angels who witnessed the resurrection of Christ appeared. Hence it was not difficult for the senses and reason to form a correct judgment of them. If some were deceived (as possibly sometimes happened) the error was not on the part of the object which clearly showed itself, but on the part of the subject and the principle of judgment of the senses.

IX. For a person to be struck with blindness by God so as to be unable to see any object properly and clearly is different from the senses (well ordered) being deceived in the testimony which they (rightly disposed) give concerning an object in their own sphere. The former is said of the Sodomites who could not find the door of Lot's house (Gen. 19:11) and of the Syrian soldiers who could not see the city of Samaria (2 K. 6:18), but not the latter.

X. If Christ passed through the midst of the crowd which wished to cast him headlong from the hill (Lk. 4:30), we are not therefore to believe that he made his body invisible and imperceptible to the senses; rather he hid himself in the

crowd that he might escape their fury, or struck them with blindness, or suddenly quieted or repressed their excitement, as Ambrose (*Expositio Evangelii . . . Lucam* 4.56 [PL 15.1713] on Lk. 4:30) and Bede (*In Lucae Evangelium Expositio* [PL 92.378] on Lk. 4:30) think.

TWELFTH QUESTION: THE USE OF CONSEQUENCES

Are the doctrines of faith and practice to be proved only by the express word of God? May they not also be legitimately proved by consequences drawn from Scripture? We affirm the latter.

Statement of the question.

I. This question owes its rise to the new method of disputing peculiar to the jugglers and mountebanks among the papists who, in order to evade with greater ease the arguments by which we invincibly established from

Scripture our opinion and confuted their errors, supposed that they had no better way of getting out of the difficulty than by compelling us to prove that all our doctrines are contained in so many words in Scripture, all use of consequences being rejected. Cardinal Perronius appears to have devised this method first (*Reply of the . . . Cardinall of Perron to the Answere of the . . . King of Great Britaine* [1630/1975]). Many others of the same worthless class followed him—Gontery, Cotton, Arnoldus (Arnoux) and especially Veron who caused a peculiar method of disputing to be called “Veronian” from him. To these the Wallenburgian Brethren in Germany joined themselves and other light-shunning missionaries. But other heretics darkened the world before these, for the Arians often used this argument to overthrow the *homoousion*. The Macedonians also denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit just because it is nowhere in Scripture expressly said that the Holy Spirit is God (see Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 31 [5], “On the Holy Spirit,” 1.1 [NPNF2, 7:318]). Maximus, the monk, testifies that the Apollinarians and Monophysites used the same weapons (in his twenty orations+ which are commonly, but falsely, ascribed to Athanasius).

II. The fifth article of the French Confession (whence they wish it to appear that they have drawn the sentence which they fix upon us) asserts indeed the perfection of Scripture when it says that “it is the rule of all truth and comprehends whatever is required for the glory of God and our salvation, so that it is lawful neither for men nor even for angels to add anything to, or take away from it” (Cochrane, 145). But it does not maintain that nothing is to be received which we do not find in so many words in Scripture; yea, by mentioning near the end that three creeds are received by us (the Apostles’, the Nicene and Athanasian) it sufficiently intimates that we do not seek for the very letters, but the truth of doctrines and worship (*ibid.*, 146). It therefore means that the word of God alone should be adhered to exclusive of all traditions, but does not restrict us to the express word exclusive of consequences.

III. In order to understand the question, we must recollect that a thing may be said to be in Scripture in two ways: either *kata lexin* (expressly and in so many words); or *kata dianoian* (implicitly and as to the sense). We say that all things are contained in Scripture not in the first way, but in the second.

IV. Consequences may be considered either materially (to denote the doctrines themselves drawn out by consequence), or formally (for the connection itself of

the terms). Augustine distinguishes between "the truth of propositions and the truth of conclusions" (CI 2.32 [50] [FC 2:105; PL 34.59]). Again some are innate and educed from Scripture, being virtually contained in it; others implied and carried into it. Some are proximate, necessary and plain; others are remote, probable and obscure. We speak here of the former, not of the latter.

V. The solid proof of a thing is such either in itself or in relation to this or that man. The one consists in the evidence of the thing; the other in the conviction of man. The former is always present in a sound reasoning by consequences, not so the latter.

VI. The articles of faith which should be proved from Scripture are either positive and affirmative (containing some doctrine to be believed), or negative and exclusive (rejecting errors introduced by heretics). The former ought to be proved clearly and certainly from Scripture because they are the proper objects of faith; but as to the latter it is not requisite that any mention should be made of them, but only of general principles by which their falsity can be shown. Hence our opponents trifle when they ask us to prove by so many words in Scripture that there is no purgatory, that the pope is not the head of the church, that the Mass is not a sacrifice, etc. (1) The affirmative is bound to prove, not the negative. (2) These doctrines are not positive, but negative with us. Therefore it is sufficient for us to teach that they are not contained in Scripture and that other things (which plainly refute them) are.

VII. The sufficiency and perfection of the Scriptures does not consist in their condemning all errors and heresies by name, but only in their announcing all positive doctrines clearly. For as the right is the touchstone of itself and of obligation (all necessary truth being clearly established), the errors opposed to it are rejected.

VIII. The question therefore is brought within these limits: whether, besides the express word of God, evident and necessary consequences are admissible in theology; or whether the doctrines of faith and practice may be lawfully proved by them. We affirm; our opponents deny. Not all however, for Bellarmine agrees with us here. "Nothing," says he, "is of faith, except what God has revealed by the apostles and prophets, or what may be plainly deduced from them" (VD 4.9, pp. 131-32; cf. "De Justificatione," 3.8 in *Opera* [1858], 4:542-44). Cano ("De Locis Theologicis," 12.6 in *Opera* [1605], pp. 586-97), Salmeron (*Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* [1612], vol. 1, Prolegomenon 9, Canon 7, p. 95), Torquemada, (*Summa de Ecclesia* 4, Pt. II.8 [1561], pp. 380-81) and many others agree with him. These maintain that to be of faith which by necessary and legitimate consequence can be derived from Scripture.

**The use of
consequences
proved from
the design
of Scripture.**

IX. Many things establish the use of consequences in things of faith. (1) The design of Scripture, which is to serve for doctrine (*didaskalia*), for reproof (*elenchos*), for correction (*panorthōsis*), for instruction (*paideia*) and comfort (*paraklēsis*) (2 Tim. 3:16; Rom. 15:4) which could not be answered without them because no thesis could be transferred to its hypothesis, nor could any application of Scripture to theological or practical uses ever be made. (2) The nature of man to whom the mysteries of religion are committed, who is not a trunk or a brute, but a rational creature and (being capable of reasoning) bound to search the Scriptures (Jn. 5:39) and not to be satisfied with the shell of the words but to

penetrate to the very kernel and sense that he may gather from what he has read something which he has not read (as Augustine well remarks, *Contra Maximinum Hereticum Arianorum Episcopum* 2*.3 [PL 42.760]). (3) The wisdom of God; for as when a wise man speaks, he wishes everything which can lawfully be gathered from his words to be understood as being said by him; thus being infinitely wise and foreseeing all that could be deduced from the word, God so spoke that whatever could be lawfully gathered from what he said should be considered as his word. (4) The practice of heretics, who the better to defend their errors against the orthodox, have entirely repudiated the use of consequences. The Arians denied the *homoousion* just because it was not contained in Scripture in so many words (*autolexei*). Hence they are called "syllable-catchers" by Basil. Gregory Nazianzus calls the contender against the divinity of the Holy Spirit who uses this artifice, an A.B.C. Sophist and a pettifogger of words (*sykophantēn tōn onomatōn*, Oration 31*.24, "On the Holy Spirit" [NPNF2, 7:325; PG 36.160]). (5) The usage of papists who prove by consequences many of their doctrines concerning the primacy and infallibility of the pope, transubstantiation, purgatory and the like. (6) The example of Christ and the apostles who often used consequences; as when Christ proved against the Sadducees the resurrection of the dead from the formula of the covenant (Mt. 22:32) which says nothing expressly about the resurrection; and when the apostles proved that Jesus of Nazareth was the true Messiah promised in the Old Testament, although nothing is there said of him in so many words (*autolexei*). Nor should it be replied that the authority of Christ and the apostles is infallible and therefore that their consequences also are of undoubted truth, while ours are not. For although the consequences of Christ are infallible in themselves from the authority of the speaker, yet they had not their force with the Sadducees from the authority of the speaker (which they did not acknowledge), but from the nature of what was said. Otherwise, how could Christ by this proof have stopped the mouths of his enemies who did not acknowledge his authority?

X. Although the inferences of Christ as to us may pass into the word of God for the simple reason that they come from Christ and may be made lawfully objects of faith, yet it is false that these were esteemed actually by the Sadducees, the enemies of Christ. Nay for this sole reason, they were admitted because they had a foundation in the words of Moses quoted by Christ. They were therefore recognized as such by them, regard being paid to the words and not the speaker.

XI. The *Logismoi*, against which the weapons of our warfare are directed (2 Cor. 10:4, 5*), are not all kinds of reasoning, but as we read there *logismoi epairomenoi kata tēs gnōseōs tou Theou* (viz., exalting themselves against, not acting as handmaids; opposing the gospel, not lending their assistance to it). The former are deservedly to be destroyed because they are incompatible (*asystatoi*) with faith; but not so legitimate reasonings, being in subjection to revelation and properly used both for its explication and application.

XII. The foundation upon which a thing rests is different from the instrument which we use for the knowledge of the thing itself. That which has a fallible foundation cannot be infallible because the effect cannot be greater in every respect than its cause. Reason here however is not the foundation, but the instrument.

XIII. Although the intellect which educes consequences is fallible, it does not follow that the consequences themselves are false and uncertain. (1) The possi-

bility of being deceived is different from being actually deceived; the being at fault sometimes from being so always. A power which is of itself and always fallible in every exercise cannot give foundation to infallible certainty. But such is not the intellect because it is fallible not in itself but accidentally; nor in all, but only in some things. Otherwise if the argument held good universally and if (because reason is sometimes deceived) no reliance must ever be placed upon it, it would follow that all true knowledge and certainty had been removed from the world, and Pyrrhonism and incomprehensibleness (*akatalēpsian*) introduced. In like manner all certainty of the senses would be taken away because they are sometimes deceived, which everyone sees to be in the highest degree absurd. For the power of fallibility is not necessarily connected with each act. Nay it can by the use of legitimate means be hindered from flowing into the act. Therefore as the senses must be freed from all obstacles inhibiting their certainty (existing either in the object, the medium or the organ), so the intellect must be freed from the prejudices which stand in the way of right reason, and then it will not go wrong. Now we speak here of a sound and rightly constituted intellect.

XIV. To apprehend the reason of a consequence is different from apprehending the consequent itself. Faith apprehends the consequent; reason the consequence. And it does not follow from this that faith (by which the consequent is believed) is founded upon reason because reason is not an argument here on account of which I believe, but the instrument through which I believe. Now the instrument does not introduce into the text what was not there before, but educes by legitimate consequences what was concealed in it. Hence the theological conclusion results from the inferred mean, but the logical from reason or the instrument eliciting consequences. The consequence, as to its materiality, is founded upon the word; as to its formality, upon reason.

XV. Although reason concurs in educing consequences, it does not follow that faith is established by reason; as, although faith cometh by hearing, yet the senses are not the foundation of faith; faith uses reason, is not built upon it. It uses it as an instrument of application and mode of knowledge, but is not built upon it as a foundation and rule of things to be believed.

XVI. Mixed syllogisms (in which one of the premises belongs to natural, the other to revealed religion) do not cease to be of faith. (1) Every proposition receives its denomination from the subject and not from the predicate. (2) A proposition of revealed religion virtually contains that which is drawn from the light of nature to prove it and thus communicates its own force to it. (3) To prove a conclusion of faith, the middle term must be taken not from nature, but from the Scriptures; but where the connection of the mean with the major extreme is denied by the adversary, it must be assisted by the principles of reason, not in order to prove the truth of the mean, but of the connection. For example, I deny that the bread becomes the body of Christ in the Supper (this mean term having been assumed that it has the accidents of bread). But if the connection of the mean with the major extreme is denied (*viz.*, that is true bread which has the properties of bread), it must then be proved from reason because it is not contained in Scripture formally, but only virtually.

XVII. The agency of reason is so far from making faith doubtful that it rather greatly assists and establishes the knowledge and certainty of it. Only distinguish between reason in the abstract and in the concrete: reason illuminates in the be-

liever or is darkness in the unregenerate. It is true that the blind and false reason does make a doubtful faith, but we deny it concerning sound and enlightened reason.

XVIII. Although the divine may have a more perfect knowledge of consequences, yet this is no reason why an ignorant person may not have the same according to his capacity, although he may be unacquainted with logic and metaphysics because the light of reason and natural logic suffice to enable him to perceive natural consequences.

XIX. In this kind of reasoning where something is adduced by consequence, it is requisite: (1) that one of the premises, or both, immediately or mediately, be contained in proper or figurative words in the Scriptures; (2) that the consequence or inference be necessary and evident (necessary not only by a formal, but also by a material and consequential necessity, as when a consequent is deduced from an antecedent, a species from a genus, an effect from a cause); (3) that it be evident on account of assent so that on account of the evidence of inference we may assent no less to the conclusion than to the premises.

XX. It is one thing to speak of reasonings drawn from Scripture and according to it and subordinated to and resolvable into it; another to speak of those which are opposed to it. Because heretics use the latter to prove their errors, it does not follow that the former are inadmissible. For the legitimate use of a thing ought not to be taken away on account of its abuse.

XXI. The use of consequences is not at variance with the simplicity of the disciples of Christ for although it becomes the sheep of Christ to be simple, they ought not to be brutes, but rational creatures. Nor if we are bound to listen to Christ's voice alone, ought the use of consequences therefore to be rejected provided we employ them with lawful moderation. Yea it is because the voice of Christ is to be heard that we must search the Scriptures so as to distinguish his voice from others, which cannot be done without the use of reason. So far from departing from Scripture or adding to it by reasonings drawn by consequences from Scripture, we are thus able rather to trace out and reduce to practice only those things which the Scriptures contain.

XXII. Although Scripture is said to be perfect (as a foundation of things to be believed and done inasmuch as it contains all the doctrines and precepts of life necessary to salvation) this is not to deny the necessity of explication and application. For a rule is perfect, and yet we have to apply it. Nor does that application detract from the perfection of the rule, but rather proves and declares it.

XXIII. The *mataiologia* or "vain jangling" which the apostle condemns (1 Tim. 1:6) is not sound reasoning by consequences from Scripture, but a curious and troublesome discussion of unimportant things which he calls fables and endless genealogies (*mythous kai genealogias aperantous*, v. 4) such as the fables of the Gentiles concerning the gods and their generation (*theogonia*) and also the dreams of the Jews concerning Lilith, Behemoth, Leviathan and other silly trifles of the Talmud.

XXIV. The abuse of reasonings is not to be confounded with their use, nor is a thing considered in the abstract to be condemned on account of its perverse application in the concrete. Thus many are deceived in their perception of objects of sound and sight. Still, on that account, we are not to say that all things are uncertain which are apprehended by the senses. So if they err, who use consequences

to establish the false doctrines of transubstantiation or of consubstantiation because they are forced and illegitimate, those who use them lawfully ought not to be condemned. Otherwise it would follow that the use of the Scriptures themselves must be condemned because many heretics have made an improper use of them.

XXV. To listen to a person as a framer of doctrines (in which character Moses, the prophets and Christ alone are to be heard both as to the things taught and as to the manner of teaching) is different from listening to a maker of instruments suitable for explaining and applying these doctrines (in which character men using consequences are to be heard).

XXVI. There is a difference between the principles of doctrines and of the truth of propositions and the principles of the truth of inferences. The former are drawn from Scripture; the latter from reason. And because the truth of propositions is more important, it is principally regarded in arguments, and from it the judgment ought to be made concerning the conclusion. Hence the conclusion of the argument will be theological because the principle of the doctrines is such. But reason is not the principle of the thing, but of the knowledge of the thing; nor so much the principle as the instrument by which the thing to be proved is known.

XXVII. The consequence is a work of reason (considered formally and organically) because it is elicited by reason, but not as considered originally and materially for the doctrine elicited by consequence. Thus consequences are not of faith on the part of the organ by which they are deduced (for I do not believe because I so reason, but because the word of God declares it); yet they are of faith on the part of the principle from which they are deduced (for as the premises, so must the conclusions thence be deduced).

XXVIII. We may consider a thing as coming from the Holy Spirit, either mediately and in branches (viz., that which is deduced from Scripture by the help of reason) or immediately and in the root (which is contained in it in so many words). In the former sense, consequences are from the Holy Spirit, not in the latter.

XXIX. Although we must not regard as the doctrine of the Reformed those which can by any method be deduced from their confessions and be imputed to them; nor as the opinion of the Lutherans that which may be inferred from their doctrine—it does not follow that we must not consider as the word of God that which may be lawfully and plainly deduced from it. The cases are entirely different. For the Holy Spirit (who searches the deep things of God [*ta bathē tou Theou*, 1 Cor. 2:10] as he is omniscient) could foresee and intend whatever it was possible to gather rightly from his words. But men (who are neither omniscient nor infallible) were unable to know what might in after times be deduced from their words.

XXX. When Peter denies that Scripture is of private interpretation (2 Pet. 1:20), he does not use the word “private” subjectively—that which can be legitimately derived by any private person from a comparison of Scriptures. Otherwise the Holy Spirit would not command us to read and to search the Scriptures and compare spiritual things with spiritual (1 Cor. 2:13); to prophesy according to the proportion of faith (Rom. 12:6); and to apply them to conviction and correction (2 Tim. 3:16*). Rather he means interpretation as private originally and (as the

text reads *idia epilysis*, i.e., one's own and individual) arising from the brain and pleasure of each man, and which the words of Scripture and the comparing of them do not furnish (such as the right which the pope claims for himself of interpreting Scripture at his pleasure according to that infallible spirit which he makes peculiar and private to himself).

XXXI. That Scripture may be explained by Scripture, it suffices that Scripture in the antecedents and consequents, in the parallels, scope, etc., supply to the interpreter the foundations and reasons by which he may deduce the genuine sense and demonstrate it to the consciences of others. But it is not necessary for the Scriptures to say in any place that this passage must be explained by another, nor that there should be read expressly in Scripture the consequences and interpretation which I propose; as when a lawyer comparing law with law and explaining one by another says that the emperor and legislator interpret each other. There is no need for the emperor to say anywhere expressly that this law must be explained by that and these words by those.

XXXII. Although Scripture judges not of the propriety of a consequence as to the truth of connection (because this depends upon the aid of reason), it does not cease to be the sole judge of controversies of faith as to the truth of propositions. As the law does not cease to be the judge of suits which arise in the state, although it does not declare that the consequences (which are deduced from it for acquitting one and condemning another) are good and well formed. Nor was it ever heard that the principles of the real sciences judged of the appropriateness of the consequences derived from them, although controversies may be decided by them, physical by physical, ethical by ethical.

XXXIII. As hearing does not make the sound and sight does not make the light (which it perceives by looking), so neither does the intellect make its own object (nor the truth and the word of God which it understands by reasoning); but in like manner it must have these things presented to it. But as the intellect by reasoning makes the truth and the word of God conclusive, so sight and hearing (by their exercise) give us the knowledge of light and sound.

XXXIV. Although that is plain and evident which is denied by no one and is immediately comprehended by all, it does not follow that a thing is not perspicuous which is not immediately comprehended by all. For often many things are obscure to many persons (which could and would be very plain to them) either because they did not give the proper attention or because they were blinded by prejudice. When we say that our consequences are evident, we do not mean in the former sense, as if they were denied by no one and could be readily comprehended by anyone without attention and examination; but that they are evident to those diligently attending and considering them in a proper manner, or such that he who does not see them cannot have a good conscience.

XXXV. If by formally revealed is meant that which is contained expressly in the word of God, we certainly cannot say that consequences are formally revealed. But if by it be meant that which is contained in so many or in equivalent words, or that which by evident and necessary consequence may be deduced from it, we cannot deny that they are formally revealed and therefore may with propriety be called the formal object of faith.

THIRTEENTH QUESTION

Is there any use of philosophy in theology? We affirm.

**The false apostles
sinned in excess.**

I. On this subject men run into two extremes. Those who confound philosophy with theology err on the side of excess. This the false apostles formerly did who incorporated various unsound philosophical opinions with the Christian doctrine and are on this account rebuked by the apostle (Col. 2:8). Some of the fathers, coming out from among the philosophers, still retained some of their erroneous opinions and endeavored to bring the Gentiles over to Christianity by a mixture of philosophical and theological doctrines: as Justin Martyr, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and the Scholastics, whose system is philosophical rather than theological since it depends more upon the reasonings of Aristotle and other philosophers than upon the testimonies of the prophets and apostles. The Socinians of this day strike against the same rock, placing philosophy in the citadel as the foundation of faith and interpreter of Scripture. *Paradoxus exercitator* strenuously contends for this in an impious treatise lately published concerning philosophy, the interpreter of Scripture (now known to be Ludwig Meyer, *Philosophia Sacrae Scripturae Interpres. Exercitatio paradoxa* [1666]). They sin in defect who hold that philosophy is opposed to theology and should therefore be altogether separated from it, not only as useless, but also as positively hurtful. The fanatics and enthusiasts of former ages held this view and the Anabaptists and Weigelians of the present day (who seem professedly to have proclaimed war against philosophy and the liberal arts) retain it.

II. The orthodox occupy a middle ground. They do not confound theology with sound philosophy as the parts of a whole; nor do they set them against each other as contraries, but subordinate and compound them as subordinates which are not at variance with, but mutually assist each other. Philo Judaeus and, after him, the fathers appropriately illustrated this by the allegory of Sarah and Hagar—the mistress and servant. Theology rules over philosophy, and this latter acts as a handmaid to and subserves the former. They acknowledge that it has many and various uses in theology which must be accurately distinguished from its many abuses.

III. Although every truth cannot be demonstrated by reason (the boundaries of truth being much more widely extended than those of reason), yet no lie against the truth can be sheltered under the protection of true reason, nor can one truth be destroyed by another (although one may transcend and surpass the other) because whatever the one may be—whether below, according to or above reason, and apprehended by the senses, the intellect or faith—it has come from no other source than God, the parent of truth. So grace does not destroy nature, but makes it perfect. Nor does the supernatural revelation abrogate the natural, but makes it sure.

IV. Philosophy is used either properly and in the abstract for the knowledge of things human and divine (as far as they can be known by the light of nature), or improperly and in the concrete for a collection of various opinions at variance with each other (which the philosophers of different sects held). In this latter sense, we acknowledge that it contains many errors and that it is of no use but of

the greatest harm. Thus Paul condemns it (Col. 2:8). But in the former sense, its uses are many. In passing, we give only the more general.

V. First, it serves as a means of convincing the Gentiles and preparing them for the Christian faith. Hence Clement of Alexandria says that "it prepares the way for the most royal doctrine" (*prokataskeuazein tēn hodon tē basilikōtatē didaskalia*, *Stromata* 1.16 [ANF 2:318; PG 8.796]), as is plain from the sermons of Paul (Acts 14 and 17) and from the writings of the fathers against the Gentiles. Hence the expression of Julian the Apostate (when he saw that the errors of the Gentiles were scattered by the Christians who were assisted by philosophy and literature): "We are caught by our own wings" (*tois hautōn pterois haliskometha*, cf. Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History* 3.4 [NPNF2, 3:97]). So God wishes us to apply all the truths of the lower sciences to theology and after rescuing them from the Gentiles (as holders of a bad faith) to take and appropriate them to Christ who is the truth, for the building of the mystic temple; as formerly Moses enriched and adorned the tabernacle with Egyptian gold, and Solomon procured the assistance of the Sidonians and Syrians in building the temple. Second, it may be a testimony of consent in things known by nature, by which (as from a twofold revelation) the truth and certainty of the things themselves may be better confirmed. Third, it may be an instrument of perceiving things clearly, and rightly distinguishing between them—judging concerning that which is true and false, consequent and inconsequent, according to the rules of good and necessary consequence impressed upon our rational nature by God after it has been illuminated by the light of the divine word (see above, Question X). For although reason receives the principles of religion from the light of faith, yet (this light preceding) it ought to judge from these principles how the parts of the heavenly doctrine cohere and mutually establish each other; what is consistent with and what is contrary to them. Fourth, the mind may be furnished and prepared by these inferior systems for the reception and management of a higher science. This must however be done so carefully that a too great love of philosophy may not captivate us and that we may not regard it as a mistress, but as a handmaid. Thus Clement of Alexandria: "Let philosophy submit to theology, as Hagar to Sarah, and suffer itself to be admonished and corrected; but if it will not be obedient, cast out the handmaid."

VI. Many abuses can also be reckoned up: (1) when those things which philosophy reports truly concerning things subject to it and of an inferior order are transferred to the mysteries of theology. For example, that from nothing nothing comes; from privation to a habit there is no return; a virgin cannot be a mother, etc. Here is a change to a different genus (*metabasis eis allo genos*), and what philosophy teaches must be understood of its own kingdom and of natural causes, not of the kingdom of grace and in a supernatural order. Therefore, they are at fault who use such arguments against the creation of the world, the incarnation and the resurrection of the dead because Scripture teaches us that these things were the results not of natural causes, but of the omnipotence of God. (2) When under the pretext of philosophy, false dogmas of philosophers are assumed, and from them errors are introduced into theology or defended, such as the opinion of Aristotle about the eternity of the world, of Plato about purgatorial fire, of the Stoics about fatal necessity, etc. But the errors of philosophers are not the dictates of philosophy, any more than the mistakes of artificers are to be imputed to the art itself. "Philosophy," says Clement of Alexandria, "is not to be called

Stoic, nor Platonic, nor Epicurean, nor Aristotelian, but whatever has been properly spoken by these sects—this, gathered into one whole, is to be called philosophy” (*Stromata* 1.7 [ANF 2:308; PG 8.731]). (3) When philosophy assumes to itself the office of a master in articles of faith, not content with that of a servant (as was done by the Scholastics who placed Aristotle upon the throne; and by the Socinians who would not admit the doctrines of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc. because they did not seem to be in accordance with the principles of philosophy). (4) When more new distinctions and phrases than necessary are introduced from philosophy into theology under which (oftentimes) new and dangerous errors lie concealed.

VII. For a thing to be denied by philosophy is different from not being taught by it. We do not deny that various theological mysteries are not taught in philosophy, but it does not follow that they are denied by it because the limits of the two sciences must be kept distinct. The physician does not meddle with geometry, nor the lawyer with natural science. So philosophy should be kept within its proper bounds and not be allowed to thrust its pruning hook into a different field. Therefore, because it says nothing about the Trinity and the incarnation, we must not suppose that it denies these doctrines.

VIII. Paul does not condemn true philosophy considered in itself (Col. 2:8), but the vain and false philosophy held by the philosophers of that age by whom the doctrines of the gospel were corrupted. Such is always found in the concrete, when it is carried beyond its true bounds and takes upon itself the judgment of supernatural and divine things. The words of Prudentius are applicable here: “If the lesser nature seeks to strain its gaze too keenly and to penetrate the mysteries of God, who would question that its vision is beaten, its frail power flags, the working of the tired intellect is thrown out in little mind and is dulled and fails under its feeble efforts” (*A Reply to the Address of Symmachus*, II, 99-104 [Loeb, 2:14-15]). That Paul meant such a philosophy is evident: (1) from the description subjoined because he calls it vain deceit (*kenēn apatēn*); (2) from the example of the “worship of angels” (v. 18), which is not a doctrine of true philosophy, but a cancerous tumor; (3) from the similar case because Paul condemns enticing words (*pithanalogian*, v. 4); not all (since he himself often used them) but those which deceive (*paralogizousan*). So he does not condemn all philosophy, but only that which is unsound and deceptive; such as the false apostles endeavored to introduce that they might thus lead believers away from the truth and simplicity of the gospel while, under the pretext of some hidden wisdom, they occupied themselves in pressing upon the Colossians new and erroneous doctrines concerning the worship of angels (probably fished up from the Platonic pools). Or by deceitful words (*paralogismois*) and sophisms, they labored to recommend the use and necessity of legal ceremonies and human traditions, and so by degrees to bring them from Christ back again to Moses.

IX. In Rom. 1:21, 22, the apostle does not condemn true philosophy, but only its abuse; nor does he speak of philosophy, but of philosophers who, puffed up with an empty opinion of their wisdom, became vain in their imaginations. So when he disputes at Athens (Acts 17:18) against the Stoics and Epicureans, he does not reject philosophy in itself, but only the doctrines of those philosophers who opposed the belief in the one true God, Jesus Christ and in the resurrection of the dead.

X. That because God is the author of philosophy and of natural reason, these should be the interpreters of Scripture is an absurd inference. For God is the author of the former by a natural enlightenment (*phanerōsin*) in the corrupt state of man so far as concerns truth known still by nature, but of the latter by a gracious revelation (*apokalypsin*) in a state restored by grace so far as concerns mysteries inaccessible to reason. Nor because God is the author of philosophy is he therefore the author of the interpretations which any philosopher may put upon it.

XI. The fathers sometimes spoke rather severely of philosophy: as Tertullian, where he says that “philosophers are the patriarchs of heretics” (*Treatise Against Hermogenes* 8 [ACW 24:37; PL 2.204]), and “What similarity exists between Athens and Jerusalem, what between the academy and the church, between heretics and Christians? Our doctrine is from the porch of Solomon, not of Zeus, they may see who have introduced a Stoic and Platonic and dialectic Christian. We have no need of curiosity after Jesus Christ, nor of searching after the gospel” (*Prescription Against Heretics* 7 [ANF 3:246; PL 2.20-21]). Cyprian (*Letter* 55, 16.1 [ACW 46:42]), Lactantius (*Divine Institutes* 3.13 [FC 49:194-97]) and others do not condemn true philosophy keeping within its bounds, but a false and rash philosophy (which dares to meddle with things above its comprehension), and the philosophers of that time who were most bitter enemies of the Christian faith.

XII. Although the apostles taught theology without the help of philosophy, it does not follow that we also can do it because the consequence from that extraordinary and immediate instruction of God (which was necessary in those first beginnings of the rising church) to the ordinary and mediate (which is given by the study and help of inferior sciences) does not hold good.

XIII. Although theology teaches many things which philosophy knows not, it does not follow that a thing may be false in philosophy which is true in theology because truth is not at variance with truth, nor is light opposed to light. But care must be taken that philosophical truths be not extended beyond their own sphere and the ordinary powers of nature to those things which are of supernatural revelation or power; that the physical be not confounded with the hyperphysical or human with divine things. For example, it is true in philosophy that a virgin cannot bring forth, that a heavy body is carried downwards, that fire burns matter placed in contact with it, that from nothing, nothing can come—the contraries of which theology maintains. But they are not on this account opposed to each other because these things are spoken of in different relations (*kai' allo kai allo*). In philosophy, they are denied with reference to the laws of nature, but in theology they are affirmed with reference to divine omnipotence and supernaturally.

XIV. Although the philosopher may be allowed to begin with a doubt in order to a safer investigation of natural things, yet this cannot be introduced into subjects of theology and faith. They are founded upon certain and indubitable principles and truths known per se, to doubt concerning which is impious (as concerning the existence of God) unless we wish to strip ourselves of conscience and the moral dependence on the Creator (which cannot be shaken off or for a moment rejected without crime) and thus to introduce philosophical doubt (*epochēn*) into religion and render the whole of theology sceptical.

FOURTEENTH QUESTION: FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES AND ERRORS

Are some theological topics fundamental, others not; and how can they be mutually distinguished?

The Socinians err in defect.

I. The question concerning fundamental articles is difficult and important. It has been discussed by many who have erred both in defect and in excess. The Socinians err in defect who admit very few fundamentals (and those only practical, the theoretical being almost entirely set aside) so that they may teach that the settling of the differences in religion is easy since they relate more to theological conclusions and to the dogmas of the schools than to fundamental articles of faith (which are both few in number and held substantially by both sides). Under this pretext they take away from fundamentals the principal doctrines of faith: as the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the person of Christ, the satisfaction, etc. To this class the Arminians evidently belong who reduce fundamentals to those heads which are placed beyond dispute among almost all Christians and are contained in these three: faith in the divine promises, obedience to the divine precepts and a due reverence for the Scriptures.

II. Those who err in excess are both the papists who are impudent enough often to declare as fundamental their own hay and stubble and whatever the Romish church teaches; and the more strict Lutherans who (to render a union with us more difficult) extend fundamentals more widely than is just, turn almost every error into a heresy and make necessary those things which are indifferent so as more easily to prove that we differ on fundamentals.

III. The orthodox hold the mean between both. As they necessarily build upon some fundamentals, so they neither restrict them too closely, nor extend them too far.

IV. As in a house that is the foundation which has such a position that the house can neither be erected nor stand without it, so in religion that is the foundation upon which the whole of religion depends and it standing, religion stands; removed, religion falls. It is used in two senses: either simply and personally (applied to Christ the foundation of all salvation upon which the church and religion are built as upon a firm and immovable rock, Mt. 16:18; 1 Pet. 2:6, 7; 1 Cor. 3:11—"for other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ"); or comprehensively and naturally for the fundamental truth which all are required to believe and which is therefore called the foundation of faith. But this may be either widely extended to the first rudiments of the Christian religion (which were taught the catechumens for initiation and are called by the apostle the foundation [*themeliou*], or the principles [*archēs*]): such as repentance from dead works, faith toward God, the doctrine of baptisms, the laying on of hands, the resurrection of the dead and eternal judgment (Heb. 6:1, 2). These principles however have not an equal degree of necessity, some being necessary primarily and by themselves and others secondarily only and by reason of some other thing. In this sense, fundamental articles of religion belong to the decalogue, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the sacraments and the power of the keys because they contain the doctrine of salvation as necessary and fundamental without which we cannot receive the rest. Or strictly, it denotes the

essential doctrines of Christianity of which the theory (*theōria*) and practice is necessary simply as to the thing itself; or which are simply and absolutely necessary to be believed by all Christians and cannot be unknown or denied without peril to salvation. In this sense, we now speak of fundamental articles.

**All articles are
not fundamental.**

V. Although all the truths revealed in Scripture are necessary to be believed as divine and infallible, yet they are not all equally necessary and the amplitude and extension of faith must be accurately distinguished here from its necessity. Not everything which belongs to the amplitude of faith must therefore belong to its necessity. All truths are not of the same weight. Some have a greater, others a lesser degree of necessity. For example, some are necessary by the necessity of means; others only by the necessity of precept. Some relate to doctrines strictly so called, others only to rites and ceremonies. One relates to some article or doctrine as to substance (for instance that Christ suffered and died); another to the same considered only with reference to circumstances (for instance, that Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate and was crucified between two thieves). For we might be ignorant of the latter without peril to our salvation.

**Proof of this
from Scripture.**

VI. Scripture plainly intimates such a difference between articles (1 Cor. 3:11-13). Here Paul distinguishes the foundation from the things built upon it. In Phil. 3:15, he teaches that there are some doctrines about which Christians may differ without destroying peace and love. If anyone touches the fundamentals, he is subjected to this anathema: "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed" (Gal. 1:8). In others there is room for Christian forbearance: "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye" (Rom. 14:1); and "Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded; and if in anything ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereunto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing" (Phil. 3:15, 16). But as in faith there is a difference with respect to doctrines, so also in the law with respect to precepts there is a moral and a ceremonial necessity—the former is absolute and indispensable, the latter hypothetical and changeable.

VII. Hence some doctrines are necessary to be known simply for the existence of faith, others only relatively (*kata ti*) and for its well-being; some to the production of faith, others to its perfection (Heb. 6:1); some per se and absolutely to all whether babes (*nēpiois*) or perfect (*teleiois*) others accidentally only to these of full age (*teleiois*) and advanced (Heb. 5:13, 14). Some doctrines are relatively necessary to the instruction of others. This necessity again is to be taken in a certain degree of latitude according to the gifts, instruction, calling, sex and age, inasmuch as some belong to the flock, while others are pastors to whom are committed the oracles of God, whose duty it is to give instruction (*didaskēin*) and to convince the gainsayers (*tous antilegontas elenchein*, Tit. 1:9).

VIII. Again as one object of faith is general and proportionate (viz., the whole word of God) and another special and peculiar (viz., the doctrine concerning Christ with the dependant articles and the promises of God), so some doctrines of faith are primary and immediate; as the articles concerning the Trinity, Christ the Mediator, justification, etc. Others are secondary and mediate (or conse-

quent) hypotheses and conclusions springing from and deduced from the primary. Some are positive, affirming some true doctrine; as that Christ is the Son of God, that his death is a ransom (*lytron*) for our sins. Others are negative, rejecting what is false; as that the Mass should not be celebrated, that there is no purgatory, etc. With regard to these doctrines, some are necessary to be believed publicly and formally, as the special and proper objects of faith (primary and immediate doctrines and positive articles concerning the principal head of faith); others only implicitly and virtually.

A threefold error, against the foundation, about it and beside it.

IX. What we have said about articles of faith may be said of the errors to which they are opposed. As all truths are not of the same necessity, so all the wounds which are inflicted upon the truth are not therefore deadly, nor is every error capital. Hence we distinguish errors into three kinds: (1) against the foundation; (2) about it; and (3) beside it. An error against the foundation is that which directly overturns one or more articles of faith (i.e., one which denies the divinity of Christ and the Trinity of persons). An error about the foundation is that which does not indeed directly deny a fundamental article, but yet maintains an opposition, which standing, the article indirectly and by necessary consequence is overthrown; as that which teaches the existence of God, but does not recognize his providence (because providence being removed, God is taken away). An error beside the foundation is one which either does not touch the foundation at all or has reference to it only by a remote and obscure consequence and is occupied about problematical and curious questions, neither revealed in the word nor necessary to be known. Such are the doctrines which Paul calls “hay and stubble” (1 Cor. 3:12*), which can stand with the true foundation. These will not hinder the one professing them from being saved, although he will suffer loss.

X. One error directly, at first and immediately overthrows the foundation; another, indirectly, secondarily and by consequence. The former is undoubtedly the greater of the two. Again, an error can overturn the foundation indirectly and by a proximate, evident, necessary consequence; or by a remote, evident and wrested consequence. The former is certainly a deadly error, not so the latter. Thus the papists do not directly attack the sufficiency of the satisfaction of Christ and justification by faith and other like doctrines; but indirectly and by consequence (though evident and necessary) oppose it by their errors concerning the merit of works, their own satisfactions, the sacrifice of the Mass, purgatory, etc. They who quietly rest in the terms of an implied contradiction where there is opposition in apposition and a contradiction in the addition are to be regarded as overthrowing the foundation no less than those who directly attack it.

XI. An error which by inevident and violent consequence is deduced from any doctrine (or which they who hold the doctrine seriously and piously detest) cannot with justice be imputed to them. For instance, those with which the Reformers were charged (i.e., that they made God the author of sin, that they denied his omnipotence because they would not hold to the ubiquity of Christ's body, that they converted the sacraments into mere signs because they denied the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper), cannot be lawfully ascribed to them. These errors neither follow—but are only supposed to follow—nor are evident and innate consequences which may be deduced from the true doctrine

of the Reformers, but are wrested against their intention and instead of being received are condemned and rejected by them.

XII. There is a verbal error (about phrases only) and a real error (about the doctrines themselves). The former cannot be fundamental because "it is heresy concerning the understanding, not concerning Scripture" (Hilary, *The Trinity* 2*.3 [FC 25:36; PL 10.51]). The sense, not the words, gives character to a fault. As Jerome says, "The gospel is not in words of the Scriptures, but in the sense, not on the surface, but in the marrow, not in the leaves of words, but in the root of reason" (*Commentariorum . . . ad Galatas* 1 [PL 26.347] on Gal. 1:11, 12).

XIII. It is one thing to speak of doctrines and principles of theology; another to speak of their conclusions and consequences. The knowledge and assent to the latter is necessary indeed to theologians that they may have a richer knowledge of divine things for the confirmation (*kataskeuēn*) of the truth and the overthrow (*anaskeuēn*) of error. But they are not always necessary to Christians in general and can be unknown by them without endangering their salvation. But when we speak here of fundamental articles, we do not mean those which are explicitly necessary to be known by the perfect man (the man of God) so as to fill up the measure of his duty and name; but exactly those which every believer and Christian must believe in order to salvation.

XIV. Some have only the necessity of means, others only that of precept. The former compose the foundation of themselves and primarily; the latter are secondarily built upon the foundation which strengthens and confirms them. The former are absolutely and always necessary; the latter relatively. Without those salvation cannot be obtained; but without these it can. Nor does a simple privation of these ensure condemnation, but only the contempt, such as the sacraments.

XV. We must distinguish between the body of substance of an article or doctrine and its mode and circumstances. The substance of a fundamental article neither can nor ought to be unknown and always remains the same, but it is otherwise in relation to the circumstance or mode, the ignorance of which is not, as a matter of course, damning. Hence an error is either about the substance of a thing or about the mode, circumstance or degree; either about the fact (*to hoti*) or about the how (*to pōs*) and the wherefore (*to dioti*). It is true that sometimes when the mode is altered the thing itself is taken away because the mode enters into the essence of the thing and forms a part of it; as in practice, he who takes away the mode of divine worship enjoined by God overthrows the worship itself (Mt. 15:9). He who takes away the mode of redemption by the ransom (*lytron*) of Christ (the mode of justification by faith) overthrows redemption itself and justification. But it is also true that an error as to the mode and circumstances may not be hurtful to the thing itself. For example, the Greeks were convicted of an error about the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit; nevertheless they held to the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of the Spirit.

XVI. Faith may be considered either according to the plenitude and degree of light or according to the multitude of things to be believed. In the former respect, faith could increase in proportion to the measure of revelation and be fuller under the New than under the Old Testament economy, but not in the latter because in this sense faith is unchangeable (Eph. 4:5) and "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, and today and forever" (Heb. 13:8).

XVII. The doctrine concerning Jesus, the son of Mary, the true Messiah, is not a new article of faith as to substance and *in thesi*, since they of old believed that the Messiah would come. But it is only a special determination and application of the prophetic oracles *in hypothesis*.

XVIII. Some subjects are fundamental in themselves; others become so only accidentally when they run into some fundamental topic. For example, circumcision is not in itself fundamental, but it becomes so when it is made necessary for salvation and runs into the doctrine of justification. In this sense, the apostle inveighs against the false apostles (who wished to retain the use of circumcision) as holding a deadly error (Gal. 5:2, 3). So also the article concerning the Lord's Supper is not of itself fundamental, yet it is rendered such by the papists when they make it a propitiatory sacrifice for sins.

XIX. The following things must belong to fundamental articles: (1) that they be catholic, for the things necessary for the salvation of everyone are required for a universal faith (according to the Athanasian Creed "whoever wishes to be saved must above all things hold the catholic faith; for unless it is held entire and inviolate he will perish forever" [cf. Schaff, 2:66]); (2) that the belief of the catholic truths necessarily draws salvation after it; and the ignorance of them, the entire doubt of danger, the impious and heretical denial, is damnable; (3) that believers cherish a true consent to them, nor do some think differently from others because if anyone thinks or speaks otherwise he is subjected to the curse (Gal. 1:8). Hence where a difference in fundamentals exists, there cannot be union. (4) That all theological doctrines be reduced to them as to a rule which the apostle calls the analogy of faith (*analogian pisteōs*); (5) that they be primary and principal truths upon which all others are built as upon a foundation—and being removed, faith itself is overthrown; not secondary and less principal, by the removal of which faith is only shaken.

***The criteria
of fundamental
articles are drawn
from the nature
of the doctrines.***

XX. The criteria for distinguishing fundamental and non-fundamental articles can be derived from the nature and condition of the doctrines themselves (viz., those which contain the necessary causes and conditions of salvation, both the end and the means necessary to that end, since, if the causes are denied, the effect is also taken away and the means being denied, the end cannot

be obtained). Hence as the grace of God by which we are elected, the merit of Christ by which we are redeemed, and the Spirit by whom we are sanctified are the principal causes of salvation and faith the instrumental (Jn. 3:16, 17), repentance and conversion to God the necessary conditions (Heb. 6:1*; Mt. 3:2), we say that all these doctrines are fundamental.

XXI. Second, fundamental articles can be derived from the declaration of Scripture. For those would certainly be considered fundamental the knowledge of which is called necessary and saving, and the ignorance or denial deadly. Such are the articles concerning the one and true God, both positively (Jn. 17:3) and negatively (1 Jn. 2:23); concerning sin (1 Jn. 1:10; Eph. 2:1); concerning the person, nature and offices of Christ (1 Cor. 3:11; Acts 4:12; 1 Jn. 4:3; Eph. 2:11, 12); concerning the gospel (Rom. 1:16, 17; Gal. 1:8, 9); concerning faith (Heb. 11:6; Mk. 16:16); concerning justification without works (Rom. 3:27; Gal. 2, 3); concerning sanctification and the worship of God (Eph. 2:10; Heb. 12:14); and concerning the resurrection and eternal life (1 Cor. 15:14; 2 Tim. 2:8; Rom. 10:9).

XXII. The third mark of fundamental articles can be drawn from the Apostles' Creed in which the ancients gathered together from the apostolic writings the substance of fundamental doctrines. Hence the name "Symbol" was given to it because it is as the mark or sign as it were of Christianity. We must however carefully note: (a) that it cannot be an exact mark of fundamental articles because it treats only of theoretical articles relating to faith, not of practical articles relating to worship; (b) that the things to be believed are not found here in so many words (*autolexei*) and explicitly, but implicitly by consequence and analogy: for example, although nothing is said about the grace of God and the satisfaction of Christ, nothing about providence, conservation and the like, yet they may easily be deduced from what is said; (c) that the Symbol is not to be considered only with regard to the words, but as to the sense (because, as Hilary says, "The Scriptures do not consist in the reading but in the understanding," *Ad Constantium Augustum*, II,9 [PL 10.570]; and "fundamentals are not found in the words but in the sense," as Jerome says). Therefore although heretics may say that they receive the Symbol, yet they do not because they reject its true and genuine sense. So Sabellius, Arius, Macedonius and other anti-Trinitarians formerly professed (to no purpose) in the words of the Symbol their faith in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, while they endeavored to overthrow this very doctrine not by secret attacks, but by open warfare. The Socinians of our day and their disciples are doing this. In vain do the papists profess their belief in it, who corrupt the meaning of the various articles concerning the sufferings and death of Christ, his descent to hell, the catholic church, the remission of sins and the like.

XXIII. Although theology is both theoretical and practical, yet the Socinians are wrong in saying that fundamental articles can be distinguished from non-fundamental by this one criterion alone—the obedience due to God and Christ or the seal for piety and good works (because not only are the commands of duty necessary to salvation, but also the doctrines of faith, as we learn from Jn. 20:31 and 2 Tim. 3:16). Hence, as there are practical fundamental articles, so there should also be theoretical.

XXIV. Although some of the orthodox hold to more, others to fewer articles of faith, they do not differ in reality, but only in the words and manner of proposing them. Some bring them into more general and summary classes; others classify them more particularly and as to parts (*kata merē*). Hence some limit the foundation of salvation to the sole truth concerning Jesus Christ as our crucified Redeemer from 1 Cor. 2:2; this however, embraces many others. Others limit it to the two concerning the knowledge of God and of Christ from Jn. 17:3. Others again extend them to four heads, theoretical as well as practical; others to six. But they all agree in these fundamental articles: the doctrines concerning the sacred Scriptures as inspired (*theopneustō*), being the only and perfect rule of faith; concerning the unity of God and the Trinity; concerning Christ, the Redeemer, and his most perfect satisfaction; concerning sin and its penalty—death; concerning the law and its inability to save; concerning justification by faith; concerning the necessity of grace and of good works, sanctification and the worship of God, the church, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment and eternal life and such as are connected with these. All these are so strictly joined together that they mutually depend upon each other. One cannot be withdrawn without overthrowing all the rest.

The question concerning the number of fundamental articles is rash and useless.

XXV. The question concerning the number of fundamental articles which our adversaries have proposed, besides being rash (since Scripture says nothing definitely about it) is also useless and unnecessary because there is no need of our knowing particularly the number of such articles, if we can prove that they err fundamentally in one or more. And this can be done easily with regard to

the papists, Socinians, Anabaptists and similar heretics.

XXVI. Nor does it follow from this that the perfection of Scripture in necessary things is detracted from, nor that the rule of ecclesiastical communion is wanting among us. For the Scriptures do not cease to contain most fully all things necessary to salvation, although their number is not accurately set forth. The truth of the fundamental articles (which should be to us in place of a rule) may be clearly deduced from the criteria mentioned above.

XXVII. When the orthodox sometimes maintain that the fundamental articles are few, this must not be understood absolutely and simply, but both as to the principal heads. Taken collectively (*syllēbdēn*), these are few in comparison with the papists (who largely increase them) making the canons of the church, the publicly received dicta of the schools and the traditions of the fathers into articles of faith, any departure from which involves one in the guilt of heresy.