

Black Reconstruction in Palestine/Israel

ON THE WAGES OF JEWISHNESS

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IN *BLACK RECONSTRUCTION*, W. E. B. DU BOIS introduced the powerful notion of the wage of whiteness, the “public and psychological wage” afforded to the white working class.¹ This wage was detrimental to the efforts of the Left insofar as the enjoyment of whiteness sowed division from within, alienated white workers’ Black comrades, and helped to derail the proletarian revolution in the United States. Drawing on Du Bois’s work, David R. Roediger comments on the ways “the pleasures of whiteness could function as a ‘wage’ for white workers. That is, status and privileges conferred by race could be used to make up for the alienating and exploitative class relationships, North and South. White workers could, and did, define and accept their class positions by fashioning identities as ‘not slaves’ and as ‘not Blacks.’”² In the same vein, Robin D. G. Kelley notes, “A sense of superiority and security was gained by being white and *not* being black. White workers sometimes obtained very real material benefits by institutionalizing their strength through white-controlled unions that used their power to enforce a ceiling on black mobility and wages. The limited privileges afforded white workers as white meant a subordinate status for African American workers. Hence even the division of labor was racialized—black workers had to perform ‘nigger work.’ And without the existence of ‘nigger work’ and ‘nigger labor,’ whiteness to white workers would be meaningless.”³ Anti-Blackness guarantees white labor’s desirable difference, its more *human* labor.

This essay turns to *Black Reconstruction* to elucidate the ways in which the economic and libidinal force of such a wage is equally at work in Palestine/Israel, where, I argue, the Zionist project of settler colonialism (with its blatant anti-Palestinianness) relies on the wage of Jewishness in a way analogous to the dynamics Du Bois analyzed. Du Bois himself didn’t adopt such a

critical position toward Zionism, at least not initially. In “The Ethics of the Problem of Palestine,” published in 1948, Du Bois expressed his unabashed support for Zionism, problematically repeating its distorted and distorting tropes: “Palestine is a land largely of plateaus, mountains, and deserts sparsely inhabited, and could easily maintain millions more people than the two million it has today. Among the Arabs there is widespread ignorance, poverty, and disease and a fanatic belief in the Mohammedan religion, which makes these people suspicious of other peoples and other religions. Their rulership is a family and clan despotism which makes effective use of democratic methods difficult.”⁴ Du Bois accepted wholesale Zionism’s Orientalist vision of Palestine and its inhabitants. And Du Bois wasn’t alone. Many Black intellectuals saw common cause with Zionism: A movement of liberation for the historically marginalized looked quite appealing.⁵ However, Du Bois became more critical of Israel as he came to recognize its colonial ambitions and affinities with Western imperialism.⁶

In the hands of Zionists, Jewishness came to function as whiteness did in America, as a source of racial division and racist oppression. As with the wage of whiteness, the wage of Jewishness is entangled in both political and libidinal economies; it induces attachment to the nation state and its capitalistic operations, while rewarding all Jews psychically. On the one hand, the wage functions as an economic encouragement, offering Jews at home and abroad the advantage of being Jewish in (Greater) Israel. Indeed, economic well-being and nationalist attachment go hand in hand. In the disenfranchised Palestinian worker, the Israeli working class does not find a comrade, an ally in collective upheaval against the capitalist order, but a foe, a fundamental threat to Israel, that is, to the state-sanctioned settler’s expropriation of Indigenous land and usurpation of its resources. In this sense, the exploitation of Palestinians is accomplished “equally” by “Israeli capitalists” and the “Israeli proletariat.”⁷

On the other hand, the wage of Jewishness helps to buttress a feeling of communal belonging, of Jewish unity and solidarity, papering over Zionism’s own racial ranking of its Jewish population, where Ashkenazi or European-descended Jews enjoy the full privileges of Jewishness because of their affiliation to a whiteness upheld as superior since the early Zionist leaders, themselves Ashkenazi, forged their image of Israel in a European settler-colonial mold. Anchoring the wage of Jewishness in broader and shared racial settler-colonial structures stresses “the public quality of the wage”⁸ and mitigates against an individualist account of the pleasure and rewards

of whiteness/Jewishness. If that whiteness was always in doubt in Europe (manifested in the curtailing and denial of European Jews' human and civil rights), Ashkenazi Zionists tirelessly worked to secure the whiteness of Jews by casting Israel as, in the chauvinist words of former prime minister Ehud Barak, a "vanguard of culture against barbarism . . . a villa in the middle of a jungle," a "protective wall" shielding the West from its primitive neighbors.⁹ Israel's other Jews—Sephardim (descendants of Jews from Spain), Mizrahim (Arab Jews, that is, Jews of Muslim countries, of Middle Eastern or North African origin), and Ethiopians—are subjected to discrimination and neglect, the last crushingly so. But the wage of Jewishness affords any Ashkenazi and non-Ashkenazi Jews in Israel and in the illegal settlements, no matter how economically and ontologically impoverished they are, the libidinal gratification that they have better standing, that they are socially better off than the Palestinians—who stand for pure abjection under Zionism's ideological horizon. All Jews are rewarded with "psychological wages" (ensuring capitalist domination)—and Palestinians punished with "badges of inferiority"¹⁰ (ensuring racial domination). The binding to your Jewish kin necessitates, then, either indifference or hostility toward Israel's racialized Palestinian neighbor: The inferior Palestinian either doesn't matter, or she is my enemy.

Ironically, the wage of Jewishness also operates alongside the fact that a majority of Israeli Jews consider themselves either nonreligious or atheists¹¹ and yet are fully committed to the belief that Israel is and should be both democratic and Jewish. We can discern at work here the psychoanalytic notion of fetishist disavowal, which takes the form of, *I know very well, but all the same*. . . . According to Octave Mannoni, this logic accounts for the paradoxical ways "a belief can be abandoned and preserved at the same time."¹² In Israel's collective fetishist disavowal, as Slavoj Žižek avers, "[Israeli Jews] know very well that God doesn't exist, but [they] none the less believe that he gave [them] the land of Greater Israel."¹³ Or in another formulation, we might say, liberal Zionists know very well about the horrors of Nakba and the ongoing Occupation, but all the same they believe in Israel's unique democracy. The wage of Jewishness nurtures the fetish of Jewish exceptionality—the Chosen People, the possibility of a Jewish *and* democratic state. This exceptionality insistently morphs into Jewish supremacy. Zionism weaponizes "Jewishness," transforming it as a communal value, the basis for inclusion in a self-enclosed nation state (Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People), where the Jew/no-Jew distinction guarantees and secures the economic and libidinal borders of who matters and who does not.

Within the Zionist settler-colonial narrative, of course the Palestinian within and without Israel's borders poses a problem. The Palestinians of 1948 who never left after the partition are citizens of Israel but not nationals. They are separate but *unequal*—at best, treated as third-class citizens; at worst, considered bloodthirsty terrorists. Classified by the Israeli government as Arab Israelis, they are stripped of their Palestinianness yet marked as Arabs, as different from Jews and suspiciously tied to the enemy without. Across the Green Line, the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories represent a constant irritant, deemed disposable, beings-waiting-for-disappearance. In the Zionist collective fantasy, the figure of the Palestinian unifies, in principle, all Jews (in Israel and in the Diaspora) and the very category of Jewishness. Thus, when Palestinians or their supporters question in any way the legitimacy of the state of Israel, they are immediately accused of anti-Semitism, of hatefully attacking Jewishness itself. On the one hand, the wage of Jewishness clearly gains strength from the prophylactic charge of anti-Semitism by immunizing Israel from critique and strengthening the phantasmatic unity of Jews through the logic of Us versus Them. This is an enemy that includes leftist activists and scholars under the dubious heading of “new anti-Semitism”; as Bernard-Henri Levy puts it, “the anti-Semitism will be progressive—or nothing at all.”¹⁴ On the other, the sheer presence of Palestinians in Israel is a demographic scandal to the Jewish nation and its committed believers, risking invalidating the Zionist *terra nullius* narrative and the circulation of the wage of Jewishness.

THE (ANTI-PALESTINIAN) STRUGGLES FOR JEWISHNESS

Under prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 2022 far-right coalition, with its aggressive agenda for “juridical reform” (or “judicial coup,” as detractors call it), the wage of Jewishness appears to be faltering, undergoing a kind of crisis of authenticity. In response to the government's disruptive overreach, the protests of hundreds of thousands of Israelis are halting the wage's smooth operation. Access to the wage is now framed as a question: Who is a Jew? Put slightly differently, who is perceived to be the proper subject of the wage of Jewishness? Who is supposed to be enjoying their Jewishness—and at whose cost? The Law of Return comes front and center in the legal and political deliberations about *belonging* to the state of Israel. Among the proposed changes are challenges to the “grandchild clause”¹⁵ and to non-Orthodox

conversion to Judaism. Secular Jews in Israel and around the world (especially in Western nations) are deeply concerned about the implications of these changes for Israeli democracy and its so-called Jewish character. And in this sense, it might be more accurate to talk about the wages (in the plural) of Jewishness, along with seemingly competing visions of Israel.

Whether or not the coalition eventually implodes because of its unprecedented local and global objections or succeeds in pressing and passing its judicial agenda, an antagonism in Israel's social fabric has been revealed that is now hard to ignore. Collective fetishist disavowal is still functioning, but taking multiple, divergent directions. For the large block of Mizrahi Jews, a commitment to Netanyahu and his far-right religious and nationalist coalition reflects their values, set in opposition to the more secular and liberal Ashkenazi segment of the population. As Laly Deraï—a committed Mizrahi supporter of Likud—put it, “We vote according to our culture, we vote for those who do not underestimate our faith, our tradition, those who do not treat us as lacking understanding not able to decide and choose what is really important to us.”¹⁶

But there is no illusion about Netanyahu's religious credentials.¹⁷ The fact that he is “religiously non-observant” does not factor in Deraï's decision.¹⁸ What matters is not his (lack of) obedience to the *halakha* (Jewish law), but his “self-definition.”¹⁹ The religious supporter notices a crucial difference between the way Netanyahu and his “liberal” political opponent Yair Lapid frame Israel's birth, or what the creation of Israel is responding to. In Deraï's words, “Yair Lapid, head of the centrist Yesh Atid party, visited Israel's Holocaust memorial when he became prime minister in July. ‘He says that Israel was created because of the Shoah.’ But when Netanyahu is elected, he goes to the Kotel [the Western Wall]; it's a Jewish declaration that fits us. The attachment to our traditions remains very strong across generations.”²⁰ Lapid conforms to a Western narrative about Israel; it is the political horizon of the Shoah that helped bring into being the nation state of Israel. But Netanyahu insists on the biblical narrative that answers the Jewish people's longings, that legitimizes Israel, not the United Nations and Western allies. Israel's existence lies in the realization of a “millennial dream” and not in Western guilt for the Shoah; its creation is not conditional, as it were, on recognition from non-Jews.²¹

Yet there is more to the Mizrahi identification with the Likud party than a shared view of Israel's eschatological calling. Economic and libidinal interests also undergird the aspirational Zionist dream of a Greater Israel. This idea,

which puts the illegal annexation of Palestinian land firmly on the political agenda, is after all what Netanyahu campaigned on, although liberal Zionists dismissed it as rhetorical red meat for his base. While it is tempting to fault Mizrahi Jews, who come from some of Israel's most disenfranchised communities, for acting against their economic interests by not voting for the Left (or even seeing common cause with Palestinians), this common objection, an Israeli version of the "what's the matter with Kansas" question, overlooks the material interests underlying the vision of a Greater Israel. Mizrahi Jews are not voting for the far right despite its economic message but *because* of it. As Tom Mehager notes, "Israel's decades-long policies of discrimination and marginalization of the Mizrahi public by the Israeli Ashkenazi establishment has caused many to find an answer to economic hardship in the nationalist camp."²² The ultrareligious and nationalist coalition forged by Netanyahu directly speaks to the economic concerns of Mizrahi Jews who have a clear material interest in living in an anti-Palestinian world, where Palestinian land is readily open for Jewish possession.

In the case of Mizrahi Jews, the wage of Jewishness breeds not only suspicion and repulsion toward Palestinians but also *ressentiment* for the Ashkenazi Jews—whose vision of liberal democracy enabled them to capitalize on the libidinal and economic value of the(ir) wage of Jewishness/whiteness. If Ashkenazi Jews had unequally enjoyed "the bounty of Palestinian land and resources . . . distributed inside '48 lines," Mizrahi Jews see it as their time to enjoy the spoils of Occupation, that is, the accumulated bounty beyond the Green Line.²³ To adapt Du Bois's formulation, the wage of Jewishness, inflected by Zionist right-wing politics, feeds the vanity of Mizrahi Jews because it associated them with the Ashkenazi subjects, positioning them as equals.²⁴ Access to affordable housing, "backed by government loans and subsidized housing," has now finally been awarded to Mizrahi families.²⁵ For this reason, the Mizrahi support for Netanyahu and right-wing parties must be interpreted, at least in part, as a resentful class vote against the liberal Zionism of the Ashkenazi elite.

Lana Tatour draws attention to the constitutive ambivalence of Mizrahi subjectivity, caught within the racial gaze of Ashkenazi Zionism and a desire to reconfigure Jewishness through a chauvinist reclaiming of muscular Zionism:

Mizrahim are simultaneously both victims and perpetrators of Zionism. They are simultaneously racialised not only as inferior Arabs but also as superior Jews. The latter is no less significant than the former. Mizrahim, therefore,

share a Zionist orientalist epistemology that views Jews as racially superior to Arabs. Zionism is not leveraged as a form of strategic essentialism so to gain access to power. It rather reflects the ways in which Mizrahi struggles have internalised and naturalised Zionism as intrinsic to Mizrahi subjectivity. Mizrahi mobilisation and activism is thus about undermining an Ashkenazi hegemony not a Zionist one. It is a struggle to expand the category of Jewish entitlement to ensure Mizrahi Jews are as privileged as Ashkenazi Jews.²⁶

The Mizrahi project of expanding the category of Jewish entitlement and deservingness has everything to do with shaping Zionism (and not simply being shaped by it) and the refashioning of its wage of Jewishness, what binds Jews to one another and to the land.

It is no surprise that Mizrahi Jews are, on the whole, inhospitable to the Israeli peace movement. Peace-loving liberal Zionists, the majority of whom are Ashkenazi Jews, oppose the idea of a Greater Israel. Rather, they dream of an end to the Occupation, but go along with the expansion of settlements; they posit peace with the Palestinians as an abstraction, through the defunct idea of the two-state solution: *I know very well that Palestinian enclaves are being reduced to bantustans, all the same, I believe in the two-state solution, in peace in Palestine/Israel*. They prefer “Occupation on cruise control” (an Occupation that does not draw attention to itself) rather than Likud’s “Occupation on steroids” (an Occupation that seeks the annihilation of the Indigenous population—whom they see as encroaching on what belongs to Jews).²⁷

Mizrahi Jews are choosing the latter, paving the way for a Greater Israel and with it the possibility of class advancement (that is, a lessening of economic anxiety/vulnerability). The wage of Jewishness here gains a more militant, religious, and nationalist dimension. It casts Jewish settlers beyond the Green Line as fulfilling the promise of Israel. They can lay proprietary claim to the land of Israel, including Judea and Samaria (what the rest of the world recognizes as the occupied West Bank). Economic interests open to libidinal enjoyment.

The example of the Huwara Pogrom crystallizes the gratification of anti-Palestinianness. In late February 2023, in retaliation for the deaths of two Israeli settlers shot and killed by a Palestinian as they drove through the Palestinian town of Huwara outside Nablus in the occupied West Bank, hundreds of rampaging settlers set fire to cars and homes, while finance minister Bezale Smotrich called for the village’s destruction (“Huwara needs to be erased”).²⁸ A video of IDF soldiers dancing with settlers in Huwara also surfaced, disclosing to the world Israel’s racial animus and the settlers’ display

of what Du Bois names “vindictive joy,”²⁹ the sadistic enjoyment of religious and nationalist Zionism. In the wake of Huwara any firm distinction between state-sanctioned violence (legal violence) and settler violence (illegal violence) appears as a flat ideological lie.³⁰ The army’s move to investigate cannot but smack of insincerity.³¹ The wage of Jewishness fuels the settler movement, eliciting the sympathies of fellow settlers, and yet, the appeal of the settler movement goes much deeper: There is a hungry settler beneath every religious or nationalist Zionist. Netanyahu’s right-wing government is tapping into this obscene identificatory sentiment, one disavowed by mainstream Zionists (who are repulsed by the vulgarity of the settlers, but tacitly enjoy an Israel without Palestinians), harnessing the wage’s genocidal powers.

THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY, OR NOSTALGIA FOR THE PRESENT

Mainstream media coverage of Israel is informed by what Fredric Jameson has dubbed “nostalgia for the present”: The alarmist storyline is typically filled with admiration for Israel’s singularity, that is, of its status as the only democracy in the Middle East (with its independent judiciary), along with its recent history as a “start-up miracle.”³² It generates an alluring but fundamentally distorted memory of Israel from the mid-1990s to the recent present by recalling a belief in the two-state solution, nostalgia for a Netanyahu before Netanyahuism, and a yearning for the time when capitalism and Zionism complemented one another.³³ Israel as a symbol of both a vibrant democracy and a burgeoning capitalism is in dire jeopardy, under attack from within, from a far-right government bent on changing the nation’s global image for the worse, transforming Israel into an authoritarian regime in the mold of Hungary and Poland. This nostalgia for the present fueling the liberal coverage of Palestine/Israel obfuscates the settler-colonial situation. From the Palestinian perspective, all Israeli governments participated, and continue to participate, in a logic of elimination. This rationality is only now becoming impossible for Israel’s Western supporters to ignore. The same Zionist ideology that legitimized the settler-colonial project—resulting in the dispossession and murder of Indigenous Palestinians in 1948 and the brutal Occupation since 1967—produced the monstrous coalition of today. When liberals like Thomas Friedman decry the situation in Israel, none of the causes outlined for this alleged shift touch the settler-colonial context.³⁴

Nostalgia for the present doubles down on the collective ideological fantasy of a Jewish *and* democratic Israel.

All versions of a democratic and Jewish Israel traffic in the wage of Jewishness to the extent that Jewish unity, resolve, and expansion are needed in the nation's demographic war. The Law of Return played, and continues to play, a significant role in the "righteous" struggle for Jewish majority. This democracy, which Western powers are desperately trying to save, promotes a soft elimination of Palestinians; its believers have resigned themselves to an indefinite Occupation. The story goes that liberal or mainstream Zionists tried in good faith to advance the peace process but got the Second Intifada. *They know very well about the Nakba and the Occupation, but all the same they believe in their democracy.* The fetish of democracy—encapsulated in the chant that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East—aligns them with Western values and whiteness. Netanyahu and his proto-fascist regime are risking the delegitimization of Israel³⁵—for liberal supporters of Israel, the Israeli government in its brutish bluntness is aiding the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The Israeli protests for a return to liberal democracy are a lure. There was no liberal democracy before Netanyahu. What protesters are after is a "liberal democracy for Jews,"³⁶ for Ashkenazi-style Jewish unity.

Nostalgia for the present marks the liberal Zionist's fear that Israel will lose its international recognition as a democratic nation capable of legal self-governance. The proposed judicial reform, which weakens the checks and balances between the branches of government, exposes Israel to international scrutiny over its Occupation and human rights abuses. The wage of Jewishness, the enjoyment of being Jewish, starts to look different when your nation's democracy—for Western eyes—begins to unravel in real time. If the state of Israel had managed to convince Western powers of the legitimacy of Israeli-style democracy through its aggressive branding campaigns and *hasbara* (propaganda), the political decision to limit the powers of the judiciary troubles this deeply ingrained narrative. Thomas Friedman sounds the alarm, calling for support for the "one major institutional barrier" standing between democracy and a theocratic nationalist state: "Israel's Supreme Court and independent attorneys general, which have long been held in high regard all over the world, and their ability to limit the government's excesses."³⁷

From a Palestinian perspective, Friedman's high praise of the court jars with the international scrutiny that the Israeli government has received from a variety of human rights groups. The least we can say about the repeated

charge of apartheid leveled at Israel is that it taints Friedman's laudatory portrait of the Supreme Court, which let racial segregation take hold under its watch. More generally, ascribing to the judiciary the role of reliably reigning in the executive branch represents an exaggeration, if not a simple distortion of reality. As David Kretzmer and Yaël Ronen extensively document in *The Occupation of Justice*, the far-right hysteria about leftist judges does not align with the actual decisions of the court: "In almost all of its judgments relating to the Occupied Territories, especially those dealing with questions of principle, the Court has decided in favour of the authorities, often on the basis of dubious legal arguments."³⁸

The exceptions prove the rule. But what concerns the far right is the very possibility of an override, that is, the principle of being subjected to judicial review. The court has already legitimized the Occupation (included state-sanctioned—but internationally illegal—Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories), but this is not enough. If there is any chance that courts might curtail the project of a Greater Israel, then far-right Zionists must denounce the activist bench for overstepping their authority in overturning laws passed by the Parliament. From a settler perspective, the court is inhibiting Zionism's "organic nationhood,"³⁹ the realization of a Greater Israel. Upholding a minimum respect for the law earns the court the outrageous label of "pro-Palestinian."⁴⁰ Without the court's powers to overrule, and with the enthusiastic backing of Netanyahu's government, the settlers will be on the frontline, driving the Zionist project of a Greater Israel, which, of course, depends on land dispossession and native elimination.

RENDERING INOPERATIVE THE WAGE OF JEWISHNESS

What preserves liberal Zionists' belief in the permanent exceptional status of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state is, on one hand, their everyday socioeconomic enjoyment of Israel as an LGBTQ+-friendly, start-up miracle nation, and on the other, their "critical" attitude toward the settlers' vulgar racism, from which they can separate themselves, voicing self-congratulatory protests against the unprecedented influence of religion and nationalism on Israeli politics. Though the plight of Palestinians pales in the face of their interest in juridical autonomy (worse: at these anti-Netanyahu protests Palestinian flags are often prohibited by organizers or looked down upon by other protesters), they still abstractly believe in peace with the Palestinians.

Its fetish-role—a state for Palestinians on condition, of course, that it never impedes on Jewish privilege, on the wage of Jewishness—sustains the liberal Zionist moral high ground. Liberal Zionists aggressively mock Netanyahu’s totalitarian ambitions, decrying the racism and brutishness of his coalition, but they share the same belief in Israeli exceptionality, premised on the disavowal of the knowledge that the settler-colonial context must exist in perpetuity.⁴¹

Like other leftist critics of the anti-Netanyahu protests in Israel, Slavoj Žižek laments protesters’ lack of engagement with Palestinians inside and outside the Green Line, observing that they have “more or less totally ignored the plight of the Palestinians (20% of Israel’s population and millions more in the occupied territories) who will obviously suffer most from the new government and its laws.”⁴² Their intervention does not in the least challenge the operation of the wage of Jewishness or its disavowed predication on anti-Palestinianness. Nostalgia for the present (Ashkenazi normality) cancels *ab initio* the possibility of new desires (about Palestinians, Jewishness, democracy, justice, and so on) emerging from the protests. Yet a civil action like a march on Tel Aviv for Palestinian rights would have politicized further the call for democracy and would have presented Palestinians with a genuine alternative to Hamas. It would have advanced the struggle for a just democracy and challenged Israel’s colonial relations of power by centering the plight of Palestinians.

Born Orientalized, always already filtered through an Islamophobic lens, Palestinians live with constant trepidation and insecurity, particularly in the Occupied Territories. The everyday existence for stateless Palestinians is a state of terror. October 7, 2023, introduced that reality to Israel. “In a few days,” Amira Hass writes, “Israelis went through what Palestinians have experienced as a matter of routine for decades, and are still experiencing—military incursions, death, cruelty, slain children, bodies piled up in the road, siege, fear, anxiety over loved ones, captivity, being targets of vengeance, indiscriminate lethal fire at both those involved in the fighting (soldiers) and the uninvolved (civilians), a position of inferiority, destruction of buildings, ruined holidays or celebrations, weakness and helplessness in the face of all-powerful armed men, and searing humiliation.”⁴³ The Israeli military and settlers can kill and terrorize the Palestinian population at will and with impunity (in the name of preserving their settler-colonial and apartheid state), but when an Indigenous people fight back, fight for their liberation, imperialist powers and media can *only* witness wickedness and terror—and

not desperation and hopelessness over the lack of prospects for a future absent the Occupation. There is no consideration of the Fanonian insight that the colonized, psychologically in agony, are returning to the occupiers their own venom—the world-denying violence of the Occupation is visited on Israeli soldiers and civilians.⁴⁴ As Nicki Kattoura and Geo Maher elaborate, “colonial violence has been pumped mercilessly into Gaza for decades. At some point, like a balloon, it can only explode.”⁴⁵ In a similar vein, Norman Finkelstein compares Hamas’s attack to a “slave revolt,” exemplified by the enslaved Nat Turner’s revolt in Southampton, Virginia, in 1831, which “killed a lot of white people, civilians in a rampage.”⁴⁶ Butchery is met with butchery (and butchery is met again with even greater butchery).

While anticolonial counter-violence appears unavoidable and necessary—insofar as “violence is a cleansing force [*la violence désintoxique*],”⁴⁷ as Fanon puts it, a response to the toxicity of the Occupation—Fanon importantly cautioned about unrestrained brutality, which becomes at its core indistinguishable from the colonizers’ dreadful brand of violence: “Because we want a democratic and renovated Algeria, because we believe one cannot rise and liberate oneself in one area and sink in another, we condemn with pain in our hearts, those brothers who have flung themselves into revolutionary action with the almost physiological brutality that centuries of oppression give rise to and feed.”⁴⁸ Undisciplined violence jeopardizes the emancipatory project of Palestinians and risks compromising the universality of their vision.

The Left asks, “Where do Palestinians go from here? What needs to change? What must happen to break this lopsided cycle of violence?” The one thing we know is that the Occupation guarantees Palestinian humiliation and social death. And it guarantees more violence from the Palestinian side. The poison of the Occupation infiltrates all spheres of Palestinian existence. Over two million Palestinians live in the open-air prison that is Gaza, in absolute deprivation, with no freedom of movement—a staggering image of the zone of nonbeing if there ever was one. Many Gazans are in fact refugees from the lands that were stolen from them during the Nakba in 1948. What do they have to lose? What happens when militants, reduced to naked life, no longer fear biological death? The life-draining status quo is marked by Israel’s belligerent unilateralism, and the US-orchestrated rapprochement between authoritarian Arab regimes and the Jewish state. As Jameson might put it, *Why is it easier to imagine the end of hostilities between Israel and Saudi Arabia than the end of the Occupation?*

Since October 7, matters have only gotten worse. Opinion polls show that “Israeli attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are more hawkish than at any point in recent memory.”⁴⁹ But just imagine if the chants “Not in our name” and “Never again for anyone”—which of course were expressed by a large number of Jews, mostly in the diaspora, protesting the atrocities in Gaza committed by the Israeli state—were to be taken up on a broad scale within Israel. They would delegitimize a racist and fascist state; there is no overcoming the latter without a reckoning with the former. As it stands, though, Israel remains unquestionably colonial to its core. Its vision of peace is either an Israel free of Palestinian insolence or a Greater Israel with a limited Arab population. Indefinite Occupation or a Nakba redux are two sides of the same coin.

When it comes to Palestinians, secular and fundamentalist Zionisms are more and less on the same page. Joseph Massad puts the matter starkly: “There is to date nothing that Zionist Jewish fundamentalists have called for that has not been already committed or advocated by secular Zionism.”⁵⁰ Indeed, the mostly secular protests are not calling for a “new beginning”;⁵¹ they “do not really pose a threat to the Israeli apartheid; [the protesters] act as if they are an internal Jewish affair.”⁵² Israeli indifference to the Palestinian question contributes to the naturalization of the Occupation, to the banality of its violence. These protests pose even less of a threat to Israel’s settler colonialism. “A true act”—a decisive intervention that would effectively render inoperative Zionism’s wage of Jewishness and confront the fundamental deadlock of settler colonialism—“would be to propose a large democratic coalition that would include Palestinians.”⁵³ And it should be clear that these Palestinians would need to come from inside and outside of Israel proper, which is the only way to foreground the settler-colonial framework. It is not exclusively about Palestinian citizens of Israel enjoying full inclusion in Israeli civil society—to be seen as a citizen and a national.

No, a democracy worthy of its name cannot fragment the unity of the Palestinian people. Palestine/Israel remains a ’48 problem, not a ’67 one. Loosening the hold of a religio-nationalist Zionism on the collective psyche of Israeli Jews, along with Jews in the diaspora, necessitates a dismantling of the wage of Jewishness (in all of its versions). The wage of Jewishness transforms “being Jewish” into an exclusionary collective claim over the land of historic Palestine. It produces and reproduces a racial state. If Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews are, in their own ways, struggling over the wage’s meaning, Israeli Jews wishing to change the political landscape would need to

disidentify with the state of Israel, and not only with its current government (and thus block the urge for nostalgia). This disidentification would break the ideological spell of the wage of Jewishness; it would involve a kind of symbolic suicide, a defection of sorts, a self-violence, a decision to go against one's roots and certain forms of self-interest—what the wage of Jewishness actively promotes. And what follows from this disidentification—coterminous with a decolonizing of the settler's mind and lifeworld—is an identification with the Palestinian cause.

Zionists will read this as an irresponsible call for civil war, instead of the call for racial and economic justice that it is. To fully identify with the Palestinians means to check your righteous anger (at Netanyahu's coalition) and over-identify with Israeli democracy, breaking its liberal Zionist fetishist-status by universalizing it and actualizing its radical demands—*equality to all*—and thus rendering democracy basically incompatible with a Jewish state. The Palestinians inside and outside the Green Line are Israel's constitutive outsiders. Though some of them are afforded Israeli citizenship, none are truly part of their world. Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are the recipients of the settler government's necropolitics (the state does not manage and protect Palestine life—but destroys it) while Palestinians in Israel proper—de-Palestinized, de-nativized—live a life of invisibility.⁵⁴ To be a Palestinian in Palestine/Israel is to be permanently “out of place”; it is “to represent the truth of the system, its constitutive injustice and inequality.”⁵⁵ As such, when Palestinians undertake to remedy wrongs, they bear witness to universal concerns.⁵⁶

This is an instance of Palestinian *ressentiment*, but unlike Mizrahi *ressentiment* toward Ashkenazi hegemony, which is caught in spiteful envy and identitarian rivalry, Palestinian *ressentiment* opens a space for a dialectics of *ressentiment*, a *ressentiment* in politicized form. Such a politicization produces a more generative *ressentiment*, shifting it from a Nietzschean model of personal, reactive, and pathologized frustration to a collective *No!*: No, we will not forget the Nakba; no, we will not disappear; no, we will not let you realize the nightmare of a Greater Israel; and so on. Palestinian *ressentiment* seeks out solidarities that avoid any romanticization of the wretched (as superior, self-righteous, redeemed, etc.) but enjoin the excluded to universalize their grievances. This latter *ressentiment* exits its Nietzschean orbit; it undergoes dislocation, and its negative but reactionary energy is canceled and preserved—that is, dialecticized. This anticolonial *ressentiment* enacts a cut in the social fabric and can be characterized as

counter-reactional, as an un-Nietzschean mode of self-affirmation, taking the shape of an insurgent counter-violence, indexing—and not forgiving and forgetting⁵⁷—Israel’s original colonial wounding, its vicious reaction to ongoing Indigenous noncompliance.

Palestinians are not locked in their *ressentiment*, as Fanon might say.⁵⁸ When, for example, Edward Said expressed his motto “equality or nothing,” he never meant it to apply only to aggrieved Palestinians. The emancipatory force of egalitarian justice, “equality or nothing,” lies in its *openness to all*, to “Arabs and Jews” alike. Against the idea of a wage that, at once, divides (Jew and non-Jew) and fetishizes (wounded Jewish identity), Said promotes a vision of political justice that de-exceptionalizes its participants, asserting that “if one people enjoys a right of return, the other one must also. Otherwise the conflict continues—in the real interests of no one at all. No one, not even those who seem to be profiting in the short run.”⁵⁹ Including Palestinians in the coalition radicalizes and universalizes the movement for democracy, and as Žižek further adds, “it would break an unwritten rule of Israeli politics” and would, in turn, “prevent Israel from becoming another religious-fundamentalist racist state.”⁶⁰

At the same time, the newness of the situation can too easily be overstated. From the Palestinian perspective, Israel has always been “another religious-fundamentalist racist state”; the difference is that the obscene excesses of religio-nationalist Zionism have been kept below the global radar through the West’s fetish of liberal Zionism (the Zionism that, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, helps the West rationalize its support of such a cruel regime). The crisis is that now the disavowed settlers are festering on top for all to see. Liberal Zionism’s disavowed belligerent settlers, unmistakably represented politically by the far-right coalition, are imposing their will on Israeli identity. You gave us the wage of Jewishness—the promise of Jewish unity and solidarity, the gratification of Jewishness and the enjoyment of anti-Palestinianness. You wanted a nation state only for Jews, and we’re telling you what that will look like—Western approval be damned. The new government is not only giving up on democracy, but on the *appearance* of democracy. With the former you can still insist on democracy’s unsettling actualization, but with the latter you’ve effectively foreclosed its political possibility.⁶¹ The unleashing of hooligan settlers on vulnerable Palestinian villages encapsulates the disintegration of Israel’s “rule of law.”⁶² Knowledge of the settlers’ doings and genocidal aspirations can no longer be compartmentalized. Liberal Zionists’ identity (being Jewish) and phantasmatic attachment to a democratic state are at stake with

this (new) government. What gives the lie to a Jewish and democratic Israel is not its new fascist coalition, but the settler-colonial situation. Netanyahu is not the problem; a racist Israeli state is.

NOTES

1. This chapter draws on material originally published in Zahi Zalloua, *The Politics of the Wretched: Race, Reason, and Ressentiment* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2024). On the wage of whiteness, Du Bois writes: “The white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated for by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and public schools. The police were drawn from their ranks and the courts, dependent on their votes, treated them with leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great affect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them”; see *Black Reconstruction in America 1860–1880* (Free Press, 1998 [1935]), 700–701.

2. David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (Verso, 2007), 13.

3. Robin D. G. Kelley, “‘We Are Not What We Seem’: Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the Jim Crow,” *The Journal of American History* 80, no. 1 (1993): 100–101.

4. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Ethics of the Problem of Palestine” [1948], in W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 1–2, <https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b209-1090>.

5. Examples include Henry Turner, Edward Blyden, Martin Delany, Marcus Garvey, and Mittie Maude Lena Gordon.

6. See Nadia Alahmed, “From Black Zionism to Black Nasserism: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Foundations of Black Anti-Zionist Discourse,” *Critical Sociology* 49, no. 6 (2023): 1053–64.

7. See W. E. B. Du Bois, “Marxism and the Negro Problem,” in *W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader*, ed. David Levering Lewis (Henry Holt, 1995), 543.

8. Ella Myers, *The Gratifications of Whiteness: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Enduring Rewards of Anti-Blackness* (Oxford University Press, 2022), 34.

9. Quoted in Jerome Slater, “What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process,” *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 2 (2001): 180.

10. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 701.
11. *Haaretz*, “New Poll Shows Atheism on Rise, With Jews Found to Be Least Religious,” *Haaretz*, August 20, 2012, <https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/2012-08-20/ty-article/jews-least-observant-intl-poll-finds/0000017f-e2b6-d7b2-a77f-e3b7be450000>.
12. Octave Mannoni, “I Know Very Well, but All the Same. . . ,” in *Perversion and the Social Relation*, ed. Molly Anne Rothenberg, Dennis A. Foster and Slavoj Žižek, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (Duke University Press, 2003), 70.
13. Slavoj Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (Picador, 2008), 124.
14. Bernard-Henri Levy, *Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against the New Barbarism* (Random House, 2008); for a critique of this line of thought, see Zahi Zalloua, “The Left and (New) Antisemitism: The Palestinian Question and the Politics of *Ressentiment*,” *Crisis and Critique* 9, no. 2 (2022): 390–413.
15. Religious parties in Netanyahu’s coalition have advocated the elimination of the “grandchild clause” of the Law of Return. The clause makes citizenship available to anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent so long as they don’t practice another religion. This proposed change in the law is intended to restore the properly “Jewish character” of the state of Israel.
16. Peggy Cidor, “Why the Right-Wing Mizrahi Vote Is Misunderstood in Israel,” *Middle East Eye*, February 1, 2023, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-why-right-wing-mizrahi-vote-misunderstood>.
17. Jacqueline Rose recalls an exchange with Netanyahu in which the latter put his pragmatics on full display: “I once asked . . . Netanyahu why he accepted the support of the Christian fundamentalists, since they believe that at Armageddon all the Jews will be destroyed or converted? He said that he tells them that he welcomes their support and that when they get to Armageddon, they can argue about it then” (“Nation as Trauma, Zionism as Question: Jacqueline Rose Interviewed,” *OpenDemocracy*, August 17, 2005, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/zionism_2766jsp).
18. Cidor, “The Right-Wing Mizrahi Vote.”
19. Cidor, “The Right-Wing Mizrahi Vote.”
20. Cidor, “The Right-Wing Mizrahi Vote.”
21. The question of Israel’s right to exist—its legal status under international law—is what, in 1977, former prime minister and Likud leader Menachem Begin vehemently objected to; for him, “our very existence per se is our right to exist!” Israel’s existence did not need *human* permission, as if it were a contingent fact of history: “We were granted our right to exist by the God of our fathers at the glimmer of the dawn of human civilization four thousand years ago. Hence,

the Jewish people have an historic, eternal and inalienable right to exist in this land, Eretz Yisrael, the land of our forefathers. We need nobody's recognition in asserting this inalienable right. And for this inalienable right, which has been sanctified in Jewish blood from generation to generation, we have paid a price unexampled in the annals of nations" (quoted in Yehuda Avner, "Israel Does Not Need Palestinian Recognition," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 14, 2006, <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/israel-does-not-need-palestinian-recognition>).

22. Tom Mehager, "Yes, Mizrahim Support the Right. But Not for the Reasons You Think," *+972*, February 27, 2020, <https://www.972mag.com/mizrahim-right-wing-ashkenazi-supremacy>.

23. Mehager, "Mizrahim Support the Right."

24. "Considering the economic rivalry of the black and white worker in the North, it would have seemed natural that the poor white would have refused to police the slaves. But two considerations led him in the opposite direction. First of all, it gave him work and some authority as overseer, slave driver, and member of the patrol system. But above and beyond this, it fed his vanity because it associated him with the masters" (Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 12).

25. Mehager, "Mizrahim Support the Right."

26. Lana Tatour, "The Israeli Left: Part of the Problem or the Solution? A Response to Giulia Daniele," *Global Discourse* 6, no. 3 (2016): 488–89.

27. Zahi Zalloua, *Solidarity and the Palestinian Cause: Indigeneity, Blackness, and the Promise of Universality* (Bloomsbury, 2023), 57–58.

28. Patrick Kingsley, "As Israel's Crises Pile Up, a Far-Right Minister Is a Common Thread," *The New York Times*, March 31, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/world/middleeast/israel-smotrich-protests.html>. Smotrich clarified his remark, claiming that he was not giving license to settlers to accomplish this genocidal task: "The State of Israel needs to do that—heaven forbid not private individuals."

29. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil* (Washington Square Press, 2004), 24.

30. Netanyahu's agreement to create a National Guard under the purview of Palestinianophobe National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir will eliminate the distinction between state-sponsored (legal) violence and settler (illegal) violence altogether. Ben-Gvir's autonomous private militia is set to give further cover to the abuses of the settlers in the West Bank.

31. Rights groups point out that for the period of 2017–2021, "only 11 investigations [out of 248 criminal investigations] . . . yielded indictments against soldiers,

showing the IDF's failure to credibly prosecute itself." See Isabel Debre, "Watchdog: Under 1% of Israel Army Probes Yield Prosecution," *The Associated Press*, December 22, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/israel-indictments-gaza-strip-0c1b864792101b9506c03e1a8f3990do>.

32. Fredric Jameson, "Nostalgia for the Present," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 88, no. 2 (1989): 517–37.

33. "It's fair to say that no prime minister has done more to transform its economy into a global powerhouse. Yet unless he changes course, Mr. Netanyahu risks throwing all that progress—and his own hard-earned legacy—away." See Michael Bloomberg, "Israel Is Courting Disaster," *The New York Times*, March 5, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/05/opinion/michael-bloomberg-israel-netanyahu.html>. Ok, but how about Netanyahu's legacy as a war criminal? Or again, Bloomberg continues: "Companies are in a global competition for talent. So are countries. The best and brightest want to live in countries where they can be assured they will not be persecuted or discriminated against because of what they believe or whom they love." Apparently, companies also want individuals who rationalize away the settler-colonial situation and Israel's racial segregation.

34. *The New York Times's* coverage exemplifies this trend. See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, "Netanyahu Is Shattering Israeli Society," *The New York Times*, February 28, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/28/opinion/netanyahu-israel-palestinians-courts.html>; Thomas L. Friedman, "What in the World Is Happening in Israel?," *The New York Times*, December 15, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/15/opinion/israel-palestinians-arabs-jews.html>; Bloomberg, "Israel Is Courting Disaster"; Editorial Board, "The Ideal of Democracy in a Jewish State Is in Jeopardy," *The New York Times*, December 17, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/17/opinion/israel-netanyahu.html>. An outlier to this anti-Palestinian bias is Peter Beinart, "You Can't Save Democracy in a Jewish State," *The New York Times*, February 19, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/19/opinion/israel-democracy-protests.html>.

35. The far-right coalition is not as manipulative as the unprincipled Netanyahu. Their fascist program is in the process of dismantling Netanyahu's international landscape, making it more difficult to gain the unconditional support of Western powers that he and previous Israeli prime ministers have automatically enjoyed.

36. Beinart, "You Can't Save Democracy in a Jewish State."

37. Friedman, "What in the World Is Happening in Israel?"

38. David Kretzmer and Yaël Ronen, *The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories* (Oxford University Press, 2021), 3.

39. Jacqueline Rose, *The Question of Zion* (Princeton University Press, 2005), 82.
40. "In recent years the willingness of the Court to order the evacuation of unauthorised outposts set up by Israeli nationals on private Palestinian land has also stirred antagonism towards the Court in some sections of the public in Israel. Some critics have gone as far as labelling the Court 'pro-Palestinian'" (Kretzmer and Ronen, *The Occupation of Justice*, 3).
41. See Alenka Zupančič, "Conspiracy Theory Without Theory: On *Don't Look Up*," *e-flux*, December 16, 2022, <https://www.e-flux.com/notes/509069/conspiracy-theory-without-theory-on-don-t-look-up>.
42. Slavoj Žižek, "Why Politics Is Immanently Theological, Part I," *The Philosophical Salon*, February 27, 2023, <https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/why-politics-is-immanently-theological-part-i>.
43. Amira Hass, "Arriving Again at the Cycle of Vengeance," *Haaretz*, October 10, 2023, <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-10-10/ty-article/.premium/arriving-again-at-the-cycle-of-vengeance/0000018b-15d7-d2fc-a59f-d5df4d810000>.
44. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. R. Philcox (Grove Press, 2004 [1963]), 219.
45. Nicki Kattoura and Geo Maher, "Israel-Palestine War: Why Must Palestinians Condemn Themselves for Daring to Fight Back?," *Middle East Eye*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-palestine-war-why-condemnation-trap>.
46. Paul Salvatori, "Q&A: 'What Happened in Israel on October 7 Was a Slave Revolt,'" *TRT World*, October 12, 2023, <https://headtopics.com/us/q-a-what-happened-in-israel-on-october-7-was-a-slave-revolt-46588280>. Haidar Eid and M. Gessen have drawn a parallel between the confinement of Palestinians in Gaza and that of the ghettoized Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. Gessen sees similarities in their living conditions, while Eid extends the parallel, comparing resistance to the occupation to the Warsaw uprising of the oppressed in 1944. See Haidar Eid, "Gaza 2023: Our Warsaw Uprising Moment," *Al Jazeera*, October 10, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/10/10/gaza-2023-our-warsaw-uprising-moment>; M. Gessen, "In the Shadow of the Holocaust," *The New Yorker*, December 9, 2023, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-weekend-essay/in-the-shadow-of-the-holocaust>.
47. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 51.
48. Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (Grove Press, 1965), 25.
49. Anna Gordon, "What Israelis Think of the War with Hamas," *Time*, November 10, 2023, <https://time.com/6333781/israel-hamas-poll-palestine>.

50. Joseph Massad, "Are Jewish Fundamentalists More Dangerous Than the Secularists? Ask Their Palestinian Victims," *Middle East Eye*, April 12, 2023, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/secular-zionists-threaten-palestinians-much-more-jewish-fundamentalists>.

51. Slavoj Žižek, *Surplus-Enjoyment: A Guide for The Non-Perplexed* (Bloomsbury, 2022), 325.

52. Žižek, "Why Politics Is Immanently Theological Part I."

53. Žižek, "Why Politics Is Immanently Theological Part I."

54. Even in the liberal city Tel Aviv, writes Udi Aloni, Palestinian presence or culture is nonexistent; "it's the only Western city in the world today without an Arab population." See "A Murder Is a Murder Is a Murder: Between Tel Aviv and Bil'in," in *What Does a Jew Want? On Binationalism and Other Specters*, ed. Udi Aloni, Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, and Judith Butler (Columbia University Press, 2011), 100.

55. Jamil Khader, "The Living Dead in Palestine and the Failure of International Humanitarian Intervention," *Truthout*, November 8, 2015, <https://truthout.org/articles/the-living-dead-in-palestine-and-the-failure-of-international-humanitarian-intervention>.

56. Slavoj Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (Verso, 2012), 83.

57. I am drawing here on Holocaust survivor and torture victim Jean Améry's bold vision of *ressentiment*. Writing at a time when Germany was urging its citizens to move beyond its past—the trauma of the Shoah—Améry declined this social imperative to *forgive and forget* in the name of a new Germany. He insisted on the memories of the actions of his "fellows," "who flogged [him] with a horsewhip." See *At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities* (Indiana University Press, 1980), 71. The life-affirming negativity of his *ressentiment* served as a foil to the national project to heal without subjecting the nation to a racial reckoning. But Améry betrays the force of *ressentiment* in his ideological support for the state of Israel, substituting the positivity of nationalist identity for the negativity of *ressentiment*: "The only connection between me and most Jews the world over is a sense of solidarity with the state of Israel, a commitment that has long since ceased to be a duty of which I need to remind myself. . . . For me, Israel is not an auspicious promise, not a biblically legitimized territorial claim, no Holy Land. It is simply the place where survivors have gathered, a state in which every inhabitant still, and for a long time to come, must fear for his life. My solidarity with Israel is a means of staying loyal to those of my comrades who perished." See "My Jewishness,"

in *Essays on Antisemitism, Anti-Zionism, and the Left*, ed. Marlene Gallner (Indiana University Press, 2022), 85. Améry's compulsory solidarity is precisely one of the effects of the wage of Jewishness, converting *ressentiment*'s collective appeal to a new identity.

58. "The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately trying to achieve the rank of man." See Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. R. Philcox (Grove Press, 2008 [1967]), xiii.

59. Edward Said, "The Gap Grows Wider," *Al-Ahram Weekly* 471 (March 2–8, 2000).

60. Žižek, "Why Politics Is Immanently Theological Part I."

61. Žižek, "Israelis' SHAME Over What Their State Is Doing in West Bank Would Be Sign of Truly Belonging to Israel," *RT.com*, May 17, 2021, <https://www.rt.com/op-ed/524075-israelis-shame-west-bank-palestinians>.

62. Žižek, "Israelis' SHAME."