



**Maritime Security and Geo-Politics:
The Dialogue b/t
'Vital Interests' & 'Core Interests' amid
the Game of Throne in the Pacific Century**

By

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- III. Geo-Politics: Nat'l Interests at Stake & Political Intentions
- IV. Strategic Maneuvering in the Asia-Pacific Region
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I. Introduction: A New Cold War in the Pacific Century

- Mahan: “**control of the sea**, by maritime commerce & naval supremacy, means **predominant influence** in the world.”

**Maritime
security**

**Geo-
Politics**

- US global commercial interests & naval dominance gave it the incentive & the power to enforce an int’l Pax Americana in 1991; since then, US has enshrined ‘**vital interests**’ as the foremost guidance for shaping the global sec. environment.
- By contrast, Beijing began stressing ‘**core interests**’ in the late 2000s to assure its due sec. interests in the global society.
- As **China’s** RCEP, OBOR, & AIB assure its **ascendance to the mainstay of globaliz’n**, most regional countries & people are increasingly tied with **China’s growing core interests**.

I. Introduction: A New Cold War in the Pacific Century

- That China's core interests grow to cover **whole Asia & Indo-Pacific** renders itself the **center of gravity of geo-politics in AP**.
 - suggests: power transition is occurring in Asia-Pacific;
 - highlights: struggle b/t '**vital interests**' & '**core interests**,'
 - implies: **destiny of regional states & people are inextricably involved in the Game of Throne in the Pacific century.**
- In the name of **mari. sec**, US kicks a fashion of **naval diplomacy**, the efforts of which, however, converge t/w the **near seas of China** & suggest a **new Cold-War** of containing China.
- Whether maritime security would fall into the tool for the Game of Throne in the Pacific century is a big question for all.

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II. Maritime Security: Theories & Practices

■ Basic Concepts on Mari. Sec. Threats



Common theory: **non-trad'l sec. agenda is likely to lead to greater cooper'n** a/m states by focusing attention upon functional engagement, which may help overcome the barrier of sovereignty and **bring about spillover effect for trad'l sec. issues.**

II. Maritime Security: **Theories** & Practices

- Latest Theory on Mari Sec. Cooper'n:
in the era of globalization, **Liberal Interventionism**
 - emphasize the use of **Expeditionary Ops** a/g the instabilities & conflicts **in the littoral region** so as to **shape the int'l sec. environment**
 - Naval functions supported by the Expeditionary Ops such as riverine warfare, ..., maritime security cooperation, and HA/DR fall into the field of **Irregular Warfare** (IW), which highly overlaps with **MOOTW**
 - MOOTW encompass the use of mili. capabilities across the range of mili. operations short of war and have become a **norm** of practices for **mari. partnerships** around the world.

II. Maritime Security: Theories & Practices

- MOOTW, Sea Control, Naval Diplo., NECC, & Nat'l Agenda
 - decision makers can use **combat/noncombat MOOTW** as **dual tracks** to **shape sec. environment** & **serve nat'l agenda**
 - By 1991, US used "forward presence" to attain **sea control** of all **chokepoints & oceans** & create a Pax Americana.
 - During 1990s, USN pushed sea control to the **littoral regions**.
 - A/f 911, TSN, GMP, CS-21, Nava Diplo.: push sea control to the **rivers, harbors, and shoreline** of all coastal states
 - US **NECC** (2006) is tasked to conduct IW or **MOOTW** for **landward push of sea control** & **fighting deep on foreign soils**.
 - sea control: core of Maritime Strat. for serving **nat'l agenda**
 - USN's sea control \equiv command, even **battlespace dominance**, which involves all dimensions of the global commons

What
interests?

III. Geo-Politics: Nat'l Interests at Stake & Poli. Intentions

Dialogue between 'VITAL INTERESTS' and 'CORE INTERESTS'

- **US** (QDR) **Vital** national **interests**: include
 - preventing the emergence of a **hostile regional hegemon**,
 - ensuring **freedom of the seas & security of int'l SLOCs**,
 - deterring & defeating aggression a/g US allies & friends.
 - NSS: **use mili. might unilaterally & decisively to defend V. Int.**
 - 2010, Def Sec. **Gates**: **SCS policy** echoes **Vital Interests**
 - **FoN** & free & unhindered econ. deve. should be maintained.
 - US opposes the use of force and actions that hinder **FoN**...
 - 2011, Clinton: **FoN in SCS** was in the '**vital interests**' of US.
- China has challenged the vital int. of the US in many ways;
- Warning: **US would go to war w/i China to defend its vital int.**
- It implicitly **facilitates a balancing coalition against China, which ultimately helps US deny power transition.**


III. Geo-Politics: Nat'l Interests at Stake & Poli. Intents

Dialogue between 'VITAL INTERESTS' and 'CORE INTERESTS'

China's Core Interests

China's integra'n into econ. globaliz'n prompts Beijing to embed **econ/soci development** into **world peace & common development**

2013 DWP ties sustained **econ/soci development** closely to prot'n of **blue territorial claims, maritime rights & interests**



III. Geo-Politics: Nat'l Interests at Stake & Poli. Intentions

■ China's Core Interests

- As China's power grows, so do its core interests.
- In addition to claims of sovereignty over Taiwan, Xinjiang, & Tibet, Beijing has designated 'core interest areas' to cover the Yellow Sea, ECS, SCS, & even the Diaoyutais (Senkaku) waters in recent years.
- Term: imply **China would use force to defend these interests**
- 2015, PLAN shifted its focus from 'offshore waters defense' to the **combination** of offshore waters defense with **open seas protection**.
- 'Core interests' on the one hand entails **competition** with regional stakeholders for protecting its national sovereignty, blue territories, and maritime rights & interests in the **near seas**; on the other hand, it requires **cooperation** with global powers for protecting shared SLOCs and overseas interests against non-traditional threats as well as **precautions** against potential traditional threats in the **far seas**.

III. Geo-Politics: Nat'l Interests at Stake & Poli. Intentions

Dialogue between 'VITAL INTERESTS' and 'CORE INTERESTS'

- Summary: Dialogue b/t 'Vital Interests' and 'Core Interests': seapower **competition** in China's **near seas** is **intensifying**; yet, there is still room for **cooperation** in the **far seas**.

Political Intentions: 'Hegemonic stability' vs. Compelled 'Hegemonic War'

- To defend its Core Interests, Beijing may be compelled to adopt the thinking of 'Hegemonic War.'
- To defend its Vital Interests, Washington has been adopting the thinking of 'Hegemonic Stability.'

Core+Cmpl Heg. War

Vital+Heg. Stab.

The Dialogue b/t 'Vital Interests' & 'Core Interests' amid the Game of Throne in the Pacific Century

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- II. Maritime Security: Theories & Practices
- III. Geo-Poli: Nat'l Int. at Stake & Poli. Intentions
- IV. **Strategic Maneuvering in the AP Region**

Core+Cmp **Heg. War** Nt. Int & Pol **Vital+Heg. Stab.**



IV. Strategic Maneuvering in the Asia-Pacific Region

■ Nat'/Def. Stra: 'Strategic Rebalancing' vs. 'Frictional Rise'

- 'Stra rebalancing': new approach to the future influence & mili. makeup for **reassuring US reg. hegemony**

- Trump admn.: may use a new term but promise to ↗ size of the USN fm 274 to 352 warships suggests **reinforcing strategic rebalancing** and **containment against China**

- 'Frictional Rise': China has to undergo a **dynamic period of frictions** in the int'l arena to **win global recognition** of the **fundamental interests of a mighty China**.

- does not seek head-on collision w/i existing hegemony; instead, it provides an **alternative to 'peaceful dvlpment.'**

- shake off restric'ns imposed on C. or change the status quo.

- is kind of **speculative adventurism** a/g stra. rebalancing.

IV. Strategic Maneuvering in the Asia-Pacific Region


- Nat'/Def. Stra: **'Strategic Rebalancing'** vs. **'Frictional Rise'**
 - Problem: **frictions** could easily generate **sparks**, which may **ignite** numerous tinder-like issues such as Taiwan, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, Diaoyutais (Senkakus) waters, and deployment of THAAD in SK.
 - Regional peace is thus laden with anxious foreboding when **Beijing's increasingly self-assertive 'frictional rise'** for defending **core interests** is answered by **Washington's increasingly containing 'strategic rebalancing'** for defending vital interests.


**How
dangerous?**

IV. Strategic Maneuvering in the Asia-Pacific Region

- **Operational Strategy: ASB (JAM-GC) vs. A2/AD (FDCSD)**
 - **JAM-GC** assure **battlespace dominance** fm Western Paci. to the Indian Ocean for the destruction of PLA's A2/AD.
 - JAM-GC involve consolidating **balancing coalition** a/g China
 - Japan, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, India, & even SK
 - Canada, UK, France join exercises and patrols in AP
 - **US Army**: playing the role of **expeditionary force** in EA:
 - in addi'n to **mari. sec. missions** such as HA/DR,
 - the Army is considering to
 - ✓ erect **archipelago defense**,
 - ✓ establish **naval fortresses**,
 - ✓ construct **US own A2/AD a/g China** along 1st isl chain, so as to **“turn the first island chain into a barrier Chinese forces would be unable to break through.”**

China's Defensive Layers





Core, Cmpl Heg. War **Nt. Int. Pol** **Vital + Heg. Stab.**



IV. Strategic Maneuvering in the Asia-Pacific Region

- **Operational Strategy: ASB (JAM-GC) vs. A2/AD (FDCSD)**
 - In turn, the PLA not only articulates a “**Chinese Dream** of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which is to ‘**make the country strong**’ by ‘**making the military strong**,’ but also identifies ‘**Force Development in Critical Security Domains**’ (FDCSD) such as ‘the **seas & oceans**,’ ‘**outer space**,’ ‘**cyberspace**,’ & ‘**nuclear force**.’
 - Apparently, the FDCSD seeks to **counter JAM-GC** and safeguard its blue territory.
 - Xi’s ‘**Chinese Dream**’ implies a **resolve to confront US military intervention** in maritime territorial disputes for **defending blue territory for sustained eco./sec. devt.**

How dangerous?

V. 2nd Thought on Competition & Cooperation in AP

- Struggle b/t JAM-GC & FDCSD highlights the brewing military conflicts & even **use of nuclear weapon** in China's near seas.
- The scenario of **a nuclear war** in the near seas is more real if US Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Scott Swift's statement in July 2017 that **he would launch a nuclear strike against China next week if President Donald Trump ordered it** is juxtaposed with **Pentagon's notice** in 2001 about **possible emergency use of nuclear weapons against China**.
- Xi: '**Chinese Dream**' bolstered by '**making the military strong**'
Trump: '**Make America Great Again**' upheld by '**greatest military buildups in American history**' could only **make existing tinderboxes more volatile** in Asia-Pacific

V. 2nd Thought on Competition & Cooperation in AP

- Increasingly entrenched Beijing & Washington are **dragging each other deeper** in the 'Thucydides' trap' or **security dilemma**, involving almost all **regional states and people** associated w/i 'core interests' and/or 'vital interests.'
- Ultimate question for humankind may be: **Can we escape from the nuke holocaust** prepared by the Spector deep in the Hobbs Jungle in the name of maritime security?
- Nat'l interests have to be balanced w/i **regional peace & stability, historic retrospection & introspection**, and **truly philanthropic passion for all people**
- Hope: liberals with maritime expertise will introspect on **what human kind needs** instead of **what politicians want** in terms of maritime interests

VI. Conclusion

- **Mari. sec.** may easily become an instrument of **geo-politics**
- In the **Pacific Century**, most reg. countries are inextricably involved in the **Game of Throne** in the name of **mari secu.**
- Struggle b/t **'core interests'** & **'vital interests'** cascades into
 - **'hege. stab.'** ↔ **compelled 'hege. war'** at **nat'l policy** level,
 - **'stra. rebalancing'** ↔ **'frictional rise'** at **nat'l & def. str** level,
 - **JAM-GC** ↔ **A2/AD** at the **operational** strategy level.
- General public: should **reflect upon the human's wellbeing** as a whole, **realize what interests they ultimately serve**, & **find a middle course to avoid a hegemonic war** in the name of **mari sec.** amid the **Game of Throne** in the **Paci. Cent.**
- Ad: **No extrm pursuit of exclusive self-interested nat'l agenda**

Thanks!

Q & A

