{
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Zevachim",
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    "versionTitle": "William Davidson Edition - English",
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    "versionNotes": "English from The William Davidson digital edition of the <a href='https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1'>Koren Noé Talmud</a>, with commentary by <a href='/adin-even-israel-steinsaltz'>Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz</a>",
    "versionTitleInHebrew": "",
    "versionNotesInHebrew": "תרגום אנגלי של תלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דיוידסון מתוך מהדורת <a href='https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1'>Noé</a> עם פירוש <a href='/adin-even-israel-steinsaltz'>הרב עדין אבן ישראל שטיינזלץ</a>, בהוצאת קורן ירושלים",
    "shortVersionTitle": "Koren - Steinsaltz",
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    "purchaseInformationURL": "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1/products/vol-33-zevahimhardcover",
    "heTitle": "זבחים",
    "categories": [
        "Talmud",
        "Bavli",
        "Seder Kodashim"
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            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake,</b> i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, <b>are fit,</b> and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. <b>But</b> these offerings <b>did not satisfy the obligation of the owner,</b> who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all offerings <b>except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering.</b> In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. <b>The Paschal offering</b> is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake <b>at its</b> appointed <b>time,</b> on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while <b>the sin offering</b> is unfit <b>any time</b> that it is sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too</b> is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: <b>The Paschal offering</b> is unfit only <b>at its</b> appointed <b>time,</b> while <b>the sin offering and the guilt offering</b> are unfit <b>at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said</b> in explanation: <b>The sin offering is brought for</b> performance of <b>a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for</b> performance of <b>a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit</b> when sacrificed <b>not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit</b> when sacrificed <b>not for its sake.</b>",
            "<b>Yosei ben Ḥoni says:</b> Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings <b>that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.</b>",
            "<b>Shimon, brother of Azarya, says</b> that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if <b>one slaughtered them for the sake of</b> an offering whose level of sanctity is <b>greater than theirs, they are fit;</b> if one slaughtered them <b>for the sake of</b> an offering whose level of sanctity is <b>less than theirs, they are unfit.</b>",
            "<b>How so? Offerings of the most sacred order,</b> e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, <b>that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> e.g., peace offerings, <b>are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit.</b> Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. <b>The firstborn</b> animal <b>and the</b> animal <b>tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit,</b> as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. <b>Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn</b> animal <b>or for the sake of</b> an animal <b>tithe are unfit.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need the mishna <b>to teach</b> this <i>halakha</i> using the language: <b>But they did not [<i>ella shelo</i>] satisfy</b> the obligation of the owner? <b>Let it teach</b> simply: <b>And they did not [<i>velo</i>] satisfy the obligation of the owner.</b> What does the word: But [<i>ella</i>], add?",
            "The Gemara responds: By adding <b>this</b> word, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings <b>is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is</b> still <b>prohibited to deviate</b> from the protocol <b>of their</b> sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.",
            "<b>And</b> this <i>halakha</i> is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rava, as Rava says:</b> With regard to <b>a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake,</b> it is still <b>prohibited to sprinkle its blood</b> on the altar <b>not for its sake.</b>",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>If you wish, propose a logical argument</b> to support this statement, and <b>if you wish, cite a verse</b> as proof. The Gemara elaborates: <b>If you wish, propose a logical argument:</b> Just <b>because</b> one <b>deviated</b> from protocol <b>in its</b> sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that <b>he should continue to deviate</b> from protocol <b>in all</b> the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.",
            "And <b>if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [<i>nadarta</i>] freely [<i>nedava</i>] to the Lord your God,</b> even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words <i>nadarta</i> and <i>nedava</i> exegetically: Can <b>this</b> verse be referring to <b>a gift</b> offering [<b><i>nedava</i></b>]?"
        ],
        [
            "<b>It is</b> already referred to as <b>a vow</b> offering <b>[<i>neder</i>]. Rather,</b> the verse indicates that <b>if you did what you vowed</b> to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, <b>it shall be</b> a satisfactory <b>vow</b> offering; <b>and if</b> you did <b>not</b> sacrifice it properly, <b>it shall be</b> rendered a voluntary <b>gift</b> offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.",
            "The Gemara concludes: <b>And is it permitted to deviate</b> from protocol <b>in</b> the sacrifice of <b>a gift</b> offering <i>ab initio</i>? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.",
            "§ <b>Ravina said to Rav Pappa:</b> Since <b>you were not with us last night within the</b> Shabbat <b>limit of Bei Ḥarmakh,</b> you did not hear <b>that Rava raises a contradiction between</b> two <b>superior</b> mishnaic <b>statements and teaches their</b> resolution.",
            "<b>What</b> are these <b>superior statements? We learned</b> in the mishna: <b>All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake</b> are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: <b>The reason</b> they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically <b>that</b> they were slaughtered <b>not for their sake. But</b> if offerings were slaughtered <b>without specification</b> of intent, <b>they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently,</b> if one performs any action <b>without specification</b> of intent, it is <b>also considered as</b> if he performed it expressly <b>for its sake.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> Rava <b>raises a contradiction</b> from another mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 24a): <b>Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of</b> the <b>woman</b> in question is <b>not valid. And</b> it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written <b>without specification</b> as to which woman it is referring, it is <b>also not valid.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> Rava <b>resolves</b> the contradiction: <b>Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand</b> designated <b>for their</b> own <b>sake.</b> From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, <b>an ordinary wife does not stand</b> designated <b>for divorce.</b> Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>And from where do we</b> derive that <b>slaughtered offerings are fit</b> and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered <b>without specification? If we say</b> it is <b>from that which we learned</b> in the mishna: <b>All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake</b> are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, <b>and</b> it <b>does not teach</b> this using the language: All slaughtered offerings <b>that were not slaughtered for their sake</b> are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna <b>also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid,</b> and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> perhaps it is derived <b>from that which we learned</b> in a mishna (13a): <b>How</b> are offerings slaughtered <b>for their sake and</b> then <b>not for their sake?</b> For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering and</b> then <b>for the sake of a peace offering.</b> The Gemara infers: <b>The reason</b> such an offering is unfit is <b>that he says</b> that he is slaughtering it <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering and</b> then he says that he is slaughtering it <b>for the sake of a peace offering. But</b> if he says that he is slaughtering it <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering, and</b> then slaughters it <b>without specification,</b> it is <b>fit. Apparently,</b> slaughtering an offering <b>without specification is considered as</b> if one slaughtered it <b>for its sake.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps there it is different, as</b> the mishna <b>is saying</b> that <b>anyone who performs</b> an action <b>performs</b> it <b>with</b> his <b>original intent</b> in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> perhaps this <i>halakha</i> is derived <b>from the latter clause</b> of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered <b>not for their sake and</b> then <b>for their sake?</b> For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a peace offering and</b> then <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering.</b> The Gemara infers: <b>The reason</b> it is unfit <b>is that he says</b> he is slaughtering it <b>for the sake of a peace offering and</b> then he says he is slaughtering it <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering. But</b> if he started slaughtering it <b>without specification and</b> then slaughtered it <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering,</b> it is <b>fit.</b> Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps there it is different, as</b> the mishna <b>is saying</b> that <b>his ultimate</b> intent <b>proves</b> the nature <b>of his original</b> intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.",
            "<b>Alternatively,</b> it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. <b>Since</b> in the former clause the <i>tanna</i> <b>taught</b> using the language: <b>For their sake and</b> then <b>not for their sake,</b> teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the <i>tanna</i> <b>also taught</b> the second clause using the language: <b>Not for their sake and</b> then <b>for their sake.</b> In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> perhaps this <i>halakha</i> is derived <b>from that</b> mishna (46b), which states: <b>The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of</b> the particular <b>offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing</b> the offering, i.e., the owner; <b>for the sake of God; for the sake of</b> consumption by the <b>fires</b> of the altar; <b>for the sake of</b> sacrificing it in a manner that gives <b>an aroma;</b> and <b>for the sake of pleasing</b> God. <b>And the sin offering and a guilt offering</b> are slaughtered <b>for the sake of</b> atonement for the <b>sin.</b>",
            "The mishna on 46b continues: <b>Rabbi Yosei said: Even</b> in the case of <b>one who did not have in mind</b> to slaughter the offering <b>for the sake of</b> any <b>one of these,</b> the offering is <b>fit, since</b> this <b>is a stipulation of the court.</b> The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The <b>court stipulated that</b> one <b>should not say</b> that he is slaughtering the offering <b>for its sake, lest he come to say</b> that he is slaughtering it <b>not for its sake.</b> Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.",
            "The Gemara infers: <b>And if it enters your mind</b> that if one slaughters an offering <b>without specification</b> it is <b>unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies</b> the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we</b> derive <b>that</b> if it is written <b>without specification</b> as to which woman it is referring, it is <b>not valid?</b>",
            "<b>If we say</b> it is inferred <b>from that which we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 24a): In the case of a man who <b>was passing through the marketplace, and</b> he <b>heard scribes</b> who write bills of divorce <b>dictating</b> to their students: The <b>man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from</b> the <b>place</b> of <b>such and such, and</b> the man <b>said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife,</b> and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is <b>unfit to divorce</b> his wife <b>with it,</b> that is not a proof.",
            "It can be explained: <b>Perhaps</b> the mishna is <b>in accordance with</b> the explanation <b>of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice</b> writing bills of divorce; <b>and</b> this bill of divorce is a draft and <b>was not written for the sake of severance,</b> i.e., divorce, <b>at all.</b> But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> derive this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the subsequent clause in <b>that</b> mishna:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Moreover,</b> if a husband <b>wrote</b> a bill of divorce with which <b>to divorce his wife but</b> later <b>reconsidered,</b> and <b>a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is</b> the same <b>as your name, and my wife’s name is</b> the same <b>as your wife’s name,</b> and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it, the bill of divorce is <b>unfit</b> for the second man <b>to divorce</b> his wife <b>with it.</b> Evidently, even if the bill of divorce was written to be used for divorce, if it was not written specifically for the given woman it is not valid.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps there it is different, as</b> the bill of divorce <b>was</b> specifically <b>designated</b> for <b>the sake of that</b> man’s <b>divorce,</b> and therefore it is not valid for the second man’s divorce. But a bill of divorce that was written without specification might be valid if written for the sake of divorce.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> derive it <b>from</b> the subsequent clause in <b>that</b> mishna: <b>Moreover,</b> if <b>he has two wives whose names are identical,</b> and he <b>wrote</b> a bill of divorce <b>to divorce the older</b> one, and then reconsidered, <b>he may not divorce the younger</b> one <b>with it.</b> Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written specifically to divorce a specific wife.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps there it is different, as</b> the bill of divorce <b>was</b> specifically <b>designated for the sake of the divorce of that</b> other wife.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> derive it <b>from</b> the subsequent clause in <b>that</b> mishna: <b>Moreover,</b> if <b>he said to the scribe [<i>lalavlar</i>]: Write</b> a bill of divorce for one of my two wives who have identical names, <b>and I will</b> use it to <b>divorce whichever</b> one of them <b>that I want,</b> this bill of divorce is <b>unfit to divorce</b> either wife <b>with it.</b> Evidently, it must be written for the divorce of a specific woman.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps there it is different, as there is no</b> retroactive <b>designation.</b> The designation of the bill of divorce cannot be determined retroactively. It cannot be used for either wife because it was possibly written for the sake of the other wife. But a bill of divorce written without specification may be valid.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> derive it <b>from that</b> mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 26a): With regard to a scribe <b>who writes the standard</b> part <b>of [<i>tofesei</i>] bills of divorce</b> in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will have to add only the details unique to the case, <b>he must leave</b> empty <b>the place</b> of the name <b>of the man, and the place</b> of the name <b>of the woman, and the place</b> of the names <b>of the witnesses, and the place of the date. And</b> in addition, <b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says:</b> A scribe <b>must also leave the place of</b> the essential phrase: <b>You are hereby permitted to</b> marry <b>any man,</b> since it must be written for the sake of that specific woman. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written for a specific husband and wife, and if not it is not valid, even if it was written for the sake of divorce.",
            "§ Ravina continued to inform Rav Pappa of Rava’s statements: Rava <b>further raises another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say</b> that <b>Rav says</b> that <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering</b> is <b>unfit,</b> whereas if one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>for the sake of</b> consumption of <b>non-sacred</b> meat, it is <b>fit? Apparently,</b> only improper intent that is <b>of its type,</b> i.e., for the sake of another offering, <b>ruins</b> the offering and renders <b>it</b> unfit, whereas wrong intent that is <b>not of its type,</b> i.e., for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, is disregarded and <b>does not ruin it.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> Rava <b>raises a contradiction</b> from the aforementioned mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 24a): <b>Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of</b> the <b>woman</b> who is being divorced with it <b>is not valid; and</b> by inference, <b>even</b> if it was written <b>for the sake of a gentile woman,</b> it is <b>not valid.</b> With regard to the matter of divorce, a gentile woman is not of the same type as a Jewish woman, as the <i>halakhot</i> of bills of divorce are irrelevant to her.",
            "<b>And</b> Rava <b>resolves</b> the contradiction: If <b>a bill of divorce</b> is written for the sake of a gentile woman it is not valid, because if you <b>remove</b> the intent for the sake of <b>a gentile woman from it, it is</b> considered to be <b>without specification</b> of the woman who is divorced with it, <b>and</b> a bill of divorce written <b>without specification is not valid.</b> But if <b>sacrificial</b> animals are slaughtered for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, they remain fit, since if you <b>remove</b> the <b>non-sacred</b> intent <b>from them, they are</b> considered to be <b>without specification, and</b> offerings slaughtered <b>without specification are fit.</b>",
            "§ <b>And</b> Rava <b>raised another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say</b> that <b>Rav says</b> that <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering</b> is <b>unfit,</b> whereas if one <b>slaughtered it for the sake of</b> consumption of <b>non-sacred</b> meat it is <b>fit? Apparently,</b> he holds that only improper intent that is <b>of its type ruins it,</b> whereas wrong intent that is <b>not of its type does not ruin it.</b>",
            "<b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to ritually impure carcasses of creeping animals: “And every earthen vessel into <b>whose interior</b> any of them falls, anything that is in its interior shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33). From the word “interior” it is derived that only food in its interior is rendered impure, <b>but not</b> any food that is in <b>the interior of its interior,</b> i.e., in another vessel within the earthenware vessel. <b>And</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> not only if the inner vessel is an earthenware vessel; <b>even</b> if it is a metal or wooden <b>vessel,</b> which is purified though <b>rinsing</b> in a ritual bath and is therefore susceptible to impurity from its exterior, it nevertheless <b>protects</b> food that is inside it from being rendered impure. Evidently, even a vessel that is not of the same type serves to nullify the status of the interior of an earthenware vessel.",
            "<b>And</b> Rava <b>resolves</b> the contradiction as follows: A vessel purified through rinsing is actually considered of the same type as an earthenware vessel, since they are both vessels. Concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of impurity, the equivalent of intent with regard to the consumption of non-sacred meat is an item that is not a vessel at all; the Sages <b>rendered non-sacred</b> meat <b>with regard to sacrificial</b> animals <b>like a partition with regard to</b> an earthenware <b>oven: Just as a partition in an oven is not effective at all</b> in preventing the transmission of impurity from one side to the other since it is not a vessel, <b>so too,</b> slaughtering an offering for the consumption of <b>non-sacred</b> meat <b>is not effective at all with regard to</b> rendering <b>sacrificial</b> animals unfit.",
            "This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 8:1): In the case of <b>an oven that</b> one <b>divided with boards or with curtains, and</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal was found in one place, all</b> of the food in the oven, including that on the other side of the partition, is rendered <b>impure.</b>",
            "The mishna continues: In the case of <b>a round barrel that is broken and plugged up with straw and lowered into the airspace of the oven,</b> if the carcass of <b>a creeping animal</b> is <b>inside</b> the barrel, <b>the oven</b> is rendered <b>impure.</b> And if the carcass of <b>a creeping animal</b> is <b>in the oven,</b> the <b>food that is inside</b> the barrel is rendered <b>impure.</b> The broken barrel is not considered a vessel despite its being plugged up with straw, and therefore it does not prevent the transmission of impurity between the creeping animal and the oven. <b>And Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> the food in the barrel <b>pure.</b>",
            "The mishna continues: <b>Rabbi Eliezer said:</b> My opinion can be inferred <b><i>a fortiori</i>: If</b> a barrel or any other partition between some item and a corpse under the same roof <b>protects</b> the item <b>from</b> becoming impure, even though impurity imparted by <b>a corpse</b> is <b>severe</b> in that it lasts seven days, <b>shouldn’t</b> a partition <b>protect</b> food <b>in</b> the airspace of <b>an earthenware vessel</b> from impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, <b>which is mild</b> by comparison?",
            "The mishna continues: The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> Your inference is <b>not</b> correct."
        ],
        [
            "<b>If</b> a partition <b>protects</b> an item <b>from</b> impurity imparted by <b>a corpse,</b> which is <b>severe,</b> this is only <b>because</b> such impurity is unique in that it is imparted to that which is in the same tent, i.e., under the same roof, and <b>tents are divided</b> by partitions. If so, <b>should</b> a partition <b>protect</b> food from impurity imparted <b>in an earthenware vessel, which,</b> although <b>mild, is not divided by</b> partitions, like <b>tents</b> are?",
            "The Gemara notes: The comparison between non-sacred meat vis-à-vis offerings and a partition in an earthenware vessel <b>works out well according to</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who hold that a partition does not prevent transmission of impurity inside an earthenware vessel. But <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer,</b> who maintains that a partition is effective in an earthenware oven, <b>what can be said?</b> How is this compatible with the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Rabbi Eliezer</b> agrees with this principle. Yet he <b>says</b> that a partition in an earthenware vessel is effective due to his <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, which overrides the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If that is so,</b> that an <i>a fortiori</i> inference overrides this principle, <b>let us say an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>there as well,</b> with regard to a sin offering that was slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat: If slaughtering sacrificial animals for the sake of other <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>desecrates</b> those <b>sacrificial</b> animals, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that slaughtering them for the consumption of <b>non-sacred</b> meat desecrates them?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Rather, the reasoning</b> behind the statement <b>of Rav</b> that a sin offering slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat is fit is not in accordance with this principle at all, but it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reasoning</b> behind the statement <b>of Rav?</b> The verse: <b>“And they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 22:15), teaches that only improper intentions for the sake of <b>sacred items,</b> i.e., offerings, <b>desecrate sacred items, but non-sacred</b> intent <b>does not desecrate sacred items.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>Apparently,</b> an inference from <b>a verse</b> can <b>come to rule out</b> a conflicting <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. If so, <b>here too,</b> with regard to a partition in an oven, <b>let</b> the verse “and every earthen vessel into <b>whose interior</b> any of them falls” <b>come to rule out</b> Rabbi Eliezer’s <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference that a partition prevents food in an oven from becoming impure.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>This</b> expression: <b>“Whose interior,”</b> does not indicate that a partition is ineffective, as it <b>is necessary to</b> teach another <i>halakha</i>, namely, that <b>food that one kneaded with clay,</b> covering it from all sides, <b>and put in the airspace of an oven</b> that had the carcass of a creeping animal in it is impure. Because it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since</b> the food <b>cannot become impure by touching</b> an impure item, as the clay serves as an interposition, <b>it also cannot become impure</b> by being put <b>in the airspace of</b> an impure oven. The phrase “in whose interior any of them falls” <b>teaches us</b> that the food does contract impurity.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>the Rabbis,</b> who apparently do interpret the verse as teaching that a partition is ineffective in preventing the contracting of impurity in an earthenware vessel, how do they derive that food covered with clay and placed in an impure oven is impure? The Gemara answers: <b>These</b> matters <b>do not need a verse</b> to teach them. Such food has the same status as any other food in an impure oven, and the <i>halakha</i> therefore is self-evident.",
            "§ <b>Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction</b> between Rav’s statement with regard to <b>deviation</b> with regard to the type <b>of offering,</b> i.e., slaughtering for the sake of a different type of offering, <b>and</b> Rav’s statement with regard to <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner,</b> i.e., slaughtering for the sake of someone other than the offering’s owner, <b>and</b> he then <b>resolves</b> the contradiction.",
            "The contradiction is as follows: <b>Did Rav say</b> that <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of</b> another <b>sin offering,</b> i.e., one that the owner is obligated to bring for a different transgression, is <b>fit,</b> but that if one slaughtered it <b>for the sake of a burnt offering</b> it is <b>unfit? Apparently,</b> slaughtering an offering with an improper intention <b>not of its type ruins it;</b> whereas intent that is <b>of its type does not ruin it.</b>",
            "<b>But doesn’t Rav say</b> that <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered for</b> a person who is not its owner but <b>who</b> nevertheless <b>is obligated</b> to bring <b>a sin offering</b> is <b>unfit,</b> whereas if one slaughtered it <b>for</b> a person <b>who is obligated</b> to bring <b>a burnt offering,</b> it is <b>fit? Apparently,</b> an improper intention that is <b>of its type ruins</b> the offering, whereas intent <b>not of its type does not ruin it.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> he <b>resolves</b> the contradiction as follows: <b>There,</b> with regard to deviation from the type of offering, <b>the Merciful One states</b> in the Torah: <b>“And slaughter it for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:33). <b>And</b> here <b>a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering,</b> and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit.",
            "<b>Here,</b> concerning deviation with regard to the owner, it <b>is written</b> in the Torah concerning a sin offering: <b>“And he shall be forgiven”</b> (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that specifically <b>he,</b> the owner, <b>but not another</b> person, shall be forgiven. Therefore, if a sin offering is slaughtered for the sake of another person, it is unfit. <b>The other</b> person to whom this is referring is presumably <b>similar to him,</b> the owner of the sin offering, in <b>that he is obligated</b> to make <b>atonement similar to</b> that of the owner. Therefore, if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.",
            "§ <b>Rav Ḥaviva raises a contradiction</b> between Rav’s statement concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner and</b> the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> concerning <b>the interior of its interior,</b> i.e., a vessel placed in an earthenware vessel, <b>and resolves</b> the contradiction.",
            "The contradiction is as follows: <b>But did Rav say</b> that <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered for</b> a person other than its owner but <b>who is</b> also <b>obligated</b> to bring <b>a sin offering</b> is <b>unfit,</b> whereas if one slaughtered it <b>for</b> a person <b>obligated</b> to bring <b>a burnt offering,</b> it is <b>fit? Apparently,</b> an improper intention that is <b>of its type ruins it,</b> whereas intent that is <b>not of its type does not ruin it.</b>",
            "<b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that if the carcass of a creeping animal is found inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel’s <b>interior</b> is rendered impure <b>but not the interior of its interior,</b> and <b>even a vessel</b> purified through <b>rinsing,</b> if placed in the earthenware vessel, <b>protects</b> food inside it from contracting impurity? Evidently, impurity in the airspace of an earthenware vessel can be contained by something not of its type.",
            "<b>And</b> Rav Ḥaviva <b>resolves</b> the contradiction as follows: The expression: <b>Whose interior [<i>tokho</i>], is written four</b> times. In other words, in the verse: “And every earthen vessel into whose interior [<i>tokho</i>] any of them falls, anything that is in its interior [<i>tokho</i>] shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33), the word <i>tokho</i> is mentioned twice, and each time, the verse could have written: The interior. Since the possessive: Its, is added to each instance, the verse is interpreted exegetically as though the word interior [<i>tokh</i>] were mentioned four times: <b>Interior [<i>tokh</i>], whose interior [<i>tokho</i>], interior [<i>tokh</i>],</b> and <b>its interior [<i>tokho</i>].</b>",
            "<b>One</b> of these is necessary <b>to</b> teach the matter <b>itself,</b> that an impure earthenware vessel imparts impurity to food in its airspace; <b>and one</b> instance is used <b>for a verbal analogy</b> between the two instances of the word interior, from which it is derived that an earthenware vessel itself contracts impurity from impure items in its airspace.",
            "<b>One</b> indicates that <b>the interior</b> airspace <b>of this,</b> i.e., an earthenware vessel, renders food impure, <b>but not the interior of another</b> type of vessel, which imparts impurity only through contact; and <b>the other</b> instance indicates that <b>its interior, but not the interior of its interior,</b> imparts impurity, <b>and</b> that <b>even a vessel</b> purified through <b>rinsing,</b> if placed in the earthenware vessel, <b>protects</b> food inside it from becoming impure. Consequently, it is derived from a verse that inside an earthenware vessel, other vessels not of its type can block the transmission of impurity. Since this halakha is derived from a verse written in that context, there is no reason to assume that a similar <i>halakha</i> would apply to slaughter."
        ],
        [
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive <b>that we require</b> that an offering’s <b>slaughter</b> be performed <b>for its own sake?</b> It is derived from a verse, <b>as the verse states: “And if his offering is a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings”</b> (Leviticus 3:1), teaching <b>that slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a peace offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But perhaps</b> when the verse states: “A sacrifice of peace offerings,” “a sacrifice of peace offerings” <b>is</b> simply <b>the name of</b> this type of offering, and is not referring to intent of the one slaughtering it.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>From</b> the fact <b>that it is written</b> in other verses: <b>“Who offers the blood of the peace offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:33), and: <b>“Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:14), <b>and</b> the term: <b>A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>], is not written,</b> whereas <b>here,</b> in this verse, the term: <b>“A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>]</b> of peace offerings,” <b>is written, learn from it that</b> the <b>slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a peace offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>slaughter</b> must be performed for the sake of the offering being sacrificed. <b>From where do we</b> derive that the <b>other</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> i.e., collecting the blood, conveying it to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar, must also be performed for the sake of the offering?",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from</b> the fact that <b>slaughter</b> must be performed for the sake of the offering that the other sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of the offering as well, this derivation can be refuted, as slaughter has a unique element of stringency: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about slaughter?</b> It is unique <b>in that with regard to a Paschal offering,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified</b> if it is slaughtered <b>not for the sake of those who eat</b> it. If the Paschal offering is slaughtered for the sake of people who are incapable of eating it, such as one who is too ill to eat, it is disqualified. By contrast, performing other rites with this intent does not disqualify the offering. Therefore, one cannot assume that a <i>halakha</i> that applies to slaughter applies to other rites as well.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, the verse states: “Who sacrifices [<i>hamakriv</i>] the blood of the peace offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:33), referring to the one who collects the blood of the offering, as the Gemara will explain. This phrase indicates <b>that</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a peace offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And let the Merciful One write</b> this <i>halakha</i> in the Torah only <b>with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood, <b>and we would derive from it</b> that <b>slaughter</b> must also be performed for the sake of the offering.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Because</b> such a derivation <b>can be refuted</b> as follows: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about collection</b> of the blood? It is unique <b>in that it is not valid</b> if performed <b>by a non-priest or a woman,</b> whereas slaughter can be performed by any competent Jew. Therefore, one cannot assume that a <i>halakha</i> that applies to collection applies to slaughter as well.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>slaughter and collection</b> of the blood must be performed for the sake of the offering. <b>From where do we</b> derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood as well?",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from these</b> rites, i.e., slaughter and collection, that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the sprinkling of the blood as well, this derivation can be refuted: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about these</b> rites? They are unique <b>in that</b> for offerings of the most sacred order, it is <b>required</b> that they be performed in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard. <b>And</b> furthermore, these rites <b>are</b> performed <b>in the</b> sacrifice of <b>inner sin offerings</b> as well as standard sin offerings. The sprinkling of the blood on the external altar, by contrast, is performed in all portions of the Temple courtyard, and it is not performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, whose blood is sprinkled only in the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, the verse states: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:14), indicating <b>that</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a peace offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And let the Merciful One write</b> this <i>halakha</i> only <b>with regard to sprinkling, and we would derive from it</b> that it applies to slaughter and collection as well.",
            "The Gemara answers: That would not be sufficient, <b>because</b> such a derivation <b>can be refuted,</b> as sprinkling has a unique element of stringency. <b>What</b> is unique <b>about sprinkling?</b> It is unique <b>in that a non-priest is liable to</b> be punished with <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven <b>for</b> performing <b>it.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>all</b> four rites save <b>conveying</b> the blood to the altar. <b>From where do we</b> derive that this latter rite must also be performed for the sake of the offering?",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from all</b> the other rites that conveying the blood must also be performed for the sake of the offering, this derivation can also be refuted: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about all of</b> the other rites? They are unique <b>in that</b> each of them is <b>an indispensable rite. Would you say</b> that any requirement that applies to those rites necessarily applies also <b>with regard to conveying</b> the blood, <b>which is dispensable?</b> If an offering is slaughtered by the side of the altar, it is unnecessary to convey its blood to the altar.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, the verse states: “And</b> the priest <b>shall sacrifice [<i>vehikriv</i>] the whole,</b> and make it smoke <b>upon the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:13), <b>and the Master said</b> that <b>this</b> is referring to <b>conveying</b> the <b>limbs</b> of the offering <b>to the ramp</b> of the altar. <b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: <b>“And</b> Aaron’s sons, the priests, <b>shall present [<i>vehikrivu</i>]</b> the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), that <b>this</b> is referring to the <b>collection of the blood. And</b> one can infer that <b>the Merciful One expresses</b> collection of the blood <b>in the</b> same <b>language</b> used for <b>conveying, to say that you should not exclude conveying from the category of collection</b> of the blood. Therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of collection apply to conveying.",
            "The Gemara asks further: <b>And we found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the type of <b>offering,</b> i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different type of offering. <b>From where do we</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner,</b> i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of one who is not the owner?",
            "<b>Rav Pinḥas, son of Rav Ami, says: The verse states</b> with regard to a thanks offering: <b>“And the meat of the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of his thanksgiving peace offering</b> shall be eaten on the day of his offering” (Leviticus 7:15), apparently indicating <b>that</b> its <b>slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a thanks offering.</b> And <b>if</b> this language <b>is not</b> needed <b>for the matter of deviation</b> with regard to the type of <b>offering,</b> and in fact it is not, <b>as we</b> already <b>derived</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from there,</b> i.e., the verse cited concerning peace offerings, <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner.</b> It is thereby derived that an offering must be slaughtered for the sake of its owner.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But does this</b> verse <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? <b>Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the phrase <b>“and the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering,” Abba Ḥanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:</b> It <b>comes to teach</b> that <b>a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit;</b> whereas <b>a peace offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. What</b> is the <b>difference between this</b> offering <b>and that</b> offering? <b>A thanks offering is called a peace offering</b> in that verse, <b>but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>We are saying</b> that it is derived <b>from</b> the superfluous term: <b>“Sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],”</b> that the slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be performed for the sake of the owner. The term “peace offering” teaches Abba Ḥanin’s ruling.",
            "The Gemara disputes this: <b>But</b> the term “sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>]” is <b>still necessary</b> to serve as the source for another halakhic midrash: <b>From where</b> is it derived that the meat of <b>a sin offering and a guilt offering</b> may be eaten only on the day the animal is sacrificed and the following night, like a thanks offering? <b>The verse states:</b> “And the meat of the <b>sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>]</b> of his thanksgiving peace offering shall be eaten on the day of his offering.” The phrase teaches that not only thanks offerings, but any slaughtered offering [<i>zevaḥ</i>] is subject to this time limit unless the Torah specifies otherwise.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If that were so,</b> i.e., if the term “sacrifice” indicated only that a sin offering and a guilt offering may be eaten only for the period of time for which a thanks offering may be eaten, <b>let the verse write: And the meat of his thanksgiving peace offering sacrifice. What</b> is indicated by the mention of the word <b>sacrifice</b> before the phrase “his thanksgiving peace offering”? Rather, <b>conclude two</b> conclusions <b>from it.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>slaughter</b> must be performed for the sake of the owner. <b>From where do we</b> derive that the <b>other</b> sacrificial <b>rites</b> must also be performed for the sake of the owner?",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter</b> that the other rites must be performed for the sake of the owner as well, this derivation can be refuted: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about slaughter?</b> It is unique <b>in that with regard to a Paschal offering,</b> slaughter <b>not for the sake of those who eat</b> it <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, whereas performing the other rites not for the sake of the owner does not.",
            "The Gemara answers: A term of <b>slaughter is stated with regard to deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering, and</b> a term of <b>slaughter is stated with regard to deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner. Just as</b> concerning the term <b>slaughter stated with regard to deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering, you did not differentiate between slaughter and</b> the <b>other</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> and all four rites must be performed for the sake of the offering, <b>so too,</b> concerning the term <b>slaughter stated with regard to deviation</b> in the context of the <b>owner, you should not differentiate between slaughter and</b> the <b>other</b> sacrificial <b>rites.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: This derivation <b>can be refuted: What</b> is unique <b>about deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering,</b> as opposed to deviation with regard to the owner? It is unique with regard to four matters: First, it is unique <b>in that its disqualification concerns</b> the essence of the offering <b>itself. And</b> second, it is unique in that deviation from the type of <b>offering applies to</b> the <b>four</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> whereas performing a rite for the sake of the owner is relevant only to the sprinkling of the blood, which atones for the owner.",
            "<b>And</b> third, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering <b>applies</b> even <b>after</b> the <b>death</b> of the owner, when the owner’s heir brings the offering, whereas intent for the sake of the owner is irrelevant after the owner has died. <b>And</b> fourth, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering <b>applies with regard to communal</b> offerings <b>as well as with regard to individual</b> offerings, whereas employing the term owner is irrelevant with regard to communal offerings, which are owned by the public."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And although two</b> of these distinctions <b>are not precise,</b> the other <b>two are in any event precise</b> distinctions, based upon which a distinction can be drawn.",
            "The Gemara explains why two of the distinctions are not precise: <b>What is different</b> about <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner,</b> such <b>that its disqualification does not concern</b> the offering <b>itself?</b> It is that this <b>merely</b> constitutes a change of <b>thought. Deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering is also merely</b> a change of <b>thought;</b> the offering is not physically affected. <b>Rather,</b> this distinction between deviation with regard to the owner and deviation from the type of offering is false; one should claim that if deviation from the type of offering <b>disqualifies it once</b> the one who slaughtered it <b>had</b> that <b>intent, here too, once</b> the one who slaughtered it <b>had intent</b> to deviate from its owner, <b>he disqualified it.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the difficulty with the second distinction, the case where the owner died: <b>And according to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Mari, who says</b> that disqualification by <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner applies</b> even <b>after</b> the owner’s <b>death,</b> there is no distinction in this regard between deviation from the type of offering and deviation with regard to the owner. <b>In any event, there are two</b> remaining distinctions based on which the comparison between a deviation from the type of offering and a deviation with regard to the owner <b>can be refuted.</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Ashi says</b> that the <i>halakha</i> that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from a verse. <b>The verse states: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him”</b> (Leviticus 1:4), teaching that the sacrificial rite that atones for the owner, namely, the sprinkling of the blood, must be performed specifically for him, <b>and not for another.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But does this</b> verse <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? Isn’t <b>it necessary for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the verse: <b>“And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him [<i>alav</i>],” Rabbi Shimon says:</b> This indicates that in a case where one consecrated an animal as an offering and it died or was lost, if it was initially incumbent <b>upon him [<i>alav</i>]</b> to bring an offering, i.e., if he had accepted upon himself a personal obligation to bring an offering, <b>he bears responsibility for it,</b> i.e., he is obligated to bring another offering in its stead. <b>But</b> if it was <b>not</b> incumbent <b>upon him [<i>alav</i>]</b> to bring an offering, i.e., if he consecrated a specific animal without accepting upon himself any personal obligation, <b>he does not bear responsibility for it</b> if it dies or is lost.",
            "<b>And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: What is the reasoning</b> behind this distinction? <b>Once</b> a person <b>said:</b> It is incumbent <b>upon me</b> to bring an offering, it is considered <b>as though</b> the offering is <b>loaded upon his shoulders.</b> He does not discharge his obligation until he brings some offering.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rav Ashi says</b> that the <i>halakha</i> that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived <b>from</b> the phrase <b>“And it shall be accepted for him,”</b> not from the term “for him,” on which the <i>baraita</i> is based.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>slaughter and</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood must be performed for the sake of the owner. <b>From where do we</b> derive that the <b>collection</b> of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner?",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter and sprinkling</b> that collection must also be performed for the sake of the owner, this derivation can be refuted: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about slaughter and sprinkling?</b> They are unique <b>in that</b> each is <b>a rite for which one is liable</b> to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven if he performs it <b>outside</b> the Temple.",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Ashi says</b> that the <i>halakha</i> that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner <b>is derived from</b> the case of <b>a nazirite’s ram. As it is written: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings</b> unto the Lord” (Numbers 6:17), indicating <b>that its offering should be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a peace offering. And if</b> the verse <b>is not</b> necessary for the <b>matter of deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering, as we derived that from there,</b> i.e., the verses cited earlier (4a), <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner.</b> It is thereby derived that its sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of its owner.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rava,</b> in objection to this derivation: <b>Say</b> that the term: <b>“Shall offer,” is a generalization</b> and: <b>“A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],” is a detail.</b> According to the principles of biblical hermeneutics, where there is <b>a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only that which is</b> specified <b>in the detail.</b> Accordingly, <b>slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>], yes,</b> must be performed for the sake of its owner; but <b>no other</b> rite must be performed for the sake of its owner in order for the offering to be fit.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If</b> it had been <b>written: Shall offer</b> the ram <b>for peace offerings as a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],</b> it would be <b>as you say.</b> The clause: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings, would be considered a generalization, and: Sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>], would be a detail. <b>Now that it is written: “Shall offer</b> the ram <b>for a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings,”</b> the term “shall offer” is <b>an incomplete generalization,</b> as the term “for a sacrifice” interrupts between “shall offer” and “peace offerings.” <b>And one cannot derive</b> a <i>halakha</i> from <b>any incomplete generalization by</b> employing the principle of <b>a generalization and a detail.</b>",
            "<b>Ravina says</b> there is a different answer: <b>Actually, one can derive</b> a <i>halakha</i> from verses with incomplete generalizations using the principle of a generalization and a detail. <b>And</b> the reason this <i>halakha</i> applies to other rites besides slaughter is that by adding the term <b>“unto the Lord,”</b> it <b>then makes a generalization.</b>",
            "Before Ravina concluded his interpretation, <b>Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But the former generalization is dissimilar to the latter generalization. The former generalization includes</b> only the essential sacrificial <b>actions and nothing more,</b> whereas <b>the latter generalization</b> includes <b>any</b> sacrificial duty <b>unto the Lord, and even pouring</b> the <b>remains</b> of the blood on the base of the altar <b>and burning</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> of the offering on the altar. Ravina responded: <b>The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught generalizations and details in cases like this.</b>",
            "Ravina concludes his explanation: Since the term: “Unto the Lord,” is another generalization, the verse is formulated as <b>a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization,</b> and <b>you may deduce</b> that the verse is referring <b>only</b> to items <b>similar to the detail. Just as the</b> mentioned <b>detail,</b> slaughter, is <b>defined</b> as an essential <b>rite and we require</b> that it be performed <b>for the sake of</b> the owner, <b>so too, we require</b> that <b>every</b> essential <b>rite</b> be performed <b>for the sake of</b> the owner.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> the verse is referring only to actions similar to the detail, not all of the essential rites are necessarily included. Perhaps it should be derived that <b>just as the</b> mentioned <b>detail,</b> slaughter, is <b>defined</b> as an essential <b>rite, and one is liable</b> to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven <b>for</b> performing <b>it outside</b> the Temple, <b>so too, any</b> essential <b>rite</b> for which <b>one is liable</b> to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven <b>for</b> performing <b>it outside</b> the Temple is included in the verse. Accordingly, <b>slaughter and sprinkling</b> the blood <b>are</b> included, but <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>and conveying</b> it are <b>not.</b>",
            "<b>Alternatively,</b> it could be derived that <b>just as the</b> item mentioned in the <b>detail</b> is clearly <b>defined</b> as <b>an action that requires</b> performance in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>and is</b> performed <b>in the</b> sacrifice of <b>inner sin offerings, so too, any</b> rite <b>that requires</b> performance in the <b>north and is</b> performed <b>in the</b> sacrifice of <b>inner sin offerings</b> is included in the <i>halakha</i>. Accordingly, <b>slaughter and collection are</b> included; <b>sprinkling</b> the blood is <b>not.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: Both possibilities are equally valid; <b>this</b> derivation <b>can be said and that</b> derivation <b>can be said.</b> Either collection or sprinkling might be included in the <i>halakha</i>. Consequently, <b>they are equal, and</b> therefore <b>both are included.</b> Or according to <b>another version</b> of the Gemara’s answer, they are equal, <b>and</b> therefore <b>each one,</b> i.e., both collection and sprinkling, <b>shall stand in</b> its <b>status.</b>",
            "The Gemara provides an alternative answer: <b>If you wish, say</b> instead that <b>sprinkling is derived from</b> the verse <b>that Rav Ashi</b> cited: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him.” Therefore, when the verse states: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord,” indicating the inclusion of rites similar to slaughter, it is apparently referring not to sprinkling but to collection.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>a nazirite’s ram</b> must be sacrificed for the sake of its owner. <b>From where do we</b> derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies with regard to <b>other peace offerings</b> as well?",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from a nazirite’s ram</b> that all peace offerings must be sacrificed for the sake of their owners, this derivation can be refuted: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about a nazirite’s ram?</b> It is unique <b>in that there is other blood,</b> i.e., there are other offerings, a sin offering and a burnt offering, that must be brought by a nazirite together <b>with</b> his ram.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If that is so,</b> if this <i>halakha</i> is unique to a nazirite’s ram, <b>let</b> the verse <b>write: His peace offerings [<i>shelamav</i>]. What</b> is indicated by writing <b>“peace offerings [<i>shelamim</i>]”?</b> It is written <b>to include all</b> types of <b>peace offerings.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>a peace offering</b> must be sacrificed for its own sake and for the sake of its owner. <b>From where do we</b> derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies with regard to <b>all other offerings?</b>",
            "<b>And if you would say: Let us derive from a peace offering</b> that all offerings must be sacrificed with these intentions, this derivation can be refuted: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about a peace offering?</b> It is unique <b>in that it requires placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>and</b> it is accompanied by <b>libations, and</b> it requires the <b>waving of</b> the <b>breast and</b> the right <b>hind leg</b> by the priest and owner together. No other offering possesses all three of these requirements.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings”</b> (Leviticus 7:37). <b>The verse juxtaposes</b> all types of offerings <b>with peace offerings,</b> indicating that <b>just as we require</b> the sacrifice of <b>a peace offering</b> to be performed <b>for its sake, both</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering and</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner, so too, we require</b> the sacrifice of <b>every</b> type of offering to be performed <b>for its sake, both</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering and</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner.</b>",
            "§ Having established the source for the requirement to sacrifice offerings with the rightful owner and the specific type of offering in mind, the Gemara inquires: Why not <b>say</b> that in a case <b>where</b> one <b>slaughtered them not for their sake, they are disqualified?</b> Why, according to the mishna, do they remain fit?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [<i>nadarta</i>]</b> freely [<i>nedava</i>] to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words <i>nadarta</i> and <i>nedava</i> exegetically: How can the offering mentioned in <b>this</b> verse be <b>a gift</b> offering <b>[<i>nedava</i>]? It is</b> already referred to as <b>a vow</b> offering <b>[<i>neder</i>]. Rather,</b> the verse indicates that <b>if you did what you had vowed</b> to do, i.e., sacrificed your vow offering properly, <b>it shall be</b> a satisfactory <b>vow</b> offering; <b>but if</b> you did <b>not</b> sacrifice it properly, <b>it shall be</b> rendered a voluntary <b>gift</b> offering. Although it does not satisfy the obligation of your vow, it remains a valid offering.",
            "<b>And it was necessary</b> for the Torah to include the verse: <b>“That which has gone out of your lips,” and it was necessary</b> to include the verse: <b>“This is the law.” As, had the Merciful One written</b> in the Torah only the verse: <b>“That which has gone out</b> of your lips,” <b>I would say</b>"
        ],
        [
            "that we <b>do not know what</b> requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes</b> the verse: <b>This is the law,</b> juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. <b>And if the Merciful One had written</b> only the verse: <b>This is the law, I would say</b> that offerings sacrificed not for their sake <b>should be disqualified.</b> Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes</b> the verse: <b>That which is gone out of your lips,</b> teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.",
            "§ <b>Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If</b> offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner <b>are fit, let them propitiate</b> God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; <b>and if they do not propitiate</b> God, <b>why are they brought</b> as offerings at all?",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found</b> a precedent for this <b>in</b> the case of offerings <b>brought after</b> the <b>death</b> of their owners, <b>as they are fit, but they do not propitiate</b> God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Kinnim</i> 2:5): With regard to <b>a woman</b> after childbirth <b>who brought her sin offering and</b> then <b>died,</b> the <b>heirs shall bring her burnt offering.</b> If she brought <b>her burnt offering and</b> then <b>died,</b> the <b>heirs shall not bring her sin offering.</b> Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.",
            "Reish Lakish <b>said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering</b> that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation, <b>since it is brought</b> even <b>after</b> its owner’s <b>death</b> in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But <b>from where do we</b> derive that <b>a guilt offering, which</b> is brought for atonement and therefore <b>not brought after</b> its owner’s <b>death,</b> is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner’s obligation?",
            "Rabbi Elazar <b>said to him: Your</b> side of the <b>dispute</b> is written in the mishna <b>next to</b> the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too</b> is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "Reish Lakish <b>said</b> in reference to Rabbi Elazar: <b>Is he</b> the one <b>of whom people say</b> that <b>he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna,</b> specifically to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, which is the accepted <i>halakha</i>. <b>And you say to me</b> that the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer</b> resolves my difficulty?",
            "<b>Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own</b> difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: <b>“That which has gone out of your lips</b> you shall observe and do, <b>etc.”</b> How can <b>this</b> be referring to <b>a gift</b> offering? <b>It is</b> already referred to as <b>a vow</b> offering; <b>and so on, as</b> stated <b>above.</b> In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying:</b> The case of <b>a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as</b> a guilt offering is <b>not brought after</b> the owner’s <b>death, and he adduced the derivation</b> from the verse: <b>“That which has gone out of your lips,”</b> as a solution <b>to it.</b> This resolution is difficult: Why not <b>say</b> that only an offering <b>that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought</b> even in a case where it <b>does not propitiate,</b> since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but <b>a guilt offering,</b> which is not brought voluntarily, <b>should not be brought at all</b> if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty?",
            "<b>Abaye said to them:</b> Although <b>Reish Lakish</b> cited that verse, he actually <b>introduced</b> the solution to his difficulty <b>from here: “And slaughter it for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word <b>“it”</b> in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered <b>for its sake,</b> it is <b>fit;</b> if it is slaughtered <b>not for its sake,</b> it is <b>unfit. Consequently, other offerings</b> slaughtered <b>not for their sake,</b> including a guilt offering, <b>are fit.</b> And since one <b>might</b> have thought that once they are fit, they also <b>propitiate</b> God, <b>the verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips,”</b> from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.",
            "Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba asked him: <b>But</b> since the phrase in the verse “that which has gone out of your lips” is referring to offerings <b>brought for a vow or a gift,</b> why not <b>say</b> that only these offerings <b>do not propitiate</b> God even though <b>one must bring</b> them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but <b>a guilt offering</b> slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering <b>propitiates</b> God <b>as well?</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said</b> in response: <b>You cannot say that a guilt offering</b> that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering <b>propitiates</b> God, due to <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone</b> for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still <b>does not propitiate</b> God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to <b>a guilt offering, which atones</b> for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, <b>is it not logical that it does not propitiate</b> God?",
            "The Gemara challenges the inference: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about a burnt offering?</b> It is unique <b>in that it is</b> totally <b>consumed</b> on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be derived from one to the other.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>A peace offering can prove</b> that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about a peace offering?</b> It is unique <b>in that it requires libations, and the waving of</b> the <b>breast and</b> the right <b>hind leg.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: If so, <b>a burnt offering can prove</b> the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. At this stage the <i>halakha</i> is derived from a combination of the two sources: <b>The aspect of this</b> case, a burnt offering, <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case, the peace offering. <b>And the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element is that they are offerings and</b> if one <b>slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering</b> in this <i>halakha</i>, <b>as it is an offering, and</b> therefore if one <b>slaughtered it not for its sake,</b> it is <b>fit but it does not propitiate.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about their common element,</b> i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique <b>in that they are</b> brought <b>by</b> the <b>public.</b> There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>A thanks offering can prove</b> the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner’s obligation."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about a thanks offering?</b> It is unique <b>in that it requires</b> a meal offering of forty loaves of <b>bread.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: If so, <b>a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove</b> the point, as loaves are not brought with them. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. The <i>halakha</i> is derived from a combination of the two sources: <b>The aspect of this</b> case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case, a thanks offering, <b>and the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element is that they are offerings, and</b> if one <b>slaughtered them not for their sake,</b> they are <b>fit but do not propitiate</b> God. <b>So too, I shall include a guilt offering</b> in this <i>halakha</i>, <b>as it is an offering, and</b> therefore if one <b>slaughtered it not for its sake,</b> it is <b>fit but does not propitiate</b> God.",
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is unique <b>about the common element of</b> a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in <b>that</b> these offerings <b>are brought</b> either <b>as a vow</b> offering <b>or as a gift</b> offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law</b> of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), <b>juxtaposes</b> a guilt offering <b>with a peace offering,</b> indicating that <b>just as peace offerings are offerings and</b> if one <b>slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering,</b> and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What did you see,</b> i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, <b>that you compared</b> a guilt offering <b>to a peace offering?</b> Why not <b>compare</b> it <b>to a sin offering,</b> which is disqualified in such a case?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>The Merciful One excluded</b> all other offerings from the <i>halakha</i> concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter <b>it</b> for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).",
            "The Gemara provides <b>a mnemonic</b> for the <i>amora’im</i> who participated in the two following discussions: <b><i>Heh</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>shin</i>; <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>reish</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised</b> his <b>difficulty</b> with regard to <b>a guilt offering, since it is not brought after</b> its owner’s <b>death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him</b> that <b>a guilt offering is also</b> essentially <b>brought after</b> its owner’s <b>death,</b> since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet said to them:</b> This claim can be refuted: <b>What</b> element <b>of a guilt offering is sacrificed</b> after its owner’s death? Only <b>its remainder,</b> i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from <b>a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed,</b> and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.",
            "Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: <b>A sin offering</b> that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified <b>even though its remainder is sacrificed,</b> because <b>the Merciful One</b> specifically <b>excludes</b> a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; <b>it</b> is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t it <b>also written with regard to a guilt offering:</b> “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; <b>it</b> is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> verse <b>is written</b> not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage <b>after the burning of the</b> offering’s <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the altar, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>But with regard to a guilt offering,</b> the term <b>“It</b> is a guilt offering” <b>is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And</b> since the guilt offering <b>itself</b> is <b>fit</b> even <b>if the sacrificial portions were not burned</b> at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if so, <b>why do I</b> need the term <b>“It</b> is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary <b>for that which Rav Huna</b> says that <b>Rav says. As Rav Huna says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>a guilt offering</b> whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and <b>that was</b> therefore <b>consigned</b> by the court <b>to grazing</b> until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone <b>slaughtered it without specification</b> of its purpose, it is <b>fit</b> as a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara infers: If <b>it was consigned</b> to grazing, <b>yes,</b> it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if <b>it was not consigned</b> to grazing, it is <b>not</b> fit. <b>What is the reason</b> for this? <b>The verse states: “It</b> is a guilt offering,” indicating that <b>it shall</b> remain <b>as it is,</b> i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.",
            "§ <b>Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying:</b> In response to <b>that which Rabbi Elazar said</b> to Reish Lakish: <b>We have found</b> a precedent for this situation <b>in</b> the case of offerings that <b>are brought after</b> their owners’ <b>death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate</b> God, <b>let Reish Lakish say to him: These</b> offerings <b>should also be brought and propitiate</b> God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them:</b> How can the offering of <b>a woman after childbirth</b> propitiate God after her death? <b>If she gave birth, did her children give birth?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Asi objects to this</b> reasoning: <b>And who shall say to us that if</b> a woman <b>has several</b> violations of <b>positive mitzvot</b> for which to atone, <b>she does not atone</b> by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. <b>And since, when she has several</b> violations of <b>positive mitzvot she atones</b> by means of the offering, <b>so too,</b> if she dies, <b>her heirs atone</b> by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is this to say that</b> the offering is <b>acquired by</b> the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say</b> that if one <b>left his two sons a meal offering and</b> then <b>died,</b> the offering must be <b>sacrificed, and it does not have</b> the status of a meal offering brought in <b>partnership? And if it enters your mind</b> that the offering is <b>acquired by</b> the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as <b>the Merciful One states</b> in the Torah: “And when <b>one</b> brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And is</b> the offering <b>not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> himself <b>say</b> that if one <b>left his two sons an animal</b> offering <b>and</b> then <b>died,</b> the offering must be <b>sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution</b> of another animal <b>for it?</b> Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. <b>Granted, if you say</b> that the offering is <b>acquired by them, this is</b> the reason <b>that they cannot effect substitution</b> of another animal <b>for it:</b> It is <b>because they are like partners,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and partners cannot effect substitution</b> of other animals for their offering. <b>But if you say</b> that it is <b>not acquired by them,</b> and the animal is the property solely of the deceased father, <b>let them also effect substitution</b> on his behalf, as heirs are able to effect substitution for their deceased parents’ offerings.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There it is different, as</b> although <b>the verse states: “If he shall at all change [<i>hamer yamir</i>]</b> animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), the superfluous word <i>hamer</i> serving <b>to include the heir</b> as one who is able to effect substitution, nevertheless the subject’s singular form teaches that only <b>one</b> heir <b>can effect substitution, but two</b> heirs <b>cannot effect substitution.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this</b> derivation: <b>If that is so,</b> one should say the same <b>with regard to</b> the redemption of the second <b>tithe, as it is written: “And if</b> a man <b>will redeem [<i>gaol yigal</i>]</b> any of his tithe, he shall add to it the fifth part thereof” (Leviticus 27:31), with the superfluous word <i>gaol</i> serving <b>to include the heir</b> as one who must add the one-fifth. <b>So too,</b> it should be derived from the verb’s singular form that if <b>one</b> heir <b>redeems</b> the tithe, he must add one-fifth of its value, <b>but</b> if <b>two</b> heirs <b>redeem</b> it, <b>they do not</b> need to add one-fifth. In fact, the <i>halakha</i> is that partners must also add one-fifth.",
            "The Gemara answers: Redemption of the <b>tithe is different, as</b> the <b>father had</b> the ability to redeem the tithe <b>even in partnership</b> with another when alive. Therefore, the heirs can do so as well. By contrast, substitution of an offering cannot be effected by partners.",
            "<b>Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: But from</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>itself,</b> that two heirs cannot effect substitution of an offering, it can be proven that they acquire the offering of the deceased. <b>Granted, if you say</b> it is <b>acquired by them, this is</b> the reason <b>that one</b> heir, <b>in any event, can effect substitution</b> of another animal for the offering. <b>But if you say</b> it is <b>not acquired by them, how can</b> even one heir <b>effect substitution?</b>",
            "<b>But doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If <b>one consecrates</b> his own animal to atone for someone else and he then redeems it, he <b>adds one-fifth</b> of its value, as he would for any other offering he owned, but if the one for whom it atones redeems it, he need not add one-fifth, since he is not the owner. Nevertheless, only the <b>one for whom</b> the offering <b>atones can render</b> another animal <b>a substitute</b> for it, as in this respect only he is considered its owner. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement concludes: <b>And</b> if <b>one separates <i>teruma</i> from his</b> own produce <b>to</b> exempt the produce <b>of another</b> from the obligation to have teruma separated from it, <b>the benefit of discretion is his.</b> Only the one who separated the <i>teruma</i> is entitled to determine which priest receives it. Since an heir is able to effect substitution, apparently the offering atones for his transgression. This supports the claim that the heir acquires the offering.",
            "Rav Ashi responds: The offering <b>does not atone</b> for the transgressions of the heirs <b>by</b> its <b>essence,</b> as it was not consecrated for their atonement, and they do not acquire it. Therefore, two heirs of a meal offering can bring it, as explained above. Yet, it <b>does atone</b> for them <b>incidentally [<i>mikkufeya</i>].</b> Therefore, an heir can effect substitution of another animal for it.",
            "§ With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that offerings slaughtered not for their sake are fit to be sacrificed but do not satisfy the obligations of their owners, <b>a dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: After these offerings are sacrificed, <b>did they atone for</b> the sins for <b>which they came, or did they not atone</b> for them?",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: It stands to reason that they did not atone, as, if it enters your mind</b> that <b>they did atone, for what</b> purpose <b>is</b> the <b>second</b> offering <b>brought?</b> Why is the owner required to bring another offering if the first atoned for his sin?",
            "The Gemara challenges this reasoning: <b>Rather, what</b> is the alternative? That <b>they did not atone?</b> If so, <b>for what</b> purpose <b>is</b> the first offering <b>sacrificed?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said: This</b> is what is <b>difficult for Rav Sheisha,</b> i.e., Rav Sheshet, <b>son of Rav Idi: Granted, if you say</b> that such an offering <b>did not atone,</b> it <b>is brought</b> even when slaughtered <b>not for its sake on the strength of</b> its prior consecration <b>for its sake. And</b> in that case, <b>for what</b> purpose <b>is</b> the <b>second</b> offering <b>brought?</b> It is brought <b>to atone</b> for the sin. <b>But if you say</b> that offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake <b>atoned</b> for the sin, <b>for what</b> purpose <b>is</b> the <b>second</b> offering <b>brought?</b>",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: When one brings a burnt offering, which atones for violations of positive mitzvot, <b>does it atone</b> even <b>for</b> a violation of <b>a positive mitzva that</b> one committed <b>after designating</b> the animal as an offering, <b>or does it not atone</b> for such a violation?",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>Do we say</b> that the <i>halakha</i> in this case is <b>just as it is with regard to a sin offering,</b> in that <b>just as a sin offering does</b> atone for a sin <b>that</b> one committed <b>before designation</b> of the animal but does <b>not</b> atone for a sin <b>that</b> one committed <b>after designation, here too,</b> a burnt offering <b>does</b> atone for violations <b>that</b> one committed <b>before designation</b> but does <b>not</b> atone for those committed <b>after designation?</b>",
            "<b>Or, perhaps</b> a burnt offering is <b>not similar to a sin offering, as</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering one must bring one sin offering for each and every sin</b> he commits. <b>But here, since</b> a burnt offering <b>atones</b> even for one who <b>has</b> committed <b>several</b> violations of <b>positive mitzvot,</b> one may claim that <b>it also atones</b> even <b>for</b> the violation of <b>a positive mitzva that</b> one committed <b>after designation</b> of the animal.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> proof from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“And he shall place</b> his hand on the head of the burnt offering, <b>and it shall be accepted</b> for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4). <b>And does placing hands atone</b> for one’s sins? <b>But isn’t atonement</b> achieved <b>only by</b> the sprinkling of <b>the blood, as it is stated: “For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the life”</b> (Leviticus 17:11)? <b>Rather, what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “And he shall place…and it shall be accepted</b> for him <b>to atone”?</b> This teaches <b>that if one deemed</b> the ritual of <b>placing hands</b> to be <b>a non-essential mitzva</b> and consequently failed to perform it, <b>the verse ascribes to him</b> blame <b>as though</b> the offering <b>did not atone</b> for his sins; <b>and</b> nevertheless, the offering <b>atoned</b> for his sins.",
            "<b>What,</b> does the final clause of the <i>baraita</i> <b>not</b> mean <b>that</b> the offering <b>atoned</b> for the violation of any <b>positive mitzva that</b> the owner committed <b>before designation</b> of the animal, but <b>it did not atone for</b> violation of <b>the positive mitzva of placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>as that constitutes</b> a violation of <b>a positive mitzva after designation</b> of the animal? Apparently, a burnt offering does not atone for the violations committed after the animal’s designation.",
            "<b>Rava said</b> in response: <b>You say</b> that <b>the positive mitzva of placing hands</b> is proof? <b>There it is different, since as long as he does not slaughter</b> the offering, <b>he remains</b> obligated <b>to stand and place</b> his <b>hands</b> on its head. He has not yet violated the mitzva. <b>When does</b> the violation of this <b>positive mitzva occur?</b> It occurs <b>after</b> the <b>slaughter,</b> at which point fulfillment of the mitzva is no longer possible. And with regard to a violation committed <b>after</b> the <b>slaughter, we do not raise the dilemma;</b> clearly a burnt offering does not atone for such a violation.",
            "<b>Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Say</b> the <i>baraita</i> means that the offering <b>atoned</b> for the transgression of <b>the person,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "but <b>it did not atone</b> for him <b>before Heaven,</b> i.e., it is not accepted by God as a perfect offering.",
            "<b>Didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna with regard to the purification process of a leper (<i>Nega’im</i> 14:10): The verse states: <b>“And the rest of the oil that is in</b> the priest’s <b>hand</b> he shall put upon the head of the one that is to be purified, <b>to make atonement for him before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 14:18). This teaches that <b>if</b> the priest <b>placed</b> the oil on the leper’s head, <b>it atoned</b> for him, and he is purified, <b>but if he did not place</b> the oil on his head, <b>it did not atone</b> for him; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says:</b> Placement of the oil on the leper’s head <b>is a non-essential mitzva.</b> Therefore, <b>whether</b> the oil <b>was placed</b> on his head or <b>whether it was not placed</b> on his head, <b>it atoned</b> for him, <b>but</b> the verse <b>ascribes</b> the leper blame <b>as though it did not atone</b> for him.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>What</b> is the meaning of the phrase: <b>As though it did not atone</b> for him? <b>If we say that it is necessary</b> for the leper <b>to bring another offering</b> of oil, <b>didn’t you say</b> that <b>whether</b> the oil <b>was placed</b> on his head or <b>whether it was not placed</b> on his head, <b>it atoned</b> for him? <b>Rather,</b> the meaning of the statement is as follows: <b>It atoned</b> for <b>the person,</b> but <b>did not atone</b> for him <b>before Heaven. Here too,</b> with regard to one who sacrificed an offering without placing hands on its head, the <i>baraita</i> apparently means that the offering <b>atoned</b> for the owner’s transgression, even if it did not atone for him before Heaven.",
            "The Gemara rejects this suggestion: <b>There too,</b> with regard to the purification process of a leper, one can explain that the oil atoned for one matter and did not atone for another: It <b>atoned;</b> in other words, the <b>placement</b> of oil on the leper’s right <b>thumb and big toe,</b> which was performed, effected its atonement. But it <b>did not atone,</b> i.e., there still needs to be an atonement effected by <b>placement</b> of oil on <b>the</b> leper’s <b>head,</b> and another <i>log</i> of oil must be brought for the performance of that act.",
            "The Gemara returns to the matter of atonement for transgressions committed after the offering’s designation. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to the communal peace offering of two <b>lambs</b> that accompanies the two loaves on <b><i>Shavuot</i>, for what</b> sin <b>are they brought?</b>",
            "The Gemara interrupts the citation of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>The</b> two <b>lambs</b> sacrificed on <b><i>Shavuot</i></b> are not brought for a sin; <b>they are peace offerings</b> brought with the annual public offering of two loaves of new wheat. <b>Rather,</b> the <i>baraita</i> should be emended as follows: <b>For what</b> sin <b>are the goats</b> sacrificed on <b><i>Shavuot</i></b> as a sin offering <b>brought?</b>",
            "Rabbi Shimon answers: They are brought <b>for</b> the <b>defiling of</b> the <b>Temple,</b> by entering it while ritually impure, <b>or</b> for defiling <b>its sacrificial foods,</b> by partaking of them while ritually impure.",
            "Rabbi Shimon continues: Once <b>the blood of</b> the <b>first</b> goat <b>is sprinkled</b> on the altar, thereby atoning for this defilement, <b>for what</b> sin <b>is</b> the <b>second one sacrificed?</b> It is sacrificed <b>for</b> any incident involving <b>impurity that</b> may have <b>occurred between</b> the sacrifice of <b>that</b> first goat <b>and</b> the sacrifice of <b>this</b> second goat. <b>Based on this, say</b> that <b>the Jewish people should have</b> had to <b>sacrifice their offerings at all times and at every moment,</b> as perhaps they sinned in the interim; <b>but the verse spared</b> them of this obligation.",
            "The Gemara infers: <b>And here,</b> where an incident involving impurity occurred between the sacrifice of the two goats, is a case <b>where</b> the <b>positive mitzva</b> of distancing ritually impure people from the Temple was violated <b>after</b> the <b>designation</b> of the offering, as both goats were designated in advance. <b>And</b> nevertheless, the second goat <b>atones</b> for the violation. Evidently, an offering can atone for transgressions committed after its designation.",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>If</b> both goats were <b>designated simultaneously,</b> this would <b>indeed</b> be evidence to that effect. But <b>here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where</b> they were <b>designated sequentially,</b> and an incident involving impurity may have occurred between their respective designations.",
            "The Gemara challenges this assertion: <b>But shall we stand and say about the verse</b> mandating these two sin offerings <b>that when it is written, it is written</b> specifically with regard to a case <b>where</b> they are designated <b>sequentially?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said</b> the inference can be rejected for a different reason: <b>Do you say</b> that evidence can be adduced from <b>communal offerings? Communal offerings are different, as</b> the <b>court makes a non-verbal stipulation about them, in accordance with</b> what <b>Rav Yehuda</b> says that <b>Shmuel says. As Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says:</b> With regard to <b>communal offerings,</b> the slaughtering <b>knife,</b> i.e., the act of slaughter, <b>designates them for what they are.</b> The court stipulates that the second goat be consecrated as it is sacrificed, and it therefore atones for incidents of impurity that occur beforehand. Individual offerings, by contrast, are all designated in advance.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, said to Rav Pappa: But does Rabbi Shimon accept</b> the opinion that <b>the court can make a non-verbal stipulation about</b> communal offerings? <b>Doesn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say</b> that <b>Rav Amram says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yitzḥak says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> With regard to animals designated as <b>daily offerings</b> but <b>which</b> in the end <b>were not necessary for</b> use by <b>the public,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed</b> as long as they are <b>unblemished,</b> since they retain the status of offerings. But <b>according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed</b> even when they are <b>unblemished,</b> as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the <i>baraita</i> can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.",
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as <b>Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:</b> If the <b>goats</b> sacrificed on <b><i>Shavuot</i></b> were slaughtered simultaneously and <b>their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of</b> the <b>first</b> goat <b>was sprinkled, for what</b> sin <b>is</b> the <b>second</b> goat <b>brought?</b> There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones <b>for</b> any incident involving <b>impurity that occurred between the sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>of that</b> first goat <b>and</b> the sprinkling of the blood of <b>this</b> second goat.",
            "One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya <b>raised the dilemma only</b> about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of <b>a positive mitzva</b> committed <b>after</b> its <b>slaughter</b> and before the sprinkling of the blood. <b>But</b> with regard to the violation of <b>a positive mitzva that</b> one committed <b>after</b> the <b>designation</b> of the offering, before its slaughter, <b>he did not raise the dilemma.</b> Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Perhaps</b> Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because <b>he was saying:</b> Even <b>if you say</b> that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.",
            "§ <b>It was stated</b> with regard to <b>a thanks offering that</b> one <b>slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering: Rabba says</b> that it is <b>fit</b> and satisfies its owner’s obligation, and <b>Rav Ḥisda says</b> it is <b>unfit</b> in this regard.",
            "<b>Rabba says</b> it is <b>fit</b> because the <b>thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav Ḥisda says</b> it is <b>unfit</b> because <b>it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba said: From where do I say</b> that it is fit? It is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“And the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering</b>…<b>on the day that he presents his offering</b> it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:15–16). <b>Abba Ḥanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:</b> The verse <b>comes to teach</b> that <b>a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering</b> is <b>fit,</b> whereas <b>a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering</b> is <b>unfit. And what</b> is the <b>difference between this</b> offering <b>and that</b> offering? <b>A thanks offering is called a peace offering</b> in the verse, <b>but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.</b>",
            "Rabba explains: The <i>baraita</i> indicates that <b>a peace offering</b> that was slaughtered <b>for the sake of a thanks offering</b> is <b>unfit, but a thanks offering</b> that was slaughtered <b>for the sake of</b> some other <b>thanks offering</b> is <b>fit. What, is it not</b> referring to the thanks offering <b>of another,</b> teaching that it satisfies its owner’s obligation?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it is referring to another thanks offering <b>of his own,</b> which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of <b>another’s</b> thanks offering, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it <b>unfit,</b> i.e., does it not satisfy the owner’s obligation? If so, <b>rather than teaching</b> that <b>a peace offering</b> slaughtered <b>for the sake of a thanks offering</b> is <b>unfit, let</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teach</b> that <b>a thanks offering</b> that was slaughtered <b>for the sake of</b> another’s <b>thanks offering</b> is unfit, <b>and</b> one could infer that <b>all the more so a peace offering</b> slaughtered <b>for the sake of a thanks offering</b> is unfit.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>It was necessary</b> for the <i>baraita</i> to specify a case where <b>a peace offering</b> was slaughtered <b>for the sake of his own thanks offering.</b> Otherwise, it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and</b> therefore <b>when one slaughters</b> a peace offering <b>for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit.</b> Therefore the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that this is not the case.",
            "§ <b>Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of</b> another <b>sin offering</b> he was obligated to bring is <b>fit;</b> but if one slaughtered it <b>for the sake of a burnt offering</b> it is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "<b>What is the reason</b> for this distinction? <b>The Merciful One states</b> in the Torah: <b>“And slaughter it for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:33), <b>and</b> therefore, as long as the <b>sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering,</b> even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered <b>for the sake of a burnt offering</b> it is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "<b>And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for</b> a person other than its owner, but <b>who</b> nevertheless was <b>obligated</b> to bring <b>a sin offering,</b> is <b>unfit.</b> But if one slaughtered it <b>for</b> one <b>who</b> was <b>obligated</b> to bring <b>a burnt offering,</b> it is <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>What is the reason</b> for this distinction? The Torah states: <b>“And he shall be forgiven”</b> (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically <b>he,</b> the owner, <b>who</b> shall be forgiven, <b>and not another</b> person. <b>The other</b> person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably <b>similar to</b> the owner <b>in</b> that <b>he is</b> also <b>obligated</b> to achieve <b>atonement similar to</b> the owner’s by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.",
            "<b>And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for</b> a person <b>who is not obligated</b> to bring <b>anything</b> is <b>unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated</b> to bring an offering for violating <b>a positive mitzva.</b> Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.",
            "<b>And Rava says</b> that <b>a sin offering atones for those obligated</b> to bring a burnt offering for violating <b>a positive mitzva, due to an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: If a sin offering <b>atones for those who are liable</b> for transgressions for which one receives <b>excision from the World-to-Come</b> if he performs them intentionally, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that it atones <b>for those liable</b> for failing to fulfill <b>a positive mitzva?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is this to say that</b> the violation of a positive mitzva <b>is of the same type as</b> the sins atoned for by a sin offering? <b>But doesn’t Rava say</b> that <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered for</b> a person other than its owner but <b>who</b> was <b>obligated</b> to bring <b>a sin offering</b> is <b>unfit,</b> but if it was slaughtered <b>for</b> a person <b>who is obligated</b> to bring <b>a burnt offering,</b> it is <b>fit,</b> as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara answers: A sin offering <b>does not atone</b> for violating a positive mitzva <b>by</b> its <b>essence,</b> since prohibitions and positive mitzvot are not of the same type, but it <b>atones</b> for it <b>incidentally.</b>",
            "<b>And Rava says:</b> As for <b>a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is</b> still <b>prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.</b>",
            "Why is this so? <b>If you wish, cite a verse;</b> and <b>if you wish, propose a logical argument.</b> The Gemara elaborates: <b>If you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe</b> and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The derivation from this verse was explained in 2a. <b>If you wish, propose a logical argument:</b> Just <b>because</b> one <b>deviated</b> from protocol <b>in its</b> slaughter, shall he continue to deviate from protocol in the rest of the sacrificial process? This is <b>as</b> it was stated at <b>the beginning of the chapter</b> (2a).",
            "<b>And Rava says:</b> With regard to <b>a burnt offering that is brought</b> by its owner’s heirs <b>after</b> his <b>death,</b> if one <b>slaughtered it with a deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering,</b> i.e., for the sake of another type of offering, it is <b>unfit,</b> i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, and the heirs must therefore bring another offering. But if it was slaughtered <b>with a deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner,</b> i.e., for the sake of another person, it is <b>fit, as</b> the offering <b>has no</b> legal <b>owner after</b> the owner’s <b>death.</b>",
            "<b>And Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, says</b> that an offering <b>has an owner after</b> its owner’s <b>death,</b> specifically, the heir. <b>Rav Ashi said to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami: Is the Master saying</b> that an offering <b>actually has an owner after</b> its owner’s <b>death, and</b> that if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir <b>must bring another burnt offering,</b> contrary to the opinion of Rava? <b>Or perhaps</b> the Master is merely saying <b>that if</b> the heir <b>has several</b> violations of <b>positive mitzvot,</b> the offering <b>atones</b> for them, but still if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir is not required to bring another offering.",
            "Rav Pineḥas <b>said to him: I am saying</b> that the heir is <b>actually</b> the owner, and if the offering was slaughtered for someone else, he must bring another offering.",
            "<b>And Rava says: A burnt offering is a gift [<i>doron</i>]</b> to God; its essential purpose is not atonement. Rava supports his assertion: <b>What are the circumstances</b> under which a burnt offering atones for violating a positive mitzva? <b>If</b> one brings a burnt offering <b>without repentance</b> for his transgression, he may not sacrifice it at all, as <b>“the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination”</b> (Proverbs 21:27). <b>And if there is repentance, isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that if one <b>violates a positive mitzva and repents,</b> God <b>forgives him before he</b> even <b>moves from</b> his place? If so, why is he required to bring an offering? <b>Rather, conclude from it</b> that a burnt offering <b>is a gift</b> that one brings in order to appease God even after he is forgiven.",
            "The Gemara states <b>a mnemonic</b> for this series of statements by Rava: <b>A sin offering atones for who, a burnt offering after a gift.</b>",
            "<b>This</b> last statement of Rava <b>is also taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon said: For what</b> purpose <b>is a sin offering brought?</b> The Gemara interrupts: <b>For what</b> purpose <b>is it brought?</b> Is it not brought <b>to atone</b> for a transgression? <b>Rather,</b> Rabbi Shimon clearly meant: <b>For what</b> reason <b>is it brought before a burnt offering</b> in all circumstances where both are brought? Rabbi Shimon answered: It is comparable <b>to an advocate [<i>lifraklit</i>] who enters</b> before the king to convince him to pardon the defendant. Once the <b>advocate has appeased</b> the king, the <b>gift is brought in after him.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that all offerings are fit even if slaughtered not for their sake, <b>except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>a Paschal offering</b> is required to be slaughtered for its sake?",
            "The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, <b>as it is written: “Observe the month of the spring and offer [<i>ve’asita</i>] the Paschal offering”</b> (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaching <b>that all of the actions [<i>asiyyotav</i>] of</b> the Paschal offering, all of its sacrificial rites, must be performed <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>Paschal offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering</b> is prohibited. <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner</b> is also prohibited?",
            "The Gemara answers that this is derived from a verse, <b>as it is written: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of</b> the Lord’s <b>Passover”</b> (Exodus 12:27), which indicates <b>that</b> the <b>slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>Paschal offering. If</b> the verse <b>is not</b> necessary in order <b>to</b> derive <b>the matter</b> of <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering,</b> as that <i>halakha</i> is derived from Deuteronomy 16:1, <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source <b>for</b> the <b>mitzva</b> to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner. <b>From where do we</b> derive that these intentions are <b>indispensable</b> and, if lacking, disqualify the offering?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>The verse states: “And you shall sacrifice [<i>vezavaḥta</i>] the Paschal offering unto the Lord, your God,</b> of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). By repeating the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner, the Torah indicates that these two intentions are both indispensable to the sacrificial process.",
            "<b>Rav Safra objects to this: Does this</b> verse: <b>“And you shall sacrifice,” come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? <b>It is necessary for</b> the statement <b>of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that a leftover Paschal offering,</b> an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, <b>is sacrificed as a peace offering</b> afterward? It is derived from <b>that</b> which <b>is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.”</b> The verse is difficult: <b>But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? From here</b> it is derived <b>that a leftover Paschal offering should be</b> sacrificed <b>as</b> an offering <b>brought</b> both <b>from the flock and from the herd. And what is that?</b> It is <b>a peace offering.</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Safra says</b> that the verses should be expounded as follows: The verse <b>“And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering”</b> teaches the statement <b>of Rav Naḥman,</b> that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. The verse: <b>“Observe the month of the spring</b> and offer the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaches that there is <b>a mitzva</b> to sacrifice the Paschal offering without <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering.</b> The verse: <b>“And you shall say:</b> It is <b>the sacrifice of</b> the Lord’s <b>Passover”</b> (Exodus 12:27), teaches that there is <b>a mitzva</b> to slaughter it without <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner.</b> The term <b>“it is”</b> in the latter verse teaches that <b>both here and there,</b> i.e., with regard to both the offering and the owner, proper intent is <b>indispensable.</b>",
            "Rav Safra continues: <b>And we found</b> a source for <b>slaughter. From where do we</b> derive that <b>other</b> sacrificial <b>rites</b> must also be performed for the sake of the owner or the offering is disqualified? <b>Since</b> the Torah <b>revealed</b> that this intention is indispensable to the proper slaughter of the Paschal offering, it thereby <b>revealed</b> that it is critical to proper performance of the other rites as well.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi says: We do not say</b> that <b>since</b> the Torah <b>revealed</b> that this <i>halakha</i> is indispensable to slaughter, it thereby <b>revealed</b> that it is indispensable to the other rites as well. <b>Rather, from where do we</b> derive that it is indispensable to the other sacrificial <b>rites?</b> It is derived from a verse, <b>as it is written: “This is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering,</b> and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), indicating that all offerings must, like a peace offering, be sacrificed for their own sake.",
            "<b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In the verse: <b>“In the day that he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings”</b> (Leviticus 7:38), <b>this</b> word, i.e., “offerings,” is referring to the <b>firstborn</b> animal, the animal <b>tithe, and</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> which are not mentioned in the previous verse.",
            "<b>The text juxtaposes</b> all types of offerings mentioned in both verses <b>with a peace offering,</b> indicating that <b>just as</b> one who sacrifices <b>a peace offering is required</b> to do so with the proper intent, <b>both</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> from the <b>offering and</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner,</b> and in addition, the <i>halakha</i> of proper intent is only <b>as a mitzva,</b> not as an indispensable requirement, <b>so too,</b> in the case of <b>any</b> type of offering that must have proper intent, <b>both</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> from the <b>offering and</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner,</b> the <i>halakha</i> of proper intent is only <b>as a mitzva.</b> Therefore, the mitzva <i>ab initio</i> is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier repeat the <i>halakha</i> to teach that it is indispensable with regard to slaughter.",
            "<b>And</b> the juxtaposition of the peace offering with the Paschal offering indicates that a Paschal offering is <b>similar to a peace offering</b> in another respect: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a peace offering, you did not distinguish between slaughter and</b> the <b>other rites with regard to</b> the <b>mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i> of proper intent, <b>so too, with regard to</b> the <b>Paschal offering, do not distinguish between slaughter and</b> the <b>other</b> sacrificial <b>rites</b> with regard <b>to</b> the <i>halakha</i> that proper intent is <b>indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Rather,</b> since the indispensability of proper intent with regard to the Paschal offering is derived from its juxtaposition with the peace offering, <b>why do I</b> need the term <b>“it is”</b> to be written in Exodus 12:27? What is derived from there?",
            "The Gemara answers: This is written to teach that this requirement is indispensable only in the case of a Paschal offering, and not in the case of a guilt offering. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Concerning</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> the term <b>“it is” is stated with regard to slaughter</b> in Exodus 12:27 <b>to</b> teach that intent for the owner is <b>indispensable. But</b> concerning <b>a guilt offering,</b> the term <b>“it is” is stated only after</b> the verse mentions <b>the burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions, and</b> since a guilt offering <b>itself</b> is <b>fit</b> even <b>when its portions were not burned</b> on the altar at all, intent for the sake of the owner at this point is certainly not indispensable.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that if <b>a sin offering</b> is sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or one other than its owner, it is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, <b>as it is written: “And slaughter it for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:33), teaching <b>that</b> the <b>slaughter must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source with regard to <b>slaughter. From where do we</b> derive this with regard to <b>collection</b> of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, <b>as it is written:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>“And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:25), teaching <b>that</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And we found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that the <b>slaughter and collection</b> must be performed for the sake of a sin offering. <b>From where do we</b> derive this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, <b>as the verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his sin”</b> (Leviticus 4:26), teaching <b>that</b> the <b>atonement must be</b> effected <b>for the sake of a sin offering,</b> as atonement is effected by the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the prohibition against <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering. From where do we</b> derive the prohibition against <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner?</b> The Gemara answers: The aforementioned <b>verse states:</b> “And the priest shall make atonement <b>for him,”</b> indicating that the intent must be <b>for him, and not for another.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source <b>for</b> the <b>mitzva</b> to sprinkle the blood for the sake of the owner <i>ab initio</i>. <b>From where do we</b> derive that this is <b>indispensable</b> and disqualifies the offering if not fulfilled? The Gemara answers: It is <b>as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says</b> with regard to the sin offering of a nazirite: Since the verse could have simply stated: <b>Sin offering,</b> but instead stated: <b>“His sin offering”</b> (Numbers 6:16), it is inferred that the offering must be sacrificed for his, the owner’s, sake. <b>Here too,</b> since the verse could have simply stated <b>“sin,”</b> but states <b>“his sin,”</b> one infers that if the blood of the sin offering is not sprinkled for the sake of its owner, it is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <b>mitzva of</b> sacrificing a sin offering without <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering</b> <i>ab initio</i>, <b>and</b> with regard to <b>sprinkling</b> its blood without <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner</b> concerning <b>both</b> its <b>mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i> <b>and</b> its <b>indispensability. From where do we</b> derive that performing <b>all</b> sacrificial <b>rites</b> without <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering is an indispensable</b> requirement, <b>and</b> that performing <b>all other rites,</b> besides sprinkling the blood, without <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner is both a mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i> <b>and indispensable?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from</b> the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>the sin offering of a nazirite; as it is written</b> concerning a nazirite: <b>“And the priest shall bring them before the Lord, and shall offer [<i>ve’asa</i>] his sin offering, and his burnt offering”</b> (Numbers 6:16). The verse teaches <b>that all of its</b> sacrificial <b>actions [<i>asiyyotav</i>] must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a sin offering must be sacrificed without <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering,</b> and that this requirement is indispensable. <b>From where do we</b> derive that sacrificing it without <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner</b> is also indispensable, even in rites other than the sprinkling of the blood?",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says:</b> Since the verse concerning a nazirite could have simply stated: <b>Sin offering,</b> but instead states: <b>“His sin offering,”</b> one infers that the offering must be sacrificed for the owner’s sake.",
            "<b>Ravina objects to this: If that is so, what do you interpret</b> from the fact that the same verse could have stated: <b>Burnt offering,</b> but instead states: <b>“His burnt offering”?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And according to Ravina, what do you interpret</b> from the subsequent verse: “The priest shall offer also his meal offering and his libation” (Numbers 6:17)? Why does Ravina not mention that this verse could have stated: <b>Meal offering,</b> but instead states: <b>“His meal offering,”</b> and that it could have stated: <b>Libation,</b> but instead states: <b>“His libation”?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> language <b>is necessary;</b> it is just like the phrase: <b>“Their meal offering and their libations,”</b> which is mentioned many times in the portion of the Festival offerings (e.g., Numbers 29:37). It teaches that the meal offerings and libations that are brought with the additional animal offerings of the Festivals can be sacrificed even <b>at night</b> after the offering is brought. The phrase: <b>“Their meal offering and their libations,”</b> also teaches that they may be brought <b>even on the following day.</b> Likewise here, when stated with regard to a nazirite, the phrase teaches that they may be brought at night or the day after the offering is sacrificed. <b>But</b> there remains a difficulty: <b>What do you interpret</b> from the fact that the verse could have stated: <b>Burnt offering,</b> but instead states: <b>“His burnt offering”?</b>",
            "The Gemara raises an additional objection to the derivation from a nazirite’s sin offering: <b>And furthermore, can</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of a standard sin offering and of a nazirite’s sin offering <b>be derived from one another?</b> The <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for a transgression, e.g., eating forbidden <b>fat, cannot be derived from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a nazirite’s sin offering,</b> due to the unique element of stringency of the latter, <b>since there is other blood,</b> i.e., other offerings are brought, <b>with it.</b> Likewise, the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a nazirite’s sin offering cannot be derived from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for eating forbidden <b>fat,</b> due to the unique element of stringency of the latter, <b>since</b> it atones for a transgression punishable by <b>excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>].</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says:</b> These <i>halakhot</i> are <b>derived from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the sin offering of a leper; as it is written: “And the priest shall offer [<i>ve’asa</i>] the sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 14:19), teaching <b>that all</b> sacrificial <b>actions of [<i>asiyyotav</i>]</b> a sin offering <b>must be</b> performed <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b>",
            "<b>And we found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a sin offering must be sacrificed without <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering,</b> and that this is indispensable. <b>From where do we</b> derive that sacrificing a sin offering without <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner</b> is also indispensable? <b>The verse states: “And make atonement for the one that is to be purified</b> of his impurity” (Leviticus 14:19), indicating that the sin offering must be sacrificed <b>for</b> the sake of <b>this</b> person <b>who is being purified, and not for another</b> person <b>who is to be purified.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But still, can</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of a standard sin offering and a leper’s sin offering <b>be derived from one another?</b> This comparison is also problematic. The <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for eating forbidden <b>fat cannot be derived from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a leper’s sin offering, since there is other blood</b> that is brought <b>with</b> the latter, i.e., a burnt offering and a guilt offering; and the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a leper’s sin offering cannot be derived from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for eating forbidden <b>fat, since</b> the latter atones for a transgression punishable by <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: Indeed, the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering <b>cannot be derived from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>one</b> other type of sin offering alone. But one can <b>derive</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>one</b> type of sin offering <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of the other <b>two.</b> The verses concerning a standard sin offering, that of a leper, and that of a nazirite all contain elements that indicate that the offering must be sacrificed for its own sake. Two of them together are sufficient to teach that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the third case. The third case is therefore apparently extraneous, and it is understood to teach that proper intent in this regard is indispensable for all the offering’s rites.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to which</b> type of sin offering <b>should</b> the Torah <b>not have written</b> this <i>halakha</i>, i.e., which of the three cases should be regarded as the extraneous case? If you say: <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> it <b>with regard to a sin offering</b> brought for eating forbidden <b>fat, and</b> one can <b>derive</b> it <b>from these</b> other sin offerings, i.e., those of a nazirite and a leper, this can be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> other sin offerings? They are notable <b>in that there is other blood</b> brought <b>with them.</b> Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> should apply only to similar sin offerings.",
            "If you say: <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> it <b>with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering, and</b> one can <b>derive</b> it <b>from these</b> other sin offerings, those of a leper and a sinner, this can also be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> other sin offerings? They are notable <b>in that</b> one <b>does not have</b> the option of obtaining an exemption through <b>a request</b> to a halakhic authority. A nazirite, by contrast, can request of a halakhic authority to dissolve his vow of naziriteship, thereby nullifying his obligation.",
            "If you say: <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> it <b>with regard to a leper’s sin offering, and</b> one can <b>derive</b> it <b>from these</b> other sin offerings, those of a nazirite and a sinner, this can also be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> other sin offerings? They are notable <b>in that they cannot be brought</b> from doves instead of sheep if the owner is <b>poor,</b> unlike a leper’s sin offering (see Leviticus 14:21). Therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of these different sin offerings cannot be derived from one another.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is derived from that which <b>the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering,</b> and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). <b>The verse juxtaposes</b> a sin offering <b>with a peace offering,</b> indicating that <b>just as</b> for <b>a peace offering we require</b> intent <b>for its sake, as a mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i>, <b>both</b> concerning the <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering and</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner, so too,</b> for <b>a sin offering we require</b> intent <b>for its sake as a mitzva, both</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> from the type of <b>offering and</b> concerning <b>deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner.</b>",
            "<b>Therefore,</b> the <b>mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i> is derived <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a peace offering; and those verses</b> mentioned earlier, from which this requirement is derived with regard to each type of sin offering separately, repeat the <i>halakha</i> <b>to</b> teach that it is <b>indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And we found</b> a source for these <i>halakhot</i> with regard to <b>a sin offering</b> brought for eating forbidden <b>fat, as it is written with regard to it:</b> “And slaughter it <b>for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:33), indicating that it must be slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering. Likewise, sources for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper have also been cited."
        ],
        [
            "<b>From where do we</b> derive these <i>halakhot</i> with regard to <b>a sin offering</b> brought <b>for idol worship,</b> which has unique <i>halakhot</i>, as detailed in Numbers 15:27–31, and with regard to which the term: For a sin offering, is not written? Likewise, from where do we derive them with regard to the sin offerings that are brought <b>for</b> the <b>hearing</b> of <b>the voice, and</b> for <b>an utterance of the lips, and</b> for the <b>defiling of</b> the <b>Temple or its sacrificial</b> foods, which also have unique <i>halakhot</i> (Leviticus 5:1–13), and <b>with regard to which</b> the term: For a sin offering, <b>is not written</b> either?",
            "The Gemara answers: With regard to <b>a sin offering</b> brought <b>for idol worship,</b> these <i>halakhot</i> are <b>derived from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for eating forbidden <b>fat, as</b> idol worship is also punishable by <b><i>karet</i>, similar to</b> consumption of forbidden fat. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all these</b> other sin offerings, which are brought for transgressions not punishable by <i>karet</i>, these <i>halakhot</i> <b>are derived by</b> analogy from <b>the common element</b> of the aforementioned three sources, namely, a standard sin offering, the sin offering of a nazirite, and the sin offering of a leper.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught:</b> When <b>a Paschal offering</b> is sacrificed <b>at its</b> appointed <b>time,</b> on Passover eve after noon, if it is sacrificed <b>for its sake,</b> it is <b>fit;</b> if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake,</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> as stated in the mishna. <b>And</b> when an offering consecrated as a Paschal offering is sacrificed <b>during the rest of the days of the year,</b> if it is sacrificed <b>for its sake,</b> it is <b>unfit;</b> if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake,</b> it is <b>fit.</b>",
            "The Gemara presents <b>a mnemonic</b> for the names of the <i>amora’im</i> mentioned in this discussion: <b><i>Shin</i>, <i>lamed</i>, <i>vav</i>; <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>alef</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>tzadi</i>, <i>nun</i>; <i>mem</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>reish</i>; <i>beit</i>, <i>tzadi</i>, <i>alef</i>; <i>beit</i>, <i>alef</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived, i.e., that if a Paschal offering is sacrificed during the rest of the year it is fit if sacrificed not for its sake? <b>Shmuel’s father says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock”</b> (Leviticus 3:6), indicating that an offering <b>that is brought</b> only <b>from the flock will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.</b> The Paschal offering fulfills this criterion.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Say</b> that if it is sacrificed for the sake of <b>a peace offering, yes,</b> it is fit, but if it is sacrificed for the sake of <b>some other</b> offering, it is <b>not</b> fit. <b>Rabbi Ila says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> The redundant expression <b>“for a sacrifice”</b> in Leviticus 3:6 is stated <b>to include any</b> type of <b>sacrifice.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, <b>say</b> that a Paschal offering <b>should be</b> rendered <b>as any</b> offering for <b>which</b> one <b>slaughters</b> it; for example, if it is slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering, it should be rendered a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If</b> the phrase: <b>For peace offerings and a sacrifice, was written</b> in the verse, it would be <b>as you say. Now that it is written: “For a sacrifice of peace offerings,”</b> it indicates that <b>for whatever</b> type of offering one <b>slaughters it, it will be a peace offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Say</b> that: <b>“For a sacrifice,”</b> is <b>a generalization</b> and: <b>“Of peace offerings,”</b> is <b>a detail,</b> and according to the principles of biblical hermeneutics, wherever there is <b>a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only that which is</b> specified <b>in the detail.</b> Accordingly, if the offering is sacrificed for the sake of <b>a peace offering, yes,</b> it is fit; but if it is sacrificed for the sake of <b>another</b> offering, it is <b>not</b> fit.",
            "The Gemara answers: With the term: <b>“Unto the Lord,”</b> the verse <b>then generalized</b> again. Therefore, the verse is formulated as a generalization, a detail, and a generalization, as the Gemara will explain.",
            "<b>Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this</b> suggestion: <b>But the latter generalization is dissimilar to the former generalization. The former generalization:</b> “For a sacrifice,” <b>includes</b> only <b>slaughtered offerings and nothing more,</b> whereas <b>the latter generalization: “Unto the Lord,”</b> includes <b>any</b> offering <b>unto the Lord. And</b> accordingly, <b>even</b> if the Paschal offering was sacrificed <b>for</b> the sake of <b>bird</b> offerings, <b>or even for</b> the sake of <b>meal offerings,</b> it should be fit, as these are brought “unto the Lord.”",
            "The Gemara responds to this objection: <b>The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught generalizations and details</b> even in examples <b>like this case.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: Since “unto the Lord” is a second generalization, the verse is formulated as <b>a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization,</b> and <b>you may deduce</b> that the verse is referring <b>only</b> to items <b>similar to the detail. Just as</b> the items mentioned in <b>the detail</b> are clearly <b>defined as</b> a case where a Paschal offering was sacrificed <b>not for its own sake, and</b> nevertheless it is <b>fit, so too,</b> in <b>any</b> case <b>where it</b> was sacrificed <b>not for its sake but</b> for the sake of another offering, it is <b>fit.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> the verse is referring only to actions similar to the detail, then <b>just as</b> the items mentioned in <b>the detail</b> are clearly <b>defined</b> as a peace offering, which is <b>a matter that is brought as a vow</b> offering <b>or as a gift</b> offering, <b>so too,</b> a Paschal offering should be fit only if it was sacrificed for the sake of <b>any</b> offering <b>that is brought as a vow</b> offering <b>or as a gift</b> offering. Accordingly, if it was sacrificed for the sake of <b>a burnt offering or a peace offering, yes,</b> it is fit, as these are brought as a vow offering or as a gift offering; but if it was sacrificed for the sake of <b>a sin offering or a guilt offering,</b> it is <b>not</b> fit, as these are not brought as a vow offering or as a gift offering.",
            "The Gemara therefore rejects the exegetical method of generalizations and details in favor of that of amplifications and restrictions: <b>Rather,</b> the term: <b>“For a sacrifice,” is</b> not a generalization, but <b>an amplification,</b> which includes any type of offering. Therefore, if a Paschal offering is sacrificed for the sake of any type of offering during the rest of the year, it is fit.",
            "The Gemara challenges: If so, <b>say</b> that it adds that a Paschal offering <b>should be</b> rendered <b>as any</b> offering for <b>which</b> one <b>slaughters</b> it. Why does Shmuel’s father interpret that it is rendered a peace offering specifically?",
            "<b>Rabbi Avin says:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Offerings that are eaten,</b> in this case the Paschal offering, <b>are diverted</b> when slaughtered not for their sake <b>to</b> serve as other types of <b>offerings that are eaten,</b> such as peace offerings. <b>But offerings that are eaten are not diverted to</b> serve as <b>offerings that are not eaten,</b> such as burnt offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is that to say</b> that <b>a sin offering and a guilt offering are not eaten?</b> Why does a Paschal offering receive the status of a peace offering and not that of a sin offering or a guilt offering, which are eaten by the priests?",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the answer should be emended: <b>Offerings that are eaten by every</b> Jewish <b>person are diverted to</b> serve as <b>offerings eaten by every</b> Jewish <b>person,</b> i.e., peace offerings. <b>But offerings eaten by every</b> Jewish <b>person are not diverted to</b> serve as <b>offerings not eaten by every</b> Jewish <b>person,</b> i.e., sin offerings and guilt offerings, which are eaten only by priests.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, says</b> that there is a different answer: <b>Offerings of lesser sanctity are diverted to</b> serve as <b>offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> i.e., peace offerings. <b>But offerings of lesser sanctity are not diverted to</b> serve as <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> i.e., burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.",
            "<b>Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Savriyu, objects to this</b> answer: If so, <b>say</b> that if one <b>slaughtered</b> a Paschal offering <b>for the sake of</b> the animal <b>tithe, let it be</b> rendered animal <b>tithe,</b> which, like a Paschal offering, is an offering of lesser sanctity. The Gemara adds: <b>For what <i>halakha</i></b> does it matter, practically speaking, that a Paschal offering has been rendered an animal tithe rather than a peace offering? It matters <b>because</b> if it is rendered an animal tithe, <b>it should not require libations. And</b> furthermore, if one sells it, he <b>should be flogged for</b> transgressing the prohibition: <b>“It shall not be redeemed”</b> (Leviticus 27:33), which applies to the animal tithe even after its slaughter.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>The verse states</b> with regard to the animal tithe: <b>“The tenth shall be sacred”</b> (Leviticus 27:32). The definite article indicates that <b>this,</b> the tenth animal, is the <b>tithe, but another</b> animal slaughtered for its sake is <b>not a tithe.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: Still, <b>say</b> that if one <b>slaughtered</b> a Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a firstborn</b> animal, <b>let it be</b> rendered <b>like a firstborn.</b> The Gemara adds: <b>For what <i>halakha</i></b> does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a firstborn rather than a peace offering? It matters <b>because</b> if it is rendered a firstborn, <b>it should not require libations. Also,</b> this means <b>that one should give it to the priests.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: With regard to <b>a firstborn too,</b> the verse states: “That you shall set apart [<i>veha’avarta</i>] unto the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12). Since with regard to the animal tithe it is stated: “Whatever passes [<i>ya’avor</i>] under the rod, the tenth shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:32), it is <b>derived</b> by verbal analogy between the <b>passing [<i>avara</i>]</b> stated with regard to a firstborn and the <b>passing [<i>avara</i>]</b> stated with regard to the animal <b>tithe</b> that a Paschal offering cannot become a firstborn either.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But say</b> that if one <b>slaughtered</b> a Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a substitute, let it be</b> rendered <b>a substitute.</b> The Gemara adds: <b>For what <i>halakha</i></b> does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a substitute rather than a peace offering? The one who slaughtered it <b>should be flogged for</b> transgressing the prohibition of effecting substitution. <b>Also,</b> its sale <b>should be determined to</b> violate the prohibition: <b>“It shall not be sold or redeemed”</b> (Leviticus 27:28).",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says:</b> It is derived from that which <b>the verse states</b> with regard to substitution: <b>“Then both it and that for which it is changed</b> shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:33). The verse teaches that only <b>it,</b> the animal substituted, is <b>a substitute, but another</b> animal is <b>not a substitute.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But say</b> that if one <b>slaughtered</b> a Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a thanks offering, let it be</b> rendered <b>like a thanks offering.</b> The Gemara adds: <b>For what <i>halakha</i></b> does it practically matter that it has been rendered a thanks offering rather than a peace offering? If so, <b>it should require</b> a meal offering of forty loaves of <b>bread.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Is there anything,</b> i.e., any situation, comparable to this suggestion <b>that a Paschal offering itself does not require bread, but its leftover,</b> an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, <b>requires bread</b> when slaughtered not for its sake? Such a suggestion is implausible.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, now</b> that a leftover Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering becomes a peace offering, this objection can <b>also</b> be raised: <b>Is there anything</b> comparable to the suggestion <b>that a Paschal offering itself does not require libations, but its leftover requires libations</b> as a peace offering?",
            "The Gemara explains its answer: <b>This</b> is what <b>we are saying: Is there anything</b> comparable to the suggestion <b>that the leftover of a thanks offering itself does not require bread, but</b> the <b>leftover</b> of an offering <b>from</b> some <b>other</b> category <b>requires bread?</b>",
            "§ It was taught that the verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that a Paschal offering sacrificed not on Passover eve is rendered a peace offering if sacrificed not for its sake. <b>Rav Yeimar, son of Rav Hillel, objects to this: But from where</b> is it derived <b>that</b> this verse <b>is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? Perhaps it is written with regard to a leftover guilt offering;</b> a guilt offering is also brought only from the flock.",
            "<b>Rava says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings</b> unto the Lord <b>is of [<i>min</i>] the flock,”</b> where the term “<i>min</i>” indicates <b>that is</b> brought <b>equally from all</b> species of the <b>flock,</b> i.e., from both sheep and goats. A guilt offering, by contrast, is brought only from rams, i.e., male sheep.",
            "<b>Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, objects to this: You say everywhere</b> that the word <b>“<i>min</i>”</b> is stated <b>to exclude</b> items, <b>but here</b> you claim that the word <b>“<i>min</i>”</b> is stated <b>to include</b> all species of the flock? You should say the opposite: The verse indicates an offering that is brought only from some species of the flock, i.e., a guilt offering.",
            "<b>Rabbi Mani says: Here too,</b> the word <b>“<i>min</i>”</b> is stated <b>to exclude</b> certain categories of the flock, <b>as</b> a Paschal offering <b>is not brought</b> from an animal that is <b>in its second year, and is not brought from</b> the <b>female</b> animals of the flock.",
            "The Gemara cites another objection. <b>Rav Ḥana of Baghdad objects to this: How can you say that when this</b> verse <b>is written, it is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? But from</b> that <b>which is written</b> in the subsequent verses: <b>“If</b> he brings <b>a lamb”</b> (Leviticus 3:7), and <b>“if</b> his offering is <b>a goat”</b> (Leviticus 3:12), one learns <b>by inference that</b> the passage is <b>not written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering;</b> the Torah states elsewhere, in Exodus 12:5, that a Paschal offering is brought from both lambs and goats, and it is unnecessary to teach this again in Leviticus.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Those</b> verses <b>are necessary for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The word <b>“lamb”</b> is written <b>to include the Paschal offering in</b> the requirement that the <b>tail</b> be offered on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this <i>halakha</i> is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>When</b> the verse <b>states: “If</b> he brings <b>a lamb,”</b> it is <b>to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose</b> first <b>year has passed</b> and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, <b>and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering.</b> Specifically, this indicates <b>that they require placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>libations, and the waving of</b> the <b>breast and thigh. And when</b> the verse <b>states:</b> “And <b>if</b> his offering is a <b>goat,” it interrupted the</b> previous <b>matter</b> and <b>taught that the</b> sacrificing of <b>a goat does not require</b> that the <b>tail</b> be burned on the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But is it derived from here</b> that a Paschal offering that is too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? <b>It is derived from</b> the verse <b>that Shmuel’s father</b> cites, <b>as Shmuel’s father says:</b> The verse: <b>“And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings</b> unto the Lord <b>is of the flock”</b> (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that an offering <b>that is brought</b> only <b>from the flock,</b> i.e., the Paschal offering, <b>will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>But</b> even without the <i>baraita</i>, Shmuel’s father’s statement is <b>still</b> superfluous, as that <i>halakha</i> is <b>derived from that which Rav Naḥman</b> says that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says. As Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? As it is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd”</b> (Deuteronomy 16:2). Why is the herd mentioned? <b>But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Rather,</b> it is derived <b>from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be</b> sacrificed as an offering <b>brought</b> both <b>from the flock and from the herd. And what is that?</b> It is <b>a peace offering.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> none of these derivations are superfluous, as <b>three verses are written</b> that teach the <i>halakha</i> that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering."
        ],
        [
            "<b>One</b> verse teaches this <i>halakha</i> in a case where <b>its time</b> of sacrifice, Passover eve, <b>has passed, and its</b> first <b>year has</b> also <b>passed,</b> disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. <b>And one</b> verse teaches the <i>halakha</i> in a case where <b>its time</b> of sacrifice <b>has passed, but not its</b> first <b>year. And</b> the third <b>one</b> teaches a case where <b>neither its time</b> of sacrifice <b>nor its</b> first <b>year has passed,</b> but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.",
            "<b>And</b> all these verses <b>are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written</b> only <b>one</b> of the verses, <b>I would say</b> that it is referring to a case <b>where</b> both <b>its</b> first <b>year and its time</b> of sacrifice <b>have passed.</b> Only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, <b>as it was completely rejected from</b> its status as <b>a Paschal offering. But</b> in a case where <b>its time</b> of sacrifice <b>has passed, but its</b> first <b>year</b> has <b>not</b> passed, in <b>which</b> case it is still <b>fit to</b> be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the <b>second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, I would say</b> that it is <b>not</b> sacrificed as a peace offering.",
            "<b>And had the Merciful One written</b> only <b>these two</b> verses, one might assume that only these Paschal offerings are sacrificed as peace offerings, <b>as they were</b> both <b>rejected from their status</b> as Paschal offerings. <b>But</b> in a case <b>where neither its time</b> of sacrifice <b>nor its</b> first <b>year have passed,</b> in <b>which</b> case it is still <b>fit to</b> be sacrificed as <b>a Paschal offering</b> on Passover eve, <b>I would say</b> that it is <b>not</b> sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses <b>are necessary.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that</b> one <b>slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon,</b> i.e., a sin offering similar to those brought by the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7), not to atone for a sin but as a gift, is <b>fit</b> and satisfies its owner’s obligation; <b>as the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 6:18), indicating that there is <b>one law for all the sin offerings.</b>",
            "<b>Rava sat and stated this <i>halakha</i></b> of Mavog. <b>Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to Rava</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake</b> but for the sake of another type of meal offering <b>are fit, and satisfied the obligation of the owner,</b> in contrast to animal offerings, which if slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.",
            "This is <b>because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. As, if one removes a handful</b> from a meal offering prepared in a shallow <b>pan for the sake of</b> a meal offering prepared in <b>a deep pan,</b> his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as <b>its</b> mode of <b>preparation proves that it is</b> a meal offering prepared in a shallow <b>pan.</b> Likewise, if one removes a handful from <b>a dry</b> meal offering <b>for the sake of</b> a meal offering <b>mixed</b> with oil, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as <b>its</b> mode of <b>preparation proves that it is a dry</b> meal offering. The demonstrably incorrect nature of the intention prevents it from affecting the status of the meal offering in any way.",
            "<b>But with regard to slaughtered offerings this is not so.</b> There is <b>one</b> mode of <b>slaughter for all of</b> the offerings, <b>one</b> mode of <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>for all of them,</b> and <b>one</b> mode of <b>sprinkling for all of them.</b> Therefore, improper intention affects the status of the offering; if a rite is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.",
            "Rav Mesharshiyya inferred from the <i>baraita</i>: <b>The reason</b> a meal offering satisfies its owner’s obligation even when one removed a handful for the sake of another type of meal offering <b>is that its</b> mode of <b>preparation proves</b> its true nature. <b>But</b> if <b>its</b> mode of <b>preparation does not prove</b> its nature, it does <b>not</b> satisfy its owner’s obligation. <b>Why</b> not? If Mavog’s derivation is correct, <b>let us say</b> likewise that the verse: <b>“This is the law of the meal offering”</b> (Leviticus 6:7), indicates that there is <b>one law for all of the meal offerings,</b> regardless of their mode of preparation.",
            "<b>Rather, if</b> Mavog’s statement <b>was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered on the condition that Nahshon,</b> the prince of Judah, <b>be atoned for by it is fit;</b> this is not considered a change of owner, as <b>there is no atonement for the dead.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> if this was Mavog’s statement, why did he mention Nahshon? <b>Let him state</b> this <i>halakha</i> in reference to <b>a dead</b> person <b>in general.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> statement of Mavog <b>teaches us</b> that <b>the reason</b> for the fitness of a sin offering slaughtered for the atonement of Nahshon <b>is that he is dead. Consequently,</b> if it was slaughtered for the sake of <b>a living</b> person obligated to bring a sin offering <b>similar to</b> that of <b>Nahshon,</b> it is <b>unfit. And what is that?</b> It is <b>a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering,</b> which are brought not to atone for a sin but to become ritually pure. Consequently, if one sacrifices a standard sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring the sin offering of a nazirite or a leper, it is considered a change of owner, and the offering is unfit.",
            "The Gemara counters: Why is the offering disqualified? <b>These</b> sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper <b>are</b> equivalent to <b>burnt offerings,</b> since they are not brought for atonement. Sacrificing a sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt offering is not considered deviation with regard to the owner and does not disqualify it (see 3b).",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, if</b> Mavog’s statement <b>was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin offering similar to</b> that of <b>Nahshon</b> is <b>fit; Nahshon’s sin offering is</b> equivalent to <b>a burnt offering.</b>",
            "<b>There is</b> one <b>who says</b> that <b>Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon</b> is <b>unfit.</b> This is because <b>a sin offering of Nahshon is</b> equivalent to <b>a burnt offering,</b> and he is therefore considered to have deviated from the type of offering.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> why did Mavog mention a sin offering of Nahshon, which one cannot bring at all? <b>Let him say</b> this <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a nazirite’s sin offering and a leper’s sin offering,</b> which are also equivalent to burnt offerings. The Gemara explains: Mavog <b>cited the primary sin offering,</b> the first case of an individual sin offering recorded in the Bible.",
            "§ <b>Rav says: A sin offering</b> brought for consuming forbidden <b>fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering</b> brought for consuming <b>blood,</b> or <b>for the sake of a sin offering</b> brought for engaging in <b>idol worship, is fit;</b> it is not considered deviation from the type of offering.",
            "But if it was slaughtered <b>for the sake of a nazirite’s sin offering,</b> or <b>for the sake of a leper’s sin offering,</b> it is <b>unfit; these</b> sin offerings <b>are</b> equivalent to <b>burnt offerings,</b> as they are not brought for atonement.",
            "<b>Rava raises a dilemma:</b> In the case of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for consuming forbidden <b>fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering</b> brought <b>for</b> the <b>defiling of</b> the <b>Temple or its sacrificial</b> foods, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we say</b> that the offering is fit, as the latter type of sin offering atones for a transgression punishable by <b><i>karet</i></b> when committed intentionally, <b>similar to</b> the transgression of consuming forbidden fat?",
            "<b>Or perhaps</b> is it unfit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is a sliding-scale sin offering, the contents of which vary with the financial situation of the transgressor (see Leviticus 5:3–13), and <b>not a set</b> sin offering, which is always an animal, <b>like</b> a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches</b> a version of Rav’s statement according to which in <b>all of</b> the cases he mentioned, including one where the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood or for engaging in idol worship, the offering is <b>unfit. What is the reason?</b> It is derived from the verse: <b>“And slaughter it [<i>otah</i>] for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:33), that a sin offering must be slaughtered <b>for the sake of that [<i>otah</i>] sin offering,</b> and no other.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: How do you teach Rava’s dilemma?</b> Rava appears to assume that if one slaughters a sin offering for the sake of some other types of sin offering it remains fit. How is this compatible with your version of Rav’s statement, according to which slaughter for the sake of any other type of sin offering disqualifies it?",
            "Rav Aḥa <b>said to him: We teach</b> Rava’s dilemma <b>with regard to deviation</b> with regard to the <b>owner</b> rather than from the type of offering. <b>And this is how we teach it:</b> First, <b>Rava says: A sin offering</b> brought for consuming forbidden <b>fat that one slaughtered for</b> the sake of one <b>who is obligated</b> to bring <b>a sin offering</b> for consuming <b>blood, or</b> for the sake of one who is obligated to bring <b>a sin offering</b> for engaging in <b>idol worship,</b> is <b>unfit.</b> Since the other person is also obligated to bring a sin offering, this is considered deviation with regard to the owner. But if it was slaughtered <b>for one who is obligated</b> to bring <b>a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering,</b> it is <b>fit,</b> as these sin offerings are not brought for atonement. Deviation with regard to the owner disqualifies an offering only if the other owner is obligated to bring a similar offering.",
            "<b>And</b> then <b>we pose the dilemma like this: Rava raises a dilemma:</b> In the case of <b>a sin offering</b> brought for consuming forbidden <b>fat that one slaughtered for</b> the sake of <b>one who is obligated</b> to bring <b>a sin offering for</b> the <b>defiling of</b> the <b>Temple or its sacrificial</b> foods, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we say</b> that the offering is unfit, as the one who defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods is obligated to bring a sin offering for a transgression punishable by <b><i>karet</i>, similar to</b> the transgression of the owner? <b>Or perhaps</b> it remains fit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is <b>not a set</b> sin offering <b>like</b> a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?",
            "The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ <b>It was stated:</b> If one <b>slaughtered</b> a sin offering <b>for its sake</b> with intent <b>to sprinkle its blood not for its sake</b> but for the sake of another type of offering, <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that the offering is <b>unfit, and Reish Lakish says</b> it is <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> as in his opinion <b>one can have intention from</b> one <b>rite to</b> affect another <b>rite,</b> i.e., one can disqualify an offering by performing one rite with improper intent about a subsequent rite that he has not yet performed. <b>And we derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from intent of <i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., intent while performing one of the main rites to consume the offering after the appointed time, which disqualifies the offering.",
            "<b>And Reish Lakish says</b> that it is <b>fit,</b> as in his opinion <b>one cannot have intention from</b> one <b>rite to</b> affect another <b>rite, and we do not derive</b> <i>halakhot</i> with regard to deviation from the type of offering <b>from intent of <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each <b>follow [<i>ve’azdu</i>] their</b> general line of <b>reasoning</b> in this matter; <b>as it was stated:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or</b> in order <b>to burn its</b> forbidden <b>fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> Deriving benefit from the animal is <b>prohibited,</b> as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because <b>one can have intention from</b> one <b>rite to</b> affect another <b>rite;</b> idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. <b>And</b> this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i>, as <b>we derive</b> <i>halakhot</i> of idol worship, which are applicable even <b>outside</b> the Temple, <b>from</b> <i>halakhot</i> concerning intent that apply <b>inside</b> the Temple.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish says:</b> Deriving benefit from the animal is <b>permitted. One cannot have intention from</b> one <b>rite to</b> affect another <b>rite, and we do not derive</b> <i>halakhot</i> applicable <b>outside</b> the Temple <b>from</b> <i>halakhot</i> that apply <b>inside</b> the Temple.",
            "Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. <b>And if</b> the Sages <b>had taught us</b> the dispute only <b>with regard to that</b> issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that <b>Reish Lakish says</b> his opinion only <b>with regard to that</b> issue, as he maintains that <i>halakhot</i> applicable outside the Temple are not derived from <i>halakhot</i> applicable only inside the Temple. <b>But</b> with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might <b>say</b> that <b>he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> that it is disqualified, as <i>halakhot</i> applicable <b>inside</b> the Temple can be derived <b>from</b> other <i>halakhot</i> applicable <b>inside</b> the Temple.",
            "<b>And if</b> the Sages <b>had taught us</b> the dispute only with regard to <b>this</b> issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> his opinion only <b>with regard to this</b> issue, which concerns <i>halakhot</i> applicable inside the Temple. <b>But with regard to that</b> issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would <b>say</b> that <b>he concedes to</b> the opinion of <b>Reish Lakish</b> that <i>halakhot</i> applicable outside the Temple are not derived from <i>halakhot</i> applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements <b>are necessary.</b>",
            "<b>When Rav Dimi came</b> from Eretz Yisrael, <b>he said: Rav Yirmeya responds</b> to this dispute by eliciting evidence <b>to support</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila</b> elicits evidence <b>to support</b> the opinion of <b>Reish Lakish.</b>",
            "Rav Dimi elaborated: <b>Rav Yirmeya</b> elicits evidence <b>to support</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: <b>Just as in</b> the <b>case</b> of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, <b>where if</b> the one slaughtering the offering <b>said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> it is <b>fit,</b> and nevertheless, if he <b>slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> so too, in the <b>case</b> of deviation from the type of offering, <b>where</b> even <b>if he said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> it <b>not for its sake,</b> it is <b>unfit, isn’t it logical that</b> if <b>he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?</b>",
            "<b>Rava bar Ahilai objects to this</b> inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> intent <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with <b><i>karet</i>,</b> whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says:</b> Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by <i>karet</i>. And <b>this</b> is what <b>he is saying: Just as</b> in the <b>case</b> of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, <b>where if</b> the one slaughtering the offering <b>said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, it is fit,</b> and nevertheless, if he <b>slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> so too, in the <b>case</b> of deviation from the type of offering, <b>where</b> even <b>if he said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> it <b>not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that</b> if <b>he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ashi objects to this</b> inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> intent to sprinkle the blood <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> the disqualification <b>applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say</b> that the same <i>halakhot</i> govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed <b>not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Ashi says: This</b> is what Rav Yirmeya <b>is saying: Just as in</b> the <b>case</b> of deviation with regard to the owner, <b>where, if</b> the one slaughtering the offering <b>said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> it <b>for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit,</b> and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order <b>to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so,</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> so too, in the <b>case</b> of deviation from the type of offering, <b>where</b> even <b>if he said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> it <b>not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that</b> if <b>he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?</b> The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ila</b> elicits evidence <b>to support</b> the opinion of <b>Reish Lakish,</b> that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah <b>should not have stated</b> the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake <b>with regard to sprinkling</b> of the blood, <b>and</b> rather <b>should have</b> let one <b>derive</b> it <b>by an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the <b>common</b> element <b>of</b> two other rites, <b>from slaughter and collection</b> of the blood. If so, <b>for what <i>halakha</i> does the Merciful One write</b> this redundant requirement? It is in order <b>to say that one cannot have intention from</b> one <b>rite to</b> affect another <b>rite.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa objects to this</b> derivation: <b>But perhaps</b> the requirement is written to teach the opposite, <b>that one can have intention from</b> one <b>rite to</b> affect another <b>rite.</b> A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to</b> sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, <b>and one could derive</b> that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite <b>from Rav Ashi’s</b> aforementioned <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.",
            "<b>And the other</b> <i>amora</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>would refute</b> Rabbi Ila’s proof <b>like this:</b> It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these?</b> They are notable <b>in that</b> in offerings of the most sacred order <b>they must</b> be performed in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard. <b>And</b> furthermore, <b>they are</b> performed <b>in the</b> sacrifice of <b>inner sin offerings</b> as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.",
            "<b>And the other</b> <i>amora</i>, Reish Lakish, would respond that <b>now, in any event, we stand</b> in a discussion <b>with regard to peace offerings,</b> since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.",
            "A parallel dispute <b>was stated:</b> If one <b>slaughtered</b> a sin offering <b>for its sake</b> but with intent <b>to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says</b> that the offering is <b>unfit,</b> and <b>Rabba says</b> that it is <b>fit. And Rabba retracted his</b> opinion, and conceded <b>to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too,</b> is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for</b> committing <b>a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for</b> committing <b>a transgression. Just as a sin offering</b> sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> is <b>unfit, so too, a guilt offering</b> sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:</b> The inference is <b>not</b> valid. <b>If you say</b> this <b>with regard to a sin offering, whose blood</b> is sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove</b> the point, <b>as its blood is</b> sprinkled <b>below</b> the red line, <b>and</b> nevertheless, if one <b>slaughtered it not for its sake</b> it is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:</b> A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a Paschal offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that its</b> designated <b>time is fixed.</b> A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove</b> the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>I return</b> to my previous claim that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going <b>around [<i>ḥalila</i>]</b> in circles.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: With regard to a sin offering,</b> the word <b>“it” is stated concerning slaughter,</b> in the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they kill the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The word “it” teaches that if <b>it</b> is sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> it is <b>fit;</b> if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> it is <b>unfit. And</b> similarly, <b>with regard to a Paschal offering,</b> the word <b>“it” is stated concerning slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>],</b> in the verse: “It is the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27). Here, the word “it” teaches that if <b>it</b> is sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> it is <b>fit;</b> if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> it is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "And the word <b>“it” is stated with regard to a guilt offering as well,</b> in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Here too, say that the word “it” teaches that if <b>it</b> is sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> it is <b>fit;</b> if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> it is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: With regard to a sin offering,</b> the word <b>“it” is stated concerning slaughter,</b> teaching that if <b>it</b> is sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> it is <b>fit,</b> but if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> it is <b>unfit. With regard to a Paschal offering</b> too, the word <b>“it” is stated concerning slaughter,</b> likewise teaching that if <b>it</b> is sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> it is <b>fit,</b> but if it is sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> it is <b>unfit. But with regard to a guilt offering,</b> the word <b>“it” is stated only after the burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions. And</b> since the offering <b>itself is fit</b> even if the <b>sacrificial portions were not burned</b> at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> concludes: <b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him:</b> A sin offering and a guilt offering are juxtaposed in the verse that <b>states: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:7). The verse teaches that <b>just as a sin offering</b> sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> is <b>unfit, so too, a guilt offering</b> sacrificed <b>not for its sake</b> is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara discusses the <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master said: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I return</b> to my previous claim, that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going <b>around</b> in circles. The Gemara asks: <b>And let the derivation revert</b> to its starting point, <b>and let</b> Rabbi Eliezer <b>derive</b> the point <b>by</b> analogy from <b>the common element</b> of the two sources, a sin offering and a Paschal offering. Together they can prove that a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is also unfit, since they share no element of stringency that the latter lacks.",
            "The Gemara answers: Even such a derivation is not valid, <b>as it can be refuted: What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> A sin offering and a Paschal offering are notable <b>in that they</b> both <b>have an element of <i>karet</i>.</b> A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i> when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>. A guilt offering, by contrast, has no element of <i>karet</i>.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> states: <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:</b> Your comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering is <b>not</b> valid. <b>If you say</b> a <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is</b> sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: <b>And let</b> Rabbi Yehoshua <b>say to him</b> another refutation: Your comparison is <b>not</b> valid, as <b>if you say</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a sin offering, whose blood enters the innermost sanctum,</b> i.e., the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, must the same be said for a guilt offering, whose blood never enters the innermost sanctum?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>We are stating</b> a comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering specifically <b>with regard to the external sin offerings,</b> whose blood does not enter the innermost sanctum.",
            "The Gemara counters: If so, Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the comparison by pointing out another difference between a sin offering and a guilt offering, <b>as, if the blood of</b> an external sin offering <b>enters the innermost sanctum,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> This is not so in the case of the blood of a guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rabbi Eliezer holds</b> that <b>a guilt offering</b> whose blood enters the innermost sanctum is <b>also</b> disqualified.",
            "The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, <b>as</b> a sin offering <b>atones for</b> transgressions for which one is <b>liable to</b> receive <b><i>karet</i></b> if he committed them intentionally.",
            "The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer derives the <i>halakha</i> specifically <b>from a sin offering</b> brought <b>for hearing the voice,</b> i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by <i>karet</i>.",
            "The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, <b>that</b> the blood of a sin offering <b>requires four placements</b> on the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering requires only two.",
            "The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yishmael, who says</b> that <b>the blood</b> of almost <b>all</b> offerings <b>requires four placements.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, <b>that</b> a sin offering’s blood <b>requires</b> placement <b>on</b> all <b>four corners</b> of the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, is sprinkled on only two corners.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>And according to your reasoning,</b> why didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua mention other distinctions between a sin offering and a guilt offering? <b>Isn’t there</b> the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his <b>finger? Isn’t there</b> the requirement to place a sin offering’s blood on the <b>corner</b> of the altar? And even according to the opinion that it is not placed on the corner itself, <b>isn’t there</b> the requirement to place it on <b>the edge of</b> the corner? None of these requirements pertain to any offering other than a sin offering. <b>Rather,</b> Rabbi Yehoshua <b>mentioned one of two</b> or <b>three</b> valid <b>claims</b> at his disposal.",
            "§ <b>The Master says: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:</b> Your comparison is <b>not</b> valid. <b>If you say</b> this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: <b>Let Rabbi Eliezer say to him: The blood of a guilt offering is also</b> sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line, since Rabbi Eliezer holds that the <i>halakhot</i> of a guilt offering and a sin offering are parallel.",
            "<b>Abaye said: You cannot say</b> that <b>the blood of a guilt offering is</b> presented <b>above</b> the red line, due to <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of <b>a burnt offering: Just as</b> in the case of <b>a burnt offering, which is</b> treated stringently in that it is totally <b>consumed</b> on the altar, <b>its blood</b> is presented <b>below</b> the red line, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that in the case of <b>a guilt offering, which is not</b> totally <b>consumed</b> on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line?",
            "The Gemara rejects the inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a burnt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it does not atone</b> for a sin, unlike a guilt offering. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>A bird sin offering can prove</b> the point, as it atones for a sin, and still its blood is presented below the red line.",
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a bird sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it is not a type of offering</b> that is <b>slaughtered;</b> it is killed by pinching the nape of its neck. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.",
            "The Gemara answers: If so, <b>a burnt offering can prove</b> the point, since it is slaughtered, and its blood is still presented below the red line. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> is derived from a combination of the <i>halakhot</i> of a burnt offering and a bird sin offering: <b>The aspect of this</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case <b>and the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and their blood is</b> presented <b>below</b> the red line. <b>So too, I shall include a guilt offering</b> in this <i>halakha</i>, <b>as it is an offering of the most sacred order, and</b> therefore <b>its blood is</b> presented <b>below</b> the red line.",
            "<b>Rava of Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Let</b> Rabbi Eliezer <b>refute</b> this inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about the common element of</b> the two cases? It is notable <b>in that neither</b> a burnt offering nor a bird sin offering <b>has a fixed</b> value. Need <b>you say</b> that the same <i>halakhot</i> apply <b>to a guilt offering, which has a fixed</b> value of two silver shekels (see Leviticus 5:15)?",
            "<b>Rather, this is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason</b> for not claiming that the blood of a guilt offering is presented below the red line: <b>As the verse states</b> with regard to the presenting of the blood of a sin offering: <b>“The priest who offers it”</b> (Leviticus 6:19). The word “it” indicates that <b>its blood</b> is presented <b>above</b> the red line, <b>but the blood of another</b> slaughtered offering is <b>not</b> presented <b>above</b> the red line.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> if Rabbi Eliezer accepts that the word “it” indicates exclusivity, <b>let him also say</b> that the verse: “And slaughter <b>it</b> for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaches that only <b>a sin offering is fit</b> if slaughtered <b>for its sake,</b> and <b>unfit</b> if slaughtered <b>not for its sake. Consequently, other slaughtered offerings, whether</b> slaughtered <b>for their sake or not for their sake, are fit.</b> Why then does Rabbi Eliezer deem a guilt offering unfit if slaughtered not for its sake?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> instance of the word <b>“it”</b> does <b>not</b> indicate that the <i>halakha</i> applies <b>specifically</b> to a sin offering and to no other offerings, <b>as</b> the Torah <b>excludes</b> the <b>Paschal offering</b> from such a generalization. A Paschal offering is certainly disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "The Gemara counters: If so, <b>here too,</b> with regard to the presenting of the blood above the red line, one must say the word “it” does <b>not</b> indicate that this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>specifically</b> to a sin offering and no other offerings, <b>as</b> the Torah <b>excludes a bird burnt offering</b> from such a generalization. The blood of a bird burnt offering is presented above the red line.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>With regard to</b> offerings that require <b>slaughter, in any event,</b> the Torah <b>excluded nothing</b> from the generalization. Bird offerings are irrelevant, as they are killed by the pinching of the nape.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that even the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented in a manner different from that of a sin offering. In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> suggestion? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: This place</b> where the blood of a sin offering is presented is <b>discrete, and that place</b> where the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented is <b>discrete.</b>",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>The blood</b> that must be placed on <b>the lower</b> half of the altar <b>is placed</b> anywhere <b>from the red [<i>hasikra</i>] line and below, and</b> the blood that must be placed on <b>the upper</b> half is placed anywhere <b>from the red line and above. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is said <b>with regard to a bird burnt offering. But</b> the placement of the blood of <b>an animal sin offering is itself performed only on the actual corner</b> of the altar.",
            "§ <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>elsewhere</b> (81b): <b>As Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that</b> should have been sprinkled on the external altar but instead <b>entered to atone in the Sanctuary</b> is <b>unfit. And the Rabbis say:</b> That is the <i>halakha</i> <b>only</b> with regard to the blood of <b>a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The halakhic status of <b>a guilt offering</b> is <b>also</b> like that of a sin offering, <b>as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:7).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer</b> is understandable, <b>as he states the reason</b> for his opinion. <b>But what is the reason</b> for the opinion of <b>the Rabbis?</b>",
            "<b>Rava said: You cannot say</b> that <b>the blood of a guilt offering that entered into</b> the Sanctuary is <b>disqualified,</b> due to <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of <b>a burnt offering: Just as</b>"
        ],
        [
            "with regard to <b>a burnt offering, which is</b> totally <b>consumed</b> by the fire on the altar, nevertheless, even if <b>its blood enters into</b> the Sanctuary it is <b>fit,</b> with regard to <b>a guilt offering, which is not</b> entirely <b>consumed</b> on the altar, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that even if its blood enters the Sanctuary it remains fit?",
            "The Gemara refutes this inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a burnt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it does not atone</b> for a sin. Perhaps this is why its blood is not disqualified if it enters the sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>The meal offering of a sinner can prove</b> the point, as it is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary, even though it atones for a sin.",
            "The Gemara interjects: <b>But let us say</b> that <b>a bird sin offering can prove</b> the point, as it too atones for a sin but is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary. This case is more similar to that of a guilt offering, as a bird has blood, unlike a meal offering. The Gemara answers: It is not certain that <b>a bird sin offering</b> is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary; this <b>is a dilemma</b> raised <b>by Rabbi Avin.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But let us refute</b> the above response as follows: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a sinner’s meal offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it is not a type of slaughtered offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: If so, <b>a burnt offering can prove</b> the point, since it is a slaughtered offering, and still if its blood enters the Sanctuary, it is not disqualified. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. The <i>halakha</i> is derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a burnt offering and a sinner’s meal offering: <b>The aspect of this</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case <b>and the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and</b> if they <b>enter into</b> the Sanctuary <b>they are</b> still <b>fit. So too, I shall include a guilt offering</b> and infer that <b>since it is</b> also <b>an offering of the most sacred order,</b> if <b>its blood enters into</b> the Sanctuary it is still <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rava of Barnish said to Rav Ashi: But let us refute</b> this inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> It is notable <b>in that neither</b> a burnt offering nor a sinner’s meal offering <b>has a fixed</b> value. <b>Should you say</b> the same <i>halakhot</i> apply <b>to a guilt offering, which has a fixed</b> value?",
            "<b>Rather, this is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of the Rabbis: As the verse states:</b> “And any sin offering, any of <b>whose blood</b> is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). The term “whose blood” teaches that <b>the blood of this</b> offering, i.e., a sin offering, <b>and not the blood of another</b> offering, is disqualified in this manner.",
            "<b>And</b> how does <b>the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, interpret this term? He derives from it that only <b>its blood</b> is disqualified by entering the Sanctuary, <b>but not its flesh.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> from where do <b>the other</b> Rabbis derive that the flesh of a sin offering is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary? They maintain that both <i>halakhot</i> are derived from this term, as the verse could have simply stated: <b>Blood,</b> but stated: <b>“Whose blood.”</b> The redundancy excludes not only the flesh, but also other offerings.",
            "<b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, <b>does not interpret</b> the redundancy indicated by the change from: <b>Blood,</b> to: <b>“Whose blood,”</b> to be significant. Once the word blood is mentioned, it is grammatically necessary for the verse to state “whose blood.”",
            "§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute in the mishna between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. <b>Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say</b> that <b>a guilt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake</b> is <b>fit, that is why a meal offering is juxtaposed with a sin offering,</b> and <b>a meal offering</b> is also juxtaposed <b>with a guilt offering.</b>",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The verse states with regard to a meal offering: <b>“It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 6:10), teaching that <b>a meal offering of a sinner is like a sin offering. Therefore,</b> if one <b>removed its handful not for its sake,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> And the verse also teaches that <b>a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering. Therefore,</b> if one <b>removed its handful not for its sake,</b> it is still <b>fit.</b> This accords with the opinion of the Rabbis, that a guilt offering slaughtered not for its sake is fit.",
            "<b>But according to Rabbi Eliezer, for what <i>halakha</i> is a meal offering juxtaposed with a sin offering, and a meal offering</b> juxtaposed <b>with a guilt offering?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: They are juxtaposed <b>to</b> teach <b>the other</b> <i>halakha</i> derived <b>by Rabbi Shimon</b> from this verse; <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 26a): If the handful of a meal offering is conveyed to the altar <b>not in a service vessel,</b> the offering is <b>unfit. And Rabbi Shimon deems</b> it <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states</b> with regard to a meal offering: <b>“It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering,”</b> teaching that if a priest <b>comes to perform</b> its sacrificial rites <b>by hand, he must perform</b> them <b>with</b> his <b>right</b> hand, <b>like</b> one performs the rites of <b>a sin offering.</b> And if he performs them <b>with a vessel, he may perform</b> them <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, <b>like</b> one performs the rites of <b>a guilt offering,</b> since Rabbi Shimon maintains this is permitted in the case of a guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> himself, <b>does he expound this verse for this</b> purpose, concerning one who if one removes its handful not for its sake, <b>and expound it for that</b> purpose, concerning conveying the handful with one’s hand?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>The verse comes mainly to</b> teach <b>that which Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya,</b> explained. <b>And</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>that a meal offering of a sinner</b> whose handful was removed <b>not for its sake</b> is <b>unfit is</b> due to <b>another reason: What is the reason a sin offering</b> sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified? The reason is <b>that</b> the word <b>“it” is written with regard to it</b> in the verse: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Since the word <b>“it” is also written with regard to the meal offering of a sinner,</b> in the verse: “For it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11), the same applies in that case.",
            "In the mishna, Rabbi Eliezer cites the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7), as a source for his opinion. The Gemara asks: <b>And according to the Rabbis, for what <i>halakha</i> is a guilt offering juxtaposed with a sin offering?</b> The Gemara answers: They are juxtaposed <b>to tell you</b> that <b>just as a sin offering requires placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>so too, a guilt offering requires placing hands</b> on the head of the offering.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Yosef ben Ḥoni says:</b> Other offerings <b>that are slaughtered</b> for the sake of a Paschal offering or a sin offering are unfit. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Yosef ben Ḥoni and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing,</b> i.e., Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Ḥoni.",
            "<b>Rabba says:</b> Although they agree that other offerings slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering are unfit, <b>they disagree with regard to other</b> offerings slaughtered <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b> Whereas Yosef ben Ḥoni holds that they are unfit, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that they are fit.",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of <b>a Paschal offering whose</b> first <b>year has passed,</b> and it must therefore be sacrificed as a peace offering, <b>and one slaughtered it at its</b> designated <b>time</b> on Passover eve <b>for its own sake</b> as a Paschal offering, <b>and likewise,</b> if <b>one slaughtered other</b> offerings <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering at its</b> designated <b>time,</b> the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree as to the status of the offering. <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> it <b>unfit, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems</b> it <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said: If, during the rest of the days of the year, when</b> a Paschal offering <b>is not fit</b> if it is slaughtered <b>for its own sake,</b> nevertheless, <b>other</b> offerings that are slaughtered <b>for its sake are fit,</b> then <b>at its</b> designated <b>time, when</b> a Paschal offering <b>is fit</b> if it is slaughtered <b>for its own sake, isn’t it logical that other</b> offerings slaughtered <b>for its sake should be fit?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Or conversely, just as during the rest of the days of the year, when</b> a Paschal offering <b>is not fit</b> if it is slaughtered <b>for its own sake, it is fit</b> if slaughtered <b>for the sake of other</b> offerings, so too, <b>at its</b> designated <b>time, when it is fit</b> if slaughtered <b>for its own sake, isn’t it logical that it should be fit</b> if slaughtered <b>for the sake of other</b> offerings? <b>And</b> accordingly, <b>a Paschal offering</b> slaughtered <b>not for its own sake on</b> the <b>fourteenth</b> of Nisan <b>should be deemed fit,</b> which contradicts the <i>halakha</i>. Clearly, this line of reasoning leads to incorrect conclusions.",
            "Furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer refuted Rabbi Yehoshua’s logic as follows: <b>And do you say this</b> derivation? <b>What</b> does it matter <b>to me</b> that <b>other</b> offerings slaughtered <b>during the rest of the days of the year for the sake of</b> a Paschal offering <b>are deemed fit? After all,</b> a Paschal offering slaughtered <b>for the sake of other</b> offerings <b>is</b> also <b>fit. But</b> must you say that <b>other</b> offerings slaughtered <b>at its</b> designated <b>time for its sake should be deemed fit? After all,</b> at its designated time, a Paschal offering slaughtered <b>for the sake of other</b> offerings <b>is unfit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: If,</b> as you maintain, other offerings slaughtered on Passover eve for the sake of a Paschal offering are disqualified, <b>you have diminished the force</b> of the requirement that <b>a Paschal offering</b> be sacrificed for its own sake, <b>and you have given</b> more <b>force to</b> the requirement that <b>a peace offering</b> be sacrificed for its own sake. A Paschal offering sacrificed at the proper time, i.e., during the rest of the year, for the sake of a peace offering, is fit, whereas a peace offering sacrificed on Passover eve for the sake of a Paschal offering is unfit.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: We find</b> that <b>a leftover Paschal offering,</b> an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, is <b>brought</b> as <b>a peace offering; but a leftover peace offering,</b> one bought with money left over from funds dedicated toward the acquisition of a peace offering, is <b>not brought</b> as <b>a Paschal offering.</b> A Paschal offering is a potential peace offering, but a peace offering is not a potential Paschal offering.",
            "<b>And</b> if so, one may infer <i>a fortiori</i>: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a Paschal offering, whose leftover</b> offering <b>is brought</b> as <b>a peace offering,</b> and nevertheless, if one <b>slaughtered it at its</b> designated <b>time for the sake of a peace offering</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> so too, with regard to <b>a peace offering, whose leftover</b> offering <b>is not brought</b> as <b>a Paschal offering, if</b> one <b>slaughtered</b> it <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering at its</b> designated <b>time, isn’t it logical that</b> it <b>should be unfit?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:</b> This inference is not valid, as <b>we find</b> that <b>a leftover sin offering,</b> e.g., one bought with money left over from funds dedicated to the acquisition of a sin offering, <b>is brought</b> as <b>a burnt offering,</b> whereas <b>a leftover burnt offering is not brought</b> as <b>a sin offering.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> according to Rabbi Eliezer’s logic, one should derive <i>a fortiori</i>: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering, whose leftover is brought</b> as <b>a burnt offering,</b> nevertheless, if one <b>slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering</b> it is <b>unfit,</b> so too, with regard to <b>a burnt offering, whose leftover is not brought</b> as <b>a sin offering,</b> if one <b>slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering, isn’t it logical that it should be unfit?</b> Yet, the <i>halakha</i> is that a burnt offering slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering is fit.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No, if you said</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a sin offering,</b> that another offering sacrificed for its sake is fit, this is only <b>because</b> a sin offering <b>is fit</b> when sacrificed <b>for its sake all year long. Shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a Paschal offering, which is fit</b> when sacrificed <b>for its sake only at its</b> designated <b>time? Since</b> a Paschal offering <b>is unfit</b> when sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> during the rest of the year, <b>it is logical that other</b> offerings <b>should be disqualified</b> when sacrificed <b>for its sake</b> at its designated time.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Shimon, brother of Azarya, says</b> that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi teaches in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches</b> the same statement <b>in the name of Rabbi Yannai: What is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of Shimon, brother of Azarya?</b> It is derived from that <b>which the verse states: “And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they will set apart [<i>yarimu</i>] unto the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 22:15). The verse is interpreted not as a prohibition but as a halakhic axiom, teaching that offerings <b>are not profaned,</b> i.e., disqualified, <b>by</b> sacrifice for the sake of offerings whose sanctity is <b>more elevated [<i>muram</i>] than theirs; they are profaned</b> only <b>by</b> sacrifice for the sake of offerings whose sanctity is <b>less than theirs.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And does that</b> verse <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? <b>But isn’t it necessary for Shmuel’s</b> derivation? <b>As Shmuel says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that one who eats untithed produce is</b> liable <b>to</b> be punished with <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven? <b>As it is stated: “And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they will set apart unto the Lord.”</b> The term: “Will set apart,” indicates that <b>the verse is speaking of</b> holy items <b>that are to be set apart in the future,</b> i.e., untithed produce, which includes the portion designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>].",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If so,</b> if <b>the verse</b> taught only one <i>halakha</i>, the <i>halakha</i> of Shimon, brother of Azarya, it <b>should have written: Which they have set apart. What</b> is the reason the verse states: <b>“Which they will set apart,”</b> in the future tense? <b>Conclude from it</b> that the verse teaches <b>two</b> <i>halakhot</i>: An offering sacrificed for the sake of an offering of greater sanctity is fit, and consumption of untithed produce is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma:</b> According to Shimon, brother of Azaria, who says that less sacred offerings sacrificed for the sake of more sacred offerings are fit, perhaps they <b>are fit but do not propitiate</b> God, i.e., they do not fulfill the owner’s obligation, as the Rabbis hold. If so, <b>when</b> Shimon, brother of Azaria, <b>disagrees</b> with the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna, <b>he disagrees</b> only <b>with regard to one</b> matter, i.e., that more sacred offerings sacrificed for the sake of less sacred ones are disqualified altogether. <b>Alternatively, perhaps</b> Shimon, brother of Azaria, holds that if less sacred offerings are sacrificed for the sake of more sacred offerings they are both <b>fit and propitiate</b> God, <b>and they disagree</b> with the Rabbis <b>about two</b> matters.",
            "<b>Abaye, and some say Rabbi Zerika, said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> proof that they do not satisfy the owners’ obligation: Shimon, brother of Azarya, elaborated on his opinion in the mishna: <b>A firstborn</b> animal <b>and the</b> animal <b>tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings are fit,</b> as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. <b>Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn</b> animal <b>or for the sake of</b> the animal <b>tithe are unfit.</b>",
            "<b>And if it enters your mind</b> that offerings sacrificed for the sake of offerings of greater sanctity are both <b>fit and propitiate</b> God, <b>is a firstborn</b> an offering that <b>propitiates?</b> Sacrificing a firstborn does not serve to propitiate God; <b>rather,</b> conclude that such offerings <b>are fit but do not propitiate. And</b> one can infer that <b>since</b> in <b>the latter clause they are fit but do not propitiate,</b> in <b>the former clause as well,</b> concerning all offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, <b>they are fit but do not propitiate.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Are the cases comparable? This</b> case is <b>as it is, and that</b> case is <b>as it is.</b> Perhaps Shimon, brother of Azarya, holds that offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order propitiate God, but a firstborn animal and animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings do not propitiate God.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Rather, what is</b> the latter clause concerning a firstborn and animal tithe <b>teaching us,</b> if not that no offerings of lesser sanctity propitiate God when sacrificed for the sake of offerings of greater sanctity? How is the clause not redundant? <b>Does it teach us</b> an example of offerings of <b>higher</b> sanctity <b>and</b> offerings of <b>lower</b> sanctity? <b>We</b> already <b>learn</b> such an example in the former clause, which teaches: <b>How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity</b> are unfit; offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit.",
            "The Gemara answers: It is stated <b>lest you say that</b> the <i>halakha</i> of offerings of <b>higher</b> sanctity <b>and</b> offerings of <b>lower</b> sanctity <b>applies only</b> when the difference is between <b>offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, but</b> with regard to offerings of <b>lesser</b> sanctity <b>and</b> other offerings of <b>lesser</b> sanctity this <i>halakha</i> does <b>not</b> apply, as they are all considered to possess the same level of sanctity. Therefore the mishna adds the example of a firstborn animal and animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings, to clarify that one can distinguish between different offerings of lesser sanctity as well.",
            "The Gemara raises an objection to this answer: <b>We</b> already <b>learn this as well,</b> in another mishna (89a): The <b>peace offering precedes</b> sacrifice of <b>the firstborn because</b> the peace offering <b>requires placement</b> of its blood twice so as to be visible on <b>four</b> sides of the altar, <b>placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>libations, and waving of</b> the <b>breast and thigh</b> by the priest and the owner, none of which is required for the firstborn.",
            "The Gemara answers: The <b>primary</b> mention of the distinction is in <b>this</b> mishna; <b>that</b> mishna <b>cites it incidentally,</b> in discussing the order of precedence of offerings.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the Paschal offering that one slaughtered</b> on the <b>morning of</b> the <b>fourteenth</b> of Nisan, the day when the Paschal offering should be slaughtered in the afternoon, if he did so <b>not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit as though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth</b> of Nisan. An animal consecrated as a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not at its designated time for the sake of a different offering is fit for sacrifice as a peace offering. <b>Ben Beteira deems it unfit as though it were slaughtered</b> in the <b>afternoon</b> of the fourteenth.",
            "<b>Shimon ben Azzai said: I received</b> a tradition <b>from seventy-two elders,</b> as the Sanhedrin deliberated and decided <b>on the day that they installed Rabbi Elazar</b> ben Azarya <b>at</b> the head of <b>the yeshiva</b> and ruled <b>that all the slaughtered offerings that are eaten that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but</b> these offerings <b>did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering.</b> Based on that version, <b>ben Azzai added</b> to the <i>halakha</i> cited in the first mishna <b>only the burnt offering,</b> which is not eaten, <b>and the Rabbis</b> disagreed and <b>did not concede to him.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Elazar says</b> that <b>Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to a Paschal offering that one slaughtered</b> on the <b>morning of</b> the <b>fourteenth</b> of Nisan <b>for its sake, ben Beteira would deem</b> it <b>fit, as</b> he held that <b>the entire day,</b> not only the afternoon, <b>is its</b> designated <b>time.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what</b> is the reason the mishna states that according to ben Beteira, a Paschal offering slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth is considered <b>as though</b> it were slaughtered in the afternoon? This language seems to indicate that it does not have the same status as a Paschal offering actually slaughtered in the afternoon.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Since Rabbi Yehoshua says</b> the term: <b>As though</b> it were slaughtered on the thirteenth, ben Beteira <b>also says</b> the term: <b>As though</b> it were slaughtered in the afternoon. But in fact he maintains that there is no difference between a Paschal offering slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth and one slaughtered in the afternoon.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, rather than disagreeing</b> in the mishna <b>with regard to</b> a Paschal offering that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth <b>not for its sake, let them disagree with regard to</b> one slaughtered <b>for its sake;</b> ben Beteira holds that it is fit, and Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it is unfit.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If</b> the mishna were to write only that <b>they disagree with regard to</b> a Paschal offering slaughtered <b>for its sake, I would say: But in</b> a case where it was slaughtered <b>not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to ben Beteira</b> that it is disqualified, even though it was slaughtered in the morning, <b>since</b> at least <b>part of</b> the day, the afternoon, is <b>fit</b> for its sacrifice as a Paschal offering. Therefore, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> that they disagree with regard to this case as well.",
            "The Gemara asks: How can ben Beteira claim that a Paschal offering may be slaughtered in the morning? <b>But isn’t it written:</b> “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it <b>in the afternoon [<i>bein ha’arbayim</i>]”</b> (Exodus 12:6)?",
            "<b>Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, says:</b> Ben Beteira interprets the phrase <i>bein ha’arbayim</i> literally: <b>Between two evenings,</b> i.e., between the eve of the fourteenth and the night after the fourteenth. Accordingly, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed all day long.",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the <b>daily offering, concerning which it is written:</b> “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning, and the other lamb you shall offer <b><i>bein ha’arbayim</i>”</b> (Numbers 28:4), is <b>the entire day fit</b> for sacrifice <b>also?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There, since it is written: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning,” by inference,</b> the term <b><i>bein ha’arbayim</i></b> is referring to the <b>actual afternoon.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: <b>Say</b> that <b>one</b> of the lambs should be sacrificed <b>in the morning,</b> and <b>the other</b> one can be sacrificed <b>all day.</b> Why is it evident from the requirement that one be sacrificed in the morning that the other must sacrificed in the afternoon?",
            "The Gemara answers: The clause <b>“One</b> lamb you shall offer <b>in the morning”</b> indicates that <b>two</b> lambs are <b>not</b> sacrificed <b>in the morning;</b> the other must perforce be sacrificed in the afternoon.",
            "The Gemara asks: With regard to the <b>lamps</b> of the Candelabrum, one should say the same, <b>as it is written:</b> “And when Aaron lights the lamps <b><i>bein ha’arbayim</i>”</b> (Exodus 30:8). Is <b>the entire day fit</b> for lighting <b>also,</b> according to the opinion of ben Beteira?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There it is different, as it is written:</b> “To burn <b>from evening to morning”</b> (Exodus 27:21). <b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase <b>“from evening to morning”</b> indicates that you must <b>allocate</b> the Candelabrum <b>its measure</b> of oil so <b>that it will burn from evening until morning. Alternatively,</b> the same verse can be interpreted as follows: <b>Only this rite is valid from evening until morning,</b> since all other rites must be performed during the day. Therefore, the Candelabrum is lit only at the end of the day.",
            "The Gemara asks: With regard to the <b>incense,</b> one should say likewise, <b>as it is written with regard to it: “<i>Bein ha’arbayim</i></b> he shall burn it” (Exodus 30:8). Is <b>the entire day also fit</b> for burning the incense according to the opinion of ben Beteira?",
            "The Gemara answers: The <b>incense is different,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>as it is juxtaposed with</b> the lighting of the <b>lamps</b> (see Exodus 30:8). Evidently, it is burned in the afternoon as well.",
            "The Gemara asks: Just as it is written explicitly that the Candelabrum must be lit in the evening, <b>there too,</b> with regard to a Paschal offering, <b>it is written: “There you shall sacrifice the Passover offering at evening”</b> (Deuteronomy 16:6). How can ben Beteira claim that it may be sacrificed all day long?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> verse <b>comes to</b> teach a different <i>halakha</i>, that a certain <b>item should be</b> sacrificed <b>after</b> another item. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the order of precedence between the Paschal offering and the daily afternoon offering: <b>An item,</b> i.e., the Paschal offering, <b>with regard to which</b> both the expressions: <b>“In the evening,” and: “<i>Bein ha’arbayim</i>,”</b> are <b>stated, should be</b> sacrificed <b>after an item,</b> the daily afternoon offering, <b>with regard to which only “<i>bein ha’arbayim</i>” is stated.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But is there anything</b> comparable to ben Beteira’s suggestion, <b>that if one slaughters it in the morning, you say</b> that <b>it is its</b> designated <b>time</b> and it is fit; <b>but when afternoon comes, you say</b> that the <b>item should be</b> sacrificed only <b>after</b> the daily afternoon offering?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Yes,</b> there is a precedent; <b>as Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If one did not recite the additional prayers of Shabbat, the New Moon, or a Festival, which should be recited in the morning, until it is time for the afternoon prayer, the <b><i>halakha</i></b> is that he should first <b>recite the afternoon prayer, and recite the additional prayers thereafter.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the term <b>“<i>bein ha’arbayim</i>”</b> is referring to the entire day, as ben Beteira maintains, <b>why do I</b> need those instances of the expression <b>that</b> are <b>written with regard to</b> burning <b>incense and</b> lighting the <b>lamps,</b> which are not performed all day?",
            "<b>Furthermore,</b> this interpretation of the opinion of ben Beteira is difficult, as <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>responded on behalf of ben Beteira to the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua</b> that a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its sake on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan is fit, as though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth: <b>No, if you said</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the <b>thirteenth, as no part of</b> the day is <b>fit</b> for sacrificing the Paschal offering, <b>shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the <b>fourteenth, part of which</b> is <b>fit</b> for sacrificing the Paschal offering? Since it can be sacrificed in the afternoon of the fourteenth, if it is slaughtered in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara concludes: <b>And if it is so</b> that a Paschal offering can be sacrificed throughout the day of the fourteenth, <b>all of it is fit,</b> not only part of it.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation of ben Beteira’s opinion is rejected. Instead, <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the fourteenth in the morning, ben Beteira would deem</b> it <b>unfit, whether</b> it was slaughtered <b>for its sake or not for its sake.</b> It is unfit even if it was slaughtered not for its sake, <b>since part of</b> the day is <b>fit</b> for its sacrifice as a Paschal offering.",
            "<b>Rabbi Abbahu ridiculed [<i>megaddef</i> ]</b> this interpretation: <b>If so, how can you find a fit Paschal offering according to ben Beteira? If</b> its owner <b>designated</b> an animal <b>now,</b> on the morning of the fourteenth, as a Paschal offering, <b>it is disqualified from the outset,</b> as it cannot be sacrificed at all, either for its sake or not for its sake. <b>And</b> even <b>if</b> its owner <b>designated it the previous day,</b> when it was fit to be sacrificed not for its sake, <b>it was fit and</b> then <b>disqualified</b> the next morning, when it was no longer fit to be sacrificed until the afternoon. Once an offering is disqualified, it can no longer become fit.",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Abbahu says: Let</b> the Paschal offering <b>be</b> fit when it is designated on the fourteenth <b>after noon,</b> when it may already be sacrificed as a Paschal offering.",
            "<b>Abaye says: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that it is fit if designated <b>in the morning,</b> as an offering is <b>not</b> disqualified due to the fact that it is an offering <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived if its time will arrive <b>on that same day.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that it is fit if designated <b>from</b> the previous <b>night,</b> as an offering that was designated at <b>night</b> and may be sacrificed the following day is <b>not</b> considered an offering <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived, <b>as it is taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael:</b> Although an animal is unfit for sacrifice until its eighth day, on the <b>night</b> before its <b>eighth</b> day it may already <b>enter the den to be tithed.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> this is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Appetoriki, as Rabbi Appetoriki raises a contradiction: It is written:</b> “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, <b>then it shall be seven days with its mother”</b> (Leviticus 22:27); <b>consequently,</b> on the following <b>night,</b> i.e., the night before the eighth day, <b>it is fit</b> for sacrifice. <b>And it is written</b> subsequently in that verse: <b>“But from the eighth day and on it may be accepted</b> for an offering made by fire unto the Lord”; <b>consequently,</b> on the previous <b>night,</b> i.e., the night before the eighth day, <b>it is not</b> yet <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled? At <b>night</b> it is fit <b>for consecration, and</b> the following <b>day</b> it is fit <b>for effecting acceptance,</b> i.e., for sacrifice. Apparently, an offering that may be sacrificed the following day can be consecrated the previous night, even though it may not be sacrificed at night, and it is not considered an offering whose time has not yet arrived.",
            "§ Rabbi Abbahu presumes that an animal consecrated before it may be sacrificed is disqualified. With regard to this, <b>Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan holds</b> that consecrated <b>animals</b> that cannot be sacrificed at any given moment <b>are disqualified</b> from ever being sacrificed?",
            "Rabbi Abbahu <b>said to him: Yes, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> With regard to <b>an animal belonging to two partners,</b> if one of them <b>consecrated</b> the <b>half of it</b> that belongs to him, <b>and then purchased</b> the other <b>half of it</b> from his partner <b>and consecrated it, it is consecrated,</b> despite the fact that it was consecrated piecemeal. <b>But it may not be sacrificed,</b> since when he first consecrated it, the consecration did not extend to his partner’s half. Since the animal was not fit to be sacrificed then, it is disqualified permanently.",
            "<b>But</b> as it is consecrated now, it can <b>render</b> consecrated as <b>a substitute</b> a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it. If the owner substitutes a non-sacred animal for this one, the second animal becomes consecrated as well. <b>And</b> yet <b>its substitute is like it;</b> it too is consecrated but cannot be sacrificed.",
            "<b>And</b> one can <b>conclude three</b> points <b>from</b> this statement: <b>Conclude from it</b> that <b>animals</b> that cannot be sacrificed <b>are</b> permanently <b>disqualified; and conclude from it</b> that <b>disqualification from the outset,</b> i.e., from the time the offering is consecrated, <b>is</b> permanent <b>disqualification; and conclude from it</b> that"
        ],
        [
            "<b>there is</b> permanent <b>disqualification</b> even <b>in</b> a case where the animal possesses sanctity that inheres in its <b>monetary</b> value, rather than inherent sanctity.",
            "§ <b>Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If one <b>ate</b> forbidden <b>fat and designated an offering</b> to atone for the transgression, <b>and</b> then <b>apostatized,</b> thereby disqualifying himself from bringing an offering, <b>and</b> later <b>recanted</b> his apostasy, <b>since</b> the offering was already <b>disqualified, it shall be disqualified</b> permanently.",
            "<b>It was also stated</b> that <b>Rabbi Yirmeya says</b> that <b>Rabbi Abbahu says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If one <b>ate</b> forbidden <b>fat and designated an offering</b> to atone for his transgression, <b>and</b> then <b>became an imbecile,</b> who is unfit to bring an offering, <b>and</b> then <b>again became</b> halakhically <b>competent, since</b> the offering was already <b>disqualified, it shall be disqualified</b> permanently.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> both statements <b>are necessary. As, if</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>had taught us</b> only <b>the first</b> statement, concerning an apostate, one might have reasoned that the offering is permanently disqualified <b>because he disqualified himself by</b> his own <b>action, but here,</b> in the case of one who became an imbecile, <b>where he was disqualified</b> through a process that occurs <b>by itself,</b> when he becomes competent again he may bring his sacrifice, as it is <b>considered as</b> though he were <b>asleep.</b> If one designated an offering and fell asleep, this certainly does not disqualify it.",
            "<b>And if</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>had taught us</b> only the statement <b>here,</b> with regard to one who became an imbecile, one might have reasoned that the offering is permanently disqualified <b>because it is not in his power to return</b> to competence, <b>but here,</b> in the case of an apostate, <b>since it is in his power to recant</b> his apostasy, <b>I would say</b> that the offering is <b>not</b> permanently disqualified. Therefore, both statements are <b>necessary.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:</b> If one <b>ate</b> forbidden <b>fat and designated an offering</b> for the transgression, <b>and</b> then the <b>court ruled that</b> the type of <b>fat</b> he ate is <b>permitted,</b> thereby rendering the offering unnecessary, <b>and</b> the court subsequently <b>retracted</b> its ruling, in this case, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Is</b> the offering permanently <b>disqualified, or is it not</b> permanently <b>disqualified?</b>",
            "<b>A certain elder [<i>hahu sava</i>] said to</b> Rabbi Yirmeya: <b>When Rabbi Yoḥanan introduced</b> the topic of permanently <b>disqualified</b> offerings, <b>he introduced</b> it <b>with this</b> case. <b>What is the reason? There,</b> in the case of one who apostatized or became an imbecile, although <b>the person was disqualified,</b> the <b>offering</b> itself <b>was not disqualified.</b> Consequently, it is less evident that the offering will be disqualified permanently. But <b>here,</b> in a case where the court ruled that the fat is permitted, the <b>offering</b> itself <b>was also disqualified,</b> as it was rendered unnecessary. Therefore, this is a more obvious example.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Shimon ben Azzai said: I received</b> a tradition <b>from seventy-two elders [<i>zaken</i>]</b> that all slaughtered offerings that are eaten, if slaughtered not for their sake, are fit. The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need to <b>teach</b> the phrase <b>seventy-two</b> elders using the singular form: <b><i>Zaken</i>,</b> rather than the plural form: <i>Zekenim</i>? The Gemara answers: <b>Because they all maintained one opinion,</b> i.e., they all agreed with this <i>halakha</i>.",
            "The mishna continues: <b>Ben Azzai added only the burnt offering</b> to the sin offering and the Paschal offering, which are mentioned in the first mishna as disqualified when sacrificed not for their sake.",
            "<b>Rav Huna said: What is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of ben Azzai?</b> The verse states: <b>“It is a burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma unto the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 1:13). The word <b>“it”</b> teaches that if it is sacrificed <b>for its sake,</b> it is <b>fit;</b> if sacrificed <b>not for its sake,</b> it is <b>unfit.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t the word <b>“it” written with regard to a guilt offering as well,</b> in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Nevertheless, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is not disqualified.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> verse <b>is written after the burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the altar. Since the offering is fit even if these portions are not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they are burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t <b>this</b> mention of the word “it” with regard to a burnt offering <b>also written after the burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the altar?",
            "The Gemara answers: The word <b>“it” is written</b> with regard to a burnt offering in <b>two</b> places, both in Leviticus 1:13 and in Exodus 29:18. Although both are written after the burning of the portions consumed on the altar, one of them is superfluous, and is therefore interpreted in reference to the main sacrificial rites, performed before the burning of the portions. The verse therefore teaches that the offering is fit only if these rites are performed for its sake.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to a guilt offering as well,</b> isn’t the word <b>“it” written</b> in <b>two</b> places, Leviticus 5:9 and Leviticus 7:5?",
            "<b>Rather, ben Azzai derives</b> his <i>halakha</i> not from a verse, but <b>by an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering, which is not</b> totally <b>consumed</b> on the altar but partially eaten by priests, if <b>one slaughtered it not for its sake</b> it is <b>disqualified,</b> so too, with regard to <b>a burnt offering, which is</b> treated more strictly in that it is totally <b>consumed</b> on the altar, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that if it is slaughtered not for its sake it is disqualified?",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it atones</b> for sin, in contrast to a burnt offering, which is not brought for atonement. Therefore, only a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>A Paschal offering can prove</b> the point, as it is not brought for atonement, yet it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a Paschal offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that its time is set</b> at Passover eve, in contrast to a burnt offering, which does not have a designated time.",
            "The Gemara suggests: If so, <b>a sin offering can prove</b> the point, since it has no set time. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. The <i>halakha</i> is derived from the common element of the two sources: <b>The aspect of this</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case <b>and the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element is that they are offerings, and</b> if one <b>slaughtered them not for their sake,</b> they are <b>disqualified. So too, I shall include a burnt offering</b> in this <i>halakha</i>, <b>as it is an offering, and</b> therefore if one <b>slaughtered it not for its sake,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> It is notable in <b>that they</b> both <b>have an element of <i>karet</i>.</b> A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i> when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>. A burnt offering does not have an element of <i>karet</i>.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Ben Azzai</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>does not refute</b> the inference by citing a common <b>element of <i>karet</i>,</b> as the elements of <i>karet</i> in a sin offering and in a Paschal offering are not parallel.",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, <b>let it be derived</b> from this inference that <b>a guilt offering</b> is <b>also</b> disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.",
            "The Gemara answers: With regard to <b>a guilt offering,</b> ben Azzai <b>refutes</b> the inference as follows: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about the common element of</b> a sin offering and a Paschal offering? It is notable <b>in that there are communal</b> offerings <b>as well as individual</b> offerings of these types, as well as communal burnt offerings, whereas there is no communal guilt offering.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that actually, ben Azzai <b>also refutes</b> the entire inference, because a sin offering and a Paschal offering uniquely share <b>an element of <i>karet</i>. And</b> the reason <b>ben Azzai</b> maintains that a burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified is that <b>he learned it</b> as <b>a tradition. And</b> as for the fact <b>that Rav Huna cites an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, he does not believe it to be the true source for ben Azzai’s <i>halakha</i>; <b>he said it only to sharpen</b> the minds of <b>his students with it,</b> challenging them to refute it.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the Paschal offering and the sin offering, where one slaughtered them not for their sake,</b> or where he <b>collected</b> their blood in a vessel, <b>conveyed</b> this blood to the altar, <b>or sprinkled</b> this blood on the altar <b>not for their sake, or</b> where he performed one of these sacrificial rites <b>for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake,</b> in all these cases the offerings <b>are unfit.</b>",
            "<b>How</b> are these rites performed <b>for their sake and not for their sake?</b> In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace offering.</b> How are these rites performed <b>not for their sake and for their sake?</b> In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering <b>for the sake of a peace offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering.</b>",
            "The offering is unfit <b>because a slaughtered offering is disqualified</b> due to prohibited intent <b>in four matters: In</b> the performance of the sacrificial rites of <b>slaughtering</b> the animal, <b>in collecting</b> the blood, <b>in conveying</b> the blood, <b>and in sprinkling</b> the blood.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon deems</b> the offering <b>fit</b> if the prohibited intent was <b>during</b> the rite of <b>conveying</b> the blood, <b>as he would say: It is impossible</b> to sacrifice an offering <b>without slaughtering</b> the animal, <b>or without collection</b> of the blood, <b>or without sprinkling</b> the blood, <b>but it is possible</b> to sacrifice an offering <b>without conveying</b> the blood to the altar. How so? If one <b>slaughters</b> the animal <b>alongside the altar and sprinkles</b> the blood, the blood does not need to be conveyed. Therefore, the rite of conveying the blood is not significant enough to cause the offering to be disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing it.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> With regard to <b>one who conveys</b> the blood <b>in a situation where he is required to convey</b> it, prohibited <b>intent</b> while conveying it <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. If he conveys the blood <b>in a situation where he is not required to convey</b> it, prohibited <b>intent</b> while conveying it <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing four rites, including collection of the blood. The Gemara asks: <b>And does collection</b> of the blood with prohibited intent <b>disqualify</b> the offering?",
            "<b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“And</b> the sons of Aaron, the priests, <b>shall present</b> the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); <b>this</b> is referring to <b>collection of the blood. Do you say</b> it is referring to <b>collection of the blood, or is it</b> referring to <b>only sprinkling</b> the blood? <b>When it states</b> immediately afterward: <b>“And sprinkle</b> the blood roundabout against the altar,” <b>sprinkling</b> the blood <b>is thereby stated.</b> If so, <b>how do I realize</b> the meaning of: <b>“And</b> the sons of Aaron, the priests, <b>shall present”? This</b> is referring to <b>collection of the blood.</b> And the phrase <b>“the sons of Aaron, the priests”</b> teaches <b>that</b> collection of the blood <b>must be</b> performed <b>by a fit priest,</b> i.e., one who has no blemish and who was not disqualified due to flawed lineage, <b>and</b> that he must do so while he is wearing priestly <b>service vestments.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Akiva said: From where</b> is it derived <b>that collection</b> of the blood <b>may be</b> performed <b>only by a fit priest and</b> while he is wearing <b>service vestments?</b> The expression <b>“the sons of Aaron” is stated here</b> in the verse in Leviticus, <b>and it is stated there: “These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed,</b> whom he consecrated to minister in the priest’s office” (Numbers 3:3). <b>Just as there,</b> in the verse in Numbers, it mentions the word “priests” <b>with regard to fit priests,</b> i.e., Aaron’s sons, <b>and with regard to</b> priests who were consecrated to serve by being dressed with <b>service vestments</b> (see Exodus 29:30), <b>so too here,</b> the reference is <b>to a fit priest and with regard to</b> one who is wearing <b>service vestments.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Tarfon said: I will bury my sons if I did not hear</b> a <i>halakha</i> from my teachers <b>discerning a distinction between collection</b> of <b>and sprinkling</b> the blood, <b>but I cannot explicate</b> the distinction, as I do not remember what it was.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Akiva said: I will explicate:</b> With regard to <b>collection,</b> the Torah <b>does not render intent like action.</b> Collecting the blood with prohibited intent does not disqualify the offering. But with regard to <b>sprinkling,</b> the Torah <b>does render intent like action.</b> Furthermore, if one <b>collected</b> the blood <b>outside</b> the Temple, <b>he is not liable</b> to be punished with <b><i>karet</i>.</b> But if one <b>sprinkled</b> the blood <b>outside</b> the Temple, <b>he is punished</b> with <b><i>karet</i>.</b> Moreover, if those who are <b>unfit</b> for the Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood, <b>they are not liable for</b> that action. But if those who are <b>unfit</b> for the Temple service <b>sprinkled</b> the blood, <b>they are liable</b> to receive the penalty of death at the hand of Heaven <b>for that</b> action.",
            "<b>Rabbi Tarfon said to him</b> excitedly: I take an oath by <b>the</b> Temple <b>service</b> that <b>you have</b> not <b>deviated left or right</b> from what I heard from my teachers. <b>I</b> myself <b>heard</b> them <b>and I cannot explicate</b> what they taught, whereas <b>you teach</b> this <i>halakha</i> on your own <b>in concurrence with the <i>halakha</i></b> I heard. <b>He said to</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>using this language: Akiva, anyone who leaves you is like one who leaves his life.</b> In any event, Rabbi Akiva’s statement in the <i>baraita</i> apparently contradicts the mishna with regard to the matter of whether the collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualifies the offering.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> It is <b>not difficult.</b> The <i>baraita</i> <b>here</b> is referring <b>to intent of <i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., intent to consume or burn the offering after its appointed time. The mishna <b>there</b> is referring <b>to intent not for the sake of</b> the offering.",
            "The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna <b>is also precise, as it teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified</b> in this manner, <b>and it does not teach</b> that an offering <b>is rendered <i>piggul</i></b> in this manner. Apparently, the mishna is referring to intent that merely disqualifies the offering without rendering it <i>piggul</i>, one who partakes of which is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The Gemara concludes: <b>Conclude from</b> the mishna’s language that this interpretation is correct.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And does intent of <i>piggul</i> during</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>not disqualify</b> the offering?",
            "<b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>intent</b> to consume an offering after its designated time <b>is effective</b> to render the offering <i>piggul</i> <b>only</b> when one has that intent <b>during sprinkling. From where</b> is it derived <b>to include slaughter and collection</b> of the blood in this <i>halakha</i>? <b>The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted,</b> neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [<i>piggul</i> ]” (Leviticus 7:18). As derived on 29a, the verse is referring to performance of the sacrificial rites with intent to consume the offering after its designated time. The phrase “is at all eaten” teaches that <b>the verse speaks of matters that lead to consumption,</b> i.e., those sacrificial rites that enable consumption of the offering, including slaughter of the animal and collecting the blood.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I</b> should <b>include even</b> the <b>pouring of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar, after its sprinkling, <b>and</b> the <b>burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the altar.",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it”</b> (Leviticus 7:18). The phrase “the one who offers it” indicates the sprinkling of the blood. <b>Sprinkling was included</b> in the general category of rites that enable consumption. <b>And for what</b> purpose <b>was it singled out? To compare</b> other <i>halakhot</i> <b>to it,</b> i.e., <b>to say to you: Just as sprinkling is unique, as it is a rite and</b> if not performed <b>it prevents atonement, so too, any rite</b> that <b>prevents atonement</b> if not performed is included in the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i>. <b>Pouring</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood <b>and burning</b> the <b>sacrificial portions are</b> therefore <b>excluded, as they do not prevent atonement</b> if not performed. Evidently, intent of <i>piggul</i> applies to the collection of the blood, contrary to Rava’s resolution of the contradiction between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i>."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather,</b> it is <b>not difficult. This</b> statement of Rava, that intent of <i>piggul</i> does not apply to collection, is referring to a case <b>where</b> the one slaughtering the offering <b>says: I am hereby slaughtering</b> this offering <b>in order to collect its blood tomorrow.</b> Because the collection of the blood is not considered consumption, such intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>. <b>That</b> statement of the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case <b>where</b> the one collecting the blood <b>says: I am hereby collecting its blood in order to pour</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar <b>tomorrow.</b> Since pouring the remains is considered consumption of the blood on the altar, such intent renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>One of the Sages said to Rava: And does</b> prohibited <b>intent with regard to</b> the <b>pouring of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood <b>and</b> the <b>burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions not disqualify</b> the offering, as this explanation of the <i>baraita</i> seems to indicate?",
            "<b>But didn’t we learn</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>only</b> prohibited <b>intent with regard to consumption of the meat is effective</b> to render the offering <i>piggul</i>. <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>to include</b> the <b>pouring of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood <b>and</b> the <b>burning of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions? The verse states: “And if</b> any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings <b>is at all eaten [<i>he’akhol ye’akhel</i> ]</b> on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). It is derived from the repeated verb that <b>the verse speaks of two</b> types of <b>consumption: One is consumption</b> of the meat <b>by man,</b> i.e., by the priests or the owner of the offering, <b>and</b> the other <b>one is consumption</b> of the blood and the sacrificial portions <b>on the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: It is <b>not difficult. This</b> case, where intent renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, is <b>where</b> the one sprinkling the blood <b>says: I am hereby sprinkling</b> the blood <b>in order to pour</b> the <b>remainder tomorrow.</b> Since sprinkling the blood is necessary for atonement, if it is performed with the intent that consumption occur beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>. <b>That</b> case, where intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, is <b>where he says: I am hereby pouring</b> the <b>remainder in order to burn</b> the <b>sacrificial portions tomorrow.</b> Although burning the portions is considered consumption, pouring the remainder of the blood is not indispensable for atonement, and therefore the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: I heard that with regard to an inner sin offering,</b> whose blood is sprinkled on the curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood in order to sprinkle it, if he does so with the intent of burning the offering on the altar the following day, <b>renders</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Ilfa heard</b> this statement and <b>said it before Rav Padda.</b> Rav Padda <b>said</b> in response: <b>Did we derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>piggul</i></b> with regard to all offerings <b>from anything but a peace offering?</b> The source for the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> is the verse stated with regard to peace offerings (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, <b>just as</b> with regard to <b>a peace offering,</b> prohibited intent while <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood to sprinkle it on the altar <b>does not render it <i>piggul</i>,</b> as there is no requirement to sprinkle the blood of a peace offering with one’s finger rather than the containing vessel, <b>so too,</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> prohibited intent while <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood <b>does not render it <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But are all</b> of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i> <b>derived from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a peace offering? If</b> that is so, then <b>just as</b> sacrifice of <b>a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude</b> its being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> as it is still fit, <b>so too,</b> the <i>halakha</i> should be that sacrifice of <b>a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude</b> its being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> In fact, the <i>halakha</i> is that a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake cannot become <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rather, what have you to say</b> to explain this <i>halakha</i>? You must say that it is <b>derived from an amplification of the verse. Here too,</b> the <i>halakha</i> that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it <i>piggul</i> is <b>derived from an amplification of the verse.</b>",
            "Similarly, <b>Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: I heard in this upper story that</b> prohibited intent while <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood of an inner sin offering <b>renders</b> it <b><i>piggul</i>. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish wondered [<i>tahei</i>] at this</b> <i>halakha</i>: <b>Did</b> the Sages <b>derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>piggul</i> from anything but a peace offering? Just as</b> with regard to <b>a peace offering,</b> prohibited intent while <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood <b>does not render it <i>piggul</i>, so too,</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> the <i>halakha</i> should be that prohibited intent while <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood <b>does not render it <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>But are all</b> of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i> <b>derived from</b> those of <b>a peace offering? If</b> so, <b>just as</b> sacrifice of <b>a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude</b> its being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>, so too,</b> the <i>halakha</i> should be that sacrifice of <b>a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude</b> its being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Indeed, all</b> of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i>, even this one, <b>are derived from a peace offering. Since in</b> the case of <b>a peace offering,</b> intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area disqualifies</b> it, <b>and in</b> the case of <b>a sin offering,</b> sacrifice <b>not for its sake disqualifies</b> it, one can infer that <b>just as</b> intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, which disqualifies a peace offering, precludes</b> its being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>, so too,</b> sacrifice <b>not for its sake, which disqualifies a sin offering, precludes its</b> being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it after its designated time does not render it <i>piggul</i>, as there is no parallel <i>halakha</i> with regard to a peace offering.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya says:</b> This inference is <b>inherently disjointed: What</b> is notable <b>about</b> intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, which disqualifies a peace offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> its disqualification <b>applies to all slaughtered offerings.</b> This is why it precludes the offering from becoming <i>piggul</i>. Need <b>you say</b> the same <b>with regard to</b> disqualification by sacrifice <b>not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?</b>",
            "<b>Rather, what have you to say</b> to explain this derivation? One must say that it is not based on a case-to-case comparison, but on a principle that is derived from a peace offering, namely: Any <b>matter that disqualifies</b> a peace offering, e.g., intent to consume it outside its designated area, <b>precludes its</b> being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and any <b>matter that prevents</b> atonement if not performed <b>renders</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> if performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.",
            "One infers therefore that <b>here too,</b> with regard to an inner sin offering, any <b>matter that disqualifies it,</b> e.g., sacrifice not for its sake, <b>precludes</b> its being rendered <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and any <b>matter that prevents</b> atonement if not performed <b>renders it <i>piggul</i></b> if it is performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time renders it <i>piggul</i>, as this rite is indispensable.",
            "<b>Rav Mari says: We learn</b> in a mishna <b>as well</b> that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it beyond its designated time renders the offering <i>piggul</i> (<i>Menaḥot</i> 12a): <b>This is the principle:</b> With regard to <b>anyone who removes a handful</b> from a meal offering, <b>or</b> who <b>places</b> the handful <b>in a vessel, or who conveys</b> the handful to the altar, <b>or who burns</b> it on the altar, if he does so with intent that the offering will be consumed after its designated time the offering is <i>piggul</i>.",
            "Since the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i> are derived from those of a peace offering, one can ask: <b>Granted,</b> the one who <b>removes</b> a handful of a meal offering can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, as he <b>is</b> considered equivalent to the one who <b>slaughters</b> a peace offering. Just as the blood is the essential part of an animal offering, and it is removed by slaughter, so too, the handful of a meal offering is its essential part. Likewise, the one who <b>conveys</b> the handful <b>is</b> equivalent to the one who <b>conveys</b> the blood of a peace offering, and the one who <b>burns</b> the handful <b>is</b> equivalent to the one who <b>sprinkles</b> the blood <b>too. But</b> to <b>what is</b> the one who <b>places</b> the handful <b>in a vessel</b> equivalent? From where is it derived that he, too, can render the offering <i>piggul</i>?",
            "<b>If we say that</b> placing the handful in a vessel is <b>comparable to collection</b> of the blood, as both rites involve placing the essential part of the offering in a vessel, one may respond: <b>Are</b> these rites actually <b>comparable? There,</b> in the case of a peace offering, the collection of the blood is performed passively. The blood spills into the vessel <b>by itself. Here,</b> in the case of a meal offering, the priest <b>takes</b> the handful himself <b>and places</b> it in a vessel. Clearly, placing the handful in a vessel is not equivalent to any specific rite in the sacrifice of a peace offering.",
            "<b>Rather, since it is not sufficient</b> for the handful to be sacrificed <b>without</b> first <b>placing</b> it in a service vessel, <b>it is, perforce, an important rite.</b> One who performs it can therefore render the offering <i>piggul</i> like those who perform other essential rites. <b>Here too,</b> with regard to dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering, although it has no equivalent in the sacrifice of a peace offering, <b>since it is not sufficient</b> if the priest <b>does not perform it, it is perforce</b> considered part of the <b>conveying</b> of the blood, and the priest can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while performing it.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No, actually,</b> placing the handful in a vessel is <b>comparable to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood. <b>And</b> despite the distinction <b>that you say,</b> namely, that <b>here,</b> in the case of a peace offering, the blood spills <b>by itself,</b> while <b>there,</b> in the case of a meal offering, the priest <b>takes</b> the handful himself <b>and places</b> it in the vessel, nevertheless, <b>since</b> both <b>this</b> rite <b>and that</b> rite involve <b>placement</b> of the essential part of the offering in <b>a vessel,</b> they are equivalent. <b>What</b> difference is it <b>to me</b> if the blood spills into the vessel <b>by itself,</b> and <b>what</b> difference is it <b>to me</b> if the priest <b>takes</b> the handful himself <b>and places</b> it in the vessel? By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering has no equivalent in a peace offering. Therefore, <i>piggul</i> does not apply to it.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that the principle that dipping one’s finger in the blood is considered part of conveying it to the curtain is <b>the subject of</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught</b> in <b>one</b> <i>baraita</i>: <b>With regard to</b> an inner <b>sin offering, dipping</b> one’s <b>finger</b> in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time <b>renders it <i>piggul</i>. And it is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: Dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time <b>does not render</b> it <b><i>piggul</i>, and neither does</b> slaughtering the animal with the intent to dip his finger in the blood the next day <b>render</b> it <b><i>piggul</i>. What, is it not</b> that this matter <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> both <i>tanna’im</i> agree that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering is part of conveying it to the curtain. Rather, <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i>, which states that a priest can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while dipping his finger in its blood, is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis</b> in the mishna (13a), who hold that one can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while conveying the blood to the altar. <b>That</b> <i>baraita</i>, which states the opposite, is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> in the mishna, who holds that one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while conveying the blood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> the latter <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, why</b> is it referring <b>specifically</b> to <b>dipping</b> one’s <b>finger? Doesn’t he say</b>"
        ],
        [
            "that <b>any</b> offering <b>whose</b> blood <b>is not</b> sprinkled <b>on the external altar like a peace offering is not subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b><i>piggul</i>?</b> If so, <i>piggul</i> does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> both <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>and that</b> <i>baraita</i> are in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis; and</b> the apparent contradiction between them is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> that maintains that one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while dipping his finger in the blood is referring <b>to the external sin offerings,</b> since dipping one’s finger in order to sprinkle the blood on the external altar is not considered an essential rite. <b>There,</b> the <i>baraita</i> that maintains that one can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while performing this rite is referring <b>to the inner sin offerings.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t it <b>obvious</b> that one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while dipping his finger in the blood of <b>the external sin offerings?</b> The statement: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall dip</b> his finger in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), <b>is not written with regard to</b> these offerings. Since it is clearly not an essential rite, why was it necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach that improper intent while performing it cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i>?",
            "The Gemara answers: It <b>was necessary</b> for the <i>baraita</i> to teach this, as otherwise it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since it is written</b> with regard to an external sin offering: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall take</b> of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:34), <b>and</b> therefore <b>if a monkey comes</b> and <b>places</b> blood <b>on the hand of</b> the priest the priest <b>must take</b> blood from the vessel <b>again</b> to perform the mitzva as stated in the verse, <b>it is considered as though</b> the statement: <b>And</b> the priest <b>shall dip</b> his finger in the blood, <b>is written</b> with regard to an external sin offering as well.",
            "Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an external sin offering is an inessential rite and one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while performing it. As it is <b>for this</b> reason that the phrase: <b>And</b> the priest <b>shall dip</b> his finger in the blood, <b>is not written</b> with regard to this offering, but rather: And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, <b>which indicates this</b> <i>halakha</i>, that the priest must actively take the blood in his hand, <b>and</b> also <b>indicates that</b> <i>halakha</i>, that dipping one’s finger in the blood is not an essential rite and cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i>.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Shimon deems</b> the offering <b>fit</b> if the prohibited intent was <b>during</b> the rite of <b>conveying</b> the blood to the altar. <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that</b> prohibited <b>intent during the conveying of</b> the blood of <b>the inner sin offerings disqualifies them, since</b> with regard to those offerings, it is <b>an indispensable rite.</b> Because the blood must be sprinkled inside the Sanctuary and the offering cannot be slaughtered inside the Sanctuary, conveying the blood into the Sanctuary is always necessary for such offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say</b> that with regard to <b>any</b> offering <b>whose</b> blood <b>is not</b> sprinkled <b>on the external altar like a peace offering, one is not liable</b> to be punished with <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it, due to</b> the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>?</b> In other words, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says:</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>concedes</b> that although intent to consume an inner sin offering after its designated time does not render it <i>piggul</i>, it <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, <b>due to an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as</b> sacrifice <b>not for its sake, which is valid in</b> the case of <b>a peace offering,</b> is nevertheless <b>not valid in</b> the case of <b>a sin offering,</b> as stated in the mishna (2a), so too, <b>isn’t it logical that</b> sacrifice with intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, which disqualifies peace offerings, should disqualify sin offerings?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And we found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that intent to consume an inner sin offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time</b> disqualifies it according to Rabbi Shimon. <b>From where do we</b> derive that intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> also disqualifies it?",
            "<b>If</b> we derive it <b>from</b> the case of intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> one may respond: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> it can render an offering <i>piggul</i>, for partaking of which one is liable to receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "<b>If</b> we derive it <b>from</b> the case of intent <b>not for its sake,</b> one may respond: What is notable about sacrifice not for its sake? It is notable <b>in that</b> this disqualification <b>applies</b> even <b>to</b> sacrifice on a private <b>altar</b> during the era when such altars were permitted. By contrast, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area is irrelevant to sacrifice on a private altar, which has no designated area.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>With regard to what</b> offering <b>does</b> disqualification due to intent <b>not for its sake apply?</b> It applies <b>to a Paschal offering and a sin offering.</b> Since <b>a Paschal offering and a sin offering may not be sacrificed on</b> a private <b>altar,</b> this factor is irrelevant. One may therefore derive from the case of intent not for its sake that intent to consume the offering outside its designated area disqualifies it.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> that <b>it is</b> derived from the <b>juxtaposition</b> of the <i>halakha</i> of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time with the <i>halakha</i> of intent to consume it outside its designated area. The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [<i>piggul</i>]” (Leviticus 7:18). <b>This</b> statement: “On the <b>third</b> day, it shall not be accepted,” is referring to intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time;</b> and <b>this</b> seemingly superfluous statement: “Neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be <b><i>piggul</i>,”</b> is referring to intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b> Such juxtaposition indicates that there are parallel <i>halakhot</i> in the two cases even if they are dissimilar.",
            "§ <b>Rava says: If you say</b> that <b>Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>his son</b> Rabbi Elazar, <b>who says</b> that the area <b>between the Entrance Hall and the altar</b> is considered part of the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard, the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, he must also hold that prohibited <b>intent while conveying</b> the blood of <b>the inner sin offerings is effective</b> to disqualify them <b>only from the doorway of the Entrance Hall inward.</b> Prohibited intent before the priest reaches the doorway of the Entrance Hall does not disqualify the offering, as conveying the blood to the doorway is not necessary; the offering could have been slaughtered at the doorway in the first place.",
            "<b>And if you say</b> that Rabbi Shimon <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda, who says</b> that the <b>interior of the Temple courtyard sanctifies</b> offerings, i.e., that offerings can be sacrificed on the courtyard floor as if it were part of the altar, prohibited <b>intent while conveying</b> the <b>removed bowls</b> of frankincense from the table in the Sanctuary to burn them on the external altar <b>is effective</b> to disqualify them <b>only</b> while <b>conveying</b> them <b>from the doorway of the Sanctuary outward</b> to the Entrance Hall. Since the table can be placed anywhere in the Sanctuary, conveying the bowls of frankincense in the Sanctuary itself is unnecessary, and once the priest exits the Entrance Hall to the Temple courtyard, the frankincense could theoretically be burned immediately.",
            "Rava continues: <b>And if you say</b> that Rabbi Shimon also <b>holds</b> that <b>the sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall are one</b> and the same, and the table can be placed in the Entrance Hall as well, prohibited <b>intent is effective only</b> while conveying the frankincense <b>from the doorway of the Entrance Hall outward,</b> i.e., in the doorway of the Entrance Hall itself.",
            "<b>And if you say</b> that he also <b>holds</b> that <b>inside the doorway is</b> considered <b>like inside</b> the Entrance Hall, then the table can be placed in the doorway too, and prohibited <b>intent is not effective</b> while conveying the frankincense <b>even one step. Rather,</b> it is effective only during the moment when the frankincense is taken out of the doorway to the courtyard, the time it takes the priest <b>to stretch out his hand</b> to place the bowls on the courtyard floor.",
            "<b>And if you say</b> that he also <b>holds</b> that <b>conveying</b> an offering <b>not by foot is not considered conveying,</b> prohibited <b>intent is not effective at all</b> while conveying the bowls of frankincense.",
            "§ <b>Abaye said to Rav Ḥisda’s interpreter: Ask Rav Ḥisda</b> for me: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a non-priest conveying</b> the blood? Is the offering disqualified, as in a case where a non-priest performs any other sacrificial rite that may performed only by priests?",
            "Rav Ḥisda <b>said to him:</b> The offering remains <b>fit, and a verse supports my</b> ruling: <b>“And they slaughtered the Paschal offering, and the priests sprinkled the blood, which they received of their hand, and the Levites flayed them”</b> (II Chronicles 35:11). Apparently, priests are required only for the sprinkling of the blood on the altar and later rites. Just as slaughter may be performed by non-priests, so can the collection and conveying of the blood be performed by them.",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>a non-priest, or an acute mourner,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>a drunk</b> priest, <b>or a blemished</b> priest performs the rites of <b>collection, conveying</b> or <b>sprinkling</b> the blood, the offering is <b>disqualified. And likewise,</b> it is disqualified if a priest performs any of these rites while <b>sitting. And</b> this is <b>likewise</b> the <i>halakha</i> if a priest performs any of these rites with his <b>left</b> hand. The Gemara concludes: This is <b>a conclusive refutation</b> of Rav Ḥisda’s ruling; if a non-priest conveys the blood, it is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But didn’t Rav Ḥisda state a verse</b> as proof that the offering is not disqualified? The verse states that the priests sprinkled the blood after receiving it from non-priests.",
            "The Gemara answers: The verse described a case <b>where</b> the non-priests <b>served as a bench [<i>itztaba</i>].</b> The priests would give the blood to the non-priests to hold it for them and would then take it and sprinkle the blood. The non-priests would not convey the blood to the altar.",
            "<b>Rabba and Rav Yosef both say</b> that the case of <b>a non-priest conveying</b> the blood is subject to <b>a dispute</b> between <b>Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis.</b> According to <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says</b> that <b>a dispensable rite is not</b> classified as a true <b>rite</b> and therefore does not disqualify the offering if performed with prohibited intent, the offering is <b>fit</b> even if the conveying of the blood is performed <b>by a non-priest. According to the Rabbis,</b> who hold that a dispensable rite is classified as a true rite, the conveying of the blood is <b>not valid</b> if performed by a non-priest.",
            "<b>Abaye said to him: But</b> what about <b>slaughter, which is an indispensable rite, and</b> yet the offering is <b>fit</b> even if it is performed <b>by a non-priest? He said to</b> Abaye: <b>Slaughter,</b> though indispensable, <b>is not</b> classified as a sacrificial <b>rite</b> at all. Therefore it need not be performed by a priest.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And is it not? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> If the <b>slaughter of</b> a red <b>heifer</b> is performed <b>by a non-priest,</b> it is <b>not valid? And Rav said about this</b> <i>halakha</i>: It is derived from the phrases: <b>“Elazar</b> the priest” (Numbers 19:3), <b>and: “Statute”</b> (Numbers 19:2), which <b>are written with regard to</b> the red heifer. The mention of Elazar indicates that slaughter must be performed by a priest, and the term “statute” indicates that one may not deviate from any of the details of the service as delineated in the verses. If one does, the heifer is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara answers: The red <b>heifer is different, as it is</b> not an offering; it has the sanctity of items <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance.</b> The <i>halakhot</i> that govern its service therefore differ from those of offerings proper.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> does <b>this not</b> prove the point <b>all the more?</b> If slaughtering an animal <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance is</b> tantamount to a sacrificial <b>rite,</b> can slaughtering <b>offerings,</b> which are sacrificed on the <b>altar, not be</b> considered a sacrificial <b>rite?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said:</b> The slaughter of a red heifer is considered <b>just as it is in</b> the case of <b>shades of</b> leprous <b>marks, which</b> are deemed ritually pure or impure by a priest. Although this is <b>not</b> a sacrificial <b>rite,</b> it still <b>requires</b> a member of the <b>priesthood</b> to perform it. Therefore, the requirement that the red heifer be slaughtered by a priest does not prove that it is classified as a sacrificial rite.",
            "The Gemara further challenges the premise of Rabba and Rav Yosef that a dispensable rite can be performed by a non-priest: <b>But</b> what about <b>conveying</b> the <b>limbs</b> of the offering <b>to the ramp, which is a dispensable rite,</b> as the offering can be slaughtered next to the ramp? <b>And</b> nevertheless, if it is performed <b>by a non-priest,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified, as it is written: “And the priest shall sacrifice the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:13); <b>and the Master says: This</b> is referring to <b>conveying</b> the <b>limbs to the ramp.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: In a case <b>where</b> the verse explicitly <b>revealed</b> that a rite must be performed by a priest, it <b>revealed</b> it; <b>but</b> in a case <b>where</b> the Torah <b>did not reveal</b> it, it <b>did not reveal</b> it. With regard to conveying the blood, the Torah does not state explicitly that a priest is required.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But is it not all the more so</b> obvious? <b>Just as conveying the limbs to the ramp requires</b> that the conveyor be a member of the <b>priesthood,</b> even though it <b>does not prevent atonement</b> if not performed at all, since atonement was already effected by sprinkling the blood, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that concerning <b>conveying</b> the <b>blood</b> and sprinkling it on the altar, <b>where</b> the failure to convey it and sprinkle it on the altar <b>prevents atonement,</b> it must be that the conveyor be a member of the priesthood? This difficulty remains unresolved.",
            "<b>It was also stated</b> that <b>Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> In a case where <b>conveying</b> the blood is performed <b>by a non-priest,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified, even according to Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: Is <b>conveying</b> the blood <b>not by foot</b> but rather by passing it by hand to another priest <b>considered conveying, or is it not considered conveying?</b> Can the rite be performed in this manner?",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> evidence from the <i>baraita</i>: <b>And likewise,</b> if the priest collected, conveyed, or sprinkled the blood while <b>sitting, and likewise,</b> if he performed any of these rites with his <b>left</b> hand, the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> Since only sitting is listed, one <b>consequently</b> infers that if the priest conveyed the blood while <b>standing</b> but in a manner <b>similar to sitting,</b> i.e., by outstretching his hand without walking, the offering is <b>fit.</b> Evidently, conveying the blood does not require walking.",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>Perhaps</b> when the <i>baraita</i> states: <b>Sitting,</b> it is referring to one who conveys the blood by moving toward the altar while sitting on the ground in such a manner <b>that he rubs</b> himself against the floor of the courtyard as he pulls himself forward. If so, the parallel case of <b>standing</b> in a manner <b>similar to sitting</b> is a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>moves</b> forward <b>a bit.</b> Perhaps if he does not move at all and merely outstretches his hand, the rite is not valid.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 64a): <b>An Israelite would slaughter</b> the Paschal offering, <b>and a priest would collect</b> the blood. The priests would be lined up from the place where the lamb was slaughtered until the altar. The priest who collected the blood would immediately <b>hand it to another</b> priest standing next to him, <b>and the other</b> priest would pass it <b>to another,</b> and so forth, until it would reach the altar. Evidently, the blood can be passed from hand to hand; it need not be conveyed by foot.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There, too,</b> the priests <b>would move a bit</b> with their feet while passing the blood forward. The Gemara asks: <b>But what is</b> the mishna <b>teaching us</b> in this description, if not that the blood need not be conveyed by foot? The Gemara answers: It teaches that: <b>“In the multitude of people is the king’s glory”</b> (Proverbs 14:28). It honors God when the Temple service is performed by a multitude of priests.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another resolution from a mishna (32a): If a priest who is <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood in a vessel <b>and gave</b> it <b>to an unfit</b> individual standing next to the altar, that individual <b>should return</b> it <b>to the fit</b> priest, so that he may perform a complete act of conveying the blood to the altar. Evidently, the blood must be conveyed to the altar by foot. If conveying by hand were valid, another priest could simply take the blood from the unfit person and complete the conveying of the blood to the altar.",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>Say</b> that the wording of the mishna should be emended; instead of stating that the unfit person should return the vessel to the fit priest, it should state that <b>the fit</b> priest, even another priest, <b>should then receive it</b> from the unfit person. If so, the mishna proves nothing about conveying by hand.",
            "<b>It was stated: Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Conveying</b> the blood <b>not by foot is not considered conveying.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara asks: If the blood was conveyed by hand, is it <b>possible to correct it</b> by conveying it again properly, <b>or</b> is it <b>not possible to correct it,</b> and the offering is disqualified permanently?",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> proof from the aforementioned mishna: If a priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood in a vessel <b>and gave</b> the vessel <b>to an unfit</b> person standing next to the altar, the latter <b>should return</b> it <b>to the fit</b> priest. Apparently, even after the blood is conveyed in an inappropriate manner, it can be corrected.",
            "<b>And though</b> one can <b>indeed</b> explain <b>that the fit</b> priest <b>should then receive it</b> from him, as posited above, <b>if it enters your mind</b> that if the blood is conveyed incorrectly it is <b>not possible to correct it,</b> the offering <b>was</b> already <b>disqualified</b> when the priest gave the blood to the unfit person. Taking it back is of no consequence.",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>Do you maintain that</b> this is referring to a case where the <b>non-priest is standing inside,</b> between the fit priest and the altar? <b>No,</b> it is a case <b>where</b> the <b>non-priest is standing outside,</b> farther away from the altar than the priest. Therefore, when the priest gave him the blood, he was not conveying it toward the altar at all; he was moving it farther away from the altar.",
            "<b>It was stated: Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Conveying</b> the blood <b>not by foot</b> renders the offering <b>unfit. Apparently, it is not possible to correct it,</b> as otherwise Rabbi Yoḥanan would have merely stated that it is not considered conveying, as in his earlier statement (14b).",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Ulla</b> from a mishna (32a): If the blood <b>spilled from the vessel onto the floor and one collected it</b> from the floor, it is <b>fit</b> for sacrifice. Apparently, although spilling the blood on the floor constitutes a not valid conveying toward the altar, it can still be corrected after the fact.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where</b> the blood that spilled <b>went outward,</b> i.e., away from the altar, so it did not constitute conveying at all.",
            "The Gemara asks: Can spilled blood <b>go outward</b> and <b>not come inward?</b> Clearly, spilled blood spreads to all sides. The Gemara answers: It is a case where the blood spilled <b>on an inclined plane,</b> and it therefore spilled only outward, away from the altar. And <b>if you wish, say</b> instead that it spilled <b>into a hole</b> in the ground, so it did not spread in any direction. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that it is a case <b>where</b> the blood is <b>thick,</b> so it did not spread in all directions.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But did the <i>tanna</i> go to all that trouble [<i>ikhpal</i></b>] just <b>to teach us all these</b> unlikely cases? <b>And furthermore, rather than teaching in another chapter</b> (see 25a) that if the blood <b>spilled</b> from the animal’s neck <b>onto the floor and one collected it</b> in a vessel from the floor it is <b>unfit, let</b> the mishna <b>teach a distinction within</b> the case where the blood spilled from the vessel <b>itself: In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that the blood is fit, <b>said?</b> In a case <b>where</b> the spilled blood <b>went outward,</b> away from the altar, <b>but</b> if it <b>came inward</b> it is <b>unfit.</b> The Gemara concludes: This is <b>a conclusive refutation;</b> if the blood is conveyed in a not valid manner, it can be corrected.",
            "§ <b>It was stated:</b> The <b>dispute</b> in the mishna (13a) between <b>Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis</b> as to whether improper intent while conveying the blood disqualifies the offering is only with regard to <b>conveying</b> the blood <b>not by foot. With regard to greater conveying,</b> i.e., conveying the blood by moving the feet, <b>everyone agrees that</b> if one performs it with prohibited intent, the offering is <b>unfit. When they disagree,</b> it is <b>with regard to lesser conveying,</b> i.e., conveying the blood by hand without moving the feet, in a case where the offering was slaughtered next to the altar.",
            "<b>They laughed at</b> this statement <b>in the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, saying: <b>But</b> if so, one encounters difficulty with regard to <b>a bird sin offering, which</b> is killed through pinching its nape on the altar and whose blood is sprinkled directly from its neck. It is known that if one sprinkled its blood with prohibited <b>intent,</b> the offering is <b>unfit.</b> And <b>according to Rabbi Shimon,</b> who holds that prohibited intent while conveying the blood by hand does not disqualify the offering, <b>how can you find these</b> circumstances? <b>If</b> the priest <b>has</b> prohibited <b>intent with regard to</b> the offering <b>before</b> the <b>blood comes out</b> of the bird, this intent <b>is nothing,</b> since his waving it is like conveying by hand. <b>And if</b> he has such intent <b>after the blood came out, its mitzva was</b> already <b>performed,</b> as the blood already reached the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the difficulty? Perhaps</b> the offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent <b>from</b> the moment the blood <b>leaves</b> the bird <b>until</b> the moment <b>it reaches the altar.</b>",
            "This is <b>as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:</b> If the priest <b>was sprinkling</b> the blood, <b>and the hand of the one sprinkling was severed before</b> the <b>blood reached the airspace of the altar, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is the sprinkling not valid since it was performed by a blemished priest, or is it valid because the blood left the bird before he was blemished? <b>And</b> Rabbi Zeira <b>said to him:</b> It is <b>not valid. What is the reason? We require</b> that the verse: <b>“And sprinkle</b> of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), be fulfilled in the same manner as the verse that follows it: <b>“And</b> the priest shall <b>place</b> of the blood upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:7), namely, that the blood reach the altar. Therefore, the blood can be disqualified anytime until it reaches the altar, whether through the priest becoming blemished or through prohibited intent.",
            "<b>When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall, they said: This is</b> the reason for <b>the laughter</b> of the scholars of Eretz Yisrael: <b>With regard to greater conveying,</b> i.e., conveying by foot, can one say Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis <b>do not disagree?</b> Clearly, <b>when they disagree</b> in the mishna, <b>they disagree with regard to greater conveying,</b> as Rabbi Shimon reasons that conveying is a dispensable rite. Only conveying by foot is dispensable, since even if the offering is slaughtered next to the altar, the priest will need to move its blood somewhat with his hand.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the statement under discussion should be emended to say: <b>With regard to lesser conveying,</b> i.e., conveying the blood by hand, <b>everyone agrees that it does not disqualify</b> the offering due to prohibited intent. <b>When they disagree,</b> it is <b>with regard to greater conveying,</b> i.e., conveying the blood for a distance by foot. Rabbi Shimon holds that improper intent even then does not disqualify the offering, as the rite is dispensable, and the Rabbis maintain that it does disqualify it.",
            "§ If <b>a non-priest conveyed</b> the blood to the altar, <b>and a priest returned it</b> to its original location, <b>and</b> a priest then <b>conveyed it again</b> to the altar, <b>the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yannai disagree with regard to</b> the <i>halakha</i>. <b>One says</b> that the offering is <b>fit, and one says</b> it is <b>unfit.</b> This is because one <b>Sage holds</b> that if the blood is conveyed improperly, it is <b>possible to correct it, and</b> one <b>Sage holds</b> that it is <b>not possible to correct it.</b>",
            "If <b>a priest conveyed it</b> to the altar, <b>and</b> then <b>returned it, and a non-priest</b> then <b>conveyed it again, Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: According to the statement of the one who deems</b> the offering <b>fit</b> in the previous case, where a non-priest conveyed it the first time and a priest conveyed it the second time, in this case the offering is <b>unfit,</b> as a non-priest conveyed it the second time. <b>According to the statement of the one who deems</b> the offering <b>unfit</b> in the previous case, as a non-priest conveyed it the first time, in this case, where a priest conveyed it the first time, <b>he deems</b> the offering <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says: Even according to the statement of the one who deems</b> the offering <b>unfit</b> in a case where a non-priest conveyed it the first time, it is <b>unfit</b> in this case as well, where a priest conveyed it the first time and a non-priest conveyed it the second time. <b>What is the reason? Because</b> after the blood is returned to its original location, <b>it is necessary</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>to bring it</b> again. Therefore, the second conveying must also be performed by a priest.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rav Ashi: This</b> is what <b>Rav Yirmeya of Difti said</b> when he stated <b>that it is necessary to bring</b> the blood to the altar again, and that therefore the second conveying is considered a sacrificial rite and must be performed by a priest: He meant that this principle is subject to <b>a dispute</b> between <b>Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.</b>",
            "This is <b>as we learned</b> in the mishna (13a): <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> With regard to <b>one who conveys</b> the blood <b>in a situation where he is required to convey</b> it, prohibited <b>intent</b> while conveying it <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. If he conveys the blood <b>in a situation where he is not required to convey</b> it, prohibited <b>intent</b> while conveying it <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering.",
            "<b>And Rava says: All</b> of the <i>tanna’im</i> <b>concede</b> that if one <b>collected</b> the blood <b>outside,</b> i.e., at a distance from the altar, <b>and he brought it inside,</b> close to the altar, <b>that is</b> considered <b>necessary conveying.</b> If one <b>collected it inside and took it outside, that is</b> considered <b>unnecessary conveying.</b>",
            "<b>They disagree only</b> with regard to a case <b>where he brought it in and took it out again.</b> One <b>Sage,</b> the first <i>tanna</i>, <b>holds</b> that since <b>it is necessary to bring it</b> back to the altar, it is considered necessary conveying, and prohibited intent while performing it disqualifies the offering. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that since the rite of conveying to the altar was already performed, <b>it is not considered conveying that is necessary for the</b> sacrificial <b>service,</b> and prohibited intent while performing it does not disqualify the offering. Apparently, the same dispute applies to a case where a non-priest conveyed the blood the second time.",
            "<b>Abaye raised an objection to</b> Rava’s interpretation from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> With regard to <b>one who conveys</b> the blood <b>in a situation where he is required to convey</b> it, prohibited <b>intent</b> while conveying it <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. <b>How so?</b> If one <b>collected</b> the blood <b>outside,</b> at a distance from the altar, <b>and he brought it inside,</b> close to the altar, <b>that is</b> considered <b>necessary conveying.</b> If one <b>collected it inside and took it outside, that is</b> considered <b>unnecessary conveying. And consequently,</b> one infers that if <b>he brought it in again, it is</b> considered <b>necessary conveying</b> even according to Rabbi Eliezer.",
            "Rava <b>said to him: If this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>is taught, it is taught,</b> and I cannot disagree with it.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>all slaughtered offerings,</b> if the one <b>who collected their blood</b> was <b>a non-priest;</b> or a priest who was <b>an acute mourner,</b> i.e., one whose relative has died and has not yet been buried; or <b>one</b> who was ritually impure <b>who immersed that day</b> and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed; <b>or one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, e.g., a <i>zav</i> or leper after the seventh day of the purification process; <b>or</b> a priest <b>lacking</b> the requisite priestly <b>vestments;</b> or one <b>who did not wash his hands and feet</b> from the water in the Basin prior to performing the Temple service; or <b>an uncircumcised</b> priest; or <b>a ritually impure</b> priest; or if the one who collected the blood was <b>sitting;</b> or if he was <b>standing</b> not on the floor of the Temple but <b>upon vessels,</b> or <b>upon an animal,</b> or <b>upon the feet of another,</b> he has <b>disqualified</b> the offering.",
            "If <b>he collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, he <b>disqualified</b> the blood for offering. In this last case, <b>Rabbi Shimon deems</b> it <b>fit.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>a non-priest</b> who performs sacrificial rites disqualifies an offering? <b>As Levi teaches:</b> The verse states: <b>“Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel [<i>benei Yisrael</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 22:2). Levi continues: <b>“The children of Israel”</b> serves <b>to exclude what</b> from the prohibition against sacrificing an offering in a state of impurity? <b>If we say</b> that it serves <b>to exclude</b> the offerings of <b>women,</b> and the verse states “<i>benei</i>” in the masculine to indicate sons but not daughters, is it conceivable that <b>an offering of women is sacrificed in</b> a state of <b>impurity?</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> perhaps it serves <b>to exclude</b> offerings of <b>gentiles. Now,</b> if the <b>frontplate</b> of the High Priest, which normally effects acceptance for offerings of Jews sacrificed in a state of impurity, <b>does not effect acceptance</b> for the offerings of gentiles, <b>as the Master said: And with regard to</b> an offering of <b>gentiles, whether</b> it was offered in a state of impurity <b>unintentionally or intentionally, it was not accepted;</b> can it be, then, that such an offering <b>is sacrificed in</b> a state of <b>impurity</b> <i>ab initio</i>?",
            "<b>Rather, this</b> is what the verse <b>is saying,</b> i.e., it should be read in the following manner: <b>That they separate themselves from the sacred items; the children of Israel, and that they not profane</b> My holy name. That is, the verse states that they, the priests, must separate themselves from the sacred items when they are ritually impure, and that the children of Israel must separate themselves from performing the sacrificial rites, so that they will not profane, i.e., disqualify, the offerings.",
            "A <i>tanna</i> of the <b>school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:</b> The <i>halakha</i> of a non-priest who performs the sacrificial rites <b>is derived via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of <b>a blemished</b> priest: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a blemished</b> priest, <b>who may partake</b> of the meat of offerings, <b>if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites</b> he has nevertheless <b>desecrated</b> the service,"
        ],
        [
            "then with regard to <b>a non-priest, who may not partake</b> of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, <b>is it not right that if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service?",
            "The Gemara rejects the inference: One cannot draw an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from a blemished priest, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>a blemished</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> the Torah <b>rendered</b> an animal that <b>is sacrificed like</b> the priest who <b>sacrifices</b> it, i.e., both blemished animals and blemished priests are disqualified. Since there is an added element of stringency with regard to the case of a blemished priest, one cannot draw an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from it.",
            "The Gemara suggests: The case of <b>an impure</b> priest <b>will prove</b> that this is no reason to reject the <i>a fortiori</i> inference. While an animal and the priest are not equated with regard to ritual impurity, as an animal cannot become impure while alive but a priest can, an impure priest desecrates the service. The Gemara rejects this as well: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>an impure</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> an impure priest <b>imparts impurity</b> to others.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>A blemished</b> priest <b>will prove</b> that this is no reason to reject the inference, as he cannot impart his blemish to others. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. Therefore, one may derive the <i>halakha</i> of a non-priest from the combination of the case of a blemished priest and that of an impure priest: <b>The aspect of this</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case, <b>and the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element</b> is <b>that they are prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites <b>and if they performed</b> these <b>rites they have desecrated</b> the service. Therefore, <b>I will also include a non-priest, who is prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites, <b>and</b> conclude that <b>if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive <b>that</b> a non-priest <b>is prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites? <b>If</b> it is derived <b>from</b> the verse: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, <b>that they separate themselves</b> from the sacred items of the children of Israel, and that they not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2), then the <i>a fortiori</i> inference is unnecessary, since <b>profanation itself is written in</b> the verse. <b>Rather,</b> it must be that it is derived <b>from</b> the verse: “Keep the charge of the Tent of Meeting, whatever the service of the Tent may be; <b>but a common man shall not draw close to you”</b> (Numbers 18:4).",
            "The Gemara asks: Still, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference drawn from the cases of a blemished priest and an impure priest <b>can be refuted: What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> a blemished priest and an impure priest <b>were not permitted</b> to perform sacrificial rites <b>on</b> a private <b>altar</b> during times when there was no Temple or permanent Tabernacle. Since it was permitted for non-priests to perform rites on private altars, perhaps non-priests do not desecrate the sacrificial rites performed in the Temple.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Do not say</b> that the case of <b>an impure</b> priest <b>will prove</b> the <i>a fortiori</i> inference with the case of a blemished priest; <b>rather, say</b> that the case of <b>an acute mourner will prove</b> it, as it is prohibited for him to perform the service and, if he were to perform it, he would desecrate it. This, too, is rejected: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>an acute mourner?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> he <b>is prohibited from</b> partaking of second <b>tithe,</b> whereas a non-priest may partake of second tithe. The Gemara responds: <b>A blemished</b> priest <b>will prove</b> the inference, as he may partake of second tithe.",
            "<b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. <b>The aspect of this</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case. <b>Their common element</b> is <b>that they are prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites <i>ab initio</i>, and they desecrate the service if they do so. Therefore, with regard to a non-priest, who is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Here, too, let one refute</b> the inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> both an acute mourner and a blemished priest <b>were not permitted</b> to perform sacrificial rites <b>on</b> a private <b>altar,</b> unlike a non-priest. <b>Rav Samma, son of Rava, objects to this: And who shall say to us that an acute mourner</b> was <b>prohibited</b> from performing rites <b>on</b> a private <b>altar? Perhaps</b> it was <b>permitted</b> for him to perform the rites <b>on</b> a private <b>altar.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Mesharshiyya says:</b> The <i>halakha</i> that a non-priest desecrates the service <b>is derived</b> by <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of a priest who performed sacrificial rites while <b>sitting: Just as</b> with regard to a priest who was <b>sitting, who may partake</b> of the meat of offerings, <b>if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service, then with regard to <b>a non-priest, who may not partake</b> of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, <b>is it not right that if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service?",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>a sitting</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> one who sits <b>is disqualified from bearing witness,</b> as witnesses must stand when testifying. Since there is an added aspect of stringency with regard to the case of a sitting priest, one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest from it. The Gemara responds: Learn instead <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a sitting Torah scholar,</b> as the court may allow a Torah scholar to sit while testifying.",
            "The Gemara challenges: Still, one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> from this, as <b>what</b> is notable about <b>the category of a sitting</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> generally speaking, one who sits <b>is disqualified from bearing witness,</b> even though there are exceptions. The Gemara responds: <b>The category of a sitting</b> priest <b>cannot refute</b> the derivation. One can refute a derivation only from concrete cases, not general concepts. <b>And</b> even <b>if you say it can refute</b> the derivation, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest <b>can be derived from</b> the case of <b>a sitting</b> priest <b>and from one of those</b> other cases, i.e., a blemished priest, an impure priest, or an acute mourner, all of whom may testify.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And from where do we</b> derive <b>that</b> one who is <b>sitting is fit</b> to perform sacrificial rites <b>on</b> a private <b>altar?</b> If he is not, one can refute the common element in the same manner as above. The Gemara responds: <b>The verse states:</b> “The Lord separated the tribe of Levi to bear the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, <b>to stand before the Lord to minister to Him”</b> (Deuteronomy 10:8). The verse indicates that the sacrificial rites must be performed while standing only <b>before the Lord,</b> i.e., in the Temple, where the Divine Presence resides, <b>and not before</b> a private <b>altar,</b> which is a mere place of worship.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that rites performed by <b>an acute mourner</b> are disqualified. The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? <b>As it is written</b> with regard to a High Priest who is an acute mourner: <b>“And he shall not leave the Sanctuary, and he will not profane</b> the Sanctuary of his God” (Leviticus 21:12). One can infer: <b>But</b> any <b>other</b> ordinary priest <b>who did not leave</b> the Sanctuary while he was an acute mourner and continued to perform the service <b>has desecrated</b> the rites he performed.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> One can derive it <b>from here</b> instead: When Moses asked Aaron why the sin offering that was sacrificed on the day that Nadav and Avihu died was burned and not eaten, he suspected that Aaron’s other sons, Eleazar and Itamar, had sacrificed the sin offering while acute mourners, which disqualified it and forced them to burn it. Aaron responded to Moses: “This day have <b>they offered</b> their sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:19). Rather, <b>I offered</b> it. As High Priest, I do not desecrate the Temple service even when I am an acute mourner; I burned it only because, as acute mourners, my sons and I are prohibited from partaking of the meat. Rabbi Elazar continues: <b>By inference,</b> one can derive <b>that if they had offered</b> the sin offering they would have disqualified it, and it would have been <b>proper</b> that <b>it was burned.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what is the reason</b> that <b>Rabbi Elazar does not say</b> that this <i>halakha</i> is derived <b>from</b> the verse: <b>“And he shall not leave the Sanctuary”?</b> The Gemara responds: He could have <b>said to you: Is it written: But</b> any <b>other</b> ordinary priest <b>that did not leave</b> the Sanctuary <b>has desecrated</b> the rites he performed? It is only an inference, and so it is not conclusive.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> Sage, who derives it from the verse: “And he shall not leave the Sanctuary,” <b>what is the reason</b> that <b>he did not say</b> to derive it <b>from</b> the verse: “This day have <b>they offered</b> their sin offering?” The Gemara responds: He <b>holds</b> that the sin offering <b>was burned because</b> it became <b>ritually impure,</b> not because Aaron and his sons were acute mourners.",
            "A <i>tanna</i> of the <b>school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:</b> The <i>halakha</i> <b>is derived by an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of <b>a blemished</b> priest: <b>And just as</b>"
        ],
        [
            "with regard to <b>a blemished</b> priest, <b>who may partake</b> of the meat of offerings, <b>if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service, then with regard to <b>an acute mourner, who may not partake</b> of the meat of offerings, <b>is it not right that if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service?",
            "The Gemara rejects the inference: One cannot derive this <i>halakha</i> from the case of a blemished priest, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about a blemished</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> the Torah <b>rendered</b> animals that <b>are sacrificed like</b> the priests who <b>sacrifice</b> them. Since this stringency does not exist with regard to acute mourning, perhaps an acute mourner may perform sacrificial rites as well.",
            "The Gemara responds: The case of <b>a non-priest will prove</b> that this is no reason to reject the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, since there is no equivalence between priest and sacrifice in this regard, yet a non-priest desecrates the service. The Gemara rejects this as well: One cannot cite a proof from the case of a non-priest, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>a non-priest?</b> It is notable <b>in that he has no remedy,</b> i.e., a non-priest may never perform the sacrificial rites. By contrast, an acute mourner will eventually become permitted to perform the service.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>A blemished</b> priest <b>will prove</b> that this is no reason to reject the inference, as even though the priest may perform the service if the blemish is healed, he desecrates the service so long as he remains blemished. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. Therefore, one learns the <i>halakha</i> from the combination of the cases of a blemished priest and a non-priest: <b>The aspect of this</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of that</b> case, <b>and the aspect of that</b> case <b>is not like the aspect of this</b> case. <b>Their common element is that they are prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites, <b>and if they performed</b> such <b>rites they have desecrated</b> the service. Therefore, <b>I will also include an acute mourner, who is prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites, <b>and</b> conclude that <b>if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>Where is</b> an acute mourner <b>prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites, as asserted in the inference? <b>If we say</b> that it is derived <b>from</b> the verse: <b>“And he shall not leave the Sanctuary,</b> and he will not profane the Sanctuary of his God” (Leviticus 21:12), then the above <i>a fortiori</i> inference is unnecessary, since <b>profanation itself is written in</b> the verse. <b>Rather,</b> it must be that it is derived <b>from</b> the verse: “This day have <b>they offered</b> their sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:19), <b>and</b> this <i>tanna</i> <b>holds</b> that the sin offering brought by Aaron <b>was burned because</b> Aaron and his sons were in <b>acute mourning.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: The inference from the common element of the cases of a blemished priest and a non-priest <b>can be refuted: What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> there are <b>no</b> circumstances in which <b>its general prohibition was permitted.</b> There is an exception to the prohibition against an acute mourner performing the Temple service, namely the High Priest, who may perform the sacrificial rites while an acute mourner.",
            "The Gemara responds: The case of <b>an impure</b> priest <b>will prove</b> that this is no reason to reject the inference, as there is an exception to the prohibition against performing the service while impure, namely that the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of impurity is permitted in cases involving the public, yet an impure priest desecrates the service.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>an impure</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that he imparts impurity</b> to others. Perhaps it is only for this reason that an impure priest desecrates the service. The Gemara responds: <b>Those</b> other cases, i.e., a blemished priest and a non-priest, <b>will prove</b> that this does not reject the inference, since they do not impart their status to others. <b>And the inference has reverted</b> to its starting point. Therefore, one can derive the <i>halakha</i> from the combination of the cases of an impure priest, a blemished priest, and a non-priest: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case; <b>their common element is that they are prohibited</b> from performing sacrificial rites and they desecrate the service. Therefore, I will also conclude that since an acute mourner is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, he desecrates the service.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But let one refute</b> this as well: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about their common element?</b> It is notable <b>in that its general prohibition was not permitted,</b> even <b>in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering.</b> By contrast, a High Priest in acute mourning may perform rites even for individual offerings. The Gemara responds: <b>The category of impurity, at least, is permitted</b> in the case of communal offerings. Therefore, one cannot claim that an impure priest, a non-priest, and a blemished priest all share a lack of exemptions.",
            "<b>Rav Mesharshiyya says:</b> The <i>halakha</i> with regard to an acute mourner <b>is derived by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of <b>a sitting</b> priest: <b>And just as</b> with regard to <b>a sitting</b> priest, <b>who may partake</b> of the meat of offerings, <b>if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service, then with regard to <b>an acute mourner, who may not partake</b> of the meat of offerings, <b>is it not right that if he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites he has desecrated</b> the service?",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> the case of <b>a sitting</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> one who sits <b>is disqualified from bearing witness,</b> as witnesses must stand when testifying. The Gemara responds: Learn instead <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a sitting Torah scholar,</b> as the court may allow a Torah scholar to sit while testifying.",
            "The Gemara challenges: Still, one cannot derive from this, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about the category of a sitting</b> priest? It is notable <b>in that</b> generally speaking, one who sits <b>is disqualified from bearing witness,</b> even though there are exceptions. The Gemara responds: <b>The category of a sitting</b> priest <b>cannot refute</b> the derivation. One can refute a derivation only from concrete cases, not general concepts. <b>And</b> even <b>if you say it can refute</b> the derivation, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest <b>can be derived from</b> the case of <b>a sitting</b> priest <b>and from one of those</b> other cases, i.e., a non-priest, an impure priest, or a blemished priest, through their common element.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if <b>an acute mourner</b> collects the blood of an offering, the offering is <b>disqualified. Rava says: They taught</b> this <b>only with regard to an individual’s offering. But with regard to a communal offering,</b> a rite performed by an acute mourner does <b>effect acceptance.</b> One can derive this by <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from ritual impurity.</b>",
            "<b>Just as</b> the prohibition against performing rites in a state of <b>ritual impurity, whose general prohibition was not permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering,</b> as no individual offering may be sacrificed in a state of impurity, <b>was</b> nevertheless <b>permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary [<i>hedyot</i>]</b> priest performing rites <b>for a communal offering,</b> as communal offerings may be sacrificed by an impure priest when necessary; then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing rites while in a period of <b>acute mourning, whose general prohibition was permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering,</b> as the High Priest may perform all rites while an acute mourner, <b>is it not right that</b> this prohibition <b>was permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering?</b>",
            "<b>Rava bar Ahilai objects to this:</b> On the contrary, if such an inference can be made, then perhaps one can make the following mistaken inference: The performance of rites in a state of <b>acute mourning should not be permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering, by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> the prohibition against performing rites in a state of <b>ritual impurity,</b> whose general prohibition <b>was permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering, was not permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering;</b> then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing the rites during a period of <b>acute mourning,</b> whose general prohibition <b>was not permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering, is it not right that</b> this prohibition <b>should not be permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering?</b>",
            "<b>And</b> similarly, one may claim: The performance of rites in a state of <b>ritual impurity should be permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering, by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> the prohibition against performing rites in a state of <b>acute mourning,</b> whose general prohibition <b>was not permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering,</b> still <b>was permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering;</b> then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing the rites in a state of <b>ritual impurity,</b> whose general prohibition <b>was permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering, is it not right that</b> this prohibition <b>was permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering?</b>",
            "<b>And</b> similarly, one may claim: The performance of rites in a state of <b>ritual impurity should not be permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering, by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> the prohibition against performing rites in a state of <b>acute mourning,</b> whose general prohibition <b>was permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual’s offering,</b> still <b>was not permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering;</b> then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing the rites in a state of <b>ritual impurity,</b> whose general prohibition <b>was not permitted in</b> the case of <b>a High Priest</b> performing rites <b>for an individual offering, is it not right that</b> this prohibition <b>should not be permitted in</b> the case of <b>an ordinary priest</b> performing rites <b>for a communal offering?</b>",
            "The Gemara provides <b>a mnemonic</b> for recalling the above rejections of Rava bar Ahilai: <b>And should not be permitted, and should not be permitted, acute mourning, and ritual impurity, ritual impurity, individual, and individual, communal.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rather,</b> one <b>can derive this</b> way <b>and</b> one <b>can derive that</b> way. Since these derivations contradict one another, <b>each and every</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>shall stand in its place</b> and not modify the other by <i>a fortiori</i> inference.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that sacrificial rites performed by <b>one who immersed that day</b> are disqualified. The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: It is derived <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Simai says: From where</b> in the Torah is the <b>allusion</b> with regard <b>to</b> a priest <b>who immersed that day, that if he performed</b> the Temple <b>service he desecrated</b> that service? It is derived from a verse, as <b>the verse states: “They shall be sacred to their God and they shall not desecrate</b> the name of their God” (Leviticus 21:6).",
            "<b>If</b> this verse <b>is not</b> written with regard to the <b>matter of an impure</b> priest who performed the Temple service, <b>as</b> that <i>halakha</i> is <b>derived for us from</b> the verse: <b>“That they separate themselves</b> from the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:2), then <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of</b> a priest <b>who immersed that day</b> who performed the Temple service. Although he is no longer impure in every sense, the priest remains impure in the sense that he is prohibited from partaking of <i>teruma</i> and sacrificial food, and from entering the Temple.",
            "The Gemara asks: Why must the verse be applied to the matter of one who immersed that day? <b>Say</b> that one should <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of one who creates a bald spot</b> upon his head <b>or to</b> the matter of <b>one who destroys</b> his <b>beard,</b> as these matters are discussed in the preceding verse.",
            "The Gemara responds: This verse is already used to indicate another <i>halakha</i> relating to one who immersed that day: <b>From where do we</b> derive <b>that if one who immersed that day performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> he is liable to receive the punishment of <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven? <b>As</b> it is <b>derived</b> by verbal analogy between <b>profanation</b> mentioned in this context and <b>profanation from <i>teruma</i>,</b> as the verse states in this context: “And not profane the name of their God” (Leviticus 21:6), and the verse states with regard to <i>teruma</i>: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die therein, if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). It can be inferred from this verbal analogy that one <b>who disqualifies <i>teruma</i>,</b> i.e., one who immersed that day, <b>profanes</b> the Temple <b>service,</b> and one <b>who does not disqualify <i>teruma</i>,</b> i.e., one who creates a bald spot or one who destroys his beard, <b>does not profane</b> the <b>service.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabba said: Why do I</b> need <b>that</b> which <b>the Merciful One wrote,</b> i.e., that <b>an impure</b> priest, <b>and one who immersed that day, and one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering all disqualify the rites they perform? Wouldn’t it have been enough to teach the <i>halakha</i> in only one case?",
            "Rabba explains: All three <b>are necessary, as</b> in each case there is a stringency not present in the others. Therefore, <b>had the Merciful One written</b> only that <b>an impure</b> priest desecrates the service, one might say that this is <b>because he imparts impurity</b> to others, and since the other two cases do not, one cannot derive them from the case of an impure priest. And had the Merciful One written the <i>halakha</i> only <b>with regard to one who immersed that day,</b> then the case of <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering <b>could not be derived from it, since</b> the former <b>is unfit to</b> partake of <b><i>teruma</i></b> while the latter is not. And had the Merciful One written the <i>halakha</i> only <b>with regard to one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, then the case of <b>one who immersed that day could not be derived from it, since</b> only the former <b>has not yet</b> performed a necessary <b>action,</b> while one who immersed that day must simply wait for nightfall in order to become fully pure.",
            "The Gemara asks: Still, why are all three necessary? Granted, <b>from one</b> of these cases the other two <b>cannot be derived,</b> but <b>let one be derived from</b> the other <b>two.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Which</b> of the three <b>should the Merciful One not write?</b> If one suggests: <b>Let</b> the Merciful One <b>not write</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to one who has not yet</b> brought an <b>atonement</b> offering <b>and derive</b> it <b>from these</b> other two, an impure priest and one who immersed that day, one can reply: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these?</b> They are notable <b>in that they are unfit to</b> partake of <b><i>teruma</i>.</b> Since one who has not yet brought an atonement offering may partake of <i>teruma</i>, perhaps he does not disqualify rites he performs.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> say: <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to one who immersed that day and derive</b> it <b>from these</b> other two, an impure priest and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering. <b>As, what can you</b> say to <b>refute</b> this? One cannot reply: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these;</b> they are notable <b>since they have not yet</b> performed a necessary <b>action,</b> because <b>ultimately their impurity,</b> i.e., the impurity of one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, <b>is weak</b> when compared to one who immersed that day, and relatively speaking, one who has not yet brought an atonement offering is not considered to be lacking the performance of an action."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara responds: Rabba <b>holds</b> that <b>a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering is still <b>considered</b> to have the impure status of <b>a <i>zav</i>.</b> The impurity of one who has immersed but has not yet brought an atonement offering is therefore considered stronger than that of one who immersed that day but requires no atonement.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> the matter of whether <b>a <i>zav</i> who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering is still <b>considered a <i>zav</i> is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>an acute mourner or one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering <b>burned</b> the red heifer, it is <b>fit. Yosef the Babylonian says:</b> If <b>an acute mourner</b> burned it, it is <b>fit,</b> but if <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering burned it, it is <b>disqualified. What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this:</b> One <b>Sage,</b> Yosef the Babylonian, <b>holds</b> that <b>a <i>zav</i> who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering <b>is considered</b> a full-fledged <b><i>zav</i></b> and therefore disqualifies the red heifer, <b>and</b> one <b>Sage,</b> the first <i>tanna</i>, <b>holds</b> that a <i>zav</i> who has not yet brought an atonement offering <b>is not considered a <i>zav</i>,</b> but is instead considered like one who immersed that day, who is fit to burn the red heifer?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No, everyone</b> agrees that he <b>is considered a <i>zav</i>, and here</b> the <i>tanna’im</i> <b>disagree with regard to this</b> matter, <b>as it is written</b> with regard to the rite of the red heifer: <b>“And the pure person shall sprinkle”</b> the water of purification (Numbers 19:19). The preceding verse already states that the one performing the service must be ritually pure. Therefore, by stating “pure” this verse emphasizes that he needs be pure enough only to perform the rite of the red heifer specifically. <b>By inference,</b> one derives <b>that he</b> may <b>be impure</b> in some way that disqualifies him for other rites. This <b>teaches that one who immersed that day is fit</b> to participate <b>in</b> the rite of the red <b>heifer.</b>",
            "The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree as to the extent of this <i>halakha</i>: One <b>Sage,</b> the first <i>tanna</i>, <b>holds</b> that it is referring to any state of <b>impurity</b> mentioned <b>in the entire Torah,</b> i.e., anyone who immersed that day due to any impurity may participate in the rite of the red heifer. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Yosef the Babylonian, <b>holds</b> that it is referring specifically to one who was in the state of <b>impurity</b> mentioned <b>in this passage,</b> i.e., impurity contracted from a corpse, which the red heifer purifies.",
            "<b>Therefore,</b> according to Yosef the Babylonian, with regard to <b>an acute mourner and one who immersed that day</b> after becoming <b>impure</b> due to contact with the carcass of <b>a creeping animal, since</b> they <b>are</b> treated more <b>leniently, they are derived <i>a fortiori</i> from</b> the case of <b>one who immersed that day</b> to remove impurity contracted from <b>a corpse,</b> and they are fit to participate in the rite of the red heifer. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>a <i>zav</i> who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>who</b> is treated more <b>stringently, since</b> his <b>impurity emerges onto him from his body</b> rather than being imparted from without, one does <b>not</b> derive that he is fit to participate in the rite of the red heifer.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that a priest <b>lacking</b> the requisite priestly <b>vestments</b> disqualifies the rites he performs. The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? <b>Rabbi Avuh says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and</b> some <b>determined it</b> to be stated <b>in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: As the verse states: “And you shall gird them with belts, Aaron and his sons, and bind mitres on them; and they shall have the priesthood by a perpetual statute”</b> (Exodus 29:9). The verse indicates that <b>when their vestments are on them, their priesthood is upon them,</b> but if <b>their vestments are not on them, their priesthood is not upon them</b> and their rites are disqualified.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> is this <i>halakha</i> <b>derived from here? It is derived from there, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>that if those who drank wine performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites they have desecrated</b> the service? <b>The verse states</b> with regard to the priests: <b>“Drink no wine or strong drink,</b> you, nor your sons with you, when you go into the Tent of Meeting, so that you not die; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations. <b>That you may put difference between the holy and the common”</b> (Leviticus 10:9–10). The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to <b>one lacking</b> the requisite <b>vestments and one whose hands and feet are not washed, from where</b> is it derived that their rites are disqualified as well?"
        ],
        [
            "<b>The verse states “statute”</b> with regard to those who drank wine, and it likewise states <b>“statute”</b> with regard to the priestly vestments (Exodus 28:43) and with regard to the washing of the hands and feet (Exodus 30:21). One therefore derives <b>by verbal analogy</b> that the <i>halakha</i> in all three cases is the same. If so, there is already a source for the <i>halakha</i> that one who lacks the requisite priestly vestments disqualifies the service.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> one derived the <i>halakha</i> only <b>from there, I would say: This matter,</b> i.e., that the rites of one who lacks the requisite vestments are disqualified, applies only to <b>a rite for which a non-priest is liable</b> to receive the punishment of <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven, since that is the topic of the passage discussing those who drank wine. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>a rite for which a non-priest is not liable</b> to receive <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven, <b>I will say</b> that they are <b>not</b> subject to this <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, the verse (Exodus 29:9) <b>teaches us</b> that the <i>halakha</i> applies to all rites.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> that <b>one lacking</b> the requisite <b>vestments</b> disqualifies all rites, even those for which a non-priest is not liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven; <b>from where do we</b> derive that the <i>halakha</i> is the same for <b>those who drank wine,</b> as the passage in Leviticus (10:9–10) addresses only rites for which a non-priest receives the death penalty? The Gemara responds: It <b>is derived</b> by verbal analogy between the word <b>“statute”</b> used there and the word <b>“statute” from</b> the verses discussing <b>one lacking</b> the requisite <b>vestments.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i></b> of the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> <b>derive</b> that the rites of those who drank wine are disqualified from the verse: <b>“That you may put difference between</b> the holy and the common” (Leviticus 10:10), and not by verbal analogy to a priest lacking the requisite vestments? The Gemara responds: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common” is the source of this <i>halakha</i> only <b>before</b> the <b>verbal analogy stands.</b> Once the verbal analogy is derived, it is the source of the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those who drank wine as well.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i></b> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>one lacking</b> the requisite <b>vestments</b> itself <b>from</b> the case of <b>those who drank wine?</b> The Gemara responds: Actually, the disqualification of rites performed by one who drank wine is derived from the case of one lacking vestments. And <b>this</b> is what the <i>tanna</i> <b>is saying: From where</b> is it derived <b>that there is no distinction between one lacking</b> the requisite <b>vestments and those who drank wine and one whose hands and feet are not washed,</b> and that all three disqualify all rites? <b>The verses state</b> the word: <b>“Statute,” “statute,”</b> in order <b>to</b> derive <b>a verbal analogy.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the <i>halakha</i> that one who drank wine disqualifies the service is derived from the verbal analogy, <b>why do I</b> need the verse: <b>“That you may put difference</b> between the holy and the common”? The Gemara responds: The verse is necessary <b>in accordance with</b> the custom <b>of Rav, as Rav</b> would <b>not place an interpreter before him,</b> i.e., he would not lecture in public, <b>from</b> the time that he drank wine on <b>one Festival</b> day <b>until</b> the <b>other,</b> the second Festival day, <b>due to drunkenness.</b> Rav was concerned that he would not issue a proper ruling, because it was customary to drink wine on the Festivals, and the verse states: “And that you may put difference between the holy and the common, and between the impure and the pure. And that you may teach the children of Israel all the statutes which the Lord has spoken” (Leviticus 10:10–11), indicating that one who drank wine may not issue a halakhic ruling.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Still,</b> is the disqualification of rites performed by one lacking the requisite vestments <b>derived from here,</b> i.e., from the verse: “And you shall gird them with belts, Aaron and his sons” (Exodus 29:9)? <b>It is derived from there: “And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put</b> fire upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:7). The superfluous term “the priest” serves to indicate that he may serve only <b>in his priestly state.</b> The verse therefore <b>teaches</b> that <b>with regard to a High Priest who wore the vestments of an ordinary priest and performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites, his service is disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> one derived the <i>halakha</i> only <b>from there, I would say: This matter</b> applies only to <b>service that is indispensable for</b> effecting <b>atonement. But service that is not indispensable for</b> effecting <b>atonement,</b> e.g., putting fire upon the altar, is <b>not</b> subject to the <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, the verse (Leviticus 1:7) indicates that the <i>halakha</i> applies even to rites that are not indispensable.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But still,</b> is the <i>halakha</i> <b>derived from here,</b> i.e., from all of the previous sources? <b>It is derived from there: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall lay the pieces,</b> and the head, and the fat, in order upon the wood that is on the fire, which is upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:8). The superfluous term <b>“the priests”</b> serves to indicate that the priests may serve only <b>in their priestly state. From here</b> one derives that <b>with regard to an ordinary priest who wore the vestments of</b> the <b>High Priest and performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites, his service is disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> one derived the <i>halakha</i> only <b>from there, I would say: This matter</b> applies only to <b>a lack</b> of vestments, e.g., a High Priest who wore fewer than his requisite eight vestments, <b>but an excess</b> of vestments, e.g., an ordinary priest who wore more than his requisite four, is <b>not</b> subject to the <i>halakha</i>. This verse therefore <b>teaches us</b> that the <i>halakha</i> applies even to an excess of vestments.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught:</b> If the priest’s vestments <b>were dragging</b> on the ground, or <b>raised up [<i>mesulakin</i>]</b> far from the ground, or <b>frayed, and</b> the priest <b>performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites</b> while wearing them, <b>his service is valid.</b> If <b>he wore two</b> pairs of <b>trousers</b> or <b>two belts,</b> or if he was <b>lacking one</b> of his requisite vestments, or if he wore <b>one extra</b> vestment, <b>or</b> in a case <b>where</b> a priest <b>had a bandage on a wound on his body under his vestment</b> such that the bandage acted as an interposition between the vestments and his skin, <b>or</b> if he wore vestments <b>that were</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>soiled or ripped, and he performed</b> sacrificial <b>rites, his service is disqualified.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says:</b> If the vestments are <b>dragging</b> on the ground, <b>they are fit,</b> but if they are <b>raised up</b> above the ground, <b>they are unfit.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in the above <i>baraita</i> that even if the vestments were <b>raised up they are fit? Rami bar Ḥama says:</b> This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> deems them fit in a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>raised them up by</b> his <b>belt,</b> although they were initially the proper length; <b>there,</b> Shmuel deems them unfit in a case where <b>they do not initially</b> cover the priest’s feet <b>at all.</b>",
            "<b>Rav says:</b> In <b>both this</b> case <b>and that</b> case, whether they were dragging or raised up, <b>they are unfit.</b>",
            "The Gemara recounts: <b>Rav Huna happened</b> to come <b>to Argiza. The son of his innkeeper [<i>oshpizekhaneih</i>] raised a contradiction</b> before <b>him: Did Shmuel</b> actually <b>say</b> that if the vestments are <b>dragging</b> on the ground, <b>they are fit, but</b> if they are <b>raised up</b> above the ground, <b>they are unfit? But isn’t it taught</b> in the <i>baraita</i> that even if the vestments were <b>raised up they are fit?</b> Rav Huna <b>said to him:</b> Raise a contradiction from any source <b>apart from this</b> <i>baraita</i>, <b>as Rami bar Ḥama</b> already <b>answered</b> that <b>it</b> does not contradict Shmuel’s statement, as it applies only to vestments that were initially the proper length.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> pose <b>a difficulty for Rav,</b> who deems the vestments unfit even if they were dragging? <b>And if you would say: What</b> is the meaning of the word: <b>Dragging,</b> in the <i>baraita</i>? It means that they would initially drag but were <b>raised up by a belt</b> to the proper length, <b>and</b> they are fit since the <b>belt</b> effectively <b>trims</b> them, <b>but</b> then the term: <b>Raised up,</b> in the <i>baraita</i> poses <b>a difficulty.</b> Why should the <i>baraita</i> deem raised vestments fit? If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to vestments that were initially the proper length and were then raised up by a belt, then shouldn’t they be unfit as the belt trims them?",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira says: Rav taught</b> the <i>baraita</i> not as referring separately to both dragging and raised vestments, but as <b>one</b> statement referring to vestments that are simultaneously dragging and raised, i.e., <b>dragging</b> vestments <b>that</b> the priest <b>raised up by</b> his <b>belt</b> to the proper height <b>are fit.</b> But if they were above or below their proper height for any reason, they are unfit.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti says:</b> The case of <b>dragging</b> vestments <b>that</b> the priest <b>did not raise is</b> the subject of a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“On the four corners of your garment”</b> (Deuteronomy 22:12), from which it can be inferred: <b>Four, but not three,</b> i.e., a three-cornered garment is exempt from the obligation of ritual fringes. One may ask: <b>Or</b> perhaps <b>it is only</b> specifying <b>four, but not five? When it says</b> in the same verse: <b>“With which you cover yourself,”</b> a garment <b>of five</b> corners <b>is mentioned</b> as obligated. If so, <b>how do I realize</b> the meaning of: <b>“Four</b> corners”? It means <b>four, but not three. And what did you see</b> that led you <b>to include</b> a garment <b>of five</b> corners <b>and to exclude</b> a garment <b>of three</b> corners? <b>I include</b> a garment <b>of five</b> corners <b>as four is included in five, and I exclude</b> a garment <b>of three</b> corners <b>as four is not included in three.</b>",
            "<b>And it is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i> that the verse states: <b>“On the four corners of your garment,”</b> from which it may be inferred: <b>Four, but not three,</b> and also <b>four, but not five,</b> i.e., only a four-cornered garment is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes. Rabbi Yirmeya continues: <b>What, is it not</b> that these <i>tanna’im</i> <b>disagree with regard to this: That</b> one <b>Sage,</b> who deems a five-cornered garment exempt, <b>holds</b> that <b>an extra</b> item <b>is considered as though it exists</b> and cannot be ignored, <b>and</b> one <b>Sage,</b> who deems it obligated, <b>holds</b> that it <b>is considered as though it does not exist</b> and the garment has only four corners? Accordingly, the first Sage deems a dragging priestly vestment unfit, since one cannot ignore the extra fabric, while the second Sage deems it fit since the extra fabric is treated as immaterial.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No, everyone</b> agrees that an extra piece of a garment <b>is considered as though it exists,</b> and therefore dragging vestments are unfit. <b>And</b> according to the <i>tanna</i> of the second <i>baraita</i>, it <b>is different here,</b> with regard to ritual fringes, <b>as the Merciful One amplifies</b> the <i>halakha</i> to obligate even five-cornered garments with the words <b>“with which you cover yourself.”</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> Sage, who deems five-cornered garments exempt, <b>what does he do with this</b> verse: <b>“With which you cover yourself”?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>He requires it for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And it shall be unto you for a fringe, <b>that you may look upon it”</b> (Numbers 15:39). The phrase: “That you may look upon it,” serves to <b>exclude a night garment</b> from the obligation of ritual fringes, as the fringes on such a garment cannot be seen. One might ask: <b>Or is it only</b> to <b>exclude the garment of a blind person,</b> who is unable to see the ritual fringes? <b>When it states</b> in the verse: <b>“With which you cover yourself”</b> (Deuteronomy 22:12), the obligation of ritual fringes for <b>the garment of a blind person is mentioned.</b> If so, <b>how do I realize</b> the meaning of the phrase: <b>“That you may look upon it”?</b> It serves to <b>exclude a night garment.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>And what did you see</b> that led you <b>to include the garment of a blind person and to exclude a night garment</b> and not the reverse? <b>I include the garment of a blind person because it is</b> at least <b>visible to others, and I exclude a night garment because it is not visible,</b> even <b>to others.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> Sage, who derives that a five-cornered garment requires ritual fringes from the phrase: “With which you cover yourself,” from where does he derive that the garment of a blind person requires ritual fringes? The Gemara responds: <b>He derives it from</b> the word <b>“which”</b> in the phrase, as that term itself connotes an amplification of the <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> what does <b>the other</b> Sage do with this word? The Gemara responds: <b>He does not interpret</b> the word <b>“which”</b> as an amplification.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> with regard to the priestly vestments that the term: “Linen [<i>bad</i> ]” (Leviticus 6:3), used in the verse indicates several properties of the garments: The verse states <b>“linen”</b> to indicate <b>that they</b> must <b>be</b> made <b>of fine linen [<i>butz</i>]; “linen,” that they</b> must <b>be new; “linen,” that</b> their thread must <b>be twisted</b> of several plies; <b>“linen,” that their thread</b> must <b>be folded six</b> times; <b>“linen,” that</b> the priest may <b>not wear non-sacred</b> clothes along <b>with them.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Granted,</b> the statement <b>that they</b> must <b>be of fine linen</b> is understood; <b>this</b> requirement <b>teaches us</b> that if they are of <b>fine linen</b> they <b>are</b> fit, but if they are of <b>something else</b> they are <b>not. But</b> with regard to the statement: <b>Linen, that they</b> must <b>be new,</b> one can infer that if they are <b>new</b> they <b>are</b> fit but if they are <b>frayed</b> they are <b>not. But isn’t it taught</b> in the <i>baraita</i> (18a) that even if they were <b>frayed</b> they <b>are fit?</b>",
            "Rav Yosef <b>said to him: And according to your reasoning</b> that the <i>baraita</i> intends to derive all of these requirements from the word linen, such that all of these requirements are indispensable, how can one understand the requirement: <b>Linen, that their thread</b> must <b>be folded six</b> times? The word <b><i>bad</i></b> itself <b>means each one on its own</b> (see Exodus 30:34). <b>Rather, this</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> Those <b>garments with regard to which it is stated: Linen, must be</b> made <b>of fine linen,</b> and they must be <b>new</b> and <b>twisted,</b> and <b>their thread</b> must <b>be folded six</b> times. <b>Some of</b> these requirements constitute <b>a mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i>, and <b>some of them are indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where</b> is it known <b>that this</b> material <b><i>bad</i> is</b> produced from the <b>flax</b> plant? <b>Rabbi Yosef, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says:</b> The verse is referring to <b>an item that grows from the ground</b> with <b>each</b> stalk growing <b>on its own [<i>bad bevad</i>],</b> i.e., it does not split into multiple stalks. The flax plant fulfills this criterion.",
            "The Gemara asks: Why not <b>say</b> that it is <b>wool?</b> The Gemara responds: The individual <b>wool</b> fibers <b>split</b> into smaller fibers. The Gemara rejects this: But <b>flax also splits.</b> The Gemara responds: <b>It splits</b> only <b>by being struck.</b> Wool, by contrast, splits naturally.",
            "<b>Ravina says</b> that the identity of <i>bad</i> is derived <b>from here:</b> The verse states with regard to the priestly vestments: <b>“They shall have linen [<i>pishtim</i>] crowns upon their heads, and shall have linen breeches upon their loins; they shall not gird themselves with <i>yaza</i>”</b> (Ezekiel 44:18). The word <i>pishtim</i> is clearly referring to flax.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said to Ravina: But before Ezekiel came, from where did we</b> derive the identity of <i>bad</i>? Ravina responded: <b>And according to your reasoning,</b> one could ask the same of <b>that which Rav Ḥisda said</b> with regard to the prohibition against Temple service by one who is uncircumcised or an apostate: <b>We did not learn this</b> following <b>matter from the Torah of Moses, our teacher; we learned</b> it <b>from the words of Ezekiel, son of Buzi: “No stranger, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My Sanctuary to serve Me”</b> (Ezekiel 44:9). <b>Until Ezekiel came, from where did we</b> derive this? <b>Rather,</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>is learned as a tradition</b> and therefore was observed for generations, <b>and Ezekiel came and gave it support by</b> writing <b>a verse. Here too, it is learned as a tradition,</b> and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the meaning of the phrase in the verse: <b>“They shall not gird themselves with <i>yaza</i>”? Abaye said: They shall not gird themselves in a place</b> in <b>which</b> people <b>sweat [<i>mezi’in</i>]. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>When they gird</b> themselves with the belt, <b>they may not gird</b> themselves <b>below their loins nor above their elbows,</b> but <b>rather</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>at the level of their elbows.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ashi says: Huna bar Natan said to me: Once, I was standing before Izgadar, king</b> of Persia, <b>and my belt was raised</b> above its appropriate height, <b>and he lowered it</b> into place <b>and said to me: “A kingdom of priests, and a holy nation”</b> (Exodus 19:6), <b>is written about you;</b> therefore, you should always look dignified. <b>When I came before Ameimar</b> and recounted this incident, <b>he said to me: With regard to you,</b> God’s promise to Israel: <b>“And kings shall be your foster fathers”</b> (Isaiah 49:23), <b>was fulfilled.</b>",
            "§ With regard to the priestly vestments, <b>we learned</b> in a mishna <b>elsewhere</b> (<i>Eiruvin</i> 103b): <b>A priest who was injured on his finger</b> on Shabbat may temporarily <b>wrap it with a reed</b> so that his wound is not visible while he is serving in the Temple. This leniency applies <b>in the Temple, but not in</b> the rest of <b>the country,</b> as the reed also heals the wound, and medical treatment is prohibited on Shabbat by rabbinic decree. <b>But if</b> his intention is <b>to draw blood from</b> the wound, <b>it is prohibited</b> both <b>here and there.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: They taught only</b> that <b>a reed</b> is permitted. <b>But a small sash [<i>tziltzul</i>]</b> as a bandage <b>is</b> considered <b>an extra garment</b> and is therefore forbidden, since it is prohibited for a priest to add to the priestly vestments prescribed by the Torah. <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They said</b> that wearing <b>extra garments</b> is prohibited <b>only</b> if the extra garment is worn <b>in a place</b> on the priest’s body where the requisite <b>vestments</b> are worn. <b>But</b> if the sash is <b>in a place</b> on his body where the <b>vestments</b> are <b>not</b> worn, e.g., on his hand, it <b>is not</b> considered <b>an extra</b> garment.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And let</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>derive</b> that a sash is prohibited <b>because</b> it acts as <b>an interposition</b> between the priest’s hand and the sacred vessel he grips, which disqualifies the service. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to a case where the wound is <b>on</b> the priest’s <b>left</b> hand. Since the entire service is performed exclusively with his right hand, a bandage on his left hand is not an interposition. <b>Alternatively,</b> the wound is on the priest’s right hand, but <b>not in a place</b> used for the <b>service,</b> such that the bandage does not interpose between his hand and the sacred vessel.",
            "<b>And</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>disagrees</b> with the opinion <b>of Rava, as Rava says</b> that <b>Rav Ḥisda says: In a place</b> on the priest’s body where the <b>vestments</b> are worn, <b>even one</b> extra <b>thread interposes</b> and is prohibited, whereas <b>in a place</b> on his body where the <b>vestments</b> are <b>not</b> worn, if the fabric is <b>three</b> fingerbreadths <b>by three</b> fingerbreadths <b>it interposes,</b> but if it is <b>less than that it does not interpose.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: Rava <b>certainly disagrees with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> who holds that fabric of any size that is in a place on his body where the vestments are not worn is not considered an interposition. <b>Shall we say</b> that <b>he</b> also <b>disagrees with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya,</b> who deems any sash an interposition, even one smaller than three by three fingerbreadths?",
            "The Gemara responds: Even according to Rava, <b>a small sash is different, as it is significant,</b> and it is therefore considered a garment even if it is less than three by three fingerbreadths.",
            "<b>Some say</b> that there is <b>another version</b> of the dispute: <b>Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says</b> that <b>they taught only</b> that <b>a reed</b> is permitted, <b>but a small sash interposes. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They said</b> that an item acts as <b>an interposition when</b> it is <b>less than three by three</b> fingerbreadths <b>only in a place</b> on the priest’s body where the <b>vestments</b> are worn. <b>But in a place</b> on his body where the <b>vestments</b> are <b>not</b> worn, the following distinction applies: If the fabric is <b>three</b> fingerbreadths <b>by three</b> fingerbreadths, <b>it interposes,</b> but if it is <b>less than this, it does not interpose. And this is</b> the same ruling <b>that Rava</b> says that <b>Rav Ḥisda says.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that Rava <b>disagrees with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya,</b> who deems any sash an interposition, even one smaller than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths. The Gemara rejects this: This is not necessarily so, as <b>a small sash is different, since it is significant.</b> It is therefore like a vestment, even if it is smaller than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths.",
            "The Gemara raises a question: <b>And according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan, why</b> does the mishna teach the <i>halakha</i> <b>specifically</b> with regard to <b>a reed? Let</b> the mishna <b>teach us</b> that a priest may wrap his wounded finger with <b>a small sash,</b> since this would teach the greater novelty that although a sash is significant, it does not constitute an interposition. The Gemara responds: <b>It teaches us a matter in passing, that a reed heals.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rava raises a dilemma:</b> If a gust of <b>wind entered</b> the priest’s <b>vestment,</b> raising it slightly off his body, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Do <b>we require</b> that the vestment be: <b>“Upon his body”</b> (Leviticus 6:3), in a literal sense, <b>and this</b> is <b>not</b> the case when the wind raises his vestment? <b>Or perhaps</b> the service is valid because <b>this</b> is the normal <b>manner of wearing</b> clothes.",
            "Furthermore, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a louse</b> found under the priest’s vestments? <b>Does it interpose</b> between the vestments and his body, disqualifying the service?",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>Do not raise a dilemma</b> with regard to <b>a dead</b> louse, <b>as</b> it <b>certainly interposes,</b> like any other item. Rather, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a live</b> louse? <b>Do we say</b> that <b>since it comes and goes,</b> i.e., it moves around on his body, <b>it is</b> like <b>a growth and does not interpose? Or perhaps, since he objects to its</b> presence, <b>it interposes?</b>",
            "Furthermore, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>dirt</b> found under the priest’s vestments? <b>Does it interpose?</b> The Gemara objects: But <b>dirt certainly interposes.</b> The Gemara clarifies: <b>Rather,</b> the question is: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>dust of dirt,</b> i.e., a minute amount of dust?",
            "Furthermore, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the gap between the underarm of the vestment and the priest’s <b>armpit? Does it interpose?</b> Do <b>we require</b> that the vestment is <b>“upon his body”</b> in a literal sense, <b>and this</b> is <b>not</b> the case? <b>Or perhaps</b> the service is valid since <b>this</b> is the normal <b>manner of wearing</b> clothes.",
            "Furthermore, if the priest <b>inserted his hand into</b> his vestments and touched <b>his chest, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Does his body interpose or not?</b>",
            "Furthermore, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a thread [<i>nima</i>]? Does it interpose?</b> The Gemara interjects: But <b>a thread certainly interposes. Rather,</b> the question is: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a thread</b> that <b>hangs</b> off the vestment itself and will soon fall off? Is such a thread considered as though it has already detached from the vestment, in which case it interposes?",
            "<b>Mar bar Rav Ashi raises a dilemma:</b> If <b>his hair emerged</b> from his head and extended <b>into his vestment</b> and separated it from his skin, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Is his hair considered like his body,</b> in which case it does not interpose, <b>or is it not considered like his body?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>phylacteries? Do they interpose?</b> The Gemara clarifies: <b>According to</b> the opinion <b>of one who says</b> that <b>night is not</b> an appropriate <b>time</b> to don <b>phylacteries, do not raise the dilemma. Since they interpose</b> at <b>night, they also interpose</b> during the <b>day.</b> Rather, <b>when you raise the dilemma,</b> do so <b>according to the one who says</b> that <b>night is</b> an appropriate <b>time</b> to don <b>phylacteries.</b> According to this opinion, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Does a mitzva</b> that one fulfills <b>with his body interpose, or does it not interpose?</b>",
            "This <b>matter circulated and</b> eventually <b>came before Rabbi Ami,</b> who <b>said to him: It is a settled tradition in our possession</b> that <b>phylacteries interpose.</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Priests in their service; and Levites on their platform</b> in the Temple, where they recite songs; <b>and Israelites at their watches,</b> where they observe the sacrifice of the daily offering, <b>are</b> all <b>exempt from prayer and from</b> donning <b>phylacteries. What, is it not</b> that the term: Exempt, indicates that <b>if they donned</b> phylacteries anyway, <b>they do not interpose?</b> Apparently, priests may wear phylacteries while performing the Temple service. The Gemara responds: <b>No, if they donned</b> phylacteries, <b>they interpose.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> why does the <i>baraita</i> use the word: <b>Exempt? It should have</b> used the word: <b>Prohibited,</b> since wearing phylacteries disqualifies the priests’ service. The Gemara responds: <b>Since there are</b> also <b>Levites and Israelites</b> mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, <b>concerning whom</b> the <i>baraita</i> could <b>not teach</b> the word: <b>Prohibited,</b> as it is permitted for them to don phylacteries, <b>due to that</b> reason the <i>baraita</i> <b>taught</b> the word: <b>Exempt,</b> which is applicable to all.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>If</b> a priest <b>donned</b> phylacteries <b>they do not interpose?</b> The Gemara responds: That is <b>not difficult. This</b> <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that phylacteries interpose is referring to the phylacteries <b>of the hand,</b> whereas <b>that</b> <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that they do not is referring to the phylacteries <b>of the head.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about the phylacteries <b>of the hand</b> that only they interpose? The verse indicates the difference, <b>as it is written</b> with regard to the vestments covering the body: <b>“Shall he put upon his body”</b> (Leviticus 6:3), indicating <b>that nothing may interpose between</b> the vestment <b>and his body.</b> The Gemara challenges: But there is <b>also</b> a verse <b>written with regard to the head: “And you shall set the mitre upon his head”</b> (Exodus 29:6), indicating that there must be no interposition between the mitre and the head. If so, the phylacteries of the head should be considered an interposition as well.",
            "The Gemara responds: The Sages <b>taught: The hair of</b> the High Priest <b>was visible between the frontplate and the mitre.</b> The frontplate was set on the forehead, below the hairline, while the mitre was set above it;"
        ],
        [
            "it was <b>there that</b> the High Priests would <b>don</b> their <b>phylacteries.</b> Consequently, the phylacteries of the head did not interpose between the mitre and the priest’s head.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that rites performed by <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering to complete the purification process are disqualified. The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? <b>Rav Huna says: The verse states</b> with regard to the offering brought by a woman who has given birth: <b>“And the priest shall make atonement for her, and she shall be pure”</b> (Leviticus 12:8). Since the verse states: “And <b>she shall be pure,”</b> one learns <b>by inference that she is ritually impure</b> to some extent until she brings her offering, even though she has already immersed. Anyone who has not yet brought an atonement offering is likewise impure to some extent, and rites performed by one who is impure are disqualified (see 17a).",
            "§ The mishna teaches that rites performed by <b>one whose hands and feet are not washed</b> are disqualified. The Gemara explains: This <i>halakha</i> <b>is derived</b> by verbal analogy between <b>“statute”</b> mentioned in this context and <b>“statute” from</b> the case of <b>one lacking</b> the requisite <b>vestments,</b> whose rites are disqualified (see 17b).",
            "<b>The Sages taught:</b> With regard to <b>a High Priest who did not immerse or did not sanctify</b> his hands and feet during the Yom Kippur service <b>between</b> donning the golden <b>garments and</b> the white linen <b>garments, or between</b> performance of one <b>rite and</b> another <b>rite, and he performed</b> the <b>service</b> in this state, <b>his service is valid</b> after the fact. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>either a High Priest or an ordinary priest who did not sanctify his hands and feet</b> at all in the <b>morning and performed</b> the <b>service, his service is disqualified.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Now,</b> there are <b>five immersions and ten sanctifications</b> of the hands and feet during the Yom Kippur service <b>by Torah law, and</b> the word: <b>“Statute”</b> (Leviticus 16:34), <b>is written with regard to them.</b> Accordingly, <b>they should be indispensable</b> and should disqualify the service if not performed.",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> After stipulating that the High Priest must wear the requisite vestments before performing the Yom Kippur service, <b>the verse states: “And put them on”</b> (Leviticus 16:4). This superfluous term serves to indicate that <b>wearing</b> the requisite vestments <b>is indispensable, but nothing else is indispensable.</b>",
            "Rav Asi’s <b>face lit up</b> with joy after hearing this response. Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him: I have</b> merely <b>written</b> the letter <b><i>vav</i> on a piece of wood for you,</b> i.e., I have not given you a satisfactory answer. As, <b>if that is so,</b> that only the wearing of the vestments is indispensable, then failure to sanctify the hands and feet <b>in the morning</b> should <b>also</b> not disqualify the service, yet according to the <i>baraita</i> it disqualifies the service.",
            "<b>Ḥizkiyya says</b> there is an alternative answer: <b>The verse states</b> with regard to sanctification of the hands and feet: <b>“And it shall be a statute forever to them, even to him and to his seed throughout their generations”</b> (Exodus 30:21). From the comparison of Aaron to his children one may derive that <b>anything that is indispensable with regard to his seed,</b> the priests, <b>is indispensable with regard to him,</b> the High Priest during the Yom Kippur service, which only he may perform. But <b>anything that is not indispensable with regard to his seed is not indispensable with regard to him.</b> Therefore, the sanctification of the hands and feet between each rite, which is unnecessary for priests during the daily service, does not disqualify the High Priest’s Yom Kippur service if not done.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yonatan says:</b> The principle is derived <b>from here:</b> The verse states with regard to the Basin in the Temple: <b>“That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet from it”</b> (Exodus 40:31). One may derive from the verse that <b>anything that is indispensable with regard to his sons is indispensable with regard to him.</b> But <b>anything that is not indispensable with regard to his sons is not indispensable with regard to him.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> that <b>Rabbi Yonatan did not say</b> to derive this <b>from</b> the verse cited <b>by Ḥizkiyya?</b> The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yonatan could have <b>said to you: That</b> verse cited by Ḥizkiyya <b>is written</b> to teach that the <i>halakha</i> applies even <b>for</b> future <b>generations,</b> not to draw a parallel between the High Priest and ordinary priests.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> Sage, Ḥizkiyya, <b>what is the reason</b> that <b>he did not say</b> to derive the <i>halakha</i> <b>from that</b> verse cited by Rabbi Yonatan? The Gemara responds: <b>He requires</b> that verse <b>for</b> the <i>halakha</i> taught <b>by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> circumstance in <b>which</b> the <b>Basin does not contain enough</b> water <b>for four priests to sanctify</b> their hands and feet <b>from it,</b> the priests <b>may not sanctify</b> their hands and feet <b>with it, as it is stated: “That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash</b> their hands and their feet <b>from it.”</b> Moses, Aaron, and Aaron’s two sons total four.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of sanctification</b> of the hands and feet performed? The priest <b>lays his right hand on top of his right foot, and his left hand on top of his left foot, and sanctifies</b> them with the water flowing from the Basin. <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He lays both his hands one on top of the other, and</b> lays them together <b>on top of both his feet,</b> themselves laid <b>one on top of the other, and sanctifies</b> them. <b>They said to him: You have gone too far; it is impossible to do so.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>They speak well to him;</b> it seems impossible to assume such a position without losing one’s balance. <b>Rav Yosef says:</b> Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, meant that the priest would assume the position <b>while another</b> priest would <b>help him</b> maintain his balance.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the difference <b>between</b> the reasoning of the Sages and that of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? <b>Abaye says:</b> The difference <b>between them is</b> their opinion with regard to <b>standing</b> with support <b>from the side.</b> According to the Sages, this is not considered standing and the priest may not sanctify his hands and feet while in such a position.",
            "<b>Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina: And let him sit and sanctify</b> his hands and feet while seated, and in this manner he may sanctify them all at once. Ravina said to him: <b>The verse states:</b> “When they go into the Tent of Meeting, they shall wash with water, that they not die; or when they come near to the altar <b>to minister”</b> (Exodus 30:20), <b>and ministration is</b> performed while <b>standing,</b> as the verse states: “To stand to minister” (Deuteronomy 18:5). Therefore, sanctification must also be performed while standing.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught:</b> If a priest <b>sanctified his hands and feet during the day, he does not need to sanctify</b> them that <b>night,</b> but if he sanctified them <b>at night, he must sanctify</b> them <b>during the</b> following <b>day.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>as Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>would say:</b> The disqualification of being <b>left overnight is determinative with regard to sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet,</b> like any sacrificial item that is sanctified. Accordingly, once night has passed, the priest must sanctify them again. <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says:</b> The disqualification of being <b>left overnight is not determinative with regard to sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet.</b> Therefore, as long as the priest continues to serve, he need not sanctify them again.",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: If the priest <b>was standing and sacrificing</b> offerings <b>on top of the altar all night, in the morning he requires sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet</b> again. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Once he sanctified his hands and feet at the beginning of</b> the <b>service, even</b> if he continues to perform rites <b>for the next ten days, he does not need to sanctify</b> them again.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> both of the above <i>baraitot</i> are <b>necessary,</b> though they seem to present the same dispute. <b>As, if it had taught us</b> only <b>the first</b> <i>baraita</i>, one might have thought that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>stated</b> his opinion only <b>with regard to that</b> case, <b>as</b> there the priest <b>paused between</b> one <b>rite and</b> another <b>rite. But in this</b> case, i.e., the second <i>baraita</i>, <b>where he did not pause</b> between rites, <b>say</b> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>concedes to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,</b> that the priest need not sanctify his hands and feet again. <b>And</b> conversely, <b>if it had taught us</b> only <b>with regard to that</b> case, i.e., the second <i>baraita</i>, one might have thought: <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, stated</b> his opinion only <b>in that</b> case. <b>But in this</b> case, <b>say</b> that <b>he concedes to Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. Therefore, both <i>baraitot</i> are <b>necessary.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reasoning of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi? <b>As it is written:</b> The priests must sanctify their hands and feet: <b>“When they come near</b> to the altar to minister” (Exodus 30:20), i.e., when they begin the service in the morning. And <b>what is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written</b> in the same verse: <b>“When they go into</b> the Tent of Meeting,” indicating that one sanctification suffices for the duration of a priest’s service in the Tent of Meeting.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> according to <b>the other</b> Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, <b>as well, isn’t it written: “When they go into</b> the Tent of Meeting”? How does he interpret this term? The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> only <b>“when they come near” had been written, and “when they go into” had not been written, I would say</b> that the priest must sanctify his hands and feet <b>for each and every approach,</b> i.e., every rite. Therefore <b>the Merciful One wrote: “When they go into,”</b> to indicate that it is necessary only once a day.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> according to <b>the other</b> Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, <b>as well, isn’t it written: “When they come near”?</b> How does he interpret this term? The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> only <b>“when they go into” had been written, and “when they come near” had not been written, I would say</b> that <b>even for an entrance with no purpose,</b> i.e., where the priest has no intention of performing rites, he must sanctify his hands and feet. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote: “When they come near.”",
            "The Gemara rejects this: How could one have thought that the priest must sanctify his hands and feet <b>for an entrance with no purpose? Isn’t is written</b> in the same verse: <b>“To minister”? Rather,</b> according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, <b>“when they come near” is necessary for</b> the <i>halakha</i> taught <b>by Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov. As Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: All concede with regard to the second sanctification</b> performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur after each immersion that he must <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet <b>while he is dressed</b> in the priestly vestments, <b>as the verse states: “Or when they come near</b> to the altar to minister.” The verse indicates that <b>one who is lacking only to come near</b> to the altar, i.e., one who is in all other ways prepared for the service, may perform this sanctification. <b>Excluded is this</b> one, <b>who is lacking</b> both <b>dressing and coming near.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need the continuation of the verse: <b>“To cause an offering by fire to smoke”?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Lest you say</b> that <b>this matter,</b> sanctification of the hands and feet, applies only to <b>a rite that is indispensable</b> for effecting <b>atonement,</b> e.g., sprinkling the blood on the altar; <b>but a rite that is not indispensable</b> for effecting <b>atonement,</b> e.g., placing the fats and sacrificial portions of the offering on the altar, does <b>not</b> require prior sanctification of the hands and feet, therefore this verse <b>teaches us</b> that even such rites require sanctification of the hands and feet.",
            "§ <b>When Rav Dimi came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Ilfa raises a dilemma: According to the statement of</b> Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, <b>who says</b> that the disqualification of being <b>left overnight is not determinative with regard to sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>the water</b> in the <b>Basin? Is it disqualified</b> by being left overnight? <b>Do we say: For what</b> purpose is <b>this</b> water? It is <b>for the sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet,</b> and since <b>sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet itself is not disqualified</b> by being <b>left overnight,</b> the <i>halakha</i> should be the same concerning the water. <b>Or perhaps, since</b> the water <b>is sanctified in a service vessel,</b> i.e., the Basin, <b>it is disqualified</b> by being left overnight, like all other items sanctified in service vessels.",
            "<b>When Ravin came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: <b>Rabbi Yirmeya says</b> that <b>Rabbi Ami says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Ilfa then resolved</b> the dilemma: Just <b>as</b> there is <b>a dispute</b> between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, <b>with regard to that</b> issue, i.e., whether sanctification of the hands and feet is disqualified overnight, <b>so</b> too there is <b>a dispute</b> between the two <b>with regard to this</b> issue, i.e., the water in the Basin. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that the water is not disqualified by being left overnight.",
            "Ravin continued: <b>Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna said before</b> Rabbi Yirmeya: <b>My teacher,</b> do <b>you say so? But this</b> is what <b>Rabbi Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Ilfa:</b> With regard to <b>a Basin that they did not sink</b> into its pit <b>at night,</b> which would have prevented the water from being disqualified by being left overnight, a priest <b>sanctifies</b> his hands and feet <b>from it for the service of</b> that <b>night, and the next day he does not sanctify</b> his hands and feet from it.",
            "<b>And we discussed it:</b> When Ilfa said that <b>the next day he does not sanctify</b> his hands and feet from it, did he mean <b>that he does not require sanctification</b> the next day, since sanctification is not disqualified overnight? <b>Or perhaps</b> Ilfa meant that it is prohibited to sanctify one’s hands and feet from the Basin since the water <b>was disqualified by</b> being <b>left overnight? And</b> Rabbi Asi <b>did not resolve</b> the issue <b>for us. But</b> you, <b>Master, are resolving</b> the issue by claiming that Ilfa ruled explicitly with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.",
            "The Gemara attempts to resolve the issue: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 37a): The High Priest <b>ben Katin made twelve spigots for the Basin</b> so that several priests could sanctify their hands and feet at once. <b>He also made a mechanism [<i>mukhani</i>] for</b> sinking <b>the Basin</b> into water during the night so <b>that its water would not be disqualified by</b> being <b>left overnight. What, is it not</b> that this mishna <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?</b> If so, he holds that water of the Basin is disqualified by being left overnight. The Gemara responds: <b>No, it is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But from</b> the fact <b>that the first clause</b> of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,</b> one should infer that <b>the latter clause is also</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>As the first clause teaches</b> (<i>Yoma</i> 35b): At one point during the Yom Kippur service, the High Priest would <b>come</b> and stand <b>next to his bull, and</b> his <b>bull was standing between the Entrance Hall and the altar</b> with <b>its head to the south and its face to the west. And the priest stands to the east</b> of the bull, <b>and his face</b> points <b>to the west.</b> This is where he would slaughter the bull. <b>Whom have you heard who says</b> that <b>between the Entrance Hall and the altar</b> is considered part of the <b>north</b> of the courtyard, where it is permitted to slaughter offerings of the most sacred order? It is <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>What is</b> the <b>north?</b> It is the area <b>from the northern wall of the altar until the northern wall of the Temple courtyard. And opposite the entire altar</b> is considered the <b>north;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, adds even</b> the area <b>between the Entrance Hall and the altar</b> to the area that is considered north. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>adds even</b> the areas to the north in <b>the place where the priests walk, and</b> the areas to the north in <b>the place where the Israelites walk. But all concede that</b> the area <b>from</b> the Chamber of <b>the Knives [<i>haḥalifot</i>] and inward,</b> which is an area to the side, is <b>unfit</b> for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, as it is not visible from the altar.",
            "The Gemara rejects the proof: <b>And</b> must <b>you understand</b> that the first clause of the mishna <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and not</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi? <b>Now,</b> does <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>add</b> only <b>to</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,</b> but <b>not add to</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?</b> The area deemed north according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is included in the area deemed north by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Accordingly, since the first clause of the mishna can also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, perhaps the mishna offers no proof at all with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.",
            "The Gemara reformulates its suggestion: <b>This is what we are saying: If it enters your mind</b> to say that the mishna <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, then <b>let him stand</b> the bull <b>in the place where the priests walk and in the place where the Israelites walk,</b> since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that those areas are also considered north. Why is the bull placed specifically between the Entrance Hall and the altar?",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>Rather, what</b> shall you say? Will you say that the mishna <b>is</b> only in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?</b> But if so, <b>let him stand</b> the bull anywhere <b>from the north wall of the altar to the north wall of the Temple courtyard,</b> as everyone agrees that this area is considered north. <b>Rather, what have you to say</b> to explain why the bull is positioned specifically between the Entrance Hall and the altar? It is <b>due to the weakness of</b> the <b>High Priest,</b> so that he need not exert himself and walk long distances on Yom Kippur. <b>Here too,</b> the mishna may be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and <b>due to the weakness of</b> the <b>High Priest</b> the bull is positioned there.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If a priest <b>sanctified his hands and feet</b> in preparation <b>for the removal of the ashes,</b> the first service performed every day in the Temple, which was performed before dawn, then <b>the next day,</b> i.e., after dawn, <b>he does not need to sanctify</b> them again, <b>as he already sanctified</b> them <b>at the beginning of</b> the day’s <b>service.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>In accordance with whose</b> opinion is this statement? <b>If</b> it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>doesn’t he say</b> that being <b>left overnight disqualifies</b> sanctification of the hands and feet? If so, one should be required to sanctify them again after dawn. And <b>if</b> it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say</b> that if the priest sanctified his hands and feet at the beginning of the service, <b>he does not need to sanctify</b> them again <b>even</b> if he continues to perform rites <b>for the next ten days?</b> Why, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan state only that one who sanctified his hands and feet before the removal of the ashes is not required to do so after dawn?",
            "<b>Abaye says: Actually,</b> the statement is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>and</b> the disqualification of sanctification of the hands and feet by being <b>left overnight is by rabbinic law. And</b> although the Sages mandate that a priest must sanctify his hands and feet every morning, <b>they concede that</b> during the period <b>from the rooster’s crow</b> before dawn <b>until morning,</b> being <b>left overnight does not disqualify</b> his sanctification. Therefore, one who sanctifies his hands and feet at the rooster’s crow may continue to perform rites after dawn.",
            "<b>Rava says: Actually,</b> the statement <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yoḥanan saw the statement of</b> Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as correct <b>with regard to the beginning of</b> the <b>service,</b> i.e., that a priest may serve during the day on the strength of sanctification performed before dawn. <b>But</b> he did <b>not</b> agree <b>with regard to the end of</b> the <b>service.</b> Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if a priest sanctified his hands and feet before participating in the day’s final rites, he must sanctify them again the next morning. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, one who sanctified his hands and feet before sunrise must do so again afterward.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 28b) that describes the daily service: <b>His priestly brethren,</b> members of the patrilineal family, <b>saw that</b> the priest who removed the ashes <b>descended</b> from the altar with the coal pan in his hands, <b>and they ran and arrived</b> at the Basin. <b>They hurried and sanctified their hands and their feet</b> with water <b>from the Basin.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "Assuming that these priests had all been serving in the Temple through the night, one can ask: <b>Granted, according to Abaye, who interprets</b> the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>and Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>concedes that</b> during the period <b>from the rooster’s crow</b> before dawn <b>until morning,</b> being <b>left overnight does not disqualify</b> sanctification, in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that although they served through the night, the previous day’s sanctification was disqualified and they must sanctify their hands and feet again in the morning, but they may do so before dawn.",
            "<b>But according to Rava, who interprets</b> the statement <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, but</b> who holds that <b>according to Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, during the period <b>from the rooster’s crow until morning</b> being <b>left overnight disqualifies</b> sanctification, in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? <b>If</b> it is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, then the priests’ sanctification described therein is useless, since being <b>left overnight disqualifies</b> it at dawn. And <b>if</b> it is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say</b> that <b>even</b> if the priest continues to perform rites <b>for the next ten days, he does not need to sanctify</b> his hands and feet again? If so, since the priests were serving throughout the night, they should not require sanctification.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Actually,</b> the mishna is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and here we are dealing with new priests,</b> who did not serve in the Temple that night. Since they are beginning their service now, they must sanctify their hands and feet.",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>leaving</b> the Temple? Is it <b>effective to</b> disqualify <b>sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet</b> such that the priest must sanctify them again when he reenters the Temple? The Gemara elaborates: <b>If you say</b> that being <b>left overnight does not disqualify</b> it, perhaps that is only <b>because he does not separate</b> from the Temple; <b>but</b> when <b>leaving</b> the Temple, <b>where</b> the priest <b>separates</b> from the Temple, it is possible that the priest <b>becomes distracted</b> from the service. If so, he must sanctify his hands and feet again. <b>Or perhaps, since it is in his power to return</b> to the Temple at any point, <b>he does not become distracted,</b> in which case he does not need to sanctify them again.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest <b>sanctified his hands and feet and</b> his hands then <b>became impure, he may immerse them</b> to purify them, <b>and he does not need to sanctify</b> them again. If he sanctified his hands and <b>they</b> then <b>left</b> the Temple, <b>they retain their sanctity.</b> Apparently, leaving the Temple does not disqualify sanctification.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>We do not raise the dilemma</b> with regard to a case where only <b>his hands left</b> the Temple. In such a case, he certainly does not need to sanctify them again. <b>When we raise the dilemma,</b> it is with regard to a case where <b>his entire body left</b> the Temple; <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case?",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One whose hands and feet are not washed</b> must <b>sanctify</b> them <b>with a service vessel inside</b> the Temple. If he <b>sanctified</b> them <b>with a service vessel outside</b> the Temple, <b>or with a non-sacred vessel inside, or</b> if <b>he immersed in cave water and performed</b> the <b>service, his service is disqualified.</b> The Gemara infers: <b>The reason</b> his service is disqualified is <b>that he sanctified</b> his hands and feet <b>with a service vessel outside, but</b> if he <b>sanctified</b> them <b>inside and</b> then <b>left, his service is valid.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps</b> one can say: <b>What are the circumstances</b> of the case where one <b>sanctified</b> them <b>with a service vessel outside?</b> It is a case <b>where he removed</b> only <b>his hands</b> and placed them <b>outside</b> the Temple <b>and sanctified</b> them there. <b>Consequently,</b> one can infer only that if <b>he sanctified</b> them <b>inside and</b> then <b>left,</b> i.e., specifically <b>where he removed</b> only <b>his hand</b> and placed it <b>outside,</b> his service is <b>valid. But</b> with regard to a case where <b>his entire body left</b> the Temple, <b>you should raise the dilemma.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Zevid said to Rav Pappa: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from another <i>baraita</i>: In a case where a priest <b>left the boundary of the wall of the Temple courtyard, if</b> he left long enough <b>to remain</b> there for a time, <b>he requires immersion. If</b> he left only <b>for a moment, he requires sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet.</b> Apparently, one who leaves even for a brief time requires sanctification.",
            "Rav Pappa <b>said to him: Here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>left</b> the Temple <b>to cover his legs,</b> a euphemism for defecating, <b>or to urinate.</b> It is only for this reason that he must sanctify his hands and feet when reentering the Temple.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> the mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 28a) already <b>teaches it explicitly: Anyone who covers his legs requires immersion</b> afterward; <b>and anyone who urinates requires sanctification of</b> the <b>hands and feet</b> with water from the Basin afterward. The Gemara responds: The redundancy is not difficult. The <i>tanna</i> <b>teaches</b> the principle <b>and then explains</b> it again.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the following dispute: With regard to the priest who performs the service of the red <b>heifer,</b> which takes place outside the Temple, <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says:</b> In preparation, he must <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet <b>with a service vessel inside</b> the Temple, as he must before any other service, <b>and</b> afterward he <b>leaves</b> the Temple to perform the service. <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> He may sanctify his hands <b>even outside</b> of the Temple, <b>and even with a non-sacred vessel, and even with an earthenware bowl [<i>bimkeida</i>].</b> Apparently, leaving the Temple does not disqualify sanctification of the hands and feet.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said:</b> The rite of the red <b>heifer is different, since all of its acts are</b> performed <b>outside</b> the Temple, unlike other rites. Therefore, <b>leaving</b> the Temple <b>does not disqualify</b> sanctification of the hands and feet <b>with regard to it.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>If so, why do I</b> require <b>that</b> the priest <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet at all for the service of the red heifer? The Gemara responds: The service of the red heifer must be <b>similar to</b> the <b>service</b> of offerings performed <b>inside</b> the Temple.",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest who contracts <b>ritual impurity</b> during the service? Is this <b>effective to</b> disqualify the <b>sanctification of</b> his <b>hands and feet</b> such that he must sanctify them again when he becomes pure? <b>If you say</b> that <b>leaving</b> the Temple <b>does not disqualify</b> sanctification, perhaps this is <b>because the person</b> remains <b>fit</b> to serve; <b>but here, where the person is unfit</b> for service, perhaps <b>he becomes distracted. Or perhaps, since he</b> will become <b>fit again</b> when he becomes pure, <b>he takes care not to become distracted.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest <b>sanctified his hands and feet and they became impure, he</b> may <b>immerse them, and he does not need to sanctify</b> them again.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>We do not raise the dilemma</b> with regard to a case where only <b>his hands became impure. When we raise the dilemma</b> it is with regard to a case where <b>his entire body became impure.</b> The Gemara challenges: But if <b>his entire body</b> contracted impurity, <b>let me derive</b> that the sanctification is disqualified <b>since he needs to allow the sun to set</b> in order to become pure after immersing, and <b>he</b> certainly <b>becomes distracted</b> in the interim. The Gemara responds: The dilemma concerns a case <b>where he became impure adjacent to sunset,</b> so that he does not need to wait long after immersing and will not become distracted.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the following dispute: With regard to the priest who performs the rite of the red <b>heifer, Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Yosef, says:</b> He must <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet <b>with a service vessel inside</b> the Temple, <b>and</b> afterward he <b>leaves</b> the Temple to perform the service. <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> He may sanctify his hands <b>even outside</b> of the Temple, <b>and even with a non-sacred vessel, and even with an earthenware bowl.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>And</b> in preparation for the rite of the red <b>heifer, we</b> intentionally <b>impart impurity to</b> the priest after he has already sanctified his hands and feet, <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:7): <b>They would render the priest who burns the heifer ritually impure and immerse him</b> immediately, <b>to remove</b> a misconception <b>from the hearts of</b> the <b>Sadducees</b> by means of a public display of disregard for their ruling. <b>As</b> the Sadducees <b>would say:</b> Only <b>by those for whom the sun set was</b> the heifer ritual <b>performed.</b> The Sadducees believed that it is prohibited for an impure priest who immersed that day to burn the red heifer until sunset, when the purification process is completed. The Gemara concludes: Since this impurity does not disqualify the sanctification of his hands and feet, <b>learn from it</b> that <b>impurity does not disqualify</b> sanctification of the hands and feet in general.",
            "The Gemara responds: The service of the <b>heifer is different, as one who immersed that day is not unfit for</b> performing <b>it,</b> unlike any other rite. Likewise, impurity does not disqualify the sanctification of hands and feet preceding the service of the heifer. The Gemara asks: <b>If so, why do I</b> require <b>that</b> the priest <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet at all for the service of the red heifer? The Gemara responds: <b>We require</b> that the service of the red heifer be <b>similar to</b> the <b>service</b> of offerings performed inside the Temple.",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest who wishes <b>to sanctify his hands and feet</b> by dipping them <b>in the Basin</b> rather than letting the water run from it onto them? Must one say that the priest may not do so, since <b>the Merciful One states:</b> “And Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and their feet <b>from it”</b> (Exodus 30:19), <b>and not inside it? Or perhaps</b> the priest may <b>even</b> use water still <b>inside it.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Or</b> if a priest <b>immersed in cave water and performed</b> the <b>service, his service is disqualified,</b> since this is not adequate sanctification of the hands and feet. From the <i>baraita</i> one infers: <b>But</b> if he used <b>water from</b> the <b>Basin</b> in a manner <b>similar to cave water,</b> i.e., by immersing his hands, <b>and performed</b> the <b>service, his service is valid.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it is possible that immersing one’s hands in the Basin is insufficient as well. Nevertheless, it <b>was necessary for</b> the <i>baraita</i> to mention <b>cave water</b> so <b>that you shall not say:</b> If one <b>may immerse his entire body in</b> cave water to purify himself, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that he may sanctify <b>his hands and feet</b> by immersing them in cave water? The <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches that despite being fit for immersion of the entire body, cave water is unfit for sanctification of the hands and feet.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: The water in</b> the <b>Basin is disqualified</b> by being left out, at different times of day for different rites. <b>For</b> rites that are <b>permitting factors</b> for an offering, i.e., that must be performed before the meat of the offering may be eaten, the water is disqualified at sunset, <b>like</b> the <b>permitting factors</b> themselves, which may be performed only during the day. For example, if a priest wishes to sprinkle an offering’s blood on the altar, he may not sanctify his hands and feet from the Basin unless it was sunk into its pit at sunset on the previous day, preventing the water from being disqualified. Similarly, <b>for</b> the burning of the offering’s <b>limbs</b> on the altar, which may be performed all night, the water in the Basin is disqualified at dawn, <b>like</b> the <b>limbs</b> themselves.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda says: Even for</b> the performance of <b>permitting factors,</b> the water <b>is disqualified only at dawn, as</b> it is for the burning of the <b>limbs. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Once</b> one <b>has sunk</b> the Basin into its pit at the end of the day’s service, reconnecting the water in the Basin to flowing water to prevent it from being disqualified, <b>he may not raise it up again</b> the entire night.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is this to say that</b> if the Basin was not sunk before sunset the water inside is <b>unfit for</b> the <b>night’s service as well? But doesn’t Rabbi Asi say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Ilfa:</b> With regard to <b>a Basin that</b> the priests <b>did not sink</b> into its pit <b>at night,</b> a priest <b>sanctifies</b> his hands and feet <b>from it for the service of</b> that <b>night, and the next day he does not sanctify</b> from it? Apparently, for purposes of the night’s service, the water in the Basin is not disqualified at sunset.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>What</b> does it mean <b>when it says: He may not raise it up</b> again? It means that he may not raise it to sanctify his hands and feet in preparation <b>for</b> the <b>day’s service; but</b> the water is <b>fit</b> for sanctification <b>for</b> the <b>night’s service.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, this is</b> the same as the opinion <b>of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef,</b> i.e., that for purposes of the day’s service the water in the Basin is disqualified at sunset, and for purposes of the night’s service it is disqualified at dawn."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara responds: The difference <b>between them</b> is that according to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef, if the water is raised at any point throughout the night, it is disqualified for sanctification prior to the day’s services. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the water is not disqualified unless the Basin is raised at the break of dawn, but the Sages issued a rabbinic <b>decree of sinking</b> the Basin into its pit all night <i>ab initio</i>, so that it would not be raised at dawn accidentally.",
            "The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yoḥanan really hold that the Basin must be sunk all night? <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say:</b> If a priest <b>sanctified his hands</b> and feet in preparation <b>for the removal of the ashes</b> before dawn, then <b>the next day he does not need to sanctify</b> them again, <b>as he already sanctified</b> them <b>at the beginning of</b> the day’s <b>service?</b> Evidently, the Basin is raised before dawn.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>Granted, according to Rava, who interprets that</b> statement <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,</b> that sanctification of the hands and feet is not disqualified overnight (see 20a), <b>this</b> statement that the Basin must be sunk all night is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that sanctification of the hands and feet is disqualified at dawn. Accordingly, he holds that the water in the Basin is disqualified as well.",
            "<b>But according to Abaye, who interprets</b> that statement <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, the first statement <b>of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi is <b>difficult</b> to reconcile <b>with</b> this other statement <b>of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi: <b>What is different there that</b> one must <b>sink</b> the Basin all night, <b>and what is different here,</b> with regard to sanctification prior to removal of the ashes, <b>that</b> one does <b>not</b> need to <b>sink it?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: There is no contradiction. Prior to removal of the ashes, one <b>raises</b> the Basin <b>and</b> then <b>sinks it again</b> so that it will not remain raised at dawn and render the water disqualified.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, why</b> does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that the priest does <b>not sanctify</b> his hands and feet again <b>the next day?</b> If the water has not been disqualified, why would the priest need to avoid sanctifying his hands and feet with it? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan means to say that <b>he does not need to sanctify</b> them again for service on the same day, not that he is prohibited from doing so.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is this to say that</b> according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, if one raised the Basin at night and sank it again before dawn, it remains <b>fit for</b> sanctification prior to performing the offering’s <b>permitting factors</b> that day? If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion <b>is</b> the same as that <b>of Rav Ḥisda.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: The difference <b>between them</b> is that according to Rav Ḥisda, there is no <b>mitzva of sinking</b> the Basin into its pit throughout the night, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is a mitzva of sinking the Basin into its pit all night <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda from a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 28b): The priests <b>would not see</b> the priest performing the removal of the ashes, <b>nor would they hear his voice.</b> Rather, they were unaware of his actions <b>until they would hear the sound of the wood</b> with <b>which ben Katin made a mechanism for</b> sinking <b>the Basin</b> into water during the night. <b>And</b> when they heard the sound of the mechanism, <b>they would say</b> to each other: <b>The time for sanctifying hands and feet from the Basin has come.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>What, is it not that</b> they heard the mechanism <b>raising</b> the Basin? <b>Apparently,</b> the mechanism would <b>sink it</b> during the night, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that there was no need to sink it overnight.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> they heard the mechanism <b>sinking</b> the Basin, which had been raised all night. The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> the mechanism were <b>sinking it, would its sound be audible?</b> No mechanism is necessary to lower the Basin; it can simply be lowered with a chain. The Gemara responds: The priest would still <b>sink it by</b> using <b>a wheel,</b> which would make a sound.",
            "The Gemara presents <b>another version</b> of the answer: The priest would deliberately <b>sink it by its wheel so that its sound would be audible, and</b> the other priests <b>would hear and come</b> to begin the service. The Gemara asks: <b>But wasn’t there Gevini</b> the <b>crier,</b> who would notify the priests of the beginning of the service? The Gemara responds: <b>They would make two conspicuous markers</b> for the beginning of the service: The sound of the wheel and the crier. Anyone <b>who heard from this</b> marker <b>would come, and</b> anyone who <b>heard from that</b> marker <b>would come.</b>",
            "§ Having mentioned a <i>halakha</i> earlier (19b), the Gemara addresses <b>the</b> matter <b>itself: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says:</b> With regard to <b>any Basin that does not contain enough</b> water <b>for four priests to sanctify</b> their hands and feet <b>from it,</b> the priests <b>may not sanctify</b> their hands and feet <b>with it, as it is stated: “That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash</b> their hands and their feet <b>from it”</b> (Exodus 40:31).",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: The priests may <b>sanctify</b> their hands and feet from <b>all vessels, whether they can hold a quarter</b><i>-log</i> of water"
        ],
        [
            "<b>or they cannot hold a quarter</b><i>-log</i> of water, <b>provided that they are service vessels.</b> Apparently, the Basin need not hold so much water.",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Aḥa says:</b> The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case <b>where one drills</b> a hole <b>in</b> the Basin and places a much smaller vessel at the hole as a conduit for the water. Even if that vessel is very small, the priest may sanctify his hands and feet from it, provided that there is enough water in the Basin for four priests.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t the Merciful One state</b> that the priests must wash their hands and feet <b>“from it,”</b> i.e., from the Basin and not from another vessel? The Gemara responds: The following verse repeats the phrase <b>“they should wash,” to include</b> any <b>service vessel.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> then it should be permitted for a priest to use <b>a non-sacred vessel as well. Abaye says: You cannot say</b> that a priest may sanctify his hands and feet from <b>a non-sacred vessel,</b> since the matter may be derived <b>by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>the base of</b> the Basin: <b>And just as its base, which was anointed along with it</b> (see Exodus 40:11), <b>is</b> still <b>not</b> fit for a priest to <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet with water from it, then with regard to <b>a non-sacred vessel, which was not anointed along with</b> the Basin, <b>is it not right that it is not</b> fit for a priest to <b>sanctify</b> his hands and feet with water from it?",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>And from where do we</b> derive that water from <b>the base of</b> the Basin is unfit? <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that water from <b>its base should be</b> fit for priests to <b>sanctify</b> their hands and feet <b>just as</b> water from <b>the Basin</b> itself is fit to <b>sanctify</b> their hands and feet. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “You shall also make a Basin of copper, and the base thereof of copper”</b> (Exodus 30:18). The verse indicates that <b>I have equated</b> the base and the Basin only <b>with regard to</b> the requirement that they both be made of <b>copper, but not for another matter.</b> Rather, the base, unlike the Basin, is unfit for sanctification.",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:</b> The <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about its base?</b> It is notable <b>in that its inside is not made for</b> use, as it is to be used only as a stand. Will <b>you say</b> that the <i>halakha</i> is the same <b>for a non-sacred vessel,</b> concerning <b>which its inside is made for</b> use? <b>Rather,</b> one must say that the term <b>“from it”</b> serves <b>to exclude a non-sacred vessel.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> “from it” should exclude <b>a service vessel as well.</b> The Gemara responds: <b>But the Merciful One amplifies</b> the <i>halakha</i> with the term <b>“they should wash,”</b> to include a service vessel.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what did you see</b> that led you to include a service vessel and exclude a non-sacred vessel, rather than the reverse? The Gemara responds: <b>This,</b> a service vessel, <b>requires anointing like</b> the Basin when the Tabernacle is raised (see Exodus, chapter 40), <b>and that,</b> a non-sacred vessel, <b>does not require anointing like</b> the Basin.",
            "§ <b>Reish Lakish says: Any</b> liquid <b>that</b> may be used to <b>complete</b> the requisite measure of <b>water for a ritual bath may complete</b> the requisite measure of <b>water for</b> the <b>Basin.</b> But <b>it may not complete</b> the <b>quarter</b><i>-log</i> required for ritual washing of the hands.",
            "The Gemara asks: This statement means <b>to exclude what</b> as unfit for completing the requisite measure for ritual washing of the hands? <b>If we say</b> that it means <b>to exclude liquefied clay,</b> there is a difficulty, as <b>what is</b> this clay <b>like? If</b> it is such <b>that a cow can kneel and drink from it,</b> it is considered water and should be fit <b>even to</b> complete the measure of <b>a quarter</b><i>-log</i> for ritual washing of the hands. <b>And if a cow cannot kneel and drink from it, it should not even</b> be fit to <b>complete</b> the requisite measure for <b>a ritual bath.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> say that it means <b>to exclude red gnats</b> that originate and grow in water. This, too, is difficult, as <b>even by themselves</b> they may constitute the entire measure of the ritual bath, not only to complete a deficient measure of water; <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> With regard to <b>anything that originates in the water, one may immerse in it,</b> since it is considered as though it were water. <b>And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: One may immerse</b> even <b>in</b> liquefied <b>fish eye</b> of sufficient volume.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says:</b> The statement of Reish Lakish means <b>to exclude</b> a case where <b>one added a <i>se’a</i> and removed a <i>se’a</i>, as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 7:2): In the case of <b>a ritual bath that contains</b> the minimum measure of <b>exactly forty <i>se’a</i></b> of water, and <b>one added a <i>se’a</i></b> of liquid other than water, <b>and</b> then <b>removed a <i>se’a</i></b> of the mixture, the ritual bath remains <b>fit.</b> The added liquid is considered nullified in the forty <i>se’a</i> of water, so that when one <i>se’a</i> of the mixture is removed, there still remain the requisite forty <i>se’a</i> of fit water. <b>And Rav Yehuda bar Sheila says</b> that <b>Rav Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>up to the greater part</b> of the measure of the ritual bath. Adding and removing such a liquid to the requisite measure for washing of the hands renders the water unfit.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: If one drilled in</b> the wall of a ritual bath, and the sides of the hole can hold <b>a quarter</b><i>-log</i> of liquid, <b>one may immerse</b> small vessels such as <b>needles and hooks in</b> the hole, even though it constitutes a space separate from the ritual bath, <b>since</b> the fitness of the water in the hole <b>derives from the fitness of</b> the water in <b>the ritual bath.</b> This <i>halakha</i> is parallel to the one discussed with regard to the Basin.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yirmeya says</b> that <b>Reish Lakish says: Water of a ritual bath is fit to</b> be used as <b>water of</b> the <b>Basin.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is this to say that</b> the water in the Basin <b>does not</b> need to be <b>flowing water,</b> i.e., spring water? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse indicates that the innards of an offering must be washed: <b>“With water”</b> (Leviticus 1:9), <b>and not with wine; “with water,” and not with</b> wine <b>mixed</b> with water; <b>“with water,” to include other</b> types of <b>water,</b> even those that are not spring water. <b>And</b> it can be inferred <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> that <b>the water</b> used <b>for</b> the <b>Basin</b> may be used to wash the innards. <b>What</b> is the basis of the <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference that <b>the water</b> used <b>for the Basin</b> may also be used? Is it <b>not that it is</b> from a source of <b>flowing water</b> and therefore obviously fit for washing the innards?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> the <i>a fortiori</i> inference is based on the fact <b>that</b> the water used for the Basin is <b>sanctified</b> for the service. The Gemara asks: <b>But is sanctified</b> water <b>preferable,</b> given that the Torah stipulates simply “water”? <b>But didn’t Rabbi Shmuel teach:</b> The word <b>“water”</b> used in the verse denotes specifically water <b>whose</b> name <b>has no modifier;</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>excluded is water of</b> the <b>Basin, which has a modifier</b> in its name? <b>Rather,</b> since the <i>baraita</i> cannot be referring to the water of the Basin itself, as it is unfit for washing the innards, <b>is it not</b> referring to water <b>that is fit to</b> be <b>water of</b> the <b>Basin? Apparently,</b> the only reason such water could be preferable is because it <b>is flowing water.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: The issue <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> With regard to <b>the water of</b> the <b>Basin, Rabbi Yishmael says: It</b> must be <b>spring water,</b> i.e., flowing water, <b>and the Rabbis say: It</b> may be <b>another</b> type of <b>water.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that a priest who is <b>uncircumcised</b> disqualifies sacrificial rites he performs. The Gemara elaborates: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? <b>Rav Ḥisda says: We did not learn this matter from the Torah of Moses, our teacher;</b> rather, <b>we learned</b> it <b>from the words of</b> the prophet <b>Ezekiel, son of Buzi: “No stranger, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My Sanctuary to serve Me”</b> (Ezekiel 44:9).",
            "<b>And from where do we</b> derive <b>that he desecrates</b> the <b>service</b> after the fact? <b>As it is written: “In that you have brought in strangers, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, to be in My Sanctuary, to profane My house”</b> (Ezekiel 44:7).",
            "<b>The Sages taught:</b> The verse states <b>“stranger”;</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that this is referring to <b>an actual stranger,</b> i.e., a gentile. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Uncircumcised in heart,”</b> to indicate that it is referring to a priest rather than a gentile. <b>If so, what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “Stranger”?</b> It is referring to one <b>whose actions are</b> considered <b>estranged from his Father in Heaven,</b> i.e., an apostate, who sins regularly. <b>And I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that <b>one uncircumcised in heart</b> is unfit to serve; <b>from where</b> is it derived that <b>one uncircumcised in flesh</b> is unfit as well? <b>The verse states: “Or uncircumcised in flesh.”</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> both phrases in the verse <b>are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written</b> only: <b>“Uncircumcised in flesh,”</b> one might think that only he is unfit <b>because he is disgusting</b> in that he possesses a foreskin, <b>but</b> concerning <b>one uncircumcised in heart, who is not disgusting, I will say</b> that he is <b>not</b> unfit. <b>And had</b> the verse <b>taught us</b> only that one <b>uncircumcised in heart</b> is unfit, one might think that only he is unfit, <b>because his heart is not</b> directed <b>toward Heaven, but one uncircumcised in flesh, whose heart is</b> directed <b>toward Heaven, I will say</b> that he is <b>not</b> unfit. Therefore, both phrases <b>are necessary.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that a ritually <b>impure</b> priest is <b>unfit</b> for Temple service and disqualifies rites he performs. <b>The Elders of the South said: They taught</b> this <b>only</b> with regard to one who became <b>impure due to</b> contact with the carcass of <b>a creeping animal. But</b> with regard to a priest who became <b>impure due to</b> contact with <b>a corpse, since he can effect acceptance</b> of his rites <b>for communal</b> offerings <i>ab initio</i> if the majority of the community has contracted impurity from a corpse, <b>he can effect acceptance</b> of his rites <b>for individual</b> offerings <b>as well</b> after the fact.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, let</b> it <b>be derived</b> that <b>one impure due to</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal</b> can also effect acceptance for communal offerings in cases of communal impurity <i>ab initio</i>, and for individual offerings after the fact, <b>by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from one impure due to a corpse: Just as</b> a priest who is <b>impure due to a corpse, who requires sprinkling</b> of the water containing the ashes of the red heifer on the <b>third and seventh</b> day to be purified, still <b>effects acceptance,</b> then with regard to <b>one</b> who is <b>impure due to</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal, who does not require sprinkling</b> on the <b>third and seventh</b> day, <b>is it not right that he</b> should also <b>effect acceptance?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>The Elders of the South hold</b> that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>those who effect atonement</b> is <b>like those who achieve atonement: Just as</b> with regard to <b>those who achieve atonement</b> through communal offerings, i.e., the community, only if a majority is <b>impure due to a corpse may</b> the offering be sacrificed in a state of impurity, but if they are <b>impure due to</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal</b> it may <b>not, so too</b> with regard to <b>those who effect atonement,</b> i.e., the priests, if they serve when they are <b>impure due to a corpse, yes,</b> their service achieves atonement, but if they serve when they are <b>impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal,</b> it does <b>not.</b>",
            "The response of the Gemara assumes that communal offerings may not be brought when the majority of the community is impure due to a creeping animal. The Gemara therefore asks: <b>What do</b> the Elders of the South <b>hold</b> with regard to the Paschal offering? <b>If they hold</b> that <b>one may not slaughter</b> it <b>nor sprinkle</b> its blood on the altar <b>for</b> an owner who is <b>impure due to a creeping animal,</b> even though he can immerse and become pure in time to eat the offering that night, then one may ask: <b>Why can’t</b> the <b>community perform</b> communal offerings <b>in</b> such a state of <b>impurity? Isn’t</b> it a principle that for <b>any</b> impurity <b>for which an individual</b> may not sacrifice the Paschal offering and <b>is deferred</b> to the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, the <b>community may perform</b> its offerings <b>in</b> such a state of <b>impurity?</b>",
            "<b>Rather, they</b> must <b>hold</b> that <b>one may slaughter</b> the Paschal offering <b>and sprinkle</b> its blood <b>for</b> an owner who is <b>impure due to a creeping animal.</b> Accordingly, the community may not offer the Paschal offering in such a state of impurity.",
            "<b>Ulla says: Reish Lakish shouted [<i>teka</i>] to</b> the Elders <b>of the South: But which power is greater</b> to overcome impurity with respect to offerings, <b>the power of those who effect atonement,</b> i.e., the priests, <b>or the power of those who achieve atonement,</b> the offerings’ owners? Since the Elders of the South hold that the Paschal offering may be sacrificed for an owner who is impure due to a creeping animal, while a priest who is similarly impure may not sacrifice any offering, <b>you must say</b> that <b>the power of those who achieve atonement</b> is greater.",
            "If so, your initial statement that a priest who contracted impurity from a corpse can effect acceptance for individual offerings can be refuted <i>a fortiori</i>: <b>And just as in a case where</b> the <b>owner became impure due to a creeping animal,</b> he <b>may send his offerings</b> for sacrifice, and yet <b>a priest who became impure due to a creeping animal cannot effect acceptance,</b> then in <b>a case where the owner became impure due to a corpse, where he may not send his offerings</b> for sacrifice, <b>is it not right that a priest who became impure due to a corpse cannot effect acceptance?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>The Elders of the South hold</b> that an owner who is <b>impure due to a corpse may also send his offerings,</b> even though he will not be able to partake of his Paschal offering. Therefore, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference does not stand.",
            "The Gemara protests: <b>But isn’t it written: “If any man of you or of your generations shall be impure</b> by reason of a dead body, or be in a journey afar off, <b>he shall perform the Paschal offering</b> to the Lord. <b>In the second month</b> on the fourteenth day at dusk they shall perform it” (Numbers 9:10–11)? Apparently, one impure due to a corpse in the first month must defer his Paschal offering to the second month. The Gemara responds: The verse intends this <b>as a mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i>. But if he sends his offering in the first month, it is accepted, and he is not required to sacrifice a Paschal offering in the second month.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written:</b> “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then shall he and his neighbor next to his house take one according to the number of the souls; <b>a man,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>according to his eating,</b> you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4)? This teaches that one may bring the Paschal offering only if he is able to partake of it. The Gemara responds: This requirement is also meant <b>as a mitzva</b> <i>ab initio</i>; it does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is this requirement <b>not indispensable</b> even after the fact? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that the phrase <b>“according to the number of the souls” teaches that the Paschal offering may be slaughtered only for those who registered for it</b> in advance. If the Paschal offering was <b>slaughtered for</b> individuals <b>who did not register for it,</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>it would</b> only <b>be like transgressing a mitzva,</b> but the offering would not be disqualified. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “You shall make your count”; the verse repeats</b> the issue of counting <b>to</b> stress that the <i>halakha</i> is <b>indispensable,</b> and if one slaughters the offering for one who is not registered, it is disqualified. The Gemara concludes: <b>And those who eat</b> the offering <b>are juxtaposed to those registered</b> for it, as the verse states: “According to the number of the souls; a man, according to his eating.” Accordingly, if one slaughters the Paschal offering for one who cannot partake of it, the offering is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>The Elders of the South do not juxtapose</b> the phrases, i.e., they do not interpret the verse’s juxtaposition of the two phrases as significant. The Gemara asks: <b>But even if they do not juxtapose</b> the phrases, <b>there is a refutation to</b> their statement <b>from this</b> inference <b>as well: And just as in a case where the owner became impure due to a creeping animal, where he may send his offerings</b> for sacrifice <b><i>ab initio</i>, a priest who became impure due to a creeping animal</b> nevertheless <b>cannot effect acceptance,</b> then in <b>a case where the owner became impure due to a corpse, where he may not send his offerings <i>ab initio</i>, is it not right that a priest who became impure due to a corpse cannot effect acceptance?</b>",
            "Furthermore, the Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 80b): <b>As</b> the Sages <b>said</b> that with regard to <b>a nazirite and one who performs</b> the rite of the <b>Paschal offering, the frontplate effects acceptance for</b> offerings sacrificed in a state of <b>impurity of</b> the <b>blood, but the frontplate does not effect acceptance for</b> offerings sacrificed in a state of <b>impurity of the body</b> of the individual bringing it.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>To what</b> impurity is it referring? <b>If we say</b> that it is referring <b>to impurity due to a creeping animal, didn’t you say</b> above that according to the Elders of the South, <b>one may slaughter</b> the Paschal offering <b>and sprinkle</b> its blood <b>for</b> an owner who is in a state of <b>impurity due to a creeping animal? Rather,</b> it must be referring to <b>impurity due to a corpse, and</b> the mishna <b>teaches: The frontplate does not effect acceptance. Evidently,</b> if the <b>owner became impure due to a corpse, he may not send his offerings</b> for sacrifice, contrary to the opinion ascribed to the Elders of the South.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No, if the owner became impure due to a corpse,</b> the frontplate <b>indeed</b> effects acceptance for the offering. The mishna is not referring to the owners of the offerings at all; rather, <b>here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where</b> the officiating <b>priest became impure due to a creeping animal.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, say the latter clause</b> of the mishna: If it became known after the offering was brought that he had <b>contracted ritual impurity</b> imparted <b>in the depths,</b> i.e., a source of impurity that had been unknown at the time, <b>the frontplate effects acceptance</b> for the offering. This clause cannot be reconciled with the suggested interpretation of the mishna, since <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: They stated</b> this <i>halakha</i> of <b>impurity</b> imparted <b>in the depths only with regard to</b> impurity due to <b>a corpse.</b> Now, when he says that it applies only <b>to</b> impurity due to <b>a corpse,</b> he means <b>to exclude what?</b> Does he <b>not</b> mean <b>to exclude impurity</b> imparted by the carcass of <b>a creeping animal in the depths?</b> If so, the mishna cannot be referring to impurity due to a creeping animal.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> Rabbi Ḥiyya means <b>to exclude impurity</b> imparted <b>by</b> a gonorrhea-like <b>discharge [<i>ziva</i>] in the depths.</b> Impurity due to the corpse of a creeping animal, by contrast, is within the scope of the mishna.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> how is one to understand <b>this dilemma that Rami bar Ḥama raises:</b> With regard to <b>a priest who effects acceptance for the offerings of</b> the nazirite and the Paschal offering, <b>was impurity</b> imparted <b>in the depths permitted for him or was impurity</b> imparted <b>in the depths not permitted for him?</b> According to the Elders of the South, why not <b>resolve</b> the dilemma and conclude <b>that impurity</b> imparted <b>in the depths was permitted for him, since</b> they hold that <b>we interpret</b> the mishna <b>here</b> as referring <b>to</b> an impure <b>priest?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: The premise of this dilemma <b>of Rami bar Ḥama certainly disagrees</b> with the opinion of the Elders of the South, and Rami bar Ḥama does not interpret the mishna in this manner.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a verse written about the frontplate: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, <b>and Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred</b> items, which the children of Israel shall consecrate, even all their sacred gifts; and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before God” (Exodus 28:38). <b>And</b> the Sages expounded: <b>Which sin does</b> Aaron <b>bear?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>If</b> the verse means that he bears <b>the sin of <i>piggul</i>, it is already stated:</b> “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, <b>neither shall it be credited</b> to he who offers it” (Leviticus 7:18). <b>If</b> he bears <b>the sin of <i>notar</i>, it is already stated</b> in the same verse: <b>“It shall not be accepted.”</b>",
            "Rather, the frontplate <b>bears only the sin of impurity, whose general prohibition was permitted in</b> cases involving <b>the public.</b> The verse indicates that the frontplate effects acceptance for individual offerings sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>What</b> is the <b>impurity</b> borne by the frontplate? <b>If we say</b> that it effects acceptance <b>for impurity due to a creeping animal, where</b> does one find that the general prohibition was <b>permitted</b> in cases involving the public? <b>Rather,</b> it must be referring to <b>impurity due to a corpse. And</b> is it <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where the owner</b> of the offerings <b>became impure from a corpse? Evidently,</b> if <b>the owner became impure from a corpse, he may send his offerings</b> for sacrifice, as the frontplate effects acceptance for them.",
            "<b>And to what</b> offering is this statement referring? <b>If</b> it is referring <b>to</b> the offering of <b>a nazirite,</b> doesn’t <b>the Merciful One state: “And if any man die</b> very suddenly <b>beside him,</b> and he defile his consecrated head” (Numbers 6:9)? The passage indicates that even if a nazirite contracts impurity against his will, he still cannot bring his offerings until he is pure. <b>Rather,</b> it must be referring <b>to one who performs</b> the rite of the <b>Paschal offering.</b> This proves the claim of the Elders of the South that one who is impure due to a corpse may send his Paschal offering for sacrifice.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Actually,</b> the statement is referring <b>to</b> impurity due to <b>a creeping animal,</b> not due to a corpse. <b>And</b> although the general prohibition with regard to impurity due to a creeping animal was not permitted in cases involving the public, nevertheless, one finds that <b>the category of impurity in general</b> was permitted in such cases.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And some infer</b> the opposite <b>and derive like this:</b> The verse states of the frontplate: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred items” (Exodus 28:38). That is, it <b>does</b> bear <b>the iniquity of the sacred items,</b> but it does <b>not</b> bear <b>the iniquity of those who consecrate</b> or sacrifice them, i.e., the owners of the offering or the priests involved in its sacrifice. And to <b>what impurity</b> is this verse referring? <b>If we say</b> that it is referring to <b>impurity</b> due to <b>a creeping animal, is</b> such impurity <b>permitted in</b> cases involving the <b>public? Rather, is it not</b> referring to <b>impurity</b> due to <b>a corpse, and</b> the verse indicates that the frontplate <b>does</b> bear <b>the iniquity of</b> the <b>sacred items</b> but does <b>not</b> bear <b>the iniquity of those who consecrate</b> them? This refutes the opinion of the Elders of the South that owners who are impure due to a corpse may send their offerings.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Actually,</b> the verse is referring to <b>impurity due to a creeping animal, and</b> although the general prohibition with regard to impurity due to a creeping animal was not permitted in cases involving the public, <b>the category of impurity in general</b> was permitted in such cases.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that a priest who is <b>sitting</b> disqualifies the rites that he performs. The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? <b>Rava says</b> that <b>Rav Naḥman says: The verse states</b> with regard to the priests: “For the Lord your God has chosen him out of all your tribes, <b>to stand to minister”</b> (Deuteronomy 18:5). The verse indicates that <b>I have chosen him for standing and not for sitting.</b>",
            "<b>The Sages taught: “To stand to minister,”</b> indicates that there is <b>a mitzva</b> to perform the service while standing. <b>When it says:</b> “Then he shall minister in the name of the Lord his God, as all his brethren the Levites do, <b>who stand</b> there before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 18:7), <b>the verse repeats</b> the matter <b>to invalidate</b> rites that are performed while not standing.",
            "<b>Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Now, one who is sitting is considered like a non-priest and desecrates</b> the <b>service.</b> Therefore, <b>I will say: Just as a non-priest</b> who performs a rite is liable <b>to</b> receive <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven, <b>so too one who is sitting</b> should be liable <b>to</b> receive <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven. If so, <b>why is it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>But one who is uncircumcised, an acute mourner,</b> and <b>one who is sitting are not</b> liable <b>to</b> receive <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven if they performed rites; <b>rather,</b> they simply transgress <b>a prohibition?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: That is taught <b>because</b> the case of a priest <b>lacking</b> the requisite priestly <b>vestments and</b> that of <b>one whose hands and feet are not washed are two verses that come as one,</b> as the verse states explicitly for each case that if they perform rites they are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And any two verses that come as one do not teach</b> their common aspect to similar cases. Therefore, one cannot assume that analogous prohibitions carry penalty of death at the hand of Heaven as well.",
            "<b>And</b> even <b>according to the one who says</b> that they do <b>teach</b> their common aspect, the prohibition against service by <b>those who drank wine</b> also contains explicit mention of death at the hand of Heaven and <b>constitutes a third</b> verse. <b>And all agree</b> that <b>three</b> verses that come as one <b>do not teach</b> their common aspect.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that one who is <b>standing upon vessels,</b> or <b>upon an animal,</b> or <b>upon the feet of another,</b> is <b>unfit</b> to perform rites. The Gemara elaborates: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? This is derived <b>as</b> the Sage <b>from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Since the floor</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>sanctifies</b> the priest to perform the service, <b>and service vessels,</b> i.e., priestly vestments, also <b>sanctify</b> him, one may draw a comparison between the two: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>service vessels, nothing may interpose between</b> the priest <b>and</b> the <b>service vessel, so too</b> with regard to the <b>floor, nothing may interpose between</b> the priest <b>and the floor.</b>",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>And</b> each of the three cases mentioned in the mishna is <b>necessary. As, had</b> the mishna <b>taught us</b> only that <b>a vessel</b> interposes between the priest’s feet and the floor, one might have thought that this is only <b>because it is not a type of flesh, but</b> with regard to <b>an animal, which is a type of flesh, I will say</b> that it <b>does not</b> constitute an interposition. <b>And had it taught us</b> only that <b>an animal</b> interposes, one might have thought that this is only <b>because it is not of the human species, but another</b> person, <b>who is human, I will say</b> that he does <b>not</b> interpose. Therefore, each is <b>necessary.</b>",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> If <b>one of</b> the priest’s <b>feet</b> was <b>on a vessel and one of his feet</b> was <b>on the floor,</b> or if <b>one of his feet</b> was <b>on a stone and one of his feet</b> was <b>on the floor,</b> one <b>sees: Any</b> case <b>where, were the vessel to be removed or the stone removed, he</b> would still be <b>able to stand on one foot and perform rites, his service</b> is <b>valid. But if</b> he would <b>not</b> be able to stand on one foot, <b>his service</b> is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Ami raises a dilemma:</b> If one of <b>the stone</b> tiles of the Temple floor <b>came loose</b> and began to wobble, <b>and</b> the priest <b>stood on it, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara elaborates: <b>Do not raise the dilemma</b> with regard to a case <b>where he does not intend to attach</b> the stone to the floor again, <b>as it certainly interposes</b> in such a case, since it is considered an item separate from the Temple. Rather, <b>when you raise this dilemma,</b> do so with regard to a case <b>where he intends to attach it</b> again. In such a case, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Does one say that <b>since he intends to attach it, it is considered like that which is</b> already <b>attached? Or perhaps now, at least, it is disconnected,</b> and it is considered a separate item.",
            "<b>Rabba Zuti raises this dilemma like this: Rabbi Ami raises a dilemma:</b> If one of <b>the stone</b> tiles <b>was uprooted and</b> the priest <b>stood in its</b> empty <b>place, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "The Gemara interjects: <b>What is the dilemma he is raising?</b> Perhaps this is the dilemma: <b>When</b> King <b>David sanctified</b> the site of the Temple, <b>did he sanctify</b> the <b>upper</b> level of the <b>floor</b> but nothing underneath it, <b>or perhaps he sanctified</b> it <b>to the depths of the earth? But</b> if this is the dilemma, <b>let him raise the dilemma</b> with regard to <b>the entire Temple courtyard,</b> i.e., what is the <i>halakha</i> if the entire floor is removed?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Actually,</b> it is <b>obvious to him that</b> King David <b>sanctified</b> the site of the Temple <b>to the depths of the earth, and this is the dilemma that he raised:</b> When a priest stands on an unfinished part of the Temple floor, <b>is this</b> a normal <b>manner of ministration, or is this not</b> a normal <b>manner of ministration?</b> Concerning the dilemma itself, the Gemara responds: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If the priest <b>collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, the service is <b>disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. The Sages taught:</b> The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:25). The conjunction of the term <b>“with his finger”</b> and the term <b>“and</b> the priest <b>shall take” teaches that</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>may be</b> performed <b>only with</b> the <b>right</b> hand, since the word “finger” in the context of priesthood is always referring to the right hand. Likewise, the phrase <b>“with his finger and put it” teaches that</b> the <b>placing</b> of the blood <b>may be</b> performed <b>only with</b> the <b>right</b> hand.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon said: But is</b> the word: <b>Hand, stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood? <b>Rather,</b> the verse states only: <b>“With his finger and put it,”</b> teaching <b>that</b> the <b>placing</b> of the blood <b>may be</b> performed <b>only with</b> the <b>right</b> hand. <b>Since</b> the word: <b>Hand, is not stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood, even if <b>one collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, the offering is <b>fit.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> as for <b>Rabbi Shimon, whichever</b> way <b>you</b> look at it, his opinion is difficult. <b>If he holds</b> that one derives <b>a verbal analogy</b> from the passage discussing a leper (Leviticus, chapter 14), which indicates that all references to hands and fingers mean specifically the right hand, then even <b>if</b> the word: <b>Hand, is not stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood, <b>what of it?</b> In any event, the word “finger” is stated. <b>And if he does not hold</b> that one derives this <b>verbal analogy,</b> then even <b>if</b> the word: <b>Hand, were stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood, <b>what of it?</b> The word would have no significance.",
            "<b>Rav Yehuda says: Actually, he does not hold</b> that one derives this <b>verbal analogy. And this</b> is what Rabbi Shimon <b>is saying: But is</b> the phrase: <b>Right hand, stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood? Rather, <b>since</b> the phrase: <b>Right hand, is not stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood, even if <b>one collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, the offering is <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba said to him: If so,</b> then <b>even</b> the rite of <b>placing</b> the blood should be valid when performed with the left hand, since the phrase: Right hand, does not appear with regard to it <b>as well. And furthermore, does Rabbi Shimon</b> really <b>not hold</b> that one derives this <b>verbal analogy? But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> In <b>every instance</b> in the Torah <b>that</b> the word <b>“hand” is stated,</b> the verse <b>is</b> referring <b>only</b> to the <b>right</b> hand, and whenever the verse mentions <b>“finger,”</b> it <b>is</b> referring <b>only</b> to a finger of the <b>right</b> hand?",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says: Actually,</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>holds</b> that one derives this <b>verbal analogy, and this</b> is what he <b>is saying: But is</b> the word: <b>Hand, stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood? <b>Since</b> the word: <b>Hand, is not stated with regard to</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood, <b>but</b> the word <b>“finger”</b> is stated, <b>and collection cannot</b> be performed <b>with a finger</b> alone, one must conclude that the word “finger” must actually be referring to the placing of the blood. Therefore, while the placing of the blood must be performed with the right hand, if <b>one collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, the offering is <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina:</b> But <b>it is possible to fashion</b> a small <b>handle for the rim of</b> the <b>bowl,</b> and one could then hold the bowl with his finger <b>and collect</b> the blood <b>in it.</b> If so, it is possible for one to collect the blood with only his finger.",
            "<b>Rather, Abaye says:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>They disagree with regard to</b> whether <b>a verse is interpreted</b> based on juxtaposition to the language <b>preceding it and</b> to the language <b>following it.</b> According to Rabbi Shimon, a verse is interpreted only based on the language following it. Therefore, when the verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it upon the corners of the altar,” the word “finger” is referring only to the placing of the blood and not its collection. The Rabbis hold that the verse is also interpreted based on the language preceding it. Accordingly, they require that both rites be performed with the right hand.",
            "<b>Abaye says: This</b> statement <b>of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, diverges from</b> the opinion <b>of his father, and it diverges from</b> the opinion <b>of the Rabbis: As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says:</b> In <b>every instance</b> in the Torah <b>that</b> the word <b>“finger” is stated with regard to collection</b> of the blood and not with regard to placing of the blood on the altar, if the priest <b>deviated</b> from the proper method <b>of collection</b> and performed it with the left hand, the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> but if he deviated from the proper method <b>of placing</b> the blood, the offering remains <b>fit. And</b> in <b>every instance that</b> the word <b>“finger” is stated</b> only <b>with regard to placing</b> the blood, if the priest <b>deviated</b> from the proper method <b>of placing,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> but if he deviated from the proper method <b>of collection,</b> the offering remains <b>fit.</b>",
            "<b>And where is</b> the word <b>“finger” stated</b> only <b>with regard to placing? As it is written: “And you shall take of the blood of the bullock and put it upon the corners of the altar with your finger”</b> (Exodus 29:12). <b>And he holds</b> that <b>a verse is interpreted</b> based on juxtaposition to the language immediately <b>preceding it and not</b> to the language <b>before that</b> which immediately <b>precedes it, nor</b> to the language <b>following it.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabba bar bar Ḥana says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> In <b>every instance</b> in the Torah <b>that it is stated</b> that an action is performed with <b>a finger and</b> by members of the <b>priesthood,</b> it may be performed <b>only</b> with the <b>right</b> hand.",
            "The Gemara comments: It might <b>enter our mind</b> to say that this means that <b>we require both</b> a finger and the priesthood to be stated together in the verse in order to mandate use of the right hand, e.g., <b>as it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger”</b> (Leviticus 4:25). <b>And</b> the fact that this verse is referring to a finger from his right hand <b>is derived from a leper, as it is written: “And the priest shall dip his right finger”</b> (Leviticus 14:16). This cannot be correct, <b>as</b> there is the verse that addresses <b>the removal of a handful</b> from a meal offering, <b>in which only</b> the <b>priesthood is written, and</b> yet <b>we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 6a): If one <b>removed the handful with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, the meal offering is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says:</b> This statement means that if the verse mentions <b>either a finger or</b> the <b>priesthood,</b> only the right hand may be used.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rava: But this is contradicted by the verse discussing <b>the conveyance of</b> the <b>limbs</b> of the daily burnt offering <b>to the ramp</b> of the altar, <b>as priesthood is written with regard to it, as it is written: “And the priest shall sacrifice the whole</b> and make it smoke <b>upon the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:13), <b>and the Master said</b> that <b>this</b> verse is referring to the <b>conveyance of</b> the <b>limbs to the ramp. And</b> yet <b>we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 31b): When the priest conveys the limbs to the ramp, <b>the foot of</b> the <b>right</b> side of the offering is carried <b>in the left</b> hand <b>of</b> the priest, <b>and the place of its skin,</b> i.e., the side of the limb covered in skin, is held facing <b>outward.</b> Clearly, use of the left hand does not disqualify the conveyance of the limbs.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>When we say</b> that if the verse states <b>either finger or priesthood</b> then the left hand is disqualified, this is only <b>with regard to a matter that precludes atonement,</b> i.e., a rite whose performance is indispensable to the atonement, <b>similar to</b> the sprinkling of the oil on the <b>leper</b> (see Leviticus 14:16). The conveyance of the limbs, by contrast, is not indispensable to atonement.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> isn’t there the <b>collection</b> of the blood in a service vessel, <b>about which priesthood is written and</b> which <b>is a matter that precludes atonement? And</b> yet <b>we learned</b> in the mishna: If <b>one collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, the blood is <b>disqualified</b> for offering, <b>and Rabbi Shimon deems</b> it <b>fit.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Rabbi Shimon requires</b> that <b>both</b> matters appear in the verse, i.e., both finger and priesthood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Does Rabbi Shimon</b> really <b>require both? But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> In <b>every instance</b> in the Torah <b>that</b> the word <b>“hand” is stated,</b> the verse <b>is</b> referring <b>only</b> to the <b>right</b> hand, and whenever the verse mentions <b>“finger,”</b> it <b>is</b> referring <b>only</b> to a finger of the <b>right</b> hand?",
            "The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Shimon, if the verse mentions only <b>“finger,”</b> then it <b>does not require</b> a mention of the <b>priesthood</b> as well for the limitation to apply. But if the verse mentions only the <b>priesthood,</b> it <b>requires</b> a mention of <b>“finger”</b> for the limitation to apply.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> according to Rabbi Shimon, if the mention of the priesthood alone does not suffice to disqualify the right hand, then <b>why do I</b> need the superfluous reference to <b>a priest</b> with regard to the collection of the blood? After all, the verse already states that the collection must be performed by the sons of Aaron. The Gemara responds: The additional mention of the priesthood indicates that the priests must perform the collection of the blood <b>in their priestly state,</b> i.e., while wearing the priestly vestments.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> isn’t there the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, <b>concerning which only</b> the <b>priesthood is written</b> in the verse, <b>and we learned:</b> If <b>one sprinkled</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand it is <b>disqualified; and Rabbi Shimon does not disagree</b> with this ruling, indicating that Rabbi Shimon holds that a mention of the priesthood does not require a mention of “finger”?",
            "<b>Abaye says: He disagrees</b> with this ruling <b>in a <i>baraita</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>one collected</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, it is <b>disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems</b> it <b>fit.</b> Additionally, if <b>one sprinkled</b> the blood <b>with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, it is <b>disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems</b> it <b>fit.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But that which Rava says</b> with regard to the superfluous phrases in the passage discussing a leper: One derives a verbal analogy between <b>“hand”</b> and <b>“hand”</b> mentioned with regard <b>to the removal of a handful</b> from a meal offering, to indicate that the latter must also be performed with the right hand. Additionally, one derives a verbal analogy between <b>“foot”</b> and <b>“foot”</b> mentioned with regard <b>to</b> the <b><i>ḥalitza</i></b> ritual. And one derives a verbal analogy between <b>“ear”</b> and <b>“ear”</b> mentioned with regard <b>to</b> the <b>piercing</b> of a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl. One may ask: <b>Why do I</b> need the first analogy? The requirement that the handful be removed with the right hand can be <b>derived from</b> the statement <b>of Rabba bar bar Ḥana</b> above, since priesthood is mentioned in the verse describing it.",
            "The Gemara responds: Both derivations are necessary, <b>one for</b> the removal of the <b>handful</b> from a meal offering, <b>and one for the sanctification of</b> the <b>handful,</b> i.e., placing it into a second service vessel. Both must be performed with the right hand."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not require sanctification of</b> the <b>handful, or according to the one who says</b> that <b>Rabbi Shimon also requires</b> the <b>sanctification of</b> the <b>handful</b> but that <b>he deems</b> the sanctification <b>fit</b> when performed <b>with</b> the <b>left</b> hand, <b>why do I</b> need the verbal analogy <b>of Rava</b> between <b>“hand”</b> and <b>“hand”?</b>",
            "<b>If</b> one suggests that it is necessary <b>to</b> indicate that the <b>removal of</b> the <b>handful itself</b> must be performed with the right hand, this cannot be, since that is <b>derived from</b> the verse cited by <b>Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya. As Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reason that Rabbi Shimon</b> does not require that the handful be sanctified in a service vessel? <b>As the verse states</b> with regard to the meal offering: <b>“It is most holy, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 6:10).",
            "The verse compares the meal offering to a sin offering and a guilt offering. Therefore, if the priest <b>comes to perform</b> the burning of the handful <b>with</b> his <b>hand,</b> then <b>he performs it with</b> his <b>right</b> hand, <b>like a sin offering,</b> whose blood is sprinkled by hand. And if he <b>comes to perform it with a vessel,</b> i.e., if he first sanctifies the handful in a service vessel, then <b>he</b> may <b>perform it with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, <b>like a guilt offering,</b> whose blood is sprinkled from a vessel. Since the removal of the handful is performed by hand, the verse indicates that it must be performed with the right hand, and the verbal analogy is unnecessary.",
            "The Gemara responds: The verbal analogy <b>is necessary only for the handful of a meal offering of a sinner,</b> to teach that it must be removed with the right hand. It might <b>enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says</b> that this offering does not require oil and frankincense <b>so that his offering will not be of superior</b> quality, perhaps <b>when he removed the handful with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, which is an inferior manner, <b>it should be fit as well.</b> The verbal analogy therefore <b>teaches us</b> that the handful must always be removed with the right hand, even in the case of the meal offering of a sinner.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If <b>the blood spilled on the floor</b> before the priest managed to collect it into a vessel, <b>and</b> the priest then <b>collected it</b> from the floor into a vessel, it is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught:</b> The verse states: <b>“And the anointed priest shall take from the blood of the bull [<i>middam happar</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 4:5). This means that the priest shall take <b>from the blood of the soul,</b> i.e., the blood that flows from the place of slaughter as the animal dies, <b>but not from the blood of the skin,</b> which bleeds out when the skin is cut before the slaughter, <b>nor from the blood of exudate,</b> i.e., that exudes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: When the verse states: <b>“From the blood of the bull,”</b> it should be interpreted as if it is written: <b>He shall collect the blood from the bull,</b> i.e., if the blood spills onto the floor before it is collected in a service vessel, it is disqualified. <b>As, if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that <b>“from the blood of the bull”</b> should be interpreted <b>as it is written,</b> i.e., that <b>“from the blood”</b> means that the priest may collect <b>even</b> only <b>a portion of the blood,</b> that is difficult: <b>But doesn’t Rav say: One who slaughters</b> the offering <b>must collect all the blood of</b> the <b>bull, as it is stated: “And all the blood of the bull he shall pour out</b> on the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:7)? The verse emphasizes that the priest must pour all the blood of the bull, which is possible only if he has collected all of it.",
            "<b>Rather, “from the blood of the bull”</b> means that the priest <b>shall collect</b> the <b>blood from the bull. And</b> this Sage <b>holds</b> that the Sages <b>subtract and add and interpret homiletically,</b> i.e., one may take a letter from one word, insert it into a second word, and explain the phrase in that manner. In this case, the <i>mem</i> of <i>middam</i> is added to <i>happar</i>, so that the verse is interpreted as though it states: <i>Dam mehappar</i>, meaning: Blood from the bull.",
            "§ The Gemara turns to <b>the</b> matter <b>itself: Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rav says: One who slaughters</b> the offering <b>must collect all the blood of</b> the <b>bull, as it is stated: “And all the blood of the bull he shall pour out</b> on the base of the altar.” The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t</b> this verse <b>written with regard to the remainder</b> of the blood that is poured onto the base of the altar after the sprinkling? How, then, can a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the collection of the blood be derived from it?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> this verse <b>is not</b> referring <b>to the matter of the remainder</b> of the blood after sprinkling, <b>as not all of the blood is</b> present for that rite since some of it has already been sprinkled, <b>apply it</b> instead to <b>the matter of collection</b> of the blood from the animal.",
            "<b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says: One who slaughters</b> the offering <b>must hold the knife up</b> after slaughter, so that blood that is on the knife does not fall into the service vessel, <b>as it is stated: “And</b> the anointed priest <b>shall take from the blood of the bull,”</b> i.e., <b>and not from</b> a mixture of <b>the blood of the bull and something else,</b> such as the blood from the knife.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And with what does he wipe</b> the <b>blood</b> from the <b>knife? Abaye says:</b> He wipes it <b>with the rim of</b> the <b>bowl</b> used to collect the blood, <b>as it is written</b> of the bowls used to collect the blood: <b>“Atoning-bowls [<i>keforei</i>] of gold”</b> (Ezra 1:10). The root <i>kaf</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>reish</i> can also mean to wipe.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda says</b> that <b>Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says: One who slaughters</b> the offering <b>must place</b>"
        ],
        [
            "the <b>veins</b> of the offering <b>into the vessel,</b> so that all the blood will empty into it. <b>It was also stated: Rav Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> The <b>veins must see the airspace of</b> the <b>vessel.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> If the priest <b>was collecting</b> the blood, <b>and the bottom of the bowl broke before</b> the <b>blood reached the</b> bowl’s <b>airspace, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is blood that enters the <b>airspace</b> of a bowl <b>that will not ultimately</b> allow it <b>to settle</b> inside nevertheless <b>considered as</b> though it <b>settled</b> inside the vessel, so that when it spills through the break it is considered to have already been collected in the bowl? If so, it remains fit for sprinkling. <b>Or</b> is it <b>not considered as</b> though it <b>settled,</b> but is instead considered to have spilled directly from the animal’s neck onto the floor, and is therefore disqualified?",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him: You learned</b> the answer in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>a barrel that is placed under a pipe</b> to catch water running from it, both the <b>water that</b> has already flowed <b>inside</b> the barrel <b>and</b> that <b>which is</b> still <b>outside it</b> but about to fall in are <b>unfit</b> to be used as water of purification, which purify one who contracts impurity from a corpse. The water of purification must be flowing water, and all of this water is considered to have been collected in the barrel. But if one <b>joined the mouth of</b> the barrel <b>to the pipe,</b> the <b>water that is inside</b> the barrel is <b>unfit, but</b> water <b>that is</b> still <b>outside it</b> is <b>fit,</b> even though it will ultimately fall in, since it is still in the pipe and is not considered to be above the airspace of the barrel. One can infer from the <i>baraita</i> that all liquid that enters the airspace of a vessel is considered to have been collected in it.",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>What is this</b> comparison? Rabbi Asi <b>raises a dilemma before</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to a case where an item enters the <b>airspace</b> of a vessel <b>that will not ultimately</b> allow it <b>to settle</b> inside, <b>and</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>resolves</b> the dilemma by citing a case where the item enters the <b>airspace</b> of a vessel <b>that will ultimately</b> allow it <b>to settle</b> inside.",
            "The Gemara responds: Rabbi Asi <b>raises two dilemmas before</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan: First, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that will not come to rest in the vessel? Second, <b>if you say</b> that an item that enters the <b>airspace</b> of a vessel <b>that will not ultimately</b> allow it <b>to settle</b> inside is <b>not considered as</b> though it <b>settled</b> inside the vessel, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that entered the <b>airspace</b> of a vessel <b>that will ultimately</b> allow it <b>to settle</b> inside?",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>Rav Yosef teaches</b> the exchange in <b>this</b> manner, i.e., as recounted. <b>Rav Kahana teaches</b> it as follows: Rabbi Asi <b>raised the dilemma before</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to <b>a barrel,</b> asking whether the water in its airspace is fit to be used for the water of purification, <b>and</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>resolved</b> the dilemma <b>for him</b> by citing the <i>baraita</i> mentioning <b>a barrel,</b> with which he was unfamiliar.",
            "<b>Rabba teaches</b> the exchange as follows: Rabbi Asi <b>raised the dilemma before</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to <b>a barrel, and</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>resolved</b> the dilemma <b>for him</b> by citing the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>a bowl</b> used to collect the blood in the Temple, saying: <b>Do you not concede with regard to the bowl that it is impossible to</b> collect the blood in <b>it without a stream</b> of blood flowing through the air from the animal’s neck? If the air above the bowl is not considered part of the bowl, the blood would be considered to have entered the bowl from the air above rather than directly from the animal’s neck, and all collected blood would be unfit. Therefore, the airspace must be considered part of the bowl, and the same holds for the barrel with regard to the water of purification.",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>elsewhere</b> (<i>Para</i> 6:4) with regard to sanctifying the water of purification: If one <b>placed his hand or his foot or vegetable leaves in order</b> to allow flowing <b>water to pass</b> through them <b>to</b> the <b>barrel,</b> the water is <b>disqualified.</b> But if the water passed through <b>leaves of reeds or leaves of nuts,</b> the water remains <b>fit. This is the principle:</b> If the water passes through <b>an item that is susceptible to impurity,</b> it is <b>disqualified;</b> if it passes through <b>an item that is not susceptible to impurity,</b> it is <b>fit.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Abba: The verse states: “Nevertheless a fountain or a cistern wherein is a gathering of water shall be pure”</b> (Leviticus 11:36). The verse indicates that <b>their being must be by way of purity,</b> i.e., the gathering of the water must not be accomplished by way of items susceptible to impurity.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ḥiyya says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> Since this mishna states that water that flows over one’s hand through the air into the barrel is disqualified, <b>that is to say</b> that the <b>airspace</b> above <b>a vessel</b> is <b>considered as</b> though it were part of the <b>vessel</b> itself. If it were not, the water would not be considered to have flowed directly from the hand to the vessel, but rather from the air above the vessel. Since air is not susceptible to impurity, the water would not be disqualified.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: But perhaps</b> the mishna is referring to a case <b>where</b> the water <b>flows weakly</b> straight from the hand into the vessel itself, since the hand is situated directly on the edge of the vessel, with no air separating them? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba <b>said to him: Imbecile, we learned</b> in the mishna: <b>In order</b> to allow flowing <b>water to pass</b> through them <b>to</b> the <b>barrel.</b> This indicates that the water is traveling in a stream and will pass through the air before reaching the barrel.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This mishna</b> concerning the barrel <b>was taught from the testimony of Rabbi Tzadok, as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 7:4): <b>Rabbi Tzadok testified with regard to rivulets that one diverted</b> by way of a pipe made <b>with leaves of nuts that</b> their water is <b>fit</b> to be used as water of purification. <b>This was an incident in</b> the town of <b>Ohalya, and</b> an account of the <b>incident came before the Sages in the Chamber of Hewn Stone</b> in the Temple, <b>and they deemed</b> the water <b>fit.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Zeira says</b> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> In the case of <b>one who slits the ear of the bull</b> with the knife after slaughter, creating a blemish, <b>and thereafter collected its blood</b> from the neck, the offering is <b>disqualified, as it is stated: “And</b> the anointed priest <b>shall take from the blood of the bull”</b> (Leviticus 4:5). By referring to the animal as a bull even after its slaughter, the verse indicates that the <b>bull</b> must be at the time of collection of the blood as <b>it already was</b> before slaughter, without a blemish.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> since the verse is referring to such an offering; <b>from where do we</b> derive that the same holds for <b>offerings of lesser sanctity?</b>",
            "<b>Rava says: It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the Paschal offering, an offering of lesser sanctity: The verse states: <b>“A lamb without blemish, a male of the first year</b> it shall be for you” (Exodus 12:5), indicating <b>that it shall be unblemished and in its</b> first <b>year at the time of slaughter. From where</b> is it derived that it must also be without blemish <b>at</b> the time of <b>collection</b> of the blood, <b>at</b> the time of <b>conveying</b> the blood to the altar, and <b>at</b> the time of the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood? <b>The verse states: “It shall be,”</b> emphasizing that <b>all its happenings shall be only</b> when it is <b>unblemished and in its</b> first <b>year.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye raised an objection to</b> this from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> With regard to <b>any of the</b> types of <b>offerings that</b> are mentioned <b>in the Torah from which there remains</b> either <b>an olive-bulk of flesh or an olive-bulk of fat,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that the priest <b>sprinkles the blood</b> of that offering. Apparently, one may sprinkle the blood even if much of the offering is damaged or missing.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Interpret</b> the verse as referring only <b>to</b> the requirement that the animal be <b>in its</b> first <b>year</b> until after the sprinkling. It may have a blemish at the time of sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara challenges this: <b>But is there any</b> case <b>where</b> the animal is <b>in its</b> first <b>year at the time of slaughter,</b> but <b>at the time of conveying</b> the blood to the altar <b>and sprinkling</b> the blood it is <b>in its second</b> year?",
            "<b>Rava says: That is to say</b> that <b>hours disqualify sacrificial</b> animals, i.e., one measures the age of the offering from the exact time of its birth. It is therefore possible that the animal reaches its second year between its slaughter and the conveying of its blood to the altar.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Ami says</b> that <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> In a case where the animal is standing <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>but its legs</b> are planted <b>outside</b> it, if one <b>severed</b> its legs <b>and thereafter slaughtered</b> it, the offering is <b>fit,</b> since all the blood collected in the bowl is from the portion of the animal standing in the courtyard."
        ],
        [
            "But if he <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>and thereafter severed</b> its legs, the offering is <b>disqualified</b> because some of the blood collected is from the legs, which are outside the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks: If he <b>severed</b> its legs <b>and thereafter slaughtered</b> it, is the offering <b>fit?</b> But isn’t <b>he sacrificing a blemished</b> animal? <b>Rather, say:</b> If one slaughtered the animal while it stood wholly in the courtyard, and afterward its legs moved beyond the edge of the courtyard, and then he <b>severed</b> its legs <b>and thereafter collected</b> the blood, the offering is <b>fit.</b> But if he <b>collected</b> the blood <b>and thereafter severed</b> the animal’s legs, the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> since the blood from the legs is mixed with the other blood of the animal.",
            "The Gemara challenges: If he <b>severed</b> its legs <b>and thereafter collected</b> the blood, is the offering <b>fit? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say:</b> If one <b>slits the ear of a firstborn</b> animal with the knife after slaughter, creating a blemish, <b>and thereafter collected its blood</b> from the neck, the offering is <b>disqualified, as it is stated: “And</b> the anointed priest <b>shall take from the blood of the bull”</b> (Leviticus 4:5)? The verse indicates that the <b>bull</b> must be at the time of collection of the blood as <b>it already was</b> before slaughter, without a blemish.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda says</b> that <b>Avimi says:</b> Rabbi Ami is not referring to a case where one severs the entire leg. Rather, one <b>cuts</b> the flesh <b>of the limb until he reaches the bone,</b> leaving the bone intact. This is not considered a blemish, and the animal remains fit for sacrifice.",
            "The Gemara suggests: Given that if he <b>collected</b> the blood <b>and thereafter severed</b> the animal’s legs, the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> perhaps <b>you</b> can <b>conclude from it</b> that <b>blood absorbed in the limbs</b> of an animal <b>is</b> considered <b>blood,</b> such that it disqualifies the offering because this blood left the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps</b> the offering is disqualified <b>because of</b> the animal’s <b>fat</b> that is mixed with the blood in the legs. This is considered to be like meat of the offering that has left the Temple courtyard, which also disqualifies the offering.",
            "The Gemara suggests: If so, perhaps <b>you</b> can <b>conclude</b> another <i>halakha</i> <b>from it:</b> In the case of <b>meat of offerings of lesser sanctity that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> even though the meat of such offerings may be eaten outside the Temple after the blood has been sprinkled.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps</b> the <i>halakha</i> was stated only <b>with regard to offerings of the most sacred order,</b> whose meat must be eaten inside the Temple courtyard. It proves nothing about offerings of lesser sanctity.",
            "The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>and collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north.</b> If one <b>stood in the south and extended his hand into the north and slaughtered</b> the offering there, <b>his slaughter</b> is <b>valid.</b> If he <b>collected</b> the blood in a similar manner, <b>his collection</b> is <b>not valid.</b> If <b>he inserted his head and most of his</b> body into the north of the courtyard and collected the blood there, it is <b>as if his entire</b> body <b>entered</b> the north. If he slaughtered the animal and it then <b>convulsed and left</b> the north <b>to the south and</b> then <b>returned</b> to the north, it remains <b>fit.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, their slaughter is</b> anywhere <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>and collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is anywhere <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard. If one <b>stood outside and inserted his hand into</b> the courtyard <b>and slaughtered</b> the offering there, <b>his slaughter</b> is <b>valid.</b> If he <b>collected</b> the blood in a similar manner, <b>his collection</b> is <b>not valid. And</b> if he <b>inserted his head and most of his</b> body into the courtyard and collected the blood, it is <b>as if he had not entered</b> it at all. If he slaughtered the animal and it then <b>convulsed and left to the outside</b> of the courtyard <b>and returned,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara infers: <b>Conclude from</b> this <i>baraita</i> that in cases of <b>meat of offerings of lesser sanctity that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood,</b> the offerings <b>are disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to</b> the <b>tail,</b> the <b>diaphragm, and</b> the <b>two kidneys</b> of offerings of lesser sanctity, which are all burned on the altar. Since these portions are never meant to leave the Temple courtyard, they are disqualified if they leave even momentarily. It may still be that the remaining meat of such offerings is not disqualified.",
            "§ <b>Shmuel’s father raised a dilemma before Shmuel:</b> If the offering was standing <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>and its legs</b> were <b>outside, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? May one slaughter it?",
            "Shmuel <b>said to him: It is written: “That they may bring them to the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 17:5), indicating that the offering may not be slaughtered <b>unless all of it is inside.</b>",
            "His father asked him further: If one <b>suspended</b> the animal in the air <b>and slaughtered</b> it, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel <b>said to him:</b> It is <b>valid.</b> His father <b>said to him: You are mistaken. We require</b> that the <b>slaughter</b> occur <b>on</b> the <b>side</b> of the altar (see Leviticus 1:11), <b>and</b> this is <b>not</b> considered to fulfill that requirement.",
            "His father asked him further: If the one slaughtering the animal <b>was suspended</b> in the air <b>and slaughtered</b> the offering while it was on the ground, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel <b>said to him:</b> It is <b>not valid.</b> His father <b>said to him: You are mistaken.</b> We require only that the <b>slaughter</b> occur <b>on</b> the <b>side</b> of the altar, <b>but not</b> that the <b>one who slaughters</b> be <b>on</b> the <b>side</b> of the altar.",
            "His father asked him further: If the priest <b>was suspended</b> in the air <b>and collected</b> the blood of the offering in that position, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel <b>said to him:</b> It is <b>valid.</b> His father <b>said to him: You are mistaken. This is not</b> a normal <b>manner of ministration.</b>",
            "His father asked him further: If the priest <b>suspended</b> the offering in the air after slaughter <b>and collected</b> its blood, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel <b>said to him:</b> It is <b>not valid.</b> His father <b>said to him: You are mistaken.</b> We require only that the <b>slaughter</b> occur <b>on</b> the <b>side</b> of the altar, <b>but not</b> that <b>collection</b> of the blood occur <b>on</b> the <b>side</b> of the altar.",
            "<b>Abaye said: With regard to offerings of the most sacred order,</b> in <b>all of</b> those cases the offerings <b>are disqualified, except for</b> the case where one <b>was suspended</b> in the air <b>and slaughtered</b> the animal. <b>With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> in <b>all of</b> those cases the offerings <b>are fit, except for</b> the case where the priest <b>was suspended</b> in the air <b>and collected</b> the blood.",
            "<b>Rava said: What is different</b> about a case where one <b>suspended</b> the animal <b>and collected</b> the blood of an <b>offering of lesser sanctity,</b> such <b>that</b> the offering is <b>fit?</b> Perhaps it is <b>because the air inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>is considered</b> to be <b>inside</b> the courtyard for purposes of the service. But if so, then <b>with regard to offerings of the most sacred order as well,</b> let one say that <b>air</b> in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>is considered</b> to be in the <b>north</b> for purposes of the service.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says: Both with regard to offerings of the most sacred order and with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> they <b>are fit</b> in all of those cases <b>except</b> where one <b>suspended</b> the animal <b>and slaughtered</b> it <b>in</b> the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> because the Torah mandates that such offerings be slaughtered on the side of the altar. And the offerings are also disqualified where the priest <b>was suspended</b> in the air <b>and collected</b> the blood, <b>both with regard to offerings of the most sacred order and with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> since this is not a normal manner of ministration.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira:</b> If the priest was <b>inside and his fringes,</b> i.e., his hair, were <b>outside,</b> and he collected the blood, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Zeira <b>said to him: Did you not say</b> that the verse: <b>“That they may bring them to the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 17:5), indicates that an offering may not be slaughtered <b>unless all of it comes inside? Here, too,</b> the verse states with regard to the priests: <b>“When they go into the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Exodus 28:43), indicating that the priest may not perform rites <b>unless all of him comes into the Tent of Meeting.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If the priest <b>placed</b> the blood <b>upon the ramp</b> leading up to the altar, or if he placed it on the wall of the altar in an area <b>that</b> is <b>not opposite the base</b> of the altar, i.e., in those parts of the altar where there is no foundation; or if <b>he placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line that runs along the middle of the altar, e.g., the blood of a burnt offering, <b>above</b> the red line, <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line, e.g., the blood of a sin offering, <b>below</b> the red line; <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary, i.e., on the golden altar or in the Holy of Holies, <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary on the external altar, <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, in all these cases the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> Nevertheless, <b>there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of these offerings."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Shmuel says:</b> When the mishna states that the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> it means that the <b>meat</b> is unfit for consumption. <b>But</b> the <b>owner</b> of the offering has <b>achieved atonement</b> through it. <b>What is the reason</b> for this? It is <b>as the verse states</b> with regard to the blood: <b>“And I have given it to you upon the altar to atone</b> for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11), from which it is derived that <b>once the blood reaches</b> any location on <b>the altar,</b> the <b>owner</b> of the offering has <b>achieved atonement.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> the <b>meat</b> should be fit for consumption <b>as well.</b> The Gemara responds: <b>The verse states “to atone,”</b> emphasizing that <b>I have given it</b> to you <b>for atonement and for nothing else,</b> e.g., consumption of the meat.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>Apparently,</b> Shmuel <b>holds</b> that blood sprinkled <b>not in its</b> proper <b>place is considered as</b> though it were sprinkled in <b>its</b> proper <b>place.</b> But <b>we learned</b> in a mishna <b>in another chapter</b> (32a): If an unfit person <b>placed</b> the blood <b>upon the ramp,</b> or on the wall of the altar <b>that</b> is <b>not opposite the base</b> of the altar; or if <b>he placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line; <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>or</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, then <b>if there is blood of the soul</b> that remains in the animal, <b>the</b> priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>should collect</b> the blood <b>again</b> and sprinkle it on the altar.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And if</b> it would <b>enter your mind</b> to say <b>that</b> blood sprinkled <b>not in its</b> proper <b>place</b> is considered <b>as</b> though it were sprinkled in <b>its</b> proper <b>place, why do I</b> need <b>the fit</b> priest to <b>collect</b> the blood <b>again</b> and sprinkle it? <b>And if you would say</b> that although the first sprinkling already effected atonement, the second sprinkling is necessary <b>to permit the meat</b> of the offering <b>for consumption, is there</b> such a concept as <b>a sprinkling that does not</b> itself <b>effect atonement and</b> yet <b>permits</b> the <b>meat for consumption?</b> Rather, one must conclude that the first sprinkling did not effect atonement at all, since it was not sprinkled in its proper place.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If a fit</b> priest <b>had</b> initially <b>placed</b> the blood improperly, the sprinkling would <b>indeed</b> have effected atonement after the fact and there would not be another sprinkling. But <b>here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where an unfit</b> person <b>placed</b> the blood, so that it did not effect atonement at all.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the mishna is dealing with a case where an unfit person placed the blood initially, then the offering <b>should be rejected</b> permanently, <b>as we learned</b> in the same mishna: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all</b> unfit people <b>who collected</b> the blood with the intent to offer it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, if there is blood of the soul</b> that remains in the animal, <b>the</b> priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>should collect</b> the blood <b>again</b> and sprinkle it on the altar. Since the mishna states this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to collection of the blood, one can infer that specifically if an unfit person <b>collected</b> the blood with improper intent, a fit priest can <b>indeed</b> collect the blood again, but if they <b>sprinkled</b> the blood with improper intent he <b>cannot. What is the reason</b> for this? Is it <b>not because</b> the offering <b>is rejected</b> permanently when an unfit person sprinkles its blood?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> the offering is rejected <b>because it is disqualified by</b> the improper <b>intent</b> of the person sprinkling the blood, not because that person is unfit.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> then improper intent with regard to <b>collection</b> of the blood should disqualify the offering <b>as well. And furthermore, does intent disqualify</b> offerings in such cases? <b>But doesn’t Rava say: Intent is effective</b> to disqualify an offering <b>only</b> when it is expressed <b>by one who is fit for the</b> Temple <b>service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the</b> Temple <b>service, and in a place that is fit for the</b> Temple <b>service?</b> Here, the one collecting the blood is unfit.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Do not say</b> that one infers from the mishna that if an unfit person <b>sprinkled</b> the blood with improper intent a fit priest <b>cannot</b> collect it again. <b>Rather, say</b> that one infers that if an unfit person <b>slaughtered</b> the offering with improper intent the mistake <b>cannot</b> be rectified. Slaughter is valid if performed by one unfit for the Temple service, and therefore an unfit person’s improper intent is effective to disqualify the offering. By contrast, collection and sprinkling of the blood must be performed by a fit priest. Consequently, an unfit person’s intent with regard to those rites does not disqualify the offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: According to this interpretation, <b>what is</b> the mishna <b>teaching us?</b> Can it mean to teach only <b>that</b> improper <b>intent</b> by an unfit person during slaughter <b>disqualifies</b> the offering? <b>We</b> already <b>learn</b> this in the same mishna (31b), which states: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, and <b>therefore, these</b> unfit people <b>disqualify</b> the offering <b>with</b> improper <b>intent.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>This</b> is what the mishna <b>teaches us: That</b> one who is unfit can disqualify the offering only during its slaughter, but <b>from</b> the rite of <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>onward</b> the <b>intent</b> of an unfit person <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering. <b>What is the reason</b> for this? It is <b>like that which Rava</b> says: Intent is effective to disqualify an offering only when expressed by one who is fit for the service in question.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered an offering and <b>had intent to place</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed <b>below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, and he had intent to do so <b>immediately,</b> i.e., on the same day, the offering remains <b>fit.</b> Therefore, if <b>he subsequently had intent</b> when performing the other rites"
        ],
        [
            "to burn or eat the offering or sprinkle its blood <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified, and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b> But if he had intent to perform one of those actions <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> then it is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>, and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b>",
            "If he had intent to sprinkle the blood improperly <b>the next day,</b> beyond the permitted time, then the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> Nevertheless, it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, because he also had intent to sprinkle the blood improperly. Therefore, if <b>he subsequently had intent</b> to sacrifice the offering or consume its meat, <b>whether beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> it is <b>disqualified and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it,</b> because an offering can be rendered <i>piggul</i> only if it would have otherwise been fit.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But if</b> blood sprinkled <b>not in its</b> proper <b>place</b> is considered <b>as</b> though it were sprinkled in <b>its</b> proper <b>place,</b> then in <b>this</b> case above, where he had intent to sprinkle the blood improperly the next day, is the offering merely <b>disqualified?</b> Since <b>it is</b> considered as though he had intent to sprinkle the blood properly the next day, shouldn’t the offering be rendered <b><i>piggul</i>?</b>",
            "<b>Mar Zutra said:</b> Intent with regard to <b>sprinkling that permits</b> the <b>meat for consumption</b> can <b>cause</b> the offering <b>to</b> become <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> Intent with regard to <b>sprinkling that does not render</b> the <b>meat permitted for consumption does not cause</b> it <b>to</b> become <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> Even Shmuel concedes that although the owner achieves atonement, if the blood is sprinkled in an improper place the meat may not be consumed. Accordingly, this offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: From where do you</b> derive <b>this?</b> Mar Zutra replied: I derive it from a verse, <b>as it is written: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten</b> on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it, <b>it shall be <i>piggul</i>”</b> (Leviticus 7:18). The verse indicates that only an offering <b>whose</b> intent of <b><i>piggul</i></b> alone <b>caused it</b> to be disqualified is considered <i>piggul</i>. <b>Excluded is this</b> case, <b>whose</b> intent of <b><i>piggul</i></b> alone <b>did not cause it</b> to be disqualified; <b>rather, the prohibition of something else,</b> i.e., the intent to sprinkle the blood in an improper location, <b>caused it</b> to be disqualified.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But <b>if so,</b> i.e., if blood applied not in its proper place is considered as though it were applied in its proper place, and the intent to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, then <b>it should not even be disqualified</b> due to such an intention. Why, then, does the <i>baraita</i> rule that it is disqualified?",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:</b> In general, intent to perform the rites of an offering beyond its designated time disqualifies the offering, even when it does not render it <i>piggul</i>, <b>just as is</b> the case <b>with regard to the intent to leave</b> portions of the offering for the next day, as taught in a mishna in the next chapter (35b), <b>and according to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda</b> there, that intent to leave the blood until the next day rather than sprinkling it on the altar disqualifies the offering even though it does not render it <i>piggul</i>.",
            "§ The Gemara cites additional opinions with regard to the statement of the mishna that blood misapplied on the altar disqualifies the offering. <b>Reish Lakish says: Actually,</b> when the mishna states that the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> this is to be taken <b>literally,</b> i.e., that the owner does not even achieve atonement through it. <b>And</b> nevertheless, blood sprinkled <b>not in its</b> proper <b>place is considered as</b> though it were sprinkled in <b>its</b> proper <b>place,</b> and it effects atonement. <b>And</b> the apparent contradiction between these two claims is <b>not difficult: Here, where</b> misapplication of the blood effects atonement, it is a case <b>where he placed</b> it <b>in silence,</b> i.e., without specific intent; <b>there,</b> in the mishna, it is a case <b>where he placed</b> it <b>with a statement,</b> i.e., intent to consume the offering beyond its appointed time.",
            "Since Reish Lakish agrees with the statement of Shmuel that blood applied not in its proper place is considered as though it were applied in its proper place, the Gemara poses the same difficulties to the statement of Reish Lakish as posed above to Shmuel: <b>We learned</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered an offering and <b>had intent to place</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed <b>above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line, etc., <b>until</b> the response of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: <b>Just as is</b> the case <b>with regard to the intent to leave</b> portions of the offering for the next day, <b>and according to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda, etc.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> Both <b>here and there,</b> i.e., in the mishna here as well as in the mishna in the next chapter (32a), it is a case <b>where he placed</b> the blood <b>in silence. And</b> the mishna here rules that the offering is completely disqualified because blood applied <b>not in its</b> proper <b>place is not considered as</b> though it were applied in <b>its</b> proper <b>place. And that</b> mishna in the next chapter, which states that the blood may be collected and sprinkled again, is referring to a case <b>where there is blood of the soul</b> left in the animal to sprinkle again, while <b>this</b> mishna is referring to a case <b>where there is no blood of the soul</b> left.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>We learned</b> in the mishna that if the blood was misapplied on the altar, the offering is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of the meat. <b>Granted, according to Reish Lakish,</b> who explains that the mishna is referring to one who expresses intent to sacrifice or consume the offering beyond its designated time, <b>this is</b> the reason <b>that</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>teaches: Disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it,</b> to stress that although one sprinkled the blood with intent of <i>piggul</i>, since the sprinkling was performed improperly, his intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, and one who partakes of it is not liable to receive <i>karet</i>.",
            "<b>But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> who explains that the mishna is referring to a case where the blood was sprinkled with no specific intent, of <b>what</b> necessity is the clause: <b>There is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it?</b> Since the offering is disqualified because the blood was placed not in its proper place, and there was no intent of <i>piggul</i>, why would one think that there should be liability for <i>karet</i>? The Gemara responds: Indeed, this clause is <b>difficult</b> for Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And according to Shmuel,</b> of <b>what</b> necessity is the clause: <b>There is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>This</b> is what the mishna <b>is saying: If one placed</b> the blood improperly <b>with intent</b> that would otherwise render the offering <i>piggul</i>, the offering is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it,</b> because such sprinkling would not have permitted the meat for consumption.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And</b> according to <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan, if</b> blood sprinkled <b>not in its</b> proper <b>place is not considered as</b> though it were sprinkled in <b>its</b> proper <b>place, it should be as if it spilled from the</b> service <b>vessel onto the floor, and let</b> the priest <b>gather it up</b> and sprinkle it again properly. Why, then, does the mishna rule that it is disqualified?",
            "The Gemara responds: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says: He may not gather it up. As Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All concede with regard to</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>that</b> if <b>one placed it above</b> the red line, and likewise with regard to the blood that is to be placed <b>below</b> the red line if one <b>placed it below</b> the red line, <b>not in accordance with</b> the procedure dictated by <b>its mitzva,</b> e.g., with the left hand or with improper intent, <b>he may not gather it up</b> again. <b>They disagree only with regard to</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>that one placed below</b> the red line, and blood that is to be placed <b>below</b> the red line <b>that one placed above</b> the red line, <b>as Rabbi Yosei says: He may not gather it up, and Rabbi Shimon says: He may gather it up.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>And our mishna is in accordance with the statement of the one who says: He may not gather it up.</b>",
            "<b>And Rav Ḥisda</b> says that <b>Avimi says: Everyone concedes with regard to</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>that</b> if <b>one placed it above</b> the red line <b>he may not gather it up</b> again. <b>And all the more so with regard to the</b> blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>that one placed below</b> the red line, <b>since the blood</b> placed <b>above</b> the red line will eventually run down the side of the altar and <b>reach below</b> the red line. <b>They disagree only with regard to</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>that one placed outside</b> on the external altar, or blood that is to be placed <b>outside that one placed inside, as Rabbi Yosei says: He may gather it up,</b> as though it had spilled on the floor, <b>and Rabbi Shimon says: He may not gather it up,</b> because the blood was nevertheless placed on an altar.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: We learn</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>as well</b> that if the blood is misapplied on the altar it may not be gathered, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that the verse states: <b>“This</b> is the law of the burnt offering: <b>It is that which goes up [<i>ha’ola</i>]</b> on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that a disqualified offering that ascended upon the altar shall not descend from it. <b>These</b> terms, i.e., “this,” “it,” and “that,” <b>are</b> three terms of <b>exclusion,</b> which serve <b>to exclude</b> three cases of disqualified offerings from this <i>halakha</i>: An offering that <b>was slaughtered at night,</b> one <b>whose blood was spilled, and</b> one <b>whose blood emerged outside the curtains,</b> i.e., the Temple courtyard. In these cases, even <b>if</b> the offering <b>ascended</b> upon the altar <b>it shall descend.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> From the term <b>“burnt offering [<i>ola</i>]” I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that <b>a fit burnt offering</b> shall not descend. <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>that</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>includes</b> an offering <b>that was slaughtered at night, or</b> one <b>whose blood was spilled, or</b> one <b>whose blood emerged outside the curtains, or</b> one <b>that was left overnight, or</b> one <b>that left</b> the courtyard, <b>or</b> one <b>that</b> became <b>impure, or</b> one <b>that was slaughtered</b> with intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> an offering for <b>which an unfit</b> person <b>collected and sprinkled its blood, or</b> a case where <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> it, <b>or</b> where <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> it, <b>or</b> where <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>outside</b> on the external altar, <b>or</b> where <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>inside</b> it, <b>or a Paschal offering or a sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake? From where</b> is it derived that if these offerings ascended they shall not descend?",
            "<b>The verse states: “The law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>],”</b> literally: That which goes up. The verse <b>included</b> under <b>one law all</b> items <b>that ascend</b> upon the altar, teaching <b>that if they ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall not descend.</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I</b> should <b>include even an animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or</b> an animal <b>that was set aside</b> for idol worship, <b>or</b> an animal <b>that was worshipped</b> as a deity, <b>or</b> an animal that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute <b>or</b> as <b>the price</b> of a dog, <b>or</b> an animal born of a mixture of <b>diverse kinds, or</b> an animal that is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, or</b> an animal <b>born by caesarean section. The verse</b> therefore <b>states: “This,”</b> to exclude these animals from the <i>halakha</i>.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what did you see</b> as the reason <b>to include</b> the former cases <b>and to exclude</b> the latter ones? The Gemara responds: <b>I include these</b> former cases, <b>whose disqualification occurred in sanctity,</b> i.e., in the course of the Temple service, <b>and I exclude these</b> latter cases, <b>whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity</b> and were disqualified as offerings from the outset.",
            "Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak continues: <b>In any event,</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches</b> that if <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> it, <b>or</b> if <b>one placed</b> the blood that is to be placed <b>above</b> the red line <b>below</b> it, the offering does not descend from the altar. <b>And Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree,</b> even though he holds that if the blood spilled on the ground the offering descends from the altar. <b>What is the reason</b> for this? Is it <b>not because</b> even if the blood was misapplied, <b>the altar has absorbed</b> the blood and it is not considered to have been spilled on the floor? <b>Conclude from it</b> that if blood was misapplied on the altar, the priest <b>may not gather it up</b> again, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "§ Pursuant to the discussion of disqualified offerings that do not descend from the external altar, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: The inner altar,</b> i.e., the golden altar inside the Sanctuary, <b>sanctifies disqualified</b> offerings such that if they ascended onto it, they do not descend.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> this statement <b>teaching us? We</b> already <b>learn</b> this in the above <i>baraita</i>: If one placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary outside on the external altar, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside it, on the golden altar, the offering does not descend.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> one were to learn the <i>halakha</i> only <b>from there, I would say: This matter</b> applies only to <b>blood</b> mistakenly placed on the golden altar, <b>as it is fit to</b> be placed on that altar in certain contexts, i.e., the blood of the bull and goat sin offerings on Yom Kippur; <b>but</b> with regard to <b>a handful</b> from a meal offering, <b>which is not fit to</b> be placed on the golden altar in any context, <b>I will say</b> that it is <b>not</b> sanctified when placed on it. Rabbi Eliezer therefore <b>teaches us</b> that even a handful from a meal offering does not descend from it.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>strange incense,</b> i.e., incense that it is prohibited to burn on the golden altar, <b>ascended onto the altar, it shall descend, as only the external altar sanctifies disqualified</b> offerings that are <b>suited for it.</b> One can infer that the <b>external</b> altar <b>does</b> sanctify disqualified offerings, but the <b>inner</b> altar does <b>not.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Answer like this:</b> The <i>baraita</i> means that if <b>strange incense ascended onto the external altar, it shall descend, as the external altar sanctifies only disqualified</b> offerings <b>that are suited for it. But the inner</b> altar sanctifies everything, <b>whether it is suited for it or it is not suited for it. What is the reason</b> for this? <b>This,</b> the external altar, is considered part of the <b>floor,</b> since it is fixed to the floor of the Temple, <b>and that,</b> the inner altar, is considered <b>a service vessel</b> with a higher level of sanctity.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>one who slaughters the offering</b> with intent <b>to sprinkle its blood outside</b> the Temple <b>or</b> to sprinkle <b>part of its blood outside</b> the Temple, <b>to burn its sacrificial portions outside</b> the Temple <b>or</b> to burn <b>part of its sacrificial portions outside</b> the Temple, <b>to partake of its meat outside</b> the Temple <b>or</b> to partake of <b>an olive-bulk of its meat outside</b> the Temple, <b>or to partake of an olive-bulk of the skin of the tail outside</b> the Temple, in all of these cases the offering is <b>disqualified, and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of it.",
            "But if one had intent <b>to sprinkle its blood the next day</b> or <b>part of its blood the next day, to burn its sacrificial portions the next day or</b> to burn <b>part of its sacrificial portions the next day, to partake of its meat the next day or</b> to partake of <b>an olive-bulk of its meat the next day, or to partake of an olive-bulk of the skin of the tail the next day,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i>, and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The students <b>assumed</b> that <b>the skin of the tail</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>is considered as</b> though it were part of the <b>tail</b> itself. The tail of a sheep sacrificed as a peace offering is burned on the altar rather than eaten. <b>But</b> if so, one who slaughters the sheep with intent to consume the skin of its tail the next day <b>has intent</b> to shift its consumption <b>from consumption by</b> the <b>altar,</b> i.e., burning the offering, <b>to</b> consumption by <b>a person.</b> Since intent to consume part of an offering beyond its designated time renders an offering <i>piggul</i> only if that part is intended for human consumption, why does the mishna rule that such an offering is <i>piggul</i>?",
            "<b>Shmuel says:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this? It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent</b> to shift an item’s consumption <b>from consumption by</b> the <b>altar to consumption by a person, or from consumption by a person to consumption by</b> the <b>altar,</b> and the offering will still be rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (35a): In a case of <b>one who slaughters the offering</b> with intent <b>to partake of an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it, or <b>to burn an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not burn</b> it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is <b>fit. And Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> it <b>unfit.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>In accordance with which</b> opinion <b>did you interpret</b> the mishna here? You interpreted it <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer.</b> But if so, <b>say the latter clause,</b> i.e., the next mishna (29b): <b>This is the principle: Anyone who slaughters</b> the animal, <b>or who collects</b> the blood, <b>or who conveys</b> the blood, <b>or who sprinkles</b> the blood with the intent <b>to partake of an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, <b>or to burn an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>burns</b> it on the altar, beyond its designated time, renders it <i>piggul</i>.",
            "One can infer that intent to partake of <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it <b>does</b> render it <i>piggul</i>, while intent to partake of an item <b>whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it does <b>not</b> render it <i>piggul</i>. In this clause, <b>we arrive at</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis.</b> Can it be that <b>the first clause</b> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer,</b> while <b>the latter clause</b> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis?</b> Shmuel <b>said to him: Yes.</b> That is how one must understand the mishna.",
            "<b>Rav Huna says: The skin of</b> the <b>tail is not considered as</b> though it were the <b>tail</b> itself. Unlike the tail itself, its skin is consumed. Consequently, both this mishna and the next can be understood in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. <b>Rava said: What is the reasoning of Rav Huna?</b> As the verse states: “And he shall present of the sacrifice of peace offerings an offering made by fire unto the Lord: <b>The fat thereof, the fat tail”</b> (Leviticus 3:9), indicating that the priest must offer the fat of the tail on the altar, <b>but not the skin of the tail.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda says: Actually, the skin of the tail is considered as</b> though it were the <b>tail</b> itself, and it is burned on the altar. <b>And here,</b> in the mishna, <b>we are dealing with the tail of a kid,</b> which is not burned on the altar but is consumed. Accordingly, intent to consume it outside its designated time renders it <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>All of them,</b> Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda, <b>do not say as Shmuel</b> says, since <b>they do not</b> wish to <b>interpret</b> that <b>the first clause</b> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer and the latter clause</b> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis.</b> And Shmuel and Rav Ḥisda <b>do not say as Rav Huna</b> says, since <b>they heard</b> that the <b>skin of</b> the <b>tail is considered as</b> though it were the <b>tail</b> itself.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> that Shmuel and Rav Huna <b>do not say as Rav Ḥisda</b> says, that the mishna is referring to the tail of a kid? The Gemara responds that they reason: According to Rav Ḥisda, <b>what is</b> the mishna <b>teaching us</b> by referring specifically to the skin of the tail? Does it mean to teach simply that the <b>skin of</b> the <b>tail is considered</b> edible, <b>like</b> the <b>tail</b> itself? <b>We</b> already <b>learn</b> this in another mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 122a): <b>These</b> are the entities <b>whose skin</b> has a halakhic status <b>like</b> that of <b>their meat,</b> since it is soft and edible: The <b>skin beneath the tail.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And Rav Ḥisda,</b> how would he respond? The Gemara answers: The reference here to the skin of the tail <b>was necessary,</b> as given only the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥullin</i>, it might <b>enter your mind to say: This matter,</b> the equation between the skin of the tail and the tail itself, applies only <b>with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, as</b> the skin of the tail is <b>soft</b> and edible, and it is therefore <b>counted</b> as part of the tail. <b>But here,</b> with regard to the matter of the Temple service, <b>I will say</b> that the verse states with regard to the gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled: <b>“As a consecrated portion”</b> (Numbers 18:8), <b>to</b> indicate that they must be eaten in <b>greatness, in the way that the kings eat. And</b> since <b>kings do not generally eat</b> the skin of the tail, <b>I will say</b> that it is <b>not</b> considered an eaten portion of the offering. The mishna therefore <b>teaches us</b> that it is nevertheless considered like the tail itself.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One who slaughters a burnt offering</b> with intent <b>to burn an olive-bulk of</b> the <b>skin beneath the tail outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> renders the offering <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of the offering. If his intent is to burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> it is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>, and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> eating <b>it.</b> This is the opinion of the Rabbis.",
            "<b>Elazar ben Yehuda of Avelim says in the name of Rabbi Ya’akov, and so Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda of Kefar Ikos would say in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Whether</b> the <b>hide of the hooves</b> of <b>small livestock, or</b> the <b>skin of the head of a young calf, or</b> the <b>skin beneath the tail, or any</b> of the skins <b>that the Sages listed with regard to ritual impurity</b> under the heading: <b>These</b> are the entities <b>whose skin</b> has a halakhic status <b>like</b> that of <b>their meat,</b> which means <b>to include the skin of the womb,</b> if one has intent to burn one of them <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it,</b> and if one’s intent is to burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> he renders it <b><i>piggul</i>, and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b>",
            "One can infer from the <i>baraita</i> that only with regard to <b>a burnt offering, yes,</b> the skin of the tail is burned on the altar like the tail itself. <b>But</b> with regard to another <b>offering,</b> this is <b>not</b> the <i>halakha</i>. <b>Granted, according to Rav Huna,</b> who holds that the skin of the tail of a peace offering is not considered as though it were the tail itself, and it is eaten rather than burned, <b>this is</b> the reason <b>that</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>teaches</b> about <b>a burnt offering</b> specifically, as all portions of a burnt offering are burned, even those that are eaten in the case of other offerings. <b>But according to Rav Ḥisda,</b> who holds that the skin of the tail is burned together with the tail, <b>why does</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>specifically teach</b> about <b>a burnt offering?</b> If the skin of the tail is always considered as though it were the tail itself, <b>let</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>teach</b> about any <b>offering.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda</b> could have <b>said to you: If you wish, say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to the tail of a kid,</b> which is never burned on the altar except in the case of a burnt offering. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that one should emend the text of the <i>baraita</i> to <b>teach:</b> One who slaughters any <b>offering,</b> etc.",
            "§ The mishna states that if one intends to consume the meat or sprinkle the blood outside its designated area, the offering is <b>disqualified, and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of it. If one intends to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Shmuel says: Two verses are written.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What are</b> these verses? <b>Rabba said:</b> Shmuel is referring to two phrases from the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The Sages taught that this verse is referring not to offerings actually eaten on the third day, but to one who performs one of the sacrificial rites with intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time. Now, when the verse states: “And if any of the flesh…be at all eaten on the <b>third</b> day,” <b>this is</b> referring to intent to consume the meat <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time.</b>",
            "When the verse states: “It shall be <b><i>piggul</i>,” this is</b> referring to one who has intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b> And when the verse states: <b>“And the soul that eats of it</b> shall bear his iniquity,” i.e., shall be liable to receive <i>karet</i>, “of it” indicates that only <b>one</b> of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of it, <b>but not two</b> of them. And <b>this</b> included case <b>is</b> intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, to the exclusion of</b> intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> which carries no such penalty.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> why not <b>say</b> the opposite, that when the verse states: <b>“And the soul that eats of it</b> shall bear his iniquity,” <b>this is</b> referring to intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, to the exclusion of</b> intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>It stands to reason</b> that intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time</b> is the <b>preferable</b> candidate to carry the punishment of <i>karet</i>, <b>as</b> the verse <b>opened with it.</b> The Gemara rejects this: <b>On the contrary,</b> intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> is <b>preferable, as</b> the clause that teaches liability for <i>karet</i> is <b>adjacent to it.</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Abaye said: When Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi came,</b> he said that <b>Rav says:</b> Shmuel was actually referring to two separate verses. And he <b>relied on that which the <i>tanna</i> taught:</b> The verse is seemingly redundant <b>when it states:</b> “And if it be eaten at all on the <b>third</b> day, it is <i>piggul</i>; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), <b>in the</b> Torah <b>portion</b> that begins: <b>“You shall be holy”</b> (Leviticus 19:2), <b>as</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state</b> this, <b>since it is already stated: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day</b>…it shall be <i>piggul</i>” (Leviticus 7:18)."
        ],
        [
            "Therefore, <b>if</b> the verse <b>is not</b> referring <b>to the matter</b> of intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, apply it to the matter of</b> intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area. And</b> as for the punishment of <i>karet</i>, <b>the Merciful One restricted</b> it to the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>,</b> i.e., actually partaking of the offering beyond its designated time, as the verse states: <b>“But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity”</b> (Leviticus 19:8). This indicates that one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of <i>notar</i>, <b>to the exclusion of</b> intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> why not <b>say</b> instead that when the verse states: <b>“But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this is</b> referring to intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, and</b> the verse serves <b>to exclude <i>notar</i> from</b> the penalty of <b><i>karet</i>?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>It stands to reason</b> that <b><i>notar</i> should be interpreted as</b> carrying the penalty of <b><i>karet</i>,</b> because this would allow one <b>to derive</b> by way of verbal analogy between <b>“iniquity”</b> and <b>“iniquity”</b> stated with regard <b>to</b> the case of intent to consume the meat <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> that the punishment of <i>karet</i> applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would be apt <b>since</b> one prohibition <b>is similar to</b> the other <b>in</b> that they share features that form the acronym <b><i>zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>:</b> Both concern the offering’s designated time [<i>zeman</i>], and both are applicable to an offering sacrificed on a private altar [<i>bama</i>].",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>On the contrary,</b> intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area should be interpreted as</b> carrying the penalty of <b><i>karet</i>,</b> because this would allow one <b>to derive</b> by way of verbal analogy between <b>“iniquity”</b> and <b>“iniquity”</b> stated with regard <b>to</b> the case of intent to consume the meat <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> that the punishment of <i>karet</i> applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would still be apt <b>since</b> one prohibition <b>is similar to</b> the other <b>in</b> that both share features that form the acronym <b><i>mikdash</i>:</b> Both concern intent [<i>maḥashava</i>]; both disqualify the entire offering even if one had intent with regard to only part [<i>ketzat</i>] of it; both occur while collecting or sprinkling the offering’s blood [<i>dam</i>]; and with regard to both the verse contains an extraneous mention of the third [<i>shelishi</i>] day.",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that <b>Zavdi bar Levi taught: It is derived</b> that the prohibition of <i>notar</i> carries the penalty of <i>karet</i> by way of verbal analogy between <b>“sacred”</b> and <b>“sacred.” It is written here:</b> “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity, because <b>he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord; and</b> that soul <b>shall be cut off</b> from his people” (Leviticus 19:8). <b>And it is written there:</b> “And if any of the flesh of the consecration, or of the bread, remain until the morning, <b>then you shall burn the remainder [<i>notar</i>] with fire;</b> it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred” (Exodus 29:34). <b>Just as</b> the verse <b>there</b> is referring to <b><i>notar</i>, so too,</b> the verse <b>here</b> is referring to <b><i>notar</i>.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> consequently, when <b>the Merciful One restricted</b> the penalty of <i>karet</i> <b>to</b> the prohibition of eating <b><i>notar</i>,</b> as the verse states: <b>“But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,”</b> this restriction serves <b>to exclude</b> the case of intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area from</b> the penalty of <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara returns to the initial assumption that the statement of Shmuel is referring to two verses: <b>And what did you see</b> that led you to conclude <b>that the long verse</b> (Leviticus 7:18) is referring <b>to</b> intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and</b> that the verse that mentions the <b>third</b> day (Leviticus 19:7) <b>in the</b> Torah <b>portion</b> that begins: <b>“You shall be holy,”</b> is referring to intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area? I</b> might just as well <b>reverse</b> the two.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>It stands to reason</b> that <b>the long</b> verse is referring <b>to</b> intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, as</b> this allows for one to <b>derive</b> by way of verbal analogy between <b>“iniquity”</b> and <b>“iniquity” from <i>notar</i></b> that an offering sacrificed with such intent carries the penalty of <i>karet</i>. The verbal analogy is apt <b>since</b> one prohibition <b>is similar to</b> the other <b>in</b> that both share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: <b><i>Zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>On the contrary,</b> it stands to reason that <b>the long</b> verse is referring <b>to</b> intent to consume the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, and</b> that the verse that mentions the <b>third</b> day <b>in</b> the Torah portion that begins: <b>“You shall be holy,”</b> is referring <b>to</b> intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time.</b> This is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> the latter intent is <b>similar to</b> <i>notar</i> in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: <i>Zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>, and it is therefore reasonable that the Torah <b>juxtaposed</b> the two in adjacent verses. <b>And</b> if so, when the verse states with regard to <i>notar</i>: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this <b>excludes</b> intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time from the penalty of <i>karet</i>.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says:</b> One must accept the original interpretation of Shmuel’s statement, that <b>all of</b> these <i>halakhot</i> with regard to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area <b>are derived from the long verse. As it is written:</b> “If any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). When the verse states: <b>“Be at all eaten [<i>he’akhol ye’akhel</i>],”</b> using a doubled verb, <b>the verse speaks of</b> intent with regard to <b>two consumptions, one consumption by a person, and one consumption by</b> the <b>altar,</b> i.e., burning the offering. Improper intent with regard to either of these acts renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The phrase <b>“any of the flesh of his peace offerings”</b> indicates that <b>just as a peace offering</b> possesses that which <b>renders <i>piggul</i> and</b> that which <b>is rendered <i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., the blood, which renders the offering <i>piggul</i> through one’s intent with regard to its rites, and the meat, which is rendered <i>piggul</i> through such intent, <b>so too</b> the verse is referring to <b>all</b> offerings that possess that which <b>renders</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i> and</b> that which <b>is rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The term “on the <b>third</b> day” indicates that the verse is referring to intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> as peace offerings may be eaten for only two days.",
            "The phrase <b>“it shall not be accepted”</b> indicates that an offering is deemed <i>piggul</i> following the stage of the service at which it would have otherwise effected atonement. Therefore, <b>like the acceptance of a fit</b> offering, <b>so</b> is <b>the acceptance of a disqualified</b> offering, <b>and just as the acceptance of a fit</b> offering does not occur <b>until one sacrifices all its permitting factors,</b> i.e., one sprinkles the blood properly, <b>so too the acceptance of a disqualified</b> offering does not occur <b>until one sacrifices all its permitting factors.</b>",
            "The term <b>“he who offers”</b> indicates that <i>piggul</i> <b>is disqualified at</b> the time of <b>offering,</b> due to improper intent, <b>and it is not disqualified on the third</b> day literally. And when the verse states <b>“it,”</b> this indicates that <b>the verse is speaking of</b> a disqualification of the <b>offering</b> only, <b>but it is not speaking of</b> the <b>priest,</b> who is not disqualified from the priesthood through such intent.",
            "The phrase <b>“neither shall it be credited [<i>yeḥashev</i>]”</b>"
        ],
        [
            "indicates that to render an offering <i>piggul</i>, the priest <b>does not mix other</b> improper <b>intentions [<i>maḥashavot</i>] with</b> intent of <i>piggul</i>. If he has more than one type of improper intent, the offering is disqualified, but it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "When the verse states: <b>“<i>Piggul</i>,” this is</b> referring to an offering that one had intent to consume <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b>",
            "And since the verse states: <b>“It shall be,”</b> and not: They shall be, this <b>teaches that</b> intent to consume half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time and intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area <b>join together with one another</b> to constitute the minimum measure required to disqualify the offering.",
            "Finally, when the verse states: <b>“And the soul that eats of it</b> shall bear his iniquity,” the term “of it” indicates that only <b>one</b> of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of <i>karet</i>, <b>but not two</b> of them. <b>And which is this?</b> It is intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, as</b> one <b>derives</b> by way of verbal analogy between <b>“iniquity”</b> and <b>“iniquity” from <i>notar</i></b> (Leviticus 19:8), that “bear his iniquity” means that one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The comparison is apt <b>since</b> <i>notar</i> <b>is similar to</b> intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time <b>in</b> that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: <b><i>Zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said to Rava: According to your</b> opinion, in <b>what</b> way do <b>you interpret</b> the reference to the <b>third</b> day (Leviticus 19:7) <b>in the</b> Torah <b>portion</b> that begins: <b>“You shall be holy”?</b> Rava responded: <b>That</b> verse is <b>necessary to</b> teach <b>that</b> a given <b>location</b> is considered to be outside the offering’s designated area only if it <b>is</b> so <b>in three ways,</b> i.e., outside the permitted limits <b>of</b> the <b>blood, of</b> the <b>meat, and of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: Why not <b>let me derive</b> that <i>halakha</i> <b>from the first verse:</b> “And <b>if</b> any of the flesh of his peace offerings <b>be at all eaten</b> on the third day” (Leviticus 7:18), <b>since the Merciful One expresses</b> that verse as well <b>with the term “third”?</b> Since Rava derives the disqualification of intent to consume an offering outside its designated area from this verse, why not let him derive this <i>halakha</i> from the verse as well?",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said: I stated</b> this <b><i>halakha</i> before Rav Mattana,</b> and <b>he said to me: If</b> one were to derive this <i>halakha</i> only <b>from there</b> (Leviticus 7:18), <b>I would say:</b> The term <b>“third”</b> is <b>a detail,</b> and the term <b>“<i>piggul</i>”</b> is <b>a generalization, and</b> whenever a detail is followed by a generalization, <b>the generalization becomes an addition to the detail, and</b> consequently, all <b>other areas are included</b> as well. The additional verse <b>teaches us</b> that the <i>halakha</i> includes only those areas that are outside in three ways.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> with regard to the verse: <b>“And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten</b> on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18): <b>Rabbi Eliezer said: Bend your ear to hear</b> the true meaning of the verse: <b>The verse is speaking of one who intends to partake of his offering on the third day. Or</b> perhaps it is referring <b>only to</b> one <b>who</b> actually <b>partakes of his offering on the third day,</b> per the straightforward meaning of the verse? But that cannot be; would <b>you say</b> that <b>after</b> the offering <b>is fit</b> for the first two days, <b>it should then be disqualified</b> retroactively by being eaten on the third day?",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yes,</b> it could be disqualified retroactively. After all, <b>we find with regard to a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>], or a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], or a woman who observes</b> a clean <b>day for a day</b> when she experiences a discharge, <b>that they</b> all <b>have the presumptive status of purity</b> after immersing. <b>But once they have seen</b> another discharge the same day, <b>they have negated</b> this status retroactively, and everything they had touched after immersing becomes impure. Therefore, <b>you as well should not be surprised about this</b> offering consumed beyond its designated time, <b>that even though it was rendered fit, it may then be disqualified</b> retroactively.",
            "Rabbi Eliezer <b>said to him: But</b> the same verse <b>says: “He who offers</b> it,” indicating that the offering <b>is disqualified at the time of</b> its <b>offering, and it is not disqualified on the third</b> day. <b>Or</b> perhaps when the verse <b>says: “He who offers</b> it,” <b>this</b> is referring <b>only</b> to <b>the priest who sacrifices</b> the offering, indicating that he is disqualified. But if so, it would have been enough for the verse to state: He who offers shall not be credited. Therefore, <b>when it states</b> instead: “Neither shall it be credited to he who offers <b>it,”</b> this indicates that the verse <b>is speaking of the offering, and it is not speaking of the priest.</b>",
            "<b>Ben Azzai says: Why</b> must <b>the verse state: “It”?</b> It is necessary <b>because</b> elsewhere <b>it is stated:</b> “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, <b>you shall not delay paying it;</b> for the Lord your God will require it from you, and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>even</b> one who <b>is late</b> in fulfilling <b>his vow</b> is included <b>in: “It shall not be accepted”</b> (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, <b>the verse states: “It,”</b> to indicate that <b>it,</b> an offering rendered <i>piggul</i>, <b>is</b> included <b>in</b> the <i>halakha</i> of: <b>“It shall not be accepted,” but</b> the animal of <b>one who is late</b> in fulfilling <b>his vow is not</b> included <b>in</b> the <i>halakha</i> of: <b>“It shall not be accepted.”</b>",
            "<b><i>Aḥerim</i> say:</b> One can conclude that the verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to improper intention rather than improper consumption from the phrase <b>“neither shall it be credited [<i>yeḥashev</i>],”</b> which indicates that the offering <b>is disqualified by</b> improper <b>intention [<i>maḥashava</i>], and it is not disqualified</b> by consumption <b>on the third</b> day.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And ben Azzai,</b> who interprets the term “it” as excluding vows that were fulfilled late, <b>from where does he</b> derive <b>that the verse is speaking of</b> the <b>offering and not of</b> the <b>priest?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>If you wish, say</b> that <b>he derives it from</b> the statement <b>of <i>Aḥerim</i></b> that the verse rules out disqualification on the third day itself. This would be necessary only if the verse is referring to the offering and not the priest. <b>Or, if you wish, say</b> instead: <b>From</b> the fact <b>that it is written: “They shall not be accepted”</b> (Leviticus 22:25), <b>and: “It shall not be accepted”</b> (Leviticus 7:18), it is evident that the verse <b>is</b> referring to <b>an offering,</b> which may be accepted or may not be accepted.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> with regard to the statement of <b>ben Azzai</b> that one derives from the word “it” that <b>it,</b> i.e., <i>piggul</i>, is included <b>in</b> the <i>halakha</i> of: <b>“It shall not be accepted,” but</b> the animal of one who <b>is late</b> in fulfilling <b>his vow is not</b> included <b>in</b> the <i>halakha</i> of: <b>“It shall not be accepted,”</b> is this <i>halakha</i> <b>derived from here? It is derived from</b> the statement <b>of <i>Aḥerim</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b><i>Aḥerim</i> say:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>a firstborn</b> animal <b>whose</b> first <b>year passed,</b> during which time it ought to have been sacrificed, <b>should be</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>like disqualified consecrated</b> animals, <b>and it should be disqualified</b> from being sacrificed, as though it had developed a blemish.",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God,</b> in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, <b>the tithe of your grain,</b> of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23). The verse <b>juxtaposes a firstborn</b> animal <b>to</b> the <b>tithe</b> of grain to indicate that <b>just as</b> the <b>tithe is not disqualified</b> by being kept over <b>from</b> one <b>year to the next</b> (see Deuteronomy 14:28), <b>so too a firstborn</b> animal <b>is not disqualified</b> by being kept over <b>from</b> one <b>year to the next.</b> If so, one already derives from this verse that an offering is not disqualified even if it is brought late.",
            "The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, the verse cited by ben Azzai <b>was necessary,</b> as without it, it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>this matter</b> applies only to <b>a firstborn, which is not for acceptance,</b> i.e., it does not serve to atone for any sin and is merely a gift for the priest, <b>but</b> with regard to other <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>that are for acceptance, say</b> that <b>they shall not effect acceptance</b> when brought late. Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us</b> that even these others are not disqualified when brought late.",
            "The Gemara asks further: <b>But still,</b> isn’t this <i>halakha</i> <b>derived from</b> a <i>baraita</i> <b>elsewhere:</b> The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you; <b>and it will be sin in you”</b> (Deuteronomy 23:22), indicating that there is sin in you, <b>but</b> there is <b>no sin in your offering,</b> and therefore it is not disqualified due to the delay?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Ben Azzai requires that</b> verse to teach a different <i>halakha</i>: The phrase <b>“and it will be sin in you”</b> indicates that there will be sin in you, <b>but</b> there will <b>not</b> be <b>sin in your wife.</b> It might <b>enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Elazar said, and some say</b> that it was <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> who said: <b>A man’s wife does not die unless</b> his creditors <b>ask him for money</b> that he owes <b>and he does not have</b> it, <b>as it is stated: “If you do not have with what to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?”</b> (Proverbs 22:27); therefore, one’s wife <b>also dies for this transgression of</b> the prohibition: <b>You shall not delay,</b> since one has failed to fulfill his commitment. Consequently, the verse <b>teaches us</b> that the sin is imputed to him alone.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> stated that <b><i>Aḥerim</i> say:</b> The phrase “neither shall it be credited” indicates that the offering <b>is disqualified by</b> improper <b>intention, and it is not disqualified</b> by consumption beyond its designated time <b>on the third</b> day. The Gemara asks: <b>And Rabbi Eliezer,</b> who derives this <i>halakha</i> from a different source, <b>what does he do with</b> the phrase <b>“neither shall it be credited”?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>He requires it for</b> that <b>which Rabbi Yannai</b> says, <b>as Rabbi Yannai says: From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to intentions that they displace one another,</b> i.e., that an additional improper intention prevents the offering from being rendered <i>piggul</i>? <b>As it is stated: “Neither shall it be credited [<i>yeḥashev</i>],”</b> indicating that an offering is rendered piggul only if the priest does <b>not mix other</b> improper <b>intentions [<i>maḥashavot</i>] with</b> intent of <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>And Rav Mari teaches</b> that <b>Rabbi Yannai says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that one who has</b> improper <b>intentions with regard to sacrificial</b> animals <b>is flogged</b> like one who transgressed a prohibition? <b>The verse states: “Neither shall it be credited [<i>lo yeḥashev</i>],”</b> i.e., one reads the verse as if it states: One shall not have improper intention [<i>lo y’ḥashev</i>].",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari:</b> But <b>it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and</b> the principle is that <b>for</b> transgressing <b>any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.</b> Rav Mari <b>said to him: It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda, who says: For</b> transgressing <b>a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>This is the principle:</b> With regard to <b>anyone who slaughters</b> the animal, <b>or who collects</b> the blood, <b>or who conveys</b> the blood, <b>or who sprinkles</b> the blood, with intent <b>to partake of an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, e.g., the meat of the offering, <b>or to burn an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>burns</b> it on the altar, if his intent was to partake of or to burn the measure of <b>an olive-bulk outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b> If his intent was to do so <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it, provided that the permitting factor,</b> the blood, <b>is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.</b>",
            "<b>How</b> is <b>the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva?</b> If one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>in silence</b> with no specific intent, and <b>he collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time; or</b> if one <b>slaughtered</b> it with intent to burn or partake of the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood <b>in silence; or</b> if one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>and collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, that is</b> the case <b>where</b> one <b>sacrifices the permitting factor in accordance with its mitzva.</b>",
            "<b>How</b> is <b>the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva?</b> If one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> and <b>he collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time; or</b> if one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> and <b>collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area; or</b> if one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>and collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> these are cases in which the permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with the mitzva.",
            "Similarly, in the case of <b>the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, and</b> one <b>collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time; or</b> if one <b>slaughtered</b> the Paschal offering or sin offering with intent to burn it or partake of it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> and <b>he collected and conveyed and sprinkled</b> the blood <b>not for their sake; or that one slaughtered</b> the Paschal offering or sin offering <b>and collected and conveyed and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, that is</b> the case of an offering <b>whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.</b>",
            "If one performed one of the sacrificial rites with the intent <b>to eat an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area and <b>an olive-bulk the next day,</b> or <b>an olive-bulk the next day</b> and <b>an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area, or <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area and <b>half an olive-bulk the next day,</b> or <b>half an olive-bulk the next day</b> and <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area, the offering is <b>disqualified and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda said</b> that <b>this is the principle:</b> In <b>any</b> case <b>where the intent</b> with regard to <b>the time preceded the intent</b> with regard to <b>the area,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it. And if the intent</b> with regard to <b>the area preceded the intent</b> with regard to <b>the time,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it. And the Rabbis say:</b> In both <b>this</b> case <b>and that</b> case, the offering is <b>disqualified and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b> If his intent was <b>to eat half an olive-bulk</b> and <b>to burn half an olive-bulk</b> not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is <b>fit because eating and burning do not join together.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> With regard to the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis concerning a case where one has intent with regard to both time and area, <b>Ilfa says:</b> There is <b>a disagreement</b> only <b>with regard to two</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> i.e., where each intent was held during a different rite, <b>but</b> if both were held <b>in</b> the course of <b>one rite, all agree</b> that <b>it constitutes a combination of intentions,</b> and the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>. <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even</b> if the intentions were both held <b>in</b> the course of <b>one rite,</b> there is still <b>a disagreement.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> the mishna is understandable <b>according to Ilfa, since the first clause</b> of the mishna: If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent and collected…beyond its designated time, etc., is referring to different intentions held <b>in</b> the course of <b>two</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> one can assume that <b>the latter clause</b> is referring <b>to two rites as well. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> could it be that <b>the first clause</b> is referring <b>to two rites, and the latter clause</b> is referring <b>to</b> only <b>one rite?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Yes,</b> it can be explained that <b>the first clause</b> is referring <b>to two</b> sacrificial <b>rites,</b> while <b>the latter clause,</b> i.e., the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, applies <b>to both one rite and two rites.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests a proof: <b>We learned</b> in the mishna: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that <b>this is the principle: If the intent</b> with regard to <b>the time preceded the intent</b> with regard to <b>the area,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> who says that the disagreement applies even to one rite, <b>this</b> is the reason <b>that</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>teaches: This is the principle,</b> indicating that the principle is broad. <b>But according to Ilfa, what</b> is added by the phrase: <b>This is the principle?</b> The Gemara responds: This indeed poses <b>a difficulty</b> to the opinion of Ilfa.",
            "§ <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>elsewhere</b> (<i>Temura</i> 25b): If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and one a peace offering, and he said with regard to another non-sacred animal of his: <b>This</b> animal <b>is hereby the substitute of</b> the <b>burnt offering, the substitute of</b> the <b>peace offering,</b> then <b>that</b> animal <b>is the substitute of</b> the <b>burnt offering;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset,</b> i.e., his intent was that this animal be the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering, <b>since it is impossible to produce two designations simultaneously</b> and one designation must precede the other, <b>his statement is effective,</b> and the animal is the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering. <b>But if</b> it was only <b>after he said: This</b> animal <b>is hereby the substitute of</b> the <b>burnt offering,</b> that <b>he reconsidered and said: This</b> animal <b>is hereby the substitute of</b> the <b>peace offering,</b> then <b>that</b> animal <b>is the substitute of a burnt offering</b> alone.",
            "<b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If one expressed the two intentions simultaneously and said: <b>This is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering and a peace offering, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Additionally, if one specified his intention <b>to split</b> the animal between a burnt offering and a peace offering, but mentioned the burnt offering first, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "<b>Abaye said: In this</b> case, <b>Rabbi Meir certainly concedes</b> that both types of sanctity apply to the animal. <b>Rava said: It is still a disagreement;</b> Rabbi Meir still holds in this case that since he mentioned the burnt offering first, only that sanctity applies to the animal.",
            "<b>Rava said to Abaye: According to your</b> opinion, <b>as you say</b> that <b>in this</b> case <b>Rabbi Meir certainly concedes,</b> one may raise an objection from the mishna, which describes a case where one performs <b>slaughter</b> with intent to eat one olive-bulk of the offering beyond its time and one olive-bulk outside its area, <b>which is comparable to</b> a case where one says: <b>To split,</b> since both intentions are held during the singular act of slaughter. <b>And</b> nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis <b>disagree,</b> and Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one attends only to the first statement, renders the animal <i>piggul</i>.",
            "Abaye <b>said to him: Do you hold</b> that <b>slaughter is</b> considered to have been performed <b>only at</b> its <b>end,</b> such that it takes effect in a single instant? Actually, <b>slaughter is</b> accomplished progressively, <b>from beginning to end, and our mishna</b> is referring to a case <b>where one says:</b> I slaughter the <b>first <i>siman</i>,</b> the gullet or the windpipe, with intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> and the <b>second <i>siman</i></b> with intent to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> what about the <b>removal of a handful</b> from a meal offering with intent to eat one olive-bulk beyond its time and one outside of its area, <b>which is comparable to</b> a case where one says: <b>To split,</b> since both intentions are held during the removal, <b>and</b> nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis <b>disagree</b> with regard to it in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i> (12a)?",
            "The Gemara responds: Since the mishna does not state such a dispute explicitly, one can say that their disagreement is not with regard to the removal of the handful but with regard to the burning of the two permitting factors of the meal offering, the handful and the frankincense. Accordingly, <b>there too,</b> the case is such <b>that</b> the priest <b>burned the handful of</b> the <b>meal offering</b> with intent to eat it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> and he burned <b>the handful of frankincense</b> with intent to eat the meal offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b>",
            "The Gemara persists: <b>But</b> what about <b>the handful from a meal offering of a sinner, which has no frankincense with it, and</b> still Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis <b>disagree?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: In that case <b>they do not disagree. Rav Ashi says:</b> Even <b>if you say</b> that <b>they disagree</b> in that case, one may say that <b>they disagree</b> specifically <b>with regard to</b> a case where the priest had different intentions during his <b>steps</b> toward the altar while holding the handful. Consequently, even this rite is divisible into separate parts.",
            "<b>Rav Shimi bar Ashi</b> would <b>teach in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Abaye</b> that in a case where one explicitly mentions both intentions at once, Rabbi Meir concedes that both sanctities apply to the animal. <b>Rav Huna bar Natan</b> would <b>teach in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rava</b> that even in such a case, Rabbi Meir considers only the first sanctity mentioned.",
            "<b>When Rav Dimi came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, <b>he said:</b> When <b>Rabbi Meir</b> said that if one says: This animal is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering, then the animal is the substitute of a burnt offering, he <b>said this according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says</b> that in general, the <i>halakha</i> is to <b>attend</b> only to the <b>first statement.</b>",
            "<b>As we learned</b> in the mishna: <b>Rabbi Yehuda said</b> that <b>this is the principle: If the intent</b> with regard to <b>the time preceded the intent</b> with regard to <b>the area,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rav Dimi: <b>But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana</b> say that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When you consider their</b> opinions, <b>Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei do not disagree with one another,</b> i.e., neither holds that one attends only to the first statement?",
            "Rav Dimi objected: <b>And</b> is it so that <b>they do not disagree? But don’t they disagree</b> explicitly in the mishna cited earlier? Abaye <b>said to him: They disagree where they disagree,</b> i.e., that specific case, <b>but they do not disagree where they do not disagree,</b> i.e., the underlying principle. Accordingly, one must understand the basis of their dispute in another manner.",
            "This is <b>as Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All,</b> i.e., Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, <b>concede that</b> in a case <b>where one says: Let this</b> sanctity of a burnt offering <b>take effect and afterward let that</b> sanctity of a peace offering <b>take effect, everyone agrees</b> that the sanctity of a peace offering <b>does not take effect,</b> because the sanctity of the burnt offering took effect first. Likewise, if one said: <b>This</b> sanctity <b>shall not take effect unless that</b> sanctity <b>applies, everyone agrees</b> that the sanctity of a peace offering <b>takes effect</b> as well.",
            "<b>They disagree</b> with regard to a case <b>where one says:</b> This animal is hereby <b>a substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering. Rabbi Meir holds: Since</b> if he wanted both sanctities to take effect, <b>he should have said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, but he said</b> instead: <b>A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering, learn from</b> his language that he originally intended for it to be a burnt offering, and he then <b>retracted</b> his first intention.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Yosei</b> holds that <b>if he</b> had <b>said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, I would say</b> that he means that <b>half</b> the animal should be <b>a substitute for a burnt offering and half a substitute for a peace offering. He therefore says: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering; that is to say that all of it is a burnt offering and all of it is a peace offering.</b> In any event, according to this explanation, Rabbi Meir does not necessarily hold that one attends only to the first statement.",
            "Rav Dimi <b>said to</b> Abaye: <b>He,</b> Rabba bar bar Ḥana, <b>says</b> that <b>they do not disagree, but I say</b> that <b>they disagree,</b> and Rabbi Meir holds that one attends only to the first statement, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna itself: <b>Ulla</b> said, <b>and some say</b> it was <b>Rav Oshaya</b> who <b>said: Perhaps our colleagues, the Babylonians, know</b> whether <b>we learn</b> the language of the improper intention in the mishna as: I hereby slaughter the animal with intent to consume <b>an olive-bulk</b> beyond its designated time, <b>an olive-bulk</b> outside its designated area, <b>or we learn: An olive-bulk</b> beyond its designated time <b>and an olive-bulk</b> outside its designated area?",
            "The Gemara elaborates: Perhaps <b>we learn: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,</b> and it is only in this case that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis. <b>But</b> if one said: <b>An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, everyone agrees</b> that <b>it constitutes a combination of intentions,</b> and the animal is not rendered <i>piggul</i>. <b>Or perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, where according to Rabbi Yehuda</b> each term <b>constitutes a separate</b> term despite the use of the conjunction: And, and he holds that one attends only to the first statement, <b>and all the more so</b> if one said: <b>An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from that <b>dilemma which Levi raised before Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi: If <b>one had intent to consume an olive-bulk the next day outside</b> its designated area, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>said to him: This</b> is an excellent <b>question.</b> The answer is that even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this <b>constitutes a combination of intentions</b> and that the animal is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>said before him:</b> How is this an excellent question; <b>is it not our mishna?</b> As we learned in the mishna: If one expressed intent <b>to eat an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area and <b>an olive-bulk the next day,</b> or <b>an olive-bulk the next day</b> and <b>an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area, or <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area and <b>half an olive-bulk the next day,</b> or <b>half an olive-bulk the next day</b> and <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area, the offering is <b>disqualified and there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> burning or partaking of <b>it.</b> Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only with regard to these cases; <b>but</b> in <b>another</b> case, it could easily be inferred that he concedes that <b>it constitutes a combination of intentions.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>said to him:</b> Levi <b>asked me a matter of wisdom, and you say our mishna. For you, whom I taught two</b> phrasings of the mishna, both: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, the question is <b>not difficult,</b> since my omission of this other case allows you to infer its <i>halakha</i>.",
            "<b>For him, whom I taught only one</b> phrasing, <b>and</b> who <b>heard the Rabbis reciting two,</b> the question is excellent, since Levi <b>thought:</b> Perhaps <b>my</b> phrasing is <b>exact, and their</b> additional phrasing <b>constitutes a combination of intentions</b> according to all opinions. <b>Or perhaps their</b> phrasing is <b>exact, and my</b> phrasing <b>omitted</b> this case. <b>And</b> if <b>my</b> phrasing <b>omitted this</b> case, perhaps <b>their</b> phrasing <b>also omitted that</b> other case, even though it is subject to disagreement.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And which</b> phrasing <b>did</b> Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>teach</b> Levi? <b>If we say</b> that <b>he taught him: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,</b> i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda still holds the terms to be distinct despite the conjunction, <b>this is not an omission,</b> since one can infer <i>a fortiori</i> that the same applies to: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk. <b>Rather,</b> it must be that <b>he taught him: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,</b> so that it was unclear to Levi what the <i>halakha</i> would be if one used the conjunction: And.",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, why did Levi raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: The next day outside? <b>Let him raise the dilemma</b> with regard to the phrasing: <b>An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: Levi <b>thought: I will raise one dilemma before him so as to learn two</b> <i>halakhot</i>. <b>As, if I ask</b> only with regard to: <b>An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, it will work out well if he says to me</b> that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that they constitute one <b>general</b> term, as this would apply <b>all the more so</b> if one said: <b>An olive-bulk the next day outside,</b> which is even more unified. <b>But if he says to me</b> that each term constitutes <b>a separate</b> term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then <b>I will still</b> need to <b>raise the dilemma</b> with regard to the case of: <b>An olive-bulk the next day outside.</b> I will therefore inquire with regard to the latter case.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so, now too, it works out well if he says to him</b> that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the wording: <b>An olive-bulk the next day outside,</b> is constituted of <b>separate</b> terms, as this would apply <b>all the more so</b> if one said: <b>An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,</b> which is less unified. <b>But if he says to him</b> that it is one <b>general</b> term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then <b>he will still</b> need to <b>raise the dilemma</b> with regard to the case of: <b>An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If</b> Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answered in <b>this</b> manner, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is considered one term, he would unwittingly provide the answer to the other question as well. As, if Rabbi Yehuda had also conceded with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would <b>become angry</b> with Levi for asking the wrong question and say:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Now</b> that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that even: <b>An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,</b> is one <b>general</b> term, <b>is</b> it <b>necessary</b> to inquire with regard to: <b>An olive-bulk the next day outside?</b>",
            "The Gemara presents <b>another version</b> of this discussion: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi might say that if Rabbi Yehuda maintains that even when one says: <b>An olive-bulk the next day outside,</b> each term is considered <b>separate, is</b> it <b>necessary</b> to inquire with regard to: <b>An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk?</b>",
            "§ <b>It was stated:</b> If one had intent to eat <b>half an olive-</b>bulk <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, half an olive-</b>bulk <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, and</b> another <b>half an olive-</b>bulk <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, Rava says:</b> In such a case, <b>the <i>piggul</i></b>: <b>“Awaked as one asleep”</b> (Psalms 78:65), i.e., since one had intent to consume two halves of an olive-bulk beyond their designated time, these intentions are joined together. The middle thought is disregarded, since it constitutes only half the requisite measure, and the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>. <b>And Rav Hamnuna says: It constitutes a combination of</b> improper <b>intentions.</b> The middle thought, although itself insufficient to disqualify the offering, is sufficient to interfere with the intention to consume it beyond its time, and the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rava said: From where,</b> i.e., based on what, <b>do I state</b> my ruling? <b>As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 1:5): <b>An egg-bulk of food</b> with <b>first-</b>degree impurity <b>and an egg-bulk of food</b> with second-degree impurity <b>that one mixed together</b> are collectively considered to have <b>first-</b>degree impurity. If one <b>separated them</b> into two portions, each containing a homogenous mixture, <b>this</b> portion is considered to have <b>second-</b>degree impurity <b>and that</b> portion is considered to have <b>second-</b>degree impurity. Since neither of them contains the requisite amount of food with first-degree impurity, each mixture settles to the lower level of impurity between the two foods. Rava reasoned: <b>But</b> if one <b>mixed them again,</b> they revert to <b>be</b> of <b>first-</b>degree impurity.",
            "<b>From where</b> do I know this? <b>From</b> the fact <b>that the latter clause</b> of that mishna <b>teaches:</b> If <b>this</b> portion <b>fell by itself and that</b> portion fell <b>by itself onto a loaf of <i>teruma</i>, it disqualifies it,</b> as would any food with second-degree impurity. But it does not render it impure, since only foods with first-degree impurity impart impurity to other foods. But if <b>they both fell simultaneously</b> onto the loaf, <b>they render it</b> a food with <b>second</b>-degree impurity. Evidently, although the first-degree impurity lay dormant for lack of a requisite measure, it resurfaces when the rest of the measure is added, despite the fact that each portion was previously considered to have second-degree impurity. The <i>halakha</i> would be the same in the case of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, i.e., the intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its area does not interfere with the intent of <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>And Rav Hamnuna says:</b> The cases are different. <b>There,</b> in the case of ritual impurity, <b>there is</b> a requisite <b>measure</b> present at the outset, which is divided and then recombined. <b>Here,</b> in the case of the offering, <b>there is no</b> requisite <b>measure</b> present at the outset to render it <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rav Hamnuna said: From where do I say</b> my opinion? <b>As we learned</b> in another mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 17b): <b>The food that became ritually impure</b> through contact <b>with a primary source of ritual impurity,</b> thereby assuming first-degree impurity, <b>and</b> the food <b>that became ritually impure</b> through contact <b>with a derivative source of ritual impurity,</b> thereby assuming second-degree impurity, <b>join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure of an egg-bulk <b>to impart impurity in accordance with the</b> more <b>lenient of the two,</b> i.e., as a food of second-degree impurity. <b>What, is it not</b> that they retain second-degree impurity <b>even if one makes up</b> the requisite measure <b>again?</b> If so, it can be inferred that the first-degree impurity is lost, and it does not lie dormant or resurface. Here as well, the latter intent of <i>piggul</i> cannot restore the initial intent of <i>piggul</i>, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its area interfered.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps</b> the mishna is referring specifically to a case <b>where one does not complete</b> the requisite measure <b>again.</b>",
            "The Gemara presents similar cases: <b>When Rav Dimi came</b> from Eretz Yisrael, <b>he said:</b> If one had intent to eat <b>half an olive-bulk outside its</b> designated <b>area, and half an olive-bulk beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and</b> then another <b>half an olive-bulk beyond its</b> designated <b>time, bar Kappara teaches</b> that the offering is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> since the <b>half an olive-bulk</b> with regard to the area <b>is not effective</b> to interfere <b>where</b> the intent with regard to the time concerns a whole <b>olive-bulk.</b>",
            "<b>When Ravin came</b> from Eretz Yisrael, <b>he stated</b> a different formulation: If one had intent to eat <b>half an olive-bulk beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and</b> then another <b>half an olive-bulk beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and</b> then <b>half an olive-bulk outside its</b> designated <b>area, bar Kappara teaches</b> that the offering is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> since the <b>half an olive-bulk is not effective</b> to interfere <b>where</b> the intent of <i>piggul</i> concerns a whole <b>olive-bulk.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ashi teaches</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>in this</b> manner: If one had intent to eat <b>half an olive-bulk beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and</b> then intended with regard to a whole <b>olive-bulk</b> to eat <b>half of it outside its</b> designated <b>area and half of it beyond its</b> designated <b>time, bar Kappara teaches</b> that the offering is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> because the <b>half an olive-bulk is not effective</b> to interfere <b>where</b> the intent of <i>piggul</i> concerns a whole <b>olive-bulk.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yannai says:</b> If one <b>had intent that dogs would eat</b> the offering <b>the next day,</b> it is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>, as it is written: “And the dogs shall eat Jezebel in the portion of Jezreel”</b> (II Kings 9:10). The verse indicates that consumption by dogs is considered eating.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ami objects to this: If that is so,</b> then if one <b>had intent that</b> non-sacred <b>fire would consume it the next day, as it is written: “A fire not blown shall consume him”</b> (Job 20:26), <b>this too</b> should be <b><i>piggul</i>. And if you would say</b> that this is <b>indeed</b> so, that is difficult: <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in the mishna: If his intent was <b>to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk</b> not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is <b>fit because eating and burning do not join together?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If one expressed</b> his intention to burn the offering <b>in terms of consumption,</b> it would <b>indeed</b> join together with intention to eat. But in the mishna <b>here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where he expressed it in terms of burning.</b> The two intentions do not join together <b>since terms of consumption and terms of burning are discrete</b> entities.",
            "§ <b>Rav Ashi raises a dilemma:</b> If <b>one had intent that two people</b> would collectively <b>eat an olive-bulk, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we follow</b> the <b>intent,</b> in <b>which</b> case <b>there is</b> the requisite <b>measure</b> of an olive-bulk? <b>Or do we follow those who eat, and neither</b> eats the requisite <b>measure?</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the mishna: If his intent was <b>to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk</b> beyond the designated time or outside the designated area, the offering is <b>fit because eating and burning do not join together.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "It can be inferred <b>that</b> if one had intent <b>to eat and to eat</b> in a manner <b>similar to</b> a case of intent <b>to eat</b> half an olive-bulk <b>and to burn</b> half an olive-bulk; Abaye interjects: <b>And what are the circumstances</b> of such a case? It is a case <b>with two people,</b> i.e., where each one will consume half an olive-bulk. Abaye continues with the conclusion of his statement: Then the two halves <b>join together.</b> The Gemara concludes: <b>Learn from it</b> that this is so.",
            "<b>Rava raises a dilemma:</b> If one <b>had intent to eat an olive-bulk in more than</b> the period of time it takes <b>to eat a half-loaf</b> of bread, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we equate</b> the consumption of offerings <b>to the consumption of the Most High,</b> i.e., the burning of offerings on the altar, for which there is no maximum allotted time? <b>Or do we equate it to the consumption of an ordinary</b> person, for whom consumption slower than this rate is not considered eating?",
            "<b>Abaye said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the mishna: If his intent was <b>to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk</b> not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is <b>fit because eating and burning do not join together.</b> One may infer that the <b>reason</b> the offering is fit is that he had intent <b>to eat and to burn</b> the offering. <b>But</b> if he had intent <b>to eat</b> half an olive-bulk at the normal rate <b>and to eat</b> half an olive-bulk in the time it takes to burn half an olive-bulk, the two would <b>join together. But</b> the <b>burning</b> of an olive-bulk of an offering can take <b>more than</b> the time it takes <b>to eat a half-loaf</b> of bread. It therefore seems that there is no upper limit on the time in which one is considered to have consumed an offering.",
            "The Gemara rejects the proof: <b>Perhaps</b> the mishna is referring to intent to burn half an olive-bulk <b>in a large fire,</b> which can consume it in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Accordingly, one may draw the inference only with regard to a case where his intent was to consume the halves of an olive-bulk within this time.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the animal with intent <b>to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk</b> not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is <b>fit.</b> The Gemara infers: The <b>reason that</b> the two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together is because his intent was <b>to eat</b> half an olive-bulk <b>and to burn</b> half an olive-bulk. <b>But</b> if his intent was <b>to eat</b> half an olive-bulk of the meat <b>and to eat</b> half an olive-bulk of <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it, then the halves do <b>join together</b> and disqualify the offering, as both intentions concern eating.",
            "The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: <b>But the first clause</b> of the mishna <b>teaches:</b> If one’s intent was <b>to partake</b> of an item <b>whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, beyond its designated time, his intent <b>joins together</b> to disqualify the offering. One can infer that only if his intent was to partake of an item <b>whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, <b>does</b> his intent join together, but if his intent was to partake of an item <b>whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not</b> partake of it, then it does <b>not</b> join together.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya says:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> latter clause? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent</b> to shift an item’s consumption <b>from consumption by a person to consumption by</b> the <b>altar, or from consumption by</b> the <b>altar to consumption by a person. As we learned</b> in another mishna (35a): In the case of <b>one who slaughters the offering</b> with intent <b>to partake of an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not</b> partake of it, <b>or to burn an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not burn</b> it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is <b>fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> it <b>unfit.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye says: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis. And do not say</b> that one should infer from the mishna <b>that</b> if his intent was <b>to eat</b> half an olive-bulk of an item normally consumed <b>and to eat</b> half an olive-bulk of <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it, then the offering is disqualified. <b>Rather, say</b> that one infers <b>that</b> if his intent was <b>to eat</b> half an olive-bulk <b>and to eat</b> another half an olive-bulk, both halves from <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, then the halves join together to disqualify the offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, <b>what</b> is this latter clause <b>teaching us? If it teaches us</b> that two half olive-bulks from <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, join together, one can already <b>learn</b> this <b>from the first clause</b> of the mishna: If one has intent to consume <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area and <b>half an olive-bulk the next day,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> One can infer <b>that</b> if his intent was to eat the first <b>half an olive-bulk the next day,</b> the offering would be rendered <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<b>But if</b> one will say that this term teaches its literal meaning, that intentions <b>to eat and to burn</b> two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together, one can already <b>learn</b> this <b>from the inference</b> drawn above <b>from the first clause</b> of the mishna, namely that intent <b>to partake</b> of <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it <b>does</b> disqualify the offering, but intent to partake of an item <b>whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it does <b>not.</b> By extension, intent to consume half an olive-bulk of such an item does not join to disqualify the offering.",
            "<b>Now,</b> consider the following: <b>And just as</b> if when one has intent <b>to partake</b> of an item normally eaten <b>and to partake of an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it, his intentions <b>do not join together,</b> even though both intentions concern consumption, <b>is it necessary</b> for the mishna to teach that intentions <b>to consume and to burn</b> do not join together? The last clause therefore seems unnecessary.",
            "The Gemara responds: It <b>was necessary</b> for the mishna to explicitly address the case where one had intent <b>to eat and to burn,</b> as it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that it <b>is</b> only <b>there,</b> where one’s intentions are referring solely to consumption, that they do not join together, <b>since he has intent</b> to act in a way that is <b>not</b> consistent with <b>its</b> typical <b>manner</b> and consume an item not normally consumed. <b>But here, where</b> his intent is to both eat and burn the offering, such that <b>with regard to this</b> half he intends to act <b>in</b> a way consistent with <b>its</b> typical <b>manner, and with regard to that</b> half he intends to act <b>in</b> a way consistent with <b>its</b> typical <b>manner,</b> one might <b>say</b> that <b>they should join together.</b> Therefore, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> that intentions to eat and to burn do not join together.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>all</b> those <b>who are unfit</b> for Temple service <b>who slaughtered</b> an offering, <b>their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter</b> of an offering <b>is valid</b> <i>ab initio</i> when performed even <b>by non-priests, by women, by</b> Canaanite <b>slaves, and by ritually impure</b> individuals. <b>And</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even with</b> regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh</b> of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure. <b>Therefore,</b> these unfit individuals can <b>disqualify</b> the offering <b>with</b> prohibited <b>intent,</b> e.g., if one of them intended to partake of the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of them,</b> in a case <b>where they collected the blood</b> with the intent to offer it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, if there is blood of the soul</b> that remains in the animal, <b>the</b> priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>should again collect</b> the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.",
            "If <b>the</b> priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood in a vessel <b>and gave</b> the vessel <b>to an unfit</b> person, that person <b>should return</b> it <b>to the fit</b> priest. If the priest <b>collected</b> the blood in a vessel <b>in his right</b> hand <b>and moved</b> it <b>to his left</b> hand, <b>he should return</b> it <b>to his right</b> hand. If the priest <b>collected</b> the blood <b>in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return</b> the blood <b>to a sacred vessel.</b> If the blood <b>spilled from the vessel onto the floor and he gathered it</b> from the floor, it is <b>valid.</b>",
            "If an unfit person <b>placed</b> the blood <b>upon the ramp</b> or on the wall of the altar <b>that</b> is <b>not opposite the base</b> of the altar, or if <b>he placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line, <b>or</b> if he placed the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>or the</b> blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, then <b>if there is blood of the soul</b> that remains in the animal, <b>the</b> priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>should again collect</b> the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara infers from the use of the past tense in the mishna: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who <b>slaughtered,</b> that <b>after the fact, yes,</b> the slaughter is valid. But <b><i>ab initio</i>, no,</b> those who are unfit may not slaughter an offering.",
            "<b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from what was taught in the halakhic midrash <i>Torat Kohanim</i>: The verse states with regard to a burnt offering: <b>“And he shall slaughter</b> the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5). The fact that the verse does not stipulate that a priest must slaughter the offering teaches that <b>slaughter is valid</b> if performed <b>by a non-priest,</b> as stated in the mishna: <b>As the</b> sacrificial rite of <b>slaughter is valid</b> when performed <b>by non-priests, by women, by</b> Canaanite <b>slaves, and by ritually impure</b> individuals, <b>and even with</b> regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order. Or</b> perhaps the term “and he shall slaughter” in the verse is referring <b>only</b> to slaughter <b>by priests?</b>",
            "<b>You</b> can <b>say</b> in response: <b>From where did you come</b> to the idea that the verse is referring only to a priest? It is <b>from the fact that it is stated</b> to Aaron: <b>“And you and your sons with you shall keep your priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar”</b> (Numbers 18:7).",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even with</b> regard to <b>slaughter,</b> that only priests are fit to slaughter an offering. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord, and</b> Aaron’s sons, the priests, <b>shall present [<i>vehikrivu</i>]</b> the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), from which it is inferred that specifically <b>from</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood <b>and onward</b> it is <b>a mitzva</b> exclusively <b>of the priesthood.</b> This <b>teaches about the</b> rite of <b>slaughter that it is valid</b> <i>ab initio</i> if performed <b>by any person.</b> This contradicts the inference from the mishna that slaughter of an offering by a non-priest is valid only after the fact.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>The same is true that even <i>ab initio</i> as well</b> it is permitted for those unfit for Temple service to slaughter an offering, <b>but because</b> the mishna <b>wants to teach</b> with regard to the <b>ritually impure that</b> they may <b>not</b> slaughter an offering <b><i>ab initio</i></b> due to a rabbinic <b>decree lest they touch the flesh</b> and render it ritually impure, therefore the mishna <b>taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> with the expression in the past tense: <b>Who slaughtered,</b> i.e., after the fact.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> in the case of <b>a ritually impure</b> individual who performed the slaughter, is it <b>permitted</b> even <b>after the fact? And</b> one can <b>raise a contradiction</b> from what is taught in the halakhic midrash: The Torah states two consecutive directives: <b>“And he shall place</b> his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…<b>And he shall slaughter</b> the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:4–5). This juxtaposition indicates that both directives are referring to the same individual, which teaches that <b>just as placing hands</b> on the head of an offering may be performed only <b>by ritually pure</b> individuals, <b>so too,</b> the <b>slaughter</b> may be performed only <b>by ritually pure</b> individuals. The Gemara answers: <b>By rabbinic law,</b> an impure person is prohibited from slaughtering an offering lest he touch the flesh of the offering, but by Torah law the slaughter is valid.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about <b>placing hands</b> that it can be performed only by those who are ritually pure even by Torah law? It is <b>that it is written: “Before the Lord,”</b> which is referring to the Temple courtyard, and an impure person may not enter the Temple courtyard. With regard to <b>slaughter as well, isn’t it written: “Before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 1:5)? How can a ritually impure person enter the Temple courtyard to slaughter an offering? The Gemara answers: It is <b>possible,</b> in a case <b>where he fashions a long knife,</b> stands outside the Temple courtyard, <b>and slaughters</b> the offering that is inside the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks: With regard to <b>placing hands also, it is possible,</b> in a case <b>where he inserts his hands</b> into the Temple courtyard <b>and places</b> them on the head of the offering. The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> <b>holds</b> that <b>a partial entry,</b> in which only a part of the body enters the Temple courtyard, <b>is called entry.</b> Therefore, an impure individual may not insert even part of his body, such as his hands, into the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda taught the</b> <i>baraita</i> in the <b>opposite</b> manner: <b>“And he shall place</b> his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…<b>and he shall slaughter</b> the bull” (Leviticus 1:4–5), teaches that <b>just as slaughter</b> may be performed only <b>by ritually pure</b> individuals, <b>so too, placing hands</b> may be performed only <b>by ritually pure</b> individuals. The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about <b>slaughter</b> that it may be performed only by those who are ritually pure? It is <b>that it is written</b> with regard to it: <b>“Before the Lord,”</b> which refers to the Temple courtyard, and a ritually impure person may not enter the Temple courtyard."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>placing hands</b> on the head of an offering <b>as well, it is written: “Before the Lord.”</b> The Gemara answers that <b>it is possible,</b> in a case <b>where he inserts his hands</b> into the Temple courtyard <b>and places</b> them on the head of the offering while he remains outside. The Gemara asks: But with regard to <b>slaughter also,</b> it is <b>possible,</b> in a case <b>where he fashions a long knife and slaughters</b> the animal while standing outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara answers: In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this? It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Shimon HaTimni,</b> who holds that the one who slaughters an offering must stand inside the Temple courtyard. This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>, that when the verse states: <b>“And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 1:5), it teaches that the bull must be inside the Temple courtyard, <b>but the slaughterer</b> need <b>not</b> be <b>“before the Lord.”</b> Therefore, he may stand outside the Temple courtyard and slaughter the offering that is inside. <b>Shimon HaTimni says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that the hands of</b> the <b>slaughterer must be</b> farther <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>than the</b> animal that is <b>slaughtered? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord,”</b> which teaches that the <b>slaughterer of the bull must be before the Lord.</b>",
            "§ Apropos the question of whether partial entry into the Temple courtyard is considered entry, <b>Ulla says</b> that <b>Reish Lakish says: A ritually impure</b> individual <b>who inserted his hand inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>is flogged</b> for transgressing the prohibition of entering the Temple while impure, <b>as it is stated</b> with regard to the impurity of a woman who gave birth: <b>“Every consecrated item she shall not touch,</b> and to the Temple she shall not come, until the days of her purification are complete” (Leviticus 12:4). The verse <b>juxtaposes entry</b> into the courtyard <b>to touching</b> a sacred item. <b>Just as touching with</b> even <b>a part</b> of the body <b>is considered touching, so too, entry with part</b> of the body <b>is considered entry.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Ulla</b> from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There is the case of <b>a leper whose eighth</b> day, on which he becomes ritually pure from his leprosy and performs the final stages of his purification process, <b>occurs on Passover eve,</b> such that it would be possible to bring his offerings and be fit to partake of the Paschal offering that evening. <b>And he experienced a seminal emission on that day</b> before he performed the final stages of his purification process, rendering him ritually impure and prohibited from entering the Temple. <b>And he</b> then <b>immersed</b> himself in a ritual bath. The question is whether he may come to the gate of the Temple courtyard, which is necessary to complete his purification process and terminate his status as a leper.",
            "<b>The Sages said: Although</b> any <b>other</b> individual who was ritually impure <b>who immersed that day</b> and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed <b>may not enter</b> the Temple mount until nightfall, <b>this</b> one <b>may enter.</b> The reason is that <b>it is better</b> for <b>a positive mitzva that has</b> a punishment of <b><i>karet</i>,</b> i.e., the bringing of the Paschal offering, to <b>come and override a positive mitzva for which there is no</b> liability to be punished with <b><i>karet</i>,</b> i.e., the mitzva to remove individuals who are ritually impure from the Temple courtyard, than have the positive mitzva that has a punishment of <i>karet</i> not be performed.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law, there is not even a positive mitzva</b> that restricts from entering the Temple courtyard one who has immersed that day and will become pure only upon nightfall, <b>as it is stated: “And Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judea and Jerusalem, in the House of the Lord, before the new courtyard”</b> (II Chronicles 20:5). <b>What</b> is the meaning of <b>“the new courtyard”? Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> This is referring to the place <b>in which they innovated many matters and said</b> that <b>one who immersed that day may not enter the camp of the Levites,</b> which in Jerusalem includes the entire Temple Mount. This indicates that the prohibition is of rabbinic origin, and by Torah law it is permitted for him to enter.",
            "Rav Hoshaya concludes his objection: <b>And if you say</b> that <b>partial entry</b> into the courtyard <b>is considered entry, how</b> does the leper who immersed himself that day <b>insert his hands</b> into the courtyard <b>so that</b> his right <b>thumb and big toe</b> will become purified? In this situation, both <b>this</b> mitzva to eat of the Paschal offering <b>and that</b> mitzva for an impure person to not enter the courtyard <b>are</b> each <b>a positive mitzva for which there is</b> liability to be punished with <b><i>karet</i>,</b> as someone who immersed himself that day who enters the Temple courtyard is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>.",
            "Ulla <b>said to</b> Rabbi Hoshaya: A proof to my opinion can be brought <b>from your</b> own <b>burden,</b> i.e., from the question you asked. <b>A leper is different,</b> as the Torah permitted him to insert his right thumb and big toe into the courtyard in order to become purified despite the fact that he has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, and <b>since he was permitted</b> to partially enter the courtyard <b>for</b> purification from <b>his leprosy, he was</b> also <b>permitted</b> with regard to his impurity due <b>to his seminal emission.</b> Nevertheless, a partial entry into the courtyard is in fact considered an entry.",
            "Based on Ulla’s previous comment, <b>Rav Yosef said: Ulla holds</b> that if <b>most of</b> the Jewish people were <b><i>zavim</i></b> on Passover eve, and were therefore prohibited from sacrificing the Paschal offering while impure, <b>and</b> then <b>they became ritually impure due to a corpse,</b> which allows them to sacrifice the Paschal offering despite their impurity as they are a majority of the Jewish people, <b>since they are permitted</b> to sacrifice the offering <b>with regard to their impurity</b> due to a corpse, <b>they are</b> also <b>permitted with regard to their <i>ziva</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to him: Are</b> the cases <b>comparable?</b> With regard to a leper who experienced a seminal emission, he was already permitted to partially enter the courtyard despite his initial impurity. Therefore, the subsequent impurity does not prohibit him from entering. By contrast, the <i>zavim</i> were originally prevented from sacrificing the Paschal offering. Therefore, even if he would be <b>permitted</b> to enter the courtyard despite becoming <b>impure</b> due to a corpse, he would <b>not</b> be <b>permitted</b> to enter due to the <b><i>ziva</i></b> that was previously present.",
            "Furthermore, Abaye <b>said to him: Perhaps this</b> is what <b>the Master is saying:</b> If <b>most of</b> the Jewish people were initially <b>ritually impure due to a corpse, and they</b> subsequently <b>became <i>zavim</i>, since they are permitted with regard to their impurity</b> due to a corpse, <b>they are permitted with regard to their <i>ziva</i></b> as well. Rav Yosef <b>said to him: Yes,</b> that was what I meant.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But still,</b> this is <b>not comparable</b> to the case of Ulla, since with regard to <b>a leper, it is</b> with total <b>permission</b> that he is allowed partial entry into the courtyard. And <b>since it was permitted</b> with regard to one impurity, <b>it was permitted</b> with regard to a second impurity. But the <b>ritual impurity</b> with regard to the sacrificing of the Paschal offering <b>is</b> only <b>overridden,</b> and there is not a total permission. Perhaps <b>with regard to this,</b> i.e., ritual impurity due to a corpse, <b>it is overridden,</b> but <b>with regard to that,</b> i.e., the impurity of <i>ziva</i>, <b>it is not overridden.</b>",
            "<b>Rava said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is</b> more <b>reasonable.</b> With regard to <b>a leper, it is</b> with specific <b>permission</b> that he was allowed by the Torah to insert his right thumb and big toe into the courtyard in order to become purified despite his ritual impurity, which was not granted for other impurities. Therefore, perhaps only <b>with regard to this</b> impurity <b>it is permitted, but with regard to that</b> impurity, i.e., due to a seminal emission, <b>it is not permitted.</b> But with regard to <b>ritual impurity,</b> since <b>it is overridden</b> in the case of ritual impurity due to a corpse, <b>what</b> difference does it make <b>to me</b> if there is <b>one</b> impurity that is <b>overridden,</b> and <b>what</b> difference does it make <b>to me</b> if there are <b>two</b> impurities that are <b>overridden?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara comments: It can be derived <b>by inference that both</b> Abaye and Rava <b>hold</b> that <b>impurity is overridden in</b> cases involving the <b>public</b> and is not entirely permitted.",
            "The Gemara returns to discussing Ulla’s statement that partial entry of a ritually impure individual is considered entry: <b>Let us say</b> that a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nega’im</i> 8:10) <b>supports</b> Ulla’s opinion: Concerning <b>all the</b> cases of <b>placing hands that were there</b> in the Temple, <b>I say about them</b> that the principle: <b>Immediately</b> following the <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> on the head of an offering is its <b>slaughter,</b> is applied, meaning that these acts must take place uninterruptedly and in the same location.",
            "This is so <b>except for this</b> case of a leper who places hands on his guilt offering, <b>which was</b> done <b>in</b> the threshold of the <b>Nicanor Gate</b> and not in the Temple courtyard where the guilt offering was slaughtered. The reason for this is <b>that a leper cannot enter</b> the courtyard <b>until they sprinkle from the blood of his sin offering and from the blood of his guilt offering</b> on the altar <b>on his behalf.</b> The Gemara explains the proof: <b>And if you say</b> that <b>partial entry is not considered entry, let him insert his hands and place</b> them on the head of the offering, and the offering should then be slaughtered in that location next to the gate.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef said:</b> There is no proof from here, as in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> <i>baraita</i>? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says</b> that the northern side of the courtyard in which it is permitted to slaughter offerings of the most sacred order, which includes a guilt offering, includes only the area to the north of the altar and not the entire northern section of the courtyard. This area is <b>far north</b> of the entrance to the courtyard, i.e., more than twenty-two cubits away. Consequently, even if the leper were to insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of his guilt offering, it would not be permitted to slaughter it there.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>But let an opening [<i>pishpash</i>] be made</b> in the northern courtyard wall facing the altar, where the leper can insert his hands. The Gemara explains: <b>Abaye and Rava both say</b> that such structural changes cannot be made to the Temple, since the verse states with regard to the Temple construction: <b>“All in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by His hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern”</b> (I Chronicles 28:19).",
            "<b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yosef said</b> another explanation as to why the leper cannot insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of the offering: <b>Anyone who places hands</b> on the head of an offering must <b>insert his head and most of his</b> body into the courtyard. <b>What is the reason? We require</b> placing hands with <b>all</b> of <b>his force. Therefore,</b> it is <b>not possible</b> for the leper to perform the placing of his hands properly without entering the courtyard, and the placing of hands on the offering is done instead in the threshold of the Nicanor Gate.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>What</b> does the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>hold? If he holds</b> that <b>placing hands</b> on the head of <b>a guilt offering of a leper</b> is <b>by Torah law, and</b> the principle that <b>immediately</b> following the <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> on the head of an offering must be its <b>slaughter</b> is also <b>by Torah law, let</b> the leper <b>openly insert</b> his hands into the courtyard <b>and place</b> them on the head of the offering, <b>as the Merciful One states</b> in the Torah that he must do so.",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Mattana says:</b> In principle that should be done. But the prohibition against the leper entering the courtyard is a rabbinic <b>decree,</b> due to the concern that <b>perhaps he will increase</b> his <b>steps,</b> enter the courtyard more than is necessary, and be liable for entering there in a state of impurity. <b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> that <b>Rav Adda bar Mattana says</b> that <b>placing hands</b> on the head of <b>a guilt offering of a leper</b> is indeed <b>by Torah law, but</b> the requirement that <b>immediately</b> following the <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> is the <b>slaughter</b> is <b>not by Torah law.</b> Therefore, he places hands on the offering outside of the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i> cited previously (32a): The verse states: <b>“And he shall place</b> his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…<b>And he shall slaughter</b> the bull” (Leviticus 1:4–5). <b>Just as placing hands</b> may be performed only <b>by ritually pure</b> individuals, <b>so too,</b> the <b>slaughter</b> may be performed only <b>by ritually pure</b> individuals. <b>And if you say</b> that the requirement that placing hands must immediately precede the slaughter is <b>not by Torah law,</b> then <b>with regard to ritually impure</b> individuals <b>you also find</b> that placing hands may be performed, since they can do so outside the courtyard.",
            "<b>Rather, reverse</b> it and say that <b>placing hands</b> on the head of the <b>guilt offering of a leper</b> is <b>not by Torah law,</b> and therefore the leper must do so outside the courtyard, <b>but</b> with regard to offerings that require placing of hands by Torah law, the requirement that <b>immediately</b> following the <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> must be the <b>slaughter</b> is <b>by Torah law.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara returns to Ulla’s statement in the name of Reish Lakish (32b) that an impure individual who inserted his hand into the Temple courtyard is flogged, as partial entry is considered entry. An objection was then raised from the case of the leper, where he is not liable to be punished with <i>karet</i> for partial entry, and Ulla offered one answer. <b>Ravina says</b> that there is another answer: It <b>was stated</b> only <b>with regard to lashes,</b> teaching that one is flogged for partially entering the courtyard while ritually impure. Reish Lakish agrees that there is no punishment of <i>karet</i> for partial entry as there is for a full entry.",
            "<b>When Ravin came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that <b>Rabbi Abbahu says</b> that the statement of Reish Lakish with regard to this verse <b>was stated with regard to a ritually impure</b> individual <b>who touched sacrificial</b> food, and not with regard to partial entry into the courtyard, as Ulla had said.",
            "This is <b>as it was stated:</b> There is an amoraic dispute with regard to <b>an impure person who touched sacrificial</b> food. <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged.</b> The Gemara elaborates. <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>flogged,</b> as it is written: <b>“Every consecrated item she shall not touch”</b> (Leviticus 12:4). <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged,</b> as <b>that</b> verse <b>is written with regard to</b> touching <b>the portion of the produce designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>].</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> does <b>Reish Lakish</b> actually hold that <b>this verse comes to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? <b>He requires this</b> verse to teach <b>a prohibition for</b> a ritually impure person <b>who eats sacrificial meat. As it was stated: From where</b> is <b>the prohibition for</b> a ritually impure person <b>who eats sacrificial meat</b> derived? <b>Reish Lakish says</b> it is derived from the verse: <b>“Every consecrated item she shall not touch,”</b> which the Gemara will explain is referring to eating.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> The Sage <b>Bardela teaches</b> that this prohibition is <b>derived from</b> a verbal analogy of the term <b>“his impurity [<i>tumato</i>]”</b> written with regard to one who eats sacrificial meat while impure (Leviticus 7:20), and the term <b>“his impurity [<i>tumato</i>]”</b> written with regard to one who <b>enters</b> the <b>Temple</b> while impure (Numbers 19:13). <b>Just as there,</b> with regard to entering the Temple while impure, the Torah <b>prescribed</b> the <b>punishment</b> of <i>karet</i> <b>and</b> also explicitly <b>prohibited</b> doing so, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to eating sacrificial meat while impure, the Torah <b>prescribed</b> the <b>punishment</b> of <i>karet</i> <b>and</b> also explicitly <b>prohibited</b> doing so. Clearly, Reish Lakish understood this verse as referring to eating sacrificial meat, not merely touching it.",
            "The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that both can be derived from Leviticus 12:4. The prohibition with regard to <b>a ritually impure</b> individual <b>who touched sacrificial</b> food is derived <b>from</b> the fact <b>that the Merciful One expressed</b> this prohibition <b>with a term of touching,</b> while <b>the prohibition with regard to one who eats</b> sacrificial food while impure is derived <b>from</b> the fact <b>that</b> the Torah <b>juxtaposed</b> the prohibition of eating <b>sacrificial</b> food while impure <b>to</b> the prohibition of entering the <b>Temple</b> while impure in the verse: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come” (Leviticus 12:4).",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Reish Lakish.</b> It is written: <b>“Every consecrated item she shall not touch”;</b> this is <b>a prohibition for</b> an impure person who <b>eats</b> sacrificial food. <b>Do you say</b> that it is <b>a prohibition for</b> an impure person who <b>eats</b> sacrificial food, <b>or</b> perhaps <b>it is only</b> a prohibition <b>for</b> an impure person who <b>touches</b> sacrificial food?",
            "<b>The verse states: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come”</b> (Leviticus 12:4). The verse <b>juxtaposes</b> the matter pertaining to <b>sacrificial</b> food <b>to</b> the matter of entering the <b>Temple</b> while ritually impure. <b>Just as</b> entering the <b>Temple</b> is <b>a matter</b> that entails a punishment <b>that involves</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>the taking of a life,</b> i.e., <i>karet</i>, <b>so too,</b> the <b>matter</b> pertaining to <b>sacrificial</b> food entails a punishment <b>that involves the taking of a life.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>And if</b> the prohibition is <b>with regard to touching</b> sacrificial food, <b>is there</b> a punishment that entails <b>the taking of a life? Rather,</b> the prohibition is <b>with regard to eating.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> this verse is <b>still necessary for</b> Reish Lakish to teach the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a ritually impure</b> person <b>who ate sacrificial meat before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood of the offering on the altar, when the meat is not yet permitted. <b>As it was stated:</b> With regard to <b>an impure</b> individual <b>who ate sacrificial meat before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>flogged</b> for doing so, <b>and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged.</b>",
            "<b>Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>flogged,</b> as it is written: <b>“Every consecrated item she shall not touch,”</b> without limiting the prohibition to a specific time, indicating that it <b>is no different</b> if one eats the sacrificial meat <b>prior to sprinkling</b> the blood, <b>and</b> it <b>is no different</b> if one does so <b>after sprinkling</b> the blood. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged, as</b> the Sage <b>Bardela teaches</b> that the prohibition <b>is derived</b> by means of the verbal analogy cited before, as the verse states <b>“his impurity”</b> with regard to an impure person who eats sacrificial food, and states <b>“his impurity”</b> with regard to an impure person entering the Temple. <b>And when</b> “his impurity” <b>is written,</b> it is with regard to partaking of sacrificial meat <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood (see Leviticus 7:20).",
            "The Gemara answers for Reish Lakish: <b>If so,</b> that the verse was referring only to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood, <b>let the verse say: A consecrated item</b> she shall not touch. <b>What</b> is the reason for using the phrase <b>“every consecrated item”? Conclude two</b> conclusions <b>from it,</b> i.e., it also includes not eating sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "§ The Gemara discusses <b>the</b> matter <b>itself:</b> With regard to <b>an impure</b> individual <b>who ate sacrificial meat before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>flogged</b> for doing so, <b>and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. Abaye says:</b> This <b>dispute</b> applies <b>with regard to</b> a case of <b>impurity of the body</b> of the one who eats the meat, <b>but with regard to impurity of the flesh</b> itself, i.e., if the sacrificial meat was ritually impure, <b>all agree</b> that he is <b>flogged.</b>",
            "This is <b>as the verse states:</b> “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire; and the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” (Leviticus 7:19). The Sages derived that the extra term <b>“and the flesh”</b> serves <b>to include wood and frankincense, which are not fit for consumption, and even so the verse included them</b> as being susceptible to impurity, and one who eats them while he is impure is flogged. Therefore, sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, which is fit for consumption, is certainly included in the prohibition.",
            "<b>And Rava says:</b> This <b>dispute</b> applies <b>with regard to</b> a case of <b>impurity of the body, but with regard to impurity of the meat all agree</b> that <b>he is not flogged. What is the reason? Since</b> one <b>does not apply to</b> meat before the sprinkling of the blood the verse: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings of the Lord, <b>having his impurity upon him,</b> that soul <b>shall be cut off</b> from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which is referring to meat after the sprinkling of the blood, so too, one <b>does not apply to it</b> the prohibition: <b>“And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten”</b> (Leviticus 7:19).",
            "The Gemara challenges the statement of Rava: <b>But doesn’t the Master say</b> that the term <b>“and the flesh”</b> serves <b>to include wood and frankincense</b> that became impure as items that are forbidden to be eaten, despite the fact that they are not fit for consumption? Certainly, then, sacrificial flesh before the sprinkling of the blood should also be included in the category of items forbidden to be eaten.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>What are we dealing with here,</b> that one would be liable for eating wood and frankincense that are impure? It is a case <b>where</b> the wood and frankincense <b>were sanctified in a vessel,</b> and the reason for the liability is <b>that</b> they are then <b>considered like</b> an item for <b>which all of its permitting factors were sacrificed,</b> such as flesh after the sprinkling of the blood, and only then is one liable for eating it while impure.",
            "This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 10a): With regard to <b>anything that has permitting factors,</b> i.e., rites that must be performed or items that must be sacrificed before the meat of the offering may be eaten, such as the meat of an offering that is permitted to be eaten by the sprinkling of the blood; one is liable for eating it while impure <b>from</b> the time <b>that its permitting factors were sacrificed.</b> With regard to <b>anything that does not have permitting factors,</b> such as the handful removed from a meal offering and the frankincense, which themselves render the rest of the meal offering permitted for consumption, one is liable for eating it while impure <b>from</b> the time <b>it is sanctified in a vessel.</b>",
            "§ <b>It was stated:</b> In the case of <b>one who offers up the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>flogged</b> for doing so, while <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged.</b> The Gemara explains the logic for each opinion: <b>Reish Lakish says</b> that he is <b>flogged,</b> because there is a positive mitzva to sacrifice an offering from the herd and the flock (see Leviticus 1:2), which are kosher animals. Therefore, it can be inferred that <b>a kosher</b> animal, <b>yes,</b> one may sacrifice, but <b>a non-kosher</b> animal one may <b>not</b> sacrifice, <b>and</b> one who transgresses <b>a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva</b> is <b>flogged for it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> One is <b>not flogged for it,</b> as one who transgresses <b>a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva</b> is <b>not flogged for it.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection</b> to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i> cited in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>: “Whatsoever parts the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews the cud, among the beasts, <b>that may you eat”</b> (Leviticus 11:3). One can infer: <b>But</b> you may <b>not</b> eat <b>a non-kosher animal; and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva</b> has the status of <b>a positive mitzva.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain</b> it <b>to you: With regard to</b> one who sacrifices the <b>limbs of a non-kosher animal</b> upon the altar, <b>everyone agrees</b> that he is not flogged, as he violates only a positive mitzva. <b>When they disagree,</b> it is <b>with regard to</b> one who sacrifices a kosher <b>undomesticated animal</b> on the altar, <b>and it was stated like this: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains their reasoning: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva,</b> since the Torah commanded that <b>a domesticated animal, yes,</b> should be sacrificed, from which it can be inferred that <b>an undomesticated animal</b> may <b>not</b> be sacrificed, and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva. <b>Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything,</b> since <b>that</b> verse which instructs one to sacrifice offerings from the herd and the flock is referring <b>to</b> the optimal manner of fulfilling the <b>mitzva,</b> but if he sacrificed an undomesticated animal, he has not transgressed the mitzva.",
            "<b>Rava raised an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Had</b> the verse (Leviticus 1:2) <b>stated</b> only: When any man of you brings <b>an offering to the Lord, animals [<i>behema</i>]</b>, <b>I would say</b> that even <b>an undomesticated animal</b> is included <b>in the category of an animal [<i>behema</i>], like that</b> which <b>is stated: “These are the animals [<i>behema</i>] that you may eat: The ox, the sheep, and the goat, the deer, and the gazelle,</b> and the fallow deer, and the wild goat, and the oryx, and the aurochs, and the mountain sheep” (Deuteronomy 14:4–5), and, for example, the deer and gazelle are undomesticated animals. Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “From animals, from the <b>cattle and</b> from the <b>flock”</b> (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that God says: <b>I have told you</b> to bring offerings from the <b>cattle and</b> the <b>flock, but not an undomesticated animal.</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that one should <b>not bring</b> an undomesticated animal <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but if</b> one <b>did bring</b> it, it is <b>valid,</b> and <b>to what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher says to him: Bring me wheat, and</b> the student <b>brought him wheat and barley.</b> In this case, <b>it is not as</b> though the student is <b>disobeying the statement of</b> the teacher; <b>rather,</b> he is merely <b>adding to his statement, and</b> that should be <b>valid.</b>",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states</b> again: “From the <b>cattle”</b> (Leviticus 1:3), <b>and:</b> “From the <b>flock”</b> (Leviticus 1:10), to reiterate that God says: <b>I have told you</b> to bring offerings from the <b>cattle and</b> the <b>flock, but not an undomesticated animal. To what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher told him: Bring me only wheat, and</b> the student <b>brought him wheat and barley. It is not as</b> though the student is <b>adding to the statement of</b> the teacher; <b>rather, it is as</b> though <b>he is disobeying his statement,</b> since his teacher instructed him to bring only wheat. Consequently, one who sacrifices an undomesticated animal does not merely add to a mitzva of the Torah, but also violates a prohibition,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> the offering is therefore <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara concludes: <b>The refutation of</b> the opinion of <b>Reish Lakish</b> is indeed <b>a conclusive refutation.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of them,</b> in a case <b>where they collected</b> the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar. <b>Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> If an individual <b>unfit</b> for Temple service presented the blood, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood that remains in the animal? Does the fact <b>that he</b> presented some blood <b>render</b> the rest of it <b>a remainder</b> and no longer fit to be presented, or perhaps the presenting performed by an unfit individual is not considered valid, and therefore a priest fit for Temple service may present the blood again?",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> An invalid presenting <b>does not render</b> the rest of the blood <b>a remainder unless</b> it is a case where a priest fit for Temple service presented the blood with the intent to offer it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, since</b> it is only in that case that the presenting of the blood <b>effects acceptance,</b> i.e., it is considered a valid presenting, <b>with regard to</b> rendering the offering <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time.",
            "<b>Rav Zevid teaches</b> the matter in <b>this</b> way: <b>Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> Concerning <b>a cup</b> of <b>disqualified</b> blood, e.g., one which had been taken out of the Temple courtyard and was then nevertheless presented on the altar, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to it <b>rendering</b> the remaining blood <b>a remainder</b> and unfit to be presented? Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> In the case of <b>an unfit</b> individual who <b>himself</b> presented the blood, <b>what do you hold</b> to be the <i>halakha</i>? <b>If an unfit</b> individual who presented the blood <b>renders</b> the remaining blood <b>a remainder,</b> then <b>a cup</b> of <b>disqualified</b> blood should <b>also render</b> the remaining blood <b>a remainder. If an unfit</b> individual does <b>not render</b> the remaining blood <b>a remainder,</b> then <b>a cup</b> of <b>disqualified</b> blood should <b>also not render</b> the remaining blood <b>a remainder.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Yirmeya of Difti teaches</b> the discussion <b>this</b> way: <b>Abaye asked Rabba:</b> If the blood was collected in more than one cup and the presenting of the blood on the corners of the altar was performed with one <b>cup, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Does the cup <b>render</b> the blood of <b>the other</b> cup <b>rejected,</b> and it is therefore poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard, <b>or</b> does it render it <b>a remainder,</b> which is poured on the base of the altar?",
            "Rabba <b>said to him:</b> This is <b>a dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the remainder of the blood of the external sin offering: In the verse <b>above,</b> discussing the sin offering of a <i>Nasi</i>, <b>it states:</b> “And <b>he shall pour its blood</b> out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). In the verse <b>below,</b> discussing the sin offering of an individual, <b>it states: “And he shall pour all its blood</b> out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30).",
            "The discrepancy between the first verse and the second verse, which contains the additional term “all,” is explained as follows: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to a sin offering which</b> the priest <b>collected its blood in four cups and placed one placement</b> of blood onto the altar <b>from this</b> cup, <b>and one placement</b> of blood <b>from that</b> cup, and likewise for all four corners of the altar, <b>that</b> the remainder of blood from <b>all</b> the cups <b>are poured</b> out <b>onto the base</b> of the altar? <b>The verse states: “And he shall pour all its blood.”</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that if <b>he placed four placements</b> of blood of the sin offering <b>from one cup,</b> the blood in <b>all</b> the rest of the cups <b>should be poured onto the base</b> of the altar. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And</b> he shall pour <b>its blood,”</b> and not all of its blood. <b>How so?</b> Only <b>that</b> blood in the cup from which blood was properly presented on the altar <b>is poured onto the base</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> the rest of the cups of blood are rejected and <b>are poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to a sin offering which</b> the priest <b>collected its blood in four cups and</b> then <b>placed four placements from one cup, that</b> the blood from <b>all</b> the cups <b>are poured</b> out <b>onto the base</b> of the altar? <b>The verse states: “And he shall pour all its blood.”</b> The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written: “And he shall pour its blood,”</b> which indicates that not all of the blood is poured? <b>Rav Ashi said: That</b> verse serves <b>to exclude</b> the <b>remainder that is in the throat of</b> the <b>animal</b> that was never collected in a vessel to be presented, which is not poured onto the base of the altar but into the Temple courtyard drain.",
            "§ The mishna discussed three similar cases: If <b>the</b> priest <b>fit</b> for Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood in a vessel <b>and gave</b> the vessel <b>to an unfit</b> person, that person should return it to the fit priest. If the priest collected the blood in a vessel in his right hand and moved it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If the priest collected the blood in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return the blood to a sacred vessel.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>And</b> it was <b>necessary</b> to mention all of these cases, <b>as had</b> the mishna <b>taught us</b> only the case where he gave the blood to <b>an unfit</b> individual, <b>I would say: What</b> does the term: <b>Unfit,</b> mean? It means <b>an impure</b> priest, who is not completely unfit, <b>as</b> he <b>is fit for communal service</b> in the Temple when the priests or the entire community are impure, and that is why the blood is not disqualified; <b>but</b> if the priest moved the blood to his <b>left</b> hand, which under no circumstances may be used to perform the rite of collecting and carrying the blood, it is <b>no</b> longer valid.",
            "<b>And had</b> the mishna <b>taught us</b> only with regard to moving the blood to his <b>left</b> hand that he should return it to his right hand and present it, one would assume that the reason is <b>that</b> the left hand <b>has validity on Yom Kippur,</b> since the High Priest carries the spoon of incense with his left hand, <b>but</b> if he poured the blood into <b>a non-sacred vessel</b> then it is <b>not</b> valid.",
            "<b>And had</b> the mishna <b>taught us</b> only with regard to <b>a non-sacred vessel</b> that the blood is not disqualified, one could suggest that perhaps it is <b>because</b> the vessels <b>are suitable to be consecrated, but</b> with regard to <b>these,</b> i.e., an unfit individual and the left hand, which have no possibility of becoming fit for service, <b>say</b> that the blood does <b>not</b> remain valid. Therefore, it is <b>necessary</b> for all of the cases to be mentioned.",
            "§ The Gemara questions the actual <i>halakha</i>: <b>But let</b> the blood <b>be</b> considered <b>rejected</b> when placed in the hand of the unfit individual, the left hand, or the non-sacred vessel. <b>Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is</b> what <b>Rav Yirmeya of Difti says in the name of Rava:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Ḥanan the Egyptian, who does not</b> subscribe to the <i>halakha</i> of <b>rejection,</b> but holds that a sacrifice that was rejected temporarily is not rejected entirely.",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Ḥanan the Egyptian says:</b> In the event that the scapegoat of Yom Kippur was lost, <b>even</b> if the <b>blood</b> of its partner that is sacrificed to God has already been collected <b>in the cup,</b> the blood is not rejected, but rather <b>he brings</b> another scapegoat as <b>its counterpart, and pairs it with</b> the goat that has already been slaughtered, and the blood is sprinkled.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi says</b> that there is another explanation to the mishna: <b>Anything that is in his power</b> to rectify <b>is not</b> considered <b>rejected,</b> as in these cases where he can simply return the blood to its proper place.",
            "<b>Rav Shaya said:</b> It <b>is reasonable</b> to explain the mishna <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Ashi,</b> as <b>whom have you heard who accepts</b> the reasoning of <b>rejection?</b> It is <b>Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 62a): <b>And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said:</b> If <b>the blood</b> of the goat sacrificed to God <b>spilled</b> from the cup before it was sprinkled, <b>the scapegoat</b> is left to <b>die.</b> Similarly, if <b>the scapegoat died, the blood</b> of the goat sacrificed to God <b>should be spilled,</b> and two other goats are used. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the scapegoat, or in the opposite case, the blood of the goat to be sacrificed to God, is totally rejected.",
            "<b>And</b> yet, <b>we have heard that</b> Rabbi Yehuda <b>says: Anything that is in his power</b> to rectify <b>is not rejected. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> A priest <b>would fill one cup with blood of the</b> many Paschal offerings brought that day that was now <b>mixed</b> together on the floor <b>and</b> then <b>sprinkle it</b> with <b>a single sprinkling against the base</b> of the altar. <b>Conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda holds that although the blood originally spilled from the cup, <b>anything that is in his power</b> to rectify <b>is not rejected.</b> The Gemara affirms: <b>Conclude from it</b> that it is so.",
            "§ The Gemara discusses <b>the</b> matter <b>itself: It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> A priest <b>would fill one cup with the mixed blood,</b> so <b>that if one of</b> the cups with the collected blood of one of the Paschal offerings <b>were to spill,</b> it would be <b>found that this</b> cup of the mixed blood that was sprinkled <b>would render</b> the sacrifice <b>valid.</b> The Rabbis <b>said to Rabbi Yehuda: But</b> the mixed blood <b>was not collected in a vessel.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>From where do</b> the Rabbis <b>know</b> that the blood was not collected in a vessel? Perhaps it was collected and it spilled out. <b>Rather,</b> this is what they are saying: <b>Perhaps it was not collected in a vessel.</b> Rabbi Yehuda <b>said to them:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>I too said</b> that the blood should be sprinkled <b>only when it was collected in a vessel.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>But he,</b> Rabbi Yehuda, <b>himself, from where did he know</b> if the blood was indeed collected? The Gemara answers: He relies on the fact that <b>priests are vigilant,</b> and perform their service properly and collect all of the blood. <b>But they work swiftly, and</b> the blood therefore <b>spills</b> from the cup.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t blood of exudate,</b> which is unfit to be sprinkled upon the altar, <b>mixed with</b> the blood of the soul on the floor? The Gemara answers: <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> conforms <b>to his</b> standard line of <b>reasoning, as he says</b> that <b>blood of exudate is considered blood.</b>",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Blood of exudate</b> is <b>subject to a prohibition,</b> and one who consumes it receives lashes. This is not as severe as consuming blood of the soul, the blood that spurts out of an animal as it is being slaughtered, for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> One who consumes blood of exudate is liable <b>to</b> receive <b><i>karet</i>,</b> as this blood is treated as proper blood.",
            "The Gemara challenges this answer: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement that</b> presenting blood of exudate <b>does not effect atonement, as it is stated:</b> “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; <b>for it is the blood</b> that makes atonement by reason <b>of the soul”</b> (Leviticus 17:11).",
            "This verse indicates that <b>blood with which the soul leaves</b> the animal, i.e., that spurts immediately upon slaughter, <b>is called blood;</b> but blood <b>with which the soul does not leave</b> the animal, i.e., blood of exudate, <b>is not called blood.</b> If so, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, blood of exudate is unfit for presenting upon the altar, and collecting blood from the floor should therefore be ineffective.",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Yehuda</b> conforms <b>to his</b> line of <b>reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood.</b> Therefore, the blood in the cup that is fit for sprinkling on the altar is not nullified by the blood of exudate, and the entire mixture may be sprinkled on the altar.",
            "The Gemara cites the continuation of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda said to</b> the Rabbis: <b>According to your statement</b> that the mixed blood on the floor may not be used, <b>why do they plug</b> the drain of <b>the</b> Temple <b>courtyard</b> on Passover eve and not allow the blood to flow out through it? The Rabbis <b>said to him: It is</b> a source of <b>praise for the sons of Aaron that they should walk in blood up to their ankles,</b> thereby demonstrating their love for the Temple service.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> the <b>blood is an interposition</b> between the feet of the priests and the floor of the Temple, and this should invalidate the service. The Gemara explains: The blood <b>is moist and is</b> therefore <b>not an interposition, as we learned</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>blood, ink, honey, and milk,</b> when they are <b>dry they interpose,</b> but when they are <b>moist they do not interpose.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks further: <b>But don’t their garments become soiled? And we learned</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest’s <b>garments were soiled and he performed</b> a Temple <b>rite</b> while wearing them, <b>his rite is disqualified. And if you would say that they raised</b> their garments so that they would stay clean, <b>but isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: “And the priest shall put on <b>his</b> linen <b>garment [<i>middo</i></b> <i>vad</i>]” (Leviticus 6:3). The term <i>middo</i>, literally, his measure, teaches that his garment must be <b>according to his measure [<i>kemiddato</i>],</b> i.e., <b>that it should not be</b> too <b>short and that it should not be</b> too <b>long.</b> If the priest raises his garment, it will no longer be exactly his size. The Gemara answers that the priests would walk in the blood only <b>while carrying the</b> sacrificial <b>limbs to the ramp</b> of the altar, <b>which is not</b> actually <b>a rite,</b> but only preparation for a rite.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is it <b>not</b> one of the rites? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>“And the priest shall bring it all</b> and burn it upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13); <b>this is</b> referring to <b>the carrying of the limbs to the ramp? Rather,</b> the priests would walk in the blood only <b>while carrying wood to the arrangement</b> of wood on the altar, <b>which is not a rite.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the floor of the Temple was full of blood; <b>how did they walk to</b> perform <b>the</b> actual <b>rites</b> without soiling their garments? The Gemara answers: <b>They would walk on platforms</b> raised above the floor, so that the blood would not reach their garments.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>one who slaughters an offering</b> with the intent <b>to eat,</b> beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not partake</b> of it, e.g., the portions of the offering consumed on the altar, <b>or</b> with the intent <b>to burn,</b> beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>not burn</b> it on the altar, e.g., the meat of the offering, the offering is <b>fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> it <b>unfit.</b>",
            "One who slaughters an offering with the intent <b>to eat,</b> beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>partake</b> of it, <b>or</b> with the intent <b>to burn,</b> beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, <b>an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one does <b>burn</b> it on the altar, but his intent was to partake or burn <b>less than an olive-bulk,</b> the offering is <b>fit.</b> If his intent was <b>to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk</b> beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is <b>fit, because eating and burning do not join together.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who slaughters an offering</b> with the intent <b>to eat, beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, an olive-bulk from the hide, or from the gravy, or from the spices</b> that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, <b>or from a tendon in the neck, or from the bones, or from the tendons, or from the horns, or from the hooves,</b> the offering is <b>fit and one is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for it,</b> neither <b>due to</b> the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to partake of the offering beyond its designated time, <b>nor</b> due to the prohibition of <b>leftover</b> meat beyond the designated time, <b>nor</b> due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who slaughters sacrificial</b> female animals with the intent <b>to eat</b> the <b>fetus</b> of those animals <b>or</b> their <b>placenta outside</b> the designated area, <b>he has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> Likewise, in the case of <b>one who pinches doves,</b> i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent <b>to eat their eggs</b> that are still in their bodies <b>outside</b> the designated area, <b>he has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> This is because the fetus, the placenta, and the eggs are not considered part of the body of the animal or the bird.",
            "For the same reason, one who consumes <b>the milk of sacrificial</b> female animals <b>or the eggs of doves is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> it, neither <b>due to</b> the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, nor</b> due to the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, nor</b> due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> If one <b>renders an offering <i>piggul</i></b> by slaughtering it with the intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, its <b>fetus is rendered <i>piggul</i></b> as well, and one who eats it is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. But if he intended to partake <b>of the fetus</b> beyond its designated time, <b>the offering has not been rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b> Likewise, if <b>he rendered</b> a bird offering <b><i>piggul</i> by</b> having intent to partake of <b>a tendon in the neck,</b> which is edible, beyond its designated time, then <b>the crop</b> of the bird <b>is rendered <i>piggul</i></b> as well, although it is not considered an item that is usually eaten, since there are people who eat it. But if he intended to partake <b>of the crop</b> beyond its designated time, then <b>a tendon in the neck is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "If <b>he rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., had improper intent <b>by</b> intending to burn <b>the sacrificial portions</b> that are consumed on the altar beyond their designated time, then <b>the</b> rest of the <b>bulls are rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b> Therefore, if one partakes of their meat, he is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. But if he intended to partake <b>of</b> the rest of <b>the bulls</b> beyond their designated time, since <i>piggul</i> does not apply to them, as they are not destined to be consumed on the altar or to be eaten, <b>the sacrificial portions</b> that are consumed on the altar <b>are not rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that the following <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion of Rabbi Elazar: <b>And</b> even those who hold that <i>piggul</i> applies to the bulls that are burned <b>agree that if he intended to partake of the bulls or</b> to <b>burn them</b> beyond their designated time <b>he did not do anything.</b> This is because these bulls are not eaten or burned on the altar, and intentions can render an offering <i>piggul</i> only in the cases of offerings that are eaten or burned on the altar. The Gemara infers: <b>What, is it not</b> possible to infer <b>that</b> if <b>he intended with regard to the sacrificial portions</b> of the bulls that are consumed on the altar to burn them beyond their designated time, the <b>bulls are rendered <i>piggul</i>,</b> which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara rejects this: <b>No,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "derive instead as follows: <b>But</b> if <b>he intended, with regard to the sacrificial portions</b> of the bulls, to burn them beyond their designated time, the <b>sacrificial portions themselves are rendered <i>piggul</i>,</b> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating them. The flesh of the bulls is never rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 9a): In the case of the <b>bulls that are burned and</b> the <b>goats that are burned,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>from</b> the time <b>that they were consecrated.</b> Once <b>they were slaughtered, they are susceptible to being rendered disqualified</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> being <b>left overnight</b> without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled.",
            "The Gemara derives: <b>What, is it not</b> referring to the <b>flesh</b> being <b>left overnight,</b> which would render it not valid? <b>And conclude from</b> the mishna that <b>since</b> the flesh <b>is rendered disqualified by</b> being <b>left overnight,</b> the flesh is also <b>rendered disqualified</b> by the <b>intention</b> to burn the sacrificial portions the next day, i.e., it is subject to <i>piggul</i>, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it is referring to <b>leaving overnight</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> of the offering, not the flesh. Likewise, only the sacrificial portions are rendered <i>piggul</i> by intent to eat them after their designated time. The Gemara asks: <b>But from</b> the fact <b>that the latter clause teaches:</b> One who derives benefit <b>from all of them by the place of the ashes</b> where they are burned is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>until the flesh is</b> completely <b>scorched, it may be inferred that the first clause</b> of the mishna is also referring to the <b>flesh</b> being <b>left overnight.</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Are the cases comparable? This</b> case is <b>as it is, and that</b> case is <b>as it is. The first clause</b> is referring to the <b>sacrificial portions</b> that are consumed on the altar, <b>and the latter clause</b> is referring to the <b>flesh.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba raises an objection</b> to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>And these</b> are portions of the offering <b>that do not render</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i>, and they do not become <i>piggul</i>:</b> The <b>wool that is on the head of</b> the <b>lambs,</b> the <b>hair that is in the beard of</b> the <b>goats, the hide, the gravy, the spices</b> that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, <b>a tendon in the neck, the crop, the bones, the tendons, the horns, the hooves, the fetus, the placenta, the milk of sacrificial</b> animals, <b>and the eggs of doves.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>All of these do not render</b> other items <b><i>piggul</i></b> in the case of intent to consume them after their designated time, <b>and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for them,</b> neither <b>due to</b> the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> nor the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, nor</b> the prohibition against partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure. And one who offers up</b> one <b>of these outside</b> the Temple is <b>exempt,</b> since they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar.",
            "Rabba explains: <b>What,</b> does the <i>baraita</i> <b>not</b> mean that all of these items <b>do not render the offering <i>piggul</i></b> if one intends to partake of them beyond the designated time, <b>and they are</b> also <b>not rendered <i>piggul</i> due to</b> the rest of the <b>offering</b> having been rendered <i>piggul</i>? This includes the fetus and placenta, and is therefore not in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar that the rest of the offering does render them <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it means that <b>they do not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i> due to themselves</b> if one had intent to partake of them beyond the designated time. But such intent with regard to the offering can render them <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> concerning <b>that which is taught</b> in <b>the latter clause: All of these do not render</b> other items <b><i>piggul</i> and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>, why do I also</b> need <b>this?</b> Doesn’t it teach that they are not rendered <i>piggul</i> due to the rest of the offering?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>And according to your reasoning</b> that the additional statement is necessary, then with regard to that which it says a third time: <b>One is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> them <b>due to</b> the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, why do I also</b> need <b>this? Rather,</b> the third statement does not teach an additional <i>halakha</i>, but <b>since</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>wants to teach</b> that one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to violating the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i> and</b> the prohibition against partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure, he taught</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b><i>piggul</i></b> as well.",
            "<b>Here too,</b> it can be explained similarly: <b>Since</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>wants to teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> that <b>one who offers up</b> one <b>of these</b> items <b>outside</b> the Temple is exempt, <b>he also taught: And all of these do not render</b> other items <b><i>piggul</i> and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b> It may be that the rest of the offering does in fact render them <i>piggul</i>, as Rabbi Elazar stated.",
            "<b>Rava says: We learn</b> in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar in the mishna <b>as well: One who slaughters sacrificial</b> female animals with the intent <b>to eat</b> the <b>fetus</b> of those animals <b>or</b> their <b>placenta outside</b> their designated area <b>has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>. And one who pinches doves,</b> i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent <b>to eat their eggs</b> that are still in their bodies <b>outside</b> their designated area, <b>has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<b>And then it is taught:</b> One who consumes <b>the milk of sacrificial</b> female animals <b>or the eggs of doves is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> it <b>due to</b> the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> nor due to the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, nor</b> due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure. But</b> it can be inferred that one who partakes of the <b>fetus or placenta,</b> which are not mentioned, is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rather, isn’t</b> it correct to <b>conclude from</b> the mishna that <b>here,</b> they are rendered <i>piggul</i> <b>due to the offering,</b> and <b>there, due to themselves,</b> i.e., if he had improper intent concerning them, then they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara affirms: <b>Conclude from</b> the mishna that it is so.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> cited by Rabba is now discussed in a different context: <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (84a) that if disqualified offerings are nevertheless brought upon the altar, they are removed, <b>and blemished</b> animals are also included in this <i>halakha</i>. <b>Rabbi Akiva deems blemished</b> animals <b>fit,</b> and if they were brought upon the altar they are not removed.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only</b> an animal with a blemish <b>on the cornea of the eye</b> and similar blemishes that are not noticeable, <b>since they are valid in</b> the case of <b>birds. And</b> in addition, this <b>is</b> the <i>halakha</i> provided <b>that its consecration preceded its blemish,</b> i.e., when the animal was consecrated it was still entirely fit.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering</b> that was brought upon the altar <b>that</b> since a burnt offering may be only a male animal, <b>it is comparable to</b> a case <b>where its blemish preceded its consecration,</b> since the disqualifying factor was there from the outset. Therefore, if it was brought upon the altar it must be removed.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira raises an objection</b> to this from the <i>baraita</i> cited by Rabba: <b>One who offers up</b> one <b>of these outside</b> the Temple is <b>exempt,</b> as they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar. <b>But</b> it can be inferred that if he were to sacrifice <b>from</b> the flesh of the <b>mother of</b> one of <b>these</b> outside the Temple, he would be <b>liable. And how can you find these</b> circumstances? It is only <b>in</b> the case of <b>a female burnt offering.</b> This is because with regard to a peace offering, which may also be from a female animal, its flesh is not burned on the altar but is eaten. Therefore, there would be no liability for sacrificing it outside the Temple.",
            "Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: <b>Granted, if you say</b> that <b>Rabbi Akiva holds</b> with regard to <b>a female burnt offering</b> that <b>if it ascended</b> onto the altar <b>it does not descend,</b> in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> <i>baraita</i>? It <b>is</b> that of <b>Rabbi Akiva.</b> This is because one is liable for sacrificing any offering outside the Temple that may be sacrificed on the altar, including one that was brought upon the altar inappropriately but is not removed. <b>But if you say</b> that with regard to a female burnt offering <b>if it ascended</b> the altar <b>it</b> must <b>descend,</b> and it entirely lacks the status of an offering fit to be sacrificed on the altar, in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> <i>baraita</i>?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Say</b> that the inference should be as follows: <b>One who offers up</b> one <b>of those</b> items <b>outside</b> the Temple is <b>exempt, but</b> if he sacrificed <b>from the sacrificial portions of</b> the <b>mother of</b> one of <b>these,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> This <i>halakha</i> can apply to both a sin offering and a peace offering, for which a female may be brought and whose sacrificial portions are burned on the altar.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches</b> this <i>halakha</i> with the term: <b>Of</b> one of <b>these,</b> indicating that it is referring to one who sacrifices the flesh, and not the sacrificial portions alone. <b>And</b> the case of <b>their mother</b> is <b>similar to</b> that of <b>them,</b> and is therefore referring to sacrificing the flesh of the mother outside the Temple, and not the sacrificial portions. <b>Rather, say</b> as follows: <b>One who offers up</b> part <b>of their sacrificial portions outside</b> the Temple is <b>exempt, but</b> one who offered up some <b>of the sacrificial portions of</b> the <b>mother of</b> one of <b>these</b> is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If <b>one slaughters</b> the animal <b>in order to leave its blood or its sacrificial portions for the next day, or to remove them outside</b> the designated area, but not in order to sacrifice them the next day, <b>Rabbi Yehuda deems</b> the offering <b>unfit, and the Rabbis deem</b> it <b>fit.</b> In the case of one who slaughters the animal <b>in order to place</b> the blood <b>upon the ramp</b> or on the wall of the altar <b>that</b> is <b>not opposite the base</b> of the altar, <b>or</b> in order <b>to place</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line, <b>or</b> to place the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, <b>or</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>or</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary; and likewise, if he slaughtered the animal with the intent <b>that ritually impure</b> people <b>will partake of it,</b> or <b>that ritually impure</b> people <b>will sacrifice it,</b> or <b>that uncircumcised</b> people <b>will partake of it, or that uncircumcised</b> people <b>will sacrifice it;</b> and likewise, with regard to the Paschal offering, if he had intent during the slaughter <b>to break the bones of the Paschal offering,</b> or <b>to eat from</b> the meat of the Paschal offering <b>partially roasted, or to mix the blood of</b> an offering <b>with the blood of unfit</b> offerings, in all these cases, although he intended to perform one of these prohibited acts, some of which would render the offering unfit, the offering is <b>fit.</b>",
            "The reason is <b>that intent does not render</b> the offering <b>unfit except in</b> cases of intent to eat or to burn the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time and outside its</b> designated <b>area, and</b> in addition, <b>the Paschal offering and the sin offering</b> are disqualified by intent to sacrifice them <b>not for their sake.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who deems the offering unfit if there was intent to leave it over until the next day or to take it out of its designated area? <b>Rabbi Elazar said:</b> There are <b>two verses</b> that <b>are written with regard to <i>notar</i>. One verse states: “You shall let nothing of it remain until the morning,</b> and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), <b>and one verse states: “He shall not leave any of it until the morning”</b> (Leviticus 7:15). <b>If</b> the additional verse <b>is not</b> necessary for <b>the matter of</b> the prohibition <b>against leaving</b> it overnight, which is already mentioned by the first verse, <b>apply it to the matter of intent of leaving</b> it overnight, which would therefore be prohibited as well.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> according to the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda, does this verse come to</b> teach <b>this</b> idea? <b>This</b> verse is <b>necessary for him to</b> derive <b>that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering; he shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). From the words: <b>“And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving,” we learned with regard to a thanks offering that it is eaten for a day and a night.</b>",
            "With regard to animals <b>exchanged</b> for thanks offerings, <b>and</b> the <b>offspring</b> of thanks offerings, and the <b>substitutes</b> of thanks offerings, <b>from where</b> is it derived that they too are eaten for only a day and a night? <b>The verse states: “And the flesh [<i>uvesar</i>],”</b> and the additional “and” includes them. With regard to <b>a sin offering and a guilt offering, from where</b> is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? <b>The verse states: “Sacrifice,”</b> to include other types of offerings.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>to include the peace offering of a nazirite,</b> i.e., the ram that a nazirite brings at the close of his term of naziriteship, <b>and the peace offering of Passover? The verse</b> therefore <b>states: “His peace offerings,”</b> in the plural. With regard to <b>the loaves of</b> the <b>thanks offering, and the loaves and wafers that</b> are part <b>of</b> the offering brought by <b>a nazirite, from where</b> is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? <b>The verse states: “His offering.” With regard to all of them I</b> will <b>read</b> the phrase <b>“He shall not leave</b> any of it until the morning” as being applicable. Evidently, this verse is necessary to teach numerous <i>halakhot</i> concerning the allotted time to partake of offerings.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If so, let the verse state: And you shall let nothing</b> of it <b>remain</b> until the morning, as stated in the other verse. <b>What</b> is indicated by the phrase <b>“He shall not leave</b> any of it”? <b>If</b> it <b>is not</b> necessary for the <b>matter of</b> the prohibition <b>against leaving</b> it overnight, <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of intent</b> to <b>leave</b> it overnight.",
            "The Gemara now questions the source cited by Rabbi Elazar: <b>This works out well</b> to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who had intent <b>to leave</b> the sacrificial portions overnight. But with regard to disqualifying the offering due to one who had intent <b>to remove</b> them from the Temple, <b>what can be said</b> to explain the source of Rabbi Yehuda, as it cannot be derived from these verses?",
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> the statement of Rabbi Elazar can be questioned, as <b>the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda is</b> based on <b>logical reasoning</b> and is not derived from a verse. This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda said to</b> the Rabbis: <b>Do you not concede that if he left it over until the next day that it is disqualified? So too,</b> if <b>he intended to leave it over until the next day</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda bases his opinion on logical reasoning, as he equates intent with action. The Gemara asks: <b>Rather, is the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda</b> based on <b>logical reasoning</b> and not derived from the verse? <b>But</b> if so, <b>Rabbi Yehuda should also disagree with regard to all of</b> the other cases in the mishna due to the same reasoning.",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>With regard to which</b> case <b>should</b> Rabbi Yehuda <b>disagree?</b> Should he disagree <b>with regard to one who</b> slaughters the offering with intent to <b>break the bones of the Paschal offering, or</b> with intent <b>to partake of</b> the Paschal offering while it is <b>partially roasted?</b> Even had he actually realized such intent, <b>would the offering itself</b> thereby <b>be disqualified?</b> It presumably would not, as the presenting of the blood effects acceptance.",
            "Likewise, if a rite was performed <b>on the condition that ritually impure</b> individuals <b>will partake of it, or that ritually impure</b> individuals <b>will sacrifice it,</b> i.e., burn the sacrificial portions on the altar, <b>would the offering itself be disqualified</b> if such actions occurred? Likewise, if it was done with the intent <b>that uncircumcised</b> individuals <b>will partake of it, or that uncircumcised</b> individuals <b>will sacrifice it, would the offering itself be disqualified</b> if this occurred? The Gemara presents <b>another version</b> of this question: <b>Is it in his</b> power to execute these actions that are contingent upon the will of others?",
            "With regard to a case where one had intent <b>to mix their blood with the blood of unfit</b> offerings, where <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> also does not disagree with the ruling of the mishna that the offering is valid, he conforms <b>to his</b> line of <b>reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood.</b> Therefore, even if one would actually mix the two types of blood, it would not be disqualified. Likewise, in cases where one had intent <b>to place</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line, or those that are to be placed <b>below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> conforms <b>to his</b> line of <b>reasoning, as he says:</b> Blood <b>that</b> was <b>not</b> placed <b>in its</b> proper <b>place</b> on the altar is <b>also considered</b> to be placed in <b>its</b> proper <b>place,</b> and it effects acceptance of the offering.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>And let him disagree with regard to</b> a case of blood that is to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>that</b> was <b>placed outside, and</b> blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>that</b> was <b>placed inside,</b> as the verse explicitly states that an external sin offering whose blood was sprinkled inside is disqualified (see Leviticus 6:23).",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Rabbi Yehuda holds</b> that in order to disqualify an offering with the intent to perform a rite outside its designated area, <b>we require that</b> the intended <b>place have threefold</b> functionality, i.e., <b>for</b> the presenting of the <b>blood, for</b> the eating of the <b>meat, and for</b> the burning of the <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the altar, which is true only of the area outside the Temple courtyard, which was valid for these three activities during an era in which it was permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars. Therefore, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary, which lacks these three elements, does not disqualify the offering, as the meat and sacrificial portions are never eaten or burned there.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And does Rabbi Yehuda accept this reasoning</b> that it must be a place of threefold functionality? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any <b>evil thing”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:1). The verse <b>included here a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south</b> and not on the northern side of the Temple courtyard as required, <b>and</b> likewise <b>a sin offering whose blood entered inside,</b> i.e., it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be brought inside the Sanctuary, that they are <b>disqualified.</b> This indicates that an offering slaughtered with improper intent with regard to a place that lacks threefold functionality nevertheless renders the offering not valid.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>And</b> does <b>Rabbi Yehuda not accept</b> the requirement of a place of <b>three</b> functions? <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna (82a) that <b>Rabbi Yehuda said:</b> If <b>he brought</b> the blood into the Sanctuary <b>unwittingly,</b> the blood remains <b>fit</b> for presenting, from which it may be inferred: <b>But</b> if he brought it in <b>intentionally,</b> it is <b>unfit. And we maintain</b> that Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit only <b>where</b> one actually <b>effected atonement,</b> i.e., he presented the blood on the inner altar.",
            "<b>Now,</b> it stands to reason that <b>if there,</b> where one actually <b>brought</b> the blood inside, only <b>if he effected atonement, yes,</b> it is unfit, but <b>if he did not effect atonement</b> it is <b>not</b> unfit, then <b>here, where</b> he merely <b>thought</b> to bring it inside, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that it should be valid? The Gemara answers: There are <b>two <i>tanna’im</i>, and</b> they disagree <b>with regard to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda</b> concerning a place with threefold functionality.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> does <b>Rabbi Yehuda hold</b> that with regard to <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "the slaughterer <b>would be liable</b> to receive lashes?",
            "<b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that with regard to <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south, he would be liable</b> for it. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep,</b> that has a blemish, even <b>any evil thing”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:1), to teach that <b>for</b> slaughtering <b>an evil thing,</b> such as a blemished offering, <b>you deem him liable</b> to receive lashes, <b>but you do not deem him liable for a sin offering that he slaughtered in the south.</b> The Gemara answers: Here too, there are <b>two <i>tanna’im</i>,</b> and they disagree <b>with regard to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Abba says:</b> Although Rabbi Yehuda says that an offering is rendered not valid if it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be left over until the next day, <b>Rabbi Yehuda concedes that</b> if the priest subsequently collected, conveyed, or presented the blood with the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, <b>he then establishes</b> the offering <b>as <i>piggul</i>.</b> The intent to leave it overnight does not prevent it from being rendered <i>piggul</i>, in contrast to intent to sacrifice or partake of it outside its designated area, or performing a sacrificial rite of the Paschal offering or a sin offering not for its own sake, which do prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered <i>piggul</i> (see 29b).",
            "<b>Rava says: Know</b> that this is so, <b>as</b> intent to sprinkle the blood the next day, which renders an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> and which inherently includes the intent to leave the blood over until the next day so that he can then sprinkle it, <b>is nothing before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood. And his intent during the slaughter to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering <i>piggul</i> until the blood is sprinkled, <b>and</b> then the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>comes and establishes</b> the offering <b>as <i>piggul</i>.</b> Clearly, the intent to leave the blood over until the next day does not prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: <b>But it is not so</b> that this is a valid proof, as <b>there,</b> with regard to standard <i>piggul</i> intent, <b>it is one intent</b> that is established with the sprinkling of the blood. By contrast, <b>here,</b> where he initially had intent to leave the blood until the next day and subsequently had intent to sprinkle it beyond its designated time, there are <b>two</b> separate <b>intents.</b> Therefore, since an improper intent already exists, the offering cannot thereafter be rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rav Huna raised an objection to Rabbi Abba</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered an offering with the intent <b>to place</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>below</b> the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed <b>below</b> the red line <b>above</b> the red line, and he had intent to do so <b>immediately,</b> i.e., on the same day, then it is <b>valid,</b> as such intent does not disqualify the offering. If <b>he then had intent</b> to sacrifice the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> it is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i> for it.</b> If he had intent to sacrifice it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> then it is rendered <b><i>piggul</i>, and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for it.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: If one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line or vice versa <b>the next day,</b> then it is <b>disqualified,</b> due to his intent to leave it overnight, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. In this case, if <b>he then had intent</b> to sacrifice the same offering <b>either beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> it is <b>disqualified, and there is no</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i> for it.</b> Evidently, intent to leave it overnight prevents the offering from subsequently being rendered <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara concludes: <b>The refutation of</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Abba</b> is indeed <b>a conclusive refutation.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rav Ḥisda says</b> that <b>Ravina bar Sila says:</b> If one slaughtered an offering with <b>intent that impure</b> individuals <b>would eat</b> the meat of the offering <b>the next day,</b> one is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> due the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. Although impure individuals are not fit to partake of the meat, this is nevertheless considered intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. <b>Rava says: Know</b> that this is so, <b>as meat prior to</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood is <b>not fit</b> to be eaten, <b>and when</b> one <b>has</b> improper <b>intent with regard to it,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> Clearly, intent to partake of a forbidden item beyond its designated time renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: <b>But it is not so,</b> as <b>there,</b> with regard to standard <i>piggul</i> intent, <b>he sprinkles</b> the blood, <b>and</b> the meat <b>is rendered fit</b> to be eaten the next day. By contrast, <b>here,</b> it is <b>not rendered fit</b> to be eaten by impure individuals <b>at all.</b> Therefore, such intent is not considered significant intent to consume the meat after its designated time.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda says</b> that <b>Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana was wont to say</b> the following <i>halakha</i>: With regard to <b>the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering</b> from <b>which</b> the priests’ portion <b>was not separated,</b> although it is prohibited for them to be eaten, nevertheless <b>one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to</b> violating the prohibition against eating <b>them</b> in a state of <b>impurity.</b>",
            "<b>Rava said: Know</b> that this is so, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The added words <b>“that pertain to the Lord”</b> serve <b>to include the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity with regard to impurity,</b> teaching that one who partakes of them while impure is liable to receive <i>karet</i>.",
            "<b>Apparently, even though they are not fit for consumption, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to</b> violating the prohibition against eating <b>them</b> in <b>ritual impurity. Here too,</b> with regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, <b>even though they are not fit to be eaten, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to</b> violating the prohibition against eating <b>them</b> in <b>impurity.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: <b>But it is not so,</b> as <b>there, the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity</b> that are burned on the altar are at least <b>fit for</b> the <b>Most High,</b> i.e., for the consumption of the altar, and therefore one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating them while ritually impure. This is <b>to the exclusion of the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and</b> the <b>loaves of a thanks offering</b> from <b>which</b> the priests’ portion <b>was not separated, which are not fit</b> at all, <b>not for</b> the <b>Most High, and not for an ordinary</b> person.",
            "The Gemara presents <b>another version</b> of the proof and its rejection: <b>But</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> are <b>not fit,</b> and yet one is liable if he consumes them while impure. The Gemara responds: <b>But it is not so,</b> since <b>these</b> sacrificial portions are <b>fit for their matters, and these,</b> i.e., the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, <b>are not fit at all.</b>",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Beit Shammai say:</b> With regard to <b>all</b> the offerings <b>whose</b> blood is to be <b>placed on the external altar,</b> even those that require that the blood be sprinkled on two opposite corners of the altar so that it will run down each of its four sides, in a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>placed</b> the blood on the altar <b>with</b> only <b>one placement, he facilitated atonement. And in</b> the case of <b>a sin offering,</b> which requires four placements, one on each of the four corners of the altar, at least <b>two placements</b> are necessary to facilitate atonement. <b>And Beit Hillel say: Even</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> in a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>placed</b> the blood with <b>one placement, he facilitated atonement</b> after the fact.",
            "<b>Therefore,</b> since the priest facilitates atonement with one placement in all cases other than a sin offering according to Beit Shammai, and even in the case of a sin offering according to Beit Hillel, <b>if he placed the first</b> placement <b>in its proper manner, and the second</b> with the intent to eat the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, he facilitated atonement.</b> Since the second placement is not indispensable with regard to achieving atonement, improper intent while performing that rite does not invalidate the offering.",
            "<b>And</b> based on the same reasoning, <b>if he placed the first</b> placement with the intent to eat the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time and</b> he placed <b>the second</b> placement with the intent to eat the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> the second of which does not render an offering <i>piggul</i>, the offering is <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> an offering disqualified by improper intention, <b>and one is liable</b> to receive <b>excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>] for its</b> consumption. This is because the intent that accompanied the second placement does not supersede the <i>piggul</i> status of the offering.",
            "All this applies to those offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar. But with regard to <b>all</b> the offerings <b>whose</b> blood is to be <b>placed on the inner altar, if</b> the priest <b>omitted</b> even <b>one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. Therefore,</b> if <b>he placed all</b> the placements <b>in their proper manner, and one</b> placement <b>in an improper manner,</b> i.e., with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> as it is lacking one placement; <b>but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of the offering, as the improper intention related to only part of the blood that renders the offering permitted for consumption, and an offering becomes <i>piggul</i> only when the improper intention relates to the entire portion of the offering that renders it permitted for consumption.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to</b> those offerings whose blood is <b>placed on the external altar, that</b> if the priest <b>placed</b> the blood <b>with one placement, he facilitated atonement? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured</b> upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that a single pouring of blood suffices. The Gemara asks: <b>But does this</b> verse <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? <b>That</b> verse <b>is necessary for that which is taught</b> in another <i>baraita</i> discussing a different matter:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>From where</b> is it derived <b>that all</b> the <b>blood</b> that is left over from an offering after the requisite placement <b>requires placement of blood on the base</b> of the altar? <b>The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured</b> upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of the first <i>baraita</i> <b>derives</b> this <b>from</b> the verse cited <b>by Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> with regard to a verse discussing a bird sin offering: <b>“And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out</b> at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). <b>As</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state “of the blood,”</b> because the entire verse is talking about the blood, <b>what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states “of the blood”?</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Since we</b> have <b>learned only about</b> those offerings whose blood is <b>placed</b> on the altar with <b>four placements,</b> i.e., outer sin offerings, <b>that they require placement of the</b> leftover <b>blood on the base</b> of the altar, <b>from where</b> is it derived that the same applies to the leftover <b>blood</b> of all the <b>other</b> offerings? <b>The verse states: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out</b> at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). <b>Since</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state “of the blood,”</b> because the entire verse is talking about the blood, <b>what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states “of the blood”?</b> This <b>teaches that all the</b> leftover <b>blood</b> from all the offerings <b>requires placement of blood on the base</b> of the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But still,</b> does <b>this</b> verse, Deuteronomy 12:27, <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>, that if a priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? <b>That</b> verse <b>is necessary for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to</b> those offerings whose blood is supposed to be <b>placed by</b> means of <b>sprinkling</b> from a certain distance from the altar, <b>that</b> if the priest <b>placed</b> the blood <b>by pouring</b> it from up close <b>he has fulfilled</b> his obligation? <b>The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured</b> upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27).",
            "The Gemara answers that the ruling in this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, while the <i>tanna</i> of the earlier <i>baraita</i> <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva, who says: Sprinkling is not included in pouring, and</b> similarly <b>pouring is not included in sprinkling.</b> Rather, these are separate actions performed under different circumstances, and one does not fulfill his obligation to sprinkle the blood by pouring it. Therefore, the verse is available to him to teach that if a priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement.",
            "The Gemara demonstrates that this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 121a): If <b>one recited the blessing over the Paschal offering,</b> which is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the Paschal offering, <b>he has</b> also <b>exempted</b> himself from reciting a blessing over the Festival peace <b>offering,</b> i.e., the peace offering that is eaten together with the Paschal offering. The blessing for the Festival peace offering of the fourteenth of Nisan is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the offering.",
            "If he recited the blessing over the Festival <b>offering, he has not exempted</b> himself from reciting a blessing over <b>the Paschal offering.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.</b> Rabbi Yishmael’s reasoning is based on the <i>halakha</i> that the blood of the Paschal offering is poured, while the blood of the Festival offering is sprinkled. He maintains that sprinkling is included in the more general category of pouring, and therefore the blessing over the Paschal offering includes the Festival offering. Pouring is not included in the more limited category of sprinkling, and therefore reciting the blessing over the Festival offering does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over the Paschal offering.",
            "The mishna continues: <b>Rabbi Akiva says: This</b> blessing <b>does not exempt</b> one from reciting a blessing over <b>that one, and that</b> blessing <b>does not exempt</b> one from reciting a blessing over <b>this one.</b> Sprinkling is not included in pouring, and pouring is not included in sprinkling. Therefore, there is a separate blessing for each offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Still,</b> does <b>this</b> verse, Deuteronomy 12:27, <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>, that if a priest placed the blood with one placement he facilitated atonement? That verse <b>is necessary for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yishmael says: Since it is stated: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat,</b> you shall not redeem; they are sacred. You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17), <b>we learned with regard to a firstborn</b> animal, which must be given to a priest to be offered on the altar in the Temple, <b>that it requires placement of</b> its <b>blood and sacrificial portions on the altar. From where</b> is it derived that the same applies to an animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>and a Paschal offering? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured</b> upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). This verse teaches that all offerings require placement of their blood on the altar.",
            "The Gemara answers that the <i>tanna</i> of the earlier <i>baraita</i>, who derives from Deuteronomy 12:27 the <i>halakha</i> that if a priest placed the blood with one placement he facilitated atonement, <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that the <i>halakha</i> that the blood and sacrificial parts of an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering must be placed on the altar is derived from the aforementioned verse concerning a firstborn animal: “You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17).",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>, that <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is not stated</b> in this verse: <b>Its blood, but</b> rather: <b>“Their blood.”</b> Similarly, <b>it is not stated: Its fat, but</b> rather: <b>“Their fat.”</b> The plural form <b>teaches with regard to</b> the <b>firstborn</b> animal, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse, as well as with regard to the animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>and</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> which have a level of sanctity similar to that of a firstborn animal, <b>that</b> each <b>requires placement of</b> the <b>blood and sacrificial portions on the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But does Rabbi Yishmael derive</b> one <i>halakha</i> <b>from this verse and</b> then <b>derive</b> another <i>halakha</i> <b>from this</b> same verse? It was stated earlier that Rabbi Yishmael derives from the verse “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured” that sprinkling is included in pouring, and yet here he derives from that same verse that the blood of an animal tithe offering and that of a Paschal offering must be presented on the altar. The Gemara answers: These are the opinions of <b>two <i>tanna’im</i>,</b> each of whom expressed his opinion <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yishmael.</b>",
            "The Gemara raises a question with regard to the disagreement about the interpretation of Numbers 18:17. <b>Granted, according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets the entire</b> verse as referring <b>to a firstborn</b> animal, and according to whom the plural form in the verse is referring to three such firstborns, that of a bull, that of a sheep, and that of a goat, <b>this</b> explains that <b>which is written</b> immediately afterward: <b>“And their meat shall be yours”</b> (Numbers 18:18), in the plural, i.e., the meat of these firstborn animals shall be eaten by the priests.",
            "<b>But according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei, who interprets</b> this verse as referring <b>also to</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>and a Paschal offering,</b> there is a difficulty, as an animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>and a Paschal offering are eaten by their owners,</b> not by the priests. If so, <b>what</b> is the meaning of the phrase <b>“and their meat shall be yours”?</b> The Gemara answers that the plural term “their meat,” is referring not to an animal tithe offering or a Paschal offering, but to different types of firstborns, i.e., <b>both an unblemished</b> animal, whose blood is poured on the altar, <b>and a blemished</b> one, which is not brought as an offering on the altar."
        ],
        [
            "<b>This</b> verse <b>teaches that a blemished firstborn is given to a priest</b> as a gift, and that he may eat its meat. This is a novel concept, <b>as we have not found in the entire Torah</b> another <i>halakha</i> similar <b>to it,</b> where a blemished offering is given to the priests for consumption.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> according to <b>Rabbi Yishmael,</b> who interprets this verse differently, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i> that a blemished firstborn is given to a priest? The Gemara answers: <b>He derives it from</b> the phrase: “As the breast of waving and as the right thigh, <b>it shall be yours”</b> (Numbers 18:18), <b>which is the latter clause</b> of that same verse. The repetition of the phrase “shall be yours” serves to teach that even the meat of a blemished firstborn shall be eaten by the priests.",
            "§ The Gemara raises another question: <b>Granted, according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who interprets</b> the verse as referring <b>also to</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>and a Paschal offering, this is as it is written</b> in the same verse: <b>“You shall not redeem; they are sacred”</b> (Numbers 18:17). The word “they” indicates that only <b>they are sacrificed</b> on the altar, <b>but their substitutes are not sacrificed.</b> In general, if one substitutes a non-sacred animal for one designated as an offering, both the original and the substitute are considered to be consecrated, and they are therefore sacrificed. But if one substitutes a non-sacred animal for a firstborn, an animal tithe offering, or a Paschal offering, the substitute is not sacrificed.",
            "This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 21a): With regard to <b>the substitute of a firstborn and</b> of an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, both <b>they,</b> the substitutes themselves, <b>and their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring, forever,</b> i.e., for all future generations, <b>are as</b> the <b>firstborn and</b> the animal <b>tithe</b> offering, respectively, <b>and</b> therefore <b>they are eaten in their blemished</b> state <b>by the owners;</b> but unlike the firstborn and the animal tithe offering themselves, they are not sacrificed on the altar.",
            "<b>And</b> likewise with regard to the substitute of a Paschal offering, <b>we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 96b) that <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says: I</b> have <b>heard</b> two rulings from my teachers: One ruling was <b>that the substitute of a Paschal offering is sacrificed</b> as a peace offering after Passover, <b>and</b> another ruling was that <b>the substitute of a Paschal offering is not offered</b> as a peace offering after Passover; <b>and I cannot explain</b> these apparently contradictory rulings, as I do not remember the circumstances to which each ruling applies. And as will be explained, if the substitution took place after the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, the animal is sacrificed, as it is considered the substitute of a peace offering, whereas if the substitution occurred before the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, it is not sacrificed, as it is the substitute of a Paschal offering. This indicates that the substitute of a Paschal offering is not sacrificed, just like the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed.",
            "<b>But according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets the entire</b> verse as dealing <b>with a firstborn, from where does he</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> <b>that the substitute of</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>and</b> of <b>a Paschal offering are not sacrificed?</b> The Gemara answers: With regard to an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>he derives</b> this by means of a verbal analogy between the terms <b>passing,</b> and <b>passing</b> written <b>with regard to a firstborn.</b> Concerning a firstborn it is stated: “And you shall pass [<i>veha’avarta</i>] to the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12), and concerning an animal tithe it is stated: “Of whatever passes [<i>ya’avor</i>] under the rod” (Leviticus 27:32). From this verbal analogy it may be derived that just as the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed, so too, the substitute of an animal tithe offering is not sacrificed.",
            "With regard to the <b>Paschal offering,</b> this <i>halakha</i> is not derived through a verbal analogy, but rather this <i>halakha</i> <b>is explicitly written concerning it.</b> The verse referring to peace offerings states: “If he offers a lamb for his offering” (Leviticus 3:7). The Torah could simply have stated: <b>A lamb,</b> and proceed from there to teach the <i>halakhot</i> of a lamb peace offering. If so, <b>what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “If</b> he offers <b>a lamb”?</b> This serves <b>to include the substitute of a Paschal offering</b> that was substituted <b>after</b> the sacrifice of <b>the Paschal offering,</b> teaching <b>that it is sacrificed as a peace offering,</b> since the Paschal offering has the status of a peace offering after that time. One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>even before</b> the sacrifice of <b>the Paschal offering the same</b> should apply, i.e., that the substitute of a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, <b>the verse states</b> with regard to the Paschal offering: “It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that <b>it,</b> the Paschal offering itself, is sacrificed, but its substitute is not sacrificed.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>all those <i>tanna’im</i> who derive a different exposition from this</b> verse: <b>“And the blood of your offerings shall be poured”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:27), <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i> that is recorded in the mishna, that with regard to <b>all</b> the offerings <b>whose</b> blood is to be <b>placed on the external altar,</b> in a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>placed</b> the blood on the altar with <b>one placement, he facilitated atonement, from where do they</b> derive this? The Gemara answers: Those <i>tanna’im</i> <b>hold in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Beit Hillel, who say: Even</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> in a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>placed</b> the blood with <b>one placement, he facilitated atonement</b> after the fact. <b>And they derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> applying to <b>all</b> the other offerings <b>from</b> that which applies to <b>a sin offering.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai maintain that in the case of <b>a sin offering,</b> which requires four placements, at least <b>two placements</b> are necessary to facilitate atonement, whereas Beit Hillel hold that even in the case of a sin offering one placement suffices. <b>Rav Huna said: What is the reasoning</b> for the opinion <b>of Beit Shammai?</b>",
            "He explains: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it upon the <b>corners</b> of the altar” (Leviticus 4:25). Subsequently, the verse states: “The priest shall take of its blood with his finger, and put it on the <b>corners</b> of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30), and an additional verse states: “The priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it on the <b>corners</b> of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As the minimum amount justifying the use of the plural form, i.e., in the word “corners,” is two, one may conclude that <b>there are six</b> references to the corners of the altar <b>here. Four</b> of them are mentioned <b>for a mitzva,</b> meaning that the priest should place the blood on all four corners of the altar <i>ab initio</i>, <b>and</b> the other <b>two</b> are mentioned <b>to invalidate</b> the offering if he did not present the blood on at least two corners.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> what is the reasoning for the opinion of <b>Beit Hillel?</b> The Gemara answers: The matter should be understood according to the written consonantal text, i.e., the way in which the words are actually spelled. The word <b>“corners”</b> is written plene, i.e., with a <i>vav</i>, in one of the verses, which means that it must be read in the plural form. In the other two verses, <b>“corners”</b> and <b>“corners”</b> are written deficient, i.e., without a <i>vav</i>, in a way that can be vocalized in the singular form, i.e., as <i>karnat</i>. Therefore, <b>there are four</b> references to corners <b>here. Three</b> of these references are written <b>to</b> indicate the placements of blood are performed only as <b>a mitzva,</b> i.e., they are performed <i>ab initio</i>, and the remaining <b>one</b> is written <b>to</b> indicate that its absence <b>invalidates</b> the offering, i.e., the offering is not valid if the blood was not placed against at least one corner of the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> according to this explanation of Beit Hillel, why not <b>say</b> that <b>all of them are</b> written <b>for</b> the <b>mitzva</b> and none are to invalidate, i.e., that the blood must be presented on all four corners <i>ab initio</i>, but the offering atones after the fact even if the blood was not presented at all? The Gemara rejects this possibility: <b>We have not found</b> anywhere in the Torah an example of an offering in which <b>atonement</b> can be achieved <b>with no</b> placement of the blood.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that <b>this is the reason of Beit Hillel: The vocalized text</b> of the Torah, i.e., the way in which the words of the Torah are pronounced based on the tradition of what vowels the words contain, <b>is effective</b> in determining how the verses are to be expounded. <b>And</b> likewise, <b>the consonantal text</b> of the Torah, i.e., the way in which the words are actually written, <b>is</b> also <b>effective</b> in determining how the verses are to be expounded. The Gemara elaborates: <b>The vocalized text is effective in adding one</b> more corner <b>and the consonantal text is effective in subtracting one</b> corner. Consequently, the verse is interpreted as referring to five corners, four of which are necessary for the mitzva <i>ab initio</i>, and one of which is indispensable after the fact.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But if that is so,</b> that this is the proper manner of expounding the verses, consider the case of the phylacteries of the head, about which it is stated: “And <b>for frontlets [<i>totafot</i>]</b> between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), and: “They shall be <b>for frontlets [<i>totafot</i>]</b> between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), and subsequently: “They shall be <b>for frontlets [<i>totafot</i>]</b> between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 11:18). The word <i>totafot</i> is written once in plene form, i.e., with a <i>vav</i>, indicating the plural form, and twice in a deficient form, i.e., without a <i>vav</i>, indicating the singular. Accordingly, <b>there are four</b> frontlets <b>here,</b> and from here the Sages derive that the phylacteries of the head consist of four compartments, which together form a cube. Why not say that <b>the vocalized text,</b> read in the plural, <b>is effective,</b> i.e., that it requires six compartments, <b>and</b> likewise, <b>the consonantal text,</b> read in the singular, <b>is effective,</b> i.e., it requires four compartments, and therefore one should be <b>required to prepare five compartments</b> for the phylacteries of the head?",
            "The Gemara answers that Beit Hillel <b>hold in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva, who says</b> that the requirement to have four compartments in the phylacteries of the head is not derived from the number of times that the word <i>totafot</i> is mentioned, but rather from an exposition of the word <i>totafot</i> itself: <b><i>Tot</i> in</b> the <b>Katpi</b> language means <b>two,</b> and <b><i>pat</i> in</b> the <b>Afriki</b> language means <b>two,</b> for a total of four.",
            "The Gemara raises another objection to this method of exposition: <b>If that is so,</b> consider the case of a <i>sukka</i>, about which it is stated: <b>“In <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>]</b> shall you reside seven days; all that are homeborn in Israel shall reside <b>in <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>].</b> So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside <b>in <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>]</b> when I took them out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 23:42–43). Two instances of the word <i>basukkot</i> are written in a deficient manner, i.e., without a <i>vav</i>, indicating the singular, and one instance is written in plene form, i.e., with a <i>vav</i>, indicating the plural form. The Sages derived from here that a <i>sukka</i> must have four walls. Why not say that <b>the vocalized text,</b> read in the plural, <b>is effective,</b> requiring six walls, <b>and</b> likewise, <b>the consonantal text,</b> read in the singular, <b>is effective,</b> requiring four walls, and therefore one should be <b>required to build</b> a <i>sukka</i> with <b>five walls?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There, one</b> of the five indicated by the <b>verse is</b> needed <b>entirely for</b> the mitzva <b>itself,</b> i.e., to teach the basic <i>halakha</i> that one must dwell in a <i>sukka</i>. <b>And</b> another <b>one</b> of the five is needed <b>to</b> teach that a <i>sukka</i>, as is indicated by its name, must have <b>a covering [<i>sekhakha</i>].</b> Accordingly, there are three left, alluding to the requirement that a <i>sukka</i> must have three walls. The Gemara adds that <b>the <i>halakha</i></b> transmitted to Moses from Sinai <b>comes and reduces the</b> size of the <b>third</b> wall, teaching that it need not be complete, <b>and sets</b> its minimum length <b>at</b> only <b>one handbreadth.</b>",
            "The Gemara raises yet another objection: <b>If that is so,</b> that both the vocalized and the consonantal texts are taken into account, consider the case of a woman who gives birth to a female child. Concerning this woman the verse states: “But if she bear a female child, <b>then she shall be impure two weeks [<i>shevu’ayim</i>],</b> as in her menstruation” (Leviticus 12:5). The way that the word is written allows it to be read as <b><i>shivim</i>,</b> seventy. Why not say that <b>the vocalized text</b> of the Torah <b>is effective,</b> teaching us that the woman is ritually impure for fourteen days, <b>and the consonantal text is</b> also <b>effective,</b> teaching us that she is impure for seventy days, and, therefore, <b>she</b> should be <b>required to sit</b> in a state of ritual impurity for <b>forty-two</b> days, which is the halfway point between fourteen and seventy days?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There it is different,</b> and the consonantal text is disregarded entirely, <b>as it is written: “As in her menstruation,”</b> and a menstruating woman is impure for one week. Evidently, the verse is speaking in terms of weeks, and is not alluding to the number seventy at all.",
            "§ The Gemara further analyzes the opinion of Beit Hillel that even in the case of a sin offering, if the priest placed the blood on the altar with one placement, he facilitated atonement. <b>And a <i>tanna</i> cites</b> proof <b>for this from here,</b> as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering brought by a king: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement</b> for him” (Leviticus 4:26), and with regard to the goat brought as a sin offering by an ordinary person: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement</b> for him” (Leviticus 4:31), and with regard to the sheep brought as a sin offering by an ordinary person: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement</b> for him” (Leviticus 4:35). The repetition of this term is <b>due to a logical inference.</b>",
            "<b>As</b> one <b>might</b> have thought to say: <b>Could this not</b> be derived through <b>logical inference</b> as follows: It <b>is stated</b> that <b>blood</b> is placed <b>below</b> the red line, <b>and</b> it <b>is stated</b> that <b>blood</b> is placed <b>above</b> the red line. <b>Just as</b> with regard to the <b>blood concerning</b> which it <b>is stated</b> that it is placed <b>below</b> the red line, <b>when</b> the priest <b>placed</b> it on the altar <b>with one placement he facilitated atonement, so too,</b> with regard to the <b>blood concerning</b> which it <b>is stated</b> that it is placed <b>above</b> the red line, <b>when</b> the priest <b>placed</b> it on the altar <b>with one placement he facilitated atonement.</b>",
            "<b>Or</b> perhaps, <b>go this way,</b> turning away from the previous explanation and toward this explanation: It <b>is stated</b> that <b>blood</b> is presented <b>on</b> the <b>inner</b> altar, i.e., with regard to a sin offering of the community or of the High Priest; the blood of these offerings is sprinkled on the incense altar that is inside the Sanctuary. <b>And</b> it <b>is stated</b> that <b>blood</b> is presented <b>on</b> the <b>external</b> altar, i.e., with regard to the sin offering of an ordinary person, which is offered on the outer altar that is in the courtyard. <b>Just as</b> with regard to the <b>blood concerning</b> which it <b>is stated</b> that it is presented <b>on</b> the <b>inner</b> altar, if the priest <b>omitted one of the placements he has done nothing,</b> i.e., the offering is not valid, <b>so too,</b> with regard to the <b>blood concerning</b> which it <b>is stated</b> that it is presented <b>on</b> the <b>external</b> altar, if the priest <b>omitted one of the placements he has done nothing.</b>",
            "The Gemara analyzes the two possibilities: <b>Let us see to which</b> of the two cases the blood of an animal sin offering is more <b>similar.</b> It can be claimed: We <b>derive</b> a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the <b>external</b> altar <b>from</b> a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the <b>external</b> altar, <b>but</b> we <b>do not derive</b> a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the <b>external</b> altar <b>from</b> a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the <b>inner</b> altar. <b>Or, go this way: We derive</b> a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to <b>a sin offering</b> whose blood is to be placed on the <b>four corners</b> of the altar <b>from</b> a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to <b>a sin offering</b> whose blood is to be placed on the <b>four corners</b> of the altar. <b>But</b> a sin offering consisting of a bird, <b>which is not a sin offering</b> whose blood is to be placed on the <b>four corners</b> of the altar, <b>cannot serve as proof</b> to the <i>halakha</i> concerning an animal sin offering, whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar.",
            "Since both of the above inferences are reasonable, neither can serve as the source of the <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” “And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” “And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,”</b> for a total of three times. The verses are interpreted as follows: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even if he placed only three</b> placements. Subsequently: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even if he placed only two</b> placements, and then: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even if he placed only one</b> placement. This interpretation is the source of Beit Hillel’s opinion.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> each of these verses <b>is necessary for itself,</b> to teach that atonement is achieved for each of the sins through its respective sin offering. <b>Rava said: Bar Adda Mari explained</b> this matter <b>to me: The verse states</b> with regard to each of these sin offerings: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement…and he shall be forgiven”</b> (Leviticus 4:26, 31, 35). <b>This is atonement</b> and <b>this is forgiveness;</b> they are one and the same. Since it would have sufficed to say: “And he shall be forgiven,” the superfluous mentions of the phrase: “And the priest shall make atonement,” serve to teach that the priest facilitates atonement even if he has not performed all the placements.",
            "The Gemara asks: But even if these phrases are superfluous, do they necessarily indicate that a priest who omitted placements has nevertheless facilitated atonement? Why not <b>say</b> that these phrases serve to teach that if the priest placed all the placements he facilitated atonement even if the placements were placed in the wrong place? And expound the verses as follows: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even if he placed</b> the blood on the altar with <b>only three</b> placements <b>above,</b> on the corners of the altar, <b>and one below,</b> on the lower portion of the altar; <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even if he placed</b> the blood with <b>only two</b> placements <b>above and two below; “And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even if he did not place</b> the blood <b>above</b> at all, <b>but</b> only <b>below.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak says: If so,</b> that the priest facilitates atonement even if he placed all the placements below, <b>you have abolished the requirement of four corners</b> that is stated with regard to the sin offering (see, e.g., Leviticus 4:34), as the four corners are on the upper portion of the altar. The Gemara is puzzled by Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak’s claim: <b>But if the Merciful One states</b> that this is so, <b>let</b> this requirement <b>be abolished.</b>",
            "As Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak’s claim was rejected, <b>Rava said</b> there is a different reason why the previous claim cannot be accepted: <b>What is</b> the <b>item that requires three</b> repetitions of “and the priest shall make atonement,” i.e., to what are these verses referring? <b>You must say</b> that <b>these are</b> the <b>corners</b> of the altar. The Torah must teach that the priest facilitates atonement even if he did not place the blood on three of the four corners. But in order for the verses to teach that all four placements can be placed below, the phrase “and the priest shall make atonement” would have to be written four times.",
            "The Gemara asks further: Even so, it is possible to interpret the three repetitions of the phrase “and the priest shall make atonement” as referring to the location of the placements, without abolishing the requirement of corners, as one can <b>say:</b> “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood on the altar with only three placements above and one below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood with only two placements above and two below; <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement,” even though he placed</b> the blood with <b>only one</b> placement <b>above and three below.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: This entire line of inquiry can be rejected, as <b>we do not find</b> a case involving <b>blood, half of which</b> is placed <b>above</b> the red line <b>and half of which</b> is placed <b>below</b> it. One either places all the blood on the lower half of the altar, as in the case of most offerings, or all of it on the upper half of the altar, as in the case of sin offerings. The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is there really <b>no</b> case of that sort? <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 53b): The High Priest took the blood of the bull into the Holy of Holies and <b>sprinkled from</b> the blood <b>one</b> time <b>upward and</b> then <b>seven</b> times <b>downward?</b> Apparently, part of the blood of an offering can be sprinkled upward, toward the upper part of the Ark Cover, and part can be placed downward, toward the lower part of the Ark Cover.",
            "The Gemara rejects this: That is not a case where half the blood is sprinkled upward and half is sprinkled downward. Instead, that sprinkling was <b>like a <i>matzlif</i>.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>What</b> is the meaning of <b>like a <i>matzlif</i>? Rav Yehuda demonstrated</b> with his hand; it means <b>like one who whips.</b> One who whips another does not strike repeatedly in one place but directs one lash beneath the other.",
            "The Gemara further asks: And is there really no case of that sort? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 58b) about the Yom Kippur service: After the High Priest sprinkled blood on the four corners of the incense altar, <b>he sprinkled</b> blood <b>seven times on <i>tohoro</i> of the altar.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>What, is it not</b> referring <b>to</b> the <b>middle</b> of the side <b>of the altar, as people say: Clear noon [<i>tihara</i>],</b> that is the middle <b>of the day?</b> Accordingly, the root <i>tet</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>reish</i> denotes the middle; in the one case, the middle of the day, and in the other case, halfway up the altar. Now, since the blood was sprinkled on the altar seven times, inevitably some of the blood landed above the midpoint and some of it landed below the midpoint. <b>Rava bar Sheila said: No,</b> that is not the meaning of <i>tohoro</i>. Rather, <i>tohoro</i> means <b>on the revealed</b> part, i.e., the top, of the altar, <b>as it is written: “Like the very clear [<i>latohar</i>] sky”</b> (Exodus 24:10). <i>Tohoro</i> is referring to the top of the altar when it has been revealed, after the ashes of the incense are cleared and the pure gold is visible.",
            "The Gemara asks again: Is there not a case where some of the blood is presented above the red line and some of it is presented below? <b>But there is</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood, which is poured on the base of the altar even in the case of a sin offering, the main blood of which is placed on the upper portion of the altar. The Gemara answers: The pouring of the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar <b>is not indispensable</b> for atonement. Blood that is indispensable for atonement is in no instance presented half above the red line and half below it.",
            "The Gemara continues this line of questioning: <b>But there is the remainder</b> of the blood <b>of the inner</b> sin offerings, the main blood of which is sprinkled on the inner altar. The remainder of the blood of these offerings is poured on the base of the external altar, and <b>there is one who says</b> that this pouring of the blood is <b>indispensable</b> for atonement. The Gemara explains: When we said that there is no blood, half of which is presented above and half below, <b>we said</b> this <b>with regard to one place,</b> i.e., the same altar. The blood of inner sin offerings is sprinkled on the inner altar, while the remainder of that blood is poured on the base of the external altar. There is no case of blood, half of which is presented above and half of which is presented below on the same altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, in the case of a sin offering two placements facilitate atonement, while with regard to other offerings a single placement is sufficient. Beit Hillel disagree and say that even in the case of a sin offering one placement suffices after the fact. With regard to this issue, it <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Beit Shammai say</b> that <b>two placements in</b> the case of <b>a sin offering, and one</b> placement <b>in</b> the case of other <b>offerings, they render</b> the offering <b>permitted</b> for eating since these actions facilitate atonement after the fact, despite the fact that blood was not placed on all four corners of the altar. <b>And</b> similarly <b>they render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> That is to say, if the priest placed two placements of the blood of a sin offering or one placement of the blood of any another offering, intending to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i>. ",
            "<b>Beit Hillel say: One</b> placement <b>in</b> the case of <b>a sin offering, and</b> likewise <b>one</b> placement <b>in</b> the case of <b>all</b> the other <b>offerings,</b> if done with proper intent, renders the offering <b>permitted</b> for eating <b>and,</b> if done with improper intent, <b>renders</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Oshaya objects to this: If so, let</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>be taught</b> in the fourth chapter of tractate <i>Eduyyot</i> <b>alongside</b> the other rare cases of <b>Beit Shammai’s leniencies and Beit Hillel’s stringencies.</b> According to Beit Hillel, a sin offering is <i>piggul</i> even if the priest intended to partake of it beyond its designated time even while performing a single placement, whereas Beit Shammai maintain that the offering is <i>piggul</i> only if he had this improper intent during two placements.",
            "<b>Rava said to</b> Rav Oshaya: <b>When</b> this question <b>was</b> initially <b>asked,</b> and the Sages stated their opinions concerning the matter, <b>it was asked with regard to the permission</b> to partake of the sin offering. In other words, the dispute arose as a result of an inquiry into the other relevant <i>halakha</i>, i.e., whether the priests may partake of a sin offering, the blood of which was placed only one time. In this case it is <b>Beit Shammai who are</b> more <b>stringent,</b> as they permit the meat of a sin offering only after two placements have been placed. For this reason, this case was not listed among the other leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> Despite the fact that, according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, the last <b>three placements in</b> the case of <b>a sin offering</b> are not indispensable to the atonement, they <b>may not be performed at night,</b> because the blood is invalidated at sunset. <b>And</b> these three placements <b>may be performed after</b> the <b>death</b> of the owner. If the owner of the offering died before any of the blood was placed on the altar, the blood may not be placed, and the offering is burned as a disqualified offering. But if he died after one placement, the priest may perform the other three placements, as he has already facilitated atonement by means of the first placement. <b>And</b> as it is a mitzva to perform these three placements on the altar, <b>one who offers</b> this blood <b>up</b> on an altar <b>outside</b> the Temple is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i>, the punishment received by one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: There are some</b> respects in which the blood of the last three placements of a sin offering is treated <b>like</b> the blood presented <b>at the outset,</b> i.e., like the blood of the first placement, <b>and there are some</b> respects in which the blood of the last three placements is treated <b>like</b> the blood presented <b>at the end,</b> i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.",
            "Rav Pappa elaborates: With regard to liability for presenting blood <b>outside</b> the Temple, <b>and</b> concerning the prohibition against presenting blood at <b>night,</b> and with regard to the disqualification of <b>a non-priest</b> from presenting blood and his liability for death at the hand of Heaven if he presents blood in the Temple, <b>and</b> with regard to the requirement that the blood that is to be presented must first be placed in <b>a service vessel,</b> and that the blood must be placed on the <b>corner</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> that the placement must be performed with the priest’s <b>finger,</b> and concerning the obligation to <b>launder</b> a garment onto which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, <b>and</b> finally with regard to the requirement of pouring the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar, the last three placements are treated <b>like</b> blood presented at <b>the outset,</b> i.e., like the first placement.",
            "<b>But</b> these last three placements <b>may be performed after</b> the <b>death</b> of the owner; and they do <b>not</b> render the offering <b>permitted</b> for eating, as that was already achieved by means of the first placement; <b>nor</b> do they <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> if during these placements the priest intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time; <b>and</b> similarly, they are <b>not</b> governed by the <i>halakha</i> that if the blood <b>enters inside</b> the Sanctuary the sin offering is disqualified. With regard to all these matters the blood of the last three placements is treated <b>like</b> the blood presented <b>at the end,</b> i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.",
            "With regard to the obligation to launder a garment onto which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, <b>Rav Pappa said: From where do I say</b> that this <i>halakha</i> applies even to the blood of the last three placements? It is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (93a): If the blood of a sin offering <b>sprayed</b> directly <b>from the neck</b> of the animal <b>onto a garment,</b> that garment <b>does not require laundering,</b> as the blood had never been received in a vessel. Likewise, if the blood sprayed onto the garment <b>from the corner</b> of the altar after having been placed there, <b>or from the base</b> of the altar after the remainder was poured there, the garment <b>does not require laundering.</b> It may be inferred from here that blood that sprayed from the corner of the altar does not require laundering. <b>But</b> blood that is <b>fit</b> to be placed <b>on the corner,</b> as it has not yet been placed, <b>requires laundering,</b> and the blood of the last three placements is indeed fit to be placed on the corner of the altar.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>But according to your reasoning,</b> one can claim in the same manner that it is only blood that sprayed <b>from the base</b> of the altar that <b>does not require laundering; but</b> blood <b>that is fit for the base</b> of the altar, i.e., what remains of the blood after it has been placed on the corners, <b>requires laundering.</b> This is difficult, as <b>it is written:</b> “And <b>when there will be sprinkled [<i>yizze</i>]</b> of its blood upon any garment” (Leviticus 6:20). The future form of the word <i>yizze</i> serves to <b>exclude</b> this blood sprayed onto the garment from the corner of the altar, <b>as it has already been sprinkled.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya, as we learned</b> in a mishna (110b) that <b>Rabbi Neḥemya says:</b> With regard to the <b>remainder of the blood</b> of an offering, <b>which</b> was to be poured at the base of the altar, if <b>one presented it outside</b> the Temple, he is <b>liable.</b> Since Rabbi Neḥemya treats the remainder of the blood as blood with regard to liability for a service performed outside the Temple, he also treats the remainder of the blood of a sin offering as blood with regard to laundering. Accordingly, Rav Pappa’s inference from the previously cited mishna is valid only according to Rabbi Neḥemya, but not according to the majority opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.",
            "The Gemara challenges the proof even according to the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya: <b>Say that you heard</b> that <b>Rabbi Neḥemya</b> ruled in this manner <b>with regard to the offering up</b> of the remainder of the blood outside the Temple, <b>just as</b> is the case <b>with regard to limbs and fats.</b> Even though the offering of the limbs and fats is not indispensable for atonement, one who offers them outside the Temple is liable. But <b>did you</b> also <b>hear him</b> say this <b>with regard to laundering,</b> that one must launder a garment sprayed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering? The Gemara answers: <b>Yes,</b> we also heard Rabbi Neḥemya rule in this manner with regard to laundering."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And</b> this is as <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>blood that requires</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar, presumably a reference to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, which must be poured on the base of the altar, it <b>requires laundering; and</b> improper <b>intent is effective with regard to it,</b> i.e., if the priest poured such blood with the intent to partake of the sacrificial meat beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i>; <b>and one who offers it up outside</b> the Temple is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> conversely, with regard to <b>blood that is poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain</b> that passed through the Temple and emptied into the Kidron River, which is blood that has become disqualified, it <b>does not require laundering, and</b> improper <b>intent is not effective with regard to it, and one who offers it up outside</b> the Temple is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "The Gemara inquires: About <b>whom did you learn that he said</b> that <b>one who offers up</b> the remainder of the blood <b>outside</b> the Temple <b>is liable? It is Rabbi Neḥemya</b> who says this, <b>and he states</b> in this <i>baraita</i> that a garment that was sprayed with such blood <b>requires laundering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And is</b> improper <b>intent effective with regard to</b> blood that must be poured on the base of the altar? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> discussing the intent that renders an offering <i>piggul</i>: The possibility of <i>piggul</i> applies only with regard to a service that is indispensable for atonement. This serves to <b>exclude</b> pouring the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the altar <b>and burning</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the altar, actions <b>that are not indispensable for atonement,</b> concerning which the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that</b> improper <b>intent is not effective with regard to them.</b>",
            "Rather, <b>when that</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>is taught,</b> stating that blood that requires the base requires laundering, it is not referring to the remainder of the blood after the placements have been completed. Instead, it is referring <b>to</b> the blood that is to be used for the last <b>three placements</b> of the blood <b>of a sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> is it correct to describe this blood as <b>requiring</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar? After all, this blood <b>goes to the corner</b> of the altar, not the base. The Gemara answers: <b>Say</b> that this means: Blood that becomes <b>required</b> for the <b>base,</b> i.e., blood that in the end, after the placements are completed, will be poured on the base of the altar. The Gemara further asks: <b>But is</b> improper <b>intent effective with regard to</b> the blood of the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering? <b>Didn’t you say</b> that this blood does <b>not render</b> the offering <b>permitted</b> for eating, <b>nor</b> does it <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>, and</b> it is <b>not</b> governed by the <i>halakha</i> that if the blood <b>enters inside</b> the Sanctuary the sin offering is disqualified? With regard to all these matters the blood of the last three placements is treated <b>like</b> the blood presented at <b>the end,</b> i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Rather, when that</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>is taught,</b> stating that blood requiring the base requires laundering, and improper intent is effective with regard to it, and one who presents of it outside the Temple is liable, it is indeed referring to the remainder of the blood after the placements have been completed. It is stated not with regard to the remainder of the blood of a standard sin offering, but <b>with regard to</b> the remainder of <b>the blood of inner</b> sin offerings, which are brought on the inner altar located inside the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if that is the case, <b>with regard to</b> the remainder of <b>the blood of external</b> sin offerings that are brought on the external altar, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Is one who presents them outside the Temple <b>exempt?</b> If so, <b>rather than teaching</b> the <i>halakha</i> of disqualified <b>blood that is poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain, let</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>distinguish and teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>within the</b> case of the remainder of the blood <b>itself,</b> in the following manner: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement said? In</b> a case of <b>the blood of</b> sin offerings brought on the <b>inner</b> altar. <b>But in</b> the case of <b>the blood of</b> sin offerings brought on the <b>external</b> altar, one who offers up such an offering outside the Temple is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> could not have made such a distinction, for in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> ruling? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya, who says:</b> With regard to the <b>remainder of the blood</b> of a sin offering brought on the external altar, in a case <b>where one presented it outside</b> the Temple, he is <b>liable. And</b> therefore, were the <i>tanna</i> to contrast the <i>halakha</i> of the blood of sin offerings brought on the external altar with that of the blood of sin offerings brought on the inner altar, <b>he would not</b> have been able to <b>teach three</b> rulings of <b>exemptions corresponding to three</b> rulings of <b>liabilities,</b> as Rabbi Neḥemya maintains that even with regard to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering brought on the external altar, if one presents it outside the Temple he is liable. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> preferred to compare the <i>halakhot</i> of the remainder of the blood of inner sin offerings to the disqualified blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain, so that he could list three lenient rulings alongside three stringent ones.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to discuss the statement of Rav Pappa, that a garment sprayed by blood from the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering requires laundering, and to his proof from the mishna that states that if the blood of a sin offering sprayed onto a garment from the corner of the altar or from the base of the altar, the garment does not require laundering. <b>Ravina says,</b> in answer to the objection raised against Rav Pappa above, that according to Rav Pappa the mishna (93a) should be understood as follows: The term: <b>From the corner,</b> means from the corner, <b>literally,</b> after the blood was placed there, and therefore Rav Pappa could infer from this that blood that is fit to be placed on the corner, including the blood to be used for the last three sprinklings, requires laundering. But the term: <b>From the base</b> of the altar, does not mean from the base, literally. Rather, it means: <b>From</b> blood <b>that is fit for the base</b> of the altar, i.e., from the remainder of the blood, which is to be poured on the base.",
            "<b>Rav Taḥlifa bar Gazza said to Ravina:</b> One can <b>say</b> a different explanation, that both <b>this and that,</b> i.e., the term: From the corner, and the term: From the base, are referring to blood that <b>is fit</b> for the corner or the base, in which case the mishna teaches that a garment sprayed by the blood that was to be used for the last three placements of a sin offering does not require laundering, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa. Ravina replied: <b>What is this</b> claim? <b>Now</b> that <b>you say</b> that blood which is <b>fit for the corner</b> does <b>not</b> require laundering, <b>is</b> it <b>necessary</b> to state that the same applies to blood that is merely <b>fit for the base</b> of the altar? That ruling would be unnecessary. <b>Rather,</b> it must be that the term: <b>From the corner,</b> means <b>from the corner, literally,</b> i.e., that the blood has already been placed there, whereas the term: <b>From the base,</b> means <b>from</b> blood <b>that is fit for the base,</b> i.e., from the remainder of the blood, which is to be poured on the base.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>all</b> the offerings <b>whose</b> blood is to be <b>placed on the inner altar,</b> which are the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and the goat for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah first discusses the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and afterward the bull for an unwitting communal sin, concerning which it states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). It may be asked: This phrase: <b>“And he shall do…as he did,” what</b> does this <b>come to teach?</b> All the details stated with regard to the first bull, i.e., that of the anointed priest, seem to be stated explicitly with regard to the second bull as well.",
            "Rather, the verse comes <b>to repeat the</b> <i>halakha</i> of the <b>sprinkling of</b> the blood, as though it were written twice with regard to the same bull. This repetition of the <i>halakha</i> indicates that the sprinkling is indispensable, thereby <b>teaching that if</b> the priest <b>omitted one of the placements he has done nothing. I have</b> a derivation <b>only</b> with regard to the <b>seven placements</b> on the Curtain separating between the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, that they are indispensable, <b>as</b> these seven <b>are indispensable in all cases,</b> as the Gemara will explain (40a). <b>From where</b> is it derived that the same applies to the <b>four placements</b> on the inner altar? <b>The verse states: “So shall he do”</b> (Leviticus 4:20).",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states: “And he shall do <b>with the bull”</b> (Leviticus 4:20); <b>this</b> alludes to a different bull whose service is similar, namely <b>the bull of Yom Kippur.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>“As he did with the bull”</b> (Leviticus 4:20); <b>this</b> is a reference to the <b>bull</b> for an unwitting sin <b>of the anointed priest,</b> teaching that all of the sprinklings of the blood of this bull are also indispensable. <b>“A sin offering”; these are</b> the <b>goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship,</b> teaching that they are offered in the same manner as the bull for an unwitting communal sin, their blood being sprinkled in the Sanctuary and their flesh burned. One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I</b> should <b>include also the goats of the Festivals and the goats</b> sacrificed on the <b>New Moons,</b> which are communal offerings as well, i.e., that their service should be performed inside the Sanctuary like that of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “So shall he do <b>with this”</b> (Leviticus 4:20), which indicates that this service is performed only with this animal and not with the goats of the Festivals or the goats of the New Moons.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what did you see to include these</b> goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship <b>and to exclude those</b> goats sacrificed on the Festivals and the New Moons? The Gemara answers: <b>After</b> noting <b>that the verse included</b> some offerings <b>and excluded</b> others, one can say: <b>I include these</b> goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, <b>as they atone for the known transgression of a mitzva,</b> i.e., idol worship, and therefore they are similar to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought for an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin with regard to a specific mitzva. <b>And I exclude those</b> goats sacrificed on the Festivals and the New Moons, <b>as they do not atone for the known transgression of a mitzva,</b> but rather they atone for the unwitting defilement of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> resumes its interpretation of the verse. <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall make atonement”;</b> this teaches that atonement is achieved <b>even if</b> the Elders <b>did not place</b> their <b>hands</b> on the head of the bull as they are commanded to do (see Leviticus 4:15). <b>“And</b> they <b>shall be forgiven”;</b> this teaches that atonement is achieved <b>even if</b> the priest <b>did not place</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar, as is required (see Leviticus 4:7).",
            "The Gemara again asks: <b>And</b> as the verse does not specify which aspects of the service are included and which are excluded, <b>what did you see to disqualify</b> the offering <b>in</b> the case of the seven <b>sprinklings;</b> how did you derive that the phrase “And he shall do…as he did” teaches that the seven sprinklings are indispensable? <b>And</b> what did you see <b>to render</b> the offering <b>fit in</b> the absence of <b>placing hands</b> on the head of the offering <b>and</b> pouring out the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar, based on the words “And the priest shall make atonement…and they shall be forgiven”?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>You should say</b> the following logical argument: I <b>disqualify</b> the offering <b>in</b> the absence of the seven <b>sprinklings, as</b> these seven sprinklings <b>are indispensable in all cases,</b> as will be explained (40a), <b>and I render</b> the offering <b>fit in</b> the absence of <b>placing hands</b> on the head of the offering <b>and</b> in the absence of the pouring of the <b>remainder</b> of the blood onto the base of the altar, <b>as</b> these <b>are not indispensable in all cases,</b> and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that they are not indispensable here either."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i> in detail. <b>The Master said</b> in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>I have</b> a derivation <b>only</b> with regard to the <b>seven placements</b> on the Curtain separating between the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, that they are indispensable, <b>as</b> these seven <b>are indispensable in all cases.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>Where</b> are the seven indispensable? <b>Rav Pappa says: In</b> the case of the red <b>heifer</b> (see Numbers 19:2–4), <b>and in</b> the purification process of one afflicted with leprous <b>marks</b> (see Leviticus 14:16).",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>From where</b> is it derived that the same applies to the <b>four placements</b> on the inner altar? <b>The verse states: “So shall he do”</b> (Leviticus 4:20). The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about <b>seven placements,</b> that they should be indispensable? If you say that the reason is <b>that</b> the seven placements <b>are written and repeated,</b> by means of the terms “And he shall do…as he did,” which teaches that they are indispensable, I can say that the <b>four placements as well are written and repeated.</b> Why then should their <i>halakha</i> be any different?",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya says:</b> This <b>is necessary only according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> who maintains that only two placements are written in this chapter, while the other two are derived through a juxtaposition. Consequently, a specific derivation is required for these. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the placements on the inner altar: <b>Above,</b> in the case of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the verse <b>states corner</b> in the plural form of <b>corners</b> (see Leviticus 4:7), i.e., it says “corners [<i>karnot</i>],” in the plural, where it could have written corner, in the singular. These are <b>two</b> corners. And <b>below,</b> with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, <b>it</b> again <b>states corner</b> in the plural form of <b>corners</b> (see Leviticus 4:18). Together these amount to <b>four</b> corners. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> This derivation <b>is not necessary, as it states</b> in these same verses: “And he shall put of the blood upon the corners of the altar which is before the Lord, which is <b>in the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 4:18). The superfluous expression “in the Tent of Meeting” teaches that the blood must be placed <b>on all</b> the corners of the altar <b>that are stated with regard to the Tent of Meeting,</b> i.e., on all four corners. The Gemara asks: <b>And Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with</b> the phrase <b>“so shall he do,”</b> which Rabbi Shimon interprets as referring to the four placements?",
            "The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda <b>requires</b> this verse <b>for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>As we did not learn</b> with regard <b>to the bull of Yom Kippur that placing hands</b> is required, i.e., that the High Priest must place his hands on this animal before it is slaughtered, <b>and</b> likewise it is not stated that the <b>remainder of</b> its <b>blood</b> must be poured on the base of the altar. <b>From where</b> is it derived that these actions must be performed? <b>The verse states: “So shall he do.”</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And did we not learn</b> with regard <b>to the bull of Yom Kippur</b> that these requirements apply? <b>But you said</b> earlier in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>“With the bull”</b> (Leviticus 4:20); <b>this</b> alludes to the bull of <b>Yom Kippur,</b> which indicates that all the rites performed in connection with the bull for an unwitting communal sin apply also to the bull of Yom Kippur.",
            "The Gemara answers: The derivation from the phrase “so shall he do” <b>was necessary,</b> as it could <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>this matter,</b> the comparison between the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the bull of Yom Kippur, applies only to <b>a service that is indispensable for atonement,</b> e.g., the sprinkling of the blood. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>a service that is not indispensable for atonement,</b> such as placing hands on the head of the animal or pouring out the remainder of the blood, one might <b>say</b> that these actions need <b>not</b> be performed. Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us:</b> “So shall he do,” i.e., these services, too, must be performed with the bull of Yom Kippur.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And Rabbi Shimon, what does he do with this</b> phrase: <b>“In the Tent of Meeting,”</b> from which Rabbi Yehuda derives that the blood must be placed on all four corners of the altar? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon <b>requires</b> the phrase <b>“in the Tent of Meeting”</b> to teach <b>that if the roof of the Sanctuary was breached</b> by a hole, the priest <b>would not sprinkle</b> the blood, as it would no longer be called the Tent of Meeting. The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehuda, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda derives it <b>from</b> the superfluous term <b>“which is</b> in the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7, 18). The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Shimon? <b>He does not interpret</b> the term <b>“which is”</b> as he maintains that this expression is not significant enough to serve as the source of a <i>halakha</i>.",
            "<b>Abaye said: According to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda as well,</b> it <b>was necessary</b> to learn from the phrase “so shall he do” that the four placements are indispensable. As it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>just as it is with regard to placing hands and</b> the <b>remainder of the blood, that even though they are written and repeated they are not indispensable,</b> so <b>too,</b> the <b>four placements</b> of blood <b>should not be indispensable.</b> Therefore, the phrase “so shall he do” <b>teaches us</b> that this is not the case, and the four sprinklings are indeed indispensable.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> teaches: <b>“With the bull”</b> (Leviticus 4:20), <b>this</b> alludes to <b>the bull of Yom Kippur. To what <i>halakha</i></b> does this statement relate? <b>If</b> it serves <b>to</b> teach that all matters stated with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur are <b>indispensable,</b> this is <b>obvious,</b> since the word <b>“statute” is written concerning it:</b> “And this shall be an everlasting statute to you” (Leviticus 16:29), and there is a principle that <i>halakhot</i> described as statutes are indispensable.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:</b> This statement <b>is necessary only according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda, who says: When</b> the term <b>“statute” is written</b> concerning the Yom Kippur service, indicating that no details may be altered, it is written only <b>with regard to actions performed in white garments inside</b> the Holy of Holies, e.g., burning the incense and sprinkling the blood, which are the essential services of the day, and it teaches <b>that if</b> the High Priest <b>performed</b> one of the <b>actions before another,</b> i.e., not in the proper order, <b>he has done nothing.</b>",
            "<b>But</b> with regard to <b>those actions performed in white garments outside,</b> in the Sanctuary, if he <b>performed</b> one <b>action before another, what he did is done</b> and he is not required to repeat the rite. Consequently, one might <b>say</b> that <b>from</b> the fact <b>that their order is not indispensable,</b> it may be derived that the <b>sprinklings,</b> i.e., placements, <b>themselves are also not indispensable.</b> Therefore, the term “with the bull” <b>teaches us</b> that the placements are indeed indispensable.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa objects to this: And how can you say this,</b> that Rabbi Yehuda derives from here that the placements are indispensable? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse discussing the Yom Kippur service states: <b>“And when he has finished atoning for the Sanctuary”</b> (Leviticus 16:20). This indicates that <b>if he performed the atonement,</b> i.e., the sprinklings, inside the Sanctuary, <b>he has finished</b> the order of the service, even though he has not poured the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar; <b>and if he did not perform the atonement, he has not finished;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda said to him: For what</b> reason <b>do we not say: If he finished</b> the entire service, which includes sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary and pouring the remainder of the blood onto the base of the altar, <b>he has facilitated atonement; and if he did not finish, he has not facilitated atonement?</b> This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda derives from this verse the <i>halakha</i> that the sprinklings in the Sanctuary are indispensable.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says:</b> This reference to the bull of Yom Kippur in the term “with the bull,” <b>is necessary only to</b> apply to the bull of Yom Kippur three <i>halakhot</i> that are derived from that which is stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest: “And the priest shall immerse his finger [<i>et etzba’o</i>] in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6). These <i>halakhot</i> can be summarized in the shortened form: <b><i>Et</i>, blood, and with immersion.</b> The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the word <b><i>et</i>, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says:</b> This word <b>is necessary only to render fit</b>"
        ],
        [
            "service performed by a priest who has <b>a wart</b> or blister <b>on</b> his <b>finger.</b> These are not considered an interposition between his finger and the blood. With regard to the term <b>“in the blood”</b> (Leviticus 4:6), this teaches <b>that the blood</b> in the service vessel <b>must be of a</b> sufficient <b>measure for immersion from the outset.</b> The priest must initially collect in the vessel enough blood for all the sprinklings, rather than adding blood to the vessel for each sprinkling. Finally, the term <b>“and</b> the priest <b>shall immerse</b> his finger in the blood” indicates that there must be enough blood in the vessel such that the priest can immerse his finger in it <b>and not</b> have to <b>wipe</b> the sides of the utensil to collect blood for sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>And</b> it <b>was necessary</b> for the verse to state both these last two terms. It had <b>to write “in the blood,” as had the Merciful One written</b> only <b>“and</b> the priest <b>shall immerse,” I would say</b> that the sprinklings are valid <b>even if there was not</b> a sufficient <b>measure</b> of blood <b>for immersion from the outset,</b> but only enough for a single sprinkling, provided that the priest then added more blood to the vessel for each sprinkling. Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes “in the blood”</b> to teach that from the outset there must be enough blood in the vessel for all the sprinklings.",
            "<b>And</b> conversely, <b>had the Merciful One written</b> only <b>“in the blood,” I would say</b> that <b>even</b> if there was enough blood in the vessel at the outset it is not necessary that there be enough blood for immersion for the last sprinklings, as the priest can <b>wipe</b> the sides of the utensil to collect blood for sprinkling. Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes “and</b> the priest <b>shall immerse.”</b>",
            "The Gemara addresses another apparently superfluous phrase in the same chapter: “And the priest shall put some of the blood upon the corners of <b>the altar of sweet incense</b> before the Lord” (Leviticus 4:7). <b>Why do I</b> need the verse to mention the sweet incense? It would have been enough to identify the altar as being “before the Lord” and one would have understood that the reference is to the inner altar. Rather, this serves to teach <b>that if the altar had not been inaugurated with sweet incense,</b> the priest <b>would not sprinkle</b> blood on it.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Pappa</b> that the superfluous phrase in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur in order to teach the three <i>halakhot</i> of <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, from the case of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which is also alluded to in that verse. The <i>baraita</i> states: <b>“And he shall do</b> with the bull, <b>as he did</b> with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). <b>What</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states “with the bull”?</b> This serves <b>to include the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in</b> this <b>matter,</b> i.e., in the passage concerning the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, specifically the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yishmael said:</b> This inclusion is unnecessary, as these <i>halakhot</i> can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as in a case in which</b> one <b>offering is not equated with</b> another <b>offering</b> of a different type of animal, the Torah <b>equated</b> the <b>actions</b> of sprinkling the blood in one offering <b>with</b> the <b>actions</b> of the blood in the other offering, as will be explained, in <b>a case in which</b> the Torah <b>equated</b> one <b>offering with</b> another <b>offering,</b> i.e., the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and the bull of Yom Kippur, <b>isn’t it logical that</b> the Torah <b>should equate</b> the <b>actions</b> of sprinkling the blood in the one offering <b>with</b> the <b>actions</b> of the blood in the other offering? Therefore, the derivation by way of a special inclusion is not necessary.",
            "<b>Rather, what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states:</b> “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering”? With regard to the first instance of <b>“with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin.</b> And with regard to the second instance of <b>“with the bull,” this is the bull for</b> an unwitting sin of the <b>anointed priest.</b> And the verse serves to teach that just as in the first case, if the priest omitted one of the sprinklings, he has done nothing, the same is true in the second case.",
            "The Gemara clarifies the <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master said</b> above: <b>Just as in a case in which</b> one <b>offering is not equated with</b> another <b>offering. What</b> is the meaning of the expression: One <b>offering is not equated with</b> another <b>offering?</b> Which offerings are not brought from the same type of animal, but nevertheless the <i>halakhot</i> governing the sprinkling of their blood are the same?",
            "<b>If we say</b> that Rabbi Yishmael is referring to <b>the bull of Yom Kippur and the goat of Yom Kippur,</b> and from them he derives by way of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that the actions concerning the bull of Yom Kippur are the same as those concerning the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which are the same animal, this <b>can be refuted</b> as follows: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> offerings, the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur? They are notable <b>in that their blood enters the innermost sanctum,</b> the Holy of Holies. This is not so of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the blood of which is sprinkled only in the outer area of the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> say that the reference here is to <b>the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship.</b> But once again this claim <b>can be refuted: What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> offerings? They are notable <b>in that</b> they both <b>atone for the known transgressions of a mitzva,</b> whereas the bull of Yom Kippur atones for unknown transgressions (see <i>Shevuot</i> 2a).",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the reference here is to <b>the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat of Yom Kippur, and this</b> is what Rabbi Yishmael <b>is saying: Just as in a case in which</b> one <b>offering is not equated with</b> another <b>offering, as this</b> is <b>a bull and that</b> is <b>a goat,</b> nevertheless the <b>actions</b> of sprinkling the blood in one offering <b>are equated with</b> the <b>actions</b> of the blood in the other offering <b>with regard to that which is written concerning it,</b> in <b>a case in which</b> one <b>offering is equated with</b> another <b>offering,</b> i.e., the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and the bull of Yom Kippur, <b>as this</b> is <b>a bull and that</b> is <b>a bull, isn’t it logical</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>that</b> the <b>actions</b> of sprinkling the blood in one offering <b>are equated with</b> the <b>actions</b> of the blood in the other offering? The blood of the goat of Yom Kippur is sprinkled even inside the Holy of Holies, which is not so concerning the blood of the bull. Nevertheless, with regard to the sprinkling in the Sanctuary, which is common to both, their actions are performed in the same manner, with the blood being sprinkled with a finger on the Curtain and on the corners of the altar.",
            "<b>And</b> by means of this <i>a fortiori</i> inference the case of <b>the bull of Yom Kippur is derived from</b> the case of <b>the bull of</b> an unwitting sin of the <b>anointed priest, with regard to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> summarized by the words <b><i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion,</b> as they are both bulls. <b>And</b> likewise, the case of <b>the goat of Yom Kippur is derived from</b> the case of <b>the goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship,</b> with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, <b>via</b> this <b><i>a fortiori</i> inference,</b> as they are both goats.",
            "The Gemara asks: How can the <i>halakhot</i> of the goat of Yom Kippur be derived from the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship? <b>But does a matter derived by juxtaposition,</b> i.e., a <i>halakha</i> that is not written explicitly in the Torah but that is learned by means of a comparison, <b>again teach by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference? There is a principle that a <i>halakha</i> derived by juxtaposition with regard to consecrated matters cannot subsequently teach another <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. The <i>halakhot</i> alluded to by the words <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, are not explicitly stated with regard to the goats of an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. Rather, they are derived from the comparison found in the verse: “And he shall do…as he did” (Leviticus 4:20), which alludes to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship and the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. <b>Rav Pappa said: The school of Rabbi Yishmael maintains</b> that <b>a matter derived by juxtaposition does again teach by <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, even with regard to consecrated matters.",
            "The Gemara continues to analyze the statement of Rabbi Yishmael in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>“With the bull”; this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin.</b> The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive this case by way of an exposition? <b>This</b> verse <b>itself is written in reference to</b> the bull for an unwitting <b>communal</b> sin. <b>Rav Pappa said:</b> The derivation is necessary <b>because</b> Rabbi Yishmael <b>wants</b> the case of the <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin to teach with regard to</b> the burning on the altar of the sacrificial portions, including the <b>diaphragm and</b> the <b>two kidneys,</b> that this obligation applies also <b>to the goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship,</b> despite the fact that this requirement is not stated with regard to them.",
            "Rav Pappa continues: <b>And</b> as the obligation to burn the diaphragm and the two kidneys on the altar is <b>not written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself,</b> but rather it is <b>derived by juxtaposition</b> from the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, in which this requirement is explictly stated (see Leviticus 4:8–9), it <b>was necessary</b> to include the bull for an unwitting communal sin once again with the term <b>“with the bull.”</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: This derivation is required in order <b>that it should be as though</b> this <i>halakha</i> of burning the diaphragm and the two kidneys <b>was written with regard to</b> the bull for an unwitting communal sin <b>itself. And</b> in this manner the derivation from this case, teaching the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, <b>should not be a matter derived by juxtaposition</b> that <b>again teaches by juxtaposition,</b> as such a derivation is not done with regard to consecrated matters.",
            "§ The Gemara comments: <b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Pappa: “And he shall do</b> with the bull, <b>as he did”</b> (Leviticus 4:20); <b>what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “With the bull”?</b> It is clear that this verse is referring to the bull.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> answers: <b>Because it is stated</b> with regard to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship: <b>“And they have brought their offering, an offering made by fire to the Lord,</b> and their sin offering before the Lord for their error” (Numbers 15:25), and this verse is interpreted as follows: <b>“Their sin offering”; these are the goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship,</b> alluded to in that passage. <b>“Their error”; this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin,</b> which is brought for an inadvertent transgression of the community. The juxtaposition of these offerings in the verse: <b>“Their sin offering…for their error,”</b> indicates that the <b>Torah</b> means to <b>say: Their sin offering is for you like their error,</b> i.e., all the portions consumed on the altar in the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin are also burned on the altar in the case of the goats for an unwitting sin of idol worship.",
            "The Gemara asks: With regard to the offering brought for <b>their error,</b> i.e., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, <b>from where did you learn</b> this <i>halakha</i>? Was it <b>not via juxtaposition</b> from the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, as the diaphragm and the two kidneys are not explicitly mentioned with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin? <b>But</b> this is difficult, as <b>does a matter derived via juxtaposition again teach via juxtaposition?</b>",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). With regard to the first instance of <b>“with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin.</b> And with regard to the second instance of <b>“with the bull,” this is the bull for</b> an unwitting sin of the <b>anointed priest.</b> Due to this juxtaposition, it is as though the burning of the diaphragm and the two kidneys was explicitly written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and therefore the <i>halakha</i> can be taught by juxtaposition with regard to the goats for an unwitting sin of idol worship, as stated by Rav Pappa.",
            "The Gemara analyzes the previous <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master said</b> above: <b>“Their sin offering,” these are</b> the <b>goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship,</b> which are juxtaposed in this verse to the bull for an unwitting communal sin. The Gemara asks: But <b>let</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>derive this from the earlier verse</b> stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, <b>as the Master said</b> in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier (39b): <b>“A sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:20), this serves <b>to include the goats for</b> an unwitting communal sin of <b>idol worship. Rav Pappa said:</b> This derivation <b>was necessary,</b> as if there were only the juxtaposition from Leviticus 4:20, it would <b>enter your mind to say: This matter</b> applies only to the acts of <b>sprinkling, which are written with regard to</b> the bull for an unwitting communal sin <b>itself.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>But</b> with regard to the burning of the <b>diaphragm and</b> the <b>two kidneys, which are not written with regard to</b> the bull for an unwitting communal sin <b>itself,</b> you might <b>say</b> that this <i>halakha</i> should <b>not</b> be derived from it. Therefore, this additional derivation of “their sin offering” <b>teaches us</b> that the two offerings are similar with regard to this detail as well.",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But the <i>tanna</i> said:</b> “With the bull”; this serves to include <b>the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in this matter.</b> This statement indicates that all the details applying to the bull for an unwitting communal sin are extended to the bull of Yom Kippur by means of a single derivation. Rav Pappa responded: This issue <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as <b>the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rav amplifies</b> the <i>halakha</i> through <b>this</b> juxtaposition, whereas <b>the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael does not amplify</b> the <i>halakha</i> through <b>this</b> juxtaposition, but maintains that an additional derivation is necessary with regard to the diaphragm and the two kidneys.",
            "§ The Gemara cites a statement that is related to the above <i>halakhot</i>. <b>The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what</b> reason <b>are</b> the <b>diaphragm and</b> the <b>two kidneys stated with regard to</b> the <b>bull</b> for an unwitting sin <b>of the anointed priest, and they are not</b> explicitly <b>stated with regard to</b> the <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin?</b> This can be explained by <b>a parable:</b> It can be compared <b>to a flesh-and-blood king who grew angry with his beloved</b> servant for his misdeeds, <b>but spoke little of</b> the servant’s <b>offense due to his</b> great <b>affection</b> for him. Likewise, as the Jewish people are beloved by God, the Torah does not describe their sin offering in detail.",
            "<b>And the school of Rabbi Yishmael</b> further <b>taught: For what</b> reason <b>is it stated:</b> “Before <b>the Curtain of the Sanctuary”</b> (Leviticus 4:6), <b>with regard to the bull</b> for an unwitting sin <b>of the anointed priest, and</b> this <b>is not stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin,</b> where it merely states: “Before the Curtain” (Leviticus 4:17)? This can be explained by <b>a parable:</b> It can be compared <b>to a flesh-and-blood king against whom a province sinned. If a minority of</b> that province <b>sinned,</b> his relationship with <b>his entourage [<i>pamalya</i>] remains,</b> i.e., the king continues to treat his loyal followers in the usual manner. But <b>if the majority of</b> the province <b>sinned,</b> his relationship with <b>his entourage does not remain,</b> and he no longer meets even those who remained devoted to him. Similarly, when the entire people sins, God no longer has the same relationship with them, and it is as though the place where the priest sprinkles the blood is no longer sacred.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that all the placements upon the inner altar are indispensable, and <b>therefore if</b> the High Priest <b>placed all</b> the placements <b>in their proper manner,</b> and one in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of the offering. The Gemara states that <b>we learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (<i>Menaḥot</i> 16a), with regard to the burning of the handful of a meal offering and the frankincense, both of which render the meal offering permitted for eating: If the priest had an intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and this occurred <b>during</b> the burning of <b>the handful but not during</b> the burning of <b>the frankincense,</b> or <b>during</b> the burning of <b>the frankincense but not during</b> the burning of <b>the handful,</b> i.e., he burned one of them with the intention of eating the remainder of the offering beyond its designated time, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one</b> who eats it is <b>liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "<b>And the Rabbis say: There is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> in this</b> case <b>unless he renders</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during</b> the performance of <b>the entire permitting factor,</b> i.e., the burning of both the handful and the frankincense.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Do not say</b> that the <b>reason of Rabbi Meir,</b> who holds that the offering is <i>piggul</i>, is <b>that he holds</b> in general that <b>one renders</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> even if he intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time <b>during</b> the performance of only <b>half a permitting factor. Rather, what are we dealing with here?</b> We are dealing with a case <b>where he</b> initially <b>placed the handful</b> of the meal offering on the altar, to burn it, <b>with</b> the improper <b>intention</b> to eat the remainder beyond its designated time, <b>and</b> afterward he placed <b>the frankincense</b> on the altar <b>silently,</b> i.e., without any particular intent. Rabbi Meir <b>holds: Anyone who performs</b> an action <b>performs</b> it <b>with his initial intent.</b> Therefore, his action with the frankincense is considered to have been performed with the same improper intention as his action with the handful.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where</b> does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish learn that this is the case? He learns it <b>from</b> the fact <b>that</b> the mishna <b>teaches: Therefore, if he placed all</b> the placements <b>in their proper manner and one in an improper manner,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i>. Consequently</b> it follows that if he initially placed <b>one</b> placement <b>in an improper manner,</b> with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, <b>and all</b> the other placements <b>in the proper manner,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Whose</b> opinion is this? <b>If we say</b> it is the opinion of <b>the Rabbis, don’t the Rabbis</b> explicitly <b>say</b> that <b>one cannot render</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> with an improper intention <b>in</b> the performance of only <b>half a permitting factor?</b> Here, the priest placed one placement in the proper manner. <b>Rather,</b> it must represent the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir,</b> who says that if he had an improper intention with regard to the handful and not the frankincense the offering is <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>And if Rabbi Meir’s reason is that</b> he holds in general that <b>one renders</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> even <b>during</b> the performance of only <b>half a permitting factor, even</b> if the priest acted <b>as it taught</b> in the mishna, the offering should <b>also</b> be <i>piggul</i>, as he had an improper intention during half the permitting <b>factor.</b> Rather, is Rabbi Meir’s reason <b>not because he holds</b> that <b>anyone who performs</b> an action <b>performs</b> it <b>with</b> his <b>initial intent?</b> Consequently, if he placed the first placement with an improper intention, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, and if his intention during the first placement was proper, the offering is not <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: Actually,</b> it is possible that the mishna <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who maintain that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention during half a permitting factor. <b>And what</b> is the meaning of the term: <b>In their proper manner,</b> in the context of the mishna? It means <b>in their proper manner with regard to <i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., he placed the blood with an intention that renders the offering <i>piggul</i>. The mishna is teaching that although he placed the first placements with an improper intention, one does not say that the last placement, which was placed without any specific intention, was performed with his initial intent.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But from</b> the fact <b>that it teaches: Therefore, if he placed all</b> the placements <b>in their proper manner and one in an improper manner,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i>,</b> which indicates that the offering is disqualified due to the one placement performed improperly, one can learn <b>by inference that</b> the term: <b>In their proper manner, comes to</b> indicate an intention that <b>renders</b> the offering <b>fit,</b> and not an intention that renders it <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rava says:</b> It can still be explained that the term: In their proper manner, is referring to an intention that renders the offering <i>piggul</i>; and <b>what</b> is the meaning of: <b>In an improper manner?</b> This is referring to the intent to eat the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b> This intention serves to disqualify the offering, which means that it is not <i>piggul</i>, as not all its rites have been performed in the proper manner. <b>Rav Ashi says:</b> The term: In an improper manner, in the mishna, means that he placed one placement <b>not for the sake of</b>  the offering being sacrificed, and in the case of a sin offering an intention of this kind disqualifies the offering; therefore, it is not <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can learn <b>by inference that when</b> the priest <b>does not perform</b> the last placement with the intent to eat the offering <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area or not for the sake of</b> the offering, but silently, <b>he becomes liable,</b> as the offering is <i>piggul</i>. This is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as they maintain that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention during half a permitting factor.",
            "The Gemara answers: The wording of the mishna is imprecise, as in fact, even if he placed the last placement silently the offering is not <i>piggul</i>. But <b>since</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>taught</b> in <b>the first clause,</b> with regard to an offering whose blood is placed on the external altar: If he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and the second placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area, the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> its consumption, <b>he likewise taught the latter clause,</b> with regard to a sin offering whose blood is placed on the inner altar, in a similar manner, that if he placed the last placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, the offering is <b>disqualified, but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> for</b> its consumption. One cannot infer from here that if he placed the last placement without intent the offering is <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> even when he intends to eat it beyond its designated time only in the first placement, <b>said? In</b> the case of <b>blood that is placed on the external altar,</b> where one placement renders the offering permitted."
        ],
        [
            "<b>But</b> with regard to the <b>blood placed</b> inside, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on the Curtain, and <b>on the inner altar, e.g.,</b> the <b>forty-three</b> presentations of the blood <b>of</b> the bull and goat of <b>Yom Kippur, and the eleven</b> presentations of the blood <b>of</b> the <b>bull for</b> an unwitting sin of the <b>anointed priest, and</b> the <b>eleven</b> presentations of the blood <b>of</b> the <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin,</b> if in those cases the priest had an intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>, whether during the first</b> set of presentations, <b>whether during the second</b> set, <b>or whether during the third</b> set, i.e., in any of the requisite sets of presentations, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for its</b> consumption. <b>And the Rabbis say: There is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> unless he</b> had an intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during</b> the performance of <b>the entire permitting factor.</b>",
            "<b>In any event,</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches:</b> If the priest had an intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>, whether during the first</b> set of presentations, <b>whether during the second</b> set, or <b>whether during the third</b> set, <b>and</b> yet Rabbi Meir <b>disputes</b> the ruling of the Rabbis and says that the offering is <i>piggul</i>. If the priest’s intent renders the offering <i>piggul</i> whether it was during the first, second, or third set of presentations, evidently Rabbi Meir’s ruling must be based on the consideration that one can render an offering <i>piggul</i> during half a permitting factor. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s claim that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent, the offering should be <i>piggul</i> only if the first set of presentations was performed with an improper intention while the rest were performed silently.",
            "<b>Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin says: What are we dealing with here?</b> We are not dealing with a case of a priest who had improper intention in the presentations themselves, where the issue of half a permitting factor is relevent. Rather, we are dealing with a case <b>where</b> he had an improper intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during</b> the act of <b>slaughter.</b> In other words, after presenting the blood of the bull inside the Sanctuary, the rest of the blood spilled, and he had to slaughter another bull so that he could continue with the presentations, this time on the Curtain. The reason for Rabbi Meir’s ruling is <b>that</b> the act of slaughter <b>is one permitting factor,</b> and therefore the priest’s improper intent involved an entire service, not half a permitting factor. The Gemara asks: <b>If so, what is the reason for</b> the ruling of <b>the Rabbis?</b>",
            "<b>Rava says: Who are</b> these <b>Rabbis?</b> This <b>is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned</b> in a mishna (109b): With regard to <b>the handful</b> of a meal offering, <b>and the frankincense, and the incense, and the meal offering of priests, and the meal offering of</b> the <b>anointed priest, and the meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings, in a case <b>where one sacrificed</b> even <b>an olive-bulk from</b> any <b>one of these,</b> which should be sacrificed on the altar, <b>outside</b> the Temple, he is <b>liable,</b> as the burning of an olive-bulk is considered a proper burning. <b>And Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> him <b>exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of</b> any one of these items outside the Temple. This indicates that according to Rabbi Eliezer even when one performs a proper action he is not liable unless he completes the service. The same should apply to the slaughter of different bulls for different sets of presentations; one should be liable only if he rendered each of them <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you explain Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion with regard to the presentation of the blood in this manner? <b>But doesn’t Rava say: And Rabbi Eliezer concedes with regard to blood</b> that even one who sacrifices part of the blood outside the Temple is liable? <b>As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 60a) that <b>Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon say:</b> If the blood of the bull or goat of Yom Kippur spilled, even if this occurred in the middle of one of the sets of sprinklings, and the High Priest slaughtered another animal, nevertheless, <b>from the place that he interrupted</b> that particular rite, when the blood spilled, <b>there he resumes</b> performance of that rite. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, each individual sprinkling in each of these rites is an act in and of itself, and therefore the offering can be rendered <i>piggul</i> through any one of them. This is certainly not the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir in the <i>baraita</i>.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says:</b> Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would explain that the <i>baraita</i> does not mean that the priest had an improper intention either during the first set of sprinklings or the second or the third. Instead, this is referring to a case <b>where</b> the High Priest had an improper intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during the first</b> set of sprinklings, in the Holy of Holies, <b>and was silent during the second</b> set of sprinklings, on the Curtain, <b>and again</b> had an improper intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during the third</b> set of sprinklings, on the inner altar. There is a certain novelty in this case according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent.",
            "Rava elaborates: <b>Lest you say</b> that <b>if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that when the priest performs the second set of sprinklings <b>he</b> does so <b>with</b> his <b>initial intent,</b> i.e., that which he had at the time of the first set of sprinklings, <b>why do I</b> need him once <b>again</b> to have an improper intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during the third</b> set of sprinklings? Doesn’t his explicit intent during the third set of sprinklings indicate that he did not have this intent during the second set of sprinklings? Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that this is not so, but rather his silence during the second set is considered a continuation of his initial intent. <b>Rav Ashi objects to this: Is</b> it <b>taught</b> that he was <b>silent</b> during the second set of sprinklings? According to Rava’s interpretation this is the key detail of the case, and yet it is not mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>.",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Ashi said: What are we dealing with here?</b> We are dealing with a case <b>where</b> the High Priest had an intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during the first</b> set of sprinklings, in the Holy of Holies, <b>and during the second</b> set, on the Curtain, <b>and during the third,</b> on the corners of the inner altar. But during the fourth set, the sprinklings on the top of the inner altar, he was silent. <b>Lest you say</b> that <b>if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> to say that <b>anyone who performs</b> an action <b>performs</b> it <b>with</b> his <b>initial intent, why do I</b> need him once <b>again</b> to have an improper intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during each and every</b> set of sprinklings? Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that even so he is considered to have performed all the sprinklings with his initial intent."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can Rav Ashi explain the <i>baraita</i> as referring to a case where the High Priest had an improper intention during the first, second, and third sets of sprinklings? <b>But doesn’t</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teach:</b> If the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, <b>whether</b> during the first set of presentations, <b>whether</b> during the second set, or whether during the third set? This indicates that he did not have improper intent during all the sprinklings but only in part of them. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this is <b>difficult,</b> as the wording of the <i>baraita</i> does not suit this interpretation.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to discuss the <i>baraita</i> that addresses the blood presented inside the Sanctuary. <b>The Master said</b> that if the High Priest had an improper intention in one of the sets of presentations, e.g., inside the Holy of Holies, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for its</b> consumption, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the rite silently. The Gemara asks: <b>Now</b> consider, <b>one is not liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> unless all the permitting factors</b> of the offering <b>have been sacrificed,</b> i.e., if the whole service is completed, including the presentation of the blood. <b>As the Master said: As</b> is <b>the acceptance of a valid</b> offering, <b>so</b> is <b>the</b> lack of <b>acceptance of a disqualified</b> offering: <b>Just as</b> there is no <b>acceptance of a valid</b> offering <b>unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed, so too,</b> there is no lack of <b>acceptance of a disqualified</b> offering, i.e., it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, <b>unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed.</b> That is to say, in the absence of one of its permitting factors it does not become <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>But</b> here, in the case of the bull or goat of Yom Kippur, <b>since he intended</b> to burn the offering beyond its designated time while he was sprinkling the blood <b>inside</b> the Holy of Holies, the sprinkling is <b>not valid,</b> and therefore the High Priest is <b>considered like one who did not sprinkle</b> the blood, as every one of the sprinklings of the blood of an inner sin offering is indispensable. If so, <b>when</b> he <b>sprinkles</b> the blood <b>again</b> later <b>in the Sanctuary,</b> on the Curtain and the inner altar, it is as though <b>he is merely sprinkling water,</b> and not the blood of the offering. Consequently, the permitting factors of the offering have not been sacrificed, and therefore the offering should not be rendered <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rabba says: You find it</b> in a case <b>of four bulls and of four goats.</b> After sprinkling blood inside the Holy of Holies with the intent to burn the offering beyond its designated time, the blood spilled. Since the priest did not use that blood again, the service inside the Holy of Holies was completed, and that permitting factor was performed properly. He then had to slaughter another bull and goat for the other sprinklings inside the Sanctuary, which he again performed with improper intent and again the blood spilled. The same sequence repeated itself in the sprinklings on the inner altar and on the top of the altar. In this manner each permitting factor was performed properly.",
            "<b>Rava said: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that this is a case where there is only <b>one bull and one goat,</b> as the sprinkling <b>effects acceptance with regard to</b> the offering’s status of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> In other words, even though the High Priest sprinkled the blood inside the Holy of Holies with an improper intention, and thereby disqualified the offering, nevertheless, since he completed the service, he is considered as having sacrificed all the permitting factors with regard to <i>piggul</i>.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> mentioned that there are <b>forty-three</b> presentations of the blood of the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it taught</b> otherwise in a different <i>baraita</i>, that there are <b>forty-seven</b> presentations of that blood? The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> statement, that there are forty-three presentations, <b>is in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that the High Priest <b>mixes</b> the blood of the bull and the goat before placing it <b>on the corners</b> of the inner altar, rather than placing the blood of each one separately. <b>And that</b> statement, that there are forty-seven presentations, <b>is in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that the High Priest <b>does not mix</b> the two types of blood before placing them <b>on the corners,</b> but sprinkles four times from the blood of the bull and another four times from the blood of the goat, and only afterward mixes the blood of the two animals for placement on the top of the altar.",
            "The Gemara raises another difficulty: <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in yet another <i>baraita</i> that there are <b>forty-eight</b> presentations? The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> statement, that there are forty-eight presentations, <b>is in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that the pouring of the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the external altar <b>is indispensable,</b> and therefore this act is added to the total. <b>That</b> statement, that there are only forty-seven presentations, <b>is in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that the pouring of the <b>remainder</b> of the blood <b>is not indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention during the performance of half a permitting factor, from a <i>baraita</i> discussing <i>piggul</i> of a meal offering, which states: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement said,</b> i.e., that if the priest had an improper intention during the performance of one of its services, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the services silently? When he had the improper intention <b>in the removal of the handful, or in the placement</b> of the handful <b>in</b> a service <b>vessel, or in the walking</b> with the handful to the altar.",
            "<b>But</b> if <b>he came to</b> perform <b>the burning</b> of the handful and the frankincense, and <b>he presented the handful</b> on the altar <b>with</b> an improper <b>intention and the frankincense</b> he presented <b>silently, or he presented the handful silently and the frankincense</b> he presented <b>with</b> an improper <b>intention, Rabbi Meir says:</b> The offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> consuming <b>it. And the Rabbis say: There is no</b> liablility to receive <b><i>karet</i> unless</b> the priest had an improper intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> during</b> the performance of <b>the entire permitting factor.</b>",
            "<b>In any event,</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches:</b> Or he presented <b>the handful silently and the frankincense</b> he presented <b>with</b> an improper <b>intention, and</b> yet Rabbi Meir <b>disagrees</b> with the ruling of the Rabbis and says that the offering is <i>piggul</i>. This indicates that the decisive factor according to Rabbi Meir is not that the priest continues his initial intent, but that one can render an offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of half a permitting factor. The Gemara answers: <b>Say</b> and explain the <i>baraita</i> as follows: Or he presented the handful silently after <b>he had already presented the frankincense with</b> an improper <b>intention.</b> In this case the offering is <i>piggul</i> because he performed the second action with his initial intent.",
            "The Gemara refutes this interpretation: <b>One</b> counterclaim is <b>that</b> if this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying, <b>this is</b> exactly the same case as <b>the first clause. And furthermore, isn’t it taught</b> explicitly in another <i>baraita</i>: <b>And afterward</b> he presented the frankincense with an improper intention. The Gemara states: Indeed, this is <b>difficult</b> for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who claims that according to Rabbi Meir one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of half a permitting factor.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>And these are</b> the <b>items for which one is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> One is liable to receive <i>karet</i> only if he partakes of an item that was permitted for consumption or for the altar by another item. As for the items listed here, either nothing else renders them permitted for consumption or for the altar, or they themselves render other items permitted. They are as follows: <b>The handful</b> of flour, which permits consumption of the meal offering; <b>the incense,</b> which is burned in its entirety, without another item rendering it permitted for the altar; <b>the frankincense,</b> which is burned together with the handful of the meal offering;"
        ],
        [
            "<b>the meal offering of priests,</b> from which no handful of flour is removed and which is burned in its entirety (see Leviticus 6:16); <b>the meal offering of</b> the <b>anointed priest,</b> which is sacrificed by the High Priest each day, half in the morning and half in the evening; <b>the blood,</b> which permits all the offerings; <b>and the libations that are brought by themselves</b> as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:</b> The same <i>halakha</i> applies <b>even</b> with regard to libations <b>that are brought with an animal</b> offering.",
            "With regard to <b>the <i>log</i> of oil</b> that accompanies the guilt offering <b>of</b> a recovered <b>leper, Rabbi Shimon says: One is not liable for</b> consuming <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> because it is not permitted by any other item. <b>And Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for</b> consuming <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the guilt offering</b> of the leper <b>permits its</b> use, as only after the blood’s sacrifice is the oil sprinkled and given to the priests. <b>And</b> the principle is: With regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that has permitting factors, either for</b> consumption by <b>a person or for</b> burning on <b>the altar, one is liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The mishna elaborates: <b>The burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh to</b> be burned on <b>the altar and its hide to</b> be used by <b>the priests. The bird burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh</b> and its skin <b>to</b> be burned on <b>the altar. The bird sin offering, its blood permits its meat for</b> consumption by <b>the priests. Bulls that are burned,</b> e.g., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, <b>and goats that are burned,</b> e.g., the goats sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, <b>their blood permits their sacrificial portions to be sacrificed</b> on the altar.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> Those bulls and goats are not subject to <i>piggul</i> because their blood is presented in the Sanctuary, and in the case of <b>any</b> offering <b>whose</b> blood <b>is not</b> presented <b>on the external altar like</b> that of <b>a peace offering,</b> with regard to which the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> was stated in the Torah, <b>one is not liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Ulla says:</b> With regard to <b>a handful</b> of a meal offering that is <b><i>piggul</i> that was offered up on the altar, its <i>piggul</i></b> status <b>has left it.</b> His reasoning is as follows: <b>If</b> this handful <b>brings other</b> items <b>to</b> a status of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> with regard to <b>itself</b> is it <b>not all the more so?</b> The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> Ulla <b>saying?</b> This consideration does not explain why the status of <i>piggul</i> should leave the handful. The Gemara answers that <b>this</b> is what <b>he is saying: If</b> the handful <b>is not accepted,</b> i.e., if its sacrifice is disqualified, <b>how can it bring other</b> items <b>to</b> a status of <b><i>piggul</i>?</b> A meal offering is considered <i>piggul</i> only if its handful is properly sacrificed.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> Ulla <b>teaching us? If</b> he is teaching us <b>that one is not liable for</b> eating the handful <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, we learn</b> this in the mishna: <b>These are</b> the <b>items for which one is not liable due to <i>piggul</i>: The handful, the incense, the frankincense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of</b> the <b>anointed priest, the meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings, <b>and the blood.</b> If so, one is not liable for eating the handful even if it was not offered up on the altar.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> Ulla is teaching <b>that if</b> items with <i>piggul</i> status <b>ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall not descend.</b> But this too, <b>we learn</b> in a mishna (84a): With regard to sacrificial flesh <b>that</b> is <b>left</b> overnight, <b>or that emerges</b> from the Temple courtyard, <b>or that is ritually impure, or</b> an offering <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intention of eating the meat <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> thereby acquiring the status of <i>piggul</i>, <b>if</b> any one of these <b>ascended</b> the altar <b>they shall not descend.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> Ulla is teaching <b>that if</b> items with <i>piggul</i> status <b>descended</b> from the altar after having been brought up there, <b>they ascend</b> once again. But <b>we also learn</b> in that same mishna (84b) that <b>this</b> is not so: <b>Just as if they ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall not descend, so</b> too, <b>if they descended</b> from the altar <b>they shall not ascend.</b> The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> Ulla’s ruling is <b>necessary</b> in a case <b>where the fire has</b> already <b>taken hold of it,</b> i.e., the handful began to burn before it came down from the altar. Ulla teaches that in such a case the priests should return the handful to the altar, as its <i>piggul</i> status has already left it.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: But <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>too, Ulla</b> already <b>said it</b> on <b>another occasion. As Ulla says:</b> The mishna <b>taught</b> that items that descended from the altar shall not ascend again <b>only where the fire has not taken hold of them, but where the fire has</b> already <b>taken hold of them, they shall ascend.</b> The Gemara explains: Even so, there is a novelty in Ulla’s ruling: <b>Lest you say</b> that <b>this matter</b> applies only"
        ],
        [
            "to <b>a limb</b> of an offering, <b>which is</b> all <b>connected</b> together so that it forms a single unit, and one can say that if fire took hold of part of it, all of it is considered the food of the altar, and therefore it is returned to the altar if it came down; <b>but</b> with regard to <b>a handful, which</b> consists of <b>separate</b> pieces, perhaps only the part that the fire took hold of is returned to the altar, but as for the rest you might <b>say</b> that it does <b>not</b> ascend again. Therefore, Ulla <b>teaches us</b> that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to the handful as to a limb, i.e., if it descended from the altar after fire already took hold of any part of it, it ascends once again in its entirety to the altar.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥai says:</b> Since the handful is considered one unit, <b>therefore,</b> in the case of <b>this handful of <i>piggul</i>, half of which lies on the ground and half of which was brought up to the</b> wood <b>arrangement</b> on the altar <b>and the fire took hold of it, one brings all of it up</b> to the altar <b><i>ab initio</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yitzḥak says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> With regard to <b><i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>,</b> i.e., offerings that remain after the time allotted for their consumption, <b>and ritually impure</b> flesh, <b>where one brought them up to the altar, their prohibition has left them. Rav Ḥisda said</b> in astonishment: <b>Teacher of this</b> <i>halakha</i>, is the <b>altar a bath of ritual purification</b> that can render an impure item pure? <b>Rabbi Zeira says:</b> This is referring to a case <b>where the fire took hold of them,</b> and therefore the item belongs to the altar and the prohibition lapses.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>. <b>Others say:</b> The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, <b>having his impurity upon him,</b> that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). Although this can also be read as: Having its impurity upon it, referring to the meat of the peace offerings, the verse in fact is referring to <b>one whose impurity can depart from him,</b> i.e., a person who is currently impure, but can attain a state of ritual purity by immersing in a ritual bath. This serves to <b>exclude</b> the impure <b>flesh</b> of offerings, <b>as its impurity cannot depart from it,</b> since ritually impure flesh cannot be purified. <b>And if it is so</b> that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is correct, the <b>impurity</b> of flesh <b>can</b> in fact <b>depart from it by means of the fire</b> of the altar.",
            "<b>Rava says:</b> When the <i>baraita</i> speaks of an item whose impurity cannot depart from it, <b>we say</b> it is referring to purification <b>by means of a ritual bath,</b> not through any other means. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>Is</b> the term <b>ritual bath written</b> in the <i>baraita</i>? It speaks only in general terms about impurity that can or cannot depart from an item. <b>Rather, Rav Pappa says:</b> In that verse <b>we are dealing with the meat of peace offerings, which are not fit for sacrificing,</b> as the meat of a peace offering is eaten rather than being burned on the altar. Therefore, bringing it up to the altar does not remove its impurity from it.",
            "<b>Ravina says</b> there is a different answer: Even if the impurity of flesh leaves it when it is brought up to the altar, this verse cannot be referring to the impure meat of peace offerings, as the phrase <b>“having his impurity upon him”</b> is referring to <b>one whose impurity departs from him when he is whole;</b> the term “upon him” indicates that he is in a state of wholeness. This serves to <b>exclude</b> sacrificial <b>flesh,</b> which is <b>an item whose impurity does not depart from it when it is whole, but</b> only <b>when it is deficient,</b> i.e., when fire takes hold of it on the altar.",
            "§ The Gemara proceeds to analyze <b>the</b> matter <b>itself.</b> In the <i>baraita</i> the Rabbis attempt to prove that the verse: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), is referring to a ritually impure person, and not to impure flesh. The <i>baraita</i> states: <b>“Having his impurity upon him”; the verse speaks of impurity of the body</b> of the person, not the impurity of the flesh of the offering.",
            "The question may be raised: <b>Do you say</b> that it is dealing <b>with impurity of the body? Or is it</b> speaking <b>only of impurity of the flesh,</b> as is suggested by the fact that the term for “meat” [<i>basar</i>] is masculine, matching the masculine pronominal suffix attached to the word “impurity,” whereas the word for “soul” [<i>nefesh</i>] is feminine? The answer is that <b>here it is stated:</b> “Having <b>his impurity</b> upon him,” <b>and there it is stated:</b> “Whoever touches the dead, the body of any man that has died, and does not purify himself, he has defiled the Tabernacle of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from Israel, because the water of sprinkling was not sprinkled upon him, he shall be impure, <b>his impurity is</b> yet <b>upon him”</b> (Numbers 19:13). <b>Just as there, the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, so too here, the verse is speaking of impurity of the body.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says</b> there is a different proof: <b>Since</b> in this verse (Leviticus 7:20) the <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>are mentioned in the plural</b> form, i.e., “peace offerings,” <b>but</b> the <b>impurity is mentioned in the singular:</b> “Upon him,” evidently <b>the verse is speaking of impurity of the body,</b> and not impurity of the peace offerings. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> there is yet another proof: Since the next verse states: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item…<b>and eat</b> of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:21), this indicates that <b>the verse is speaking of impurity of the body,</b> as will be explained. <b>Others say</b> that the phrase <b>“having his impurity upon him”</b> proves that the reference here is to <b>one whose impurity can depart from him,</b> i.e., a person. This serves to <b>exclude</b> the impure <b>flesh</b> of offerings, <b>as</b> its <b>impurity cannot depart from it.</b> This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.",
            "The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master said: Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> that the term <b>“and eat”</b> indicates that <b>the verse is speaking of impurity of the body.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>From where</b> is this <b>inferred?</b> How is the meaning of this verse derived from this term, which appears in a different verse? In this connection the Gemara notes that <b>Rava said: Any verse that was not explained by Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi, and any <i>baraita</i> that was not explained by Rav Ze’eiri, was not explained,</b> as these Sages are the most accomplished interpreters of verses and <i>baraitot</i>, respectively.",
            "Rava cites the relevant explanation of the verse referred to by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: <b>This</b> is what <b>Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says:</b> The next verse states: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any impure detestable thing, and eat of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21). The beginning of that verse: “And when anyone shall touch,” and the end of that verse: “That soul shall be cut off,” are in the feminine form, whereas the middle of the verse: “And eat of the meat,” is in the masculine form, and yet it is clear that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body. The same may be said about the previous verse: <b>Since the verse begins in the feminine</b> form <b>and ends in the feminine</b> form, <b>and the masculine</b> form is used <b>in the middle, the verse</b> must be <b>speaking of impurity of the body,</b> despite the change from the feminine to the masculine.",
            "The Gemara cites the <b><i>baraita</i>,</b> alluded to by Rava, through which the interpretative prowess of Rav Ze’eiri is demonstrated. This <i>baraita</i> also discusses the topic of eating consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>If</b> the <b>lenient are stated, why are</b> the <b>stringent stated; and if</b> the <b>stringent</b> are <b>stated, why</b> are the <b>lenient stated? If</b> the <b>lenient were stated and not</b> the <b>stringent, I would say: For the lenient,</b> one is liable to receive lashes <b>for</b> violating <b>a prohibition, and for the stringent,</b> one is liable <b>to</b> be punished with <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven. <b>Therefore,</b> the <b>stringent</b> are <b>stated. And if</b> the <b>stringent were stated and</b> the <b>lenient were not stated, I would say:</b> Only <b>for the stringent should one be liable</b> to receive a punishment; <b>but for the lenient, one should be</b> entirely <b>exempt. Therefore,</b> the <b>lenient</b> are <b>stated.</b> This concludes the <i>baraita</i>, the meaning of which is opaque.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> are the <b>lenient, and what</b> are the <b>stringent?</b> It is known that the <i>baraita</i> is discussing the broad topic of eating consecrated food in a state of impurity, but its precise meaning requires elucidation. <b>If we say</b> that the <b>lenient</b> is referring to the consumption of second <b>tithe</b> while one is impure, and the <b>stringent</b> is referring to the partaking of <b><i>teruma</i>,</b> the portion of the produce designated for the priest, in a state of impurity, how can the <i>baraita</i> say that had the Torah stated only the prohibition against eating second tithe <b>I would</b> incorrectly <b>have said</b> that one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> is liable to be punished <b>with death</b> at the hand of Heaven? <b>Now too, this</b> is the <i>halakha</i>; one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> when he is in a state of impurity is indeed liable <b>to</b> be punished with <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven.",
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> is it correct to say: <b>And if</b> the Torah <b>had not stated</b> the stringent case of <i>teruma</i> but only the lenient case of second tithe, and I would learn the <i>halakha</i> in the stringent case from the <i>halakha</i> in the lenient case by way of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, <b>I would</b> then <b>say</b> that the punishment in the stringent case is that <b>of death</b> at the hand of Heaven? This is impossible, as there is a principle with regard to <i>a fortiori</i> inferences that <b>it is sufficient for the</b> conclusion that <b>emerges from</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference to be like</b> its <b>source.</b> In other words, a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. In this instance, if an impure person who eats second tithe is flogged for violating a prohibition, then the punishment for partaking of <i>teruma</i> in a state of impurity, were it not stated in the Torah, could be no more severe than that.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> when the <i>baraita</i> refers to the <b>lenient</b> it is referring to <b>the impurity of</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal,</b> while the <b>stringent</b> is referring to <b>the impurity</b> imparted by <b>a corpse,</b> as the Torah discusses both these cases in the context of eating consecrated foods in a state of ritual impurity: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead, or a man whose semen goes from him, or whoever touches any creeping animal” (Leviticus 22:4–5).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if so, <b>to what</b> food is this referring? <b>If</b> it is referring to the partaking <b>of <i>teruma</i>,</b> both <b>this</b> one who was rendered impure by the dead <b>and that</b> one who was rendered impure by a creeping animal <b>are</b> liable to be punished <b>with death</b> at the hand of Heaven. No matter how he became impure, if he partakes of <i>teruma</i> in a state of ritual impurity he is liable to be punished with death. <b>And furthermore,</b> how can the <i>baraita</i> state: <b>Therefore, the stringent are stated,</b> i.e., to teach <b>that</b> one is liable only to be flogged <b>for</b> violating <b>a prohibition,</b> and not to be punished with death. After all, one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> when impure <b>is</b> in fact liable <b>to</b> be punished with <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven. Consequently, the reference to stringent and lenient cannot be referring to the partaking of <i>teruma</i>.",
            "<b>And if</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to the eating of</b> second <b>tithe,</b> this too is difficult."
        ],
        [
            "<b>If</b> the <b>stringent</b> case of impurity imparted by a corpse <b>were not stated,</b> but only the lenient case of the impurity of a creeping animal, <b>would I say</b> that the punishment in <b>the stringent</b> case is that <b>of death</b> at the hand of Heaven? <b>Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> in the case of impurity imparted by a corpse would be <b>derived from</b> the <i>halakha</i> in the case of <b>the impurity of a creeping animal</b> by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, <b>and it is sufficient for</b> the conclusion <b>that emerges from</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference to be like</b> its <b>source,</b> in this case that one is liable to be flogged for the violation of a prohibition, and no more.",
            "<b>Ze’eiri says:</b> Indeed, the <b>lenient</b> case is referring to <b>the impurity of a creeping animal,</b> and the <b>stringent</b> case is referring to <b>impurity</b> imparted by <b>a corpse. And this</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying: If the impurity of a creeping animal was stated, and it was stated</b> that one who eats second <b>tithe</b> while impure with such impurity has violated a prohibition <b>and</b> one who partakes of <b><i>teruma</i></b> in that state is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, <b>and the impurity</b> imparted by <b>a corpse was not stated</b> in this context, <b>I would say</b> as follows: The <b>lenient</b> level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, <b>with regard to</b> food with <b>lenient</b> <i>halakhot</i>, second tithe, <b>involves</b> the violation of <b>a prohibition, and with regard to</b> food with <b>stringent</b> <i>halakhot</i>, <i>teruma</i>, it involves liability to be punished <b>with death</b> at the hand of Heaven.",
            "Ze’eiri continues his explanation of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>And from</b> the fact <b>that</b> the <b>lenient</b> level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, <b>with regard to</b> food with <b>stringent</b> <i>halakhot</i>, <i>teruma</i>, involves liability to be punished <b>with death</b> at the hand of Heaven, it may be inferred that <b>also</b> in the analogous case of the <b>stringent</b> level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, <b>with regard to</b> food with <b>lenient</b> <i>halakhot</i>, there is liability to be punished <b>with death</b> at the hand of Heaven. <b>Therefore, the stringent</b> level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, <b>was stated</b> with regard to second tithe, which has lenient <i>halakhot</i>, to teach that even if one contracted impurity from a corpse, he has violated only a prohibition for eating second tithe, and is not liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that has permitting factors, either for</b> consumption by <b>a person or for</b> burning on <b>the altar, one is liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> The Gemara cites a verse and a related <i>baraita</i>. The verse states: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who sacrifices it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The <i>baraita</i> first demonstrates that the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies not only to a peace offering, with regard to which it is stated in the Torah, but to all offerings.",
            "<b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Or perhaps</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> <b>extends only to</b> an offering that is <b>similar to peace offerings: Just as peace offerings are notable</b> in that <b>they are eaten for two days and one night, so too,</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies to <b>any</b> offering that is <b>eaten for two days and one night.</b>",
            "But as for an offering that <b>is eaten</b> only <b>for one day,</b> i.e., the day the offering is sacrificed, <b>and</b> the following <b>night,</b> e.g., a sin offering, guilt offering, and firstborn offering, <b>from where</b> is it derived that the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies to this offering as well? The verse states: <b>“Of the flesh</b> of the sacrifice of his peace offering,” which teaches that the status of <i>piggul</i> can apply to <b>any</b> offering <b>whose remainder</b> of meat <b>is eaten</b> after its sacrificial portions have been offered on the altar. The <i>baraita</i> asks: With regard to <b>a burnt offering, whose remainder</b> of meat <b>is not eaten,</b> as it is burned in its entirety on the altar, <b>from where</b> is this <i>halakha</i> derived? <b>The verse states: “Sacrifice,”</b> which includes any offering that is slaughtered.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> asks: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>to include bird</b> offerings, e.g., doves or pigeons, which are not slaughtered but whose napes of their necks are pinched, <b>and meal offerings, until I include</b> even the <b><i>log</i> of oil</b> that accompanies the guilt offering <b>of</b> a recovered <b>leper? The verse states</b> with regard to the consumption of consecrated food in a state of ritual purity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, <b>which they consecrate to Me,</b> and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).",
            "The <i>baraita</i> clarifies this derivation: The <i>halakha</i> that the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i></b> applies to all these offerings is <b>derived</b> through a verbal analogy of <b>profanation</b> in the context of <i>notar</i>: “And if anything remains until the third day, it shall be burned in fire…and anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:6–8), and <b>profanation</b> stated in the verse discussing <b>ritual impurity:</b> “And that they do not profane My holy name.” <b>And</b> the <i>halakha</i> that <b><i>piggul</i></b> applies to all these offerings is subsequently <b>derived</b> through a verbal analogy of <b>“iniquity”</b> in the context of <i>piggul</i> and <b>“iniquity”</b> stated in the verse discussing <b><i>notar</i>.</b> With regard to <i>piggul</i>, the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to <i>notar</i>, it is stated in the aforementioned verse: “And anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity.”",
            "The <i>baraita</i> asks: <b>And since</b> the verse <b>eventually includes all items,</b> even meal offerings and the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, <b>now</b> one can ask: <b>Why does</b> the verse <b>state</b> <i>piggul</i> specifically with regard to <b>peace offerings?</b> The <i>baraita</i> answers: This serves <b>to tell you</b> that the offering must be similar to peace offerings in the following way: <b>Just as peace offerings are notable</b> in <b>that they have permitting factors, either for</b> consumption by <b>a person or for</b> burning on <b>the altar, so too,</b> with regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar, one is liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> specifies: With regard to <b>the burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted to</b> be burned on <b>the altar and its hide</b> to be used <b>by the priests.</b> With regard to <b>the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh</b> and its skin <b>permitted to</b> be burned on <b>the altar.</b> With regard to <b>the bird sin offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted for</b> consumption by <b>the priests.</b> With regard to <b>bulls that are burned,</b> e.g., the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal transgression, <b>and goats that are burned,</b> e.g., the goat sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, <b>their blood renders their sacrificial portions permitted to be sacrificed</b> on the altar.",
            "<b>And I exclude,</b> via the analogy to peace offerings, <b>the handful</b> of a meal offering, <b>the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of</b> the <b>anointed priest, the meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings, <b>and the blood.</b> All these do not have an item that renders them permitted either for a person or for the altar.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> concludes: <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> that the fact that the verse specifies peace offerings as the standard case of <i>piggul</i> teaches: <b>Just as peace offerings are notable</b> in <b>that they have</b> a permitting factor that is sacrificed <b>on the external altar,</b> i.e., their blood, <b>and one is liable for</b> eating <b>them</b> due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, <b>so too,</b> with regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that</b> has a permitting factor that <b>is</b> sacrificed <b>on the external altar, one is liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> This serves to <b>exclude bulls that are burned and goats that are burned: Since</b> their blood is <b>not</b> presented <b>on the external altar like peace offerings, one is not liable for</b> eating <b>them due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master said:</b> Perhaps the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> extends only to an offering that is <b>similar to peace offerings: What is this</b> offering that is similar to a peace offering but not included in the category of peace offerings? The Gemara answers: The reference is to <b>a firstborn</b> offering, <b>which is eaten for two days and one night,</b> as is a peace offering. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>By what</b> hermeneutical principle <b>is</b> the <i>halakha</i> of the firstborn offering <b>derived? If</b> it is <b>by</b> the hermeneutical principle of: <b>What do we find</b> with regard to, a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details, i.e., since the peace offering and firstborn offering are similar with regard to the time designated for their eating, <i>piggul</i> status should apply to each, this <b>can be refuted.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies the refutation: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about peace offerings?</b> They are notable in <b>that they require placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>libations, and waving of the breast and thigh.</b> None of these apply in the case of a firstborn offering.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> that <i>piggul</i> status applies to a firstborn offering is derived through the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, <b>from</b> the following verse: <b>“And if any be at all eaten</b> of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). The terms: “And if any” and “be at all eaten” are generalizations, while the words: “The flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering” constitute a detail. According to the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, in such a case one includes any item that is similar to the detail, and therefore one includes the firstborn offering.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>These two</b> phrases <b>are generalizations that are adjacent to one another,</b> which means that this is not an instance of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, as they are not in that order. <b>Rava said:</b> The hermeneutical principle applies even in this case, <b>as they say in the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael: In <b>every place that you find two generalizations that are adjacent to one another, cast</b> the <b>detail</b> that is written afterward <b>between them, and interpret them in</b> the manner of <b>a generalization and a detail</b> and a generalization. Consequently, this verse is considered to state a generalization and a detail and a generalization.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> teaches: <b>Until I include</b> even <b>the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper.</b> The Gemara asks: In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> ruling? The Gemara answers that <b>it is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <b><i>log</i> of oil of the leper, one is liable for</b> consuming <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became <i>piggul</i>; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>Say the latter clause: And I exclude the meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings, <b>and the blood,</b> as they do not have a permitting factor. Here <b>we arrive at</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who dispute the ruling of Rabbi Meir.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>As it is taught</b> in another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <b>libations of an animal</b> offering, <b>one is liable for</b> consuming <b>them due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the offering renders them permitted to be offered</b> on the altar; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> The Rabbis <b>said to him: But a person</b> may <b>bring his offerings today and</b> the accompanying <b>libations from now until</b> even <b>ten days</b> later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does not render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir <b>said to them: I too spoke only about</b> libations that <b>come</b> to be sacrificed together <b>with the offering.</b> If so, the <i>baraita</i> under discussion represents two conflicting opinions.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef said:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> ruling, that even the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper is included in the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>who</b> agrees with the Rabbis that the libations of an animal offering are not permitted by the blood of the offering. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> with regard to the <b><i>log</i> of oil of a leper</b> that it is not the blood of the guilt offering that renders it permitted; rather, the <b>placements of its</b> oil “before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:16) <b>render</b> the remainder of the oil <b>permitted</b> to be eaten by the priests. <b>And from</b> the fact <b>that</b> the <b>placements of its</b> oil <b>render</b> the oil <b>permitted,</b> by the same token the <b>placements of its</b> oil <b>render it <i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., if the oil was placed with the intent that the priests should consume its remainder on the following day, one who consumes the oil is liable for consuming <i>piggul</i>.",
            "The Gemara cites the source for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <b><i>log</i> of oil of a leper,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property if he derives benefit from it at any point after it has been consecrated in a service vessel, <b>until the blood</b> of the leper’s guilt offering <b>is sprinkled.</b> At this stage the oil is permitted to the priests, and therefore the prohibition against misusing property consecrated to the Temple no longer applies to it. Once <b>the blood has been sprinkled, one may not derive benefit</b> from the oil <i>ab initio</i>, by rabbinic law, as it must still be placed on the leper’s right ear, thumb, and big toe. <b>But</b> if one derived benefit from it, he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> One who derives benefit from the oil is liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property <b>until</b> the priest <b>places its</b> own <b>placements,</b> i.e., until the oil is sprinkled seven times toward the Sanctuary, as these sprinklings render the remainder of the oil permitted to the priests. <b>And</b> the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>agree that consumption</b> of the <i>log</i> of oil is <b>prohibited until</b> the priest <b>places the seven placements,</b> i.e., sprinklings, of oil toward the Sanctuary, <b>and</b> performs the <b>placing</b> of the oil <b>on the</b> leper’s <b>thumb and big toe.</b>",
            "<b>They said this</b> statement <b>before Rabbi Yirmeya</b> in Eretz Yisrael, whereupon <b>he said:</b> Would <b>a great man such as Rav Yosef say such a matter,</b> that the sprinkling of the oil renders the rest of the oil <i>piggul</i>?"
        ],
        [
            "But there is the case of the <b><i>log</i> of oil that is brought by itself,</b> i.e., where the leper brings it after he has sacrificed his offerings. There <b>everyone</b> agrees that <b>its placements render</b> the remainder of the oil <b>permitted to</b> the priests, <b>and</b> yet <b>they do not render</b> the oil <b><i>piggul</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <b><i>log</i> of oil of a leper, one is liable for</b> consuming <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, as</b> the <b>blood</b> of the offering <b>renders it permitted to</b> be placed on <b>the thumb and big toe</b> of the leper. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b>",
            "The Rabbis <b>said to Rabbi Meir: But a person</b> may <b>bring his guilt offering today and</b> the accompanying <b><i>log</i></b> of oil <b>from now until</b> even <b>ten days</b> later. Rabbi Meir <b>said to them: I too spoke only about</b> a <i>log</i> of oil that <b>comes with the guilt offering.</b> This indicates that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is the blood of the offering that renders the oil <i>piggul</i>.",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya says: Actually,</b> the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir, and omit</b> the case of the meal offering brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings <b>from</b> the list of items that are not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i>. <b>Abaye says: Actually, do not omit</b> this item from the list, and the <i>baraita</i> can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir as follows: The <i>tanna</i> first <b>taught</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <b><i>log</i></b> of oil <b>that comes with the</b> leper’s <b>guilt offering, and the same is true of libations that come with</b> an animal <b>offering,</b> as according to Rabbi Meir <i>piggul</i> status applies to both of these. <b>And then</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>taught</b> that <i>piggul</i> does not apply to <b>libations that come by themselves, and the same is true of a <i>log</i></b> of oil <b>that comes by itself.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its meat</b> and its skin <b>permitted to</b> be eaten by <b>the priests.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>From where is this matter,</b> that the meat of a bird burnt offering is eaten by the priests, derived? The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> <b>that Levi teaches,</b> with regard to a verse that discusses the gifts that are to be presented to the priests: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they shall render to Me, shall be most sacred for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9).",
            "The <i>baraita</i> clarifies what is included by the term “every” in each of these clauses. The verse states: <b>“Every offering of theirs,”</b> which serves <b>to include</b> the <b><i>log</i> of oil of a leper;</b> it too is given to the priests. The Gemara explains why it is necessary to derive from the verse that the oil is a gift to the priesthood: It might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that the oil should not be included, as <b>the Merciful One writes</b> in this same verse: <b>“From the fire,” and this</b> <i>log</i> of oil, notwithstanding its status as an offering, <b>is not reserved from the fire.</b> Only an item concerning which part of it is brought to the altar can be said to be reserved from the fire, and none of the oil is brought to the altar. Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us</b> by the phrase: “Every offering of theirs,” that the oil goes to the priests.",
            "The phrase: <b>“Every meal offering of theirs,”</b> serves <b>to include</b> the <b><i>omer</i> meal offering,</b> brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, <b>and the meal offering of jealousy,</b> brought by a <i>sota</i>. The Gemara elaborates: It might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that as the verse states with regard to the consumption of sacrificial food by the priests: <b>“And they shall eat those items with which atonement is achieved”</b> (Exodus 29:33), only those foods that facilitate atonement are given to the priests. <b>And</b> this would exclude the <i>omer</i> meal offering and the meal offering of jealousy, as <b>the <i>omer</i> meal offering comes to permit</b> the consumption of the new crop, <b>and the meal offering of jealousy comes to clarify</b> the <b>transgression</b> of the <i>sota</i>, as part of the ordeal undergone by the woman. Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us</b> by the phrase: “Every meal offering of theirs,” that even these meal offerings are eaten by the priests.",
            "The phrase: <b>“And every sin offering of theirs,”</b> serves <b>to include the bird sin offering;</b> its meat too is given to the priests. The Gemara explains: It might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that this meat should not be eaten at all, as <b>it is</b> an unslaughtered <b>animal carcass,</b> since the bird is killed by pinching its nape (see Leviticus 5:8) rather than by slaughtering, which is the manner of ritual slaughter of non-sacred birds. Therefore, the phrase: “And every sin offering of theirs,” teaches that the bird sin offering is eaten by the priests.",
            "The phrase: <b>“Every guilt offering of theirs,”</b> serves <b>to include the guilt offering of a nazirite</b> who contracted ritual impurity, <b>and the guilt offering of a leper.</b> The Gemara elaborates: It might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that these should not be given to the priests to eat, as <b>they come to qualify</b> these individuals, rather than to atone. The guilt offering of a nazirite renders him fit to restart his term of naziriteship, and the guilt offering of a leper qualifies him to eat sacrificial food, whereas the verse states: “And they shall eat those items with which atonement is achieved” (Exodus 29:33). Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us</b> by the phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” that these offerings as well are eaten by the priests.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>It is explicitly written with regard to the guilt offering of a leper</b> that it is consumed by the priests: “For as the sin offering is the priest’s, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:13). Why, then, is this derivation necessary? <b>Rather,</b> the <i>baraita</i> means to say that the phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” serves <b>to include the guilt offering of a nazirite,</b> teaching that it is <b>like the guilt offering of a leper,</b> in that both are eaten by the priests.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to the phrase <b>“which they shall render</b> to Me,” <b>this is</b> referring to an item <b>stolen</b> from <b>a convert.</b> One who robs a convert who then dies with no heirs must give the stolen item and an additional one-fifth to the priests. Finally, the term <b>“for you”</b> teaches that <b>it shall be yours, even to betroth a woman with it,</b> i.e., these gifts are considered the priest’s property in all regards.",
            "§ According to the first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, the blood of which is presented on the inner altar, are subject to <i>piggul</i>, whereas Rabbi Shimon rules that they are not subject to <i>piggul</i>. <b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that there is a third opinion concerning the matter: <b>Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:</b> If in his service of the bulls that are burned or the goats that are burned the priest had an intention that can <b>render</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i> with regard to a matter that is performed outside</b> the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, <b>he has rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> If his intention was <b>with regard to a matter that is performed inside</b> the Sanctuary or the Holy of Holies, <b>he has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: <b>How so?</b> If <b>he was standing outside</b> when slaughtering the animal, <b>and said: I hereby slaughter</b> the animal with the intention of <b>sprinkling its blood tomorrow</b> inside the Sanctuary, <b>he has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> The reason is <b>that</b> in the case of <b>an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed inside, one has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> Likewise, if he <b>was standing inside</b> when sprinkling, <b>and said: I hereby sprinkle</b> the blood of the sin offering <b>in order to burn</b> its <b>sacrificial portions</b> on the external altar <b>and to pour out</b> its <b>remainder</b> on the base of the altar <b>tomorrow, he has not rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>, as</b> this is <b>an intention inside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.</b>",
            "<b>But</b> if <b>he was standing outside, and said: I hereby slaughter</b> the animal with the intention of <b>pouring out</b> the <b>remainder</b> of its blood <b>tomorrow, or to burn</b> its <b>sacrificial portions tomorrow, he has rendered</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i>, as</b> this is <b>an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: What is the verse</b> from which this is derived? The verse states with regard to the sacrificial portions of a bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which is one of the bulls that are burned: <b>“As it is taken off from the bull of the peace offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:10). <b>But what, then, do we learn from the bull of a peace offering?</b> Everything that is specified with regard to a peace offering is stated with regard to this bull as well.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the verse <b>juxtaposes the bull</b> for an unwitting sin <b>of</b> the <b>anointed priest with the bull of the peace offering: Just as the bull of the peace offering</b> is not rendered <i>piggul</i> <b>unless</b> the priest’s <b>actions and intentions</b> relate to the service performed <b>on the external altar,</b> as that is where it is offered, <b>so too, the bull</b> for an unwitting sin <b>of</b> the <b>anointed priest</b> is not rendered <i>piggul</i> <b>unless</b> the priest’s <b>intentions and actions</b> relate to the service performed <b>on the external altar.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> The <b><i>halakha</i></b> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, who says</b> his ruling <b>in the name of Rabbi Yosei.</b>",
            "<b>Rava said:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "Does one issue <b>a <i>halakha</i> for the messianic</b> period, when the Temple will be rebuilt? <b>Abaye said to him: If that is so,</b> that such <i>halakhot</i> are not taught, <b>let</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>not teach all</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>the slaughter of sacrificial</b> animals, i.e., tractate <i>Zevaḥim</i>, as <b>it is</b> entirely <b>a <i>halakha</i> for the messianic</b> period. <b>Rather,</b> one studies these <i>halakhot</i> due to the principle of: <b>Study</b> Torah <b>and receive reward,</b> i.e., one is rewarded for the study of Torah regardless of its practical applicability. <b>Here too, study</b> Torah <b>and receive reward.</b> Rava said to him: <b>This</b> is what <b>I am saying to you: Why do I</b> need a practical ruling of <b><i>halakha</i>?</b> According to <b>another version,</b> which presents the same answer in different terms, Rava <b>said to him: I spoke</b> in reference to the ruling of <b><i>halakha</i>,</b> as it is puzzling that a halakhic ruling is given in this case.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>offerings</b> consecrated by <b>gentiles</b> for sacrifice to God, <b>one is not liable for</b> eating <b>them,</b> neither <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i></b> if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, nor</b> due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while <b>ritually impure. And one who slaughters them outside</b> the Temple courtyard is <b>exempt;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yosei deems</b> him <b>liable.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>offerings</b> consecrated by <b>gentiles,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them, he is <b>not</b> liable after the fact for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property. <b>And one is not liable for</b> eating <b>them,</b> neither <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i></b> if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, nor</b> due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> gentiles <b>cannot render</b> an animal <b>a substitute,</b> i.e., if a gentile stated with regard to an animal that it should be the substitute of a consecrated animal, the substitution does not take effect. <b>And</b> gentiles <b>cannot bring libations</b> that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering, <b>but their</b> animal <b>offerings require libations.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says: I see</b> the logic of the opinion that <b>in all of</b> these cases it is correct <b>to be stringent</b> about the offerings of gentiles, <b>as it is stated with regard to them:</b> “Any man of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel that will sacrifice his offering…<b>to the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 22:18). This indicates that all offerings, even those of gentiles, are fully consecrated to God; therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and eating the meat while ritually impure should all apply to the offerings of gentiles. <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement said? In</b> the case of items <b>consecrated for the altar. But</b> with regard to items that are <b>consecrated</b> by gentiles <b>for Temple maintenance,</b> one who derives benefit from them is liable for <b>misusing them.</b> This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.",
            "The Gemara begins to analyze this <i>baraita</i> in detail. The <i>baraita</i> taught that one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from items consecrated by gentiles <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them, he is <b>not</b> liable after the fact for <b>misusing</b> of consecrated property. The Gemara explains: <b>One may not</b> derive <b>benefit</b> from them <b>by rabbinic law,</b> as the Sages prohibited deriving benefit from any item that was consecrated to God.",
            "The Gemara’s explanation continues: <b>But</b> if one derived benefit from them, he is <b>not</b> liable after the fact for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property, <b>as</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>derives</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property through a verbal analogy between <b>“sin”</b> stated with regard to misuse of consecrated items and the word <b>“sin”</b> stated with regard to <b><i>teruma</i>.</b> With regard to misuse of consecrated property, the verse states: “If any one commits a trespass, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). In the case of <i>teruma</i>, the verse states: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die due to it, if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). And <b>with regard to <i>teruma</i>, it is written:</b> “And they shall not profane the sacred items of <b>the children of Israel”</b> (Leviticus 22:15), which indicates: <b>But not</b> the sacred items of <b>gentiles,</b> i.e., one is not liable for partaking of the <i>teruma</i> of gentiles while he is in a state of ritual impurity.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> further taught: <b>And one is not liable for</b> eating the offerings of gentiles <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> or <b><i>notar</i>, or</b> eating the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> for this? The Gemara explains that the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>piggul</i> is derived</b> through a verbal analogy between the word <b>“iniquity”</b> stated with regard to <i>piggul</i> and the word <b>“iniquity”</b> stated with regard to <b><i>notar</i>.</b> With regard to <i>piggul</i>, the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to leftover sacrificial meat the verse states: “Therefore anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8).",
            "<b>And</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>notar</i></b> itself is <b>derived</b> through a verbal analogy between <b>profanation</b> stated with regard to <i>notar</i> and <b>profanation</b> stated with regard to <b>ritual impurity.</b> With regard to <i>notar</i> the verse states: “Because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and with regard to impurity the verse states: “And that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). <b>And with regard to impurity it is written</b> in that same verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of <b>the children of Israel,”</b> which indicates: <b>But not</b> the sacred items of <b>gentiles.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> also teaches: <b>And</b> gentiles <b>cannot render</b> an animal <b>a substitute.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> for this? The Gemara explains: It is <b>because substitution is juxtaposed</b> in the Torah <b>with animal tithe,</b> as the verse states: “And concerning the tithe of the herd, or of the flock…the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord…neither shall he make a substitute for it” (Leviticus 27:32–33). <b>And animal tithe is juxtaposed with the tithe of grains,</b> as the verse states: “You shall tithe [<i>asser te’asser</i>] all the increase of your seed that the field brings forth year by year. And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain” (Deuteronomy 14:22–23). The doubled verb form, <i>asser te’asser</i>, is understood as an allusion to two tithes, grain tithe and animal tithe. <b>And with regard to the tithe of grains it is written:</b> “When you take of <b>the children of Israel</b> the tithes” (Numbers 18:24), which indicates: <b>But not</b> of <b>gentiles.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition again teach via a juxtaposition?</b> There is a principle that in consecrated matters, a <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition cannot teach another <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition. The Gemara answers: This derivation is not relevant exclusively to consecrated matters, as the <b>tithe of grains is non-sacred</b> food.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that when implementing this principle <b>we follow</b> the source that <b>teaches</b> the <i>halakha</i>, i.e., if the matter that teaches the first juxtaposition involves non-sacred items, one can employ two juxtapositions even with regard to deriving the <i>halakha</i> for consecrated matters. <b>But according to the one who says</b> that <b>we follow</b> the matter that <b>is taught</b> the <i>halakha</i>, i.e., the case to which we wish to apply the <i>halakha</i>, and if that case involves offerings one cannot employ two juxtapositions, <b>what can be said?</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the reason why gentiles cannot bring an animal tithe offering is that <b>animal tithe is an obligation for which there is no fixed time, and</b> with regard to any <b>obligation for which there is no fixed time, a Jew can bring</b> it but <b>gentiles cannot bring</b> it. And as stated, substitution is juxtaposed with the animal tithe, and therefore gentiles can also not render an animal a substitute.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> teaches: <b>And</b> gentiles <b>cannot bring libations</b> that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering, but their animal offerings require libations. The Gemara cites the source of these <i>halakh</i>ot. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to libations: “All who are <b>homeborn</b> shall do these things after this manner” (Numbers 15:13), which teaches that those who are <b>homeborn,</b> i.e., Jews, can <b>bring libations</b> as a separate offering, <b>but a gentile cannot bring</b> such <b>libations.</b> One <b>might</b> consequently have thought that a gentile’s <b>burnt offering should not require</b> the standard accompanying <b>libations.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “So</b> it shall be done for each bull” (Numbers 15:11), which indicates that every offering requires libations.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Yosei says: I see</b> that <b>in all of</b> these cases it is correct <b>to be stringent. In what</b> case <b>is this statement said? In</b> the case of items <b>consecrated for the altar.</b> But with regard to items that are consecrated by gentiles for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misusing them. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> of Rabbi Yosei?",
            "The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei <b>holds</b> that <b>when</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>is derived</b> through a verbal analogy between <b>“sin”</b> stated with regard to misuse of consecrated property and <b>“sin”</b> stated with regard to <b><i>teruma</i>,</b> this is referring to items that are <b>similar to <i>teruma</i>, which is sacred</b> with <b>inherent sanctity. But</b> with regard to an item <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance, which</b> has no inherent sanctity, but only <b>sanctity</b> that inheres in its <b>value,</b> this exemption of gentiles does not apply.",
            "The Gemara continues to analyze the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>blood that became impure and</b> a priest <b>sprinkled it</b> on the altar, if he did so <b>unwittingly,</b> the offering is <b>accepted.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "But if he sprinkled the blood <b>intentionally,</b> the offering is <b>not accepted. In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is <b>with regard to</b> the offering of <b>an individual. But with regard to</b> the offering of <b>the community, whether</b> the priest sprinkled the blood <b>unwittingly or</b> he did so <b>intentionally,</b> the offering is <b>accepted. And</b> in the case of the offerings <b>of gentiles, whether</b> he sprinkled the blood <b>unwittingly or</b> he did so <b>intentionally,</b> the offering is <b>not accepted.</b>",
            "<b>The Sages said before Rav Pappa: In accordance with whose</b> opinion was this <i>baraita</i> taught? Apparently, it was taught <b>not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei, as if</b> it reflects the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei,</b> there is a difficulty: <b>Doesn’t</b> Rabbi Yosei <b>say: I see</b> the logic of the opinion that <b>in all of</b> these cases it is correct <b>to be stringent</b> about the offerings of gentiles? This indicates that Rabbi Yosei equates the <i>halakhot</i> applying to the offerings of gentiles with those governing the offerings of Jews.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said to them: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei,</b> and it <b>is different there, as the verse states</b> with regard to the High Priest’s frontplate, which atones for ritual impurity contracted by offerings in the Temple without the knowledge of those offering them: “And it shall be always upon his forehead that it may be accepted <b>for them</b> before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), which indicates that it is accepted <b>for them,</b> i.e., for Jews, <b>but not for gentiles.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: If that is so,</b> with regard to the verse discussing ritually impure priests and consecrated items: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, <b>which they consecrate to Me”</b> (Leviticus 22:2), <b>so too,</b> would Rabbi Yosei say that the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity applies only to offerings which <b>they,</b> the Jews, consecrate, <b>and not</b> to those of <b>gentiles?</b> This cannot be, as Rabbi Yosei explicitly states in the <i>baraita</i> that in this regard the offerings of gentiles are like those of Jews.",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Ashi says</b> that it is not from the words “for them” that one derives that the offering of a gentile is not accepted when the blood that was sprinkled had become impure. Rather, it is because the atonement achieved by way of the High Priest’s frontplate does not apply to gentiles, as <b>the verse states: “That it may be accepted for them</b> before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), <b>and gentiles are not subject to</b> the <b>acceptance</b> of offerings.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> Even with regard to those <b>items</b> enumerated in the previous mishna (42b) for <b>which one is not liable for</b> eating <b>them due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> e.g., the handful, the frankincense, and the incense, <b>one is,</b> nevertheless, <b>liable for</b> eating <b>them due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and due to</b> violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while <b>ritually impure, except for the blood. Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>eats</b> it. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>the wood, the frankincense, and the incense, one is not liable for</b> eating <b>them due to</b> violation of the prohibition against eating a consecrated item while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: It <b>might</b> have been thought that <b>one should be liable due to</b> violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while in a state of <b>ritual impurity only for an item that has permitting factors, either for</b> consumption by <b>a person or for</b> burning on <b>the altar.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> explains: <b>And</b> this may be derived via <b>a logical derivation: Just as</b> with regard to <b><i>piggul</i>, which</b> renders one who unwittingly eats it liable to bring <b>a fixed</b> sin offering, <b>and</b> this liability is incurred <b>with one</b> change in his <b>awareness,</b> i.e., it suffices for the sinner to become aware after the fact that he had sinned unwittingly, <b>and</b> it has <b>no permitted</b> exceptions <b>from its general</b> prohibition, as there are no circumstances in which one is permitted to eat <i>piggul</i>, and yet <b>one is liable due to</b> violation of the prohibition against eating <i>piggul</i> <b>only for an item that has permitting factors, either for</b> consumption by <b>a person or for</b> burning on <b>the altar,</b> so too, the same should certainly apply to the more lenient case of ritual impurity.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>Impurity</b> is more lenient than <i>piggul</i>, <b>as</b> it renders the unwitting sinner liable only to bring <b>a sliding-scale offering,</b> which varies according to his financial circumstances: A poor person brings a bird offering or even a meal offering (see Leviticus 5:6–13). <b>And</b> liability is incurred only <b>with two</b> changes in his <b>awareness,</b> i.e., when the sinner was aware of his impurity beforehand, then forgot about it at the time of his sin, and then once again become aware of his impurity. <b>And</b> it has <b>permitted</b> exceptions <b>from its general</b> prohibition with regard to the community, as it is permitted to sacrifice communal offerings in the Temple in a state of impurity. With these leniencies in mind, <b>is it not right that one should be liable</b> due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure <b>only for an item that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar.</b>",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states,</b> with regard to eating consecrated foods in a state of ritual impurity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, <b>which they consecrate to Me,</b> and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). This teaches that a ritually impure person is liable for eating any item that has been consecrated.",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that one is liable for eating sacred items <b>immediately</b> after they have been consecrated. Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that <b>approaches</b> the sacred items” (Leviticus 22:3), and <b>Rabbi Elazar said,</b> in explanation of this verse: <b>But is there</b> one who merely <b>touches,</b> i.e., approaches, consecrated items, <b>who is liable?</b> Only one who eats consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity is liable.",
            "<b>Rather, what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “Approaches [<i>yikrav</i>]”?</b> This term alludes to sacrificing [<i>hakrava</i>], as though the verse has stated: Whoever sacrifices sacred items and eats them. This teaches that <b>the verse is speaking of flesh that has been rendered fit to be sacrificed. How so?</b> With regard to an item <b>that has permitting factors,</b> one is liable <b>from when</b> the <b>permitting factors are sacrificed.</b> In the case of an item that <b>does not have permitting factors,</b> one is liable <b>from when it is sanctified in</b> a service <b>vessel</b> for the purpose of its sacrifice.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We have found</b> proof that the prohibition against eating consecrated food in a state of <b>ritual impurity</b> applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor. <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b><i>notar</i></b> likewise applies to an item that does not have a permitting factor? The Gemara answers: This is <b>derived</b> through a verbal analogy between <b>profanation</b> stated in the context of <i>notar</i> and <b>profanation</b> stated in the context of <b>ritual impurity.</b> With regard to <i>notar</i> the verse states: “Because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and with regard to impurity the verse states: “And that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But let</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> <b>be derived</b> through a verbal analogy between <b>“iniquity”</b> stated in the context of <i>notar</i> and <b>“iniquity”</b> stated in the context of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> With regard to <i>piggul</i>, the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to leftover sacrificial meat the verse states: “Therefore anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8). If so, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> should be similar to that of <i>piggul</i>, for which one is liable only for an item that has a permitting factor.",
            "The Gemara answers that <b>it is</b> more <b>reasonable to derive</b> <i>notar</i> <b>from ritual impurity, for</b> several reasons, as indicated by the <b>mnemonic: <i>Gimmel</i>, <i>zayin</i>, <i>lamed</i>.</b> Both <i>notar</i> and impurity are disqualifications that apply to the body [<i>guf</i> ] of the offering itself, whereas <i>piggul</i> is caused by intent; unlike <i>piggul</i>, these two disqualifications are not determined by the sprinkling [<i>zerika</i>] of the blood, and in both cases the Torah uses the term profanation [<i>ḥillul</i> ].",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>On the contrary, it is</b> more <b>reasonable to derive</b> <i>notar</i> <b>from <i>piggul</i>, as</b> like <i>piggul</i> it does not have <b>permitted</b> exceptions from its general prohibition, it has no atonement through the High Priest’s <b>frontplate,</b> both <i>notar</i> and <i>piggul</i> apply to <b>a ritually pure</b> offering, these disqualifications are dependent <b>on time,</b> and both of them are disqualifications of the item being <b>sacrificed,</b> not the priest performing the service. None of these features are true of ritual impurity. <b>And these</b> reasons for comparing <i>notar</i> to <i>piggul</i> are more <b>numerous.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> is derived <b>from that</b> which <b>Levi taught</b> with regard to the verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2), which is referring to the eating of consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity. <b>As Levi taught: From where</b> is it derived <b>that the verse is speaking even of a disqualification</b> caused by <b>time,</b> and not only ritual impurity? <b>The verse states</b> profanation elsewhere: <b>“And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel”</b> (Leviticus 22:15)."
        ],
        [
            "<b>The verse is speaking</b> here <b>of two profanations; one</b> is the <b>disqualification of <i>notar</i> and one</b> is the <b>disqualification of ritual impurity.</b> This teaches that like impurity, <i>notar</i> applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, <b>except for the blood.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. <b>Ulla says: The verse states</b> with regard to blood: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, <b>and I have given it to you</b> upon the altar to make atonement for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). “To you” indicates that <b>it shall be yours;</b> it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.",
            "<b>The school of Rabbi Yishmael</b> similarly <b>taught: The verse states: “To make atonement,”</b> teaching that God is saying: <b>I gave it for atonement, and not for</b> the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the latter part of <b>the verse,</b> which <b>states:</b> “For <b>it is</b> the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., <b>it is before atonement as</b> it is <b>after atonement.</b> As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term “it is” teaches that <b>just as after atonement,</b> i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is <b>not subject to</b> the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, <b>so too, before atonement,</b> i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, <b>it is not subject to</b> the prohibition of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara asks: But if the term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can <b>say</b> just the opposite: It is <b>after atonement as</b> it is <b>before atonement. Just as before atonement</b> the blood <b>is subject to</b> the prohibition of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>so too after atonement it is subject to</b> the prohibition of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: <b>There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is</b> still <b>subject to</b> the prohibition of <b>misusing</b> consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is there <b>no</b> such case? <b>But there is</b> the mitzva of <b>the removal of the ashes</b> of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.",
            "The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, <b>because</b> the matter of <b>the removal of the ashes and</b> the matter of the <b>priestly vestments,</b> the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the <i>halakha</i> that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they <b>are two verses that come as one,</b> i.e., they share a unique <i>halakha</i> not found elsewhere. <b>And</b> there is a principle: <b>Any two verses that come as one do not teach</b> their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.",
            "The Gemara raises a further difficulty: <b>This works out well according to</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis, who say</b> that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, <b>and shall leave them there”</b> (Leviticus 16:23), <b>teaches that</b> the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and <b>they require interment.</b>",
            "<b>But according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Dosa, who says</b> that these priestly vestments <b>are fit for an ordinary priest</b> and do not require interment, <b>provided that</b> a High Priest <b>does not use them on Yom Kippur</b> in <b>a different</b> year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore <b>what is there to say?</b> In his opinion, the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?",
            "The Gemara responds: It is <b>because</b> the cases of <b>the removal of the ashes and</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the heifer whose neck is broken</b> are <b>two verses that come as one,</b> as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, <b>and any two verses that come as one do not teach</b> their common element to apply to other cases.",
            "The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that two verses that come as one <b>do not teach</b> their common element to apply to other cases, <b>but according to the one who says</b> that two verses that come as one do <b>teach</b> their common element to apply to other cases, <b>what is there to say?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Two exclusions are written</b> in these two cases, which indicate that this <i>halakha</i> applies to them alone. <b>Here,</b> with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, <b>it is written: “Whose neck was broken”</b> (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this <i>halakha</i>, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. <b>And there,</b> with regard to the removal of ashes, <b>it is written: “And he shall put it”</b> (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies to “it,” and nothing else.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And why do I</b> need <b>these three verses</b> stated <b>with regard to blood,</b> from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, from the verse: “I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).",
            "The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves <b>to exclude</b> the blood <b>from</b> the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood <b>from</b> the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>.</b> If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming <i>notar</i>. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. <b>And</b> the last phrase serves to exclude it <b>from</b> the prohibition of <b>ritual impurity.</b> If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.",
            "<b>But no verse is required</b> to exclude this blood from the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> because this is already derived from another source, <b>as we learned</b> in the mishna (43a): With regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that has permitting factors, either for</b> consumption by <b>a person or for</b> burning on <b>the altar, one is liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> The permitting factor itself is not subject to <i>piggul</i>. <b>And</b> consequently, <i>piggul</i> does not apply to <b>blood itself,</b> as <b>it</b> renders the offering <b>permitted</b> for human consumption or for the altar.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why do I</b> need <b>three</b> mentions of <b><i>karet</i> with regard to</b> one who eats <b>peace offerings</b> in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [<i>venikhreta</i>] from his people” (Leviticus 7:20); “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21); and: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:3)."
        ],
        [
            "<b>One</b> mention of <i>karet</i> in the verse: “That approaches the sacred items,” is <b>for a generalization, and one</b> mention in the verse: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,” is <b>for a detail.</b> This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain <i>halakha</i> was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. <b>And one</b> mention of <i>karet</i> in the verse: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item,” serves <b>to</b> include <b>items whose</b> typical manner is such that they are <b>not to be eaten,</b> e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive <i>karet</i>.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says</b> in the mishna with regard to <b>items whose</b> typical manner is such that they are <b>not to be eaten,</b> that one <b>is not liable for</b> eating <b>them due to</b> violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of <b>ritual impurity, what</b> does this last mention of <i>karet</i> serve <b>to include?</b> The Gemara answers that it serves <b>to include the sin offerings</b> whose blood is presented <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might <b>enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says</b> that concerning <b>any</b> offering <b>whose</b> blood <b>is not</b> presented <b>on the external altar like</b> that of <b>a peace offering, one is not liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> one should likewise <b>not be liable</b> for eating it <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b>ritual impurity.</b> Therefore, the additional mention of <i>karet</i> <b>teaches us</b> that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Shimon stated</b> a ruling in which he <b>deems</b> one <b>liable</b> for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item <b>whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>eats</b> it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It <b>was stated</b> that two pairs of <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish,</b> and the other pair is <b>Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.</b> The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by <b>one of this pair and one of that pair.</b>",
            "<b>One says:</b> The <b>dispute</b> between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is <b>with regard to the impurity of meat,</b> i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: “And the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). <b>But</b> if one ate wood or frankincense <b>in</b> a state of <b>impurity of the body, everyone agrees</b> that <b>he is not flogged.</b>",
            "<b>And one says: As</b> there is <b>a dispute with regard to this</b> case, when the item eaten is impure, <b>so</b> is there <b>a dispute with regard to that</b> case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. <b>What is the reason</b> for this opinion? <b>Since one reads with regard to</b> these inedible items: <b>“And the flesh that touches any impure item”</b> (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, <b>one</b> likewise <b>reads with regard to</b> them the next verse: “But the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings…<b>having his impurity upon him,</b> that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>Rav Tavyumei teaches</b> the discussion in <b>this</b> preceding manner, whereas <b>Rav Kahana teaches</b> it in <b>this</b> alternative manner: <b>One of this pair</b> of <i>amora’im</i> <b>and one of that pair</b> disagreed <b>with regard to the latter clause</b> in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon’s statement. <b>One says</b> that Rabbi Shimon’s <b>dispute</b> with the Rabbis is <b>with regard to the impurity of the body,</b> as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. <b>But with regard to the impurity of flesh,</b> i.e., these items themselves, <b>everyone agrees</b> that one is <b>flogged. And one says: As</b> there is <b>a dispute with regard to this</b> case, <b>so</b> is there <b>a dispute with regard to that</b> case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> It <b>stands to reason</b> that the correct interpretation is <b>like the one who says: As</b> there is <b>a dispute with regard to this</b> case, <b>so</b> is there <b>a dispute with regard to that</b> case. <b>What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to</b> these inedible items: <b>“Having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,”</b> as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly <b>one does not read with regard to</b> them the previous verse: <b>“And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.”</b>",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But doesn’t the Master say</b> that the term: <b>“And as for the flesh,”</b> in the same verse, serves <b>to include wood and frankincense?</b> This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring <b>merely to disqualification,</b> i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters,</b> and one must have all of these matters in mind: <b>For the sake of</b> the particular type of <b>offering</b> being sacrificed; <b>for the sake of the one who sacrifices</b> the offering; <b>for the sake of God; for the sake of</b> consumption by the <b>fires</b> of the altar; <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>aroma; for the sake of</b> the <b>pleasing</b> of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God’s will; <b>and,</b> in the cases of <b>a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of</b> atonement for the <b>sin.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says: Even</b> in the case of <b>one who did not have in mind</b> to slaughter the offering <b>for the sake of any one of these,</b> the offering is <b>valid, as it is a stipulation of the court</b> that he should not state any intent <i>ab initio</i>. This is necessary <b>because the intent follows only the one performing the</b> sacrificial <b>rite,</b> and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rav says</b> with regard to the verse: “A burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), the term <b>“a burnt offering”</b> means that one must intend that it be <b>for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of</b> one who sacrifices a burnt offering <b>for the sake of a peace offering, which</b> one may <b>not</b> do. The mention of <b>fires,</b> i.e., the term “an offering made by fire,” teaches that the offering must be sacrificed <b>for the sake of</b> complete consumption by the <b>fires</b> of the altar, <b>to the exclusion of</b> one who intends that its portions should only be <b>roasted</b> on the fire, <b>as</b> one may <b>not</b> do so.",
            "Rav continues to expound the verse. The term <b>“aroma”</b> indicates that the offering must be sacrificed <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one</b> first <b>roasted and</b> afterward <b>took them up</b> to the altar, <b>which</b> he may <b>not</b> do. <b>As Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>limbs that one</b> first <b>roasted and</b> afterward <b>took them up</b> to the altar, <b>they do not constitute</b> fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the <b>aroma.</b>",
            "The term <b>“pleasing”</b> means <b>for the sake of pleasing</b> God’s <b>spirit,</b> i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression <b>“to the Lord”</b> indicates that it should be <b>for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>a sin offering that one slaughtered</b> with intent that the slaughter be <b>for the sake of a burnt offering,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be <b>for the sake of a non-sacred</b> animal, it is <b>valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav?</b> The verse states: <b>“And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel”</b> (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that <b>consecrated items,</b> i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, <b>profane consecrated items, but</b> the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of <b>a non-sacred</b> animal <b>does not profane consecrated items.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba raises an objection</b> from the mishna: <b>Rabbi Yosei says: Even</b> in the case of <b>one who did not have in mind</b> to slaughter the offering <b>for the sake of any one of these,</b> the offering is <b>fit, as it is a stipulation of the court</b> that one not state any intent <i>ab initio</i>. Rabba infers from this that <b>the reason</b> the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that <b>he did not have in mind</b> any intent <b>at all. But</b> if he <b>had in mind</b> to slaughter the offering <b>for the sake of a non-sacred</b> animal, it is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rabba: <b>Perhaps</b> Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he <b>did not have</b> in mind any intent <b>at all,</b> the offering is <b>valid and</b> it <b>effects acceptance, but</b> if he <b>had in mind</b> to slaughter the offering <b>for the sake of a non-sacred</b> animal, the offering is <b>valid, but it does not effect acceptance,</b> as it is a flawed offering. Rav’s statement can be understood in a similar fashion.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> Indeed, <b>a sin offering that one</b> intentionally <b>slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred</b> animal is <b>valid,</b> as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it <b>as a non-sacred</b> animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is <b>disqualified,</b> as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is <b>like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>From where</b> is it derived with regard <b>to one who acts unawares</b> in the case <b>of consecrated</b> items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, <b>that</b> the offering <b>is disqualified?</b> Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, <b>as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly <b>unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull,</b> i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.",
            "Shmuel <b>said to</b> Rav Huna: <b>We have this</b> as an established <i>halakha</i> already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but <b>from where</b> is it derived that this requirement is <b>indispensable?</b> Rav Huna <b>said to him</b> that the verse states: <b>“With your will you shall slaughter it”</b> (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., <b>with your</b> full <b>awareness you shall slaughter</b> it, in the form of a purposeful action.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Because the intent follows only the one performing the</b> sacrificial <b>rite.</b> The Gemara comments: <b>The mishna is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>this <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that</b> even <b>the owner</b> of an offering <b>can render it <i>piggul</i></b> through improper intention. <b>Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice</b> his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention.",
            "<b>Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold</b> that even in a case involving two people, where <b>this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is</b> the <b>intention</b> that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei,</b> is <b>that which we</b> just <b>said,</b> that the owner can render his offering <i>piggul</i> through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.",
            "The statement of <b>Rabbi Eliezer</b> is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 38b): With regard to <b>one who slaughters</b> an animal on behalf <b>of a gentile, his slaughter is valid</b> and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. <b>But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit,</b> as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.",
            "The statement of <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar</b> is <b>as we learned</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle:</b> In the case of <b>any</b> item <b>that is not fit to be stored, and</b> therefore people do <b>not</b> typically <b>store</b> items <b>like it,</b> but <b>it was deemed fit</b> for storage <b>by this</b> person <b>and he stored it, and another</b> person <b>came and carried out</b> on Shabbat the item that was stored, <b>that</b> one who carried it out <b>is rendered liable by the thought of this</b> one who stored it.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>These two</b> Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, <b>accept</b> as <i>halakha</i> the ruling <b>of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>Now</b> that concerning matters <b>outside</b> the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, <b>we say</b> that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, <b>is</b> it <b>necessary</b> to state that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to matters <b>inside</b> the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?",
            "But <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not</b> necessarily <b>accept</b> as <i>halakha</i> the rulings of <b>these two</b> Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: <b>Perhaps</b> it is only concerning <b>inside</b> the Temple <b>that we say</b> that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning <b>outside</b> the Temple, <b>we do not say</b> this.",
            "The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts</b> as <i>halakha</i> the ruling <b>of Rabbi Eliezer: Now</b> that <b>with regard to Shabbat we say</b> that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, <b>is</b> it <b>necessary</b> to say that the same applies <b>concerning idol worship,</b> where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?",
            "But <b>Rabbi Eliezer does not</b> necessarily <b>accept</b> as <i>halakha</i> the ruling <b>of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is</b> only <b>with regard to idol worship that you say</b> that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat <b>similar to</b> service performed <b>inside</b> the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>Shabbat, the Torah prohibited</b> only <b>planned,</b> constructive <b>labor,</b> i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>What is the location</b> of the slaughtering and consumption <b>of offerings?</b> The principle is that with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard.",
            "Specifically, with regard to <b>the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter</b> is <b>in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves</b> of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, <b>and upon the Curtain</b> separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, <b>and on the golden altar.</b> Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even <b>one placement of their</b> blood <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. As to <b>the remainder of the blood,</b> which is left after those sprinklings, a priest <b>would pour</b> it <b>onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place</b> the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering.",
            "With regard to <b>bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>and the collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain</b> separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, <b>and upon the golden altar,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "and failure to perform even <b>one placement of their</b> blood <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. As for <b>the remainder of the blood</b> that is left after those sprinklings, a priest <b>would pour</b> it <b>onto the western base of the external altar, but if he did not pour</b> the remainder it does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering. <b>These,</b> the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, <b>and those,</b> the bulls and the goats that are burned, <b>are</b> then <b>burned in the place of the ashes,</b> a place outside of Jerusalem where the priests would bring the ashes from the altar.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna opens with a principle that the slaughter of offerings of the most sacred order is in the north of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara inquires: <b>And let</b> the mishna <b>also teach</b> as a principle: <b>And the collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard. Since collecting the blood is an indispensable part of the service, why is it not listed in this clause of the mishna? The Gemara explains: <b>Since there is</b> among the offerings of the most sacred order <b>the guilt offering of a leper,</b> for <b>which the collection of its blood is in the hand,</b> the mishna could not state this as a principle. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> <b>omitted</b> this from the requirements for offerings of the most sacred order.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And</b> is the blood of the guilt offering of a leper <b>not</b> collected in a service vessel? <b>But</b> the mishna <b>teaches</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>later</b> (54b): With regard to <b>the guilt offering of a nazirite</b> brought for his purification <b>and the guilt offering of a leper</b> brought for his purification, <b>their slaughter</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>and collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north.</b> Apparently, the <i>tanna</i> maintains that the blood of the guilt offering of a leper must be collected in a service vessel.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Initially,</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>held</b> that since <b>collection of the blood of</b> the guilt offering of a leper must also be <b>in the</b> priest’s <b>hand,</b> not exclusively in a service vessel, <b>he omitted it. But since</b> it is the case <b>that it is possible for</b> one to collect some of the blood <b>only in</b> a service <b>vessel,</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>subsequently taught it.</b>",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nega’im</i> 9:2): The Torah states with regard to the guilt offering of a leper: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall take</b> of the blood of the guilt offering, and the priest shall put it upon the tip of the right ear of him who is to be purified, and upon the thumb of his right hand, and upon the big toe of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:14). One <b>might</b> have thought that he should take it <b>in a vessel;</b> therefore, <b>the verse states: “And</b> the priest <b>shall put.” Just as putting</b> the blood on the ear, thumb, and big toe must be performed <b>with the priest’s own</b> body, <b>so too, taking</b> of the blood is performed <b>with the priest’s own</b> body, not with a service vessel.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>even</b> with regard to the blood of the leper’s guilt offering that he presents <b>on the altar,</b> like the blood of other guilt offerings, it is <b>so,</b> that he collects the blood in his hand rather than with a vessel. To counter this, <b>the verse states: “For as the sin offering is, so is the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 14:13). This teaches that <b>just as a sin offering requires a vessel</b> for collection of its blood, <b>so too,</b> the blood of <b>a guilt offering requires a vessel</b> for collection of its blood. <b>You consequently say:</b> In the case of <b>a leper’s guilt offering, two priests collect its blood; one</b> collects the blood <b>by hand, and</b> the other <b>one</b> collects the blood <b>in a vessel. This</b> one, <b>who collected</b> the blood <b>in a vessel, comes to the altar</b> and sprinkles some of the blood on it. <b>And that</b> one, <b>who collected</b> the blood <b>by hand, comes to</b> the <b>leper</b> and places some of the blood on his right ear, right thumb, and right big toe."
        ],
        [
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur,</b> their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna list these sin offerings first? <b>After all,</b> while the <i>halakha</i> that slaughter must be in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>is written</b> in the Torah <b>with regard to a burnt offering</b> (Leviticus 1:11), the Torah does not explicitly state that the other offerings must be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, <b>let</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a burnt offering first.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Since</b> the location for slaughtering the <b>sin offering is derived through interpretation, it is dear to</b> the <i>tanna</i>, and therefore he gives it precedence. The verse states: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18). The Gemara (55a) derives from this verse that the sin offering must be slaughtered in the same place as the burnt offering, i.e., in the north of the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But let</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>teach</b> first the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the external sin offerings,</b> since those are the offerings to which the verse is referring. The Gemara explains: <b>Since</b> the <b>blood</b> of the Yom Kippur sin offerings <b>enters the innermost sanctum,</b> these offerings are <b>dear to</b> the <i>tanna</i>, and he taught them first.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And where</b> is it <b>written</b> that <b>a burnt offering</b> must be slaughtered in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers that with regard to a sheep that is brought as a burnt offering the Torah states: <b>“And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward</b> before the Lord; and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall dash its blood against the altar round about” (Leviticus 1:11).",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>We have found</b> that this verse provides a source that <b>a young sheep</b> burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north. <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>a young bull</b> burnt offering must also be slaughtered in the north? The Gemara answers: <b>The verse states: “And if</b> his offering be <b>of the flock,</b> whether of the sheep, or of the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it a male without blemish” (Leviticus 1:10). The conjunctive “and” represented by the letter <b><i>vav</i> adds to the previous matter.</b> The previous passage addresses cattle offerings. <b>And let</b> the <b>upper</b> passage, the place of the slaughter of a bull, <b>be learned from</b> the <b>lower</b> passage, the place of slaughtering a sheep.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that <b>we learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> in this manner. <b>But according to the one who says</b> that <b>we do not learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> in this manner, <b>what is there to say?</b>",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Immediately following the passage in the Torah addressing a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, the Torah discusses the <i>halakhot</i> of a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. The verse states: <b>“And if anyone</b> sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). This serves <b>to render</b> him <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse</b> of consecrated property; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis deem</b> him <b>exempt</b> in such a case. The Gemara suggests: <b>What, is it not</b> that <b>they disagree with regard to this:</b> One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>holds</b> that <b>we learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> of the upper passage from the lower passage, <b>and</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> i.e., the Rabbis, <b>holds</b> that <b>we do not learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> in this manner?",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said:</b> This is not correct, <b>as everyone</b> holds that <b>we learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> of the upper passage from the lower passage. <b>And this is</b> the <b>reason that the Rabbis</b> exempt from bringing an offering one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property: They learn a verbal analogy. <b>It is stated here:</b> “And if anyone sin, and does any of the <b>commandments</b> which the Lord has commanded not to be done” (Leviticus 5:17). <b>And it is stated with regard to the sin offering for</b> eating forbidden <b>fat:</b> “And if any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the <b>commandments</b> which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27).",
            "The verbal analogy teaches that <b>just as there,</b> the sin offering is brought only for an act <b>that for its intentional</b> violation <b>one is liable</b> to be punished with <b><i>karet</i>, and for its unwitting</b> violation one is liable to bring <b>a sin offering, so too here,</b> one brings a provisional guilt offering only for an act <b>that for its intentional</b> violation <b>one is liable</b> to be punished with <b><i>karet</i>, and for its unwitting</b> violation one is liable to bring <b>a sin offering,</b> which is not the case concerning misuse of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> what does <b>Rabbi Akiva</b> derive from this verbal analogy? He learns that <b>just as there</b> the verse obligates one to bring <b>a fixed</b> sin offering, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to the provisional guilt offering, one brings it for a case of uncertain transgression of a prohibition for which one would be liable to bring <b>a fixed</b> sin offering, <b>to exclude a sin offering</b> brought for uncertain transgression <b>of</b> the <b>defiling of</b> the <b>Temple or sacrificial</b> foods, <b>as</b> the sin offering for that transgression is not fixed, but <b>is a sliding-scale</b> offering. If the sinner is poor he brings a meal offering or a bird offering; if he is rich he brings an animal offering. In a case of uncertainty one does not bring a provisional guilt offering.",
            "<b>And</b> as for <b>the Rabbis,</b> who derived a different <i>halakha</i> from the verbal analogy, they hold that <b>there is no verbal analogy for half</b> of a matter. Once a provisional guilt offering is compared to a sin offering, it must be completely similar, and both matters are derived from the verbal analogy. The Gemara asks: <b>But Rabbi Akiva also</b> must hold that <b>there is no verbal analogy for half</b> of a matter, so why does he not agree with the derivation of the Rabbis?",
            "The Gemara reconsiders: <b>Yes,</b> this <b>is indeed so. And here they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Akiva holds</b> that <b>it is written</b> with regard to the provisional guilt offering: <b>“And if anyone</b> sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). The word “and” represented by the letter <b><i>vav</i> adds to the previous matter.</b> When a phrase begins with the conjunction <i>vav</i>, it is a continuation of the previous matter, and the <i>halakhot</i> of the previous passage can be learned from the subsequent passage. Therefore one brings a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> according to the opinion of <b>the Rabbis also, isn’t it written: “And if anyone</b> sin”? <b>Let us say</b> that <b>they disagree about this: As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>holds</b> that a derivation from <b>a juxtaposition is preferable,</b> and derives from the juxtaposition of the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property to the <i>halakhot</i> of a provisional guilt offering that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> i.e., the Rabbis, <b>holds</b> that a derivation from <b>a verbal analogy is preferable,</b> and therefore derives from a verbal analogy between the passage of misuse of consecrated property and the passage of a sin offering for eating forbidden fat that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>No,</b> it may be <b>that everyone</b> agrees <b>that</b> a derivation from <b>a juxtaposition is preferable. And the Rabbis would say to you</b> that the reason one is exempt from bringing a provisional guilt offering in a case of uncertain misuse of consecrated property is that the juxtaposition should be understood in the opposite manner. <b>It is</b> the <b>lower</b> passage <b>that</b> is <b>derived from</b> the <b>upper</b> passage.",
            "The juxtaposition teaches that a provisional <b>guilt offering</b> must be a ram <b>worth</b> a minimum of two <b>silver shekels,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the offering brought for misuse of consecrated property. This derivation is needed <b>so that you should not say</b> that a provisional guilt offering, brought for <b>his uncertain</b> transgression, <b>should not be</b> more <b>stringent than</b> the offering one brings in a case of <b>his definite</b> transgression. According to that claim, one would say that <b>just as</b> for <b>his definite</b> transgression one may bring <b>a sin offering worth</b> only <b>one-sixth [<i>danka</i>]</b> of a dinar, <b>so too,</b> for <b>his uncertain</b> transgression one may bring a provisional <b>guilt offering worth</b> only <b>one-sixth</b> of a dinar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And from where</b> does <b>Rabbi Akiva</b> derive <b>this conclusion?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>He derives</b> it <b>from</b> the verse that states: <b>“And this is the law of the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:1), which teaches that there is <b>one law for all of the guilt offerings</b> and they must all be worth at least two shekels, provisional guilt offerings included.",
            "The Gemara asks: This <b>works out well</b> according to <b>one who holds</b> that there is a derivation from the word <b>“law,”</b> but according to the <b>one who does not hold</b> that there is a derivation from the word <b>“law,” from where does he learn</b> that all guilt offerings must have the same minimum value? The Gemara answers: <b>He learns</b> it from a verbal analogy between the term <b>“according to your valuation”</b> stated with regard to a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:15) and the term <b>“according to your valuation”</b> stated with regard to a provisional guilt offering (Leviticus 5:18) and a guilt offering for robbery (Leviticus 5:25).",
            "The Gemara asks: This <b>works out well</b> concerning guilt offerings <b>where it is written “according to your valuation,”</b> but with regard to <b>a guilt offering</b> brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with <b>an espoused maidservant, concerning which</b> it is <b>not written</b> in the Torah <b>“according to your valuation,” what is there to say?</b> How does one derive that the guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant must be worth a minimum of two silver shekels?",
            "The Gemara answers that it is <b>derived</b> from a verbal analogy between the term <b>“with the ram”</b> stated with regard to a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:16) and the term <b>“with the ram”</b> stated with regard to the guilt offering for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant (Leviticus 19:22).",
            "§ The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna. <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>a sin offering requires</b> slaughter in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: <b>As it is written</b> with regard to an individual sin offering: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, <b>and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:29). Just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, so too, a sin offering must also be slaughtered in the north.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We have found</b> from this verse that the <b>slaughter</b> must be in the north. <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>collection</b> of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers: <b>As it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering</b> with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and all its remaining blood he shall pour out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As this verse immediately follows the verse discussing the slaughter of a sin offering, evidently the taking of the blood is performed in the same place as the slaughter.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>the one collecting</b> the blood must <b>himself</b> stand in the north of the Temple courtyard? Perhaps he may stand near the north and extend his arm to collect the blood. The Gemara answers that <b>the verse states: “And</b> the priest <b>shall take [<i>velakaḥ</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 4:34), which can be read, as: <b>He will take himself [<i>lo yikkaḥ</i>].</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We have found</b> that the offering must be slaughtered in the north and the blood collected in the north <b>to</b> perform the <b>mitzva</b> in the optimal manner. <b>From where</b> is it derived that if one slaughters the offering or collects the blood anywhere else the offering is <b>disqualified?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>It is written</b> in <b>another verse</b> which speaks of a goat sin offering brought by a king who sins: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat <b>and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering</b> before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). <b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? In the north. This</b> sin offering of a king must <b>also</b> be slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And do you learn</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from here? But isn’t it already stated:</b> “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: <b>In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered</b> before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, <b>to what</b> purpose <b>was this singled out?</b> Why did the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: <b>To fix a place for it,</b> that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching <b>that if it was not slaughtered in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, the offering is <b>disqualified</b> even after the fact.",
            "The Gemara asks: Do <b>you say</b> that it is <b>singled out for this</b> purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? <b>Or</b> perhaps <b>it is only</b> to teach <b>that this</b> goat sin offering <b>requires</b> slaughter in the <b>north but no other</b> goat sin offering <b>requires</b> slaughter in the <b>north.</b> The Gemara answers: <b>The verse states:</b> “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, <b>and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:29). <b>This established a paradigm for all sin offerings,</b> teaching <b>that they require</b> slaughter in the <b>north.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues its explanation: <b>We have found</b> that the Torah writes with regard to the <b>goat</b> sin offering <b>of a king</b> that it requires slaughter in the north <b>both to</b> perform the <b>mitzva</b> in the optimal manner and <b>to disqualify</b> the offering even after the fact. <b>We have also found</b> with regard to the <b>other sin offerings</b> that the Torah states that <b>to</b> perform the <b>mitzva</b> in the optimal manner they must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard. <b>From where do we</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> <b>to disqualify</b> other sin offerings if they were not slaughtered in the north?",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>As it is written with regard to a lamb</b> sin offering that it must be slaughtered in the north: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:33) <b>and</b> it is also <b>written with regard to a she-goat</b> sin offering: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter it for a sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). This repetition teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if it is not slaughtered in the north.",
            "§ Having derived from these verses that all sin offerings are disqualified if they are slaughtered not in the north, the Gemara questions its earlier explanation. <b>Rather, why do I</b> need the term <b>“it”</b> stated with regard to the sin offering of a king in the verse: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24)?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>It is required for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>It,</b> the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Tabernacle, <b>but</b> the <b>goat</b> offered by <b>Nahshon</b> and the other princes was <b>not</b> slaughtered <b>in the north.</b> Nahshon was the prince of the tribe of Judah. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (Numbers, chapter 7). Although the offerings were classified as sin offerings because they shared some characteristics of sin offerings, they were not brought to atone for any particular sin. Therefore, the term “it” teaches that the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.",
            "<b>And</b> the reason that it is necessary for the Torah to exclude Nahshon’s sin offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north is because <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: <b>“And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat,</b> and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is <b>to include</b> the <b>goat</b> brought as a sin offering by <b>Nahshon in</b> the requirement of <b>placing hands</b> on the head of an offering. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The term “of the goat” serves <b>to include</b> the <b>goats</b> brought as sin offerings for communal <b>idol worship in</b> the requirement of <b>placing hands</b> on the head of an offering.",
            "The Gemara explains: It might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since</b> the sin offerings of the princes <b>are included in</b> the requirement of <b>placing hands, they are also included in</b> the requirement of being slaughtered in the <b>north.</b> Therefore, the term “it” <b>teaches us</b> that for the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon and the other princes there was no requirement of slaughter in the north.",
            "<b>Ravina objects to this</b> interpretation: <b>This works out well according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who says that the offering of Nahshon required him to place his hands on the head of the animal. But <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say?</b> Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Tavi, said to Ravina: And according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda, does it work out well?</b> Why is it necessary for the Torah to specifically exclude the offerings of the princes from the requirement of slaughter in the north? Why not say that <b>for that</b> for <b>which it was included,</b> i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, <b>it was included, and</b> for <b>that which it was not included,</b> i.e., slaughter in the north, <b>it was not included.</b>",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that <b>if the verse had not excluded</b> the offerings of the princes <b>I would say</b> that one could <b>derive</b> the requirement for slaughter in the north <b>via a paradigm</b> from all other sin offerings, <b>if so,</b> one could also <b>derive</b> the requirement for <b>placing hands</b> on the head of an animal <b>itself via</b> the same <b>paradigm. Rather,</b> the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that <b>we do not learn</b> the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was only for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, <b>from</b> the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all <b>generations. So too,</b> the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because <b>we do not learn</b> the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon <b>from</b> the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all <b>generations.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that <b>it</b> must be slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>but the one who slaughters</b> it does <b>not</b> need to stand <b>in the north</b> when he slaughters it.",
            "The Gemara challenges this: The <i>halakha</i> of the one who <b>slaughters</b> the offering has already been <b>derived from</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Aḥiyya says:</b> The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: <b>“And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward</b> before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). <b>Why</b> must <b>the verse state</b> the exclusionary term “it”?",
            "He explains: <b>Since we have found</b> that the priest <b>stands in the north and collects</b> the blood from the neck of the animal <b>in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected</b> the blood <b>in the north</b> the offering is <b>disqualified,</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that this is <b>so also</b> with regard to <b>this</b> one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “And he shall slaughter <b>it,”</b> to teach that <b>it,</b> the animal, must be <b>in the north, but the one who slaughters</b> it is <b>not</b> required to be standing <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. Therefore, the question must be addressed: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Rather,</b> the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that <b>it,</b> a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered <b>in the north, but a young bird</b> brought as an offering does <b>not</b> need to be killed <b>in the north.</b> This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>a male bird requires</b> pinching of the nape in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard. <b>And this</b> can be derived through <b>a logical inference: Just as a young sheep</b> brought as a burnt offering is an offering for <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did not fix</b> that <b>its</b> slaughter must be performed by <b>a priest</b> but nevertheless <b>fixed</b> that <b>its</b> slaughter must be in the <b>north,</b> with regard to <b>a young bird</b> brought as an offering, for <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did fix</b> that <b>its</b> killing must be performed by <b>a priest, is it not logical that</b> the Torah <b>should</b> also <b>fix its</b> slaughter in the <b>north?</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states “it,”</b> to exclude a male bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.",
            "The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a bird offering from the <i>halakha</i> of a sheep offering, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about a young</b> sheep offering? It is notable <b>in that</b> the Torah <b>fixed</b> the requirement that <b>it</b> be slaughtered with <b>a utensil,</b> i.e., a knife. A bird, by contrast, is killed by the priest using his fingernail. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Rather,</b> the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that <b>it,</b> the goat of the king, is slaughtered <b>in the north, but</b> the <b>Paschal offering</b> is <b>not</b> slaughtered <b>in the north.</b>",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>a Paschal offering requires</b> slaughter in the <b>north. And this</b> can be derived through <b>a logical inference: Just as a burnt offering</b> is an offering for <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did not fix a time for its slaughter</b> but <b>fixed</b> that <b>it</b> requires slaughter in the <b>north,</b> with regard to <b>a Paschal offering,</b> for <b>which</b> the Torah <b>fixed a time for its slaughter,</b> as it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, <b>is it not logical that</b> the Torah <b>would fix</b> that <b>it</b> must be slaughtered in the <b>north?</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states “it,”</b> to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.",
            "The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a Paschal offering from the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about a burnt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> the Torah teaches that <b>it is entirely</b> burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.",
            "The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a sin offering,</b> which is not entirely burned upon the altar but is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As <b>what</b> is notable <b>about a sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it atones for</b> those sins that render one <b>liable for</b> punishment by <b><i>karet</i>,</b> which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.",
            "The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a guilt offering,</b> which is not entirely burned, which does not atone for those sins punishable by <i>karet</i>, and which is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As <b>what</b> is notable <b>about a guilt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> it has the status of <b>an offering of the most sacred order,</b> which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for <b>all of</b> the three offerings <b>as well,</b> the <i>halakha</i> of a Paschal offering cannot be derived <b>from them, since</b> they all have the status of <b>offerings of the most sacred order.</b>",
            "The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: <b>Actually,</b> the term “it” teaches <b>as we said initially: It,</b> i.e., the animal, must be standing <b>in the north, but</b> the <b>one who slaughters</b> the animal does <b>not</b> have to stand <b>in the north. And that</b> which is <b>difficult for you,</b> that <b>we derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Aḥiyya,</b> is in fact not difficult. The derivation from the term “it” is <b>not to exclude</b> one who <b>slaughters</b> from the requirement to slaughter <b>in the north,</b> since that <i>halakha</i> is known already from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya. <b>Rather,</b> the derivation is that it is only one who <b>slaughters</b> the animal who does <b>not</b> have to stand <b>in the north, but</b> by inference, the one who <b>collects</b> the blood from the neck of the animal must stand <b>in the north.</b>",
            "The Gemara questions this inference: The <i>halakha</i> that the one who <b>collects</b> the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived <b>from</b> the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest <b>shall take,</b> and instead writes: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall take” [<i>velakaḥ</i>]</b> (Leviticus 4:34), which may be read as: He will take himself [<i>lo yikaḥ</i>], as explained on the previous <i>amud</i>. The Gemara explains: This <i>tanna</i> <b>does not learn</b> anything from this distinction between: The priest <b>shall take,</b> and: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall take.”</b> He does not agree with this derivation, and therefore he must derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the requirement of <b>slaughter</b> in the north <b>with regard to a burnt offering</b> in order <b>to</b> perform the <b>mitzva</b> in the optimal manner. <b>We also found</b> a source for the requirement of <b>collecting</b> the blood while standing in the north in order <b>to</b> perform the <b>mitzva</b> in the optimal manner. <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>slaughter and collection</b> of the blood are <b>disqualified</b> if they are not performed in the north?",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Ahava says, and some say</b> it was <b>Rabba bar Sheila</b> who says: It is derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as</b> the <i>halakha</i> that the slaughter and blood collection of <b>a sin offering</b> be performed in the north <b>comes by virtue of</b> a comparison to the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a burnt offering,</b> as the verse states: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), yet if the animal was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north it <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, with regard to the <b>burnt offering</b> itself, <b>as</b> the <i>halakha</i> that the slaughter and blood collection of <b>a sin offering</b> be in the north <b>comes by virtue of it, is it not logical that</b> if it was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north, this should <b>disqualify</b> the offering?",
            "The Gemara rejects this logical inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it atones for</b> those sins that render one <b>liable for</b> punishment by <b><i>karet</i>,</b> which is not so with regard to a burnt offering.",
            "<b>Ravina said: This</b> is what is <b>difficult for Rav Adda bar Ahava.</b> In other words, regardless of the notable characteristic of a sin offering, he still is of the opinion that his logical inference stands. <b>Have we ever found</b> that <b>a secondary</b> prohibition is more <b>stringent than a primary</b> prohibition? Since the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering is derived via a comparison to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, the former cannot have stringencies that the latter lacks.",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But</b> have we <b>not</b> found a secondary prohibition that is more stringent than the primary one?"
        ],
        [
            "<b>But there is</b> the case of the second <b>tithe, which</b> may be <b>redeemed, whereas</b> food that is <b>purchased with</b> second-<b>tithe</b> redemption <b>money</b> may <b>not</b> be <b>redeemed. As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 10:10): With regard to food <b>that was purchased with</b> second-<b>tithe money</b> and <b>that</b> then <b>became ritually impure,</b> this ritually impure food <b>must be redeemed</b> with money, with which one must purchase other food. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The food <b>must be buried.</b> The Gemara infers from the mishna: If the food purchased with the second-tithe money <b>became impure, yes,</b> it may be redeemed, but if it <b>did not become impure,</b> it may <b>not</b> be redeemed. If so, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the <i>halakha</i> that food purchased with second-tithe money must be buried if it becomes impure is more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> for second-tithe produce itself, which may be redeemed if it becomes impure.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There,</b> the reason one may not redeem food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure is not that the <i>halakha</i> is more stringent. Rather, there is a different reason. Since this food was merely purchased with second-tithe money, its <b>sanctity is not</b> as <b>strong</b> as the tithe itself and is unable <b>to grasp its redemption</b> money. Its status as second tithe is weak, and cannot be transferred to a third item. Consequently, if it becomes impure, according to Rabbi Yehuda it cannot be redeemed for money but must be buried, as an item that one is prohibited to derive benefit from.",
            "Mar Zutra asks: <b>But there is</b> the case of <b>a substitution, as</b> the status of <b>an offering does not take effect with regard to a permanently blemished</b> animal, <b>while</b> consecration performed via substitution does <b>take effect</b> with regard to an animal with a permanent blemish. Although the animal cannot be sacrificed as an offering and must be redeemed, even after its redemption it may not be used for labor and its wool may not be used.",
            "The Gemara answers: The sanctity of <b>a substitution comes by virtue of a consecrated</b> animal; therefore it has a stronger sanctity. <b>But</b> the sanctity of <b>a consecrated</b> animal itself <b>comes by virtue of a non-sacred</b> animal, as there was no consecrated animal by which the owner extended the sanctity to this animal.",
            "Mar Zutra asks: But <b>there is</b> the case of <b>a Paschal offering, as it does not require</b> the <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> on its head, <b>or</b> wine <b>libations</b> to accompany the offering, <b>or waving of</b> the <b>breast and thigh. While its remainder,</b> an animal that was designated as a Paschal offering but was not sacrificed at the right time, which is then sacrificed as a peace offering, has more stringent <i>halakhot</i>, because it <b>requires</b> the <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> on its head, <b>and</b> wine <b>libations</b> to accompany the offering, <b>and waving of</b> the <b>breast and thigh.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>A Paschal offering on the rest of the days of the year is</b> the same as <b>a peace offering,</b> and the animal is no longer considered to be a Paschal offering. Since it is a peace offering, all the <i>halakhot</i> of a peace offering apply to it, and the fact that it was once designated as a Paschal offering is irrelevant. The conclusion of the Gemara is that there are no cases where a secondary status is more stringent than the corresponding primary status. Therefore, the derivation from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, that the latter should be disqualified if it was not slaughtered in the north or if its blood was not collected in the north, remains.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> there is a different proof that even after the fact a burnt offering that was not slaughtered in the north is disqualified. <b>The verse states:</b> “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of <b>the burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:29). Since the earlier verse (Leviticus 4:24) already stated: “In the place of the burnt offering,” the repetition in this verse stresses that <b>it shall be in its place,</b> meaning that the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered anywhere else.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive <b>that a guilt offering,</b> which is an offering of the most sacred order, <b>requires</b> slaughter in the <b>north?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>As it is written: “In the place where they slaughter the burnt offering they shall slaughter the guilt offering,</b> and its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar” (Leviticus 7:2). Since the burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north, the guilt offering must also be slaughtered in the north.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We have found</b> a source that the <b>slaughter</b> must be in the north. <b>From where do we</b> derive that the <b>collection</b> of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers that the second half of the verse states: <b>“And its blood shall be sprinkled</b> around the altar.” Since the blood must be collected immediately after the slaughter and before the sprinkling, just as the slaughter must be in the north, so the <b>collection of its blood</b> must <b>also</b> be <b>in the north.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that the one who <b>collects</b> the blood must <b>himself</b> stand in the north? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not only state: <b>“Its blood</b> shall be sprinkled,” but states: <b>“And its blood</b> shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 7:2). The conjunction “and [<i>ve’et</i>]” serves to include the one who collects the blood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We have found</b> a verse teaching that in order <b>to</b> perform the <b>mitzva</b> in the optimal manner, the slaughtering of the guilt offering is in the north. <b>From where do we</b> derive <b>to disqualify</b> after the fact an offering slaughtered elsewhere, not in the north? The Gemara answers: <b>Another verse is written,</b> referring to a guilt offering, which states: <b>“And he shall slaughter the sheep</b> in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). This teaches that all guilt offerings are disqualified if they are not slaughtered in the north.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But does this</b> verse <b>come to</b> teach <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>? <b>This</b> verse is <b>necessary for that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>a matter that was included in a general</b> category <b>but left to discuss a new matter,</b> i.e., if a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, <b>you may not return it to its general</b> category even for other matters, and this case is understood to have been entirely removed from the general category, <b>until the verse explicitly returns it to its general</b> category.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>How so?</b> The verse states: <b>“And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering;</b> to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). <b>As</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,”</b> since the verse had already equated the guilt offering with the sin offering, <b>why</b> does the <b>verse state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”?</b> What does it serve to teach?",
            "<b>Since the guilt offering of a leper left</b> the general category of guilt offerings <b>to teach a new matter,</b> as there is a <i>halakha</i> unique to the guilt offering of a leper in that blood of the offering is placed <b>on</b> the right <b>thumb of the hand and</b> the right <b>big toe of the foot and</b> the <b>right ear</b> of the leper, one <b>might</b> have thought that this guilt offering <b>does not require placement of blood or</b> the burning of <b>sacrificial portions on the altar,</b> as the <i>halakhot</i> of this guilt offering are unique.",
            "To counter this reasoning, <b>the verse states: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering.” Just as the sin offering requires the placement of the blood and</b> the burning of <b>sacrificial portions on the altar, so too, the guilt offering of a leper requires placement of the blood and</b> the burning of <b>sacrificial portions on</b> the <b>altar.</b> Similarly, just as the verse had to teach these two <i>halakhot</i>, so too, the verse had to state: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering,” to teach that it requires slaughter in the north. It cannot serve as a source for the general <i>halakha</i> that a guilt offering slaughtered in a place other than in the north is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>If so,</b> that the optimal manner to perform the mitzva is to slaughter a guilt offering in the north but failure to do so does not disqualify the offering, <b>let</b> the Torah <b>write</b> the requirement to slaughter in the north <b>in this</b> context, i.e., in the context of the guilt offering of a leper, <b>and not write it in that</b> context, i.e., that of the standard guilt offering. The requirement for slaughter in the north for all other guilt offerings could be derived from the guilt offering of the leper. The repetition of the requirement to slaughter in the north serves to disqualify a guilt offering whose slaughter is not in the north.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>This works out well if we hold</b> that with regard to a matter that <b>left</b> its category <b>to teach a new matter,</b> the following principle applies: That matter itself <b>does not learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>from its general</b> category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>but</b> other matters in <b>its general</b> category <b>learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>from it;</b> in this case <b>with regard to</b> the <i>halakha</i> of slaughtering a guilt offering in the <b>north,</b> it is <b>well.</b> Although some of the <i>halakhot</i> of the guilt offering of a leper do not apply to the category of guilt offerings in general, it can still serve as the source for the <i>halakha</i> that any guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not in the north. <b>But if we hold that</b> in the case of a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, <b>it,</b> the original matter, <b>does not learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>from its general</b> category <b>and its general</b> category <b>does not learn</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>from it,</b> then <b>this</b> verse <b>is necessary to</b> teach <b>its own</b> <i>halakha</i>.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Once</b> the verse <b>returned</b> the <i>halakha</i> of the guilt offering of a leper to the general category by stating “as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” <b>it returned it</b> completely. Therefore, when the verse states that it requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard, the phrase is not needed to teach the <i>halakha</i> about the guilt offering of a leper, and it can be used to teach the <i>halakha</i> about guilt offerings in general.",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Say</b> that <b>when the verse returned</b> the guilt offering of a leper to the class of standard guilt offerings, that is only <b>with regard to placement of blood</b> on the altar <b>and</b> burning the <b>sacrificial portions, which require priesthood,</b> i.e., only a priest may perform those rites. As the verse states: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest” (Leviticus 14:13). <b>But</b> say that <b>slaughter, which does not require priesthood,</b> as even a non-priest may slaughter an offering, <b>does not require</b> that it be done in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard.",
            "Ravina answered him: <b>If so, let the verse state: For as the sin offering, so is it. What</b> is added by the expanded phrase: “For <b>as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”?</b> It teaches that the guilt offering of a leper <b>will be like the rest of</b> the <b>guilt offerings.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need <b>to juxtapose</b> the guilt offering of a leper <b>to a sin offering</b> to teach the <i>halakha</i> that it must be slaughtered in the north, and <b>why do I</b> need <b>to juxtapose</b> it <b>to a burnt offering</b> to teach the same <i>halakha</i>? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 14:13).",
            "<b>Ravina said:</b> It <b>was necessary</b> to juxtapose the guilt offering to both of them, as, <b>if</b> the verse <b>had juxtaposed it</b> only <b>to a sin offering but had not juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, I would say: From where</b> is the requirement to slaughter <b>a sin offering</b> in the north <b>derived?</b> It is <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a burnt offering,</b> as explained on 48a. I would then assume that <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition,</b> i.e., the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering, which was derived via a juxtaposition to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, <b>then teaches</b> that <i>halakha</i> to another case <b>via a juxtaposition.</b> But there is a principle that with regard to matters of consecration the <i>halakha</i> may not be derived via a juxtaposition from another <i>halakha</i> that was itself derived via a juxtaposition. To prevent this incorrect assumption, the verse had to specifically teach the juxtaposition to a burnt offering.",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But let</b> the verse <b>juxtapose</b> the guilt offering of a leper only <b>to a burnt offering and not juxtapose it to a sin offering.</b> The juxtaposition to a sin offering appears superfluous.",
            "Ravina answered: If that had been so, <b>I would</b> still <b>say</b> that <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition. And if you would say</b> that if that were to be so, <b>let</b> the verse <b>juxtapose</b> the guilt offering of a leper only <b>to a sin offering,</b> one could answer that <b>it is preferable for</b> the Torah <b>that it juxtaposes</b> the guilt offering <b>to the primary</b> offering about which it states that it must be slaughtered in the north, i.e., the burnt offering, <b>and not juxtapose it to the secondary</b> offering, the sin offering. <b>For this</b> reason, i.e., to prevent the incorrect assumption that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, the verse <b>juxtaposed it to a sin offering and</b> also <b>juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, to say</b> that <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition does not then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says:</b> The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition is derived <b>from here, as it is written</b> with regard to the sin offering brought by the High Priest: “And the two kidneys, and the fat that is upon them, which is by the loins, and the diaphragm with the liver, which he shall take away by the kidneys. <b>As it is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings;</b> and the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:9–10). One can ask: <b>For what <i>halakha</i></b> is this offering juxtaposed to that of a peace offering? <b>If</b> it is <b>to</b> teach that the priest must sacrifice <b>the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys</b> from the offering, that is <b>written with regard to</b> the offering <b>itself,</b> in the previous verse. This does not need to be derived via a juxtaposition.",
            "It is written <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> the verse <b>wants to teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys,</b> deriving it <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of the offering of <b>the bull for an unwitting communal sin,</b> then teaching it <b>to</b> apply it to the <i>halakha</i> of the <b>goats</b> brought as sin offerings for communal <b>idol worship. It is not written</b> explicitly <b>in</b> the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin <b>itself, and it is derived from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the bull for</b> an unwitting sin of <b>an anointed priest,</b> i.e., the High Priest. The offering for an unwitting communal sin is juxtaposed to the sin offering brought by the High Priest in the verse: “So shall he do with the bull; as he did with the bull of the sin offering, so shall he do with this” (Leviticus 4:20).",
            "<b>For this</b> reason it <b>was necessary</b> for the verse to state: <b>“As it is taken off</b> from the ox” (Leviticus 4:10), so <b>that it is as though it wrote</b> explicitly <b>in</b> the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin <b>itself.</b> One of the hermeneutical principles applied to understanding verses in the Torah is: If the <i>halakha</i> stated is not required for the matter in which it is written, apply it to another matter. When this principle is employed, the <i>halakha</i> written in one context is viewed as if it were written elsewhere. In this case, as it was not necessary for the verse to write the juxtaposition to a peace offering in the context of the sin offering brought by the High Priest, it is applied to the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. <b>And</b> therefore it <b>will not be</b> a case of <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition</b> that <b>then teaches</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said to Rava: But</b> why not <b>let</b> the Torah <b>write</b> explicitly <b>in</b> the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin <b>itself</b> that the diaphragm with the liver and two kidneys must be removed from the ox, <b>and not juxtapose</b> it to a peace offering in this convoluted manner?",
            "Rava answered: <b>If</b> the Torah <b>had written</b> it <b>in</b> that passage <b>itself, and not juxtaposed</b> it, <b>I would say</b> that in general <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches via a juxtaposition,</b> as one would not have this instance to serve as a counterexample to that principle. <b>And if you would say:</b> If so, why not simply <b>juxtapose</b> the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin to the case of the bull of the anointed priest, I would answer: <b>It is preferable for</b> the verse <b>that it writes it in</b> the passage <b>itself</b> rather <b>than to juxtapose it</b> alone. It is <b>for this</b> reason that <b>it wrote it and juxtaposed it, to say</b> that <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition.</b>",
            "§ Before beginning a lengthy discussion concerning derivations via compounded methodologies of the hermeneutical principles, the Gemara presents <b>a mnemonic</b> for its forthcoming discussion: <b>Juxtaposition, verbal analogy, an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference.",
            "The principle that <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition</b> is indicated <b>either from</b> the proof <b>of Rava or from</b> the proof <b>of Ravina,</b> both cited earlier. The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition can</b> then <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a verbal analogy?</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Natan ben Avtolemos says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that</b> if leprosy <b>of garments spreads</b> throughout an entire garment <b>that it is pure?</b> It is derived via a verbal analogy: <b>A bareness within [<i>karaḥat</i>] and a bareness without [<i>gabbaḥat</i>]</b> are <b>stated with regard to</b> leprosy of <b>garments:</b> “And the priest shall look, after that the mark is washed; and behold, if the mark has not changed its color, and the mark has not spread, it is impure; you shall burn it in the fire; it is a fret, whether the bareness be within or without” (Leviticus 13:55); <b>and a bald head [<i>karaḥat</i>] and a bald forehead [<i>gabbaḥat</i>]</b> are <b>stated with regard to</b> leprosy of <b>a person:</b> “But if there be in the bald head, or the bald forehead, a reddish-white plague, it is leprosy breaking out in his bald head, or his bald forehead” (Leviticus 13:42).",
            "<b>Just as there,</b> with regard to a person, if the leprosy <b>spread throughout him</b> entirely he is <b>pure,</b> as the verse states: “Then the priest shall look; and behold, if the leprosy has covered all of his flesh, he shall pronounce the one who has the mark pure; it is all turned white: He is pure” (Leviticus 13:13), <b>so too here</b> with regard to garments, if the leprosy <b>spread throughout the entire</b> garment it is <b>pure.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues its proof: <b>But there,</b> with regard to the head, which serves as the source for this verbal analogy, <b>from where do we</b> derive that if the leprosy spreads throughout the head he is pure? <b>As it is written:</b> “And if the leprosy breaks out on the skin, and the leprosy covers all the skin of the one who has the mark, <b>from his head to his feet,</b> as far as it appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12). <b>And</b> the verse thereby <b>juxtaposes</b> leprosy on <b>his head to</b> leprosy on his <b>foot,</b> teaching the following <i>halakha</i>: <b>Just as there,</b> with regard to leprosy of the body and foot, if <b>its entirety turned white,</b> and it <b>spread all over him,</b> he is <b>pure, so too here,</b> in the case of leprosy of the head, if <b>its entirety turned white and it spread over all his</b> head, he is <b>pure.</b> Evidently, a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> This cannot serve as a proof with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of consecrated matters. <b>With regard to the entire Torah,</b> one <b>derives</b> a <i>halakha</i> <b>derived</b> via a verbal analogy <b>from</b> a <i>halakha</i> <b>derived</b> via a juxtaposition, <b>apart from</b> with regard to <b>consecrated</b> matters, <b>where</b> one <b>does not derive</b> a <i>halakha</i> <b>derived</b> via a verbal analogy <b>from</b> a <i>halakha</i> <b>derived</b> via a juxtaposition.",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: <b>As if</b> it were to be <b>so</b> that one could derive a <i>halakha</i> in this manner even concerning consecrated matters, the verse <b>should not state</b> the requirement for slaughter in the <b>north with regard to a guilt offering,</b> as stated from the explicit juxtaposition of a burnt offering and a sin offering, <b>and</b> instead <b>derive it through a verbal analogy.</b> The verse describes a guilt offering <b>as an offering of the most sacred order</b> (see Leviticus 7:1), and its <i>halakha</i> can be derived via a verbal analogy <b>from</b> that of <b>a sin offering,</b> which is described in the same manner (see Leviticus 6:18).",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: Is this <b>not to say,</b> at least with regard to consecrated matters, <b>that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a verbal analogy?</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects Rabbi Yoḥanan’s proof: <b>But perhaps</b> the requirement to slaughter a guilt offering in the north must be written explicitly <b>because</b> the verbal analogy <b>can be refuted</b> as follows: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it atones for</b> those sins <b>liable for</b> punishment by <b><i>karet</i>,</b> which is not so with regard to a guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara rejects this claim: There are <b>additional</b> descriptions of a guilt offering and a sin offering as <b>offerings of the most sacred order written</b> in the verses: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, reserved from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may offer to Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). A verbal analogy derived from extra phrases in the verse cannot be refuted with a logical claim. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s claim stands, and, at least with regard to consecrated matters, a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy.",
            "The Gemara states: That <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference"
        ],
        [
            "is apparent <b>from that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught,</b> discussed in the previous chapter (41a).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> in another context <b>via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says:</b> It must be that it cannot, as, if it could, <b>let</b> the Torah <b>not write</b> the requirement to slaughter an offering in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>with regard to a guilt offering</b> (see Leviticus 14:13), <b>and</b> one can <b>derive</b> it <b>via a paradigm from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a sin offering,</b> since they are both offerings of the most sacred order. <b>For what <i>halakha</i> did</b> the verse <b>write it</b> with regard to a guilt offering as well? Is this <b>not to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> in another context <b>via a paradigm?</b>",
            "The Gemara questions this proof: <b>But according to your reasoning,</b> why not <b>derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> that a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a burnt offering, via a paradigm? What is the reason</b> that this <i>halakha</i> <b>is not derived</b> from there? It must be <b>because it can be refuted</b> with the following claim: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a burnt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> the Torah teaches that <b>it is entirely</b> burned on the altar, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering. The Gemara now states its objection: In that case, the derivation from <b>a sin offering</b> via a paradigm <b>can also be refuted: What</b> is notable <b>about a sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it atones for</b> those sins <b>liable for</b> punishment by <b><i>karet</i>,</b> which is not so with regard to a guilt offering. If so, there is no proof from here.",
            "The Gemara suggests an alternative paradigm: Although the requirement to slaughter <b>one</b> of these three offerings, i.e., a burnt offering, sin offering, or guilt offering, in the north <b>cannot be derived from</b> any <b>one</b> of the others, one can <b>derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>one</b> of them <b>from</b> the other <b>two.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>From which</b> two could one <b>derive</b> the third? <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> the requirement to slaughter the offering in the north with regard to <b>a burnt offering, and derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering and a guilt offering.</b> The Gemara refutes this derivation: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> two offerings? They are notable <b>in that they atone</b> for transgressions, whereas a burnt offering does not atone for any sin.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> the requirement to slaughter an offering in the north <b>with regard to a sin offering, and derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>these</b> others, the burnt offering and the guilt offering. The Gemara refutes this derivation: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> two offerings? They are notable <b>in that</b> they are brought only from <b>male</b> animals, whereas an individual’s sin offering is a female animal.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let the Merciful One not write</b> the requirement to slaughter an offering in the north <b>with regard to a guilt offering, and derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>these</b> other two. The Gemara refutes this derivation: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about these</b> two offerings? They are notable <b>in that they are</b> brought <b>by a community just as</b> they are brought <b>by an individual,</b> whereas a guilt offering can be brought only by an individual.",
            "The Gemara returns to its discussion of hermeneutical principles. <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via a verbal analogy</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a juxtaposition? Rav Pappa says:</b> The verse states: <b>“And this is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings,</b> which one may offer to the Lord. <b>If</b> he sacrifices it <b>for a thanks offering,</b> then he shall offer with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour soaked” (Leviticus 7:11–12). From this juxtaposition <b>we have learned that</b> the money to purchase <b>a thanks offering</b> can <b>come from</b> money used to redeem <b>the</b> second <b>tithe, since we find that</b> the money to purchase <b>a peace offering</b> can <b>come from</b> money used to redeem the second <b>tithe.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that the money to purchase <b>peace offerings themselves</b> can come from money used to redeem the second tithe? <b>As it is written</b> with regard to peace offerings: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and shall eat <b>there”</b> (Deuteronomy 27:7). And it is written with regard to second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to cause His name to dwell <b>there”</b> (Deuteronomy 14:23). The usage of the term “there” in both passages serves as a verbal analogy, and demonstrates that a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy, that of a peace offering, can then teach a <i>halakha</i> via its juxtaposition to a thanks offering.",
            "<b>Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:</b> This is not a proof, because the <b>tithe of grain,</b> including the second tithe, <b>is merely non-sacred.</b> Therefore, it cannot be used to prove that in the realm of consecrated matters a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy can teach a <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.",
            "Ravina <b>said to him:</b> Does the one who <b>said</b> that in the realm of consecrated matters a <i>halakha</i> derived via one of the hermeneutical principles cannot teach via another of those principles <b>say this</b> only when the <i>halakha</i> that is <b>derived</b> is in the realm of <b>consecrated</b> matters <b>and</b> the <i>halakha</i> that <b>teaches</b> is in the realm of <b>consecrated</b> matters as well? He holds that even if that which is derived is in the realm of consecrated matters it cannot teach its <i>halakha</i> via one of the hermeneutical principles. Therefore, since peace offerings are in the realm of consecrated matters, the <i>halakha</i> derived from the juxtaposition of thanks offerings to peace offerings serves as a source that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a juxtaposition.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via a verbal analogy</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via</b> another <b>verbal analogy? Rami bar Ḥama says: It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the types of bread that accompany a thanks offering: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened loaves mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and loaves mingled with oil, of <b>fine flour cooked</b> with oil” (Leviticus 7:12). <b>We have derived</b> from here <b>that</b> the <b>poached</b> breads accompanying the thanks offering <b>come from fine flour.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>From where</b> is it derived that the <b>loaves</b> accompanying a thanks offering are also prepared with fine flour? <b>The verse states: “Loaves</b> mingled with oil, of fine flour cooked with oil” (Leviticus 7:12), and it also states in the same verse: “Unleavened <b>loaves</b> mingled with oil.” <b>From where</b> is it derived that the unleavened <b>wafers</b> accompanying a thanks offering are also prepared with fine flour? <b>The verse states: “Unleavened</b> cakes mingled with oil” (Leviticus 7:12), and the verse also states: <b>“Unleavened</b> wafers spread with oil.” The <i>baraita</i> derives via a verbal analogy that the unleavened loaves mingled with oil are prepared with fine flour, and then teaches the <i>halakha</i> concerning unleavened wafers using a verbal analogy from the <i>halakha</i> of unleavened loaves.",
            "<b>Ravina said to</b> Rami bar Ḥama: <b>From where</b> do you know <b>that</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>learns</b> the verbal analogy of <b>“unleavened”</b> and <b>“unleavened” from loaves</b> of the thanks offering? <b>Perhaps</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>learns</b> the verbal analogy <b>from</b> the word “unleavened” stated with regard to meal offerings <b>baked in an oven,</b> about which the verse states explicitly that they are prepared with fine flour: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in the oven, it shall be unleavened cakes of fine flour mingled with oil, or unleavened wafers spread with oil” (Leviticus 2:4). If so, there is no source that a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy can teach a <i>halakha</i> via a verbal analogy.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says</b> that the source is from a different <i>baraita</i>, as <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the bull offering of a High Priest: “And the skin of the bull and all its flesh, with its head and with its legs, <b>and its innards, and its dung,</b> the whole bull <b>shall he carry out</b> of the camp to a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it on wood with fire” (Leviticus 4:11–12). This <b>teaches that he brings</b> the offering <b>out whole.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that he should burn it whole</b> as well. <b>It is stated here: “Its head and its legs,” and it is stated there,</b> with regard to a burnt offering: “And he shall cut it into its pieces; and the priest shall lay them, with <b>its head</b> and its fats, in order on the wood that is on the fire which is upon the altar. But the innards <b>and the legs</b> shall he wash with water” (Leviticus 1:12–13). <b>Just as there,</b> the burnt offering is burned <b>by means of cutting</b> the offering into pieces, as explicitly stated in the verse, <b>so too here,</b> it is burned <b>by means of cutting</b> the offering into pieces.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>If</b> these are compared, one could say that <b>just as there,</b> the burnt offering is prepared for being burned <b>by</b> first <b>flaying</b> it, <b>so too here,</b> the bull offering of a High Priest should <b>also</b> be prepared for being burned <b>by</b> first <b>flaying</b> it. To counter this reasoning, <b>the verse states: “And its innards and its dung”</b> (Leviticus 4:11). The Gemara asks: <b>What is the</b> biblical <b>derivation?</b> How do these words teach that there is no requirement to flay the animal? <b>Rav Pappa says: Just as the dung</b> remains <b>inside</b> the animal when the animal is burned, <b>so</b> the animal’s <b>flesh</b> remains <b>inside its skin.</b> In any event, the <i>halakha</i> that the bull offering of a High Priest is cut into pieces before it is burned is derived via a verbal analogy.",
            "Rava continues: <b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> It <b>is stated here,</b> with regard to the bull and goat offered by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, the terms <b>skin, flesh, and dung,</b> in the verse: “And the bull of the sin offering, and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to make atonement in the Sanctuary, shall be carried out of the camp; and they shall burn in the fire their skin, and their flesh, and their dung” (Leviticus 16:27)."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And it is stated below,</b> with regard to the bull sin offerings that are burned, the terms <b>skin, flesh, and dung,</b> in the verse: “But the skin of the bull, and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). <b>Just as below</b> it is prepared for burning <b>by means of cutting</b> it into pieces but <b>not by means of flaying,</b> as derived by the verbal analogy, <b>so too here</b> it is prepared for burning <b>by means of cutting</b> it into pieces but <b>not by means of flaying.</b> Evidently, a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy can then teach another <i>halakha</i> via a verbal analogy.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via a verbal analogy</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference? The Gemara answers: That question itself can be answered with <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> a matter derived via <b>a juxtaposition, which cannot</b> then <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>either from</b> the statement <b>of Rava or from</b> the statement <b>of Ravina</b> (49b), can nevertheless <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), with regard to a matter derived via <b>a verbal analogy, which</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rav Pappa</b> (50a), <b>is it not logical that it should teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference?",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>This works out well according to the one who accepts</b> the statement <b>of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept</b> the statement <b>of Rav Pappa,</b> i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, <b>what is there to say?</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> this can be derived through a different <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> a matter derived via <b>a juxtaposition, which cannot</b> then <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>either from</b> the statement <b>of Rava or from</b> the statement <b>of Ravina</b> (49b), can nevertheless <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), with regard to a matter derived via <b>a verbal analogy, which</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via another verbal analogy,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rami bar Ḥama</b> (50a), <b>is it not logical that it should teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference?",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via a verbal analogy</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a paradigm?</b> The question <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a juxtaposition?</b> The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> (49b), can nevertheless <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rav Pappa</b> (50a), with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, which <b>can be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), <b>is it not logical that it should teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition?</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>This works out well according to the one who accepts</b> the statement <b>of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept</b> the statement <b>of Rav Pappa,</b> i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, <b>what is there to say?</b> The Gemara comments: The question <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a verbal analogy?</b> The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. <b>And just as</b> a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> (49b), can nevertheless <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a verbal analogy,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rami bar Ḥama</b> (50a), with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, which <b>can be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), <b>is it not logical that it should teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a verbal analogy?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. <b>And just as</b> a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> (49b), can nevertheless <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, <b>as we have said,</b> with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, which <b>can be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), <b>is it not logical that it should teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference?",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>And this is an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference that is the <b>son of,</b> i.e., is derived from, another <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. The Gemara challenges this last statement: <b>It is</b> not the son of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, but the <b>grandson of an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, which cannot be used. The very fact that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can then teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is itself derived from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the Gemara stated.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be derived via another <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. <b>And just as</b> a matter derived via <b>a juxtaposition, which cannot be derived via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>either from</b> the statement <b>of Rava or from</b> the statement <b>of Ravina</b> (49b), can nevertheless <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, which <b>can be derived</b> from another <i>halakha</i> derived <b>via a juxtaposition,</b> as proven <b>from</b> the statement <b>that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> (50a), <b>is it not logical that it should teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference? The Gemara comments: <b>And this is an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference that is the <b>son of</b> another <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a mishna (69a–b): If a priest <b>pinched</b> the nape of a bird offering properly <b>and it was</b> then <b>found</b> to be a bird <b>with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>],</b> which disqualifies it from being used as an offering and renders it prohibited for consumption by the priests, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> An olive-bulk of its meat <b>does not render</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning a bird carcass, as the fact that it underwent pinching means that it is not in the category of a carcass. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Its status is like that of any other carcass of a kosher bird, and its meat <b>renders</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "The mishna continues: <b>Rabbi Meir said:</b> My opinion can be proved via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. <b>And just as</b> with regard to <b>the carcass of an animal, which transmits impurity</b> to a person <b>through touching</b> it <b>and carrying</b> it, <b>its slaughter</b> nevertheless <b>purifies its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity,</b> with regard to <b>the carcass of a bird,</b> which possesses less severe impurity, <b>as it does not transmit impurity through touching</b> it <b>and carrying</b> it, but only when it is in the throat, <b>is it not logical that its slaughter purifies its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity?</b> And once it is established that slaughter purifies a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i>, it can be derived: <b>Just as we found with regard to</b> a bird’s <b>slaughter that it permits it for consumption</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> it <b>purifies its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity, so too</b> its <b>pinching, which permits</b> bird offerings <b>with regard to consumption, should purify its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> Although one can derive from the case of an animal that slaughter purifies the <i>tereifa</i> of a bird from its impurity, that derivation cannot be extended to pinching. The same restriction that applies to every <i>a fortiori</i> inference, namely, that a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived, applies here: <b>It is sufficient</b> for the halakhic status of the carcass of a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> to be <b>like</b> that of <b>the carcass of an animal</b> of <b>a kosher</b> species that is a <i>tereifa</i>; i.e., <b>that</b> only <b>its slaughter purifies it, but not its pinching.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>And</b> that <b>is not so. Let it remain there,</b> i.e., one cannot learn from it, as that is a case that <b>comes from the slaughter of non-sacred</b> animals. The <i>halakha</i> of the pinching of a consecrated bird is derived through a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of the slaughter of a non-sacred bird, and the <i>halakha</i> of the slaughter of a non-sacred bird is derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of the slaughter of a non-sacred animal. Outside of the realm of consecrated matters there is no question that a matter derived via one of the hermeneutical principles can then teach its <i>halakha</i> via another principle. The entire question under discussion is only with regard to the realm of consecrated matters.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>a matter derived via a paradigm</b> can <b>teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> to another matter <b>via a juxtaposition or via a verbal analogy or via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>or via a paradigm?</b>",
            "The Gemara states: <b>Resolve at least one</b> of those questions. The Gemara cites a lengthy <i>baraita</i> before stating the resolution inferred from that <i>baraita</i>. <b>For what</b> reason <b>did</b> the Sages <b>say</b> that <b>in</b> the case of <b>blood left overnight</b> it is <b>fit,</b> i.e., if blood of an offering had been left overnight and was then placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is <b>as</b> it is <b>in</b> the case of <b>sacrificial portions,</b> where if they are <b>left overnight</b> they are <b>fit.</b> From where is it derived that <b>in</b> the case of <b>sacrificial portions</b> which are <b>left overnight,</b> they are <b>fit?</b> This is <b>as</b> it is <b>in</b> the case of <b>meat,</b> where if it is <b>left overnight</b> it is <b>fit,</b> because the meat of a peace offering may be eaten for two days and one night.",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering that has <b>left</b> the Temple courtyard is then placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, <b>since</b> an offering that <b>leaves</b> its area is <b>fit in</b> the case of an offering brought on a private <b>altar.</b>",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering that has become <b>ritually impure</b> is placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, <b>since</b> one is <b>permitted</b> to offer an impure offering <b>in</b> the case of <b>communal rites,</b> i.e., communal offerings. In cases of necessity, the communal offerings may be sacrificed even if they are ritually impure.",
            "From where is it derived that in the case of an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time [<i>piggul</i>],</b> if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? The <i>halakha</i> applies there <b>since</b> the sprinkling of its blood <b>effects acceptance</b> of the offering notwithstanding <b>its</b> status of <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> The status of <i>piggul</i> takes effect only if the sacrificial rites involving that offering were otherwise performed properly. This indicates that it still has the status of an offering, so it need not be removed from the altar.",
            "From where is it derived that in the case of an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, <b>since</b> it is <b>juxtaposed to</b> an offering that was slaughtered with intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time.</b>",
            "From where is it derived that in the case of an offering for <b>which</b> priests who are <b>disqualified collected and sprinkled its blood,</b> if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>these</b> priests who are generally <b>disqualified</b> because they are impure, yet <b>who are fit to</b> perform the <b>communal rites,</b> i.e., to sacrifice communal offerings, when all the priests or the majority of the Jewish people are impure. In any event, the <i>halakha</i> of the sacrificial portions was derived via a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of meat that was left overnight, and then the <i>halakha</i> of blood was derived via a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of the sacrificial portions. Evidently, a matter derived via a paradigm can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a paradigm.",
            "The Gemara questions the derivations of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>But can one deduce</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a matter that is not fit,</b> i.e., sacrificial portions that are disqualified due to having been left overnight, <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a matter that is fit,</b> i.e., the peace offering, which is permitted to be eaten for two days and one night? Similarly, how can the <i>baraita</i> derive the <i>halakha</i> of meat that was removed from the Temple courtyard from the <i>halakha</i> of a private altar, which has no sacred area surrounding it?",
            "The Gemara answers: The <b><i>tanna</i> relied on</b> the verse: “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: <b>This is the law of the burnt offering:</b> It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night until the morning; and the fire of the altar shall thereby be kept burning” (Leviticus 6:2), which <b>amplified</b> it, teaching that many types of disqualified offerings may be left upon the altar. The derivations written in the <i>baraita</i> are mere supports for those <i>halakhot</i>.",
            "§ The mishna teaches with regard to the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary: As to <b>the remainder of the blood</b> which is left after the sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> that it must be poured on the western base? The Gemara answers: <b>The verse states</b> with regard to the bull offering of the High Priest: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting; and all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out <b>at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 4:7). This means that he must pour it on <b>that</b> base <b>which he encounters first</b> when he leaves the Tent of Meeting, which is the western base.",
            "<b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: There are three verses that contain the same phrase. With regard to pouring the remainder of the blood of a bull offering of the High Priest, the verse states: “All the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out <b>at the base of the altar of burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:7). This teaches that it must be on the base of the external altar, <b>but not</b> on <b>the base of the inner altar,</b> where he had sprinkled the blood.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin the verse states: “And he shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar which is before the Lord, that is in the Tent of Meeting, and all the remaining blood shall he pour out <b>at the base of the altar of burnt offering,</b> which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). This teaches that the <b>inner altar itself has no base</b> at all.",
            "Finally, the verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out <b>at the base of the altar of the burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:25). This teaches that you must <b>give a base to the altar of</b> the <b>burnt offering,</b> i.e., that the remainder of any blood placed on the altar must be poured on the base.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Or</b> perhaps it <b>is not</b> so, but <b>rather</b> the verse serves to teach that any sprinkling of blood on the corners of the <b>altar of</b> the <b>burnt offering will be</b> done on a part of the altar where there is <b>a base. Rabbi Yishmael said:</b> There is no need for the verse to teach that <i>halakha</i>, because it can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood, <b>which does not effect atonement, requires</b> pouring on the <b>base</b> of the altar, with regard to <b>the initial</b> sprinkling of the blood <b>of a burnt offering, which effects atonement, is it not logical that it requires</b> a part of the altar where there is <b>a base?</b>",
            "Similarly, <b>Rabbi Akiva said: Just as</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood, <b>which does not effect atonement and does not come for atonement,</b> nevertheless <b>requires</b> pouring on the <b>base</b> of the altar, with regard to <b>the initial</b> sprinkling of the blood <b>of a burnt offering, which effects atonement and comes for atonement, is it not logical that it requires</b> a part of the altar where there is <b>a base?</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> concludes: <b>If so, why</b> must <b>the verse state: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:25)? It is to teach that you must <b>give a base to the altar of</b> the <b>burnt offering,</b> i.e., that the remainder of the blood of the offering must be poured on the base.",
            "The Gemara discusses this <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master says:</b> The verse states: <b>“At the base of the altar</b> of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). This teaches that it must be on the base of the external altar, <b>but not the base of the inner altar.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>Isn’t that necessary for the matter itself,</b> to teach that the remainder of the blood must be poured onto the base of the external altar? The Gemara answers: That <i>halakha</i> is <b>derived from: “Which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 4:18), referring to the external altar. Therefore, the verse mentions the altar of burnt offering to exclude the base of the inner altar.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> teaches with regard to the sin offering of a king: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out <b>at the base of the altar of burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:25)."
        ],
        [
            "This teaches that you must <b>give a base to the altar of</b> the <b>burnt offering,</b> i.e., that the remainder of any blood placed on the altar must be poured on the base.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Because if it enters your mind</b> that the verse states this simply to teach <b>as it is written,</b> concerning this offering alone, <b>why do I</b> need <b>these verses</b> with regard to the sin offering of a king? If you would answer: The verses are needed <b>to</b> teach the <i>halakha</i> that the <b>remainder</b> of the blood must be poured on the external altar rather than on the inner altar, then the question remains: Is there any need for the Torah to teach this about the <b>remainder? But</b> the sprinklings of blood themselves are <b>performed</b> on the <b>external</b> altar, so why would one think that the remainder of the blood should be poured on the inner altar?",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that one might mistakenly say <b>that</b> the priest <b>reverses</b> the sprinklings,"
        ],
        [
            "such that with regard to an offering for <b>which</b> he sprinkles the blood on the <b>external</b> altar he should pour the remainder of the blood <b>on</b> the <b>inner</b> altar, <b>and</b> this is analogous to the <i>halakha</i> that he pours the remainder <b>of</b> the blood sprinkled on the <b>inner</b> altar <b>on</b> the base of the <b>external</b> altar, this is not possible. <b>But the inner</b> altar <b>itself does not have a base,</b> and therefore it is not possible to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the inner altar. Therefore, the verse must teach that the remainder of the blood of the burnt offering is poured on the base of the external altar.",
            "The Gemara analyzes the next clause of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>Or</b> perhaps it <b>is not</b> so, but <b>rather</b> the verse serves to teach that any sprinkling of blood on the corners of the <b>altar of</b> the <b>burnt offering will be</b> done on a part of the altar where there is <b>a base.</b> The Gemara asks: How can the verse mean that? <b>Is it written: At the base of the burnt offering?</b> This would indicate that the blood of the burnt offering must be placed where there is a base. <b>It is written</b> in the verse: <b>“At the base of the altar of burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:25).",
            "The Gemara answers: Even if the verse were to be speaking about sprinkling the blood of the burnt offering and is not referring to pouring the remainder of the blood, the term “altar of” is necessary, because <b>if it were written: At the base of the burnt offering, I would say</b> that the priest must sprinkle the blood <b>on the upright</b> wall <b>of the base</b> of the altar, i.e., the side of the base, rather than on the upper surface of the base. <b>Now that it is written: “At the base of the altar of the burnt offering,”</b> it means that the blood must be sprinkled <b>on the upper surface of the base.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the next clause of the <i>baraita</i> based on this understanding: <b>Rabbi Yishmael said: Why do I</b> need <b>a verse</b> to teach that the blood must be sprinkled on the <b>upper surface of</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar? <b>It</b> can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as the remainder</b> of the blood <b>of a sin offering, which does not effect atonement,</b> nevertheless <b>requires</b> that it must be poured on the <b>upper surface of</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar, with regard to <b>the initial</b> sprinkling of the blood <b>of a burnt offering, which effects atonement, is it not logical that it requires</b> the <b>upper surface of</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar?",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva</b> explained similarly and <b>said: And just as the remainder</b> of the blood <b>of a sin offering, which does not effect atonement and does not come for atonement,</b> nevertheless <b>requires</b> that it must be poured on the <b>upper surface of</b> the <b>base,</b> with regard to <b>the initial</b> sprinkling of the blood <b>of a burnt offering, which effects atonement and comes for atonement, is it not logical that it requires</b> the <b>upper surface of</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar? The <i>baraita</i> concludes: <b>If so, why</b> must <b>the verse state: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:25)? It is to teach that you must <b>give a base to the altar of</b> the <b>burnt offering,</b> i.e., that the remainder of any blood sprinkled on the altar must be poured on the base.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the difference <b>between</b> the explanations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva? <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava says:</b> The difference <b>between them</b> is whether failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, so that all the sprinklings must be done again. One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yishmael, <b>holds</b> that failure to pour the remainder of the blood does <b>disqualify</b> the offering. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, who adds the words: Which does not come for atonement, <b>holds</b> that failure to pour the remainder of the blood does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: Everyone</b> agrees that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering. <b>But here they disagree with regard to</b> the issue of whether failure to <b>squeeze</b> the blood from <b>a bird sin offering</b> after sprinkling the blood <b>disqualifies</b> the offering or not. One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yishmael, <b>holds</b> that it does <b>disqualify</b> the offering, <b>and</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>holds</b> that it does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering.",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Pappa</b> that even Rabbi Yishmael agrees that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base does not disqualify the offering. The verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting; <b>and all the remaining blood</b> of the bull <b>he shall pour out</b> at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). <b>What</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states “of the bull”?</b> This seems superfluous, as the entire passage is referring to the bull. This serves to <b>teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>of</b> another bull, i.e., <b>the bull of Yom Kippur, which</b> also <b>requires placement of blood on the base</b> of the external altar. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Yishmael said:</b> It is not necessary for the Torah to write that the blood of the bull of Yom Kippur requires placement of blood on the base of the external altar. This is because it can be derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as if</b> the bull of the anointed priest, i.e., the sin offering of a High Priest, with regard to <b>which it is not obligatory to bring its blood inside</b> the Sanctuary, i.e., it is not an obligatory offering, as he brings it only if he sins, nevertheless <b>requires</b> sprinkling blood on the <b>base</b> of the altar; with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur, with regard to <b>which it is obligatory to bring its blood inside</b> the Sanctuary, i.e., it must be brought every year, <b>is it not logical that it requires</b> sprinkling of its blood on the <b>base</b> of the altar?",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said: Just as</b> the bull of a High Priest, with regard to <b>which its blood does not enter the innermost sanctum, whether as</b> a fixed <b>obligation or as a mitzva,</b> nevertheless <b>requires</b> pouring of blood on the <b>base</b> of the altar, concerning the bull of Yom Kippur, with regard to <b>which its blood enters the innermost sanctum</b> as <b>an obligation, is it not logical that it requires</b> pouring of blood on the <b>base</b> of the altar?",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought that the reason the Torah writes the phrase “of the bull” is to teach that failure to place the blood on the base of the external altar <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. Therefore, <b>the verse states</b> with regard to the service of Yom Kippur, after sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary: <b>“And when he has made an end of atoning for the Sanctuary,</b> and the Tent of Meeting, and the altar, he shall present the live goat” (Leviticus 16:20). This teaches that once he has sprinkled the blood in the innermost sanctum <b>all the atonements are completed.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>From now,</b> i.e., based on this, one can state <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>to</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the bull of</b> the <b>anointed priest from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the goat of</b> the <b>king. Just as</b> the goat sin offering of a king, with regard to <b>which its blood does not enter inside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>whether</b> as a fixed <b>obligation or</b> as <b>a mitzva,</b> but is sprinkled, like other individual sin offerings, on the external altar, <b>requires</b> that the blood be poured on the <b>base</b> of the altar (see Leviticus 4:25); with regard to the sin offering of a High Priest, the blood of <b>which enters inside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>whether as</b> a fixed <b>obligation or as a mitzva, is it not logical that it should require</b> pouring on the <b>base</b> of the altar?",
            "If so, the verse that states that there is a requirement that the blood of the sin offering of a High Priest is poured on the base of the altar is apparently superfluous. One <b>might</b> have thought that the reason the Torah writes it is to teach that failure to pour the blood there <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “And the priest shall sprinkle of the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting, <b>and all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour</b> out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7).",
            "The <i>baraita</i> explains: Since the verse inverted the terms in the clause, writing: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out,” and not: He shall pour out all the remaining blood of the bull, the <b>verse detaches this positive</b> mitzva of pouring the remaining blood from the other mitzvot in the verse. <b>And</b> the verse thereby <b>made</b> this <b>a non-essential mitzva, to tell you</b> that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering. This <i>baraita</i> supports Rav Pappa’s interpretation, that Rabbi Yishmael agrees that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar does not disqualify the offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> does <b>Rabbi Yishmael hold</b> that failure to <b>squeeze out</b> the blood of <b>a bird sin offering disqualifies</b> the offering, as Rav Pappa explained? <b>But the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:</b> The verse states: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar; <b>and the remainder of the blood shall be squeezed out</b> at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). This means: <b>And the remainder shall be squeezed out,</b> i.e., it needs to be squeezed out only if some blood remains."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And that which does not remain,</b> i.e., if there is no blood remaining, <b>he shall not squeeze</b> it <b>out.</b> This indicates that failure to squeeze the blood does not disqualify the offering. The Gemara answers: There are <b>two <i>tanna’im</i>, and</b> they disagree <b>with regard to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yishmael.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues its discussion of the remainder of the blood. <b>Rami bar Ḥama says: This</b> following <b><i>tanna</i> holds</b> that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of offerings whose blood is sprinkled inside the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>“The priest that sacrifices it for sin</b> shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19). The verse states the word “it” to teach that <b>it,</b> the offering <b>whose blood was sprinkled</b> correctly, <b>above</b> the red line of the altar, is valid, and the priest may eat the meat. <b>But</b> this is <b>not</b> so for an offering <b>whose blood was sprinkled below</b> the red line, which is disqualified.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>You said</b> this, <b>but from where did you come?</b> In other words, why would one think that such an offering is valid, so that the verse needs to teach that it is not? The <i>baraita</i> explains: <b>From the fact that it is stated:</b> “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood, upon the altar of the Lord your God; <b>and the blood of your offerings shall be poured out against the altar</b> of the Lord your God, and you shall eat the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:27), <b>we learned</b> that <b>with regard to</b> those offerings whose blood is <b>placed with four placements</b> on the corners of the altar, <b>that if</b> the priest <b>placed them with</b> only <b>one placement, he has effected atonement.</b> Therefore, since it is derived that if the priest does not present the blood on the specified corners of the altar, the offering is nevertheless valid, one <b>might</b> have thought that blood <b>that</b> should have been <b>placed above</b> the red line but <b>that one placed below</b> the red line <b>effects atonement as well,</b> and the offering is valid.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>And</b> it would seem there <b>is a logical inference</b> to counter this logic. <b>It is stated</b> that <b>blood</b> is to be sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line, referring to the blood of an animal sin offering, which is to be sprinkled on the corners on the upper half of the altar, <b>and it is stated</b> that <b>blood</b> is to be sprinkled <b>below</b> the red line, referring to the blood of a bird sin offering, which is to be sprinkled on the lower half of the altar. <b>Just as</b> with regard to the <b>blood</b> about <b>which</b> it <b>is stated</b> that it is to be <b>below</b> the red line, if it is a case <b>where one placed</b> it <b>above</b> the red line, it does <b>not effect atonement,</b> as the Sages derived from the verse: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar, and the remainder of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9), <b>so too,</b> with regard to the <b>blood,</b> about <b>which</b> it <b>is stated</b> that it is to be <b>above</b> the red line, if it is a case <b>where one placed</b> it <b>below</b> the red line, it does <b>not effect atonement.</b>",
            "This logical inference is rejected: <b>No, if you said</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the blood of a bird sin offering, which is to be sprinkled <b>below</b> the red line <b>that was placed with a placement above</b> the red line, that may be <b>because they will not ultimately</b> be sprinkled <b>above.</b> For this reason it does <b>not effect atonement. Shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the blood that is to be sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line, i.e., the blood of an animal sin offering, but <b>which one placed below</b> the red line, that it will not effect atonement? The blood that is to be sprinkled above the red line is different, <b>as</b> some <b>of it is sacrificed below</b> the red line, when the remainder of the blood is poured on the base of the altar.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> responds: The <b>blood</b> that is placed <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>will prove</b> it, <b>as</b> some <b>of it is sacrificed outside, but if</b> the priest <b>initially placed</b> the blood on the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary it does <b>not effect atonement.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> rejects this proof: <b>No, if you said</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the <b>blood</b> that is placed <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, concerning <b>which the inner altar does not complete</b> the atonement, as they require additional blood placements, <b>shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the blood offered <b>above</b> the red line, i.e., the blood of an animal sin offering, concerning <b>which</b> the <b>corners</b> of the altar <b>complete</b> the atonement? Accordingly, it is possible to say that <b>if one placed them below</b> the red line <b>they are valid.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> concludes: To counter this reasoning, <b>the verse states</b> with regard to an animal sin offering that is sacrificed outside: “The priest that sacrifices <b>it</b> for sin shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19), to emphasize that <b>it,</b> the offering <b>whose blood was placed</b> correctly, <b>above</b> the red line of the altar, is valid, and the priest may eat the meat. <b>But</b> this is <b>not</b> so for an offering <b>whose blood was placed below</b> the red line, which is disqualified.",
            "Rami bar Ḥama proves his point: <b>What</b> does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it says: If you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood that is placed inside the Sanctuary, concerning <b>which the inner altar does not complete</b> the atonement? What is required to complete the atonement? Is it <b>not</b> referring to <b>this remainder</b> of the blood and is teaching that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar disqualifies the offering?",
            "<b>Rava said to</b> Rami bar Ḥama: <b>If so,</b> that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds that failure to pour the remainder of the blood of the offerings whose blood is sprinkled inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the offering, you could <b>derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> that if the priest sprinkled the blood below the red line the offering is disqualified <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference.",
            "<b>Just as</b> it is with regard to <b>the remainder</b> of the blood of the offerings <b>of the inner</b> altar, concerning <b>which their ultimate</b> rite, pouring on the base of the altar, is <b>obligatory on the external</b> altar, but if the priest <b>initially performed</b> the rite of placing the blood <b>on the external</b> altar, it does <b>not effect atonement,</b> with regard to those offerings whose blood <b>is placed above</b> the red line, concerning <b>which their ultimate</b> rite, pouring on the base of the altar, is <b>not obligatory below</b> the red line of the altar, <b>and</b> the priest <b>initially performed</b> the rite of placing the blood <b>below</b> the red line, <b>is it not logical that</b> it does <b>not effect atonement?</b> Since the <i>baraita</i> does not advance this claim, but derived the <i>halakha</i> from a verse, this indicates that pouring the remainder of the blood is not obligatory.",
            "Rava continues: <b>Rather,</b> when the <i>baraita</i> states that the blood of the offerings offered inside the Sanctuary are those concerning which the inner altar does not complete the atonement it means that <b>the inner altar does not complete</b> the atonement <b>alone,</b> but <b>rather</b> requires that blood also be sprinkled inside the Sanctuary on the <b>Curtain</b> separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states concerning the sacrificial rite performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur: <b>“And when he has finished atoning</b> for the Sanctuary, and the Tent of Meeting, and the altar, he shall present the live goat” (Leviticus 16:20). This verse indicates that <b>if he performed</b> the <b>atonement, he has finished</b> the service, <b>but if he did not perform</b> the <b>atonement, he has not finished.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: For what</b> reason <b>do we not say: If he finished, he has performed atonement,</b> but <b>if he did not finish, he has not performed atonement?</b> This derivation would indicate <b>that if one of any of the</b> blood <b>placements is lacking</b> it is as though <b>he did nothing.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: <b>What</b> is the difference <b>between them? Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi</b> engaged in a dispute concerning this. <b>One says</b> that <b>interpretation of the meaning</b> of the verse <b>is</b> the difference <b>between them,</b> i.e., there is no halakhic difference between them but only a dispute as to how to interpret the verses. <b>And one says</b> that <b>there is</b> a difference <b>between them</b> with regard to whether failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood at the base of the altar <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. According to Rabbi Akiva, it does not disqualify the offering, whereas Rabbi Yehuda maintains that it does disqualify the offering.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>It may be concluded that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is</b> the one <b>who says</b> that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda disagree as to whether or not failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the altar <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. <b>As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: According to the statement of the one who says</b> that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood on the base of the altar <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, if the priest finished placing the blood on the inner altar and the blood was spilled before he poured the remainder on the external altar, he must <b>bring one bull</b> and slaughter it, <b>and begin</b> the sprinkling of the blood as he did <b>initially on the inner</b> altar, so that there will be blood remaining from the sprinkling, and then he pours the remainder of the blood on the external altar. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi discusses the opinion that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, apparently in reference to the <i>baraita</i> cited here.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is that to say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan does not</b> agree with <b>this reasoning? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> himself <b>say</b> (111a): <b>Rabbi Neḥemya taught</b> a <i>halakha</i> <b>in accordance with the statement of the one who says</b> that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of blood <b>disqualifies</b> the offering? Rabbi Yoḥanan also discusses the opinion of a <i>tanna</i> who holds that failure to pour the remainder of blood disqualifies the offering, apparently in reference to the <i>baraita</i> cited here.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> there is no proof that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda. He is stating a <i>halakha</i> <b>in accordance with the statement of the one who says</b> that it disqualifies the offering, whichever <i>tanna</i> that may be, <b>but</b> he is <b>not</b> referring <b>to</b> the dispute between <b>these <i>tanna’im</i>. Here too,</b> Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is stating a <i>halakha</i> <b>in accordance with the statement of the one who says</b> that it disqualifies the offering, whichever <i>tanna</i> that may be, <b>but</b> he is <b>not</b> referring <b>to</b> the dispute between <b>these <i>tanna’im</i>.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> These are the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>the communal and the individual sin offerings. These are the communal sin offerings: Goats of the New Moon and of the Festivals. Their slaughter</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>and</b> the <b>collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north, and their blood requires four placements on the four corners of the altar. How</b> did the priest do so?"
        ],
        [
            "<b>He ascended the ramp</b> of the altar <b>and turned</b> right <b>to the surrounding ledge</b> and he continued east, <b>and he came to the southeast corner</b> and sprinkled the blood of the sin offering there and then to the <b>northeast</b> corner and sprinkled the blood there, and then to the <b>northwest</b> corner and sprinkled the blood there, and the <b>southwest</b> corner, where he performed the fourth sprinkling and descended from the altar. <b>He would pour the remainder of the blood on the southern base</b> of the altar. <b>And</b> the meat portions of the offering <b>are eaten within the curtains,</b> i.e., in the Temple courtyard, <b>by the males of the priesthood.</b> And they are eaten prepared <b>in any</b> form of <b>food</b> preparation, <b>on</b> the <b>day</b> the offering is sacrificed <b>and</b> during the <b>night</b> that follows, <b>until midnight.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>How does</b> the priest <b>perform</b> the rite of sprinkling the blood on the corners of the altar? There is a dispute between <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar. One says</b> that the priest <b>places</b> the blood within <b>a cubit on this</b> side <b>or a cubit on that</b> side. He places the blood wherever he wants, provided that it is within one cubit of the corner of the altar. <b>And one says</b> that <b>he sprinkles</b> the blood <b>on the</b> outer <b>edge of</b> the <b>corner</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> it flows <b>down</b> on both sides of the altar.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>According to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says</b> that the sprinkling of the blood of a sin offering <b>itself is performed only on the actual corner,</b> the one-by-one-cubit projection above each corner of the altar, <b>everyone agrees</b> that the blood may be sprinkled anywhere on the corner, and this will be a fulfillment of the verse: “And put it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). <b>When they disagree</b> is only <b>according to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the blood may be sprinkled anywhere above the red line on the edge of the altar. One <b>Sage holds</b> that the blood may be sprinkled on the cubit on either side of the edge, because <b>a cubit on this</b> side <b>and a cubit on that</b> side <b>is</b> still considered to be <b>on</b> the <b>corner. And</b> one <b>Sage holds</b> that <b>on its edge, yes,</b> it is fit, but any <b>further</b> on either side is <b>not.</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to the opinion that one cubit on either side of the edge is still considered on the edge, from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>communal sin offerings and individual</b> sin offerings, <b>how</b> is <b>the placement of their blood</b> on the altar performed? The priest <b>would ascend the ramp</b> of the altar <b>and turn</b> right <b>to the surrounding ledge</b> and continue east, <b>and</b> he would <b>come to</b> the <b>southeast corner. And</b> he would then <b>dip with his right [<i>haymanit</i>] finger, the</b> most <b>dexterous [<i>hamyumenet</i>] of the right</b> hand, i.e., the index finger, <b>of the blood that is in the bowl, and</b> would <b>gather</b> the blood <b>with his thumb above and his smallest finger below,</b> so that it would remain on his finger. <b>And</b> he would <b>sprinkle</b> the blood <b>and</b> move his hand <b>down on the</b> outer <b>edge of</b> the <b>corner, until</b> he would <b>finish</b> sprinkling <b>all the blood that</b> was <b>on</b> his <b>finger. And</b> he would act <b>similarly</b> at <b>each and every corner.</b> This <i>baraita</i> states explicitly that the blood must be sprinkled on the actual edge.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> The optimal manner to perform the <b>mitzva</b> is to sprinkle the blood <b>on the edge of</b> the corner. But <b>if he did</b> the sprinkling on the <b>cubit on this</b> side, <b>or</b> the <b>cubit on that</b> side, <b>we have no</b> problem <b>with it,</b> and he has still fulfilled the mitzva.",
            "The Gemara discusses the aforementioned dispute. <b>What</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>and what</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?</b> This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 6:11): The <b>blood</b> that must be placed on <b>the upper</b> half of the altar, e.g., the blood of a sin offering, <b>is placed</b> anywhere <b>from the red line</b> that circumscribed the middle of the altar <b>and above.</b> The <b>blood</b> that must be placed on <b>the lower</b> half of the altar <b>is placed</b> anywhere <b>from the red line or below it.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon says: In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is said <b>with regard to a bird burnt offering,</b> as its blood may be placed anywhere above the red line. <b>But with regard to an animal sin offering,</b> the placement <b>itself may be performed only on the actual corner</b> of the altar. This is based on the verse that states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25).",
            "<b>Rabbi Abbahu says: What is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi? <b>As it is written: “And the altar shall be four cubits; and from the altar and above</b> there shall be four corners” (Ezekiel 43:15). The Gemara asks: <b>Was</b> the altar only <b>four cubits</b> wide? <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava said: And</b> the total <b>area</b> of the four <b>corners,</b> which were each one square cubit, was <b>four</b> cubits. The Gemara asks: <b>Was the area of</b> the <b>corners four</b> square cubits? If the four corners would be placed together the area would be only two square cubits. <b>Rather, say</b> that the <b>domain</b> of the <b>corners</b> is <b>four</b> cubits. In other words, the verse means that the blood may be sprinkled up to four cubits beneath the actual corners of the altar.",
            "<b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (<i>Middot</i> 35b): <b>A red line circumscribed</b> the altar <b>in the middle, to separate between</b> the area for the <b>blood</b> that must be placed on <b>the upper</b> part of the altar <b>and</b> the area for the <b>blood</b> that must be placed on <b>the lower</b> part of the altar. The Gemara asks: <b>From where is this matter</b> derived? <b>Rav Aḥa bar Rav Ketina said</b> it is derived from a verse, <b>as it is stated:</b> “And you shall put it under the ledge round the altar beneath, <b>and the net will reach halfway up the altar”</b> (Exodus 27:5). <b>The Torah provided</b> for <b>a separation</b> on the altar, <b>to separate between</b> the area for the <b>blood</b> placed on <b>the upper</b> part of the altar <b>and</b> the area for the <b>blood</b> placed on <b>the lower</b> part of the altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: He would pour <b>the remainder of the blood</b> on the southern base of the altar. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the phrase: <b>“At the base of the altar”</b> (Leviticus 4:30), mentioned with regard to pouring the remainder of the blood of the sin offering of a king, <b>this</b> is referring to the <b>southern base</b> of the altar. The <i>baraita</i> challenges: <b>Do you say</b> that <b>this</b> is referring to the <b>southern base, or is it</b> referring <b>only</b> to the <b>western base?</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> suggests: <b>And</b> one can <b>derive</b> the meaning of this <b>unspecified</b> phrase <b>from</b> the meaning of <b>the explicit</b> phrase, as follows: <b>You said</b> that one can <b>derive</b> the location of the priest’s <b>descent from the ramp</b> of the external altar after sprinkling blood of the sin offering by comparing it <b>to his exit from the Sanctuary</b> with the blood that remained after having sprinkled blood inside the Sanctuary. The verse states with regard to the bull offering of the High Priest: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). <b>Just as</b> upon <b>his exit from the Sanctuary</b> the priest pours the remainder of the blood <b>on</b> the side <b>closest to him,</b> the western side, <b>so too,</b> upon <b>his descent from the ramp</b> of the external altar after sprinkling blood from the sin offering, he pours the blood <b>on</b> the side <b>closest to him,</b> which is the southern side.",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in another <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yishmael says: This and that,</b> both the remainder of the blood sprinkled inside the Sanctuary and the remainder of the blood sprinkled on the external altar, are poured on the <b>western base</b> of the altar. <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: This and that</b> are poured on the <b>southern base</b> of the altar.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>Granted, according to the one who says</b> that the blood is poured on the <b>western base</b> of the altar, it is clear how he derived his <i>halakha</i>. He <b>holds</b> that one can <b>derive</b> the meaning of <b>an unspecified</b> phrase <b>from</b> the meaning of <b>the explicit</b> phrase. Therefore, just as the remainder of the blood sprinkled inside the Sanctuary is poured on the western base of the external altar, the same is done with the remainder of the blood sprinkled on the external altar.",
            "<b>But according to the one who says</b> that the blood is poured on the <b>southern base</b> of the altar, <b>what is the reason? Rabbi Asi said: This <i>tanna</i> holds</b> that <b>the entire</b> external <b>altar stands in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard. Therefore, the southern base is in the center of the courtyard, opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. This is what the verse is referring to when it states: “At the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). The Gemara presents <b>another formulation</b> of Rabbi Asi’s explanation: <b>The entire entrance</b> of the Sanctuary <b>stands in the south</b> of the altar. Accordingly, when the priest exits the Sanctuary the southern base is the first one he encounters."
        ],
        [
            "<b>The school of Rabbi Yishmael, in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, says:</b> Both <b>this and that,</b> i.e., the blood of an inner sin offering and that of an external sin offering, were poured at the <b>western base</b> of the altar. According to this version, Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. The Gemara comments: <b>And your mnemonic</b> to remember this change in opinion is: <b>The men pulled the man.</b> In this case, the numerous students of Rabbi Yishmael claim that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai agrees with their teacher.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The burnt offering</b> is <b>an offering of the most sacred order. Its slaughter</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>and the collection of its blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north, and its blood requires two placements that are four, and</b> it <b>requires flaying</b> of its carcass <b>and the cutting</b> of the sacrificial animal into pieces, <b>and</b> it is consumed <b>in its entirety,</b> with the exception of its hide, <b>by the fire</b> of the altar.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>What is the reason</b> that the <i>tanna</i> <b>taught</b> that <b>a burnt offering</b> is <b>an offering of the most sacred order,</b> when the mishna earlier (52b) did not mention that a sin offering is of the most sacred order? The Gemara answers: It is <b>because</b> in the Torah <b>it is not written</b> explicitly <b>with regard to</b> the burnt offering: <b>It is most sacred,</b> as it states concerning the sin offering and the guilt offering in a verse concerning a meal offering: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire; it is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10). Consequently, the <i>tanna</i> explicitly states that a burnt offering is likewise of the most sacred order.",
            "The mishna teaches: <b>And its blood requires two placements</b> that are four. <b>How does</b> the priest <b>perform</b> the placements? <b>Rav says: He places</b> the blood on one side of the corner of the altar, <b>and places</b> it <b>again</b> on the other side of the corner of the altar. He repeats this on the diagonally opposite corner, so that he places on two corners but on all four sides of the altar. <b>And Shmuel says:</b> He <b>places one placement</b> on each of the two diagonally opposite corners, so that each placement is <b>similar to</b> the shape of the Greek letter <b>gamma,</b> which is bent at a right angle.",
            "The Gemara comments: This dispute between Rav and Shmuel is <b>like</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that a priest <b>should sprinkle one sprinkling</b> with the blood of a burnt offering. To counter this possibility, <b>the verse states:</b> “And sprinkle the blood <b>around</b> against the altar that is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 1:5). <b>If</b> the blood must be sprinkled <b>around</b> the altar, one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>he should circumscribe</b> the altar <b>as</b> one would do with <b>a thread,</b> and sprinkle the blood all around. To counter this possibility, <b>the verse states:</b> “Shall present the blood, <b>and sprinkle</b> the blood around against the altar” (Leviticus 1:5), and one cannot have the blood circumscribe the altar as a thread would without directly applying it with a finger. <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> verses be reconciled? He applies the blood in a shape that is <b>similar to</b> that of the Greek letter <b>gamma, and its blood requires two sprinklings that are four.</b> This opinion accords with the opinion of Shmuel.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Yishmael says: It is stated here:</b> “Shall present the blood, and sprinkle the blood <b>around</b> against the altar” (Leviticus 1:5), <b>and it is stated there,</b> with regard to the sin offering sacrificed at the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “And when it was slain, Moses took the blood, and put it upon the corners of the altar <b>around</b> with his finger” (Leviticus 8:15). <b>Just as there,</b> with regard to the sin offering, the blood was placed <b>discretely and</b> with <b>four placements,</b> one on each corner, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to a burnt offering, it must be placed <b>discretely and</b> with <b>four placements.</b> This opinion accords with the opinion of Rav.",
            "<b>If</b> these offerings are compared to each other, why not say that <b>just as there,</b> the blood of the sin offering must have <b>four placements on</b> the <b>four corners, so too here,</b> the blood of the burnt offering requires <b>four placements on</b> the <b>four corners? You said</b> that <b>a burnt offering requires</b> that the blood be placed on a part of the altar that has <b>a base, and</b> the <b>southeast corner</b> of the altar <b>had no base</b> beneath it. Therefore, the blood had to be placed on the northeast corner and the southwest corner.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> that there was no base on the southeast corner of the altar? <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Because it was not in the portion</b> of land <b>of the one who tears,</b> i.e., the tribe of Benjamin, as he is described in the following manner: “Benjamin is a wolf that tears apart; in the morning he devours the prey, and in the evening he divides the spoil” (Genesis 49:27). <b>As Rav Shmuel, son of Rav Yitzḥak, says:</b> The <b>altar</b> would <b>consume,</b> i.e., occupy, <b>one cubit of the portion of Judah.</b> The part of the altar in Judah’s portion was the southeast corner of the base, and therefore there was no base on that corner.",
            "<b>Rabbi Levi bar Ḥama says</b> that <b>Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A strip</b> of land <b>emerged from the portion of Judah and entered into the portion of Benjamin,</b> and the southeast corner of the base was on that strip. <b>And</b> the tribe of <b>Benjamin the righteous would agonize over it every day,</b> desiring <b>to take it</b> into its portion, due to its unique sanctity. <b>As it is stated</b> in Moses’ blessing to the tribe of Benjamin:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>“He covers it throughout the day,</b> and He dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12). The term “covers it” is understood to mean that Benjamin is continually focused upon that site. <b>Therefore, Benjamin the righteous was privileged and became the host of the Holy One, Blessed be He,</b> as the Holy of Holies was built in his portion. <b>As it is stated: “And He dwells between his shoulders.”</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>How</b> was the rite of <b>a bird burnt offering performed?</b> The priest ascended the ramp and turned to the surrounding ledge. When he arrived at the southeast corner, the priest <b>would pinch</b> the bird’s <b>head</b> by pinching <b>at</b> its <b>nape</b> with his thumbnail <b>and sever</b> the bird’s head from its body, <b>and</b> would <b>squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara states its objection: <b>And if you say</b> that the southeast corner of the altar <b>had no base, is he merely performing</b> the rite <b>in the air,</b> i.e., not within the domain of the altar? <b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Say</b> that when Eretz Yisrael was apportioned, they <b>made this condition: The airspace</b> of what would become the southeast part of the altar is in the portion of the tribe <b>of Benjamin,</b> so the pinching of the bird offering was performed within the domain of the altar. But the <b>land</b> was in the portion of the tribe <b>of Judah.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it states that the southeast corner of the altar <b>had no base? Rav says:</b> It is <b>with regard to</b> the fact that it had no base <b>built</b> on those sides. <b>Levi says:</b> It is <b>with regard to</b> the fact that no <b>blood</b> was sprinkled on that side, as the blood was not permitted to be presented there, even though there was a physical base. Based on this dispute, each of them disagreed as to the correct Aramaic translation of the verse: “Benjamin is a wolf that tears apart; in the morning he devours the prey, and in the evening he divides the spoil” (Genesis 49:27). <b>Rav translates</b> this as: <b>In his portion will the altar be built. Levi translates</b> this as: <b>In his portion will the Sanctuary be built,</b> which means: <b>A place sanctified for blood.</b>",
            "The Gemara brings proof for each opinion: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof for the explanation of Rav from a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 35b): <b>The base</b> of the altar <b>would extend along all of the northern</b> side <b>and along all of the western</b> side. It <b>consumed one cubit on the southern</b> side <b>and one cubit on the eastern</b> side. This indicates that there was no base on most of the southern or eastern sides of the altar. The Gemara comments: Levi would explain: <b>What</b> is the meaning of the term: <b>Consume?</b> The <i>baraita</i>, <b>as well,</b> is stated <b>with regard to</b> consuming <b>blood</b> of the offerings.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof for the explanation of Levi from that same mishna: <b>The altar was thirty-two</b> cubits <b>by thirty-two</b> cubits. This indicates that there was a base on all four sides, in accordance with the opinion of Levi. Rav could answer: <b>Here we are dealing with</b> the measurement <b>from the side.</b> In other words, only the northern and western sides were thirty-two cubits in length.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof for the explanation of Levi from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>It turns out</b> the top of the ramp of the altar would <b>overhang</b> one <b>cubit</b> in the air <b>over</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar <b>and</b> one <b>cubit over</b> the <b>surrounding ledge.</b> This indicates that it had a base on all four sides, as the ramp was on the southern side. Rav could answer: <b>Say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> means it would overhang <b>toward</b> the place where the <b>base</b> of a <b>cubit</b> would have been, <b>and</b> one <b>cubit over</b> the <b>surrounding ledge.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof, <b>as Levi teaches</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>How does one build the altar?</b> He <b>brings a square</b> wooden frame, <b>which is thirty-two</b> cubits <b>by thirty-two</b> cubits, <b>and its height is one cubit. And he brings pieces of damp [<i>mefulamot</i>] stone, both large and small,</b> which are the main components of the altar, which is described as: “An altar of stone” (Exodus 20:22). <b>And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts</b> them <b>and pours</b> the mixture into the gaps between the stones. <b>And this is the place of</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar.",
            "<b>And then he brings a square</b> wooden frame, <b>which is thirty cubits by thirty cubits, and its height is five cubits. And he brings pieces of</b> damp <b>stone,</b> both large and small. And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts them and pours the mixture into the gaps between the stones. <b>And then he brings a square</b> wooden frame, <b>which is twenty-eight</b> cubits <b>by twenty-eight cubits, and its height is three cubits. And he brings pieces of</b> damp stone, both large and small. And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts them and pours the mixture into the gaps between the stones. <b>And this is the place of the arrangement</b> of wood on the altar.",
            "<b>And then he brings a square</b> wooden frame, <b>which is</b> one <b>cubit by</b> one <b>cubit. And he brings pieces of damp stone, both large and small. And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts</b> them <b>and pours</b> the mixture into the frame. <b>And this is</b> the <b>corner</b> of the altar. <b>And so</b> he does this <b>for each and every corner.</b> This <i>baraita</i> indicates that the altar had a base around all four sides.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>And if you would say</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>that he cuts</b> the base on the southern and western sides after he has poured the mixture for the altar and it has dried, <b>it is written</b> concerning the altar: “You shall build the altar of the Lord your God of <b>unhewn stones;</b> and you shall offer burnt offerings on it to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 27:6), so it cannot be cut.",
            "Rav could answer: This means <b>that he places something under</b> the frame, in the place where there is to be no base, <b>and</b> after the poured mixture has dried he <b>removes it,</b> leaving the space empty. <b>As if you do not say so,</b> how will you explain <b>that which Rav Kahana says: The stone</b> interiors <b>of the corners were hollow,</b> i.e., there were gaps between the stones, <b>as it is written: “And they shall be filled like the basins, like the corners of the altar”</b> (Zechariah 9:15)? The verse compares the corners to hollow basins. <b>Here too,</b> doesn’t <b>the Merciful One state</b> that the altar must be made of <b>“unhewn stones”?</b> If so, how could the corners be hollow? <b>Rather,</b> it must be <b>that he places something,</b> e.g., sticks and twigs, <b>under</b> the frame and pours the mixture for the corners over it, <b>and</b> when it has hardened, <b>removes</b> the sticks and twigs, leaving the corners somewhat hollow. <b>Here too, he places something under</b> the frame <b>and</b> later <b>removes it.</b>",
            "§ Apropos the altar and the Temple, the Gemara relates that <b>Rava taught: What</b> is the meaning of that <b>which is written</b> concerning David: <b>“And he and Samuel went and dwelt in Naioth.</b> And it was told Saul, saying: Behold, David is at Naioth [<i>beNayot</i>] <b>in Ramah”</b> (I Samuel 19:18–19)? <b>But what does Naioth have to do with Ramah?</b> They are in two distinct places. <b>Rather,</b> this means <b>that they were sitting in Ramah and</b> were <b>involved in</b> discussing <b>the beauty [<i>benoyo</i>] of the world,</b> i.e., the Temple.",
            "David and Samuel <b>said: It is written: “Then you shall arise, and get you up unto the place</b> which the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8). This <b>teaches that the Temple is higher than all</b> places in <b>Eretz Yisrael. And Eretz Yisrael is higher than all countries. They did not know where</b> the highest <b>place</b> in Eretz Yisrael was.",
            "<b>They brought the book of Joshua. With regard to all of</b> the borders of the tribes <b>it is written: “And went down”</b> (see Joshua 15:10, 16:3, 17:9), and it is written: <b>“And the border went up</b> to Beth Hoglah.” (Joshua 15:6), and: <b>“And the border was drawn</b> from the top of the mountain to the fountain of the waters of Nephtoah” (Joshua 15:9). The verse uses different terms to describe the borders of the portion of each tribe. And <b>with regard to</b> the borders of <b>the tribe of Benjamin it is written</b> only: <b>“And went up”</b> (Joshua 18:11), but it <b>is not written: “And went down.” They said: Conclude from</b> the verses that the Temple’s <b>place is here,</b> in the portion of Benjamin.",
            "<b>They thought to build it at Ein Eitam, which is higher</b> than any other place in the portion of Benjamin. <b>They said: Let us lower it a bit, as it is written:</b> “He covers it throughout the day, <b>and He dwells between his shoulders”</b> (Deuteronomy 33:12). This indicates that the Temple is situated slightly lower, between two peaks.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that <b>it is learned</b> as a tradition <b>that</b> the <b>Sanhedrin</b> is to be located <b>in the portion of Judah, and</b> the place of the <b>Divine Presence is</b> to be located <b>in the portion of Benjamin.</b> They said: <b>And if we raise it</b> and place it near Ein Eitam <b>it</b> will be <b>too distant</b> from the portion of Judah. They said: It is <b>preferable that we lower it a bit, as it is written:</b> “He covers it throughout the day, <b>and He dwells between his shoulders”</b> (Deuteronomy 33:12).",
            "<b>And with regard to this matter,</b> that David and Samuel discovered the location of the Temple, <b>Doeg the Edomite was jealous of David, as it is written: “Because jealousy for Your House has eaten me up”</b> (Psalms 69:10), <b>and it is written: “Lord, remember for David all his affliction; how he swore to the Lord,</b> and vowed unto the Mighty One of Jacob: <b>I will not come into the tent of my house,</b> nor go up into the bed that is spread for me; <b>if I will give sleep to my eyes, or slumber to my eyelids; until I find a place for the Lord,</b> a dwelling place for the Mighty One of Jacob” (Psalms 132:1–5).",
            "The verse following those verses states: <b>“We heard of it as being in Ephrath; we found it in the field of the wood”</b> (Psalms 132:6). Rava explains the meaning of these words: <b>“In Ephrath”; this</b> is a reference to <b>Joshua, who came from</b> the tribe of <b>Ephraim.</b> This alludes to the fact that David and Samuel were able to locate the highest place in Eretz Yisrael based on the book of Joshua. <b>“We found it in the field of the wood”; this</b> is a reference to <b>Benjamin, as it is written</b> concerning him: <b>“Benjamin is a wolf that tears apart;</b> in the morning he devours the prey, and in the evening he divides the spoil” (Genesis 49:27). A wolf is a wild animal living in the field, and David and Samuel found the location of the Temple in the portion of Benjamin.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> These are the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>communal peace offerings and guilt offerings. These are guilt offerings: The guilt offering for robbery,</b> brought by one from whom another demanded payment of a debt and he denied it and took a false oath (see Leviticus 5:20–26); <b>the guilt offering for</b> unwitting <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:14–16); <b>the guilt offering of an espoused maidservant,</b> brought by one who engaged in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave (see Leviticus 19:20–22); <b>the guilt offering of a nazirite</b> who became impure via contact with a corpse (see Numbers 6:12); <b>the guilt offering of a leper,</b> brought for his purification (see Leviticus 14:12); and <b>the provisional guilt offering,</b> brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–18).",
            "Concerning all of these, <b>their slaughter</b> is <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>and collection of their blood in a service vessel</b> is <b>in the north, and their blood requires two placements that are four. And</b> the meat portions of the offering <b>are eaten within the curtains,</b> i.e., in the Temple courtyard, <b>by male priests.</b> And they are eaten prepared <b>in any</b> manner of <b>food</b> preparation, <b>on</b> the <b>day</b> the offering was sacrificed <b>and</b> during the <b>night</b> that follows, <b>until midnight.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>From where do we</b> derive <b>that</b> the communal peace offerings, i.e., the two sheep brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, <b>require</b> slaughter in the <b>north</b> of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: <b>As Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan taught before Rava:</b> The passage in the Torah discussing the offerings of <i>Shavuot</i> states: <b>“And you shall offer one he-goat for a sin offering,</b> and two male sheep in their first year for a sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 23:19). The peace offerings are juxtaposed with the sin offering. <b>Just as</b> the <b>sin offering</b> must be slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>so too, communal peace offerings</b> must be slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Rava said to him: But from where</b> is the requirement to slaughter <b>a sin offering</b> in the north of the Temple courtyard <b>derived?</b> It is derived <b>from</b> its juxtaposition with <b>a burnt offering,</b> as the verse states: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18). In the realm of consecrated matters, can <b>a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition?</b> The Gemara (49b) demonstrates that it cannot.",
            "Rava explains: <b>Rather,</b> the source that communal peace offerings must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard is derived <b>from</b> that <b>which Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, teaches:</b> The verse states: “Also in the day of your gladness, and in your appointed seasons, and in your New Moons, you shall blow with the trumpets <b>over your burnt offerings, and over your peace offerings;</b> and they shall be to you for a memorial before your God: I am the Lord your God” (Numbers 10:10). This verse directly juxtaposes burnt offerings with communal peace offerings. <b>Just as burnt offerings</b> are <b>offerings of the most sacred order, so too, communal peace offerings</b> are <b>offerings of the most sacred order.</b> Furthermore, <b>just as a burnt offering</b> must be slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>so too, communal peace offerings</b> must be slaughtered <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Rather, what</b> <i>halakha</i> does <b>the first juxtaposition</b> between communal peace offerings and the he-goat sin offering <b>come to</b> teach? The Gemara answers: It teaches that the <i>halakhot</i> of communal peace offerings are <b>like</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a sin offering. Just as a sin offering is eaten only by male priests, so too, communal peace offerings</b> are eaten only <b>by male priests.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rava: <b>If so,</b> then <b>with regard to a nazirite’s ram,</b> concerning <b>which it is written</b> in the verse: <b>“And he shall present his offering to the Lord, one he-lamb in its first year without blemish for a burnt offering, and one ewe-lamb in its first year without blemish for a sin offering, and one ram without blemish for a peace offering”</b> (Numbers 6:14), <b>so too shall we say that the Torah juxtaposed</b> the nazirite’s ram <b>with a sin offering</b> of a nazirite to teach that <b>just as a sin offering is eaten only by male priests, so too, a nazirite’s ram is eaten only by male priests?</b> As the next mishna states, a nazirite’s ram may be eaten by every ritually pure Jew.",
            "Rava answers: <b>How can</b> these cases <b>be compared? There,</b> with regard to the nazirite’s ram, <b>since it is written: “And the priest shall take the foreleg of the ram when it is cooked”</b> (Numbers 6:19), <b>by inference</b> one can deduce <b>that the owner may eat all of</b> the remaining portions of the animal.",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, <b>in any event,</b> the <b>cooked foreleg</b> of the nazirite’s ram <b>should be eaten only by male priests.</b> The mishna states that the cooked foreleg may be eaten by priests, their wives, and their slaves. The Gemara concedes: This is <b>difficult.</b> Based on its juxtaposition with the sin offering of a nazirite, the <i>halakha</i> should be that only the male priests may eat it, yet that is not the case.",
            "The Gemara offers another explanation: <b>And if you wish, say</b> that the foreleg of the nazirite’s ram <b>is called sacred, but it is not called an offering of the most sacred order.</b> Therefore, it cannot be juxtaposed with the sin offering of a nazirite in this regard. The Gemara asks: <b>But rather, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> is</b> the nazirite’s ram <b>juxtaposed</b> with the sin offering of a nazirite? <b>Rava says:</b> It is juxtaposed to teach <b>that if</b> the nazirite <b>shaved after</b> the sacrifice of any <b>one of the three</b> offerings, he has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation after the fact.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The thanks offering and nazirite’s ram</b> are <b>offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter</b> is <b>anywhere in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, and their blood requires two placements that are four, and they are eaten throughout the city</b> of Jerusalem, <b>by every person,</b> i.e., any ritually pure Jew, prepared <b>in any</b> manner of <b>food</b> preparation, <b>on</b> the <b>day</b> the offering was sacrificed <b>and</b> during the <b>night</b> that follows, <b>until midnight.</b> The status of the portion <b>that is separated from them</b> and given to the priests <b>is similar to theirs; but</b> the portion <b>that is separated is eaten by the priests, by their wives, and by their children, and by their slaves.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the priests: <b>“And the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving you shall eat in a pure place;</b> you, and your sons, and your daughters with you; for they are given as your due, and your sons’ due, out of the peace offerings of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 10:14). <b>Rabbi Neḥemya said: But did they eat</b> the <b>first</b> offerings, mentioned in the previous two verses, <b>in</b> a place of <b>impurity?</b> The previous verses make reference to the remainder of the meal offering, which also had to be eaten in a pure place.",
            "<b>Rather, by inference,</b> the word <b>“pure”</b> in this context is referring to a place <b>that is</b> to some degree <b>ritually impure,</b> but pure in some respects. The priest must eat in a place that is <b>pure due to the impurity of a leper, but</b> it may be a place that is <b>impure due to the impurity of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>]. And which</b> place <b>is this? This</b> is <b>the Israelites’ camp</b> in the wilderness, and, once the Temple was built in Jerusalem, the entire city of Jerusalem. A <i>zav</i> could remain in these places, but not a leper. This is the source for the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that these offerings may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> why not <b>say</b> that the word “pure” is referring to a place which is <b>pure from the impurity of a <i>zav</i> and impure due to ritual impurity</b> imparted by <b>a corpse? And which</b> place <b>is this? This</b> is <b>the Levites’ camp</b> in the wilderness, and, once the Temple was built in Jerusalem, the Temple Mount.",
            "<b>Abaye says</b> that <b>the verse states</b> with regard to the meal offering: <b>“And you shall eat it in a sacred place”</b> (Leviticus 10:13). The word “it” is a restriction, teaching that one must eat <b>“it,”</b> i.e., the meal offering, <b>in a sacred place,</b> i.e., in the camp of the Divine Presence, <b>but</b> one is <b>not</b> required to eat <b>another</b> offering, i.e., the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving, <b>in a sacred place.</b> This <b>removes</b> the portions from the camp of the Divine Presence, <b>to</b> be eaten in <b>the Levites’ camp. Then it is written:</b> “You shall eat <b>in a pure place,”</b> which <b>removes</b> the portions from the Levites’ camp, <b>to</b> be eaten in <b>the Israelites’ camp.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says</b> a different explanation: <b>“It,”</b> i.e., the meal offering, must be eaten <b>in a sacred place, but</b> one is <b>not</b> required to eat <b>another</b> offering, i.e., the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving, <b>in a sacred place.</b> This verse <b>removes</b> the portions <b>completely</b> from any pure place, and according to this stage of Rava’s interpretation, these portions may be eaten anywhere. <b>Then the Merciful One wrote: “You shall eat in a pure place,”</b> which <b>brings it into the Israelites’ camp,</b> which is a pure place, relative to everywhere outside it.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> why not <b>say</b> that the verse <b>brings it into the Levites’ camp,</b> which is also referred to as pure? The Gemara answers: <b>We bring it into one</b> camp, adjacent to the area outside the encampment of the Jewish people, but <b>we do not bring it into two</b> camps.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, also</b> with regard to <b>removing it,</b> why not say that <b>we remove it to one</b> place, but <b>we do not remove it from two</b> places? Accordingly, the initial derivation should be to eat it in the Israelites’ camp. <b>And furthermore, it is written: “You may not eat within your gates</b> the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows which you vow, nor your gift offerings, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). This verse negates the possibility that an offering may be eaten “in your gates,” i.e., outside of Jerusalem. <b>Rather, it is clear</b> that the source for the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is <b>in accordance with</b> the explanation <b>of Abaye.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Peace offerings</b> are <b>offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter</b> is <b>anywhere in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, and their blood requires two placements that are four, and they are eaten throughout the city</b> of Jerusalem, <b>by every person,</b> i.e., any ritually pure Jew, prepared <b>in any</b> manner of <b>food</b> preparation, <b>for two days and one night,</b> i.e., the day on which they are slaughtered, the following day, and the intervening night. The status of the portion <b>that is separated from them</b> and given to the priests <b>is similar to theirs; but</b> the portion <b>that is separated is eaten by the priests, by their wives, and by their children, and by their slaves.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to cattle peace offerings, the verse states: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of his offering, <b>and slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:2). With regard to sheep peace offerings the verse states: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of his offering, <b>and slaughter it before the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:8). With regard to goat peace offerings the verse states: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of it, <b>and slaughter it before the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:13).",
            "This repetition serves <b>to render fit all directions</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>for</b> the slaughter of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity.</b> From here one can derive <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>to</b> permit slaughter in <b>the north</b> of the Temple courtyard: <b>Just as</b> the rites of slaughtering <b>offerings of the most sacred order, which are not rendered fit in all directions, are rendered fit in the north,</b> with regard to the rites of slaughtering <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, which are rendered fit in all directions, is it not logical that they are rendered fit in the north?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The repetition of <b>the verse is stated only to render fit</b> slaughter in the <b>north. As</b> one <b>might</b> have thought: <b>And could this not</b> be derived through <b>logical inference? Just as</b> with regard to <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, whose</b> slaughter is <b>rendered fit in any direction,</b> nevertheless <b>their place is not rendered fit for</b> the slaughter of <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, whose</b> slaughter is <b>rendered fit only in the north, is it not logical that their place should not be rendered fit for</b> the slaughter of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity?</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Tent of Meeting,”</b> to teach that offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered in the north."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>With regard to what do they disagree? The first <i>tanna</i> holds</b> that <b>three verses are written. One</b> verse serves <b>to</b> teach the <i>halakha</i> <b>itself, that we require</b> that the slaughter take place at the <b>entrance of the Tent of Meeting. And one</b> verse serves <b>to render fit</b> slaughter at the <b>sides,</b> i.e., the entire length of the Temple courtyard eastward from the entrance, and not only that part which is directly in front of the entrance. <b>And one</b> verse serves <b>to disqualify the sides of the sides,</b> i.e., those parts of the courtyard that are not in front of the entrance at all. <b>And it was not necessary</b> to have <b>a verse</b> teach the fitness of slaughtering in the <b>north,</b> as it can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Eliezer holds</b> that <b>one</b> verse is necessary <b>to</b> teach the <i>halakha</i> <b>itself, that we require</b> slaughter at the <b>entrance of the Tent of Meeting. And one</b> verse serves <b>to render fit</b> slaughter in the <b>north</b> of the courtyard. <b>And one</b> verse serves <b>to render fit</b> slaughter at the <b>sides</b> of the courtyard. <b>But</b> according to him, <b>it was not necessary</b> to have <b>a verse</b> teach that the <b>sides of the sides</b> are not fit for the slaughter of the offering.",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>What is different here that it is written: “At the entrance to the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:2), <b>and what is different there that it is written: “Before the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:8, 13)? The Gemara answers: This <b>teaches us</b> a matter <b>in accordance with that</b> which <b>Rav Yehuda</b> says that <b>Shmuel says. As Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered</b> in the Temple <b>before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened are disqualified, as it is stated</b> with regard to peace offerings: <b>“And he shall slaughter it at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:2), which teaches that it must be slaughtered <b>when</b> the entrance <b>is open</b> and serves as an actual entrance, <b>and not when it is locked.</b> As long as the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, or in the Temple the doors to the Sanctuary, remain closed, one may not sacrifice the peace offerings, and if they are sacrificed, they are disqualified.",
            "<b>It was also stated: Mar Ukva bar Ḥama says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened are disqualified, as it is stated</b> in the verse: <b>“He shall slaughter it at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:2). This means <b>when the entrance of the Sanctuary is open, and not when it is locked.</b>",
            "<b>In the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, <b>they teach</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>like this: Rav Ya’akov bar Aḥa says</b> that <b>Rav Ashi says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened are disqualified. And in the Tabernacle,</b> which had no doors, peace offerings that were slaughtered <b>before</b> the <b>Levites erected the Tabernacle or after</b> the <b>Levites dismantled the Tabernacle are disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara comments: It is <b>obvious</b> that if the door is <b>closed</b> but not locked it has the same status <b>as if it were locked.</b> The Gemara asks: If there is <b>a curtain</b> covering the entrance, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Rabbi Zeira says:</b> A curtain <b>itself is made only</b> to be used <b>like an open entrance,</b> and therefore it is not considered as if the entrance is closed.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the <i>halakha</i> if <b>a tall</b> item is blocking the entrance? The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof that a tall item does not render an entrance as closed, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: There were two wickets,</b> i.e., openings, <b>in the Chamber of Knives, and their height</b> was <b>eight</b> cubits. The function of these openings was <b>in order to render fit the entire</b> Temple <b>courtyard for the eating of offerings of the most sacred order, and</b> to render fit all of the Temple courtyard <b>for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity.</b> Due to the openings, the western area of the courtyard was considered to be “before the Tent of Meeting.”",
            "The Gemara explains the inference: <b>What, is</b> the reference to eight cubits <b>not</b> referring to the fact <b>that in front of</b> the wickets there was an obstruction <b>eight</b> cubits high? Nevertheless, the area outside of it is considered open to the Chamber of Knives. The Gemara answers: <b>No, their height</b> was <b>eight</b> cubits, i.e., the wickets themselves were eight cubits high.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to this explanation from a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 35a), which teaches: <b>All the gates that were there,</b> in the Temple, were <b>twenty cubits high and ten cubits wide.</b> If so, how could these wickets be only eight cubits high? The Gemara answers: The <b>wickets are different,</b> and they are not considered gates.",
            "The Gemara questions the ruling of the <i>baraita</i>. How did the wickets render fit the entire Temple courtyard? <b>But there are</b> the <b>sides,</b> i.e., to the north and south of the Chamber of Knives, and the wickets faced only to the west. The Gemara answers <b>that they inserted</b> the wickets <b>in</b> the <b>corner</b> of the Chamber, so that one opened to the northwest, and one to the northeast.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the area <b>behind the Hall of the Ark Cover,</b> i.e., behind the Sanctuary, from where one could not see the entrance of the Temple courtyard or the two wickets? The Gemara answers: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear, as Rami bar Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rav says: There was a small niche behind the Hall of the Ark Cover,</b> which was <b>eight cubits high.</b> The function of this niche was <b>in order to render fit the entire</b> Temple <b>courtyard for the eating of offerings of the most sacred order, and</b> to render fit all of the Temple courtyard <b>for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity. And this is as it is written:</b> “For the precinct westward, four at the causeway, and <b>two at the precinct”</b> (I Chronicles 26:18). <b>What</b> is the meaning of the term: <b>“For the precinct [<i>laparbar</i>]”? Rabba bar Rav Sheila said:</b> It is <b>like one who says: Facing outward [<i>kelappei bar</i>].</b>",
            "§ <b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says:</b> One is <b>liable for</b> entering the Temple courtyard in a state of <b>ritual impurity only with regard to</b>"
        ],
        [
            "an area whose <b>length</b> is <b>187</b> cubits <b>by 135</b> cubits in <b>width.</b>",
            "<b>A <i>tanna</i> taught</b> a <i>baraita</i> <b>before Rav Naḥman: The entire</b> Temple <b>courtyard was 187</b> cubits in length <b>by 135</b> cubits in <b>width.</b> Rav Naḥman <b>said to</b> the <i>tanna</i>: <b>My father said this to me:</b> In an area <b>such as this,</b> the <b>priests enter there and eat offerings of the most sacred order there, and slaughter offerings of lesser sanctity there, and are liable due to</b> entering in a state of <b>ritual impurity.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: These specific dimensions serve <b>to exclude what? If we say</b> they are stated <b>to exclude</b> the <b>windows, doors, and thickness of the wall, we learn</b> the opposite in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 85b): <b>The windows</b> in the wall <b>and the thickness of the wall</b> are considered <b>as though</b> they are <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>But rather,</b> they are stated <b>to exclude</b> the <b>chambers</b> in the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: <b>And if</b> it is referring to chambers that are <b>built in the non-sacred</b> area, which is outside this designated space, <b>and open to the sacred</b> area, <b>but didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 3:8): The inside of chambers that are built in the sacred area but are open to the non-sacred area is non-sacred, but their roofs are sacred. If they are built in a non-sacred area and open to a sacred area, <b>their interior</b> is <b>sacred</b> and their roofs are non-sacred? The Gemara answers: They have sanctity <b>by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> do they <b>not</b> have sanctity <b>by Torah law? But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <b>chambers</b> that are <b>built in the non-sacred</b> area of the Temple Mount <b>and open to the sacred</b> area, <b>from where</b> is it derived <b>that the priests enter there and eat there offerings of the most sacred order and the remainders of meal offerings? The verse states</b> with regard to a meal offering: “It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place; <b>in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it.”</b> (Leviticus 6:9). The verse could have simply stated: “In a holy place,” which indicates the courtyard. By also stating: “In the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting,” <b>the Torah amplified many courtyards with one</b> type of <b>eating,</b> i.e., of the meal offering. If the chambers do not have sanctity by Torah law, the Sages would not have permitted the priests to eat offerings of the most sacred order there.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> The <i>halakha</i> <b>concerning eating</b> is <b>different.</b> The Torah specifically includes these chambers in addition to the Temple courtyard itself for eating offerings of the most sacred order. By contrast, with regard to slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity and the punishment for entering the courtyard in a state of ritual impurity, these chambers are not considered sacred by Torah law.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But with regard to ritual impurity,</b> is one <b>not</b> liable to receive <i>karet</i> for entering these chambers? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <b>chambers that are built in the non-sacred</b> area <b>and</b> that <b>open to the sacred</b> area, <b>priests enter there and eat offerings of the most sacred order there, but may not slaughter offerings of lesser sanctity there, and are liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to ritual impurity</b> if they enter there while ritually impure?",
            "Rava could answer: <b>Did you not say</b> in the <i>baraita</i> that <b>they may not slaughter</b> offerings of lesser sanctity in those chambers? If so, emend the text of the <i>baraita</i> and <b>teach also: They are not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> for entering in a state of ritual impurity.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Granted,</b> the priests <b>may not slaughter</b> there, because slaughtering an offering <b>requires</b> that it be performed <b>before the entrance</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>and</b> if he slaughters it inside a chamber, it <b>is not. But why</b> would they <b>not</b> be <b>liable</b> for entering there in a state of ritual impurity?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>And according to your reasoning,</b> when it teaches that they <b>may not slaughter</b> there, <b>are we not dealing</b> even with a case in <b>which there is</b> an act of <b>slaughter</b> performed <b>before the entrance,</b> i.e., the entrance to the chamber directly faced the entrance of the Temple? <b>As if not, for what</b> purpose <b>was</b> it <b>necessary</b> to teach this at all? <b>Rather, even though he slaughters</b> the offering <b>before the entrance,</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches</b> that a priest <b>may not slaughter</b> offerings in the chambers <b>because</b> that area <b>is not sacred.</b> If so, <b>teach also</b> that they <b>are not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> for entering the chambers in a state of ritual impurity, as they are not sacred.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And for eating</b> an offering, <b>do we not require</b> that this take place <b>before the entrance</b> of the Temple courtyard? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: There were two wickets in the Chamber of Knives,</b> and <b>their height</b> was <b>eight</b> cubits; the function of these openings was <b>in order to render fit the</b> entire Temple <b>courtyard for the eating of offerings of the most sacred order, and</b> to render fit all of the Temple courtyard <b>for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity? Ravina said: Remove from here</b> the clause concerning <b>eating.</b> The eating of offerings does not have to take place before the entrance of the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written</b> with regard to the offerings brought at the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “And Moses said to Aaron and to his sons: <b>Cook the meat at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting; and eat it there”</b> (Leviticus 8:31). This indicates that the eating of offerings had to be at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. The Gemara answers: <b>Offerings</b> that were sacrificed only one <b>time are different.</b> Since they were specifically commanded for just that time, one cannot derive from there any <i>halakhot</i> with regard to offerings in general.",
            "§ <b>Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that the blood</b> of offerings <b>becomes disqualified at sunset</b> and can no longer be presented on the altar? This is <b>as it is stated</b> in the verse: “But if the sacrifice of his offering be a vow, or a gift offering, <b>it shall be eaten on the day that he sacrifices his offering [<i>zivḥo</i>],</b> and on the morrow” (Leviticus 7:16). This means that <b>on the day that you slaughter [<i>zove’aḥ</i>]</b> the offering <b>you sacrifice</b> it on the altar and present its blood. But <b>on the day that you do not slaughter</b> the offering <b>you may not sacrifice</b> it and present its blood.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But <b>he requires this</b> verse"
        ],
        [
            "<b>for</b> the matter <b>itself,</b> to teach that a peace offering may be eaten for only two days? The Gemara answers: <b>If so, let the verse state: On the day he slaughters it shall it be eaten,</b> and the following day. <b>Why do I</b> need the verse to add the term <b>“that he sacrifices it”? Conclude from</b> the wording of the verse that <b>on the day that you slaughter</b> the offering <b>you sacrifice</b> the blood on the altar, but <b>on a day that you do not slaughter</b> the offering <b>you do not sacrifice</b> the blood on the altar.",
            "The Gemara questions this proof: <b>But perhaps this</b> is what <b>the Merciful One is saying: If</b> the <b>blood is sacrificed today,</b> i.e., the day the offering was slaughtered, the <b>meat</b> may <b>be eaten today and tomorrow. If</b> the <b>blood is sacrificed tomorrow,</b> the <b>meat may be eaten tomorrow and the following day.</b> The Gemara answers: <b>If so, let the verse state: On the day it is sacrificed it shall be eaten,</b> and the following day. <b>Why do I</b> need the verse to state: “That he sacrifices <b>his offering”? Conclude from</b> the wording of the verse that <b>on the day that you slaughter</b> the offering <b>you sacrifice</b> the blood on the altar, but <b>on a day that you do not slaughter</b> the offering <b>you do not sacrifice</b> the blood on the altar.",
            "§ <b>It was stated:</b> With regard to <b>one who</b> slaughters a peace offering and <b>intends</b> to eat it <b>on the evening</b> preceding the <b>third</b> day, <b>Ḥizkiyya says:</b> The offering is <b>valid,</b> and it is not disqualified due to his intention to eat it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>]. And <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> It is <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>Ḥizkiyya says</b> that the offering is <b>valid because</b> on the evening preceding the third day, the peace offering has <b>not</b> yet <b>been removed</b> from its previous status and designated <b>for burning.</b> A peace offering is not burned until the third morning, as the verse states: “It shall be eaten the same day you offer it, and on the following day; and if anything remain until the third day, it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 19:6). <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> it is <b>disqualified, because it has been rejected from</b> being <b>eaten.</b>",
            "These two <i>amora’im</i> have the same dispute concerning a similar matter: With regard to <b>one who eats</b> a peace offering <b>on the evening</b> preceding the <b>third</b> day, <b>Ḥizkiyya says:</b> He is <b>exempt</b> from <i>karet</i>, <b>because</b> the offering has <b>not</b> yet <b>been removed</b> from its previous status and designated <b>for burning.</b> And <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> He is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i>, <b>because it has been rejected from</b> being <b>eaten.</b>",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> With regard to <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>that may be eaten for one day,</b> if one <b>intends to</b> present <b>their blood after sunset, or</b> if one intends <b>to</b> eat <b>their meat or to</b> sacrifice <b>their sacrificial portions after the first rays of dawn,</b> the offering is considered to be <i>piggul</i> and is disqualified. With regard to <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>that may be eaten for two days and one night,</b> if one <b>intends to</b> present <b>their blood after sunset, or</b> if one intends <b>to</b> sacrifice <b>their sacrificial portions after the first rays of dawn, or</b> if one intends <b>to</b> eat <b>their meat after sunset</b> following the second <b>of</b> the <b>two days,</b> the offering is considered to be <i>piggul</i> and is disqualified.",
            "The Gemara cites another <i>baraita</i> on this topic. <b>The Sages taught:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that peace offerings, which may be eaten for two days, <b>may</b> also <b>be eaten on the evening</b> preceding the <b>third</b> day. <b>And this</b> is the conclusion of <b>a logical inference:</b> Other <b>offerings,</b> e.g., thanks offerings, <b>are eaten for one day, and</b> peace <b>offerings are eaten for two days. Just as</b> with regard to <b>offerings that are eaten for one day,</b> the <b>night follows</b> the previous day, i.e., the offering may be eaten during the day and the subsequent night, <b>so too,</b> with regard to peace <b>offerings that are eaten for two days,</b> say that the <b>night follows</b> the day, and rule that they may be eaten on the night after the second day.",
            "To counter this logic, <b>the verse states:</b> “And when you sacrifice a peace offering to God, you shall sacrifice it of your own will. It shall be eaten the same day you sacrifice it, and on the next day; <b>and if any remains until</b> the third <b>day,</b> it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 19:5–6). This teaches that <b>it may be eaten while</b> it is still <b>daytime,</b> i.e., during the second day, <b>but it may not be eaten on the evening</b> preceding the <b>third</b> day.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: If a peace offering may not be eaten beyond the second day, one <b>might</b> have thought that it should <b>be burned immediately</b> after the conclusion of the second day, <b>and this</b> too is the conclusion of <b>a logical inference:</b> Other <b>offerings are eaten for one day, and</b> peace <b>offerings are eaten for two days. Just as</b> with regard to <b>offerings that are eaten for one day, immediately</b> after the conclusion of their permitted time <b>for eating</b> should their <b>burning</b> commence, on the morning of the second day, <b>so too,</b> with regard to peace <b>offerings that are eaten for two days</b> say that <b>immediately</b> after the conclusion of their permitted time <b>for eating</b> should their <b>burning</b> commence, at night after the second day.",
            "To counter this logic, <b>the verse states:</b> “And if any remains of the flesh of the sacrifice <b>on the third day, it shall be burned with fire”</b> (Leviticus 7:17), meaning: <b>You</b> must <b>burn it during the day, but you may not burn it during the night.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The firstborn</b> offering, <b>the</b> animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>and the Paschal offering are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, and their blood requires one placement, provided that</b> the priest <b>places it</b> so that the blood goes <b>on the base</b> of the altar.",
            "The <i>halakha</i> <b>differs with regard to their consumption. The firstborn</b> offering <b>is eaten by the priests, and the</b> animal <b>tithe</b> offering is eaten <b>by any person,</b> i.e., any ritually pure Jew. <b>And they are eaten throughout the city</b> of Jerusalem, prepared <b>in any</b> manner of <b>food</b> preparation, <b>for two days and one night. The Paschal offering is eaten only at night, and it is eaten only until midnight, and it is eaten only by its registrants,</b> i.e., those who registered in advance to partake of the offering, <b>and it is eaten only roasted,</b> not prepared in any other manner.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Who</b> is the <i>tanna</i> who <b>taught</b> that the blood of these offerings is placed, not poured, so that it goes on the base of the altar? <b>Rav Ḥisda says</b> that <b>it is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:</b> The verse states: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred; you shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and you shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17). <b>It is not stated: Its fat, but</b> rather: <b>“Their fat.”</b> Similarly, <b>it is not stated: Its blood, but</b> rather: <b>“Their blood.”</b> This <b>teaches with regard to a firstborn</b> offering, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse, <b>and</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>and a Paschal offering,</b> which are similar in their sanctity to a firstborn offering, <b>that they</b> all <b>require placement of their blood and</b> the burning of their <b>sacrificial portions on the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that their blood must be placed so that it goes <b>on the base</b> of the altar? <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> This is <b>derived</b> by way of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of the word <b>“sprinkling”</b> stated here derived <b>from</b> the meaning of the word <b>“sprinkling”</b> stated with regard to <b>a burnt offering.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And from where do we</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> that <b>a burnt offering itself</b> has its blood presented on the altar in a place where there is a base? The Gemara answers: We derive it from a verse, <b>as it is written:</b> “And he shall pour all the blood of the bull <b>at the base of the altar of the burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:7). This <b>teaches that</b> the blood of <b>an obligatory burnt offering requires</b> presentation at the <b>base</b> of the altar, as the verse specifically describes the base of the altar as connected to the burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> it is derived from a burnt offering via a verbal analogy, one might think that <b>just as there,</b> a burnt offering requires <b>two placements that are four, so too here,</b> a firstborn offering, an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering should also require <b>two placements that are four,</b> and not just a single placement.",
            "<b>Abaye says: Why do I</b> need the Torah <b>to write:</b> “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood, and sprinkle the blood <b>around</b> against the altar” (Leviticus 1:5), <b>with regard to a burnt offering,</b> to teach that the blood must be placed on all four sides of the altar, in addition to writing: “And Moses took the blood, and put it upon the corners of the altar <b>around</b> with his finger” (Leviticus 8:15), <b>with regard to a sin offering? They are two verses that come as one,</b> i.e., they teach the same matter; <b>and any two verses that come as one do not teach</b> their common aspect to apply to other cases. Therefore, a firstborn offering, an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering do not require two placements that are four.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that two verses that come as one <b>do not teach</b> their common aspect with regard to other cases. <b>But according to the one who says</b> that two verses that come as one do <b>teach</b> their common aspect with regard to other cases, <b>what is there to say?</b> The Gemara answers: Together with the verse stated with regard to <b>a guilt offering, there are three</b> verses, as it is written: “And its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar” (Leviticus 7:2), <b>and three</b> verses which come as one <b>certainly do not teach</b> their common aspect with regard to other cases.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>The firstborn</b> offering is <b>eaten by the priests,</b> throughout the city of Jerusalem, prepared in any manner of food preparation, for two days and one night. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to a firstborn</b> offering <b>that</b> it is <b>eaten for two days and</b> the intervening <b>night?</b> It is derived from a verse, <b>as it is stated</b> with regard to a firstborn offering: <b>“And their flesh shall be yours, as the breast of waving and as the right thigh”</b> (Numbers 18:18). <b>The verse juxtaposes</b> the firstborn offering <b>with the breast and thigh of peace offerings. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn</b> offering is <b>eaten for two days and one night.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> relates: <b>And this question was asked before the Sages in the vineyard,</b> i.e., the academy, <b>in Yavne: For how many</b> days and nights is <b>a firstborn</b> offering <b>eaten? Rabbi Tarfon responded and said: For two days and one night.</b>",
            "<b>There was one student there who came to the study hall before the Sages</b> for the <b>first</b> time, <b>and his name</b> was <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. He said to</b> Rabbi Tarfon: <b>My teacher, from where do you</b> derive this? Rabbi Tarfon <b>said to him: My son, peace offerings</b> are <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, and a firstborn</b> offering is <b>an offering of lesser sanctity. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn</b> offering is <b>eaten for two days and one night.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>said to him: My teacher,</b> there is a different comparison that can be made: <b>A firstborn</b> offering is given as <b>a gift to the priest, and a sin offering and a guilt offering</b> are each given as <b>a gift to the priest. Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering</b> are eaten <b>for</b> one <b>day and</b> one <b>night, so too, a firstborn</b> offering should be eaten <b>for</b> one <b>day and</b> one <b>night.</b>",
            "Rabbi Tarfon <b>said to him: Let us judge a matter from a matter</b> to which it is most similar, i.e., a firstborn offering is an offering of lesser sanctity, as are peace offerings, <b>and learn a matter from a matter,</b> i.e., there is another comparison to be made: <b>Just as peace offerings do not come</b> as atonement <b>for a sin, so too, a firstborn</b> offering <b>does not come</b> as atonement <b>for a sin. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn</b> offering is <b>eaten for two days and one night.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>said to him: My teacher,</b> I can answer you in a similar way. <b>Let us judge a matter from a matter</b> to which it is most similar, i.e., a firstborn offering is more similar to a sin offering and a guilt offering, and <b>learn a matter from a matter,</b> i.e., there is another comparison to be made: <b>A sin offering and a guilt offering</b> are each given as <b>a gift to the priest, and a firstborn</b> offering is given as <b>a gift to the priest. Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering do not come as a vow</b> offering <b>or</b> as <b>a gift</b> offering, i.e., they are brought only by one obligated to bring them, <b>so too, a firstborn</b> offering <b>does not</b> come <b>as a vow</b> offering <b>or as a gift</b> offering. <b>Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering are eaten for one day</b> and one night, <b>so too, a firstborn</b> offering should be <b>eaten for one day</b> and one night.",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva jumped</b> into the discussion, <b>and Rabbi Tarfon left.</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: <b>But</b> the verse <b>states: “And their flesh shall be yours,</b> as the breast of waving and as the right thigh” (Numbers 18:18). <b>The verse juxtaposes</b> firstborn offerings <b>with a breast and thigh of peace offerings. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn</b> offering is <b>eaten for two days and one night.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>You juxtaposed it with a breast and thigh of peace offerings. But</b> since the Torah does not specify with which offering the firstborn is juxtaposed, <b>I juxtapose it with a breast and thigh of a thanks offering,</b> which are also given to a priest. <b>Just as a thanks offering is eaten for</b> one <b>day and</b> one <b>night, so too, a firstborn</b> offering should be <b>eaten for</b> one <b>day and</b> one <b>night.</b>",
            "Rabbi Akiva <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: I concede that it is possible to juxtapose a firstborn offering with a thanks offering, <b>but</b> the verse <b>states: “And their flesh shall be yours,</b> as the breast of waving and as the right thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:18). <b>Since</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state</b> a second time: <b>“It shall be yours,” what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states</b> a second time: <b>“It shall be yours”? The verse adds another</b> day on which it is permitted <b>for a firstborn</b> offering to <b>be</b> eaten, i.e., a second day.",
            "The Gemara relates: <b>And when these matters were said before Rabbi Yishmael, he said to</b> his students: <b>Go out and tell Rabbi Akiva: You were mistaken</b> when you conceded to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili that the allotted time for eating a firstborn offering could have been derived from the allotted time for eating a thanks offering. Why? <b>From where is</b> it <b>derived</b> that the breast and thigh of <b>a thanks offering</b> are eaten by priests? It is derived <b>from</b> a juxtaposition with <b>a peace offering.</b> Nowhere is it stated explicitly that the breast and thigh of a thanks offering are eaten only by priests. <b>And</b> in the realm of consecrated matters, <b>can a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teach</b> its <i>halakha</i> <b>via a juxtaposition?</b> The Gemara (49b) demonstrated that it cannot. <b>Consequently, you should not infer from the latter formulation</b> of the verse, from the words “It shall be yours,” <b>but</b> rather, <b>from the first formulation</b> of the verse, as you claimed that the Torah juxtaposes a firstborn offering with the breast and thigh of a peace offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what does Rabbi Yishmael do with this</b> extra phrase: <b>“It shall be yours”?</b> This <b>teaches about a blemished firstborn</b> offering, <b>that it is</b> also given as <b>a gift to the priest, as we have not found</b> it written explicitly anywhere <b>in the entire Torah</b> what should be done with a blemished firstborn.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> from where does <b>Rabbi Akiva</b> derive that a blemished firstborn offering is also given as a gift to the priest? <b>He derives it from</b> the term <b>“their flesh,”</b> which is written in the plural. This teaches that <b>both an unblemished</b> firstborn offering <b>and a blemished</b> firstborn offering are given as gifts to the priest. The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Yishmael</b> understand the plural term? The Gemara answers that he understands it to be <b>saying</b> that the priest receives gifts <b>from the flesh of</b> all <b>these firstborn</b> offerings mentioned in the verse, i.e., the firstborn of cattle, sheep, and goats.",
            "The Gemara asks: Since Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael both agree that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, <b>with regard to what</b> principle <b>do they disagree?</b> The Gemara answers: One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yishmael, <b>holds</b> that a <i>halakha</i> derived both <b>from that</b> juxtaposition <b>and</b> from <b>another</b> principle <b>is</b> considered <b>a juxtaposition.</b> In this case, the specific detail that the breast and thigh of a thanks offering are given to a priest is derived from a juxtaposition with peace offerings. The length of time in which it may be eaten, one day and one night, is written explicitly. Since it is nevertheless considered a juxtaposition, it cannot be used to teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a firstborn offering. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>holds</b> that such a case <b>is not</b> considered to be <b>a juxtaposition,</b> and therefore it can be used to teach another <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Granted, according to the one who says</b> that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle <b>is not</b> considered <b>a juxtaposition, this is</b> the reason <b>that it is written</b> with regard to the rites performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur: <b>“And so shall he do for the Tent of Meeting</b> that dwells with them in the midst of their impurity” (Leviticus 16:16).",
            "The High Priest sprinkles the blood of two offerings, the bull and the goat. He sprinkles their blood between the staves of the Ark and on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies. In each location he sprinkles their blood once above and seven times below. The verse does not write all of the details of these sprinklings with regard to each offering, and the details of each are derived from what is written explicitly in the other, as follows: <b>Just as</b> the High Priest <b>sprinkles in the innermost sanctum,</b> between the staves of the Ark, <b>once above and seven</b> times <b>below, with the blood of the bull, so he sprinkles</b> on the Curtain <b>in the Sanctuary.</b>",
            "<b>And just as in the innermost sanctum</b> he sprinkles <b>once above and seven</b> times <b>below, with the blood of the goat, so he sprinkles</b> on the Curtain <b>in the Sanctuary.</b> This is an instance of a <i>halakha</i> derived both from a juxtaposition and from another principle, and the stringency that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot also teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition is not applied in this case.",
            "<b>But according to the one who says</b> that this too <b>is</b> considered <b>a juxtaposition, what can be said?</b> How can these <i>halakhot</i> be derived? The Gemara answers: <b>It is</b> the <b>locations</b> where the blood is sprinkled <b>that are derived from one another</b> in the second juxtaposition. The first juxtaposition teaches one <i>halakha</i>, namely, that the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are to be compared to one another. The second juxtaposition does not teach a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat per se; rather it teaches a comparison between the sprinkling performed in the Holy of Holies and the sprinkling performed in the Sanctuary. These are two unconnected juxtapositions."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>And if you wish, say</b> there is a different resolution: The sprinkling <b>outside is derived from</b> the sprinkling <b>inside, all at once.</b> There are not two comparisons here, one derived from the other, but rather a single, complex juxtaposition, from which all of the relevant <i>halakhot</i> are derived.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Granted, according to the one who says</b> that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle <b>is not a juxtaposition, this is</b> the reason <b>that it is written</b> with regard to the offering brought on <i>Shavuot</i>: <b>“You shall bring out of your dwellings two wave loaves</b> of two-tenths of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 23:17).",
            "<b>Since</b> apparently there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state: “You shall bring,”</b> as it already states: “And you shall present a new meal offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:16), <b>why</b> must <b>the verse state: “You shall bring”?</b> It states this to teach that <b>anything that you bring from another place</b> that is similar to this offering, i.e., the leavened bread that accompanies a thanks offering, <b>shall be</b> prepared <b>like this. Just as there,</b> with regard to the two loaves, they must be prepared from <b>a tenth</b> of an ephah of flour <b>for</b> each <b>loaf, so too here,</b> each of the ten loaves of leavened bread that accompany a thanks offering must be prepared from <b>a tenth</b> of an ephah of flour <b>for</b> each <b>loaf.</b>",
            "<b>If</b> they are compared, why not say that <b>just as there,</b> with regard to the two loaves, the total amount of flour is <b>two-tenths</b> of an ephah, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to the ten loaves that accompany a thanks offering, the total amount of flour for all ten should be <b>two-tenths</b> of an ephah? To counter this comparison, <b>the verse states: “They shall be,”</b> to serve as a restriction and teach that only these two loaves amount to a total of two-tenths of an ephah, but the bread accompanying the thanks offering does not amount to two-tenths of an ephah.",
            "The Gemara continues: The ten loaves accompanying a thanks offering must each be a tenth of an ephah, and this has been derived from two sources: A juxtaposition with the offering of <i>Shavuot</i> and another principle, which is that which the verse states concerning the thanks offering, that there must be ten leavened loaves. <b>And we have learned</b> that <b>ten</b>-tenths of an ephah is required <b>for</b> the ten loaves of <b>leavened bread. From where</b> is it derived that <b>ten</b>-tenths of an ephah are required <b>for</b> the <b><i>matza</i></b> which also accompanies a thanks offering? After stating that thirty <i>matzot</i> accompany a thanks offering, <b>the verse states: “With cakes of leavened bread”</b> (Leviticus 7:13), to juxtapose the <i>matza</i> with the leavened bread. This teaches that one must <b>bring <i>matza</i></b> of an amount <b>corresponding to</b> the <b>leavened bread.</b> In any event, this derivation can be employed according to the one who says that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle is not a juxtaposition.",
            "<b>But according to the one who says</b> that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle <b>is a juxtaposition,</b> and therefore it cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via another juxtaposition, <b>what is there to say?</b> How can the measure of flour for the <i>matza</i> be derived from the measure of flour for the leavened bread? The Gemara answers: The first <i>halakha</i>, connecting the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> to the bread accompanying a thanks offering, is not derived via a juxtaposition, but rather via a superfluous word. The term <b>“You shall bring,”</b> written with regard to the two loaves, <b>is extra,</b> and is therefore considered as if it were written explicitly with regard to the leavened bread accompanying the thanks offering. Therefore, it is possible to derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning matza from the <i>halakha</i> concerning leavened bread via a juxtaposition.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>The Paschal offering is eaten only</b> at night and it is eaten only until midnight. The Gemara asks: <b>Who is the <i>tanna</i></b> who taught this mishna? <b>Rav Yosef said</b> that <b>it is Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And they shall eat of the flesh on that night” (Exodus 12:8). <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: It is stated here: “On that night,”</b> without stating when the night ends. <b>And it is stated there,</b> with regard to the plague that afflicted the firstborn Egyptians: <b>“And I will pass through the land of Egypt on that night</b> and I will strike every firstborn in the land of Egypt” (Exodus 12:12). With regard to the death of the firstborns the Torah states: “So said the Lord: At about midnight, I will go out into the midst of Egypt and every firstborn in Egypt shall die” (Exodus 11:4–5).",
            "Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya continues: <b>Just as</b> in the verse <b>there,</b> the death of the firstborns occurred <b>until midnight,</b> as stated explicitly in the verse, <b>so too,</b> in the verse <b>here,</b> the mitzva to eat the Paschal offering continues <b>until midnight</b> but not beyond.",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said to</b> Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: <b>But isn’t it</b> already <b>stated:</b> “And so you shall eat it, with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, your staffs in your hands, <b>and you will eat it in haste,</b> for it is the Paschal offering for the Lord” (Exodus 12:11)? This verse indicates that the Paschal offering may be eaten <b>until the time of haste,</b> i.e., until dawn, as the Jewish people left Egypt hastily the next morning.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, why</b> must <b>the verse state: “On that night,”</b> with regard to eating the Paschal offering? The Gemara explains: This phrase is necessary, <b>as</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that the Paschal offering is <b>like all the</b> other <b>offerings</b> in <b>that it should be eaten during the day,</b> on the day it is sacrificed. To counter this reasoning, <b>the verse states: “On</b> that <b>night,”</b> to emphasize that this particular offering <b>shall be eaten at night, but it shall not be eaten during the day.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rav Yosef: <b>And from where</b> do you know <b>that</b> the mishna represents the opinion <b>of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and</b> is stating that the Paschal offering must be eaten by midnight <b>by Torah law? Perhaps</b> the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and is stating that the Paschal offering must be eaten by midnight <b>by rabbinic law, and</b> the reason for the rabbinic decree was <b>to distance</b> one <b>from a sin.</b> Rav Yosef replied: <b>If so, what</b> does the mishna mean when it says: It is eaten <b>only until midnight?</b> With regard to the other offerings the mishna teaches: Until midnight, without specifying: Only. <b>Rather,</b> one must say that it is <b>like there,</b> with regard to the other <i>halakhot</i> of the Paschal offering stated in the mishna. <b>Just as there,</b> the requirements are <b>by Torah law, so too here,</b> with regard to the final time for eating the meat, the requirement is <b>also by Torah law.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> It was taught in the previous chapter that offerings of the most sacred order are to be slaughtered in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. With regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered atop the altar, Rabbi Yosei says:</b> Their status is <b>as though they were slaughtered in the north,</b> and the offerings are therefore valid. <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:</b> The status of the area <b>from the halfway point of the altar and to the south</b> is <b>like</b> that of <b>the south,</b> and offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in that area are therefore disqualified. The status of the area <b>from the halfway point of the altar and to the north</b> is <b>like</b> that of <b>the north.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rav Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei used to say: The entire altar stands in the north</b> section of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: <b>And what</b> is the meaning of Rabbi Yosei’s statement that if one slaughtered offerings of the most sacred order atop the altar it is <b>as though</b> they were slaughtered in the north, which indicates that they were not actually slaughtered in the north? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei said this <b>lest you say</b> that <b>we require</b> that the offering be slaughtered <b>“on the side</b> of the altar northward” (Leviticus 1:11), i.e., on the ground beside the altar, <b>and</b> that requirement <b>is not</b> fulfilled when it is slaughtered on top of the altar. Therefore, Rabbi Yosei <b>teaches us</b> that the offering is still valid.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi:</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan apparently understands that the reason Rabbi Yosei holds that an offering of the most sacred order slaughtered on the altar is valid is because the entire altar is in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. <b>If that is so,</b> shall one <b>also</b> say <b>that according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, half of</b> the altar was situated <b>in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>and half of it</b> was situated <b>in the south?</b>",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that <b>indeed</b> that is so, <b>wasn’t it you who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> that <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, concedes that if one slaughtered</b> offerings of the most sacred order <b>on the ground opposite</b> the northern half of the altar, the offering is <b>disqualified?</b> Accordingly, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, apparently maintains that the altar is not located in the north at all.",
            "Rav Asi <b>said to</b> Rabbi Zeira: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement with regard to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is an independent statement rather than an inference from the mishna. And with regard to the dispute in the mishna, <b>this</b> is what <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both of them derived</b> their opinions <b>from one verse:</b> “An altar of earth you shall make for Me, <b>and you shall slaughter upon it your burnt offerings and your peace offerings”</b> (Exodus 20:21).",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei maintains</b> that the verse teaches that <b>all of it,</b> i.e., the entire altar, is fit <b>for</b> slaughtering <b>a burnt offering, and all of it</b> is also fit <b>for</b> slaughtering <b>a peace offering. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, maintains</b> that the verse teaches that <b>half of it</b> is fit <b>for</b> slaughtering <b>a burnt offering and half of it</b> is fit <b>for</b> slaughtering <b>a peace offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: <b>As if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that <b>all of it is fit for</b> slaughtering <b>a burnt offering, now</b> that <b>all of it is fit for</b> slaughtering <b>a burnt offering,</b> which must be slaughtered in the northern section of the Temple courtyard (see 53b), <b>is it necessary</b> to teach that it is also fit <b>for</b> slaughtering <b>a peace offering,</b> which may be slaughtered anywhere in the Temple courtyard (see 55a)? The verse therefore must be understood as teaching that half the altar is fit for slaughtering burnt offerings and half is fit for slaughtering peace offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>the other</b> Sage, Rabbi Yosei, respond to this reasoning? The Gemara answers: It <b>was necessary</b> for the verse to mention peace offerings. Otherwise, it could <b>enter your mind to say</b> that the verse allows one to slaughter only <b>a burnt offering</b> atop the altar, <b>as the location</b> where <b>it</b> may be slaughtered on the ground is <b>narrow. But</b> with regard to <b>peace offerings, whose location</b> for slaughter on the ground is <b>not narrow, say</b> that <b>no,</b> one may not slaughter them atop the altar. Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us</b> that peace offerings as well may be slaughtered atop the altar.",
            "§ The Gemara discusses <b>the</b> matter <b>itself: Rav Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, concedes that if one slaughtered</b> offerings of the most sacred order <b>on the ground opposite</b> the northern half of the altar, the offering is <b>disqualified. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: What</b> is the meaning of the phrase: <b>On the ground opposite</b> the northern half of the altar? <b>If we say</b> it means that the offering was sacrificed upon the <b>cubit</b>-wide <b>base</b> of the altar or upon the <b>cubit</b>-wide <b>surrounding ledge</b> of the altar, <b>this itself is</b> part of the <b>altar. And furthermore, what</b> is the meaning of the phrase: <b>On the ground opposite</b> the northern half of the altar? The base and ledge are not on the ground.",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that the case is <b>where one dug tunnels in the ground</b> beneath the altar, <b>and slaughtered</b> the offerings <b>in them, in a case like this would</b> the <b>altar</b> itself <b>be</b> fit for use so that according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, one may slaughter the offerings of the most sacred order on the altar but not on the ground? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“An altar of earth you shall make for Me”</b> (Exodus 20:21)? This verse indicates <b>that</b> the altar <b>must be attached to the earth,</b> so <b>that one may not build it on top of tunnels nor on top of arches.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> it is <b>necessary</b> to have the phrase: On the ground opposite the northern half of the altar, in order to teach the <i>halakha</i> in a case <b>where one minimized</b> the dimensions of the altar and slaughtered the offerings on the ground where the northern half of the altar had previously stood.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to discuss Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that according to Rabbi Yosei the entire altar was located in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara had mentioned that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is an independent statement, not based on the mishna. <b>Rabbi Zeira said:</b> Is it <b>possible</b> that <b>this</b> statement <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan is</b> correct <b>and we did not learn it in</b> any <b>mishna?</b>",
            "Rabbi Zeira <b>went out, examined</b> the matter, <b>and discovered</b> a mishna that alludes to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 2:5): The priests <b>selected fine wood of a fig tree from</b> the chamber of firewood, with which <b>to lay out a second arrangement</b> of wood on the altar so that coals from this arrangement could be used <b>for</b> burning the <b>incense.</b> This second arrangement was located <b>opposite</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar, <b>distanced from</b> the <b>corner northward</b> by <b>four cubits.</b> They would arrange enough wood which, when burned, would produce <b>approximately five <i>se’a</i></b> of <b>coals. And on Shabbat,</b> there was enough wood to produce <b>approximately eight <i>se’a</i></b> of <b>coals, as they would place there the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what is the</b> significance of the mishna’s <b>defining</b> the precise location of the arrangement and the fact that this is where the frankincense is burned? The Gemara embarks on a lengthy discussion to answer this question: This mishna <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei,</b> who holds that this arrangement of wood and the burning of the frankincense must be in that precise location, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says: This</b> is the <b>principle</b> of where sacrificial items are placed on the inner and outer altars: <b>Any</b> sacrificial item <b>that is taken</b> from the altar located <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary in order <b>to be placed</b> on the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard, <b>may be placed only on</b> the area of that altar that is <b>near</b> the Sanctuary, so <b>that there is no</b> area closer to the <b>inside</b> of the Sanctuary. It must therefore be placed on the part of the external altar closest to the entrance to the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>And any</b> sacrificial item <b>that is taken</b> from the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard, in order <b>to be placed</b> on the altar located <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>may be taken only from</b> the area of the external altar that is <b>near</b> the Sanctuary, so <b>that there is no</b> area closer to the <b>inside</b> of the Sanctuary, i.e., from the part of the external altar closest to the entrance to the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: With regard to the statement concerning <b>any</b> sacrificial item <b>that is taken</b> from the altar located <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary in order <b>to be placed</b> on the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>what are these</b> items? <b>If we say</b> they are the <b>remaining</b> blood of the sin offerings whose blood is presented on the inner altar, there is no reason for Rabbi Yosei to formulate his principle, as <b>it is explicitly written concerning them:</b> “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out <b>at the base of the altar of the burnt offering, which is at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 4:7). This verse describes how the blood of the inner sin offerings that remained after the sprinkling was to be poured out on the base of the west side of the altar, which is the side closest to the entrance to the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> with regard to the statement about <b>any</b> sacrificial item <b>that is taken</b> from the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard, in order <b>to be placed</b> on the altar located <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>what are these</b> items? <b>If we say</b> these are the <b>coals of</b> the <b>Yom Kippur</b> service, which must be taken from the western side of the altar, <b>it is explicitly written concerning them: “And he shall take a coal pan full of coals of fire</b> from off the altar before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:12). The expression “before the Lord” is a reference to the western side of the altar, which is the side closest to the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>Rather,</b> Rabbi Yosei’s statement with regard to <b>any</b> sacrificial item <b>that is taken</b> from the altar located <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary in order <b>to be placed</b> on the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary is referring to the <b>two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread.</b> According to Rabbi Yosei, they must be burned on the western side of the altar, <b>as he derives</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the location on the base of the altar where the <b>remaining</b> blood of the inner sin offerings is poured.",
            "Rabbi Yosei’s next statement, that any sacrificial item <b>that is taken</b> from <b>the</b> altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary in order <b>to be placed on</b> the altar located <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary may be taken only from the area of the external altar that is near the Sanctuary, is referring to the <b>coals that</b> are taken from the external altar <b>each and every day</b> and placed on the inner altar in order to burn the incense. According to Rabbi Yosei these coals must be taken from the western side of the altar, <b>as we derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the location on the altar from where the <b>coals of</b> the <b>Yom Kippur</b> service must be taken.",
            "The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that the second arrangement of wood was placed four cubits north of the southwest corner of the altar: <b>And what does</b> Rabbi Yosei <b>hold</b> about the placement of the altar in the Temple courtyard? <b>If he holds</b> that <b>the entire altar stands in the south</b> side of the Temple courtyard, then only the five northernmost cubits of the altar are opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. Accordingly, in order for the arrangement of wood to be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary, one is <b>required to move</b> it <b>twenty-seven</b> cubits north of the southwest corner of the altar.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And even if</b> Rabbi Yosei <b>holds</b> that the level of <b>sanctity of</b> the <b>Sanctuary and</b> the <b>Entrance Hall is the same,</b> so that the arrangement of wood can be opposite the Entrance Hall, which is ten cubits wider than the Sanctuary, his opinion is still difficult. In order for the arrangement of wood to be opposite the Entrance Hall, one is <b>required to move</b> it <b>twenty-two</b> cubits north of the southwest corner of the altar.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And</b> even <b>if</b> Rabbi Yosei <b>holds</b> that <b>half of</b> the altar was located <b>in the north</b> side of the Temple courtyard <b>and half in the south,</b> in order for the arrangement of wood to be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary one is still <b>required to move</b> it <b>eleven</b> cubits to the north of the southwest corner of the altar. <b>And</b> if one suggests that, <b>rather, he holds</b> that <b>the sanctity of</b> the <b>Sanctuary and</b> the <b>Entrance Hall is one matter,</b> i.e., equal, one is still <b>required to move</b> the arrangement of wood <b>six</b> cubits from the southwest corner in order to be opposite the Entrance Hall.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> is it <b>not</b> that Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that the arrangement of wood was located four cubits from the altar’s southwest corner is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that he holds</b> that <b>the entire altar stands in the north</b> side of the Temple courtyard? Accordingly, only the five southernmost cubits of the altar were opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>And</b> of <b>these four cubits</b> from which the arrangement of wood was distanced from the southwest corner of the altar, one <b>cubit</b> was the <b>base</b> of the altar; <b>and</b> one <b>cubit</b> was <b>the surrounding ledge</b> of the altar; <b>and</b> one <b>cubit</b> was the <b>place</b> where the <b>corners</b> of the altar were located; <b>and</b> another <b>cubit</b> was <b>the place of the feet of the priests,</b> i.e., space for the priests to walk around the perimeter of the surface of the altar in order to perform the sacrificial rites. The arrangement of wood was located specifically in that location, <b>as if</b> one were to <b>move</b> it <b>farther away</b> from the southwest corner of the altar, it would <b>no longer</b> be opposite the <b>entrance</b> to the Sanctuary. This proves that according to Rabbi Yosei, the entire altar was located in the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "The Gemara challenges this proof by suggesting an alternative explanation of the mishna in <i>Tamid</i>: <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava said:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: The altar was centered and standing</b> precisely <b>in the middle of the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, and it was thirty-two cubits</b> wide. <b>Ten cubits</b> were <b>opposite the entrance to</b> the <b>Sanctuary, eleven cubits</b> were <b>to this</b> side of the entrance to the Sanctuary, <b>and eleven cubits</b> were <b>to that</b> side of the entrance to the Sanctuary. It <b>turns out</b> that the length of the <b>altar was aligned opposite</b> the width of the <b>Sanctuary,</b> which itself was thirty-two cubits wide.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Ultimately, according to Rabbi Yehuda,</b> one is still <b>required to move</b> the arrangement of wood <b>eleven</b> cubits from the southwest corner in order for it to be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. <b>And</b> even <b>if he holds</b> that <b>the sanctity of</b> the <b>Sanctuary and</b> the <b>Entrance Hall is one matter,</b> i.e., equal, one is still <b>required to move</b> the arrangement of wood <b>six</b> cubits in order to be opposite the Entrance Hall. Therefore, the mishna, which states that the arrangement of wood is four cubits north of the southwest corner, cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Do you hold</b> that <b>these four cubits include</b> the <b>cubit</b> of the <b>base</b> of the altar <b>and</b> the <b>cubit</b> of the <b>surrounding ledge</b> of the altar? Actually, the <b>four cubits</b> are <b>aside from</b> the <b>cubit</b> of the <b>base</b> of the altar <b>and</b> the <b>cubit</b> of the <b>surrounding ledge</b> of the altar. Accordingly, the arrangement of wood was actually a total of six cubits from the southwest corner of the altar, and the mishna can be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.",
            "The Gemara asks why Rav Adda bar Ahava interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: <b>But let him interpret it</b> to be <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei and</b> explain that the altar is located <b>in the center</b> of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara explains: Rav Adda bar Ahava interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda <b>because we heard that Rabbi Yehuda explicitly</b> said that the altar was positioned <b>in the center</b> of the Temple courtyard, whereas we did not hear that Rabbi Yosei maintains such an opinion.",
            "<b>And Rav Sherevya said:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna in <i>Tamid</i>, which holds that the entire altar was located in the northern part of the Temple courtyard? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Since it is stated: “And you shall set the Basin between the Tent of Meeting</b> and the altar” (Exodus 40:7), and another verse states: <b>“And</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>the altar of the burnt offering</b> he set at the entrance to the Tabernacle of the Tent of Meeting.” (Exodus 40:29), indicating that no object was allowed to be located between the altar and the Tent of Meeting, whose parallel, in the Temple, was the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives from these verses that only the <b>altar</b> stood <b>at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, but</b> the <b>Basin</b> did <b>not</b> stand <b>at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting. Where would</b> they <b>place</b> the Basin? It was placed <b>between the Entrance Hall and the altar, extended slightly toward the south.</b> Therefore, although the Basin was closer to the Sanctuary than the altar was, it did not actually stand between the altar and the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara seeks to clarify: <b>What does</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>hold? If he holds</b> that <b>the entire altar stands in the south</b> section of the Temple courtyard, <b>let him stand</b> the Basin anywhere <b>from</b> where <b>the wall of</b> the <b>Sanctuary</b> begins <b>and southward,</b> so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary but it is <b>between</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and the altar.</b> This would allow for the optimal fulfillment of both verses (Exodus 40:29; Leviticus 4:7), as the Basin would be located between the altar and the Sanctuary without interposing between the altar and the entrance to the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And even if he holds</b> that <b>the</b> level of <b>sanctity of</b> the <b>Sanctuary and</b> the <b>Entrance Hall is the same,</b> in which case the Basin could not be located opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall as this too would be considered a violation of the second verse, <b>let him stand</b> the Basin anywhere <b>from</b> where <b>the wall of</b> the <b>Entrance Hall</b> begins <b>and southward,</b> so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall but is <b>in between</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and the altar.</b> From the fact that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili did not say that, it is clear he held that the altar was not located in the southern section of the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Alternatively,</b> if Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>holds</b> that <b>half of</b> the altar was located <b>in the north</b> section of the Temple courtyard <b>and half of it</b> was located <b>in the south, let him stand</b> the Basin anywhere <b>from</b> where <b>the wall of</b> the <b>Sanctuary</b> begins <b>and southward,</b> so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary but <b>between</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and the altar.</b> Since the entrance to the Sanctuary was five cubits wide and stood in the middle of the courtyard, and the altar was thirty-two cubits long, there would have been eleven cubits to both the north and the south of the entrance to the Sanctuary where the Basin could be placed in order to be located between the altar and the Sanctuary without interposing between the altar and the entrance to the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>And even if</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>holds</b> that <b>the</b> level of <b>sanctity of</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and</b> that of the <b>Sanctuary is the same,</b> in which case the Basin could not be located opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall because this too would be considered a violation of the second verse, <b>let him stand</b> the Basin anywhere <b>from</b> where <b>the wall of</b> the <b>Entrance Hall</b> begins <b>and southward,</b> so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall but <b>in between</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and the altar.</b> Why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili require that the Basin be placed south of the altar? The Gemara concludes: <b>Rather, is it not due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>holds</b> that <b>the entire altar</b> stood <b>in the north</b> section of the Temple courtyard?",
            "The Gemara asks: Even if this is the case, why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili require that the Basin be located to the south of the altar so that it is not actually in between the altar and the Sanctuary? <b>Even if you stand it</b> anywhere <b>from</b> where <b>the wall of</b> the <b>Sanctuary</b> begins <b>and northward,</b> it would not interpose between the altar and the entrance to the Sanctuary but <b>it would</b> actually <b>be</b> located in <b>between</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and the altar.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> even if Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the sanctity of the Entrance Hall is equal to that of the Sanctuary, and that the Basin cannot interpose between the altar and the entrance to the Entrance Hall, <b>stand</b> the Basin anywhere <b>from</b> where <b>the wall of</b> the <b>Entrance Hall</b> begins <b>and northward,</b> so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall but it is located <b>in between</b> the <b>Entrance Hall and the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: That suggestion is technically not feasible, as <b>the verse states:</b> “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar <b>northward [<i>tzafona</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 1:11). This verse indicates <b>that the north</b> section of the Temple courtyard must <b>be vacant of</b> all <b>vessels,</b> including the Basin. This concludes the Gemara’s explanation of Rav Sherevya’s assertion that the mishna in <i>Tamid</i>, which holds that the altar was located in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:</b> The verse states: <b>“Northward</b> before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This indicates <b>that the north</b> section of the Temple courtyard must <b>be vacant of everything, and even of the altar.</b> Therefore, he maintains that the entire altar stood in the southern section of the Temple courtyard.",
            "§ <b>Rav says:</b> In a case of <b>an altar that was damaged, all sacrificial</b> animals <b>that were slaughtered there</b> are <b>disqualified.</b> Rav continues: <b>We have a verse</b> as the source for this <i>halakha</i> <b>but we have forgotten</b> which one <b>it</b> is. <b>When Rav Kahana,</b> Rav’s disciple, <b>ascended</b> from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, <b>he found Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: From where</b> is it derived that in the case of <b>an altar that was damaged, that all sacrificial</b> animals <b>that were slaughtered there</b> are <b>disqualified?</b>",
            "It is derived from a verse, <b>as it is stated</b> in the verse with regard to the altar: “An altar of earth you shall make for Me, <b>and you shall slaughter upon it your burnt offerings and your peace offerings [<i>shelamekha</i>]”</b> (Exodus 20:21). <b>Is it</b> true that <b>you slaughter</b> sacrificial animals <b>on</b> the altar itself? They are slaughtered on the ground near the altar. No, <b>rather,</b> the verse indicates that one is able to slaughter the sacrificial animals on account of the altar, i.e., <b>when</b> the altar <b>is complete [<i>shalem</i>], but not when it is lacking,</b> i.e., damaged. Rav Kahana <b>said: This is the verse that eluded Rav.</b>",
            "<b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both this</b> one <b>and that</b> one are <b>disqualified,</b> i.e., all animals that were designated as offerings when the altar was in a damaged state are disqualified, even if they were not yet slaughtered. The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to what</b> issue do Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>disagree?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Rav holds</b> that <b>living</b> animals <b>are not</b> permanently <b>deferred, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds</b> that <b>living</b> animals are permanently <b>deferred.</b> If the altar is damaged and it is therefore impossible to sacrifice offerings, Rav holds that only offerings that were already slaughtered become permanently deferred, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that even those that were not yet slaughtered become permanently deferred.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rav’s opinion, based on a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of <b>all sacrificial</b> animals <b>that were</b> consecrated <b>before the altar was built, and then the altar was</b> subsequently <b>built,</b> the animals are <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara assumes that this <i>baraita</i> is referring to animals that were consecrated before the building of the altar in the Second Temple. The Gemara responds: In a case where the animals were consecrated before the altar <b>was built,</b> the animals are considered <b>initially deferred,</b> i.e., deferred from the time they were initially consecrated. In this case all agree they are not permanently deferred and they can be sacrificed when the altar is built.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> explain the <i>baraita</i> as follows: If the animals were consecrated <b>before the altar was destroyed</b> in the First Temple, and then the altar was destroyed and rebuilt, the animals are still disqualified. The Gemara questions this reading: Can the <i>baraita</i> be referring to a case where the altar was <b>destroyed</b> in the First Temple? <b>Didn’t</b> the animals <b>become</b> too <b>old</b> for sacrifice by the time the altar was constructed in the Second Temple?",
            "The Gemara emends the <i>baraita</i> yet again: <b>Rather,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where one consecrated the animals <b>before the altar was damaged, and subsequently the altar was damaged.</b> The <i>halakha</i> is that the animals are <b>disqualified.</b> It seems from this <i>baraita</i> that even sacrificial animals that were not yet slaughtered when the altar became damaged are nevertheless permanently disqualified, in contrast to the opinion of Rav. The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>But did you not</b> already have to <b>emend</b> the text of the <i>baraita</i>? Emend it differently and <b>say that</b> the case is where the animals <b>were slaughtered</b> before the altar became damaged. Accordingly, there is no proof from this <i>baraita</i> with regard to the deferral of living animals.",
            "Rav said that sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard when the altar was in a damaged state are disqualified. The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t Rav Giddel say</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> In a case <b>where</b> the golden <b>altar became uprooted</b> from its location in the Sanctuary, <b>one may burn</b> the <b>incense in its place?</b> Apparently, it is not essential to have the altar in order to sacrifice offerings.",
            "The Gemara answers: It is <b>like that which Rava says</b> (60a): Although Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the entire Temple courtyard is fit for burning the sacrificial portions of offerings, <b>Rabbi Yehuda would concede with regard to</b> the presenting of the <b>blood</b> that it must be performed specifically on the altar. <b>Here too,</b> the Gemara says, <b>Rav concedes with regard to</b> the <b>blood</b> that an altar is required. Consequently, if consecrated offerings were slaughtered when the altar was in a damaged state, since the blood may not be presented, the offering is disqualified.",
            "Having briefly mentioned Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, the Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the context of the statement of <b>Rabbi Yehuda?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the inauguration of the Temple in the time of King Solomon: <b>“On that day the king sanctified the middle of the court</b> that was before the House of the Lord; as there he offered the burnt offering, and the meal offering, and the fat of the peace offerings; <b>because the copper altar that was before the Lord was too small to receive</b> the burnt offering, and the meal offering, and the fat of the peace offerings” (I Kings 8:64). <b>The matters</b> in the verse <b>are</b> to be understood <b>as they</b> are <b>written,</b> i.e., that the altar in the Temple was too small to receive all of the offerings that Solomon sacrificed, and Solomon therefore sanctified the Temple courtyard so that it, too, could function as an altar; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei said to him:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>But isn’t it already stated</b> with regard to the altar that Moses built: <b>“A thousand burnt offerings did Solomon offer upon that altar”</b> (I Kings 3:4), <b>while with regard to the Eternal House,</b> i.e., the Temple, <b>it states: “And Solomon offered for the sacrifice of peace offerings, which he offered to the Lord, two and twenty thousand cattle</b> and one hundred and twenty thousand sheep” (I Kings 8:63)?",
            "<b>And when you arrive at the calculation of burnt offerings and the number of cubits</b> for each altar, <b>this</b> was <b>greater than that,</b> i.e., Solomon sacrificed more offerings per square cubit on Moses’ altar than he did on the altar in the Temple upon its inauguration. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest that the altar in the Temple was not large enough to accommodate the number of offerings that Solomon sacrificed.",
            "Rabbi Yosei presents an alternative understanding of the verse: <b>Rather, what is</b> the meaning of the phrase “because the copper altar…<b>was too small to receive”?</b> It is not referring to the altar built by Solomon, but rather to the copper altar built in the time of Moses, which was disqualified from use from the day of the Temple’s inauguration on. Rather than stating outright that the altar became disqualified, the verse employed a euphemism, <b>like a person who says to his friend: So-and-so is a dwarf [<i>nanas</i>], and</b> what he really means to say is that he is <b>disqualified from</b> performing the Temple <b>service.</b> Similarly, rather than stating outright that the altar built in the time of Moses became disqualified, the verse states that it was too small to accommodate the offerings sacrificed in the Temple.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> respond to this claim? <b>Rabbi Yosei is saying well,</b> i.e., his claim is persuasive. The Gemara explains: <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> conforms <b>to his</b> standard line of <b>reasoning, as he says</b> that <b>the altar that Moses built was large. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states that the altar built in the time of Moses was: <b>“Five cubits long and five cubits wide”</b> (Exodus 27:1). <b>The matters</b> in the verse are to be understood <b>as they are written;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yosei.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda says: It is stated here</b> that the altar built in the time of Moses was: <b>“Square”</b> (Exodus 27:1), <b>and it is stated there,</b> in Ezekiel’s prophetic description of the altar, that it is: <b>“Square”</b> (Ezekiel 43:16). <b>Just as there,</b> in Ezekiel’s vision, <b>he was measuring</b> the distance in each direction <b>from its center, so too here,</b> the verse <b>was measuring</b> the altar that Moses built <b>from its center.</b> Accordingly, the altar built by Moses was ten cubits by ten cubits. As a result, Solomon sacrificed more offerings per square cubit of space on the altar in the Temple than he did on the altar built by Moses. It is therefore possible that the altar in the Temple was not sufficient to accommodate the offerings, and Solomon consecrated the Temple courtyard to serve as an altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And from where do we</b> derive that the altar mentioned <b>there,</b> in Ezekiel, was measured from its center? The Gemara answers: <b>As it is written: “And the hearth shall be twelve cubits</b> long by twelve wide, square, to its four sides” (Ezekiel 43:16). The Gemara asks: Does the verse mean twelve cubits <b>in each direction</b> from the center of the altar, so that in total it was twenty-four by twenty-four cubits? <b>Or</b> perhaps the altar was <b>only</b> a total of <b>twelve by twelve</b> cubits. The Gemara answers: <b>When</b> the verse <b>states: “To its four sides,” it teaches that</b> Ezekiel was <b>measuring from the center</b> of the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Yosei</b> respond to Rabbi Yehuda’s claim? The Gemara answers: <b>When he learns the verbal analogy, he learns it with regard to</b> the altar’s <b>height. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the altar built in the time of Moses: <b>“And its height shall be three cubits”</b> (Exodus 27:1). The <b>matters</b> in the verse are to be understood <b>as they are written,</b> i.e., that the height of the altar was three cubits. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says: It is stated here</b> that the altar built in the time of Moses was: <b>“Square”</b> (Exodus 27:1), <b>and it is stated there</b> that the incense altar was: <b>“Square”</b> (Exodus 30:2). The verbal analogy indicates that <b>just as there,</b> with regard to the incense altar, <b>its height</b> was <b>twice its length, so too here,</b> the height of the altar built in the time of Moses was <b>twice its length,</b> i.e., ten cubits.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda said to</b> Rabbi Yosei: <b>But isn’t it already stated:</b> “The length of <b>the court shall be a hundred cubits…and the height five cubits”</b> (Exodus 27:18)? Is it <b>possible</b> that the <b>priest</b> would <b>stand atop the altar and</b> hold the items with which he would perform the sacrificial <b>service in his hand, and the whole nation</b> could <b>see him from outside</b> the courtyard? That would constitute a lack of respect for the service in the Tabernacle.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei said</b> back <b>to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And the curtains of the court, and the screen for</b> the door of <b>the gate of the court which is by the Tabernacle and by the altar”</b> (Numbers 4:26)? This verse juxtaposes the Tabernacle with the altar to teach that <b>just as</b> the <b>Tabernacle</b> was <b>ten cubits</b> high, <b>so too,</b> the <b>altar</b> was <b>ten cubits</b> high. <b>And</b> another verse <b>states: “The curtains were fifteen</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>cubits for the one side”</b> (Exodus 38:14), which indicates that the height of the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle was fifteen cubits. <b>And what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states:</b> “And the height <b>five cubits”</b> (Exodus 27:18)? It is referring to the height of the curtains <b>from the</b> upper <b>edge of the altar and above;</b> the curtains surrounding the courtyard were five cubits higher than the altar.",
            "Rabbi Yosei continues: <b>And what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states:</b> “And you shall make the altar…<b>and its height shall be three cubits”</b> (Exodus 27:1)? The verse means that the altar measures three cubits <b>from the edge of</b> the <b>surrounding ledge and above.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who understands that the copper altar built in the time of Moses was actually three cubits high, interpret the verbal analogy based upon the word “square,” from which Rabbi Yosei derived that the height of the copper altar was ten cubits? The Gemara answers: <b>When he learns</b> the <b>verbal analogy, he learns it with regard to the</b> altar’s <b>width,</b> not its height. This is based on the verse in Ezekiel (see 59b). Accordingly, it teaches that the altar built in the time of Moses was ten cubits by ten cubits.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And according to Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who maintains that the altar was three cubits high and the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle were five cubits high, <b>isn’t the priest visible</b> while performing the service atop the altar? The Gemara answers: <b>Granted, the priest is visible,</b> but the items with which he performs the sacrificial <b>service that</b> are <b>in his hand</b> are <b>not visible.</b>",
            "The Gemara returns to the original dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei with regard to whether or not Solomon consecrated the floor of the Temple courtyard. <b>Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who maintains that the floor of the Temple courtyard was consecrated so that it could serve as an altar, <b>this is</b> the meaning of that <b>which is written:</b> “The king <b>sanctified</b> the middle of the court” (I Kings 8:64). <b>But according to Rabbi Yosei, what</b> is the meaning of the phrase “the king <b>sanctified”?</b> The Gemara answers: It means that Solomon sanctified the courtyard in order <b>to stand the altar in it.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>Granted, according to Rabbi Yosei,</b> who maintains that the surface of the altar built in the time of Moses was five cubits by five cubits, <b>this is</b> the meaning of that <b>which is written</b> in the continuation of that verse: “Because the copper altar that was before the Lord was <b>too small</b> to receive.” <b>But according to Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who maintains that its surface area was ten cubits by ten cubits, <b>what</b> is the meaning of the phrase <b>“too small”?</b> The Gemara answers: The verse is referring to the altar built by Solomon, and <b>this</b> is what it <b>is saying: The stone altar that Solomon built in place of the copper altar</b> built in the time of Moses <b>was</b> too <b>small</b> to accommodate the large quantity of offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to what</b> principle do Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei <b>disagree</b> that causes them to interpret differently the verbal analogy based on the word “square”? The Gemara answers: One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yehuda, <b>holds</b> that <b>we derive</b> the dimensions of the <b>external</b> altar built in the time of Moses <b>from</b> the <b>external</b> altar described in Ezekiel; <b>but we do not derive</b> the dimensions of the <b>external</b> altar <b>from</b> the dimensions of the <b>inner</b> altar, used for burning the incense.",
            "<b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yosei, <b>holds</b> that <b>we derive</b> the dimensions of a portable <b>vessel,</b> i.e., the copper altar built in the time of Moses, <b>from</b> the dimensions of another portable <b>vessel,</b> i.e., the golden incense altar built at that time; <b>but we do not derive</b> the dimensions of a portable <b>vessel from</b> the dimensions of <b>an edifice,</b> i.e., the stone altar in the Temple.",
            "§ <b>Rava says:</b> Although <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> maintains that the entire Temple courtyard is fit for burning the sacrificial portions of offerings, he <b>concedes with regard to</b> the <b>blood</b> and holds that it must be presented on the altar, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> On Passover eve, a priest <b>would fill one cup with the blood of the</b> many offerings brought that day and that was now <b>mixed</b> together on the floor. <b>And</b> then he would <b>pour it on the altar, so that if</b> all of <b>the blood of one of the</b> offerings had been <b>spilled</b> and was never presented on the altar, <b>this</b> cup would contain a small amount of that blood and pouring it on the altar <b>would render</b> the offering <b>fit.</b>",
            "Rava explains his proof: <b>And if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda maintains the entire Temple courtyard was consecrated</b> so that it had the status of the altar, then <b>the mitzva of</b> sacrificing the Paschal offering <b>was performed</b> even if the blood spilled on the ground of the courtyard and was never presented on the altar.",
            "The Gemara attempts to reject this proof: <b>Perhaps</b> Rabbi Yehuda requires pouring a cup of the mixture of blood on the altar <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that he holds we require pouring</b> of the blood of the Paschal offering <b>by human force.</b> Since the blood on the floor of the courtyard was not poured there by a person, the mitzva has not yet been fulfilled despite the fact that the floor has the same status as the altar. The Gemara responds: <b>If so, let</b> the priest <b>take</b> the cup of the mixture of blood <b>and pour it in its place</b> on the floor rather than on the altar.",
            "The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: <b>But perhaps</b> Rabbi Yehuda requires the blood to be poured on the altar only <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that we require</b> the <b>mitzva</b> to be performed in <b>the optimal</b> manner. Even if Rabbi Yehuda holds that the floor of the courtyard has the same status as the altar, he would agree that it is preferable for the blood to be poured on the altar itself.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> In the case of <b>an altar that was damaged, one may not eat the remainder of a meal offering on its account, as it is stated:</b> “Take the meal offering…<b>and eat it without leaven beside the altar;</b> for it is most holy” (Leviticus 10:12). The verse is difficult: <b>But did</b> the priests have to <b>eat</b> the meal offering <b>beside the altar?</b> A priest may eat sacrificial items even of the most sacred order anywhere in the Temple courtyard. <b>Rather,</b> the verse means that one may eat the meal offering only <b>at a time when</b> the altar <b>is complete, but not at a time when it is lacking.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>We found</b> a source for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <b>remainder of a meal offering; from where do we</b> derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies to all <b>offerings of the most sacred order?</b> The Gemara answers: The end of <b>the verse states:</b> “For it is <b>most holy.”</b> Since this term is also used with regard to the other offerings of the most sacred order, it is derived through verbal analogy that these offerings may not be eaten if the altar is damaged.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>From where</b> is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> also applies to <b>offerings of lesser sanctity? Abaye said:</b> It is <b>derived from the exposition of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yosei says three</b> halakhic <b>matters in the name of</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>three elders, and this is one of them: Rabbi Yishmael says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>a person would bring second-tithe</b> produce <b>up to Jerusalem in the present,</b> after the destruction of the Temple, <b>and eat it. And</b> ostensibly, <b>it</b> could be derived by means of <b>a logical inference</b> that one may not do so: <b>A firstborn</b> offering <b>requires bringing</b> it <b>to</b> the <b>place,</b> to Jerusalem, and eating it there, <b>and</b> second<b>-tithe</b> produce <b>requires bringing</b> it <b>to</b> the <b>place</b> (see Deuteronomy 12:17–18); <b>just as</b> the <b>firstborn</b> offering may be eaten there <b>only in the presence of the Temple, so too,</b> second<b>-tithe</b> produce may be eaten there <b>only in the presence of the Temple.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yishmael notes that this derivation can be challenged: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a firstborn?</b> Bringing the firstborn to Jerusalem is required only in the presence of the Temple, because it is notable <b>in that it requires placement of</b> its <b>blood and</b> its <b>sacrificial portions upon</b> the <b>altar;</b> will you say the same with regard to second-tithe produce, which requires only that it be consumed in Jerusalem?",
            "He continues: <b>First fruits will prove</b> that placement of blood upon the altar is not a factor, as they do not require placement of blood upon the altar, and yet they are brought to Jerusalem only in the presence of the Temple. Rabbi Yishmael counters: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about first fruits?</b> They are notable <b>in that they require placement</b> alongside the altar. Perhaps, since second-tithe produce does not require placement at all, even in the present one must bring it to Jerusalem and eat it there.",
            "Rabbi Yishmael concludes: Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And there you shall bring your burnt offerings,</b> and your sacrifices, and your tithes…and the firstborns of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:6); the Torah <b>juxtaposes</b> second-<b>tithe</b> produce <b>with</b> the <b>firstborn. Just as</b> the <b>firstborn</b> offering may be eaten there <b>only in the presence of the Temple, so too,</b> second<b>-tithe</b> produce may be eaten there <b>only in the presence of the Temple.</b>",
            "The Gemara questions why a verse was needed to teach that second-tithe produce may not be consumed nowadays: <b>But let the logical derivation return and</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>will be derived from the common element</b> between the <i>halakhot</i> of firstborn animals and first fruits. Although each has a unique factor, they share a common element: They must be brought to Jerusalem and they may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple. So too, second-tithe produce, which also must be brought to Jerusalem, should be permitted for consumption only in the presence of the Temple.",
            "The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael did not present this derivation <b>because</b> it <b>can be refuted</b> in the following manner: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about</b> the two sources that share <b>a common element?</b> Both firstborn animals and first fruits are notable <b>in that they possess an aspect</b> of being offered upon the <b>altar.</b> Since second-tithe produce does not share this characteristic, its <i>halakhot</i> cannot be derived from those pertaining to firstborn animals and first fruits.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What does</b> Rabbi Yishmael <b>hold? If he holds</b> that the <b>initial consecration</b> of the Temple <b>sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever,</b> then it should be permitted to build an altar and sacrifice offerings even nowadays, and therefore <b>even a firstborn</b> animal may be eaten. <b>And if he holds</b> that the initial consecration of the Temple area <b>did not sanctify it forever, let the dilemma be raised</b> with regard to <b>a firstborn as well.</b>",
            "<b>Ravina said: Actually,</b> Rabbi Yishmael <b>holds</b> that the initial consecration of the Temple <b>did not sanctify it</b> forever. <b>And</b> although one cannot slaughter the firstborn to begin with, <b>here we are dealing with a firstborn</b> that was slaughtered and <b>whose blood was sprinkled</b> on the altar <b>before the destruction of the Temple, and</b> then <b>the Temple was destroyed, and the meat of</b> the firstborn <b>still exists.</b>",
            "It is prohibited to eat the meat of the firstborn in this case because <b>its meat was juxtaposed with its blood,</b> which is mentioned in the previous verse, as it is stated: “You shall sprinkle their blood…and you shall burn their fats…and their flesh shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). The juxtaposition teaches that <b>just as its blood</b> is sprinkled only <b>on the altar, so too, its meat</b> may be consumed only <b>in</b> a time when there is <b>an altar. And</b> the case of second-<b>tithe</b> produce <b>comes and is derived from</b> the case of <b>a firstborn.</b> Consequently, second-tithe produce may not be consumed unless there is an altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition</b> with another case <b>then teach</b> that the <i>halakha</i> applies to a third case <b>via a juxtaposition</b> between the second and third cases? There is a principle that this is not a valid method of deriving <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to consecrated matters. Since the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meat of the firstborn offering is derived from the juxtaposition of the meat with the blood of the firstborn, one cannot then prove that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to second-tithe produce simply because it is juxtaposed in a verse with the meat of the firstborn. The Gemara answers: Second-<b>tithe grain is non-sacred,</b> and therefore the acceptable methods for deriving its <i>halakhot</i> are not limited in this manner.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>This works out well according to the one who says:</b> In determining whether the derivation involves consecrated matters or whether it involves non-sacred matters, <b>we follow</b> the matter that <b>is derived</b> from a matter derived from a juxtaposition. Since in this case the matter derived is second-tithe produce, which for these purposes is non-sacred, its legal status may be derived from juxtaposition with the <i>halakhot</i> of sacrificial matters. <b>But according to the one who says: We follow</b> the matter that <b>teaches,</b> i.e., from which the <i>halakha</i> is derived, <b>what is there to say?</b> The status of second-tithe produce may not be derived by means of juxtaposition with the status of the firstborn offering, which itself was derived from the blood of the offering, because the firstborn offering is a sacrificial matter.",
            "The Gemara answers: This is not a matter derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition, as the status of the firstborn offering is not derived from the status of blood; <b>blood and meat are one matter.</b> There is only one derivation in this case, which is that the status of second-tithe produce is derived from the status of the blood and the meat of the firstborn. In any event, Abaye has proven, quoting Rabbi Yishmael’s statement cited by Rabbi Yosei, that even sacrificial items of lesser sanctity may not be eaten if the altar is missing or damaged.",
            "The Gemara relates: <b>When Ravin ascended</b> from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, <b>he stated this <i>halakha</i>,</b> that even items of lesser sanctity are disqualified if the altar is damaged or missing, <b>in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya.</b> Rabbi Yirmeya <b>said: Foolish Babylonians! Because they dwell in a dark land, they state <i>halakhot</i> that are dim. Have they not heard that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>At the time</b> when the Jewish people would dismantle the Tabernacle in order to <b>depart</b> on their <b>journeys</b> in the wilderness, <b>sacrificial</b> food was <b>disqualified</b> from being consumed, since the altar was not in place. Nevertheless, <b><i>zavim</i> and lepers</b> were <b>sent out of</b> the relevant <b>partition;</b> a <i>zav</i> was sent out of the Levite camp and a leper was sent out of the Israelite camp.",
            "<b>And it is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: <b>Sacrificial</b> food could be <b>consumed in two locations,</b> i.e., one could eat it while the Tabernacle was in place and one could continue eating it after the Tabernacle had been disassembled and transported. <b>What, is it not</b> that <b>this</b> first <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to offerings of the most sacred order,</b> and <b>that</b> second <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to offerings of lesser sanctity?</b> Accordingly, Abaye’s statement that offerings of lesser sanctity may not be consumed if the altar is damaged is incorrect.",
            "<b>Ravina said</b> that there is an alternative reconciliation of the two <i>baraitot</i>: Both <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>and that</b> <i>baraita</i> are referring <b>to offerings of lesser sanctity, and</b> it is <b>not difficult:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>This</b> first <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yishmael,</b> who derives that meat of a firstborn offering, which is an offering of lesser sanctity, cannot be consumed if the altar is damaged or absent, based upon the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to the blood of the firstborn. <b>That</b> second <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Sages,</b> who disagree with Rabbi Yishmael.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> there is a different resolution of the two <i>baraitot</i>: Both <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>and that</b> <i>baraita</i> are referring <b>to offerings of the most sacred order. And what</b> does the second <i>baraita</i> mean when it says the food may be consumed <b>in two locations?</b> It is referring to when the Israelites arrive at a new camp, <b>before the Levites erect the Tabernacle,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and,</b> when they are leaving the camp, <b>after the Levites dismantle the Tabernacle</b> but before they remove the altar. Since the altar has not yet been moved, it is still permitted to consume the sacrificial food.",
            "The Gemara continues: It was necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> <b>lest you say</b> that once the partitions surrounding the courtyard have been taken down, the sacrificial food <b>has been disqualified because</b> it is considered to have <b>left</b> the courtyard of the Tabernacle. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that the food is permitted for consumption as long as the altar remains in place.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And say</b> it is <b>indeed</b> so, that the sacrificial food should be disqualified because it is no longer within the partitions surrounding the courtyard. The Gemara explains: <b>The verse states: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall travel”</b> (Numbers 2:17). This verse indicates that <b>even though it traveled it is</b> still considered <b>the Tent of Meeting.</b> Therefore, the sacrificial food is not considered to have left its designated area.",
            "§ The Gemara raises another discussion concerning the altar: <b>Rav Huna says</b> that <b>Rav says: The altar in Shiloh was</b> fashioned <b>of stones,</b> unlike the portable altar constructed in the time of Moses, which was fashioned from copper. This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Why</b> must <b>the verses state</b> that the altar must be fashioned from <b>stones</b> (Exodus 20:22), and state again that the altar must be fashioned from <b>stones</b> (Deuteronomy 27:5), and mention yet again the word <b>stones</b> (Deuteronomy 27:6), with regard to the altar, for a total of <b>three times?</b> These allude to three different stone altars: <b>One in Shiloh, and one in Nov and Gibeon, and</b> one in the <b>Eternal House,</b> i.e., the Temple.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa bar Ami raises an objection</b> based on a <i>baraita</i>: The <b>fire that descended from Heaven</b> upon the altar <b>in the days of Moses</b> (see Leviticus 9:24) <b>departed from atop the copper altar only in the days of Solomon,</b> when he replaced the copper altar with a stone altar, <b>and</b> the <b>fire that descended</b> upon the altar <b>in the days of Solomon did not depart until Manasseh came and removed it</b> by destroying the altar. <b>And if it is so</b> that the altar in Shiloh was fashioned of stones, <b>it</b> emerges <b>that</b> the fire <b>departed</b> the copper altar <b>earlier,</b> when the stone altar in Shiloh replaced the copper altar of Moses, many years before King Solomon.",
            "The Gemara explains: Rav Huna <b>stated</b> his opinion <b>in accordance with</b> the statement of <b>Rabbi Natan, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Natan says: The altar in Shiloh was</b> fashioned <b>of copper;</b> it was <b>hollow and full of stones.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says</b> there is an alternative answer: <b>What</b> is the meaning of the statement in the <i>baraita</i> that the fire <b>did not depart</b> until the days of Solomon? It means that <b>it did not depart</b> in a manner in which it was <b>nullified;</b> it was still somewhat present in Shiloh on the copper altar, which stood together with the stone altar. The Gemara asks: <b>What is it,</b> i.e., what does it mean that the fire did not depart in a manner in which it was nullified? The Gemara answers: <b>The Rabbis say:</b> The fire on the copper altar <b>would emit sparks</b> toward the stone altar when the priests would sacrifice offerings on the stone altar. <b>Rav Pappa says:</b> The fire <b>was</b> as <b>a guest; sometimes</b> it was <b>here,</b> on the copper altar, <b>and sometimes</b> it was <b>there,</b> on the stone altar.",
            "§ The Gemara continues discussing the altar: <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (<i>Middot</i> 35b): The altar in the First Temple was twenty-eight by twenty-eight cubits. <b>When the members of the exile ascended</b> to Jerusalem in the beginning of the Second Temple period, <b>they added four cubits to it on the south and four cubits on the west</b> sides of the altar, <b>like</b> the shape of the Greek letter <b>gamma,</b> i.e., the additions made a right angle. As a result, the altar in the Second Temple was thirty-two by thirty-two cubits. The Gemara asks: <b>What was the reason</b> for this expansion? <b>Rav Yosef said: Because</b> the size of the altar from the First Temple <b>was not sufficient.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to him: Now,</b> if in <b>the First Temple</b> era, <b>about which it is written: “Judah and Israel were many as the sand that is by the sea”</b> (I Kings 4:20), the altar <b>was sufficient,</b> how could it be that in <b>the Second Temple</b> era, <b>about which it is written: “The whole congregation together was forty</b> and two <b>thousand</b> three hundred and sixty” (Ezra 2:64), the altar <b>was not sufficient?</b> Rav Yosef <b>said to</b> Abaye: <b>There,</b> in the First Temple, a <b>heavenly fire</b> would <b>assist them</b> and consume the offerings. <b>Here,</b> in the Second Temple, there was <b>no heavenly fire</b> that would <b>assist them.</b> Therefore, they needed a larger area in which to burn the offerings.",
            "<b>When Ravin came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that which <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says in the name of Bar Kappara</b> with regard to the expansion of the altar: <b>They expanded</b> the altar to extend over the underground <b>cavities</b> into which the libations flowed. <b>Initially,</b> in the First Temple era, <b>they held</b> that when the verse states: <b>“An altar of earth</b> you shall make for Me” (Exodus 20:21), it means <b>that it</b> should be completely <b>filled with earth.</b>",
            "<b>But ultimately,</b> in the Second Temple era, <b>they maintained</b> that the altar’s <b>drinking is like</b> its <b>eating,</b> i.e., just as the offerings are burned upon the altar, so too, the libations must be poured onto the altar itself and not down its side. Consequently, they expanded the altar to cover the underground cavities, and created holes in the altar so that the libations could be poured on top of the altar and flow into the underground cavities. <b>And</b> according to this, <b>what</b> is the meaning of the phrase <b>“an altar of earth”?</b> It teaches <b>that</b> the altar must <b>be attached to the earth,</b> so <b>that one may not build it on top of arches</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> one may <b>not</b> build it <b>on top of tunnels.</b>",
            "The Gemara relates that after reconsidering the reason for the expansion of the altar, <b>Rav Yosef said: Is this not as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: <b>“And they set the altar upon its bases”</b> (Ezra 3:3), which teaches <b>that</b> in the Second Temple the size of the altar <b>reached its full measure,</b> i.e., that it was the ideal size, whereas in the First Temple it was not the ideal size? The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written</b> with regard to the instructions David gave Solomon about how to build the Temple: <b>“All this in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by His hand upon me,</b> even all the works of this pattern” (I Chronicles 28:19), indicating that the design of the First Temple was dictated by God?",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Yosef said:</b> The size of the altar in the First Temple was ideal, but in the Second Temple era there was a need to expand the altar, and they <b>found a verse and interpreted</b> it as follows. The verse states: <b>“Then David said: This is the House of the Lord God, and this is the altar of burnt offering for Israel”</b> (I Chronicles 22:1). The verse juxtaposes the House, i.e., the Temple, with the altar, which indicates that the altar is <b>like</b> the <b>Temple: Just as</b> the <b>House</b> was <b>sixty cubits</b> (see I Kings 6:2), <b>so too,</b> the <b>altar</b> may be extended up to a length of <b>sixty cubits.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara discusses the construction of the altar in the Second Temple. The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> with regard to the location of the <b>House, its shape</b> was <b>discernable</b> from the vestiges of its foundations; <b>but how did they know</b> the proper location of the <b>altar?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers that <b>Rabbi Elazar says: They saw</b> a vision of the <b>altar</b> already <b>built and Michael the archangel standing and sacrificing</b> offerings <b>upon it. And Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: They saw</b> a vision of <b>the ashes of Isaac</b> that were <b>placed in that location. And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: From the entire House they smelled the scent of incense,</b> yet <b>from there,</b> the location of the altar, <b>they smelled a scent of</b> burned animal <b>limbs.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba bar bar Ḥana says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Three prophets ascended with them from the exile: One who testified to them about</b> the size and shape of <b>the altar, and one who testified to them about the</b> proper <b>location of the altar, and one who testified to them that one sacrifices</b> offerings <b>even if there is no Temple,</b> provided that there is a proper altar.",
            "It <b>was taught in a <i>baraita</i></b> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Three prophets ascended with</b> the Jewish people <b>from the exile: One who testified to them about</b> the size and shape of <b>the altar and about the</b> proper <b>location of the altar, and one who testified to them that one sacrifices</b> offerings <b>even if there is no Temple, and one who testified to them about the Torah</b> and instructed <b>that it be written</b> in <b>Assyrian script [<i>Ashurit</i>]</b> rather than the ancient Hebrew script used in the times of Moses.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The <b>corner</b> built at each point where the edges of the altar meet, the <b>ramp</b> upon which the priests ascended the altar, the <b>base</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> the requirement that the altar must be exactly <b>square, are</b> all <b>indispensable</b> in order for the altar to be fit for use. But <b>the measurement of its length, and the measurement of its width, and the measurement of its height are not indispensable.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Rav Huna says:</b> In reference to each of these characteristics <b>the verse states</b> the term <b>“the altar,”</b> and there is a principle that <b>wherever</b> the term <b>“the altar” is stated,</b> it serves <b>to</b> indicate that the halakhic detail mentioned is <b>indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If that is so,</b> then the <b>engraving [<i>kiyyur</i>]</b> that was on the altar <b>according to Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>or</b> the <b>surrounding ledge</b> of the altar <b>according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,</b> should <b>also be indispensable, as it is written: “And you shall put it under the <i>karkov</i> of the altar beneath”</b> (Exodus 27:5). <b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>What is</b> the <b><i>karkov</i>? Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: This is</b> the <b>engraving</b> on the altar. <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: This is the surrounding ledge.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Yes,</b> the <i>karkov</i> is also indispensable, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: On <b>that day</b> when <i>etrogim</i> were pelted at a Sadducee priest who poured the water libation of <i>Sukkot</i> on his feet rather than on the altar (see <i>Sukka</i> 48b), <b>the corner of the altar was damaged</b> as a result of the pelting and the ensuing chaos. <b>They brought a fistful of salt and sealed</b> the damaged section. They did this <b>not because</b> it rendered the altar <b>fit for the</b> Temple <b>service, but</b> in deference to the altar, <b>so that the altar would not be seen</b> in its <b>damaged</b> state. The reason the altar is disqualified is <b>because any altar that does not have a corner, a ramp, and a base, and</b> any altar that is not <b>square,</b> is <b>disqualified. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even the surrounding ledge</b> is indispensable.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>What is</b> the <b><i>karkov</i></b> of the altar? It is the area <b>between</b> one <b>corner and</b> the next <b>corner,</b> which is the <b>cubit-</b>wide <b>place</b> on top of the altar where <b>the priests</b> would <b>walk.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>Is that to say</b> that <b>the priests would walk between</b> one <b>corner and</b> the next <b>corner?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, say:</b> The <i>karkov</i> is the cubit-wide area between one corner and the other, <b>and</b> there was an additional <b>cubit</b> that was <b>the place</b> where <b>the priests</b> would <b>walk.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written:</b> “And he made for the altar a grating of network of brass, <b>under the <i>karkov</i> beneath, reaching halfway up”</b> (Exodus 38:4), which indicates that the <i>karkov</i> was on the side of the altar and not on top of it? The Gemara answers: <b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There were two</b> entities called <i>karkov</i>. <b>One</b> was a slight protrusion above the midway point of the altar <b>for aesthetic</b> purposes, <b>and one</b> was an indentation on top of the altar <b>for</b> the benefit of <b>the priests,</b> to ensure <b>that they</b> would <b>not slip</b> off the top of the altar.",
            "It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> cited above that <b>the measurement of</b> the altar’s <b>length, and the measurement of its width, and the measurement of its height are not indispensable. Rabbi Mani says:</b> This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>provided that one does not decrease its</b> size so that it is smaller <b>than</b> the <b>altar constructed by Moses.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>And how</b> large was the altar constructed by Moses? <b>Rav Yosef says:</b> One <b>cubit.</b> Those in the study hall <b>mocked</b> Rav Yosef, as it is written explicitly: <b>“Five cubits long and five cubits wide; the altar shall be square”</b> (Exodus 27:1).",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rav Yosef: <b>Perhaps the Master is speaking</b> about <b>the area of the arrangement</b> of wood? Since the corners took up one cubit on each side and there was an additional cubit on each side for the priests to walk, only one cubit was left for the arrangement of wood. Rav Yosef <b>said to</b> Abaye: <b>The Master,</b> i.e., Abaye, <b>who is a great man, knows what I</b> mean to <b>say.</b> Rav Yosef <b>read,</b> i.e., applied, the following verse <b>to those</b> who mocked him:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>“The children of Keturah”</b> (Genesis 25:4). Although Keturah’s children were children of Abraham, they were not of the same caliber as Isaac. Similarly, Rav Yosef was saying that his other students were not of the caliber of Abaye. Having mentioned this term, the Gemara relates: <b>The sons of Rabbi Tarfon’s sister were sitting</b> silently <b>before Rabbi Tarfon.</b> In an attempt to encourage them to say something, <b>he began and said:</b> The verse states: <b>And Abraham took another wife, and her name was Yoḥani. They said to</b> Rabbi Tarfon: <b>It is written: “Keturah”</b> (Genesis 25:1), not Yoḥani. Rabbi Tarfon <b>read,</b> i.e., said, <b>about them</b> the phrase <b>“the children of Keturah”</b> as they were able to contribute only this small piece of information.",
            "§ <b>Abaye bar Huna says</b> that <b>Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says:</b> With regard to the <b>logs that Moses prepared</b> for the mitzva of burning wood upon the altar, <b>their length</b> was <b>a cubit and their width</b> was <b>a cubit, and their thickness</b> was <b>like</b> that of <b>a leveler,</b> a kind of flat stick used to remove the excess grain <b>heaped</b> on top of a container that holds one <b><i>se’a</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya says:</b> The length and width of the logs mentioned were measured <b>with a shortened cubit. Rav Yosef said: Is this not as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“Upon the wood that is on the fire that is upon the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:8). The seemingly superfluous phrase “that is upon the altar” teaches <b>that the wood should not extend at all beyond</b> the area of <b>the altar</b> designated for the arrangement of wood. Since this area was one square cubit, the logs were exactly one cubit as well.",
            "§ The Gemara discusses the ramp of the altar: <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (<i>Middot</i> 36a): <b>There was a ramp</b> that was located <b>on the south</b> side <b>of the altar,</b> whose size was <b>a length</b> of <b>thirty-two</b> cubits <b>by a width</b> of <b>sixteen</b> cubits. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived, i.e., from where is it derived that the ramp is on the south side of the altar? <b>Rav Huna said: The verse states: “And he shall slaughter it on the side [<i>yerekh</i>] of the altar northward”</b> (Leviticus 1:11), which teaches <b>that</b> the altar’s <b>thigh [<i>yarekh</i>] should be</b> located <b>in the north, and its face,</b> i.e., the front of the altar where the priests ascend to it, should be <b>in the south.</b> The verse likens the positioning of the altar to a person who is lying down flat, in which case if his legs are to the north, his face is to the south.",
            "The Gemara asks: Why not <b>say</b> that its <b>thigh</b> should be <b>in the north and its face</b> should also be <b>in the north?</b> Perhaps the verse is referring to a person sitting with both his face and feet in the north. <b>Rava said</b> in response: <b>Place the man on his face,</b> i.e., the analogy is to a man who is lying down. <b>Abaye said to him: On the contrary, sit the man straight up</b> so that his face and his legs are facing the same direction.",
            "Rava <b>said</b> back <b>to him: It is written</b> in a verse that the altar must be <b>“square [<i>ravua</i>]”</b> (Exodus 27:1), which indicates lying down or crouching, as it is similar to the term <i>ravutz</i>, meaning crouching. Abaye challenges Rava: <b>But</b> this word is <b>necessary to</b> teach <b>that</b> the altar must be <b>square.</b> Rava responds: <b>Is it written</b> in the verse that the altar must be <b>square [<i>merubba</i>]?</b> The verse specifically uses the form <i>ravua</i> in order to allude to the word <i>ravutz</i>, crouching. Abaye counters: <b>According to your reasoning, is it written</b> in the verse that the altar must be <b><i>ravutz</i>?</b> Rava answers: It <b>is written</b> in the verse that the altar must be <b><i>ravua</i>, which</b> is a term that <b>indicates this,</b> i.e., that the altar must be square, <b>and indicates that,</b> i.e., that its positioning is comparable to that of a person who is lying down.",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>And</b> another <b><i>tanna</i> cites</b> the source for the ramp’s positioning <b>from here, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The verse states with regard to the future altar: <b>“And its steps shall look [<i>penot</i>] toward the east”</b> (Ezekiel 43:17), which indicates that <b>all the turns [<i>pinot</i>] that you turn should be only to the right</b> and you should turn <b>to the east.</b> Only if the ramp is in the south can one turn to the right and be facing eastward.",
            "The Gemara challenges: The verse indicates only that after a person turns he is facing eastward. Why not <b>say</b> that the ramp was located in the north and the priest turns <b>left</b> and faces <b>eastward?</b> The Gemara answers: This possibility should <b>not enter your mind, as Rami bar Yeḥizkiya teaches:</b> A verse describes the <b>sea,</b> i.e., the Basin, <b>that Solomon built,</b> in the following terms: <b>“It stood upon twelve oxen, three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the north, and three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the west, and three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the south, and three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the east”</b> (II Chronicles 4:4). From the order of the directions in which the verse lists the groups of oxen under the Basin, it can be derived that <b>all the turns that you turn should be only to the right</b> and <b>to the east.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>That</b> verse <b>is necessary to</b> teach <b>its own</b> information describing the Basin. The Gemara explains: <b>If so, why do I</b> need the verse to repeat the term <b><i>ponim</i>, <i>ponim</i>?</b> It must be in order to teach how one turns while performing the sacrificial rite upon the altar, which, in turn, teaches the location of the ramp.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Yosei:</b> Is it so that <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai used to say</b> that <b>there is airspace,</b> i.e., a gap, <b>between the ramp and the altar?</b> Rabbi Yosei <b>said to him: And you, don’t you say so</b> as well? <b>But isn’t it already stated: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:27)? The verse juxtaposes the flesh of the burnt offering with its blood to teach that <b>just as</b> the <b>blood</b> is presented upon the altar <b>via tossing</b> while the priest stands on the ground next to the altar (see Leviticus 1:5), <b>so too,</b> the <b>flesh</b> of the burnt offering is presented <b>via tossing.</b> In order to fulfill this requirement, the priest stands on the ramp and tosses the flesh over the gap between the ramp and the altar, so that it lands on the arrangement of wood.",
            "Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya <b>said to him:</b> If the verse simply teaches that the flesh must be tossed onto the arrangement of wood, it does not prove that there must be a gap between the ramp and the altar, <b>as I say</b> that the priest should <b>stand next to</b> the <b>arrangement</b> of wood <b>and toss</b> the flesh onto it.",
            "Rabbi Yosei <b>said to him: When he tosses</b> the flesh, <b>does he toss</b> it <b>onto</b> a part of the <b>arrangement</b> of wood that is <b>burning or does he toss</b> it <b>onto</b> a part of the <b>arrangement</b> of wood <b>that is not burning? You must say</b> that <b>he tosses</b> it <b>onto</b> a part of the <b>arrangement</b> of wood that is <b>burning.</b> And <b>there,</b> according to your suggestion that the priest is standing next to the arrangement of wood, he would have to toss the flesh, <b>because it is impossible</b> to place the flesh directly into the fire without the priest getting burned. It would be unnecessary for the verse to teach that the priest tosses the flesh while standing next to the arrangement. Consequently, when the verse juxtaposed the blood with the flesh, it must be teaching that the flesh must be tossed over a gap between the ramp and the altar.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says:</b> The requirement that there be a gap between the ramp and the altar can be derived from this verse, because the juxtaposition teaches that the flesh is <b>like blood</b> in the manner in which it is tossed: <b>Just as</b> with regard to the <b>blood</b> there is <b>space</b> on the <b>ground</b> that <b>interposes</b> between the priest and the altar, <b>so too</b> with regard to the <b>flesh,</b> there is <b>space</b> on the <b>ground</b> that <b>interposes</b> between the priest and the altar, i.e., he stands on the ground next to the altar and tosses the flesh onto the altar.",
            "§ The Gemara continues discussing the ramp: <b>Rav Yehuda says:</b> There were <b>two small ramps protruding from the</b> main <b>ramp</b> that led to the altar, <b>on which</b> the priests could <b>turn to the base</b> of the altar <b>and to the surrounding ledge</b> of the altar. They were <b>separated from the altar</b> by <b>a hairbreadth, because it is stated: “Roundabout”</b> (Leviticus 1:5), with regard to the altar. This indicates that nothing is attached to the entire perimeter of the altar. <b>And Rabbi Abbahu says</b> there is a different source, as it states: <b>“Square”</b> (Exodus 27:1), and if the ramps would be connected to the altar it would no longer be square.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And it was necessary</b> for the verse <b>to write: “Roundabout,” and it was necessary</b> for the verse <b>to write: “Square,” as, had the Merciful One written</b> only: <b>“Roundabout,” I would say that</b> the altar <b>can be circular.</b> Therefore, <b>the Merciful One wrote</b> that the altar must be <b>“square.” And had the Merciful One written</b> only that the altar must be <b>“square [<i>ravua</i>],” I would say that</b> the word <i>ravua</i> simply means rectangular and the altar can be <b>long and narrow.</b> Therefore, <b>the Merciful One wrote</b> the term <b>“roundabout,”</b> which teaches that the altar must not have some sides that are longer than others.",
            "§ <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>elsewhere</b> (<i>Middot</i> 37b): <b>The ramp and the altar</b> together were <b>sixty-two</b> cubits long. The Gemara challenges: The dimensions of <b>these are sixty-four</b> cubits, as the altar and the ramp were each thirty-two cubits long (<i>Middot</i> 36a). The Gemara explains: The thirty-two-cubit measurement of the ramp is explained by a <i>baraita</i> that states: It <b>is found</b> that the ramp of the altar <b>overhung</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar by one <b>cubit and</b> the <b>surrounding ledge</b> by one <b>cubit,</b> resulting in an aggregate length of thirty-two cubits."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rami bar Ḥama says:</b> The slope of <b>each</b> of the <b>minor ramps,</b> was <b>one cubit</b> of rise <b>per three cubits</b> of run; this was true <b>aside from the</b> main <b>ramp of the altar, which</b> rose one cubit in <b>three and a half cubits and one fingerbreadth and one-third of a fingerbreadth,</b> measured <b>by the tip</b> of the thumb. The slope of the main ramp of the altar was slightly less than that of the minor ramps in order to make it easier for the priests to ascend the ramp while holding the sacrificial portions.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Handfuls were removed from the meal offerings in any place in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard and were consumed within</b> the area enclosed by <b>the curtains by males of the priesthood,</b> prepared <b>in any</b> form of <b>food</b> preparation that he chooses, e.g., roasted or boiled, <b>for</b> one <b>day and night, until midnight.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Elazar says: A meal offering that had its handful removed in the Sanctuary</b> is <b>valid, as we found with regard to</b> the <b>removal of</b> the two <b>bowls</b> of frankincense that were placed beside the shewbread on the Table, which was located in the Sanctuary. On Shabbat, these bowls of frankincense were removed and burned on the altar, which allowed the shewbread to be eaten. Removal of the bowls of frankincense paralleled the process of removing a handful from a meal offering; just as the removal of the bowls took place in the Sanctuary, so could the removal of a handful of the meal offering be done in the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the meal offerings: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons, the priests; <b>and he shall take from there</b> his handful” (Leviticus 2:2). The term “from there” indicates that the handful must be taken <b>from a place where the feet of the non-priest</b> who brought the meal offering may <b>stand,</b> i.e., the Temple courtyard, but not the Sanctuary, in direct contradiction to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Ben Beteira says</b> there is a different explanation of the verse. <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>that if</b> the priest <b>removed a handful with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, <b>that he should return</b> the handful to the vessel <b>and</b> then <b>remove</b> another <b>handful with</b> his <b>right</b> hand? <b>The verse states:</b> “And he shall take <b>from there</b> his handful,” indicating that he may take it <b>from the place where he already removed a handful.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> that Rabbi Yirmeya <b>raises the objection and he resolves it,</b> and <b>there are</b> those <b>who say</b> that <b>Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain to you</b> the solution. The verse that indicates that the handful is taken from a place where non-priests may stand <b>is necessary only to render the entire</b> Temple <b>courtyard valid</b> for removing the handful, but not to indicate that one may not take the handful in the Sanctuary.",
            "This was necessary because it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since a burnt offering</b> is one of the <b>offerings of the most sacred order, and a meal offering</b> is also one of the <b>offerings of the most sacred order, just as a burnt offering requires</b> slaughter specifically in the <b>north</b> side of the Temple courtyard, <b>so too, a meal offering requires</b> the taking of the handful specifically in the <b>north</b> side of the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a burnt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> it is <b>completely</b> burned upon the altar. Therefore, one would not have derived that just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north side of the Temple courtyard, the handful must be taken from a meal offering in the north side of the Temple courtyard.",
            "And if one would attempt to derive that the handful of a meal offering must be taken in the north side of the Temple courtyard <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to <b>a sin offering,</b> which is an offering of the most sacred order whose slaughtering must take place in the north side, yet is not completely consumed upon the altar, this too can be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a sin offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that it atones for those liable to</b> receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "And if one would attempt to derive that the handful of a meal-offering must be taken in the north side of the Temple courtyard <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to <b>a guilt offering,</b> which is an offering of the most sacred order that must be slaughtered in the north, and that does not share the unique characteristics of the burnt offering or sin offering, this too can be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a guilt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> it is one of the <b>types of</b> offerings whose sacrificial rites are performed with their <b>blood,</b> which is not so with regard to a meal offering.",
            "The Gemara adds: It also cannot be suggested to draw an analogy <b>from</b> the common element shared by <b>all of the</b> offerings mentioned above. <b>What</b> is notable <b>about all of them?</b> They are notable <b>in that</b> they are all <b>types of</b> offerings whose sacrificial rites are performed with their <b>blood.</b>",
            "The Gemara presents a different answer: <b>Rather, it was necessary</b> for the <i>baraita</i> to teach that the handful may be taken from the meal offering anywhere in the Temple courtyard because it may <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since it is written: “And he shall bring it to the altar”</b> (Leviticus 2:8), and then it states: <b>“And he shall take up from there his handful”</b> (Leviticus 6:8), indicating that the handful must be taken from the vessel in which the meal offering was brought near the altar, that the verses also indicate that the handful must be taken in the place where the vessel is brought near the altar.",
            "Therefore, <b>just as</b> one must <b>bring</b> the meal offering <b>to</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar, <b>so too,</b> the <b>removal of</b> its <b>handful</b> must take place <b>at</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar. To counter this, the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that the removal of the handful may take place anywhere in the Temple courtyard.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered in the Sanctuary are valid, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 3:2), i.e., in the courtyard; <b>and</b> the courtyard, which is of <b>secondary</b> sanctity, <b>should not be weightier than the</b> place of <b>primary</b> sanctity. Accordingly, as the offering is valid if it was slaughtered in the courtyard, it is certainly valid if it was slaughtered in the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beteira says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that if gentiles surrounded the entire</b> Temple <b>courtyard</b> and were attacking, making it impossible for the priests to remain there, <b>the priests may enter that area,</b> i.e., the Sanctuary, <b>and eat the offerings of the most sacred order there? The verse states: “In a most holy place shall you eat it”</b> (Numbers 18:10).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But why</b> is there a need to derive the <i>halakha</i> from this source? <b>Let us say</b> that it can be derived from the verse: <b>“In the court of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it”</b> (Leviticus 6:9), <b>and</b> the place of <b>secondary</b> sanctity <b>should not be weightier than the</b> place of <b>primary</b> sanctity. Therefore, similar to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, if the sacrificial food can be eaten in the courtyard, it can certainly be eaten in the Sanctuary. The fact that the <i>baraita</i> requires another source indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s method of derivation is not valid.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>How can</b> these cases <b>be compared? There,</b> with regard to slaughtering offerings, the act of slaughter is a sacrificial <b>rite,</b> and <b>a person serves in the presence of his master.</b> Therefore, <b>we say</b> that the place of <b>secondary</b> sanctity <b>should not be weightier than the</b> place of <b>primary</b> sanctity, and if one can slaughter an offering in the courtyard, he can certainly do so in the Sanctuary. By contrast, in the case of <b>eating</b> sacrificial food, <b>which</b> is different because <b>a person does not eat in the presence of his master, we do not say</b> the rationale that the place of <b>secondary</b> sanctity <b>should not be weightier than the</b> place of <b>primary</b> sanctity. Therefore, a verse was required to teach that the priest may partake of the offerings in the Sanctuary.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The sacrificial rite of <b>a bird sin offering would be performed at</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar. <b>And</b> if its sacrificial rite was performed <b>in any place</b> on the altar, the offering <b>was</b> deemed <b>valid; but that</b> corner <b>was its</b> designated <b>place. And</b> there were <b>three matters</b> for which the portion of <b>that corner below</b> the red line that served as the demarcation between the upper and lower portions of the altar <b>served</b> as the proper location, <b>and</b> there were <b>three</b> matters for which the portion of that corner <b>above</b> the red line served as their proper location. The following rites were performed <b>below</b> the red line: Sacrificing <b>a bird sin offering, and bringing</b> meal offerings <b>near</b> the altar before removal of the handful, <b>and</b> pouring out <b>the remaining blood.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> the following rites were performed <b>above</b> the red line: <b>The wine libation</b> that is brought together with animal offerings or as an offering by itself, <b>and the water</b> libation on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>and</b> sacrificing <b>a bird burnt offering when</b> they were <b>numerous</b> and it was impossible to perform the rite <b>in the east,</b> i.e., the southeastern corner where the bird burnt offering was sacrificed.",
            "<b>All</b> those <b>who ascend</b> the ramp <b>to the altar ascend via</b> the <b>right</b> side of the ramp toward the southeast corner"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and circle</b> the altar until reaching the southwest corner <b>and descend via</b> the <b>left</b> side of the ramp, <b>except for one who ascends for</b> one of <b>these three matters, where they would ascend</b> directly to the southwest corner of the altar, <b>and descend</b> by turning <b>on</b> their <b>heels</b> and retracing the path by which they ascended rather than circling the altar.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks a question about the mishna’s statement that the sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering is performed at the southwest corner of the altar: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says: The verse states</b> with regard to the sin offering of a destitute sinner, which is a meal offering brought in lieu of an animal or bird: <b>“He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense on it; for it is a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 5:11). From this verse it is evident that <b>a sin offering is called a meal offering and a meal offering is called a sin offering,</b> so that their <i>halakhot</i> may be compared.",
            "<b>Just as a sin offering requires</b> slaughtering in the <b>north</b> section of the Temple courtyard, <b>so too,</b> the handful of <b>a meal offering requires</b> sanctification in a service vessel in the <b>north. And just as a meal offering</b> is brought near <b>to</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar, <b>so too,</b> the blood of <b>a sin offering</b> is sprinkled <b>on</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>a meal offering itself, from where do we</b> derive that it must be brought near the altar at the southwest corner? <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And this is the law of the meal offering…<b>before the Lord,</b> in front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7). From the phrase: “Before the Lord,” one <b>might</b> have thought that the rite of bringing the meal offering near the altar must be performed <b>at the west</b> side of the altar, which faces the Sanctuary. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “In front of the altar,”</b> which is its south side, from where the priests ascend the ramp.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>If</b> the verse merely stated: <b>“In front of the altar,”</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that the practice of bringing the meal offering near the altar must be performed <b>at the south</b> side of the altar. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Before the Lord,”</b> which indicates the west side. <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled? The priest <b>brings it near at</b> the <b>southwest corner</b> of the altar, <b>opposite the edge of</b> the <b>corner</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> that is <b>sufficient.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that the priest may <b>bring it near</b> the altar <b>to the west of</b> the southwest <b>corner or to the south of</b> the southwest <b>corner. You</b> must <b>say: Anywhere you find two verses,</b> and acting in accordance with <b>one</b> of them <b>fulfills itself,</b> i.e., the requirement stated in that verse, <b>and fulfills the</b> requirement stated in the <b>other</b> verse, whereas acting in accordance with the other <b>one</b> of them <b>fulfills itself and negates the</b> requirement stated in the <b>other</b> verse, <b>one leaves the</b> verse <b>that fulfills itself and negates the other, and seizes</b> the verse <b>that fulfills itself and fulfills the other</b> verse as well.",
            "The Gemara explains: In this context, <b>when you say: “Before the Lord,”</b> which indicates that the meal offering should be brought near the altar <b>at the west</b> side of the altar, <b>how have you fulfilled</b> the other part of the verse: <b>“In front of the altar,”</b> which indicates the south side? <b>But when you say: “In front of the altar,”</b> and bring it near the altar <b>at the south</b> side, <b>you have</b> also <b>fulfilled</b> the phrase: <b>“Before the Lord.”</b> Consequently, the meal offering must be brought near the south side of the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: If one brought the meal offering near the altar <b>at the south</b> side, <b>how have you fulfilled</b> the phrase: “Before the Lord”? <b>Rav Ashi says: This <i>tanna</i> holds</b> that <b>the entire altar stood in the north</b> section of the Temple courtyard. The southern side of the altar was directly aligned with the midpoint of the Temple courtyard, directly opposite the entrance of the Sanctuary, and therefore it is considered “before the Lord.”",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if the sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering was performed <b>in any place</b> on the altar, the offering is <b>valid,</b> but the southwest corner was its designated place. The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the mishna <b>saying</b> when it states that the southwest corner was its designated place? The mishna already stated that the sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering should be performed at the southwest corner. <b>Rav Ashi said: This</b> is what the mishna <b>is saying: Any place was valid for its pinching, but</b> the southwest corner <b>was the place for</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of <b>its</b> blood.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>We learn</b> in this mishna <b>that which the Sages taught</b> explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a bird sin offering: If the priest <b>pinched its</b> nape <b>in any place on the altar,</b> it is <b>valid.</b> If <b>he sprinkled its blood in any place</b> on the altar, it is <b>valid.</b> If <b>he sprinkled</b> the blood, <b>but did not squeeze out</b> the remaining blood upon the lower part of the wall of the altar, in accordance with the verse: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar; and the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 5:9), it is nevertheless <b>valid, provided that he places</b> some <b>of the blood of the soul</b> anywhere on the altar <b>from the red line and below.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>saying?</b> It first states that the offering is valid no matter where on the altar its blood is sprinkled, and it then states that blood must be placed specifically below the red line. The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> If <b>he pinched its</b> nape <b>in any place on the altar,</b> it is <b>valid.</b> If <b>he squeezed out its blood in any place on the altar,</b> it is <b>valid,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>because if he sprinkled</b> the blood <b>but did not squeeze out</b> the rest of it, it is still <b>valid, provided that he places</b> some <b>of the blood of the soul</b> anywhere on the altar <b>from the red line and below.</b> This version of the <i>baraita</i> states that the offering is valid no matter where on the altar its blood was squeezed out; but it is essential that blood is sprinkled on the lower half of the altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that there were <b>three matters</b> for which the portion of the southwest corner below the red line served as the proper location: The sacrificing of a bird sin offering, and the bringing of the meal offerings near the altar, and pouring the remaining blood. The Gemara cites sources to prove that each of these three matters was performed at the southwest corner: The source with regard to <b>the bird sin offering</b> is <b>that which we said</b> earlier (63b), that it is derived from a comparison to meal offerings.",
            "The source for <b>bringing</b> meal offerings <b>near</b> the altar at the southwest corner is derived from that <b>which is written: “And he shall bring it to the front of the altar.”</b> The source for pouring <b>the remaining blood</b> at the southwest corner of the altar is <b>as it is written: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar”</b> (Leviticus 4:7), which the Gemara derives to be referring to the southwest corner (see 53a).",
            "§ The mishna teaches that there were three matters for which the portion of the southwest corner <b>above</b> the red line served as the proper location: <b>The water and wine libations, and</b> sacrificing <b>a bird burnt offering when</b> they were <b>numerous in the east,</b> i.e., the southeast corner. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> the sacrificial rites of a bird burnt offering were ideally supposed to be performed at the southeast corner of the altar? <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Because it is the closest</b> of all the corners <b>to the place of the ashes,</b> i.e., the place where the ashes from the altar are placed every morning. The crop and feathers of a bird burnt offering are placed there as well.",
            "The Gemara cites a comment pertaining to the mishna’s statement that when the southeast corner of the altar is too crowded, the sacrificial rites of a bird burnt offering can be performed at the southwest corner: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Come and see how great</b> was <b>the strength of the priests, as you have no</b> parts <b>of birds lighter than the crop and feathers,</b> and there were <b>times when the priest would toss them more than thirty cubits</b> from the southwest corner of the altar to the place of the ashes.",
            "This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 28b) describing the procedure of separating the ashes: The priest <b>would take a coal pan of silver and ascend to the top of the altar and clear the</b> upper layer of <b>coals to</b> this <b>side and to</b> that <b>side, and,</b> using the coal pan, <b>scoop up</b> coals <b>from</b> among <b>the inner, consumed</b> coals <b>and descend</b> the ramp. When he <b>reached the floor</b> of the Temple courtyard, he would <b>turn his face</b> to the left, <b>toward the north, and walk about ten cubits along the eastern</b> side of the ramp. There, he would <b>heap the coals upon the floor</b> at <b>a distance</b> of <b>three handbreadths from the ramp.</b> This was <b>the location where one places</b> the <b>crop and feathers, and the ashes removed from the inner altar and the Candelabrum.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: The distance from the southwest corner to the location described in that mishna <b>is more than thirty-one cubits.</b> The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>did not consider the space</b> taken up by <b>people,</b> i.e., the priest performing the service, in his calculation.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>everyone who ascends</b> the ramp <b>to the altar</b> ascends via the right side of the ramp, circles the altar until reaching the southwest corner, and descends via the left side of the ramp, with the exception of one ascending in order to perform the wine or water libations, or to sacrifice a bird burnt offering on the southwest corner of the altar. In those cases the priest would ascend directly to the southwest corner. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> for these exceptions to the standard practice? <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> With regard to the <b>libations,</b> the priest would not walk all the way around the altar <b>lest</b> the wine or water <b>absorb</b> the <b>smoke</b> of the altar fire. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>a bird burnt offering</b> he would not walk all the way around <b>lest</b> the bird <b>die from</b> inhaling <b>the smoke.</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from the following mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 33b): If the High Priest was performing the sacrificial rites of the daily offering, after he would place the limbs on the fire on top of the altar and <b>he would come to circle the altar, from where does he start</b> walking? He starts <b>from</b> the <b>southeast corner,</b> continues to the <b>northeast</b> corner, then to the <b>northwest</b> corner, and finally arrives at the <b>southwest</b> corner. <b>And he is given wine to pour</b> on the altar. This indicates that the High Priest circles the altar while holding the wine for the libation, and there is no concern that it will absorb too much smoke.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The <b>circling</b> around the altar by the High Priest is done <b>on foot,</b> i.e., empty-handed, as he was given the wine to pour only once he arrived at the southwest corner. <b>Rava said:</b> The language of the mishna <b>is also precise, as it teaches</b> that <b>he is given wine to pour, and</b> the mishna <b>does not teach</b> that <b>one tells him</b> to <b>pour</b> the wine, which would have indicated that the High Priest was already holding the wine as he circled the altar. The Gemara comments: <b>Conclude from</b> the language of the mishna that the High Priest was given the wine only once he arrived at the southwest corner of the altar.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>All</b> those <b>who ascend</b> the ramp to <b>the altar ascend via</b> the <b>right</b> side of the ramp <b>and descend via</b> the <b>left</b> side; they <b>ascend via</b> the <b>east</b> side of the ramp <b>and descend via</b> the <b>west</b> side, <b>except for one who ascends for</b> one of <b>these three matters:</b> The wine libation, the water libation, and the sacrificial rite of a bird burnt offering. In these cases, one <b>ascends via</b> the <b>west</b> side of the ramp <b>and descends via</b> the <b>west</b> side; one <b>ascends via</b> the <b>right</b> side <b>and descends via</b> the <b>right</b> side.",
            "The Gemara asks: Does one who ascends via the west side of the ramp do so <b>via</b> the <b>right</b> side? Ascending via the west side of the ramp <b>is</b> the same as ascending <b>via</b> the <b>left. Ravina says:</b> Emend the <i>baraita</i> so that it <b>teaches</b> that he ascends via the <b>left</b> side. <b>Rava says: What</b> is the meaning of the <b>right</b> side mentioned in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>? It is the <b>right</b> side from the standpoint <b>of</b> the <b>altar,</b> facing south, in which case the altar’s west side is synonymous with its right side. <b>And what</b> is the meaning of the <b>left</b> side mentioned in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>? It is the <b>left</b> side from the standpoint <b>of a person</b> facing the altar.",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>But let</b> the <i>baraita</i> be consistent and <b>teach</b> both <b>this</b> case <b>and that</b> case, i.e., the first clause and latter clause, from the standpoint <b>of the altar, or</b> let it teach both <b>this</b> case <b>and that</b> case from the standpoint <b>of a person</b> facing the altar. The Gemara concedes: This is <b>difficult.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The sacrifice of <b>the bird sin offering, how was it performed?</b> The priest <b>would pinch</b> off <b>the</b> bird’s <b>head</b> by cutting <b>opposite its nape</b> with his thumbnail <b>and</b> would <b>not separate</b> the bird’s head from its body. <b>And he sprinkles from its blood on the wall of the altar</b> below the red line. <b>The remaining blood would be squeezed out</b> from the body of the bird <b>on the base</b> of the altar. <b>The altar has only its blood and the entire</b> bird goes <b>to the priests</b> for consumption.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bird sin offering: <b>“And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering</b> upon the side of the altar” (Leviticus 5:9). This teaches that the blood is sprinkled directly <b>from the body of the sin offering,</b> not with the priest’s finger or from a vessel. <b>How so?</b> The priest <b>holds the head and the body and sprinkles</b> its blood <b>on the wall of the altar. And</b> he does <b>not</b> sprinkle it <b>on the wall of the ramp, and not on the wall of</b> the <b>Sanctuary, and not on the wall of</b> the <b>Entrance Hall. And which</b> is this wall of the altar that the blood is sprinkled on? <b>This is the lower wall,</b> below the red line.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> suggests: <b>Or</b> perhaps the verse is referring <b>only</b> to <b>the upper wall,</b> above the red line. <b>And</b> this should be <b>a logical inference: Just as</b> with regard to <b>an animal</b> offering, <b>where</b> the blood of <b>a burnt offering</b> is applied <b>below</b> the red line (see 10b), nevertheless, the blood of <b>the sin offering</b> is applied <b>above</b> the red line (see Leviticus 4:30), with regard to <b>a bird</b> offering, <b>where</b> the blood of <b>the burnt offering</b> is sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line (see 65a), <b>is it not logical that</b> the blood of <b>its sin offering</b> is sprinkled <b>above</b> the red line?",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out [<i>yimmatze</i>] at the base of the altar”</b> (Leviticus 5:9), which teaches that the priest sprinkles the blood on the <b>wall where its remaining</b> blood <b>drains to the base</b> of the altar. <b>And which</b> wall is this? <b>This is the lower wall.</b> The surrounding ledge of the altar is located one cubit above the red line, and any blood sprinkled above this ledge will not drip down to the base of the altar. The verse teaches that the blood is sprinkled on the wall of the altar from which it would drip down to the altar’s base unimpeded.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let</b> the priest <b>perform</b> the sprinkling of the blood <b>above,</b> as the <i>baraita</i> logically deduced, <b>and then perform</b> the squeezing <b>below</b> in fulfillment of the aforementioned verse. <b>Rava said: Is it written: He shall drain [<i>yematze</i>]? It is written: It shall be drained [<i>yimmatze</i>], which indicates</b> that the blood trickles down to the base of the altar <b>by itself.</b> Accordingly, the blood must be sprinkled on a part of the altar wall from which it can trickle down to the base of the altar.",
            "§ <b>Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says</b> that <b>Rav says: How</b> does the priest <b>pinch</b> the nape of <b>a bird sin offering?</b> He holds the bird by its back in the palm of his hand and <b>holds its wings with two fingers,</b> i.e., the middle and index fingers, <b>and</b> its <b>two legs with</b> his next <b>two fingers,</b> i.e., the ring finger and pinky, leaving the head resting between his index finger and thumb, <b>and he stretches its neck over the width of his thumb and pinches</b> its nape with his thumbnail.",
            "The Gemara cites a varying opinion: <b>It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The bird</b> is not in the priest’s palm, but rather <b>on the outside</b> of his hand. The priest <b>holds its wings with two fingers and</b> its <b>two legs with two fingers.</b> Using his thumb, the priest bends its head into his palm <b>and stretches its neck over the width of his two fingers, and pinches</b> its nape. <b>And this</b> is the most <b>difficult</b> sacrificial <b>rite in the Temple</b> to perform.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>This is</b> the most difficult rite to perform, <b>and no other? But isn’t there</b> also the <b>removal of the handful</b> of the meal offering <b>and the handful</b> of the incense on Yom Kippur? The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, say</b> that the pinching procedure was <b>a difficult</b> sacrificial <b>rite,</b> one <b>of the</b> most <b>difficult</b> sacrificial <b>rites in the Temple</b> to perform.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The sacrifice of <b>the bird burnt offering, how was it performed?</b> The priest <b>ascended the ramp and turned to the surrounding ledge and came to</b> the <b>southeast corner</b> of the altar. He <b>would</b> then <b>pinch</b> off <b>the</b> bird’s <b>head</b> by cutting <b>at its nape</b> with his thumbnail <b>and separate</b> the bird’s head from its body, <b>and</b> would <b>squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar. He took the head and neared the place of its pinching,</b> i.e., its nape, <b>to the altar</b> in order to squeeze the blood from the head. <b>He would</b> then <b>absorb</b> the remaining blood <b>with salt and throw</b> the head <b>onto the fire</b> on the altar.",
            "<b>He</b> then <b>arrived at the body and removed the crop and the feather</b> attached to it <b>and the innards that emerge with them and he tossed them to the place of the ashes. He</b> then <b>ripped</b> the bird lengthwise <b>and did not separate</b> the two halves of the bird; <b>but if he separated</b> them, the offering is <b>valid.</b> He would then <b>absorb</b> the remaining blood <b>with salt and throw</b> the body of the bird <b>onto the fire</b> on the altar.",
            "If <b>he neither removed the crop, nor the feather and the innards that emerge with them, nor absorbed</b> the blood <b>with salt,</b> with regard to <b>any</b> detail <b>that he changed in</b> the sacrificial rites <b>after he squeezed out its blood,</b> the offering is <b>valid.</b> If <b>he separated</b> the head from the body <b>in</b> sacrificing <b>the sin offering, or</b> if <b>he did not separate</b> the head from the body <b>in</b> sacrificing <b>the burnt offering,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> In a case where <b>he squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body, it is disqualified.</b> If he squeezed out the <b>blood of the body and did not squeeze out the blood of the head,</b> the offering is <b>valid.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>a bird sin offering that</b> the priest <b>pinched not for its sake,</b> or if <b>he squeezed out its blood not for its sake,</b> or if he did so <b>for its sake and</b> then <b>not for its sake, or not for its sake and</b> then <b>for its sake,</b> it is <b>disqualified,</b> like all other sin offerings that are disqualified when performed not for their sake (see 2a). <b>A bird burnt offering</b> sacrificed not for its sake is <b>valid;</b> it is <b>just that it did not satisfy the obligation of the owner.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>both a bird sin offering and a bird burnt offering where</b> the priest <b>pinched its nape or squeezed out its blood</b> with the intent <b>to partake of an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>partakes</b> of it, <b>or to burn an item whose</b> typical <b>manner</b> is such that one <b>burns</b> it on the altar, <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> But <b>there is no</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> one who partakes of the offering. If his intent was to eat it or burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and</b> one is <b>liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> partaking of the offering, <b>provided that the permitting factor,</b> the blood, <b>was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.</b>",
            "<b>How</b> is <b>the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva?</b> If one <b>pinched</b> the nape <b>in silence,</b> i.e., with no disqualifying intent, <b>and squeezed out</b> its <b>blood</b> with the intent to partake of the parts typically eaten or to burn the portions that are to be burned on the altar, <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time; or</b> in the case of one <b>who pinched</b> with the intent to partake of the offering or burn it on the altar <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, and squeezed out</b> its <b>blood in silence; or</b> in the case of one <b>who pinched and squeezed out the blood</b> with the intent to partake of the offering or burn it on the altar <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, that is</b> the case of a bird offering <b>where</b> the <b>permitting factor is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.</b>",
            "<b>How</b> is <b>the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva?</b> If the priest <b>pinched</b> the nape of the bird with the intent to partake of it or burn it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> and <b>squeezed out</b> its <b>blood</b> with the intent to partake of it or burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, or</b> he <b>pinched</b> with the intent to partake of it or burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time and squeezed out</b> its <b>blood</b> with the intent to partake of it or burn it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> if the priest <b>pinched and squeezed out the blood</b> with the intent to partake of it or burn it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "or in the case of <b>a bird sin offering where one pinched</b> its nape <b>not for its sake and squeezed out</b> its <b>blood</b> with the intent of consuming it or burning it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, or</b> in a case <b>where he pinched</b> its nape with the intent to consume it or burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time and squeezed out</b> its <b>blood not for its sake, or</b> in a case <b>where he pinched</b> its nape <b>and squeezed out its blood not for its sake, that is</b> a case of a bird offering <b>whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.</b>",
            "If one pinched the nape of the bird and squeezed out its blood with the intent <b>to eat an olive-bulk</b> of the offering <b>outside</b> its designated area and <b>an olive-bulk the next day,</b> or <b>an olive-bulk the next day</b> and <b>an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area, or <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area and <b>half an olive-bulk the next day,</b> or <b>half an olive-bulk the next day</b> and <b>half an olive-bulk outside</b> its designated area, the offering is <b>disqualified and</b> it <b>does not include</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> disagreed and <b>said</b> that <b>this is the principle: If the</b> improper <b>intent</b> with regard to <b>the time preceded the intent</b> with regard to <b>the area,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> eating <b>it. And if the intent</b> with regard to <b>the area preceded the intent</b> with regard to <b>the time,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified and</b> it <b>does not include</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say:</b> In both <b>this</b> case where the intent with regard to time came first <b>and that</b> case where the intent with regard to area came first, the offering is <b>disqualified and</b> it <b>does not include</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "If his intent was <b>to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk</b> not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is <b>valid, because eating and burning do not join together.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse pertaining to a bird burnt offering: “And the priest shall bring it to the altar, and pinch off its head, and make it smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:15). <b>What</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: And</b> the priest <b>shall bring it</b> to the altar? Since the previous verse states that “he shall bring his offering,” this verse should have started with the phrase “And he shall pinch off its head.”",
            "<b>Since it is stated</b> in the preceding verse: “And if his offering to the Lord be a burnt offering of birds, <b>then he shall bring</b> his offering <b>of doves, or of pigeons”</b> (Leviticus 1:14), one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>one who donates a bird</b> as an offering <b>may not</b> donate <b>fewer than two birds.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And</b> the priest <b>shall bring it,”</b> indicating that <b>one may bring even one bird to</b> be sacrificed on <b>the altar.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues analyzing the verse: <b>What</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states</b> that <b>“the priest</b> shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 1:15)? It is <b>to establish</b> that only <b>a priest</b> may pinch its nape, <b>as</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that even a non-priest may perform this procedure. <b>Could this not</b> be derived through <b>logical inference: And if</b> with regard to <b>a sheep</b> burnt offering, with regard to <b>which</b> the verse <b>established</b> that <b>it</b> must be slaughtered in the <b>north</b> (see Leviticus 1:11), it did <b>not establish</b> that <b>it</b> must be slaughtered by a <b>priest</b> (see 32a), then in the case of <b>a bird</b> burnt offering, with regard to <b>which</b> the verse <b>did not establish</b> that its nape must be pinched in the <b>north, is it not logical that</b> the verse does <b>not establish</b> that its nape must be pinched by <b>a priest?</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states</b> that <b>“the priest</b> shall bring it to the altar,” in order <b>to establish</b> that its nape must be pinched specifically by <b>a priest.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought that the priest should <b>pinch its</b> nape <b>with a knife. And</b> one could derive this through <b>a logical inference: And if</b> with regard to <b>slaughtering,</b> with regard to <b>which</b> the verse <b>did not establish</b> that <b>it</b> must be performed by <b>a priest,</b> it <b>established</b> that <b>it</b> must be performed with <b>an instrument,</b> i.e., a knife (see 97b); then in the case of <b>pinching, which</b> the verse <b>established</b> must be performed by <b>a priest, is it not logical that</b> the verse <b>establishes</b> that <b>it</b> must be performed with <b>an instrument?</b>",
            "To counter this, <b>the verse states:</b> “And the <b>priest</b> shall bring it near the altar <b>and pinch off</b> its head.” In explanation of this verse, <b>Rabbi Akiva said: Could it enter your mind that a non-priest may approach</b> the <b>altar</b> in order to sacrifice an offering? Since this is impossible, the verse does not need to state that the sacrificial rite is performed by a priest. <b>Rather, what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states:</b> “The <b>priest”?</b> It means <b>that the pinching must be</b> performed <b>with the very</b> body of the <b>priest.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues to analyze the verse: One <b>might</b> have thought that the priest <b>may pinch</b> the bird’s nape <b>whether above</b> the red line of the altar <b>or below</b> it. To counter this, <b>the verse states:</b> “And the priest shall bring it unto the altar <b>and pinch off</b> its head, <b>and make it smoke</b> on the altar.” The verse juxtaposes the pinching to the burning of the bird on the altar to teach that <b>just as</b> the <b>burning</b> occurs <b>atop the altar, so too,</b> the <b>pinching</b> occurs <b>on</b> the <b>top</b> part of the wall of <b>the altar.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states that the priest shall <b>“pinch off</b> its head,” which must be performed <b>at the nape. Do you say</b> that the pinching occurs <b>at the nape, or</b> is it <b>only at the throat? It</b> can be derived through <b>a logical inference:</b> It <b>is stated here,</b> with regard to a bird burnt offering: <b>“And pinch off</b> its head” (Leviticus 1:15), <b>and</b> it <b>is stated there,</b> with regard to a bird sin offering: <b>“And pinch off</b> its head opposite its nape, but shall not separate it” (Leviticus 5:8). <b>Just as there,</b> the head is pinched <b>at the nape, so too here,</b> the head is pinched <b>at the nape.</b>",
            "<b>If</b> the <i>halakha</i> of a bird burnt offering is derived from that of a bird sin offering, perhaps it should also be derived that <b>just as there,</b> the priest <b>pinches</b> off the head <b>but does not separate</b> it completely from the body, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to a bird burnt offering, he <b>pinches</b> off the head <b>but does not separate</b> it from the body. To counter this, <b>the verse states</b> with regard to a bird burnt offering: <b>“And pinch off</b> its head, <b>and make it smoke</b> on the altar” (Leviticus 1:15). This indicates that <b>just as</b> with regard to the <b>burning</b> of the bird burnt offering, <b>the head</b> is burned <b>by itself and the body</b> is burned <b>by itself, so too</b> with regard to the <b>pinching, the head</b> is <b>by itself and the body</b> is <b>by itself,</b> i.e., the head is completely detached from the body.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>that the burning of the head</b> is <b>by itself and the body</b> is burned <b>by itself? As it is stated:</b> “And he shall rend it by its wings…<b>and</b> the priest <b>shall make it smoke</b> upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:17). Since <b>the burning of the body is stated</b> in this verse, <b>how do I realize</b> the meaning of the earlier phrase: <b>“And make it smoke on the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:15)? One must conclude that <b>the verse is speaking about the burning of the head.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues to expound the verse stated with regard to a bird burnt offering: “And its blood shall be drained out on the wall of the altar” (Leviticus 1:15). When the verse states: <b>“And its blood shall be drained out,”</b> it means that <b>all of it</b> must be drained out. The continuation of the verse indicates that it must be drained out <b>“on the wall of the altar,” and not on the wall of the ramp, nor on the wall of the Sanctuary. And which</b> wall of the altar <b>is this? This is the upper wall,</b> i.e., above the red line.",
            "<b>Or</b> perhaps the verse is referring <b>only</b> to <b>the lower wall,</b> i.e., below the red line; <b>and this</b> can be supported by <b>a logical inference:</b> And <b>if</b> with regard to <b>an animal</b> offering, <b>where</b> the blood of <b>its sin offering</b> is applied <b>above</b> the red line, the blood of <b>its burnt offering</b> is applied <b>below</b> the red line, then with regard to <b>a bird</b> offering, <b>where</b> the blood of <b>its sin offering</b> is sprinkled <b>below</b> the red line, <b>is it not logical that</b> the blood of <b>its burnt offering</b> is sprinkled <b>below</b> the red line?",
            "To counter this, <b>the verse states: “And pinch off</b> its head, <b>and make it smoke</b> on the altar; <b>and its blood shall be drained out.” Could it enter your mind</b> that <b>after he has burned</b> the bird, the priest <b>goes back and drains out</b> its blood? <b>Rather,</b> the verse serves <b>to tell you: Just as</b> the <b>burning</b> occurs <b>atop the altar, so too,</b> the <b>draining</b> occurs <b>atop the altar. How so?</b> The priest <b>would ascend the ramp and turn to the surrounding ledge and arrive at</b> the <b>southeast corner. He would pinch off the</b> bird’s <b>head at its nape, and separate</b> it from its body. <b>He would</b> then <b>squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar</b> beside him. Nevertheless, <b>if</b> the priest <b>performed</b> the squeezing <b>below his feet,</b> i.e., below the surrounding ledge, <b>even</b> one <b>cubit</b> beneath the ledge, it is <b>valid.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> concludes by citing a dissenting opinion: <b>Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov say: The entire</b> rite of a bird burnt offering <b>is performed only atop the altar.</b> The Gemara asks: Since the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov agree that the bird must be burned atop the altar and its blood must be squeezed on the top part of the wall of the altar, <b>what is</b> the difference <b>between them?</b>",
            "<b>Abaye and Rava both say: There is</b> a difference <b>between them</b> with regard to whether one may <b>form an arrangement</b> of wood <b>on</b> the <b>surrounding ledge</b> and burn the bird there. According to the first <i>tanna</i>, this is permitted when needed, and therefore it is valid if the priest squeezes out the blood on the wall up to a cubit below the surrounding ledge. According to Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, one may never burn the bird on the surrounding ledge, and therefore it is not valid if the priest squeezed out the blood below the surrounding ledge.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that after the priest throws the bird’s head onto the fire on the altar, <b>he arrives at the body</b> and removes the crop and the feathers attached to it and the innards that emerge with them, and tosses them to the place of the ashes. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse pertaining to a bird burnt offering: <b>“And he shall take away <i>murato</i> with its feathers”</b> (Leviticus 1:16). <b>This</b> word, <i>murato</i>, is referring to the <b>crop.</b>",
            "Had the verse written only “its crop,” one <b>might</b> have thought that the priest may <b>cut</b> the skin <b>with a knife and take</b> the crop without any other part of the bird. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “With its feathers [<i>benotzatah</i>],”</b> which teaches that <b>he takes the feathers with it,</b> i.e., he must remove the skin with the feathers still attached. The Gemara presents another opinion: <b>Abba Yosei ben Ḥanan says: He takes</b> the crop <b>and he</b> also <b>takes its gizzard with it.</b>",
            "A Sage <b>from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:</b> The word <b><i>benotzatah</i></b> is a contraction of the words <b><i>benotza shelah</i>,</b> meaning its feathers. This teaches that the priest <b>cuts it with a knife,</b> creating an opening <b>like a window</b> opposite the crop. This allows him to remove the crop with only the feathers and skin directly opposite it, and that is what he brings to the place of the ashes."
        ],
        [
            "§ The mishna teaches that after removing the crop and the feathers and innards that emerged with it, the priest <b>ripped</b> the bird lengthwise <b>and did not separate</b> the two halves of the bird. In this regard <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“And he shall rend”</b> (Leviticus 1:17). The act of <b>rending is</b> performed <b>only by hand, and so too,</b> the verse <b>states</b> with regard to Samson: <b>“And he rent it as one would have rent a kid,</b> and he had nothing in his hand” (Judges 14:6).",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if the priest <b>did not remove the crop,</b> or he changed any detail of the sacrificial rite after he squeezed out the blood, the offering is valid. If he separated the head from the body of a bird sin offering, it is disqualified. The Gemara says: <b>The mishna is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: I heard that one may separate</b> the head from the body <b>of a bird sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the reason for the difference <b>between them,</b> i.e., what is the basis of the disagreement? <b>Rav Ḥisda says:</b> The difference <b>between them</b> concerns the question of whether <b>squeezing out</b> the blood of <b>a bird sin offering</b> after its blood has been sprinkled is <b>indispensable. The first <i>tanna</i>,</b> whose opinion is cited in the mishna, <b>holds</b> that <b>squeezing out</b> the blood of <b>a bird sin offering</b> is <b>indispensable. And since squeezing out</b> the <b>blood</b> is indispensable, the priest will have to squeeze out the blood after separating the head from the body, and he will have <b>performed the rite of</b> a bird <b>burnt offering on a bird sin offering,</b> which disqualifies the offering (see 66a).",
            "<b>And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds</b> that <b>squeezing out</b> the blood of <b>a bird sin offering is not indispensable.</b> Consequently, if the priest would separate the bird’s head from its body, he would refrain from squeezing out the blood, in which case the rite is dissimilar to that of a bird burnt offering. <b>And</b> the separation of the head <b>is</b> considered as though the priest was <b>merely cutting flesh,</b> and the offering is valid.",
            "<b>Rava says</b> there is an alternative explanation of the dispute: It is possible that all agree that squeezing the blood of a bird sin offering is indispensable, and <b>there is</b> a difference <b>between them</b> with regard to whether <b>interrupting</b> the pinching before severing the <b>second <i>siman</i>,</b> i.e., the gullet or windpipe, one of the organs that must be cut in the ritual slaughter, <b>of a bird burnt offering disqualifies</b> the offering. <b>The first <i>tanna</i> holds</b> that <b>interrupting</b> the pinching before severing the <b>second <i>siman</i> of a bird burnt offering does not disqualify</b> the offering, <b>and</b> therefore, if the priest separates the head of a bird sin offering from its body, <b>even though he interrupted</b> the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i>, <b>he has performed the rite of</b> a bird <b>burnt offering on</b> a bird <b>sin offering,</b> which disqualifies it.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds</b> that interrupting the pinching of a bird burnt offering <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. Therefore, in the case of a bird sin offering, <b>since</b> the priest <b>interrupted</b> the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i>, even if he separates the head from the body <b>he is merely cutting flesh,</b> i.e., it is an insignificant act because he is not performing the rite of a burnt offering on a sin offering, and the offering is not disqualified.",
            "<b>Abaye says</b> there is a third explanation of the dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>: It is possible that all agree that interrupting the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i> disqualifies a bird burnt offering, and <b>there is</b> a difference <b>between them</b> with regard to whether cutting the <b>majority of</b> the <b>flesh</b> of the nape of a bird sin offering is <b>indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara points out: <b>And</b> Rava and Abaye disagree <b>with regard to</b> the issue that is the subject of <b>the dispute between Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak. One says</b> that the difference <b>between</b> the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, concerns whether <b>interrupting</b> the pinching before severing the <b>second <i>siman</i> of a bird burnt offering disqualifies</b> the offering. <b>And one says</b> that the difference <b>between them</b> concerns whether cutting the <b>majority of</b> the <b>flesh</b> of the nape of a bird sin offering is <b>indispensable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: Since there is a dispute concerning whether cutting the majority of the flesh of the nape of a bird sin offering is indispensable, can it be deduced <b>by inference</b> that all agree <b>that we require</b> the priest to cut <b>the majority of the flesh <i>ab initio</i>?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>Yes; and</b> similarly it <b>was taught</b> in <i>baraita</i>: <b>How does one pinch</b> the nape of <b>a bird sin offering?</b> Using his thumbnail, the priest <b>cuts</b> the <b>spine and nape, without</b> cutting through the <b>majority of</b> the <b>flesh, until he reaches</b> either <b>the gullet or the windpipe.</b> Upon <b>reaching the gullet or the windpipe, he cuts one <i>siman</i></b> entirely, <b>or</b> at least <b>the majority of it, and</b> he cuts <b>the majority of the flesh with it. And in</b> the case of a bird <b>burnt offering,</b> he cuts the <b>two</b> <i>simanim</i> <b>or the majority of the two</b> <i>simanim</i>.",
            "The Gemara relates that the Rabbis <b>said this</b> dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> concerning the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, <b>before Rabbi Yirmeya.</b> Rabbi Yirmeya <b>said: Have they not heard that which Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat, in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, used to say: I heard that one may</b> completely <b>separate</b> the head of <b>a bird sin offering</b> from its body. <b>And what</b> is the meaning of the verse that states: “But <b>shall not separate it”</b> (Leviticus 5:8)?"
        ],
        [
            "It means that the priest <b>does not have to separate</b> it, but not that it is prohibited to do so. <b>Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If that is so,</b> then <b>with regard to a pit</b> in the public domain, <b>where it is written:</b> “And if a man shall open a pit…<b>and does not cover it”</b> (Exodus 21:33), can one claim that this verse <b>also</b> means <b>that he does not have to cover</b> it?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>How can</b> these cases <b>be compared? There,</b> with regard to a pit, <b>since it is written</b> in the following verse: <b>“The owner of the pit shall pay”</b> (Exodus 21:34), it is evident that <b>it is incumbent upon him to cover</b> the pit. <b>But here, since it is written</b> with regard to a bird burnt offering: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall bring it</b> to the altar” (Leviticus 1:15), the term “it” indicates that the verse is referring only to a burnt offering, and <b>the verse has</b> thereby <b>differentiated between a bird sin offering and a bird burnt offering.</b>",
            "Consequently, it is obvious that whereas the priest must completely separate the head of a bird burnt offering, this is not the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering. <b>Why do I</b> need the verse to state with regard to a bird sin offering: “But <b>shall not separate it”</b> (Leviticus 5:8)? <b>Conclude from</b> this verse that it is not forbidden to separate the head of a bird sin offering from the body, but rather <b>one does not have to separate</b> it.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if the priest squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body, it is disqualified. If he <b>squeezed out</b> the <b>blood of the body</b> and did not squeeze out the blood of the head, the offering is valid. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In reference to a bird burnt offering, the verse states, seemingly unnecessarily: “It is <b>a burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 1:17). This teaches <b>that even though</b> the priest <b>squeezed out the blood of the body and did not squeeze out the blood of the head,</b> it is valid. One <b>might</b> have thought that if the priest <b>squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body</b> the offering is still valid. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “It is.”</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the</b> biblical <b>derivation</b> for the opinion that the offering is valid if the priest squeezed out only the blood of the body but not if he squeezed out only the blood of the head? <b>Ravina said:</b> There is no conclusive proof from the language of the verse itself, but it <b>stands to reason</b> that this is the case, <b>as most of the blood is found in the body,</b> not the head.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If the priest <b>sacrificed a bird sin offering</b> in its designated place <b>below</b> the red line, and he sacrificed it <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering</b> with pinching, i.e., cutting from the nape with a fingernail, and sprinkling, and he sacrificed it <b>for the sake of a sin offering,</b> the offering is <b>fit.</b> This is the manner in which a priest is to sacrifice a sin offering <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "If the priest sacrificed the bird sin offering below the red line in the middle of the altar and <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering,</b> but he sacrificed it <b>for the sake of a burnt offering;</b> or if he sacrificed it <b>according to the procedure of a burnt offering,</b> even if he sacrificed it <b>for the sake of a sin offering;</b> or if he sacrificed it <b>according to the procedure of a burnt offering for the sake of a burnt offering;</b> in all these cases the sin offering is <b>disqualified.</b> If <b>one sacrificed</b> a bird sin offering <b>above</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of any of</b> the offerings, it is <b>disqualified,</b> because he did not sacrifice it in its designated place.",
            "<b>A bird burnt offering that one sacrificed</b> in its designated place <b>above</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of a burnt offering</b> and <b>for the sake of a burnt offering</b> is <b>fit.</b> This is the manner in which a priest is to sacrifice a burnt offering <i>ab initio</i>. If he sacrificed a bird burnt offering above the red line <b>according to the procedure of</b> the <b>burnt offering</b> but <b>for the sake of a sin offering,</b> the offering is <b>fit, but it did not satisfy the obligation of its owner.</b>",
            "If the priest sacrificed a bird burnt offering <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering for the sake of a burnt offering,</b> or <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering for the sake of a sin offering,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified.</b> If <b>he sacrificed it below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of any of</b> the offerings, it is <b>disqualified,</b> because he did not sacrifice it in its designated place."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> According to the mishna, a bird sin offering that one sacrificed according to the procedure of a burnt offering is disqualified. The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to what</b> rite <b>did</b> the priest <b>change</b> the procedure? <b>If we say that he changed</b> the <b>pinching</b> by severing the head completely, as is proper for a burnt offering, shall <b>we say that</b> the mishna <b>is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: I heard that</b> the priests would <b>sever</b> the head completely even <b>in</b> the sacrifice of <b>a bird sin offering?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>And</b> what is wrong with this conclusion? <b>Have we not</b> already <b>explained that</b> the mishna in the previous chapter (65a), with regard to pinching, <b>is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?</b>",
            "The Gemara offers another explanation: <b>No,</b> the mishna is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>changed</b> the procedure <b>in</b> the rite of <b>sprinkling</b> by squeezing out all the blood at once, as one would do with a burnt offering, rather than first sprinkling the blood on the altar as is proper for a sin offering. Under such circumstances, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, would also agree that the offering is disqualified.",
            "<b>This, too, stands to reason</b> that the mishna is referring to a change in the sprinkling. This can be inferred <b>from</b> the fact <b>that</b> the mishna <b>teaches</b> in <b>the latter clause:</b> If <b>one sacrificed</b> a bird sin offering <b>above</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of any of</b> the offerings, it is <b>disqualified, and</b> this applies <b>even</b> if he sacrificed it <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering. With regard to what</b> rite <b>did</b> the priest <b>change</b> the location of the procedure? <b>If we say that he changed</b> the <b>pinching,</b> performing it above the red line, <b>didn’t the Master</b> already <b>say</b> with regard to a bird sin offering that <b>pinching is valid anywhere on the altar? Rather, is it not that he changed</b> the location of the <b>sprinkling? And since</b> the ruling of <b>the latter clause</b> is stated <b>with regard to sprinkling,</b> by inference, the ruling of <b>the first clause</b> is <b>also</b> stated <b>with regard to sprinkling.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds to this proof: <b>Are the cases comparable? This</b> case is <b>as it is, and that</b> case is <b>as it is.</b> Even if the ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a change in the location of the sprinkling, the ruling of the first clause may still be stated with regard to a change in the procedure of the pinching, in which case the mishna would not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.",
            "§ According to the mishna, <b>a bird burnt offering</b> that one sacrificed according to the procedure of a sin offering is disqualified. The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to what</b> rite <b>did</b> the priest <b>change</b> the procedure?",
            "<b>If we say</b> that <b>he changed</b> the <b>pinching</b> of the bird’s nape by leaving the head partially attached, as is proper for a sin offering, then <b>from</b> the fact <b>that the latter clause,</b> i.e., the first clause of the next mishna (66b), <b>teaches: All of</b> the offerings enumerated above <b>do not render</b> one who swallows their meat <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat, and</b> one who benefits <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, by inference, <b>we</b> must <b>say</b> that the mishna <b>is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua. As, if</b> it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua, doesn’t he say</b> later on in that mishna concerning a burnt offering whose nape was pinched according to the procedure of a sin offering: One who derives benefit from it is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property?",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the mishna must be referring to a change <b>in</b> the procedure of <b>squeezing</b> out the blood. Instead of squeezing out the blood, the priest sprinkled it on the wall of the altar as if it were a sin offering. In this case, even Rabbi Yehoshua would concede that one is liable for misusing it.",
            "But <b>say the last clause</b> of the subsequent mishna: In the case of <b>a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering,</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> One who benefits <b>from it</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> One who benefits <b>from it</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, as the bird assumes the status of a sin offering. Here, <b>with regard to what</b> rite <b>did</b> the priest <b>change</b> the procedure and perform it as if it were a sin offering?",
            "<b>If we say</b> that he changed the <b>squeezing,</b> this poses a difficulty, as it is reasonable to <b>say that Rabbi Yehoshua says</b> that one is not liable for misuse specifically <b>when</b> the priest <b>changed</b> the <b>pinching,</b> as pinching a burnt offering for a bird as though it were a sin offering changes its status; but <b>does he say</b> this <b>in</b> a case where it was pinched properly, and the priest changed the <b>squeezing</b> procedure alone? It is unreasonable to suggest that the offering changes its status at this later stage.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> this final clause must be referring to a change <b>with regard to</b> the <b>pinching.</b> But can it be that <b>the first clause</b> concerning a sin offering sacrificed as a burnt offering <b>and the last clause</b> concerning the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua are both referring to a change <b>with regard to</b> the <b>pinching, but the middle clause</b> concerning a burnt offering sacrificed as a sin offering is referring to a change <b>with regard to</b> the <b>squeezing?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Indeed, the first clause and the last clause</b> are referring to a change <b>with regard to</b> the <b>pinching, and the middle clause</b> is referring to a change <b>with regard to</b> the <b>squeezing.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>And all of</b> the offerings enumerated in the previous mishna, even those that are disqualified and may not be eaten or sacrificed, still differ from carcasses of unslaughtered kosher birds in that they <b>do not render</b> one who swallows their meat <b>ritually impure</b> when the meat is <b>in the throat.</b> This is because the pinching of the napes of bird offerings, like the slaughter of animals, prevents them from assuming the status of a carcass. <b>But</b> nevertheless, since they are forbidden to the priests, one who derives benefit from any of <b>them</b> is liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property. This is the <i>halakha</i> in all cases <b>except for the bird sin offering that one sacrificed below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of</b> the <b>sin offering</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b> Since it was sacrificed properly and it is permitted for priests to partake of a fit sin offering, there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property.",
            "In the case of <b>a bird burnt offering that</b> one improperly <b>sacrificed below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of</b> the <b>sin offering,</b> and one did so <b>for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> One who derives benefit from <b>it</b> is liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering, whose meat is never permitted to the priests. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> One who derives benefit from <b>it</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property. Since the entire sacrificial process was conducted according to the procedure of a sin offering, the offering assumes the status of a sin offering in this regard.",
            "The mishna recounts the dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>. <b>Rabbi Eliezer said: And if</b> in the case of <b>a sin offering that</b> was sacrificed <b>for its sake,</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it,</b> and nevertheless, <b>when one changed its designation</b> and sacrificed it not for its sake, one is liable for <b>misusing it,</b> then in the case of <b>a burnt offering, where</b> one is liable for <b>misusing it</b> even when it was sacrificed <b>for its sake, when one changed its designation</b> and sacrificed it not for its sake <b>is it not right that</b> he is liable for <b>misusing it?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No,</b> that <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not correct, as <b>if you said with regard to a sin offering</b> for <b>which one changed its designation</b> and sacrificed it <b>for the sake of a burnt offering</b> that there is liability for misuse, this is reasonable, <b>because he changed its designation to an item for which there is</b> liability for <b>misuse. Would you say in</b> the case of <b>a burnt offering</b> for <b>which one changed its designation</b> and sacrificed it <b>for the sake of a sin offering</b> that there is liability for misuse, <b>as</b> in that case <b>he changed its designation to an item for which there is no</b> liability for its <b>misuse?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him:</b> The case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>and slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, will prove</b> that the fact that one changed the offering’s designation to an item that is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse is not a relevant factor. <b>As</b> in this case, one <b>changed their designation to an item that is not subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse and,</b> nevertheless, one is liable for <b>misusing them. You too should not be puzzled about the burnt offering,</b> concerning which <b>even though one changed its designation to an item that is not subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that</b> one would be liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No,</b> that is no proof, as <b>if you said with regard to offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard, <b>and slaughtered them for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> that one is liable for misusing them, that is reasonable. The reason is <b>that</b> one who slaughtered them <b>changed their designation to an item for which there are both prohibited and permitted</b> elements as offerings of lesser sanctity. Although one is not liable for misuse of their flesh, after the blood is sprinkled one is liable for misuse of the portions consumed on the altar. <b>Would you say</b> the <i>halakha</i> is the same <b>in</b> the case of <b>a burnt offering</b> for <b>which one changed its designation to an item that</b> is <b>permitted in its entirety,</b> i.e., a bird sin offering, which is eaten by the priests and none of it is burned on the altar?",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The discussion between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>, where it is recounted in greater detail: <b>Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua:</b> The case of <b>a guilt offering that one slaughtered in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>for the sake of a peace offering will prove</b> my point, <b>as</b> here the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation</b> to an item for which there is no liability for misuse, <b>and</b> yet one is liable for <b>misusing it. And you too should not be puzzled about the</b> bird <b>burnt offering</b> that was sacrificed as a sin offering, concerning <b>which even though</b> the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation</b> to an item for which there is no liability for misuse, the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that</b> one is liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a guilt offering</b> sacrificed as a peace offering, <b>as although</b> the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation, he</b> still <b>did not change its location</b> but sacrificed it in the north of the Temple courtyard, which is the appropriate location for both guilt offerings and peace offerings, <b>shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> a bird <b>burnt offering</b> sacrificed below the red line as a sin offering, <b>where</b> the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation and</b> also <b>changed its location?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A guilt offering that one slaughtered in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>for the sake of a peace offering will prove</b> my point, <b>as</b> here the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation and</b> also <b>changed its location, and</b> yet one is liable for <b>misusing it. You too should not be puzzled about the</b> bird <b>burnt offering</b> that was sacrificed below the red line as a sin offering, concerning <b>which even though</b> the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation and</b> also <b>changed its location,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that one is liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say</b> that this this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a guilt offering</b> sacrificed as a peace offering, in <b>which</b> case the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation and changed its location, but</b> he <b>did not change its procedure, shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> a bird <b>burnt offering</b> sacrificed entirely according to the procedure of a sin offering, in <b>which</b> case the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation and procedure and</b> also <b>changed its location?</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> ends here, and it would appear that Rabbi Eliezer had no response to this claim. <b>Rava said:</b> Why? <b>Let him say to</b> Rabbi Yehoshua that <b>a guilt offering that one slaughtered in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>for the sake of a peace offering with a deviation with regard to</b> the offering’s <b>owner,</b> i.e., he slaughtered it for the sake of someone other than the offering’s owner, will prove my opinion; <b>as</b> this is tantamount to a case where the one who performed the slaughter <b>changed its designation and changed its location and</b> also <b>changed its procedure,</b> yet one is liable for its misuse.",
            "Rava concluded: <b>Since he did not say this to him, learn from it</b> that at this stage <b>Rabbi Eliezer grasped Rabbi Yehoshua’s</b> line of <b>reasoning; as Rav Adda bar Ahava says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yehoshua would say</b> the following reasoning: In the case of <b>a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering, once he pinched one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter [<i>siman</i>],</b> i.e., either the gullet or the windpipe, the offering <b>is removed</b> from its status as a burnt offering <b>and becomes a bird sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> then in the case of <b>a bird sin offering that one sacrificed above</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of a burnt offering, too, as soon as he pinches one <i>siman</i> it should be removed</b> from its status as a sin offering <b>and become a bird burnt offering. And if you would say</b> that <b>indeed</b> that is so, this is difficult: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Bena’a</b> that <b>this is</b> the accurate <b>presentation of the mishna? What,</b> does he <b>not</b> mean that <b>this is</b> the accurate <b>presentation</b> in the sense that Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle applies specifically to the case stated in the mishna, namely, that of a burnt offering sacrificed as a sin offering, <b>and</b> to <b>nothing more?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> what Rabbi Bena’a means is that <b>this is</b> the accurate <b>presentation of the entire mishna.</b> Just as Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to a bird burnt offering sacrificed entirely as a sin offering, he holds similarly that a bird sin offering sacrificed entirely as a burnt offering assumes the status of a burnt offering.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said:</b> The two cases are different. <b>Granted,</b> Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle applies to <b>a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering. Since</b> the method of <b>preparing</b> this bird sin offering is <b>by</b> pinching <b>one <i>siman</i>, and</b> the method of <b>preparing that</b> bird burnt offering is <b>by</b> pinching <b>two <i>simanim</i>, and</b> since <b>there</b> can be <b>no bird burnt offering below</b> the red line, therefore <b>once he pinched one <i>siman</i></b> below the red line, the offering <b>is removed</b> from its status as a burnt offering <b>and becomes a bird sin offering.</b>",
            "<b>But</b> one cannot say this with regard to <b>a bird sin offering</b> that was sacrificed as a burnt offering. <b>Since the Master said</b> with regard to the bird sin offering: <b>Pinching is valid everywhere</b> on the altar, it follows that <b>as soon as one pinched one <i>siman</i></b> for the sake of a burnt offering it was <b>disqualified,</b> like any other sin offering pinched for the sake of a different type of offering. Consequently, <b>when he then pinched the other <i>siman</i></b> according to the procedure of a burnt offering, <b>how could it</b> then <b>be removed</b> from its status as a sin offering <b>and become a bird burnt offering?</b>",
            "§ The Gemara discusses <b>the</b> matter <b>itself,</b> that <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yehoshua would say:</b> In the case of <b>a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below</b> the red line <b>according to the procedure of a sin offering</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering, once he pinched one <i>siman</i>,</b> the offering <b>is removed</b> from its status as a burnt offering <b>and becomes a bird sin offering.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a challenge to this principle from a mishna in tractate <i>Kinnim</i> (24a). A woman after childbirth must bring two bird offerings: A burnt offering and a sin offering. The mishna discusses a case where two women after childbirth, one of whom already brought her burnt offering and one of whom already brought her sin offering, bring their remaining offerings to the Temple, <b>a sin offering for this one and a burnt offering for that one,</b> but confusion has arisen as to which bird is which.",
            "If the priest <b>sacrificed both of them above</b> the red line, <b>half</b> of the birds, i.e., one of them, <b>is fit,</b> as in any event the burnt offering has been sacrificed properly, <b>and half</b> of the birds, i.e., the other one, <b>is disqualified.</b> Likewise, if he sacrificed <b>both of them below</b> the red line, <b>half are fit,</b> as in any event the sin offering was sacrificed properly, <b>and half are disqualified.</b> If he sacrificed <b>one above</b> the red line <b>and one below, they are both disqualified, as I say</b> that perhaps the <b>sin offering was sacrificed above, and</b> the <b>burnt offering was sacrificed below.</b>",
            "But according to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle, the sin offering should be deemed fit in any event; <b>even</b> though the <b>burnt offering was indeed sacrificed below</b> the red line, <b>it should be removed</b> from its status as a burnt offering <b>and become a bird sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this claim: It is reasonable to <b>say that Rabbi Yehoshua stated</b> his principle <b>with regard to one person,</b> whose offering the priest sacrificed below the red line instead of above it; but <b>did he state</b> it <b>with regard to two people,</b> one of whose offering the priest sacrificed for the sake of the other person? In the case of the two women, the priest sacrificed the offering for the sake of a different person altogether, and Rabbi Yehoshua would concede that such an offering does not become a sin offering.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another challenge from a mishna in tractate <i>Kinnim</i> (24a). The mishna discusses a case of two women who jointly brought three pairs of birds, as follows: The birds of one pair were designated as <b>a sin offering and a burnt offering</b> respectively, but it was not specified which woman’s obligation they were to satisfy; <b>and</b> the second pair was <b>unspecified</b> as to which bird was to be which offering; <b>and</b> the third pair was <b>specified</b> as to both the type of offering of each bird and whose obligation each bird was to satisfy.",
            "If the priest <b>sacrificed all of them above</b> the red line, <b>half</b> of the birds <b>are fit,</b> as in any event the burnt offerings have been sacrificed properly, <b>and half are disqualified.</b> Likewise, if he sacrificed <b>all of them below</b> the red line, <b>half are fit,</b> as in any event the sin offerings were sacrificed properly, <b>and half are disqualified.</b> If he sacrificed <b>half of</b> every pair <b>above</b> the red line <b>and half of</b> it <b>below,</b> but it is unclear which bird he sacrificed above and which he sacrificed below, <b>only</b> the <b>unspecified</b> pair is <b>fit,</b> as by sacrificing one above and one below the priest has in effect designated them. <b>And</b> since the women brought the birds jointly, the fit pair <b>is divided between them,</b> one bird counting toward the obligation of each woman.",
            "The mishna teaches that only the unspecified pair is fit, <b>while</b> the <b>specified</b> birds are <b>not,</b> as perhaps each bird was sacrificed on the wrong side of the red line and disqualified. <b>But why</b> should that be the <i>halakha</i>? According to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle, <b>even</b> if the <b>burnt offering was indeed sacrificed below</b> the red line, <b>it should be removed</b> from its status as a burnt offering <b>and become a bird sin offering.</b>",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that <b>this</b> mishna <b>is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua, how can you say that?</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> evidence that the <i>mishnayot</i> in tractate <i>Kinnim</i> are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua from another mishna in the same chapter (24b): The mishna discusses the case of <b>a woman who said: It</b> is incumbent <b>upon me</b> to bring <b>one nest,</b> i.e., one pair of bird offerings, <b>if I give birth to a male</b> child. Since all women who give birth must bring one pair of birds in any event, if <b>she</b> ultimately <b>gave birth to a male, she must bring two nests, one for her vow and one for her obligation.</b>",
            "If <b>she gave them to the priest</b> without specifying which bird is to be which type of offering, <b>the priest must sacrifice three above</b> the red line <b>and one below.</b> This is because the obligatory pair must consist of a burnt offering and a sin offering, while a pair of birds brought to fulfill a vow must consist of two burnt offerings.",
            "If the priest <b>did not do so,</b> but <b>rather,</b> thinking that both pairs were obligatory, <b>sacrificed two above and two below, and</b> he <b>did not consult</b> the woman before sacrificing them, <b>she must bring one more bird [<i>perida</i>] and sacrifice it above</b> the red line to satisfy her remaining obligation.",
            "This is the <i>halakha</i> only if both pairs were <b>of the same species</b> of bird, either doves or pigeons; <b>but</b> if the two pairs were <b>of two</b> different <b>species,</b> and the priest does not remember which pair he sacrificed first, <b>she must bring two</b> more birds, one of each species. Whichever pair was sacrificed first is deemed the obligatory pair, and the woman must bring a bird of the other species to satisfy her remaining obligation of a burnt offering. But since it is not known which species of bird that is, she must bring one of each.",
            "If the woman initially <b>specified</b> which species of bird she would bring for <b>her vow</b> but subsequently forgot what species she specified, and she then brought two pairs of a single species, and the priest mistakenly sacrificed two birds above the red line and two below, then <b>she must bring three more birds,</b> all as burnt offerings. One must be of the species she brought, to replace the bird mistakenly sacrificed below, and the other two must be of the other species, in case that was the species she specified in the first place.",
            "This is the <i>halakha</i> only if both pairs that she brought were <b>of the same species. But</b> if they were <b>of two</b> different <b>species,</b> and the priest does not remember which pair he sacrificed first, <b>she must bring four,</b> two of each species. This is because no matter which species she specified, the priest may have sacrificed the pair of that species first, leaving none of that species to satisfy even part of her vow. She therefore may still need to satisfy an entire vow of either species.",
            "The mishna continues: If, besides forgetting which species of bird she specified to bring for her vow, the woman also <b>committed</b> to sacrificing the birds of <b>her vow</b> together with the burnt offering of the obligatory pair, but the priest mistakenly sacrificed two birds above the red line and two below,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>she must bring another five birds</b> and sacrifice them all <b>above</b> the red line as burnt offerings. Since her commitment was not satisfied, she has not fulfilled even part of her vow. She must therefore bring two burnt offerings of each species to ensure that she fulfills her vow, and she must bring another bird to replace the initial obligatory burnt offering and fulfill her commitment to bring them together.",
            "This is the <i>halakha</i> only if both pairs that she brought were <b>of the same species. But</b> if they were <b>of two</b> different <b>species,</b> and the priest does not remember which he sacrificed first as the obligatory pair, <b>she must bring six,</b> two of each species to ensure that she fulfills her vow, and one more of each species to ensure that she properly replaces the original burnt offering of the obligatory pair and fulfills her commitment.",
            "If the woman specified the species of bird for her vow but then forgot which species she specified, and <b>she gave</b> two pairs of birds <b>to the priest but does not know</b> now <b>what</b> species <b>she gave,</b> or even if she gave him one or two species of birds, and <b>the priest went and sacrificed</b> the birds <b>but does not know</b> now <b>what he sacrificed</b> where, in this case, <b>she must</b> bring seven birds, as follows: <b>Four birds,</b> two of each species, <b>for her vow; and two</b> more birds, one of each species, <b>for her obligatory</b> burnt offering, in case the priest sacrificed a sin offering of a certain species and the burnt offering must now match that species; <b>and one sin offering</b> of either species, in case the priest sacrificed them all as burnt offerings.",
            "<b>Ben Azzai says</b> she must bring <b>two sin offerings,</b> one of each species, as he holds that if the priest sacrificed a bird of a certain species specifically as the obligatory burnt offering, the sin offering must now match that species.",
            "The mishna concludes: <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said</b> that there is a parable that explains this situation: <b>This is what</b> people <b>say</b> about a sheep: <b>When it is alive it</b> makes <b>one sound, and when it is dead it</b> makes <b>seven sounds.</b> Its two horns become trumpets, its two shinbones become flutes, its skin becomes a drumhead, its large intestines become harp strings, and its small intestines become lyre strings. Here too, because of the uncertainty as to what had occurred, the woman must bring seven extra birds. Since Rabbi Yehoshua summarizes the mishna, the <i>mishnayot</i> in this chapter must be in accordance with his opinion. According to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle, burnt offerings of birds sacrificed as sin offerings become valid sin offerings. Why then, according to these <i>mishnayot</i>, are they disqualified?",
            "The Gemara responds: Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation is not at odds with these <i>mishnayot</i>; while it is reasonable to <b>say,</b> i.e., to explain, <b>that Rabbi Yehoshua said</b> that the offering becomes a sin offering insofar as <b>to exclude</b> one who derives benefit from <b>it from</b> liability for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>did he say</b> that it becomes a sin offering so expansively as <b>to</b> indicate that it would <b>satisfy</b> the owner’s <b>obligation?</b> In the cases in the <i>mishnayot</i> in <i>Kinnim</i>, all burnt offerings that were sacrificed as sin offerings are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property, but the women must nevertheless bring replacement offerings.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>any</b> of those people <b>disqualified</b> from performing the Temple service <b>who pinched</b> the nape of a bird offering, <b>their pinching is not valid, but</b> the offering’s meat <b>does not render</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat,</b> as would the meat of a kosher bird that was not ritually slaughtered. If a priest <b>pinched</b> it <b>with</b> the thumbnail of his <b>left</b> hand, <b>or</b> if he pinched it <b>at night,</b> or if <b>he slaughtered a non-sacred</b> bird <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>or a sacrificial</b> bird <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, in all these cases, although it is prohibited to consume these birds, <b>they do not render</b> one <b>ritually impure</b> when they are <b>in the throat,</b> as the halakhic status of pinching is like that of slaughtering.",
            "If <b>he pinched with a knife</b> and not with his thumbnail; or if <b>he pinched a non-sacred</b> bird <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>or a sacrificial</b> bird <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard;"
        ],
        [
            "or if he pinched <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has not</b> yet <b>arrived,</b> as they are too young to be sacrificed; <b>or if he</b> pinched <b>pigeons whose time</b> of fitness <b>has passed,</b> as they are too old; or if he pinched the nape of a fledgling <b>whose wing was withered,</b> or <b>whose eye was blinded, or whose leg was severed;</b> in all these cases, although the bird’s nape was pinched, <b>it renders</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "<b>This is the principle:</b> The meat of <b>any</b> bird that was initially fit for sacrifice and <b>whose disqualification</b> occurred in the course of the service <b>in the sacred</b> Temple courtyard <b>does not render</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b> The meat of any bird <b>whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred</b> area, but rather was disqualified before the service began, <b>renders</b> one <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rav says:</b> Pinching with the thumbnail of the <b>left</b> hand <b>and</b> pinching at <b>night do not</b> cause the offering’s meat to <b>render</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat</b> as would the carcass of an unslaughtered bird; but pinching by <b>a non-priest and</b> pinching, i.e., cutting from the nape of the neck, with <b>a knife</b> rather than the fingernail do cause the meat to <b>render</b> one <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>What is different</b> about the first two cases that prevents the bird from assuming the status of a carcass? Temple service with the <b>left</b> hand <b>has</b> an instance of <b>validity</b> during the service <b>on Yom Kippur,</b> when the High Priest enters the Holy of Holies holding the spoon of incense in his left hand. <b>And</b> Temple service at <b>night has</b> an instance of <b>validity in</b> the burning of <b>limbs and fats</b> of offerings on the altar, which may be burned throughout the night. But <b>a non-priest also has</b> an instance of <b>validity in</b> the <b>slaughter</b> of animal offerings. Why then does Rav rule that pinching by a non-priest renders the bird a carcass? The Gemara answers: <b>Slaughter is not</b> considered a full-fledged sacrificial <b>rite,</b> and therefore it cannot be compared to pinching.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is it <b>not</b> a full-fledged rite? <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say</b> that <b>the slaughter of</b> a red <b>heifer by a non-priest is not valid,</b> which indicates that it is a full-fledged rite? <b>And Rav showed</b> a source in the Torah <b>for</b> this <i>halakha</i>: The verses concerning the red heifer mention both <b>Elazar</b> the priest as performing the slaughter <b>and</b> the word <b>“statute,”</b> which is mentioned in the verse: “This is the statute of the law” (Numbers 19:2), teaching that Elazar’s involvement was halakhically required.",
            "The Gemara answers: The red <b>heifer is different, as it</b> has the halakhic status of an item <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance</b> rather than for sacrifice on the altar. Therefore, its slaughter cannot teach the <i>halakha</i> concerning an actual offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> can <b>it not</b> be inferred <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> that slaughter is a sacrificial rite? If animals that have the status of items <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance,</b> which are of lesser sanctity, <b>require</b> slaughter by the <b>priesthood, is</b> it <b>necessary</b> to say that the slaughter of animals <b>consecrated for</b> sacrifice on the <b>altar,</b> which are of greater sanctity, is a sacrificial rite that should require a priest? Apparently, the fact that non-priests may slaughter offerings proves that certain sacrificial rites apply to them.",
            "<b>Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said:</b> The slaughter of a red heifer does not constitute Temple service at all, and therefore it cannot be compared to the slaughter of an offering. The <i>halakha</i> is <b>just as it is with regard to</b> the examination of the <b>shades of</b> leprous <b>marks, which</b> does <b>not</b> constitute Temple <b>service but requires</b> a declaration of purity or impurity by the <b>priesthood.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But let us derive from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of a private <b>altar,</b> which was a valid medium for sacrificing offerings before the Temple was built, where non-priests were permitted to pinch the napes of bird offerings, that there is a circumstance in which pinching by non-priests is valid. Why then does the bird assume the status of a carcass when the pinching is performed by a non-priest?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>One cannot derive</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of the Temple service <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of a private <b>altar,</b> which was considered non-sacred by comparison.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> can one <b>not</b> derive the <i>halakhot</i> of the Temple service from the <i>halakhot</i> of a private altar? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to</b> an item, e.g., the limbs of an offering, which <b>emerged</b> from the Temple courtyard and was thereby rendered unfit for sacrifice upon the altar, <b>that if</b> it nevertheless <b>ascended</b> upon the altar <b>it shall not descend?</b> It is derived from the fact <b>that</b> an item that <b>emerged is valid</b> for sacrifice <b>on</b> a private <b>altar.</b> This indicates that one can learn from the <i>halakhot</i> of a private altar with regard to the Temple service.",
            "The Gemara answers: The <b><i>tanna</i></b> of that <i>baraita</i> <b>relies on</b> the verse: <b>“This is the law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that any item that ascends [<i>ola</i>] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. In other words, the verse is the actual source for the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling.",
            "Until this point the Gemara has discussed the opinion of Rav, who holds that the pinching of a non-priest renders the bird a carcass with regard to ritual impurity. <b>But Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If <b>a non-priest</b> pinched the nape of a bird offering, the meat <b>does not render</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat;</b> but if a priest pinched it, i.e., cut it from the nape of the neck, with <b>a knife,</b> the meat <b>renders</b> one <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "The Gemara brings proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from that which <b>we learned</b> in the mishna: If <b>any</b> of those <b>disqualified</b> for Temple service <b>pinched</b> the nape of a bird offering, <b>their pinching is not valid,</b> but the meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. <b>Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> the word: <b>Any,</b> is written <b>to add</b> that even the pinching of <b>a non-priest</b> does not render the bird a carcass. <b>But according to Rav,</b> who holds that it does render the bird a carcass, <b>what is added</b> by the word: <b>Any?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: It is written <b>to add</b> pinching with the <b>left</b> hand <b>or</b> pinching at <b>night.</b> The Gemara challenges: The word: Any, is unnecessary with regard to teaching the cases of pinching with the <b>left</b> hand <b>and</b> pinching at <b>night,</b> as <b>they are taught</b> in the mishna <b>explicitly.</b> The Gemara answers: According to Rav, the word: Any, is not meant to add a specific case. Rather the mishna <b>teaches</b> the principle <b>and then explains</b> using specific examples.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> proof from the continuation of the mishna: <b>This is the principle:</b> The meat of <b>any</b> bird <b>whose disqualification occurred</b> during the course of the service <b>in the sacred</b> Temple courtyard <b>does not render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when the meat is <b>in the throat. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> the word: <b>Any,</b> is written <b>to add</b> that even the pinching of <b>a non-priest</b> does not render the bird a carcass. <b>But according to Rav,</b> who holds that it does render the bird a carcass, <b>what is added</b> by the word: Any?"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara responds: <b>And according to your reasoning,</b> one could infer the opposite from the following clause: The meat of any bird <b>whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred</b> Temple courtyard transmits ritual impurity to one who swallows it. Here, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>what</b> disqualification <b>is added</b> if not pinching by a non-priest?",
            "<b>Rather,</b> both clauses add other disqualifications not mentioned in the mishna. <b>The former clause,</b> concerning an offering that was disqualified in the Temple courtyard, is written <b>to add</b> that <b>the slaughter of sacrificial</b> birds <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard does not render them carcasses. <b>The latter clause,</b> with regard to an offering disqualified outside the Temple courtyard, is written <b>to add</b> that <b>the pinching of non-sacred</b> birds <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard does render them carcasses.",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> In a case where <b>a non-priest pinched</b> a bird offering, or a priest <b>disqualified</b> from the Temple service <b>pinched it,</b> or it became <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., it was sacrificed with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, <b>or</b> it became <b><i>notar</i>,</b> i.e., its meat remained uneaten beyond its designated time, <b>or</b> it became <b>ritually impure,</b> in all these cases, even though the meat of these birds may not be consumed, they still <b>do not render</b> one who swallows them <b>ritually impure</b> when they are <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yitzḥak says: I heard [<i>shamati</i>] two</b> <i>halakhot</i>, <b>one</b> concerning <b>the removal of a handful</b> from a meal offering <b>by a non-priest</b> for burning on the altar, <b>and one</b> concerning the <b>pinching</b> of a bird offering <b>by a non-priest.</b> Although both offerings are disqualified, I heard that <b>one shall descend</b> from the altar if it ascended, <b>and one shall not descend; but I do not know</b> which <i>halakha</i> applies to which case. <b>Ḥizkiyya said: It stands to reason</b> that in the case of the <b>removal of</b> the <b>handful</b> the offering <b>shall descend</b> and in the case of <b>pinching</b> the offering <b>shall not descend.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about <b>pinching</b> by a non-priest that would allow the bird to be sacrificed if it ascended onto the altar? If the difference is <b>that</b> for a non-priest to do so <b>would be</b> valid <b>on</b> a private <b>altar,</b> where all sacrificial rites were performed by non-priests, this does not constitute a difference, as the <b>removal of</b> the <b>handful</b> by a non-priest <b>would also be</b> valid <b>on</b> a private <b>altar.</b>",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that no handfuls were removed on private altars because <b>no meal offering</b> was sacrificed <b>on</b> a private <b>altar,</b> as meal offerings were brought before the construction of the Temple only on the altar in the Tabernacle, you must also say that there was no pinching either, as according to this opinion <b>no birds</b> were sacrificed <b>on</b> a private <b>altar either.</b>",
            "<b>As Rav Sheshet says: According to the statement of the one who says</b> that <b>a meal offering was</b> sacrificed <b>on</b> a private <b>altar, birds were</b> sacrificed <b>on</b> a private <b>altar. According to the statement of the one who says</b> that <b>no meal offering</b> was sacrificed on a private altar, <b>no birds</b> were sacrificed there either. <b>What is the reason</b> for this? This is because the Torah, in describing the offerings brought at Mount Sinai, before the Tabernacle was built, mentions <b>slaughtered offerings</b> (see Exodus 24:5) <b>but not meal offerings;</b> it mentions <b>slaughtered offerings,</b> i.e., animal offerings, <b>but not birds.</b>",
            "<b>Rather, say</b> that even though both pinching the nape of a bird offering and removing the handful of a meal offering by a non-priest are valid on a private altar, the <i>halakhot</i> of meal offerings sacrificed on a private altar cannot be compared to those of meal offerings sacrificed in the Temple. This is because in the case of <b>a meal offering</b> sacrificed <b>on</b> a private <b>altar, there is no consecration in a service vessel of</b> the handful removed from it. By contrast, in the Temple, the handful must always be consecrated in a service vessel.",
            "§ The mishna rules that if a priest <b>pinched with</b> his <b>left</b> hand, <b>or</b> if he pinched <b>at night,</b> the offering does not render one ritually impure when in his throat. With regard to this issue <b>the Sages taught:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that invalid <b>pinching that</b> occurs <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard, such as pinching with the left hand or pinching at night, <b>would</b> cause the offering to <b>render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b> Therefore <b>the verse states:</b> “Every soul that eats <b>a carcass</b>…shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). Bird offerings whose napes were pinched inside the Temple courtyard are not considered carcasses.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Isn’t</b> a bird offering whose nape was pinched inside the Temple courtyard <b>also a carcass? Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is derived from that which <b>the verse states:</b> “Every soul that eats a carcass or <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b>…shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). A <i>tereifa</i> is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months. It is derived from this verse that <b>just as</b> having the status of <b>a <i>tereifa</i> does not render permitted</b> any <b>forbidden</b> bird, <b>so too, any</b> type of death <b>that does not render permitted</b> any <b>forbidden</b> bird renders the animal a carcass with regard to ritual impurity.",
            "Consequently, invalid <b>pinching that is</b> performed <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>is excluded, since it renders permitted a forbidden</b> bird, as it is permitted to sacrifice such a disqualified offering if it ascended onto the altar, whereas it was prohibited to sacrifice such a disqualified offering if it was not pinched. The meat of such an offering therefore <b>does not render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "This principle <b>includes</b> two other cases of invalid pinching, for which the Gemara gives a two-word <b>mnemonic: <i>Ketz</i>, <i>ḥefetz</i>.</b> These words are acronyms for the cases of <b>one who pinches</b> the napes of <b>sacrificial</b> birds <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>and</b> one who <b>pinches</b> the napes of <b>non-sacred</b> birds <b>whether inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>or outside</b> of it. <b>Since</b> these offerings <b>do not render permitted</b> any <b>forbidden</b> bird, as these offerings may not be sacrificed even if brought onto the altar, <b>they render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows them <b>ritually impure</b> when they are <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that the slaughter of non-sacred</b> birds <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>or</b> the slaughter of <b>sacrificial</b> birds <b>whether inside or outside</b> of it, would cause their meat to <b>render</b> the garments of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b> Therefore <b>the verse states:</b> “Every soul that eats <b>a carcass</b>…shall be impure until the evening.” Birds that have been slaughtered in this manner are not considered carcasses, and so they do not impart ritual impurity.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Isn’t</b> a bird slaughtered in one of these manners <b>also a carcass? Rather,</b> it is derived from that which <b>the verse states:</b> “Every soul that eats a carcass or <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b>…shall be impure until the evening,” as follows: <b>Just as</b> the status of <b>a <i>tereifa</i> is the same,</b> if the bird is slaughtered <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>as</b> it is if the bird is slaughtered <b>outside</b> of it, i.e., forbidden, <b>so too all</b> forbidden birds whose status <b>is the same</b> if slaughtered <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>as</b> it is if they were slaughtered <b>outside</b> of it constitute carcasses.",
            "Consequently, <b>the slaughter of non-sacred</b> birds <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>or</b> of <b>sacrificial</b> birds <b>whether inside or outside</b> of it, <b>is excluded, since</b> the status of such birds <b>is not the same</b> if they are slaughtered <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>as</b> if they are slaughtered <b>outside</b> of it. The meat of such an offering therefore <b>does not render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Granted,</b> the status of <b>non-sacred</b> birds <b>is not the same</b> if slaughtered <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>as</b> if they are slaughtered <b>outside</b> of it, as if slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard they are forbidden, while if slaughtered outside of it they are permitted. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>sacrificial</b> birds, in both <b>this</b> case <b>and that</b> case, whether slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard or outside of it, they <b>are disqualified.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says:</b> The <i>halakha</i> with regard to slaughtered sacrificial birds outside the Temple should not be derived from the verse at all, but rather by logic. <b>If the slaughter of</b> a sacrificial bird <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>has</b> sufficient <b>effect on it</b> as proper slaughter <b>to render</b> the one who slaughtered it <b>liable to excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>],</b> which is the punishment for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard (see 107a), could it be that <b>it does not have</b> sufficient <b>effect on</b> the bird as proper slaughter <b>to render it ritually pure</b> by preventing it <b>from</b> assuming the status of <b>a carcass?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source for the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the slaughter of sacrificial birds <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard; <b>from where do we</b> derive this <i>halakha</i> with regard to their slaughter <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers that it is derived from the principle articulated above: <b>Since</b> their status <b>is not the same</b> if they are slaughtered <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>as</b> if they are slaughtered <b>outside</b> of it, as one who slaughters a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, the status of a carcass does not apply.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> it follows that if the priest <b>pinched sacrificial</b> birds <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, they are <b>also not</b> considered carcasses, <b>as</b> their status <b>is not the same</b> if they are pinched <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>as</b> if they are pinched <b>outside</b> of it; if they are pinched inside, they are fit offerings, and if they are pinched outside, they are disqualified. This conclusion would contradict the mishna, which rules that sacrificial birds pinched outside the Temple courtyard are considered carcasses, and they render one who eats their meat impure.",
            "<b>Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: One can derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>an item that is</b> prepared <b>not in its valid manner,</b> i.e., sacrificial birds slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to another <b>item that is</b> prepared <b>not in its valid manner,</b> i.e., sacrificial birds slaughtered inside it. <b>But one cannot derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>an item that is</b> prepared <b>not in its valid manner,</b> i.e., sacrificial birds pinched outside the Temple courtyard, <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>an item that is</b> prepared <b>in its valid manner,</b> i.e., those pinched inside it. The cases of a bird pinched outside and a bird pinched inside the Temple courtyard are not subject to comparison, so one cannot derive conclusions from the differences between them.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> can one <b>not</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to disqualified offerings from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to fit offerings? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to</b> an item that <b>emerged</b> from the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, <b>that if</b> it nevertheless <b>ascended</b> upon the altar <b>it shall not descend?</b> It is derived from the fact <b>that</b> an item that <b>emerged is valid</b> for sacrifice <b>on</b> a private <b>altar,</b> i.e., that disqualification was not applicable to an offering sacrificed on a private altar, as there was no Temple. Here, the <i>baraita</i> derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a disqualified offering from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a fit one.",
            "The Gemara answers: The <b><i>tanna</i></b> of that <i>baraita</i> <b>relies on</b> the phrase: <b>“This is the law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 6:2), a seemingly superfluous general phrase which is interpreted homiletically to <b>include</b> the <i>halakha</i> that any item that ascends [<i>ola</i>] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. The verse is the actual source for the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If the priest <b>pinched</b> the nape of the bird’s neck properly <b>and</b> then <b>it was found</b> to be <b>a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> and it was therefore disqualified from being sacrificed and forbidden for consumption by a priest, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> An olive-bulk of its meat <b>does not render</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat,</b> as the pinching prevents it from assuming the status of a carcass."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Its status is like any other carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird, and its meat <b>renders</b> one who swallows it <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Meir said:</b> My opinion can be inferred <b><i>a fortiori</i>. If an animal carcass transmits impurity</b> to a person <b>through touching</b> it <b>and through carrying</b> it, and nevertheless the <b>slaughter of</b> an animal <b>purifies it,</b> even if it is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity,</b> i.e., its slaughter prevents it from assuming the impurity status of a carcass, then with regard to <b>a bird carcass, which</b> possesses a lesser degree of impurity, as it <b>does not transmit impurity</b> to a person <b>through touching</b> it <b>and through carrying</b> it, but only through swallowing it, <b>is it not logical that its slaughter should purify it,</b> even if it is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity?</b>",
            "And once it is established that slaughter renders a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> pure, it can be inferred that <b>just as we found with regard to its slaughter that it renders</b> a bird <b>fit for consumption and purifies</b> a bird, even if it is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity, so too its pinching, which renders</b> a bird offering <b>fit with regard to consumption, should purify it,</b> even if it is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> Although one can derive from the case of an animal that slaughter renders even a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> pure, that derivation cannot be extended to pinching. The same restriction that applies to every <i>a fortiori</i> inference, namely, that a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived, applies here: <b>It is sufficient</b> for the halakhic status of the carcass of a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> to be <b>like</b> that of <b>the carcass of</b> an <b>animal</b> that is a <i>tereifa</i>; <b>its slaughter renders it pure, but its pinching</b> does <b>not.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> In the mishna, Rabbi Yosei answers Rabbi Meir by invoking the principle that a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. The Gemara asks: <b>And does Rabbi Meir not require</b> that <i>a fortiori</i> inferences conform to the principle that <b>it is sufficient</b> for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source? <b>But isn’t</b> the principle: <b>It is sufficient,</b> etc., mandated <b>by Torah law?</b>",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>How</b> is it derived from the Torah that derivation <b>by</b> means of an <b><i>a fortiori</i> inference</b> is a valid method of biblical exegesis? The Torah states with regard to Miriam, who was reprimanded by God: <b>“And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had but spit in her face,</b> should she not hide in shame seven days? Let her be shut up outside the camp seven days” (Numbers 12:14). If one who was reprimanded by her father would hide in shame for seven days, one could infer through an <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference that one reprimanded by <b>the Divine Presence</b> should be shut up outside the camp for <b>fourteen days. Rather,</b> one must say: <b>It is sufficient for the</b> conclusion that <b>emerges from</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference to be like</b> its <b>source.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, said: Rabbi Meir</b> does require that <i>a fortiori</i> inferences conform to this principle. But he does not actually infer his opinion <i>a fortiori</i>; rather, <b>he found a verse and interpreted</b> it.",
            "The Torah states, with regard to the impurity of unslaughtered animal carcasses: <b>“This is the law of the beast, and of the fowl”</b> (Leviticus 11:46), indicating that the two are somehow equated. <b>But with regard to what law is a beast equal to a fowl and a fowl</b> equal <b>to a beast?</b> The <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity governing animals and birds are not comparable; <b>an animal transmits impurity by touching and by carrying,</b> whereas <b>a bird does not transmit impurity by touching or by carrying.</b> Furthermore, <b>a bird renders</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat; an animal does not render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> this verse serves <b>to tell you</b> that <b>just as</b> with regard to <b>an animal, that which renders it fit for consumption,</b> i.e., slaughter, <b>purifies it,</b> even when it is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity, so too</b> with regard to <b>a bird, that which renders</b> it <b>fit for consumption,</b> i.e., both the slaughter of a non-sacred bird and pinching the nape of a bird offering, <b>purifies</b> a bird, even if it is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who holds that a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> imparts impurity even when slaughtered? He too <b>found a verse and interpreted</b> it. The Torah states with regard to the ritual impurity of kosher bird carcasses: “And every soul that eats <b>a carcass,</b> or <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b>…he shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). <b>Rabbi Yehuda said: Why was</b> the case of <b>a <i>tereifa</i> stated? If</b> the verse is referring to <b>a live <i>tereifa</i>,</b> it should not be impure, as the term <b>“a carcass” is stated,</b> indicating that to impart impurity the bird must be dead. <b>If</b> it is referring to <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b> that <b>is not alive,</b> but rather has died of its wounds, <b>it</b> falls <b>within the category of a carcass. Rather,</b> the word <i>tereifa</i> is written <b>to include a <i>tereifa</i> that one slaughtered</b> before it had the opportunity to die by itself, to teach <b>that it imparts ritual impurity</b> as would a carcass.",
            "<b>Rav Sheizevi said to</b> the Sage who suggested this source for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: <b>If that is so,</b> one should interpret another verse likewise, <b>as it is written: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), meaning that although the meat of a carcass imparts ritual impurity, those fats that would be forbidden even if the animal had been slaughtered do not impart impurity.",
            "<b>There too let us say,</b> interpreting the verse according to Rabbi Yehuda’s logic: Why is the case of a <i>tereifa</i> stated? <b>If</b> it is referring to <b>a live <i>tereifa</i>,</b> the case is superfluous, as <b>“a carcass” is stated.</b> Since the forbidden fat of a carcass is pure, obviously that of a live animal is pure. <b>If</b> it is referring to <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b> that <b>is not alive,</b> but has rather died of its wounds, <b>it is</b> included <b>within the category of “a carcass,”</b> and likewise it need not be mentioned. <b>Rather,</b> the word “<i>tereifa</i>” is written <b>to include a <i>tereifa</i> that one slaughtered,</b> to teach <b>that its</b> forbidden <b>fat</b> is <b>pure. By inference,</b> one should then conclude <b>that</b> its meat <b>does impart impurity.</b>",
            "<b>But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say</b> that <b>Rav says, and some say it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>:</b> The verse concerning the impurity of carcasses states: <b>“And if some animal,</b> of which you may eat, <b>dies,</b> one who touches its carcass shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:39)? The word “some” teaches that <b>some animals impart impurity</b> and <b>some animals do not impart impurity. And what is</b> it <b>that</b> does not impart impurity? <b>That is a <i>tereifa</i> that one slaughtered.</b> And if even its meat does not impart impurity, the word <i>tereifa</i> is not needed to teach that its forbidden fat is pure.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the word <b><i>tereifa</i></b> in the verse concerning forbidden fat (Leviticus 7:24) <b>is necessary to exclude non-kosher</b> animals from the <i>halakha</i> in the verse and to teach that their forbidden fat is impure. The word indicates that only the forbidden fat of <b>those</b> carcasses <b>to whose species</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>tereifa</i> applies,</b> i.e., those of kosher animals, impart impurity. Forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal <b>is excluded, as</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>tereifa</i> does not apply to its species.</b> The status of <i>tereifa</i> is immaterial for a non-kosher animal as its consumption is prohibited in any event.",
            "<b>Here too,</b> the word <i>tereifa</i> in the verse concerning the impurity of kosher bird carcasses (Leviticus 17:15) should be interpreted as <b>excluding</b> a carcass of <b>a non-kosher bird</b> from ritual impurity, <b>as</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>tereifa</i> does not apply to its species.</b> Therefore, this verse cannot serve as a source for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the impurity of a slaughtered bird that is a <i>tereifa</i>.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>According to Rabbi Yehuda,</b> the <i>halakha</i> that the carcass of <b>a non-kosher bird</b> does not impart impurity <b>is derived from</b> the phrase <b>“a carcass”</b> as it appears elsewhere.",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>the carcass of a non-kosher bird renders</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b> But <b>the verse states,</b> concerning the impurity of carcasses of birds: <b>“A carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>, he shall not eat”</b> (Leviticus 22:8). This type of impurity applies only to <b>those</b> birds <b>that are forbidden</b> specifically <b>due to</b> the prohibition: <b>You shall not eat</b> of <b>a carcass,</b> i.e., kosher birds that died without ritual slaughter. <b>This</b> carcass of a non-kosher animal <b>is excluded,</b> and is not impure, <b>as</b> it is <b>forbidden not due to</b> the prohibition: <b>You shall not eat</b> of <b>a carcass,</b> but <b>rather due to</b> the prohibition: <b>You shall not eat a non-kosher</b> bird, to render yourself impure with it. Consequently, the word <i>tereifa</i> in the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 17:15) teaches that a slaughtered <i>tereifa</i> imparts ritual impurity, as originally posited."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara challenges: According to <b>this</b> logic, one can <b>also derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> that the forbidden fat of the carcass of a non-kosher animal is impure <b>from</b> the verse: <b>“And the fat of a carcass,</b> and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), which teaches that such forbidden fat is ritually pure.",
            "The continuation of the verse: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” indicates that the verse renders pure only fat <b>that</b> is <b>forbidden</b> specifically <b>due to</b> the prohibition: <b>You shall not eat the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a carcass,</b> i.e., the forbidden fat of kosher animals. This serves <b>to exclude this</b> forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal, <b>which is not forbidden due to</b> the prohibition: <b>You shall not eat the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a carcass,</b> but <b>rather due to</b> the prohibition against eating <b>a non-kosher</b> animal. Since the verse that states that fats are ritually pure is referring only to kosher animals, the forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal must be impure. Rav Sheizevi’s derivation of this <i>halakha</i> from the word <i>tereifa</i> is therefore superfluous.",
            "<b>Rather, this</b> word <b>“<i>tereifa</i>” is necessary to include</b> the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher <b>undomesticated animal,</b> to teach that it is ritually pure; as it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that only the forbidden fat of carcasses of <b>those</b> animals <b>whose fat is forbidden and whose meat</b> is <b>permitted</b> if slaughtered, i.e., kosher domesticated animals, is ritually pure, and this serves <b>to exclude this</b> forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals <b>whose fat and meat are</b> both <b>permitted</b> if slaughtered, i.e., kosher undomesticated animals, whose fat is impure. To counter this possibility, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” <b>teaches us</b> that the fat of a carcass of any animal that can become a <i>tereifa</i> is ritually pure, including the fat of kosher undomesticated animals.",
            "<b>He said to him:</b> If it is derived from the verse that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal is pure, <b>what is different</b> about <b>a non-kosher</b> animal that would cause its forbidden fat to be impure? If the difference is <b>that its fat is not distinct from its meat,</b> as both are forbidden for consumption, <b>the fat of</b> a kosher <b>undomesticated animal is also not distinct from its meat,</b> as both are permitted. <b>And furthermore, isn’t it written</b> later in the verse: <b>“But you shall in no way eat of it”</b> (Leviticus 7:24)? This phrase is interpreted (70b) as excluding the fat of undomesticated animals, teaching that it is impure.",
            "<b>Rather, Abaye said:</b> The word <b>“<i>tereifa</i>”</b> in this verse <b>was necessary for its own</b> sake, to teach that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a <i>tereifa</i> of a kosher domesticated animal is pure. The inclusion of the word teaches <b>that you should not say</b> that <b>since a non-kosher</b> animal is <b>forbidden while</b> still <b>alive, and a <i>tereifa</i></b> is <b>forbidden while</b> still <b>alive,</b> therefore <b>just as the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a non-kosher</b> animal is <b>impure, so too the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a <i>tereifa</i></b> is <b>impure.</b> The word “<i>tereifa</i>” therefore teaches that it is pure.",
            "The Gemara asks: But <b>if so,</b> i.e., if one could have learned the <i>halakha</i> of the forbidden fat of a <i>tereifa</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal, then <b>this</b> word “<i>tereifa</i>” in the verse concerning the impurity of a kosher bird carcass (Leviticus 17:15) <b>is also necessary</b> for its own sake, to teach that the carcass of a kosher bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> is impure. It is necessary for this to be written with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird so <b>that you should not say</b> as follows: <b>Since a non-kosher bird</b> is <b>forbidden for consumption, and a <i>tereifa</i></b> is <b>forbidden for consumption,</b> therefore <b>just as a non-kosher bird does not impart impurity, so too a <i>tereifa</i> does not impart impurity.</b> According to Rabbi Yehuda, the word is necessary to include the slaughtered kosher bird that is a <i>tereifa</i>, not a carcass.",
            "<b>And furthermore, is it</b> possible <b>to derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>a <i>tereifa</i> from</b> that concerning <b>a non-kosher</b> animal, as suggested? The two cases are incomparable, as <b>a non-kosher</b> animal <b>never had a kosher period</b> before being forbidden, whereas <b>a <i>tereifa</i> had a kosher period</b> before becoming a <i>tereifa</i>. <b>And if you would say: What can be said</b> with regard to an animal that is <b>a <i>tereifa</i> from the womb,</b> which never had a kosher period? <b>In any event, there are</b> kosher animals <b>among its species,</b> i.e., the <i>tereifa</i> is a member of a kosher species, which cannot be said of a non-kosher animal.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava said:</b> The word <i>tereifa</i> in the verse concerning forbidden fat (Leviticus 7:24) teaches a different <i>halakha</i>. By stating: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” referring to the forbidden fat of a carcass, <b>the Torah states: Let the prohibition of</b> eating <b>a carcass come and take effect</b> where <b>the prohibition of</b> eating forbidden <b>fat</b> already exists. One who eats the forbidden fat of a carcass is liable both for eating forbidden fat and for eating from a carcass. Likewise, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” in the verse teaches: <b>Let the prohibition of</b> eating <b>a <i>tereifa</i> come and take effect</b> where <b>the prohibition of</b> eating forbidden <b>fat</b> already exists, so that one who eats the forbidden fat of a <i>tereifa</i> is liable for transgressing two prohibitions.",
            "<b>And</b> both the word “carcass” and the word “<i>tereifa</i>” <b>are necessary,</b> even though they teach similar <i>halakhot</i>. <b>As, had</b> the verse <b>taught us</b> about additional liability only with regard to the forbidden fat of <b>a carcass,</b> one might have thought that it applies to only a carcass, <b>as it imparts ritual impurity, but</b> with regard to <b>a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> which does not, one might <b>say</b> that the additional liability does <b>not</b> apply. <b>And had</b> the verse <b>taught us</b> this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to <b>a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> one might have thought that it applies only to a <i>tereifa</i>, <b>as its prohibition</b> takes effect <b>while</b> it is still <b>alive, but</b> with regard to <b>a carcass,</b> which becomes forbidden only when it dies, one might <b>say</b> that it does <b>not</b> apply. Both words are therefore <b>necessary.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara has established that according to Rabbi Yehuda, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” in the verse concerning the impurity of a kosher bird carcass (Leviticus 17:15) teaches that a slaughtered bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> imparts ritual impurity. The Gemara asks: <b>And what does Rabbi Meir,</b> who holds that a slaughtered bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> does not impart ritual impurity, <b>do with this</b> word <b>“<i>tereifa</i>”?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>It is necessary to exclude</b> the <b>slaughter</b> of non-sacred birds <b>that</b> occurs <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard, teaching that it does not cause them to impart ritual impurity as would a carcass, even though they are forbidden for consumption.",
            "<b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: <b>Another</b> instance of the word <b><i>tereifa</i> is written</b> concerning the ritual impurity of birds: “A carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>, he shall not eat to become impure with it” (Leviticus 22:8). Rabbi Yehuda derives the <i>halakha</i> from this verse.",
            "<b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Meir</b> interpret the appearance of the word <i>tereifa</i> in both verses? The Gemara answers: <b>One</b> is necessary <b>to exclude</b> the <b>slaughter that</b> occurs <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard as mentioned above, <b>and one</b> is necessary <b>to exclude a non-kosher bird,</b> to teach that the carcass of a non-kosher bird does not impart ritual impurity.",
            "<b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> derive that the carcass of a non-kosher bird does not impart ritual impurity? The Gemara answers: He <b>derives it from</b> the word <b>“carcass”</b> in the verse: “A carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>, he shall not eat to become impure with it” (Leviticus 22:8), which indicates that only carcasses of birds that are forbidden for consumption due to their status as a carcass are impure. Non-kosher birds are forbidden due to their non-kosher status, not due to their status as a carcass.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what does Rabbi Meir do with this</b> word <b>“carcass”?</b> The Gemara answers: Since the verse mentions eating, Rabbi Meir holds that the word “carcass” is written <b>to</b> teach that the minimum <b>measure of consumption</b> of the meat of a bird carcass that renders one impure is <b>an olive-bulk,</b> which is the standard legal measure of consumption for Torah laws in general.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But let him derive</b> this measure <b>from the first verse:</b> “And every soul that eats a carcass…shall be impure” (Leviticus 17:15), <b>from</b> the fact <b>that the Merciful One expresses</b> this <i>halakha</i> using <b>the language of consumption.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: Both verses are necessary, <b>one to</b> indicate that <b>the measure of consumption</b> that renders one impure is <b>an olive-bulk, and one to</b> indicate that <b>the</b> maximum <b>measure of</b> time for <b>consumption</b> of the olive-bulk is the time it takes <b>to eat a half-loaf</b> of bread. One who takes longer than this standard measure of time will not contract impurity.",
            "It is necessary for the Torah to indicate this latter <i>halakha</i> as well, as otherwise it might <b>enter your mind to say: Since</b> the impurity of carcasses of birds <b>is a novelty,</b> as one contracts it by eating rather than by touching or carrying, perhaps its <i>halakhot</i> are unusually stringent and even one who eats an olive-bulk in <b>more than</b> the time it takes <b>to eat a half-loaf</b> of bread <b>should also contract impurity.</b> Therefore, the verse <b>teaches us</b> otherwise.",
            "§ The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> concerning the impurity of the forbidden fat of a carcass. <b>The Sages taught:</b> When the verse: <b>“And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24) teaches that such fat is pure, <b>the verse speaks of the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a kosher animal.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> challenges: <b>Do you say</b> that <b>the verse speaks of the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a kosher animal, or</b> perhaps does it <b>only</b> speak <b>of the</b> forbidden <b>fat of a non-kosher animal?</b>",
            "<b>You</b> may <b>say</b> in response: The Torah <b>renders</b> a slaughtered animal <b>pure</b> of the impurity of a carcass <b>due to the fact</b> that it was ritually <b>slaughtered. And</b> likewise the Torah <b>renders</b> the forbidden fat of a carcass <b>pure, due to the fact</b> that it is forbidden <b>fat.</b> Therefore, the two cases are comparable: <b>Just as when</b> the Torah <b>renders</b> a slaughtered animal <b>pure due to the fact</b> that it was <b>slaughtered,</b> it is referring only <b>to a kosher</b> animal <b>and not to a non-kosher</b> animal, which is impure even when ritually slaughtered, <b>so too, when</b> the Torah <b>renders</b> forbidden fat <b>pure due to the fact</b> that it is forbidden <b>fat,</b> it is referring only <b>to a kosher</b> animal <b>and not to a non-kosher</b> animal.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> challenges: <b>Or</b> perhaps <b>go this way</b> and maintain that since the Torah <b>renders</b> the carcass of a non-kosher animal ritually <b>pure,</b> removing it <b>from the category of a carcass, and</b> likewise the Torah <b>renders</b> the forbidden fat of a carcass <b>pure, due to the fact</b> that it is forbidden <b>fat;</b> therefore, the two cases are comparable: <b>Just as when</b> the Torah <b>renders</b> the carcass of a non-kosher animal <b>pure,</b> removing it <b>from the category of a carcass,</b> it is referring only <b>to a non-kosher</b> animal <b>and not to a kosher</b> animal, the carcass of which imparts impurity, <b>so too, when</b> the Torah <b>renders</b> forbidden fat <b>pure due to the fact</b> that it is forbidden <b>fat,</b> it is referring only <b>to a non-kosher</b> animal <b>and not to a kosher</b> animal.",
            "<b>You</b> may <b>say</b> in response:"
        ],
        [
            "<b>When one approaches</b> the matter <b>this</b> first <b>way,</b> the <i>halakha</i> that forbidden fat is pure <b>applies</b> specifically <b>to kosher</b> animals, but <b>when one approaches</b> the matter <b>that</b> second <b>way,</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>applies</b> specifically <b>to non-kosher</b> animals. To decide the matter, <b>the verse states:</b> “The fat of <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b> may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), indicating that only the forbidden fat of <b>those</b> animals <b>to whose species</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>tereifa</i> applies,</b> i.e., kosher animals, is ritually pure. The status of <i>tereifa</i> is immaterial to a non-kosher animal as its consumption is prohibited in any event.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> concludes: One might still assume that <b>I will exclude</b> from this <i>halakha</i> only the forbidden fat of a carcass of <b>a non-kosher</b> animal, <b>as</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>tereifa</i> does not apply to its species, but I will not exclude</b> the fat of a carcass of <b>an undomesticated</b> kosher <b>animal, as</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>tereifa</i> applies to its species.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states</b> in conclusion: <b>“But you shall in no way eat of it,”</b> indicating that the reference is only to animals <b>whose fat</b> is <b>forbidden</b> for consumption if slaughtered <b>but whose meat</b> is <b>permitted,</b> i.e., kosher domesticated animals. <b>Excluded</b> are kosher <b>undomesticated animals, whose fat and meat</b> are both <b>permitted</b> for consumption.",
            "<b>Rav Ya’akov bar Abba said to Rava: If that is so,</b> it appears from the <i>baraita</i> that <b>the carcass of a kosher animal imparts impurity,</b> but <b>the carcass of a non-kosher animal does not impart impurity.</b> Rava <b>said to him: How many elders have you caused to err in</b> the interpretation of this <i>baraita</i>? In <b>the latter clause we come to</b> discuss only <b>the carcass of a non-kosher bird,</b> which does not impart impurity. By contrast, carcasses of non-kosher animals are impure.",
            "§ In the mishna, Rabbi Meir states that a bird offering whose nape was pinched and was found to be a <i>tereifa</i> does not impart impurity as would a carcass. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir deemed pure only unblemished</b> birds whose napes were pinched, as they are fit to be sacrificed, <b>but</b> he did <b>not</b> deem pure <b>blemished</b> birds, which are not fit to be sacrificed. <b>And Rabbi Elazar says:</b> Rabbi Meir deemed <b>even blemished</b> birds pure and did not distinguish between the two. <b>It was also stated</b> that <b>Rav Beivai says</b> that <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Meir would deem pure blemished</b> birds, <b>and</b> this was his opinion <b>even</b> concerning <b>geese and chickens,</b> species that may not be brought as offerings and as such are never supposed to be pinched.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:</b> According to Rabbi Elazar’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who <b>broke the neck of a goat?</b> Does the impurity of animal carcasses apply? The breaking of the neck is considered the proper procedure in certain cases, as the Torah commands that a heifer’s neck be broken if a murdered body is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:4).",
            "One could claim: <b>What is the reason</b> that <b>geese and chickens</b> are pure if their napes are pinched? It is <b>because they are species of birds</b> and the napes of some birds are pinched; <b>but a goat is not</b> of the same <b>species</b> as <b>a heifer,</b> as goats are considered small livestock whereas cattle are large livestock. <b>Or perhaps</b> one could claim: Since a goat <b>is</b> still <b>a species of domesticated animal,</b> it is similar enough to a heifer that the breaking of its neck prevents it from imparting impurity as a carcass.",
            "<b>Rav Dimi was sitting and saying this <i>halakha</i>,</b> i.e., this dilemma. <b>Abaye said to him: By inference</b> from this dilemma, it seems that you assume that <b>a heifer whose neck is broken is</b> itself <b>pure</b> and does not impart impurity as would a carcass. Rav Dimi <b>said to him: Indeed,</b> as the Sages <b>of the school of Rabbi Yannai say:</b> Since the language of <b>atonement is written with regard to</b> the heifer whose neck is broken, in the verse: “Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8), just <b>as</b> atonement is written with regard to <b>sacrificial</b> animals, the breaking of the heifer’s neck is equivalent to the pinching of the nape of a bird offering, and breaking its neck prevents the heifer from imparting ritual impurity.",
            "<b>Rav Natan, father of Rav Huna bar Natan, raises an objection</b> based on a <i>baraita</i> concerning the purity of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal, mentioned in the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>, may be used for any other service; <b>but you shall in no way eat of it”</b> (Leviticus 7:24). <b>I have</b> derived from the verse <b>only</b> that forbidden <b>fat that</b> is <b>forbidden for consumption but from which</b> deriving <b>benefit</b> is <b>permitted</b> is pure. <b>From where</b> is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> also applies to the forbidden <b>fat of an ox that is stoned</b> by the court <b>or</b> the forbidden fat of <b>a heifer whose neck is broken,</b> from both of which one is prohibited from deriving benefit?",
            "<b>The verse states:</b> “You shall eat <b>no fat</b> nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). The generalization “no fat” indicates that the same <i>halakhot</i> apply to the forbidden fats of all domesticated kosher animals, including those from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit.",
            "Rav Natan concludes his objection: <b>And if it enters your mind</b> that the meat of <b>a heifer whose neck is broken is pure,</b> why must the verse teach that its forbidden fat is pure? Could one entertain the possibility that its meat <b>is pure but its</b> forbidden <b>fat</b> is <b>impure?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: The derivation in the <i>baraita</i> <b>was not necessary for</b> a case <b>where one broke the neck</b> of the heifer. <b>It was necessary</b> for the verse to teach that the forbidden fat is pure even in a case <b>where one slaughtered</b> a heifer whose neck was designated to be broken.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> the <b>slaughter</b> itself <b>should be effective in purifying</b> the forbidden fat, as slaughter prevents an animal <b>from</b> assuming the impure status of <b>a carcass,</b> and the derivation is still superfluous. The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it is <b>necessary</b> to teach that the forbidden fat of a heifer <b>that died</b> before its neck could be broken is pure even though the heifer itself assumes that status of a carcass.",
            "The Gemara asks: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring only to a heifer that died before its neck could be broken, and it describes benefitting from it as being prohibited, <b>by inference,</b> is it <b>prohibited</b> to derive benefit from the heifer <b>while</b> it is still <b>alive?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>Indeed,</b> as <b>Rabbi Yannai says: I heard</b> the <b>boundary,</b> i.e., stage, beyond which it is forbidden, <b>but I have forgotten</b> what it is, <b>and</b> yet the members of <b>the group</b> of scholars <b>were inclined to say</b> that <b>its descent to a hard valley</b> (see Deuteronomy 21:4), where its neck was broken, is the action that <b>renders it forbidden.</b>",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>All the offerings that were intermingled with</b> animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden, e.g., <b>sin offerings</b> left to <b>die, or with an ox that</b> was sentenced to be <b>stoned, even</b> if the ratio is <b>one in ten thousand,</b> deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and <b>they all must die.</b> If the offerings <b>were intermingled with</b> animals whose sacrifice is forbidden but deriving benefit from them is not, the <i>halakha</i> is different. Examples of this are <b>an ox with which a transgression was performed,</b> which disqualifies it from being sacrificed as an offering, <b>or</b>"
        ],
        [
            "an ox <b>that</b> is known to have <b>killed a person based on</b> the testimony of <b>one witness or based on</b> the admission of <b>the owner.</b> Had two witnesses testified, deriving benefit from the ox would have been prohibited. Additional examples include when an offering is intermingled <b>with an animal that copulated with a person; or an animal that was the object of bestiality;</b> or <b>with</b> an animal that was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship; <b>or</b> one that <b>was worshipped</b> as a deity; or <b>with</b> an animal that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute <b>or</b> as the <b>price</b> of a dog, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19)."
        ],
        [
            "Additional examples include an offering that was intermingled <b>with</b> an animal born of a mixture of <b>diverse kinds,</b> e.g., the offspring of a ram and a goat, <b>or with an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>],</b> or <b>with</b> an animal <b>born by caesarean section.</b> In all these cases the animals that are intermingled <b>shall graze until they become unfit</b> for sacrifice <b>and</b> then <b>they shall be sold. And</b> from the money received in the sale, the owner <b>shall bring</b> another offering <b>of the monetary value of</b> the <b>highest-quality</b> animal <b>among them, of the same type</b> of offering that the intermingled offering was.",
            "The mishna continues: If sacrificial animals <b>were intermingled with unblemished, non-sacred</b> animals, which, if consecrated, are fit for sacrifice, <b>the non-sacred</b> animals <b>shall be sold for the purpose</b> of purchasing offerings <b>of the same type</b> as the offering with which they were intermingled.",
            "In a case where <b>sacrificial</b> animals were intermingled <b>with</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> animals, if it was an animal of one <b>type</b> of offering <b>with</b> animals of the same <b>type</b> of offering, <b>one shall sacrifice this</b> animal <b>for the sake of whoever is</b> its owner <b>and one shall sacrifice that</b> animal <b>for the sake of whoever is</b> its owner, and both fulfill their obligation.",
            "In a case where <b>sacrificial</b> animals were intermingled <b>with</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> animals, where an animal of one <b>type</b> of offering was intermingled <b>with</b> animals <b>not</b> of the same <b>type</b> of offering, e.g., two rams, where one is designated as a burnt offering and one as a peace offering, <b>they shall graze until they become unfit</b> for sacrifice <b>and</b> then <b>they shall be sold. And</b> from the money received in the sale, the owner <b>shall bring</b> another offering <b>of the monetary value of</b> the <b>highest-quality</b> animal <b>among them as this type</b> of offering, <b>and</b> another offering <b>of the monetary value of</b> the <b>highest-quality</b> animal <b>among them as that type</b> of offering, <b>and he will lose the additional</b> expense of purchasing two highest-quality animals, when he had sold only one highest-quality animal, <b>from his</b> own <b>assets.</b>",
            "In a case where sacrificial animals <b>were intermingled with a firstborn</b> offering <b>or with</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>they shall graze until they become unfit</b> for sacrifice <b>and they shall</b> both <b>be eaten as a firstborn</b> offering <b>or as</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering.",
            "<b>All</b> offerings <b>can become</b> indistinguishably <b>intermingled</b> with each other, <b>except for a sin offering and a guilt offering,</b> as the Gemara will explain.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches the <i>halakha</i> of all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden. This indicates that one offering became intermingled with a majority of prohibited animals, as it is usual to describe the smaller unit as being intermingled with the larger unit. The Gemara asks: If so, <b>what</b> is the meaning of the term: <b>Even,</b> in the clause: Even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the permitted animal is rendered prohibited by a simple majority, of course it is prohibited if the ratio is one in ten thousand.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>This</b> is what the mishna <b>is saying: All the offerings in which were intermingled sin offerings</b> left to <b>die, or</b> in which <b>an ox that</b> was sentenced to be <b>stoned</b> was intermingled, <b>even</b> if the ratio is <b>one</b> forbidden animal intermingled <b>with ten thousand</b> offerings, <b>they all must die.</b>",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why is this mishna necessary? <b>We</b> already <b>learn</b> this <i>halakha</i> on <b>another occasion,</b> in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 28a): With regard to <b>all</b> animals <b>whose</b> sacrifice <b>on the altar</b> is <b>prohibited,</b> if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted <b>they render</b> the entire mixture <b>prohibited in any amount,</b> regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. The mishna adds that these are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: <b>An animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality.</b> That mishna proceeds to add other categories of animals to this list, including ones mentioned in the mishna here. In any event, the basic <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is also taught in tractate <i>Temura</i>.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi says: I said this <i>halakha</i> in the presence of Rav Shimi, and he</b> explained to <b>me</b> that both <i>mishnayot</i> <b>are necessary,</b> as each teaches a novelty not included in the other. Rav Ashi clarifies: <b>As, if</b> this <i>halakha</i> was learned only <b>from there,</b> the mishna in <i>Temura</i>, <b>I would say</b> that <b>this statement,</b> that prohibited animals render a mixture prohibited in any ratio, applies only to prohibiting the animals from being sacrificed <b>to the Most High; but</b> with regard to prohibiting the animals even <b>to an ordinary</b> person <b>[<i>hedyot</i>],</b> e.g., that if they became intermingled with an ox that is to be stoned they all must die without the possibility of redemption, one might <b>say</b> that they are <b>not</b> all rendered prohibited in benefit, as the prohibited animal is nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna here teaches that even with regard to deriving benefit, all the animals in the mixture are prohibited.",
            "Rav Ashi continues: <b>And if</b> this <i>halakha</i> was learned only <b>from here, I would say</b> that <b>it is</b> only <b>these</b> categories that are mentioned in this mishna, i.e., sin offerings that were condemned to die or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, that render a mixture prohibited in any ratio. The <i>halakha</i> is stringent with regard to them, as <b>they are items from which</b> deriving <b>benefit is prohibited. But</b> with regard to <b>these</b> categories mentioned in the mishna in <i>Temura</i>, e.g., an animal that copulated with a person, which are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, one might <b>say</b> that they are <b>not</b> disqualified from being sacrificed, and they are nullified in a majority. Therefore, both <i>mishnayot</i> <b>are necessary.</b>",
            "The Gemara questions this explanation: This justifies the mishna here, but concerning the <i>halakha</i> stated in <i>Temura</i>, why did that mishna teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those animals <b>that are not items from which</b> deriving <b>benefit is prohibited,</b> such as an animal that copulated with a person; the <i>tanna</i> already <b>taught this</b> <i>halakha</i> in the mishna here. The Gemara answers: <b>Does</b> the mishna here <b>teach by what</b> ratio they render the mixture prohibited? The important measure: <b>In any amount, is taught there,</b> in <i>Temura</i>, not in the mishna here, and that is the novelty of the mishna in <i>Temura</i>.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> if so, <b>let</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>teach that</b> mishna in <i>Temura</i>, <b>and</b> then he would <b>not require this</b> mishna here. Why teach the second clause of the mishna here? The Gemara explains: It <b>was necessary for</b> the <i>tanna</i> to mention <b>the remedy,</b> i.e., that the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold; and from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as the same type of offering that the sacrificial animal was. This <i>halakha</i> is not stated in the mishna in <i>Temura</i>.",
            "The Gemara raises another difficulty. The <i>halakha</i> of the mishna that items from which deriving benefit is prohibited render a mixture prohibited in any amount even <b>to an ordinary</b> person, as stated with regard to the sin offerings that were condemned to die and an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, is <b>also taught</b> in a mishna (<i>Avoda Zara</i> 74a): <b>And these</b> following items are themselves <b>forbidden, and any amount</b> of them <b>renders</b> other items with which they become mixed <b>forbidden: Wine</b> used for <b>a libation</b> that became mixed with kosher wine, <b>and</b> objects of <b>idol worship</b> that were intermingled with permitted items."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara explains that both the mishna here and the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i> <b>are necessary, as, if</b> this <i>halakha</i> had been learned only <b>from there,</b> the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i>, <b>I would say</b> that this applies only if the prohibited animal is intermingled with a non-sacred animal and thereby becomes prohibited <b>to an ordinary</b> person. <b>But</b> if it is intermingled with offerings that are designated <b>to the Most High</b> so a loss to the Temple would ensue, one might <b>say</b> that <b>we</b> should <b>not lose all</b> the valid offerings, and therefore the prohibited animal should be nullified in a simple majority. Accordingly, the ruling of the mishna here was necessary, to teach that the same applies to a mixture involving offerings.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And</b> conversely, <b>if</b> this <i>halakha</i> were learned only <b>from here I would say</b> that <b>this statement,</b> that the entire mixture is prohibited, applies specifically to <b>sacrificial</b> animals, <b>as</b> it is <b>repulsive</b> to sacrifice to God an animal from a mixture that includes a prohibited animal. <b>But</b> with regard to deriving benefit from <b>a non-sacred</b> animal from this mixture, <b>which is not a repulsive</b> act, one might <b>say: Let</b> the <b>items from which</b> deriving <b>benefit is prohibited be nullified in a majority.</b> Therefore, the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i> is also <b>necessary.</b>",
            "The Gemara questions the ruling of the mishna: <b>But let</b> the prohibited animals <b>be nullified in a majority,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning other matters, in which the minority items assume the status of the majority. <b>And if you would say</b> in response that animals <b>are significant,</b> as they are counted individually <b>and</b> therefore <b>they are not nullified</b> in a majority, this answer is unsatisfactory. The Gemara elaborates: <b>This</b> suggested answer <b>works out well according to the one who says</b> that <b>we learned</b> in the mishna discussing nullification in a majority (see <i>Orla</i> 3:6–7): <b>Any</b> item <b>whose manner is</b> also <b>to be counted,</b> i.e., that are sometimes sold by unit rather than weight or volume, is considered significant. This definition includes animals, as they are sometimes sold as individual animals, and therefore they would be considered significant.",
            "<b>But according to the one who says</b> that <b>we learned</b> in that mishna: An item <b>whose manner is</b> exclusively <b>to be counted,</b> i.e., one that is always sold by unit, is considered significant, <b>what can be said?</b> Although animals are often sold by unit, they are occasionally sold as part of a herd, and would therefore not be considered significant. The Gemara cites the mishna in which this dispute appears. <b>As we learned</b> (<i>Orla</i> 3:6–7): With regard to <b>one who had bundles of fenugreek,</b> a type of legume, that were <b>diverse kinds</b> planted <b>in a vineyard,</b> from which it is prohibited to derive benefit,"
        ],
        [
            "those bundles <b>must be burned.</b> If the bundles <b>were intermingled with others, and</b> those <b>others</b> were intermingled <b>with others, they all must be burned.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They can be nullified when</b> the total is <b>201</b> items, i.e., one prohibited item intermingled with two hundred permitted ones.",
            "The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir holds that they all must be burned, <b>as Rabbi Meir would say: Any</b> item <b>whose manner is to be counted renders</b> its mixture <b>prohibited,</b> as it is considered significant and cannot be nullified. <b>And the Rabbis say: Only six items</b> are sufficiently significant to <b>render</b> their mixture <b>prohibited. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> There are <b>seven. And they are: Nuts</b> with <b>brittle</b> shells, <b>and pomegranates from Badan, and sealed barrels</b> of wine, <b>and beet greens, and cabbage stalks, and Greek gourd. Rabbi Akiva adds: Loaves of a homeowner</b> are <b>also</b> in this category.",
            "The mishna continues: Different prohibitions apply to these items. <b>That which is fit</b> to be forbidden due <b>to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>],</b> i.e., nuts, pomegranates, and sealed barrels of wine, prohibit their mixture as <b><i>orla</i>. That which is fit</b> to be forbidden due <b>to diverse kinds</b> planted <b>in a vineyard,</b> i.e., beets, cabbage, and gourd, prohibit their mixture as <b>diverse kinds in a vineyard.</b>",
            "<b>And it was stated</b> that there is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> <b>with regard to</b> the wording of Rabbi Meir’s opinion in this mishna. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that <b>we learned:</b> Only an item <b>whose manner is</b> exclusively <b>to be counted</b> is significant and cannot be nullified, and it therefore renders its mixture prohibited according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. <b>And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says</b> that <b>we learned: Any</b> item <b>whose manner is</b> also <b>to be counted</b> is significant and cannot be nullified.",
            "The Gemara reiterates its question: <b>This works out well according to</b> the opinion of <b>Reish Lakish, but according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan, what can be said?</b> According to his opinion, since animals are not sold exclusively by unit, they are not sufficiently significant. Therefore, a prohibited animal should be nullified in a simple majority. <b>Rav Pappa says:</b> According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>this <i>tanna</i>,</b> who says that a prohibited animal cannot be nullified, <b>is</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>of</b> the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>a <i>litra</i> of dried figs, who says:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Any item that is counted, even</b> if it is prohibited <b>by rabbinic law,</b> e.g., <i>teruma</i> of fruit, <b>cannot be nullified, and all the more so</b> items prohibited <b>by Torah law,</b> such as animals that are disqualified for the altar, as in the mishna.",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 5:11): The <i>baraita</i> discusses three cases, all of which relate to the tithing of figs, which is an obligation by rabbinic law. The first is the case of <b>a <i>litra</i> of</b> untithed <b>dried figs</b> that were pressed in different vessels and shaped into circles, <b>that</b> one placed into a barrel containing tithed figs, and during the process of producing a circle he <b>pressed</b> the figs <b>onto the opening of</b> one of the <b>circular</b> vessels in which the circles are formed, <b>and he does not know into which circular</b> vessel <b>he pressed it.</b> The second is the case in which he recalls that he pressed it <b>on the opening of a barrel</b> containing tithed figs, <b>but he does not know into which barrel he pressed it.</b> The third case is that he recalls that he pressed it <b>on the opening of</b> a straw <b>receptacle</b> containing tithed figs, <b>but he does not know into which receptacle he pressed it.</b> In all of these cases, there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as to the details of a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.",
            "<b>Rabbi Meir says</b> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: One views the upper</b> layers of possibly untithed dried figs <b>as though they are separate</b> pieces, rather than one unit. <b>And the lower</b> ones, which were there beforehand and have certainly been tithed, <b>nullify the upper</b> ones, as there are enough circles of figs to nullify the upper layer. One does not need to tithe the figs at the top of any of the containers.",
            "Rabbi Meir continues: By contrast, <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says: If there are one hundred openings</b> of containers present there, the untithed <i>litra</i> of figs on the opening of one of the containers <b>is nullified</b> in a ratio of one part of untithed figs to one hundred parts of similar, tithed figs. <b>But if not,</b> all of <b>the</b> layers of figs at the <b>openings</b> of the containers <b>are prohibited,</b> i.e., viewed as untithed, as one of them certainly contains an untithed <i>litra</i> that has not been nullified. <b>And the</b> figs on the <b>insides</b> of the vessels <b>are permitted,</b> as the untithed figs certainly did not reach there. This is Rabbi Meir’s version of the dispute.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: If there are one hundred openings</b> of containers with tithed figs present <b>there,</b> in addition to the untithed figs, <b>it is nullified</b> in the one hundred. <b>But if not,</b> all of <b>the</b> layers of figs at the <b>openings</b> of the containers <b>are prohibited,</b> i.e., viewed as untithed, as one of them certainly contains an untithed <i>litra</i> that has not been nullified. And the figs on the insides of the vessels are permitted, as the untithed figs certainly did not reach there.",
            "Rabbi Yehuda continues his statement: By contrast, <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even</b> if <b>there are three hundred openings</b> present <b>there,</b> the layer at the top of the container is <b>not nullified.</b> This <i>litra</i> cannot be nullified in any manner, as Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that even an item occasionally sold by unit, such as a circle of dried figs, can never be nullified.",
            "Rabbi Yehuda continues: But if one <b>pressed</b> the <i>litra</i> of dried figs <b>into a circular</b> vessel along with other dried figs, <b>but does not know onto which place,</b> i.e., which side, <b>of the circular</b> vessel <b>he pressed it, whether,</b> e.g., <b>to its northern</b> side <b>or to its southern</b> side, in this case, as the prohibited <i>litra</i> is not located in a defined place and it cannot be distinguished from the others, it is not considered an item of significance, and <b>everyone agrees</b> that it is <b>nullified.</b> Accordingly, the ruling of the mishna that animals that are disqualified from being sacrificed are not nullified is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua as stated by Rabbi Eliezer, that an item occasionally sold by unit is not nullified. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, that only an item whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi says: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> i.e., Rabbi Meir, who maintains that an item that is not always counted is nullified in a majority. The reason is that <b>living creatures are significant, and</b> therefore <b>they are not nullified.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara raises a difficulty with the ruling of the mishna that all of the animals are prohibited. <b>And let us draw out and sacrifice one</b> animal <b>from</b> the mixture, <b>and say,</b> i.e., apply the principle: <b>Any</b> item <b>that separates</b> from a group is assumed to have <b>separated from the majority.</b> Accordingly, the animal that was sacrificed is presumed to be fit. One can continue in this manner until only two animals from the mixture remain. The Gemara questions this suggestion: Should <b>we draw out</b> an animal from the mixture? But this <b>is</b> the removal of an item from its <b>fixed</b> place,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> there is a principle that <b>anything fixed is considered as</b> though it was <b>half and half,</b> i.e., equally balanced, and it remains a case of uncertainty. The Gemara clarifies its suggestion: <b>Rather, let us push</b> the intermingled animals so <b>that they</b> all <b>move</b> from their places, which negates the fixed status of the prohibited item. <b>And</b> accordingly, <b>let us say</b> with regard to each animal: <b>Any</b> item <b>that separates</b> from a group is assumed to have <b>separated from the majority.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says: Now that the Sages have said</b> that <b>we do not sacrifice</b> any of them, this is evidently a rabbinic <b>decree, lest ten priests come simultaneously and sacrifice</b> all the animals in the mixture together, not one at a time. Therefore, the fact that there could be a method to permit the animals is immaterial.",
            "<b>One of the Sages said to Rava: If that is so,</b> do you hold that <b>the large basin [<i>megisa</i>]</b> on which the sacrificial portions of the animal are placed is <b>prohibited?</b> In other words, is it possible that these animals, which were slaughtered when they were initially declared permitted after being separated from their places, could later become prohibited again when their sacrificial portions are ready to be burned on the altar?",
            "Rava responded that he did not mean there is a concern that ten priests would sacrifice their sacrificial portions simultaneously. Rather, the decree is <b>due to</b> the concern <b>lest</b> when the animals move, <b>ten priests will come simultaneously and take</b> them from the mixture. As all or most of the animals were separated simultaneously in this case, it is assumed that the prohibited animal is among those that were separated. The Gemara asks: <b>Is it possible</b> for <b>ten priests</b> to take these scattered animals <b>simultaneously? Rather, Rava says</b> that one may not allow the animals to be sacrificed by moving them <b>due to</b> a decree that if this is allowed, one may, in another circumstance, allow them to be sacrificed even when they are taken from <b>a fixed</b> location.",
            "§ <b>Rava said: Now that the Sages say</b> in the mishna that <b>we do not sacrifice</b> any of the animals, <b>if we did sacrifice</b> one of them, the offering <b>does not effect acceptance</b> for the owner. <b>Rav Huna bar Yehuda raised an objection to Rava</b> from a mishna (<i>Kinnim</i> 22b): With regard to a bird <b>sin offering that was intermingled with</b> a bird <b>burnt offering, or</b> a bird <b>burnt offering that was intermingled with</b> a bird <b>sin offering, even</b> if the ratio is <b>one in ten thousand, they all must die,</b> as there is no remedy for these birds. It is not known which is which, and their sacrificial rites are performed differently.",
            "The mishna continues: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement said? In</b> the case of <b>a priest</b> who <b>consulted</b> the court to ask how he should proceed. <b>But in</b> the case of <b>a priest who did not consult</b> the court, but sacrificed them of his own accord, if there was an equal number of bird sin offerings and burnt offerings, and <b>he performed</b> all their sacrificial rites <b>above</b> the red line that circumscribes the altar at its midpoint, as required for a burnt offering, <b>half</b> of the birds are <b>fit,</b> as in any event the burnt offerings were sacrificed properly, <b>and half</b> are <b>unfit.</b>",
            "Likewise, if he performed all of their sacrificial rites <b>below</b> the red line, <b>half</b> are <b>fit,</b> as in any event the sin offerings were sacrificed properly, <b>and half</b> are <b>unfit.</b> If he performed the sacrificial rites of <b>one</b> of the birds <b>below</b> the red line and <b>one</b> of the birds <b>above</b> the red line, <b>they are both unfit, as I say</b> that the <b>sin offering</b> was <b>sacrificed above</b> the red line <b>and</b> the <b>burnt offering</b> was <b>sacrificed below.</b> This mishna proves that an offering that is prohibited to be sacrificed as part of a mixture is fit after the fact, which contradicts the statement of Rava.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> Rava would claim that this matter depends on a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. <b>This</b> statement of Rava is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that <b>living creatures</b> that become disqualified <b>are</b> permanently <b>rejected</b> from being sacrificed on the altar, and this animal was rejected when it was part of the mixture. <b>That</b> ruling of the mishna in <i>Kinnim</i> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that <b>living creatures are not</b> permanently <b>rejected</b> from the altar. Therefore, if the animal was sacrificed it is fit.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: But <b>there is</b> the case of <b>slaughtered</b> offerings that are rejected from the altar, concerning <b>which everyone agrees</b> that these <b>are rejected.</b> Even those who say that living creatures generally are not rejected agree that, in this case, they should be rejected."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And we learned</b> in a mishna (77b) that in a case where sacrificial portions from unblemished burnt offerings became mixed with sacrificial portions from blemished burnt offerings, which are disqualified, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them was sacrificed</b> on the altar before they knew of the blemish, <b>all the heads should be sacrificed,</b> as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar. This indicates that even with regard to slaughtered animals, if they were rejected from the altar due to being in a mixture, they are not permanently rejected, but are fit after the fact.",
            "The Gemara explains that this mishna affords no proof, as Rabbi Eliezer <b>states</b> his ruling <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Ḥanan the Egyptian,</b> who maintains that even slaughtered animals are not permanently rejected. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Ḥanan the Egyptian says,</b> with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the one sacrificed to God and the scapegoat designated to be sent to Azazel: <b>Even</b> if the <b>blood</b> of the sacrificed goat is already <b>in the cup</b> where it was collected and the scapegoat dies, the sacrificed goat is still a fit offering, and the priest <b>brings another</b> goat <b>and joins it to</b> this slaughtered goat to serve as the scapegoat. By contrast, the other <i>tanna’im</i>, who maintain that slaughtered animals are rejected, hold that once they have become rejected due to being in a mixture they are no longer fit for sacrifice, as stated by Rava.",
            "§ Concerning a similar case, <b>Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rava bar Avuh says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>a ring</b> used in <b>idol worship,</b> from which it is prohibited to derive benefit and which is not nullified even in a ratio of one in one hundred, <b>that was intermingled with one hundred</b> permitted <b>rings, and</b> subsequently <b>one of them fell into the Great Sea [<i>Yam HaGadol</i>], they are all permitted.</b> The reason is <b>that we say: That</b> ring <b>that fell</b> into the Great Sea <b>is the prohibited</b> ring.",
            "<b>Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman</b> from the mishna: With regard to all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, <b>even</b> if the ratio is <b>one in ten thousand, they all must die.</b> According to the opinion of Rav, that we say the one that was lost is the prohibited item, <b>why</b> must they all die? <b>Let us say,</b> with regard to the first animal <b>that died,</b> that <b>the prohibited</b> animal <b>died,</b> and the rest should be permitted.",
            "Rav Naḥman <b>said to</b> Rava: <b>Rav states</b> his ruling <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned</b> in the mishna that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them is sacrificed</b> on the altar before the priests knew of the blemish, <b>all the heads should be sacrificed,</b> as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar.",
            "Rava asked Rav Naḥman: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Rabbi Eliezer permitted</b> the sacrifice of all the heads <b>only</b> if they were sacrificed <b>two</b> by <b>two,</b> as at least one of them is certainly permitted; <b>but</b> he did <b>not</b> permit them to be sacrificed <b>one</b> by <b>one,</b> in case the priest sacrifices the prohibited head by itself? How, then, can Rav Naḥman permit the rings without qualification? Rav Naḥman <b>said to</b> Rava: <b>I</b> too <b>am saying</b> that Rav permits the rings only if they are sold <b>two</b> at a time, in which case one of them is certainly not from idol worship.",
            "The Gemara discusses a similar case. <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>a ring</b> used in <b>idol worship that was intermingled with one hundred</b> permitted <b>rings, and</b> then <b>forty</b> of them became <b>separated to one place, and</b> the other <b>sixty</b> became separated <b>to another place,</b> so that they are now two distinct groups of rings, if <b>one</b> ring <b>from</b> the group of <b>forty</b> became <b>separated</b> from them and then became intermingled with other rings, <b>it does not render</b> them <b>prohibited.</b> But if <b>one</b> ring <b>from</b> the other <b>sixty</b> became separated from its group and became mixed with other rings, it <b>renders</b> them <b>prohibited.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> concerning the case in which <b>one</b> ring <b>from</b> the group of <b>forty</b> separated, <b>that</b> it does <b>not</b> render the other rings prohibited? The reason is <b>that we say:</b> The <b>prohibited</b> ring <b>is in</b> the group that contains <b>the majority</b> of the rings, i.e., it is in the group of sixty. If so, in the case where <b>one</b> ring <b>from</b> the group of <b>sixty</b> became separated and became intermingled with the other rings, <b>we</b> should <b>also say</b> that the <b>prohibited</b> ring <b>is</b> still <b>in</b> the group that contains <b>the majority</b> of the rings, i.e., it is one of the fifty-nine remaining rings. <b>Rather,</b> Rav’s statement was as follows: <b>If all forty</b> became <b>separated to one place,</b> where they became intermingled with other rings, the forty rings <b>do not render</b> those other rings <b>prohibited,</b> as it is assumed that the prohibited ring is in the group of sixty. Conversely, if all of the <b>sixty</b> rings became separated <b>to one place,</b> where they became intermingled with other rings, the sixty rings <b>render</b> those other rings <b>prohibited.</b>",
            "Rav Yehuda, who said this statement citing Rav, added: <b>When I said this</b> ruling <b>in the presence of Shmuel,</b> that if the forty rings became intermingled with others they do not render them prohibited, <b>he said to me: Disregard</b> this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the case of <b>idol worship, as</b> this prohibition is so stringent that <b>its uncertainty and its compound uncertainty are prohibited forever,</b> i.e., no matter how many uncertainties are added they are all prohibited.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to the opinion of Shmuel from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>An uncertainty of idol worship</b> is <b>prohibited, but its compound uncertainty</b> is <b>permitted. How so?</b> With regard to <b>a cup</b> used in <b>idol worship that fell into a storeroom full of cups, they are all prohibited.</b> If <b>one of these</b> cups <b>separated</b> from the rest and fell <b>into</b> a group of <b>ten thousand</b> other cups, <b>and from</b> that <b>ten thousand</b> cups a single cup fell <b>into ten thousand</b> other cups, <b>they</b> are <b>permitted.</b> This <i>baraita</i> teaches that only one uncertainty is prohibited, not a compound uncertainty.",
            "The Gemara explains: This <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 5:10) that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Prohibited <b>pomegranates</b> from <b>Badan,</b> which are too significant to be nullified, <b>prohibit</b> a mixture <b>in any amount. How so?</b> If <b>one of them fell into</b> a group of <b>ten thousand</b> other pomegranates, <b>and</b> one of that group fell <b>from</b> that <b>ten thousand into</b> another <b>ten thousand, they</b> are all <b>prohibited,</b> despite the fact that this is a compound uncertainty.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:</b> If a prohibited pomegranate fell <b>into</b> a group of <b>ten thousand</b> pomegranates, <b>they</b> are all <b>prohibited,</b> as he concedes that these pomegranates are not nullified in a majority. <b>But</b> if one pomegranate <b>from</b> the <b>ten thousand</b> fell <b>into</b> a group of <b>three</b> pomegranates, <b>and</b> one <b>of</b> these <b>three</b> pomegranates fell <b>into a different place,</b> it is <b>permitted,</b> as this is a compound uncertainty.",
            "The Gemara inquires: <b>In accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>which</b> of these <i>tanna’im</i> <b>does Shmuel state</b> his opinion that an item used in idol worship remains prohibited no matter how many uncertainties are involved? <b>If</b> you say that he stated his ruling <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda,</b> then <b>even with regard to other prohibitions</b> a compound uncertainty should be <b>prohibited,</b> as Rabbi Yehuda stated his ruling with regard to a prohibited pomegranate, not an item of idol worship. And <b>if</b> Shmuel stated his ruling <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> then <b>even in the</b> case of <b>idol worship</b> a compound uncertainty should be <b>permitted,</b> as Rabbi Shimon did not differentiate between different types of prohibitions.",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that there is <b>a difference according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon between idol worship and other prohibitions,</b> and he prohibits compound uncertainties only in the case of idol worship, <b>then</b> if so, <b>that which is taught</b> in the <i>baraita</i> cited previously: <b>An uncertainty of idol worship</b> is <b>prohibited but its compound uncertainty</b> is <b>permitted, whose</b> opinion does this represent? It is <b>neither</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda nor</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Actually,</b> that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> as he permits a compound uncertainty in all cases. <b>And Shmuel holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one</b> matter, that a compound uncertainty is prohibited in the case of idol worship, <b>and disagrees with him with regard to one</b> matter, as Shmuel does not apply this stringency to other prohibitions.",
            "§ The Gemara continues its analysis. <b>The Master,</b> Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda citing Rabbi Shimon, <b>says</b> above: If one pomegranate <b>from</b> the <b>ten thousand</b> fell <b>into</b> a group of <b>three</b> pomegranates, <b>and</b> one <b>of</b> these <b>three</b> pomegranates fell <b>into a different place,</b> the mixture is <b>permitted.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about a case where the pomegranate fell into a group of <b>three</b> other pomegranates? The essential factor is <b>that there is a majority</b> of permitted pomegranates, which nullify the pomegranate that fell from the ten thousand. <b>Even</b> if it fell into a group of <b>two</b> others, <b>there is a majority</b> of permitted items. Why must it fall into a group of three? The Gemara explains: <b>What</b> is the meaning of <b>three that</b> the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches?</b> It means that there were <b>two</b> permitted pomegranates initially, <b>and</b> the pomegranate of uncertain status fell into them, for a total of three.",
            "The Gemara returns to the question concerning the opinion of which <i>tanna</i> is followed by Shmuel, who is stringent with regard to a compound uncertainty involving idol worship. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that Shmuel <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer,</b> as he is similarly stringent with regard to mixtures of items of idol worship, as explained in tractate <i>Avoda Zara</i> (49b).",
            "§ The Gemara discusses a related topic. <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> In the case of <b>a barrel of <i>teruma</i></b> produce, which may be eaten only by a priest and his household, <b>that was intermingled with one hundred barrels</b> of non-sacred produce, they are all considered as <i>teruma</i>, as a sealed barrel is significant and is not nullified. <b>And</b> if <b>one of</b> these barrels <b>fell into the Dead Sea, all</b> the barrels <b>are permitted, as we say:</b> Since there is <b>that</b> barrel <b>that fell,</b> the assumption is <b>that</b> it is <b>the prohibited</b> barrel that <b>fell.</b>",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>And</b> it <b>was necessary</b> for the Gemara to record the ruling <b>of Rav Naḥman</b> with regard to rings used in idol worship, <b>and</b> it <b>was</b> also <b>necessary</b> for the Gemara to record the ruling <b>of Reish Lakish</b> with regard to barrels of <i>teruma</i>, despite the similarity between the two cases. The Gemara elaborates: <b>As, if</b> the <i>halakha</i> were taught only <b>from</b> the ruling <b>of Rav Naḥman, I would say</b> that <b>this matter</b> applies only with regard to a mixture involving an item of <b>idol worship, which has no permitting factors;</b> such items themselves cannot be permitted in any other manner. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> is to be lenient, i.e., to assume that the prohibited ring fell into the sea. <b>But</b> in the case of <b><i>teruma</i>, which has permitting factors,</b> as the mixture can be sold in its entirety to priests, perhaps the mixture should <b>not</b> be permitted because one of them fell into the sea.",
            "<b>And</b> conversely, <b>if</b> the <i>halakha</i> was taught only <b>from</b> the ruling <b>of Reish Lakish, I would say</b> that the <i>halakha</i> is lenient only in the case of <b>a barrel</b> of <i>teruma</i>, <b>as its falling is noticeable,</b> and everyone will know that the other barrels were permitted due to the one that fell. Accordingly, they will not come to permit barrels in a similar case where no barrel became separated from the mixture. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>a ring, whose falling is not noticeable,</b> perhaps the rest of the rings should <b>not</b> be permitted. Therefore, both statements <b>are necessary.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba says: Reish Lakish deemed</b> the rest of the items <b>permitted only</b> in the case of <b>a barrel, as its falling is noticeable. But</b> in the case of <b>a fig</b> that fell from a group of figs that contained a fig of <i>teruma</i>, Reish Lakish does <b>not</b> deem the rest of the figs permitted, as the one that fell is too small for its fall to be discernible. <b>And Rav Yosef says:</b> Reish Lakish deemed the rest of the items permitted <b>even</b> with regard to <b>a fig.</b> The reason is that just <b>as</b> the initial <b>falling</b> of one fig rendered the entire mixture prohibited, <b>so too, the emerging of</b> one fig from the pile permits the rest.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> With regard to <b>a barrel of <i>teruma</i></b> wine <b>that fell among one hundred barrels</b> of non-sacred wine, it cannot be nullified in its current state, as sealed barrels are significant and are therefore not nullified. How should one proceed? He should <b>open one of them,</b> so that it is no longer an item of significance, <b>and take from it as much as</b> ought to be taken from a normal <b>mixture</b> of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred produce, i.e., one-hundredth. He should give that to a priest, <b>and</b> then he may <b>drink</b> the rest of the wine.",
            "<b>Rav Dimi sat and said this <i>halakha</i>,</b> and <b>Rav Naḥman said to him: I see</b> a ruling of: <b>Swallow and drink here,</b> i.e., this formulation indicates that one may act in this manner <i>ab initio</i>, which is puzzling. <b>Rather, say:</b> If <b>one of</b> the barrels <b>was opened,</b> after the fact <b>one may take from it as much as</b> ought to be taken from a normal <b>mixture</b> of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred produce. He should give that to a priest, <b>and</b> then he may <b>drink</b> the rest of the wine.",
            "With regard to the same issue, <b>Rabbi Oshaya says:</b> In the case of <b>a barrel of <i>teruma</i></b> wine <b>that was intermingled with 150 barrels</b> of non-sacred wine, <b>and one hundred of them opened, one may take from it as much as</b> ought to be taken from a normal <b>mixture</b> of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred produce. He should give that to a priest, <b>and</b> then he may <b>drink</b> the rest of the wine. <b>And</b> as for the <b>rest</b> of the fifty barrels, <b>they</b> remain <b>prohibited,</b> i.e., they have <i>teruma</i> status, <b>until they are opened</b> and the ratio of <i>teruma</i> is separated from them. This is because <b>we do not say</b> that the <b>prohibited</b> barrel <b>is in</b> the group that contains <b>the majority</b> of barrels and the one he opens is likely permitted.",
            "§ The mishna listed various categories of prohibited animals: <b>An animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality,</b> an animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped as a deity, an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal that is a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> with regard to <b>all of</b> the other examples in this list, the prohibited animal is <b>not known.</b> In other words, it is physically indistinguishable from the other animals. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>this <i>tereifa</i></b> animal, <b>what are the circumstances? If,</b> due to its physical impairment, it is <b>known to him</b> which animal it is, <b>let him come and take it</b> from there, and all the other animals will be permitted. <b>If it is not known to him, how does he know that</b> a <i>tereifa</i> animal <b>was intermingled</b> with others in the first place?",
            "<b>They say</b> in <b>the school of Rabbi Yannai: What are we dealing with here?</b> We are dealing with a case <b>where</b> an animal that was <b>pierced by a thorn,</b> which does not render it a <i>tereifa</i>, <b>was intermingled with</b> an animal that was <b>clawed by a wolf,</b> which renders it a <i>tereifa</i>. Since the skin of both animals has been pierced, one cannot identify the <i>tereifa</i>.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish says</b> there is a different answer: The mishna is discussing a case <b>where</b> a healthy animal <b>was intermingled with a fallen</b> animal, i.e., one that has fallen from a great height. A fallen animal is prohibited in case it is a <i>tereifa</i>, despite the fact that it bears no external sign of injury. The Gemara raises a difficulty: With regard to <b>a fallen</b> animal <b>as well, let us examine it</b> and see if it can walk by itself, in which case it is not a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Reish Lakish, even after an examination of this kind it is still a possible <i>tereifa</i>, which is prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, as <b>he holds</b> that if an animal fell and <b>stood</b> up again, <b>it requires</b> a twenty-four-hour waiting <b>period</b> to determine if it is in fact injured. Furthermore, even if it both stood up and <b>walked</b> after the fall, <b>it requires inspection</b> after slaughter to determine whether it was injured by the fall and rendered a <i>tereifa</i>.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya says</b> there is a third answer: The mishna is referring to a case <b>where</b> a healthy animal <b>was intermingled with the offspring of a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> which of course bears no sign of a <i>tereifa</i>. <b>And</b> this <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, who says: The offspring of a <i>tereifa</i> may not be sacrificed upon the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains why each of these Sages suggests a different interpretation of the mishna: <b>All of them,</b> i.e., Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yirmeya, <b>do not say</b> that the explanation of the mishna is <b>in accordance with</b> the explanation of <b>Rabbi Yannai</b> that an animal pierced by a thorn became mixed up with one clawed by a wolf, as they maintain that the difference <b>between</b> an animal <b>pierced by a thorn and</b> one that was <b>clawed by a wolf is known,</b> as <b>this</b> perforation caused by a wolf is <b>elongated, and that</b> perforation caused by a thorn is <b>round.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues: Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yirmeya <b>do not say</b> that the explanation of the mishna is <b>in accordance with</b> the explanation of <b>Reish Lakish,</b> that the mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal became intermingled with one that has fallen, as <b>they hold</b> that if a fallen animal <b>stood,</b> it <b>does not require</b> a twenty-four-hour waiting <b>period,</b> and if it <b>walked it does not require</b> any further <b>inspection</b> after slaughter at all. Consequently, one can simply examine the animals to see if they can walk, and if they can, they are fit.",
            "Finally, Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish <b>do not say</b> that the explanation of the mishna is <b>in accordance with</b> the explanation of <b>Rabbi Yirmeya,</b> that the mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal became intermingled with the offspring of a <i>tereifa</i>, as they <b>do not</b> want to <b>interpret</b> the mishna <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer</b> because the <i>halakha</i> does not follow his ruling.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: In a case where <b>sacrificial</b> animals were intermingled <b>with</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> animals, if it was an animal of one <b>type</b> of offering <b>with</b> animals of the same <b>type</b> of offering, one should sacrifice this animal for the sake of whoever is its owner and one should sacrifice that animal for the sake of whoever is its owner, and both owners fulfill their obligations. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> each animal <b>requires placing hands</b> on its head, a rite that must be performed by its owner, and in this case the owner is unknown.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef says:</b> The <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is stated <b>with regard to an offering of women,</b> who do not perform the placing of hands. The Gemara is puzzled by this suggestion: <b>But</b> this indicates that <b>with regard to an offering of men,</b> the <i>halakha</i> stated in the mishna is <b>not</b> applicable, and therefore there is no way of rectifying a mixture of consecrated animals of the same type of offering."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Abaye raised an objection to</b> this from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 8:22): With regard to <b>the offering of an individual that was intermingled with</b> another <b>offering of an individual, and</b> likewise <b>a communal offering that was intermingled with</b> another <b>communal offering, or the offering of an individual and a communal offering that were intermingled with each other,</b> the priest <b>places four placements</b> of blood <b>from each and every one</b> of them on the altar, and in this manner fulfills the obligation of the blood rites of all the offerings. <b>But if he placed</b> one <b>placement from each one,</b> he has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation. <b>And</b> likewise, <b>if he placed four</b> placements <b>from all of them</b> together, he has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that he places from the blood of each of the offerings <i>ab initio</i>, <b>said?</b> In a case <b>where</b> the offerings <b>were intermingled</b> when they were still <b>alive,</b> before they were sacrificed, and therefore the priest could perform four placements from the blood of each animal separately. <b>But</b> if <b>slaughtered</b> animals <b>were</b> then <b>intermingled,</b> i.e., their blood became mixed together in one container, the priest <b>places four placements from all of them</b> together, only one set of four.",
            "<b>And</b> in any case, <b>if he placed one placement from all of them,</b> he has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation, as the blood of all these offerings is placed on the outer altar, and with regard to all of them one fulfills the obligation after the fact with a single placement. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: One assesses the</b> blood of the <b>placement</b> given from each animal; <b>if there is enough in</b> that blood for a placement of blood <b>for this</b> offering <b>and enough for that</b> one, it is <b>fit, but if not,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the difficulty: This <i>baraita</i> indicates that if live offerings became intermingled, each is sacrificed for its owner, despite the fact that these offerings are owned by men and therefore require placing of the hands. It is evident that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to offerings of men, as it <b>teaches</b> the case of the offering of <b>an individual</b> adjacent to, and therefore <b>similar to,</b> the case of <b>a communal</b> offering: <b>Just as a communal</b> offering is sacrificed by <b>men, so too,</b> the offering of <b>an individual</b> that is being discussed here also belongs to <b>men.</b> This presents a difficulty to the explanation of Rav Yosef.",
            "<b>Rava says: And can you understand</b> the <i>baraita</i> in this manner? Is <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>accurate</b> as it stands? There is another difficulty with the <i>baraita</i>, <b>as it teaches: In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is said in a case <b>where</b> these offerings <b>were intermingled</b> when they were still <b>alive. But</b> if <b>slaughtered</b> animals <b>were intermingled</b> it is <b>not</b> said. This is problematic, as <b>what</b> difference is it <b>to me</b> whether the animals are <b>alive</b> or <b>whether</b> they are <b>slaughtered?</b> This is not the decisive factor, as even if the animals were slaughtered, if the blood of each is in a separate vessel the priest should perform separate placements from the blood of each.",
            "Rava continues: <b>Rather, this</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying: In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is said in a case <b>where</b> these offerings <b>were intermingled</b> after they were <b>slaughtered,</b> but they were <b>similar to living</b> animals, i.e., the blood of each animal was <b>in</b> separate <b>cups. But</b> in a situation <b>where</b> the blood of these animals was <b>mixed</b> together in a single cup, the priest <b>places four placements</b> of blood <b>from all of them. And if he placed one placement from all of them,</b> he has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation. If so, this <i>baraita</i> has no bearing on the issue of offerings that became intermingled while they were still alive, as it deals exclusively with the blood of animals that have been slaughtered.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> cited teaches that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: One assesses the</b> blood of the <b>placement</b> given from each animal; <b>if there is enough in</b> that blood for a placement of blood <b>for this</b> offering <b>and enough for that</b> offering, it is <b>fit, but if not,</b> the offerings are <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>And does Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>hold</b> in accordance with <b>this</b> line of <b>reasoning,</b> that there must be a minimum amount of blood placed from each offering? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Para</i> 9:5) with regard to the water of purification into which water that is invalid for sprinkling fell that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>a sprinkling of any</b> amount of the water of purification on someone rendered impure by impurity imparted by a corpse <b>purifies</b> him from his ritual impurity, as <b>sprinkling does not require</b> a minimum <b>measure</b> to purify him. Likewise, <b>a sprinkling</b> of water that is <b>half fit and half unfit</b> for sprinkling serves to purify the individual. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that no minimum amount is required for the sprinkling of the water of purification, and the same should apply to the sprinkling of blood on the altar.",
            "The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>stated</b> his opinion <b>in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer,</b> but he himself does not agree with this opinion. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that <b>sprinkling</b> of water of purification <b>is discrete and placement</b> of blood on the altar <b>is discrete,</b> i.e., these are two separate <i>halakhot</i> that have no bearing on each other.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: In a case where sacrificial animals <b>were intermingled with a firstborn</b> offering <b>or with</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. This means that one may not sell them in the marketplace nor sell their meat by weight, so as not to degrade consecrated animals. <b>Rami bar Ḥama says:</b> With regard to <b>a firstborn</b> offering, <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Beit Shammai,</b> who hold (<i>Bekhorot</i> 33a) that even after a firstborn offering develops a blemish the priest may not eat it in a state of ritual impurity, and therefore <b>one may not feed</b> it <b>to menstruating women, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>its substitute?</b> That is, if the owner of a firstborn animal stated with regard to a non-sacred animal in his possession: This animal is a substitute for the firstborn offering, is a menstruating woman permitted to eat that substitute after it develops a blemish?",
            "Rami bar Ḥama further asks: <b>A firstborn</b> offering itself <b>may not be redeemed,</b> even after it develops a blemish, but <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to redeeming <b>its substitute?</b> He likewise inquired: <b>A firstborn</b> offering itself, even after it develops a blemish, <b>may not be weighed</b> and sold <b>by the <i>litra</i>,</b> in the manner that non-sacred meat is sold. <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>its substitute</b> in this regard? <b>Rava says</b> that an answer to these questions <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>a firstborn</b> offering <b>or</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>from when they develop a blemish they</b> can be used to <b>render</b> another animal <b>a substitute, and their substitute</b> has the same status <b>as them.</b> Their substitutes have the same <i>halakhot</i> as they do.",
            "<b>Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma:</b> If the priest who received a firstborn offering <b>dedicated</b> the <b>firstborn</b> offering <b>to the Temple maintenance,</b> i.e., he vowed to give the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the matter <b>that he may weigh</b> its meat <b>by the <i>litra</i>?</b> The Gemara explains the dilemma: In this case, is consideration of <b>the profit of the Temple</b> treasury <b>preferable, or perhaps</b> avoidance of the <b>demeaning of the firstborn</b> offering is <b>preferable.</b> If the profit of the Temple treasury is preferable, the firstborn offering should be weighed in the normal manner so as to increase its price; a buyer will pay more for meat he is able to resell afterward by exact weight. If avoidance of demeaning the firstborn offering is preferable, it should not be weighed by the <i>litra</i>, even though a loss to the Temple would result.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida says: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the ruling of the mishna: In a case where sacrificial animals <b>were intermingled with a firstborn</b> offering <b>or with</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>they shall graze until they become unfit</b> for sacrifice <b>and they shall</b> both <b>be eaten as a firstborn</b> offering <b>or as</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering. Is this <b>not</b> meaning <b>to say that</b> the sacrificial animal that became intermingled with a firstborn offering <b>is</b> also <b>not weighed by the <i>litra</i>,</b> despite the fact that this causes a slight loss to the Temple?",
            "<b>Rav Huna and Rabbi Ḥizkiyya,</b> the <b>students of Rabbi Yirmeya, say: Are</b> these cases <b>comparable? There,</b> the mishna is referring to <b>two</b> separate <b>sanctities,</b> the sanctity of a firstborn offering and that of another offering, <b>and two</b> separate <b>bodies,</b> i.e., two different animals, and in such a case one may not degrade the sanctity of the firstborn due to the other animal with which it is intermingled. Conversely, <b>here,</b> with regard to one who vows to give the value of a firstborn to the Temple, there are <b>two sanctities,</b> a firstborn offering and the Temple maintenance, <b>but</b> they are both found in <b>one body.</b> In this case, as the sanctity of the Temple maintenance itself is in the firstborn offering, it may be weighed by the <i>litra</i>, because of the profit the Temple will gain.",
            "<b>Rav Yosei bar Avin objects to this: What</b> would be the <i>halakha</i> <b>if one says: Redeem for me,</b> i.e., I wish to redeem, <b>a firstborn</b> offering <b>that he</b> had previously <b>dedicated</b> as the object of his vow <b>to the Temple maintenance? Does</b> the court <b>listen to him?</b> His request is certainly not granted, as by Torah law a firstborn offering may not be redeemed. Similarly, the fact that he dedicated the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple should not negate the prohibition of weighing it by the <i>litra</i>. The Gemara questions this comparison: One cannot raise a difficulty from a case where someone says: <b>Redeem</b> the firstborn offering for me, as <b>the Merciful One states</b> with regard to a firstborn offering: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, <b>you shall not redeem;</b> they are sacred” (Numbers 18:17). But the weighing of the offering by the <i>litra</i> is not prohibited by Torah law.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the Gemara suggests a different resolution of Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma: <b>Rabbi Ami says: Can this</b> priest <b>transfer</b> to the Temple maintenance anything <b>other than that which was transferred to him?</b> In other words, just as the priest who took the vow may not weigh the firstborn by the <i>litra</i> and gain a profit, the same applies to the Temple treasury, the recipient of his vow.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: All offerings <b>can become</b> indistinguishably <b>intermingled</b> with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering. The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> about <b>a sin offering and a guilt offering,</b> that they cannot become intermingled? Is the reason <b>that this,</b> a guilt offering, is always <b>a male, and that,</b> a sin offering, is always <b>a female?</b>",
            "The Gemara questions this explanation: <b>A sin offering and a burnt offering</b> are <b>also</b> like this, as a sin offering is always female while a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara answers that although the standard sin offering is always female, <b>there is</b> the <b>goat</b> of the <b><i>Nasi</i>,</b> which is a male sin offering, and therefore it can become intermingled with a male goat burnt offering. And as to the statement of the mishna that a sin offering cannot become intermingled with a guilt offering despite the male sin offering of the <i>Nasi</i>, that is because <b>this</b> goat has straight <b>hair and that</b> guilt offering comes only from sheep or rams, which have <b>wool,</b> and the wool is curly.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>A Paschal offering and a guilt offering also cannot become intermingled,</b> as <b>this</b> Paschal offering is <b>in its first year, and that</b> guilt offering is <b>in its second year.</b> The Gemara answers that <b>there is the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper,</b> which must be in their first year. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that an animal in its first year can become intermingled with an animal in its second year, as <b>there is</b> an animal <b>in its first year that looks like</b> an animal <b>in its second year, and</b> likewise <b>there is</b> an animal <b>in its second year that looks like</b> an animal <b>in its first year.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>a guilt offering that was intermingled with a peace offering, Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them should be slaughtered in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north while a peace offering may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard. <b>And</b> they both <b>must be eaten in accordance with</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the</b> more <b>stringent of them,</b> i.e., the guilt offering, with the following <i>halakhot</i>: They may be eaten only in the courtyard rather than throughout Jerusalem; by male priests and not by any ritually pure Jew; and on the day they were sacrificed and the following night, and not on the day they were sacrificed, the following day, and the intervening night.",
            "The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Shimon: One may not limit the time of the consumption of an offering, as <b>one may not bring sacrificial</b> animals <b>to the status of unfitness.</b> According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the peace offering becomes leftover, <i>notar</i>, the morning after it is sacrificed, and not at the end of that day, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning peace offerings. Rather, the Rabbis hold, the owner shall wait until these animals become blemished, redeem them, and bring an offering of each type that is worth the monetary value of the higher-quality animal among them.",
            "The mishna adds: Even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if <b>pieces</b> of the meat of one offering <b>were intermingled with pieces</b> of the meat of another offering, e.g., meat from <b>offerings of the most sacred order with</b> meat from <b>offerings of lesser sanctity;</b> or if pieces of meat from offerings <b>eaten for one day</b> and the following night were intermingled <b>with</b> pieces of meat from offerings <b>eaten for two days and</b> one <b>night,</b> since in that case the remedy with regard to offerings that were intermingled cannot be implemented, they both <b>must be eaten in accordance with</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the</b> more <b>stringent of them.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> In connection to the principle cited by the Rabbis in the mishna that one may not bring consecrated animals to the status of unfitness, <b>a <i>tanna</i> taught</b> a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Shevi’it</i> 6:29) <b>before Rav:</b> With regard to produce of the <b>Sabbatical</b> Year, <b>one may not purchase</b> produce of <b><i>teruma</i></b> from a previous year <b>with its money,</b> i.e., money received in its sale, <b>because</b> one thereby <b>reduces the</b> time of <b>eating</b> the <i>teruma</i>. The produce of the Sabbatical Year may be eaten only until the time of the removal of that type of produce from the field, whereas <i>teruma</i> may be consumed at any time.",
            "<b>The Sages said</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>before Rabba,</b> and they explained that <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> is <b>not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> in the mishna. Their reasoning was <b>that if</b> you would say it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say,</b> as can be inferred from the mishna, that <b>one may bring sacrificial</b> animals <b>to the status of unfitness?</b> Similarly, one can limit the time allowed for the consumption of the Sabbatical Year produce.",
            "Rabba <b>said to them: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon. That statement,</b> that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, applies only in a case that is <b>after the fact,</b> as in the mishna, where offerings became intermingled. Rabbi Shimon did <b>not</b> permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness <b><i>ab initio</i>.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> does Rabbi Shimon <b>not</b> permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness <b><i>ab initio</i>? Abaye raised an objection to</b> Rabba from a mishna that discusses the manner of eating the meat of offerings (Zevachim 90b):"
        ],
        [
            "<b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of</b> the offerings that are eaten, the <b>priests are permitted to alter</b> the manner <b>of their consumption</b> and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted <b>to eat them roasted, boiled, or cooked, and</b> they are likewise permitted <b>to place non-sacred spices or <i>teruma</i> spices in</b> the cooking pot. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.</b> This indicates that it is permitted to spice offerings with <i>teruma</i> spices <i>ab initio</i>, despite the fact that this reduces the time available to eat the <i>teruma</i>. Rabba <b>said to</b> Abaye: <b>Set aside</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>teruma</i> of spices,</b> as this <i>teruma</i> applies <b>by rabbinic law,</b> not by Torah law.",
            "Abaye <b>raised an objection to</b> Rabba from a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 3:2): <b>One may not purchase <i>teruma</i> with</b> second <b>tithe money, because</b> he thereby <b>limits</b> the circumstances <b>for the eating of</b> the <i>teruma</i>. <i>Teruma</i> may be eaten in any place and even by an acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative died that same day and has not yet been buried, whereas second tithe and food purchased with second tithe money must be eaten in Jerusalem and is prohibited to an acute mourner. <b>And Rabbi Shimon permits</b> one to purchase <i>teruma</i> with second tithe money. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon allows one to bring <i>teruma</i> to the status of unfitness. Rabba <b>was silent</b> in response <b>to his</b> statement, and did not answer Abaye.",
            "<b>When</b> Abaye <b>came before Rav Yosef</b> and told him of his discussion with Rabba, Rav Yosef <b>said to him: Why didn’t you raise an objection to</b> Rabba <b>from this</b> mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 8:7): <b>One may not cook vegetables of</b> the <b>Sabbatical</b> Year <b>in <i>teruma</i> oil, so that one does not bring consecrated</b> food, <i>teruma</i>, <b>to the status of unfitness,</b> as the <i>teruma</i> oil would have to be eaten before the time of the removal of the Sabbatical Year produce; <b>and Rabbi Shimon permits</b> one to cook in this manner. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon allows one to bring <i>teruma</i> to the status of unfitness <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rav Yosef: <b>And didn’t I raise an objection to</b> Rabba <b>from that</b> mishna discussing the <i>halakha</i> <b>of</b> <i>teruma</i> <b>spices, and he said to me: Disregard</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b><i>teruma</i> of spices,</b> as this <i>teruma</i> applies <b>by rabbinic law. Here too,</b> with regard to vegetables of the Sabbatical Year, he could likewise say that this <b><i>teruma</i></b> oil is not olive oil, but oil that is <b><i>teruma</i> of vegetables,</b> which applies <b>by rabbinic law.</b> Rav Yosef replied: <b>If so,</b> that this mishna is referring to vegetable oil of <i>teruma</i>, <b>it should teach the opposite</b> case, that one may not cook <b>vegetables of <i>teruma</i> in oil of</b> the <b>Sabbatical</b> Year. Since the <i>tanna</i> specifies <i>teruma</i> oil, he must certainly be speaking of <i>teruma</i> by Torah law, i.e., olive oil.",
            "Abaye then said to Rav Yosef: <b>And didn’t I raise an objection to</b> Rabba <b>from the mishna,</b> in <b>which Rabbi Shimon permits</b> one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, <b>and</b> Rabba <b>said to me that</b> Rabbi Shimon’s ruling applies only after the fact, when the guilt offering and peace offering <b>have become intermingled? Here too,</b> he would say <b>that</b> this ruling is after the fact, that when the <i>teruma</i> oil and the vegetables of the Sabbatical Year <b>have become intermingled</b> one may then cook them together, but he does not permit one to cook them together <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> this <i>halakha</i> is referring to a case <b>where</b> the foods <b>have</b> already <b>become intermingled, what is the reason of the Rabbis</b> for prohibiting one to cook them together? The Gemara answers: This is <b>just as it is</b> in the case of the mishna <b>with regard to a guilt offering and a peace offering</b> that became intermingled, that even after the offerings are intermingled, one may not bring the flesh of the peace offering to the status of unfitness.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>Are</b> these two cases <b>comparable? There,</b> with regard to the offerings, the situation <b>has a remedy by</b> having the offerings <b>graze</b> until they develop a blemish, at which point the owner brings each offering of each type with the monetary value of the higher-quality animal. By contrast, in <b>this</b> case of <i>teruma</i> oil mixed with vegetables of the Sabbatical Year, the situation <b>has no remedy</b> similar to that <b>of</b> having the offerings <b>graze,</b> and therefore if the Rabbis prohibited the mixture the <i>teruma</i> would go to waste.",
            "If one wishes to compare this case of oil and vegetables to an intermingling of sacrificial animals, <b>this is comparable only to</b> the other <i>halakha</i> of the mishna, which addresses <b>a piece</b> of the flesh of an offering of the most sacred order <b>that</b> was intermingled <b>with pieces</b> of the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity. Here the Rabbis concede that <b>since there is no remedy</b> for the intermingled pieces, the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that</b> they both <b>must be eaten in accordance with</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the</b> more <b>stringent among them,</b> but they are not prohibited.",
            "<b>Ravina objects to this</b> comparison: <b>Are</b> these cases <b>comparable?</b> In the case of the <b>piece</b> of sacrificial flesh <b>that</b> is intermingled <b>with the</b> other <b>pieces, it has no remedy at all,</b> whereas <b>this</b> case of <i>teruma</i> oil <b>has a remedy through squeezing</b> the oil from the vegetables. If so, this case of vegetables is in fact comparable to that of an intermingling of a guilt offering and peace offering, which also have a means of remedy, and for this reason the Rabbis prohibited the mixture.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how would <b>Rav Yosef</b> respond to the claim that the Rabbis prohibit this mixture after the fact because there is a remedy available through squeezing it? The Gemara explains that Rav Yosef would respond that squeezing is not in fact a remedy, as <b>how can one squeeze</b> it? If <b>one squeezes</b> the vegetables <b>a lot,</b> he thereby <b>causes a loss of Sabbatical</b> Year produce; if <b>one squeezes</b> the vegetables <b>a little, ultimately</b> the <i>teruma</i> oil and vegetables of the Sabbatical Year <b>will</b> still <b>be intermingled,</b> as this squeezing will be ineffective. If so, Rav Yosef’s contention that in this case the Rabbis would not have prohibited cooking vegetables of the Sabbatical Year in <i>teruma</i> oil remains valid. Consequently, this must be referring to a case where the vegetables and oil have not yet become mixed, which means that this case does prove that Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness <i>ab initio</i>, not only after the fact, as claimed by Rabba.",
            "Rav Yosef <b>raised an objection to</b> the opinion of Rabba from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nazir</i> 6:1): How should one whose status as a confirmed leper has not been determined bring his guilt offering and <i>log</i> of oil on the eighth day of his purification? <b>Rabbi Shimon says: On the following day,</b> after his seven days of purification, <b>he brings his guilt offering and his <i>log</i></b> of oil <b>with it, and says</b> the following stipulation: <b>If this</b> offering is one <b>of a leper,</b> i.e., if I am a confirmed leper, <b>this is his,</b> i.e., my, <b>guilt offering and that is his <i>log</i></b> of oil."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And if</b> he is <b>not</b> a leper, <b>this</b> animal that is brought for <b>a guilt offering</b> shall be <b>a voluntary peace offering,</b> because their sacrificial rites are equivalent. <b>And that</b> uncertain <b>guilt offering requires slaughter in the north</b> of the Temple courtyard as a guilt offering, <b>and placement</b> of the blood on the right <b>thumb</b> and <b>big toe</b> and right ear of the leper, as described in Leviticus 14:14, <b>and</b> it requires <b>placing hands</b> on the head of the animal, <b>and</b> the accompanying wine <b>libations and waving of</b> the <b>breast and thigh</b> like a peace offering.",
            "<b>And</b> lastly, <b>it is eaten</b> by males of the priesthood <b>on</b> the <b>day</b> it is sacrificed <b>and</b> the following <b>night,</b> in the Temple courtyard, like a guilt offering, not for two days and one night in the manner of a peace offering. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness even <i>ab initio</i>, not only when the animals became intermingled. The Gemara answers that <b>the remedy of a man is different</b> from the case discussed by Rabba. Since this person has no way of purifying himself from his leprosy other than by bringing the offering, the concern of reducing the time available for its consumption is disregarded.",
            "The Gemara asks a question with regard to the resolution suggested by Rabbi Shimon of bringing the offerings and stating a stipulation. This <b>works out well</b> with regard to the <b>guilt offering,</b> but with regard to the <b><i>log</i></b> of oil <b>what can be said?</b> A <i>log</i> of oil does not accompany a peace offering. The Gemara explains <b>that</b> the individual bringing the offering <b>says:</b> If I am not a leper, then <b>this <i>log</i> shall be a gift</b> to the Temple, as one can dedicate oil to the Temple. The Gemara questions this resolution: <b>But perhaps he is not</b> in fact <b>a leper, and</b> if so, it is <b>required</b> that a priest <b>remove a handful</b> of the donated oil and sacrifice a handful of it on the altar before the rest of the oil may be consumed by the priests, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to oil brought as an offering. The Gemara explains that this is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest already <b>removed a handful.</b>",
            "The Gemara further questions: <b>But perhaps he is</b> in fact <b>a leper, and he requires the placement of seven</b> sprinklings of oil before the Lord (see Leviticus 14:15–16). The Gemara answers <b>that</b> the priest does <b>place</b> these sprinklings.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the priest sprinkle the oil? <b>But it is lacking,</b> as a handful has been removed from the oil, and one sprinkles only from a whole <i>log</i>. The Gemara explains <b>that</b> after the handful is removed the priest <b>brings a little</b> more oil to the container <b>and fills it</b> up to a <i>log</i>. This is <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 14:10): In a case where <b>the <i>log</i> lacked</b> a full measure, then <b>if</b> it became lacking <b>before</b> the priest <b>poured</b> from it into his palm in order to place it on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, <b>he shall fill it.</b>",
            "The Gemara poses yet another question: <b>But</b> if he is not a leper, and that <i>log</i> of oil is a gift, that handful removed from the oil <b>requires burning</b> on the altar for the remainder of the oil to be permitted to the priests. The Gemara explains <b>that</b> the priest does in fact <b>burn</b> the handful.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>When</b> does the priest burn the handful? <b>If</b> he does so <b>after the placement of seven</b> sprinklings for the leper’s purification, in such a case the <i>log</i> will be lacking due to the sprinklings. That which remains <b>is</b> akin to the <b>remainder</b> of a meal offering <b>that was lacking between</b> the <b>removal of</b> the <b>handful and</b> the <b>burning, and one may not burn the handful for that</b> remainder. Similar to a gift of oil, in a meal offering a handful is removed from the offering and then sacrificed on the altar. If after the handful is removed but before it is sacrificed some of the remainder of the meal offering is separated, the handful may not be sacrificed. The same should apply if some of the oil was sprinkled after the handful was removed.",
            "<b>If,</b> alternatively, the priest burns the handful <b>before the placement of seven</b> sprinklings, once he has burned the handful he may no longer perform the sprinklings, in accordance with the principle: <b>Whatever is partly</b> burned <b>in the fire</b> on the altar <b>is subject to</b> the prohibition of: <b>You may not make as an offering</b> (see Leviticus 2:11). This principle states that if part of an item, such as the blood of an animal offering or the handful of a meal offering, has been sacrificed, one who sacrifices any other part of it that is not designated for sacrifice has violated a prohibition. The sprinkling of the oil is equivalent to sacrifice in this regard.",
            "<b>Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, says that</b> the priest does not sprinkle the oil as a definite rite but stipulates that if the man is not a leper he is sprinkling it in a manner analogous to other items that one <b>burns for the sake of wood,</b> i.e., as fuel for the altar and not as a sacrificial rite. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke from it as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord; but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar” (Leviticus 2:11–12). This verse indicates that <b>you may not offer up</b> leaven and honey <b>as a pleasing aroma,</b> an offering. <b>But you may offer up</b> leaven and honey and other substances"
        ],
        [
            "<b>for the sake of wood,</b> not as an offering. Here as well, the priest stipulates that if the man is not a confirmed leper, the sprinkling of the oil should not be viewed as a rite.",
            "The Gemara questions further: <b>But</b> even if the priest removes a handful from the oil and burns it, and also sprinkles from the oil, <b>there is</b> the matter of the <b>remainder</b> of the oil, <b>which must be filled</b> after the removal of the handful so that the priest can perform the sprinkling with a full <i>log</i>, <b>and there is</b> therefore <b>that bit</b> of oil that was added <b>from which</b> the priest <b>did not remove</b> the <b>handful</b> initially. If the one bringing the offering is not a leper, and the <i>log</i> of oil is a gift, it will turn out that there is a small portion of the oil that was not permitted by the removal of the handful. The Gemara explains <b>that</b> the priest <b>redeems it,</b> i.e., after the sprinklings of the oil have been performed, he stipulates that if the person who brought the offering is not a leper then the oil should be desacralized by his giving its value to the Temple treasury.",
            "The Gemara asks: If you say <b>that he redeems it, where</b> does he redeem it? <b>If</b> he redeems it when the oil is <b>within</b> the walls of the Temple, he would thereby be <b>bringing non-sacred</b> oil <b>into the courtyard. If</b> he redeems the oil <b>outside</b> the courtyard, before he can redeem the oil <b>it would become disqualified due to</b> the prohibition of a consecrated item <b>leaving</b> the courtyard. The Gemara answers: <b>Actually,</b> he redeems the oil when it is <b>within</b> the walls of the Temple. This is permitted because the <b>non-sacred</b> oil <b>is</b> then found in the Temple courtyard <b>by itself,</b> i.e., he did not bring a non-sacred item into the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks a question with regard to the suggested resolution, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that one whose status as a leper is uncertain should bring a <i>log</i> of oil as a gift offering and state a stipulation. <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say</b> that <b>one may not donate oil</b> as a gift? The Gemara answers, as on 76b: <b>The remedy of a person is different,</b> i.e., Rabbi Shimon concedes that one may donate oil in this instance, as this is the only manner by which this person can undergo ritual purification.",
            "The Gemara continues to discuss the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. It was stated above that according to Rabbi Shimon, one whose status as a leper is uncertain may bring a lamb as a gift for a peace offering and state a stipulation with regard to it. The Gemara relates that <b>Rav Reḥumi was sitting before Ravina, and he was sitting and saying</b> the following <b>in the name of Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa: But</b> why can’t he bring a lamb for a guilt offering and <b>say</b> that if he is not a leper then <b>this guilt offering shall be a provisional guilt offering,</b> brought by one who is uncertain whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering? This guilt offering is eaten for one day and night, like the guilt offering of a leper, and therefore he would not be reducing the time for its consumption, unlike when he stipulates that it should be a peace offering.",
            "Rav Reḥumi continued: Since this option was not suggested, one can <b>learn from</b> here that <b>who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Eliezer,</b> who holds that one may donate a provisional guilt offering (<i>Keritut</i> 25a)? <b>It is Rabbi Shimon, who says,</b> by inference from his suggestion here, that <b>one may not donate a provisional guilt offering.</b> Ravina <b>said to</b> Rav Reḥumi: <b>Torah, Torah!</b> That is, where is the Torah of such a great man as yourself? <b>You are confusing lambs with rams.</b> The guilt offering of a leper is a lamb in its first year (see Leviticus 14:10), which cannot be brought as a provisional guilt offering because these must be rams (see Leviticus 5:15), i.e., they must be in their second year.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>the limbs of a sin offering,</b> which are eaten by priests and may not be burned on the altar, <b>that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering,</b> which are burned on the altar, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The priest <b>shall place</b> all the limbs <b>above,</b> on the altar, <b>and I view the flesh</b> of the limbs <b>of the sin offering above</b> on the altar <b>as though they are</b> pieces of <b>wood</b> burned on the altar, and not as though they are an offering. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> One should wait until <b>the form of</b> all the intermingled limbs <b>decays and they will</b> all <b>go out to the place of burning</b> in the Temple courtyard, where all disqualified offerings of the most sacred order are burned.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer</b> for deeming it permitted to burn the limbs of the sin offering on the altar as wood? The Gemara explains: <b>The verse states:</b> “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord; <b>but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar”</b> (Leviticus 2:11–12). This indicates that <b>you may not offer up</b> leaven and honey <b>as a pleasing aroma,</b> i.e., as an offering. <b>But you may offer up</b> leaven and honey and other substances that are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, such as the limbs of a sin offering, <b>for the sake of wood.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the Rabbis,</b> who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, how do they respond to this reasoning? They claim that <b>the Merciful One excludes</b> other cases at the beginning of the verse: “As an offering of first fruits you may bring <b>them.”</b> This indicates that <b>it is</b> with regard to <b>them,</b> i.e., leaven and honey alone, <b>that</b> it is stated: <b>You may not offer up</b> as an offering, <b>but you may offer up</b> leaven and honey <b>for the sake of wood. But</b> with regard to any <b>other substances</b> that are prohibited to be brought on the altar, one may <b>not</b> offer them up to the altar at all.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And Rabbi Eliezer,</b> what does he derive from this term of exclusion “them”? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer expounds this word as follows: It is only with regard to <b>them,</b> leaven and honey, <b>that</b> the verse <b>includes</b> a prohibition against bringing them up to the <b>ramp</b> of the altar <b>like</b> offering them up on <b>the altar</b> itself. <b>But</b> with regard to any <b>other substances</b> that are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, bringing them up to the ramp is <b>not</b> considered like offering them up on the altar itself.",
            "The Gemara further asks: <b>And the Rabbis,</b> from where do they derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers that the Rabbis <b>learn two</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>from</b> the word “them.” This term of emphasis teaches that all that is stated in this verse is referring only to leaven and honey, both the <i>halakha</i> that it is permitted to offer them up on the altar as wood, and the ruling that the ramp is considered like the altar with regard to this <i>halakha</i>.",
            "§ The Gemara comments: <b>The mishna is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>this</b> following <b><i>tanna</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 8:15) that <b>Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to the limbs of a sin offering that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering,</b> as all agree <b>that they shall be sacrificed.</b> Likewise, they agree that if limbs that are fit to be burned on the altar became intermingled <b>with</b> the limbs of <b>an animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person, or</b> with the limbs of <b>an animal that was the object of bestiality,</b> which are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, <b>that they shall not be sacrificed,</b> even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.",
            "Rabbi Yehuda continues: <b>With regard to which</b> case <b>did</b> Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis <b>disagree?</b> They disagreed <b>with regard to the limbs of an unblemished burnt offering that were intermingled with the limbs of a blemished</b> animal, which is disqualified from the altar. <b>As</b> in this case <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> All the limbs <b>shall be sacrificed, and I consider</b> the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering <b>above,</b> on the altar, <b>as though they are</b> pieces of <b>wood</b> burned on the altar. <b>And the Rabbis say: They shall not be sacrificed.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> concerning the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, what is different</b> about the limbs of <b>an animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person, or</b> the limbs of <b>an animal that was the object of bestiality,</b> that they may not be sacrificed? If one says that the reason is <b>that they are not fit</b> for the altar, that cannot be the reason, as <b>a blemished</b> animal <b>is not fit</b> for the altar <b>as well,</b> and there he holds that the limbs are burned."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rav Huna says:</b> When Rabbi Eliezer makes reference to a blemished animal, he is speaking of an unobtrusive blemish, e.g., one that is <b>on the cornea of the eye. And</b> his ruling is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Akiva, who says</b> that in the case of an offering with such a blemish, <b>if</b> its sacrificial parts <b>ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall not descend</b> from it, because it is not a disgrace to the altar for the sacrificial parts of such an offering to be burned on it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>Say that Rabbi Akiva says</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>after the fact,</b> meaning that if the priest already brought up the limbs of these blemished animals, they do not descend from the altar. <b>Does</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>say</b> that one may burn a mixture of these limbs <b><i>ab initio</i>?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: What are we dealing with here?</b> We are dealing with a case <b>where</b> all the limbs in the mixture were <b>brought up upon</b> the <b>ramp.</b> Since they have been brought on the ramp and sanctified as offerings, it is considered after the fact. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>If so,</b> i.e., if we are dealing with a case in which the limbs were already carried to the ramp, then <b>even</b> if they were <b>as is,</b> and not intermingled, the limbs of the blemished animal should be burned, as claimed by Rabbi Akiva.",
            "<b>Rather, the reason of Rabbi Eliezer</b> is that with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing a blemished animal upon the altar, <b>the Merciful One excludes</b> certain cases. After listing the various disqualifying blemishes, the verse states: “Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall you offer the bread of your God of any of these, because their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them; they shall not be accepted for you” (Leviticus 22:25). This teaches that <b>it is</b> only if there is <b>a blemish</b> clearly <b>in them that they shall not be accepted; but</b> if they were sacrificed <b>by means of a mixture they shall be accepted.</b> This exclusion is stated only with regard to blemished animals, not with regard to animals that copulated with people, and consequently the limbs of these animals are not brought up to the altar even if they became intermingled with the limbs of fit offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the Rabbis,</b> how do they expound this verse? The Gemara explains that they expound it as follows: <b>It is</b> only if the <b>blemish</b> is still <b>in them that they shall not be accepted; but</b> if their <b>blemish has passed, they shall be accepted. And Rabbi Eliezer</b> derives this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the previous clause in that same verse: “Because their corruption is in them [<i>bahem</i>].” Since the verse could have stated the shorter form of <b><i>bam</i>,</b> and instead stated <b>“<i>bahem</i>,”</b> one derives from here that if the animal no longer is blemished it is accepted as an offering. <b>And</b> as for <b>the Rabbis, they do not interpret</b> anything from the variation between <b><i>bam</i></b> and <b>“<i>bahem</i>”;</b> they do not see this as a significant deviation from the standard language of the verse.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If that is so,</b> and Rabbi Eliezer permits the limbs of blemished animals to be sacrificed if they are in a mixture, why is it necessary for him to say: I <b>view</b> the flesh of the limbs of the blemished animals as though they are pieces of wood? After all, <b>the Merciful One permits</b> them as an offering. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer is <b>speaking to</b> the Rabbis <b>in accordance with their statement,</b> as follows: <b>According to my</b> opinion, <b>the Merciful One permits</b> these limbs to be sacrificed upon the altar. But even <b>according to your</b> opinion, <b>at least agree with me</b> that the <b>flesh of a blemished</b> animal that was intermingled with the flesh of a qualified offering <b>is considered like wood, just as is</b> the <i>halakha</i> of the <b>flesh of a sin offering</b> that became intermingled with the flesh of a burnt offering, as according to this <i>baraita</i> the Rabbis concede that the flesh of these two offerings should be sacrificed together.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the Rabbis,</b> how do they respond to this claim of Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara explains: According to the Rabbis there is a difference between the cases: <b>Here,</b> with regard to a mixture that includes limbs of blemished animals, these limbs <b>are repulsive,</b> and therefore they may not be brought upon the altar, even as wood. Conversely, <b>there,</b> in the case of a mixture of limbs of a sin offering and limbs of a burnt offering, the limbs of the sin offering <b>are not repulsive</b> in and of themselves, and consequently they may be sacrificed upon the altar as wood.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In a case where <b>limbs</b> of burnt offerings fit for sacrifice were intermingled <b>with limbs of blemished</b> burnt offerings, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> Although all the limbs are unfit for sacrifice, <b>if the head of one of them was sacrificed all the heads shall be sacrificed,</b> as the head that was sacrificed is assumed to have been that of the unfit animal in the mixture. Likewise, if one sacrificed <b>the legs of one of them all the legs shall be sacrificed. And the Rabbis say: Even</b> if <b>all</b> the limbs <b>were sacrificed except for one of them,</b> there is a concern that the remaining limb is the unfit limb, which may not be sacrificed. Rather, all of the limbs <b>must go out to the place of burning</b> in the Temple courtyard.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Eliezer permitted</b> the sacrificing of all the heads <b>only</b> if they were sacrificed <b>two</b> by <b>two,</b> as at least one of each pair is certainly permitted; <b>but</b> he did <b>not</b> permit them to be sacrificed <b>one</b> by <b>one,</b> in case the priest may be sacrificing the prohibited head by itself. <b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection</b> from the mishna, which states: <b>And the Rabbis say: Even</b> if <b>all</b> the limbs <b>were sacrificed except for one of them,</b> all the limbs <b>must go out to the place of burning</b> in the Temple courtyard. This indicates that even in this situation, where only one of the limbs remains, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis still applies, which means that Rabbi Eliezer permits it to be sacrificed despite the fact that it is only one limb.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa said to</b> Rabbi Yirmeya in response: <b>I will explain</b> the meaning of this statement <b>to you: What</b> does the mishna mean when it states: Except for <b>one</b> of them? It means except for <b>one pair,</b> i.e., two limbs, as even Rabbi Eliezer did not permit one to sacrifice the limbs individually.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>blood</b> of an offering fit for sacrifice <b>that was mixed with water, if</b> the mixture <b>has the appearance of blood</b> it is <b>fit</b> for sprinkling on the altar, even though the majority of the mixture is water. If the blood <b>was mixed with</b> red <b>wine, one views</b> the wine <b>as though it is water.</b> If that amount of water would leave the mixture with the appearance of blood it is fit for presentation. And likewise if the blood <b>was mixed with the blood of</b> a non-sacred <b>domesticated animal or the blood of</b> a non-sacred <b>undomesticated animal, one considers</b> the non-sacred blood <b>as though it is water.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood.</b> Therefore, the priest presents the blood of the mixture on the altar.",
            "If blood fit for presentation <b>was mixed with the blood of unfit</b> offerings, there is no remedy. Therefore, the entire mixture <b>shall be poured into the drain</b> running through the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if blood fit for presentation was mixed <b>with blood of exudate,</b> i.e., that exudes from the neck after the initial spurt following its slaughter concludes, which is unfit for presentation, the entire mixture <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain. Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> this mixture <b>fit</b> for presentation. Even according to the first <i>tanna</i>, <b>if</b> the priest <b>did not consult</b> the authorities <b>and placed</b> the blood on the altar, the offering is <b>fit.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that in a case where water became mixed with the blood of an offering, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit, despite the fact that there is more water than blood. Concerning this <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>only</b> in a case <b>where</b> the <b>water fell into</b> the <b>blood. But</b> in a case where the <b>blood fell into</b> the <b>water,</b> the <b>first</b> drop of blood, and then the next <b>first</b> drop of blood, is <b>nullified</b> in the water, i.e., each drop is nullified in turn. Consequently, the mixture is unfit for presentation, regardless of whether it has the appearance of blood.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: But with regard to</b> the mitzva of <b>covering</b> the blood of birds or undomesticated animals that are slaughtered, <b>it is not so.</b> In this case, even if the blood fell into water, the mitzva of covering applies to it, provided that the mixture has the appearance of blood. The blood is not nullified by the water <b>because there is no</b> permanent <b>rejection with regard to mitzvot,</b> i.e., its nullification was merely temporary, but once there is enough blood in the water, it reassumes its status of blood.",
            "§ The Gemara continues to discuss various mixtures. <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> With regard to meat of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, <b>and</b> meat of <b><i>notar</i>,</b> an offering whose designated time for consumption has passed, <b>and ritually impure</b> sacrificial meat, each of which was an olive-bulk, the minimum size for which one is liable to be flogged for its consumption, <b>that one mixed together and ate them</b> as a mixture, he is <b>exempt</b> from being flogged. The reason is that it is <b>impossible that</b> while eating them one <b>type would not be greater than another</b> type <b>and nullify it.</b> Since it is unknown which prohibition will nullify the other, one cannot forewarn the offender as to which prohibition he is about to transgress, and in order to be liable to be flogged one must receive a forewarning concerning a specific prohibition.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Conclude three</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>from</b> this statement of Reish Lakish. <b>Conclude from it</b> that <b>prohibitions nullify one another</b> in a majority, just as permitted items nullify a prohibited item. <b>And conclude from it</b> that the <i>halakha</i> that when a prohibited food <b>imparts flavor</b> to a permitted substance it prohibits it even <b>when</b> the permitted substance is the <b>majority</b> does <b>not</b> apply <b>by Torah law,</b> but by rabbinic law. The proof is that if this principle were applied by Torah law, then one should be flogged for this consumption, as the meats are of different types and therefore one of them must have imparted flavor to the other. <b>And</b> finally, <b>conclude from it</b> that <b>an uncertain forewarning,</b> e.g., one in which the witnesses cannot be sure which prohibition the transgressor is about to violate, <b>is not considered a forewarning.</b>",
            "Concerning the inference that the <i>halakha</i> that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, <b>Rava raises an objection</b> from a mishna (<i>Ḥalla</i> 3:7): In a case where one <b>prepared a dough from wheat and from rice, if</b> this mixture <b>has the taste of wheat,</b> it is <b>obligated in</b> the separation of <b><i>ḥalla</i>,</b> a portion of dough that must be given to a priest (see Numbers 15:17–21). <i>Ḥalla</i> is separated only from one of the five species of grain, not rice. Rava explains his objection: <b>And</b> this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>even though the majority</b> of the mixture is flour from <b>rice.</b> Apparently, the fact that the wheat imparts flavor to the dough renders it obligated in <i>ḥalla</i> even if the wheat is the minority.",
            "The Gemara answers: The obligation to set aside <i>ḥalla</i> in this case applies <b>by rabbinic law,</b> not by Torah law. Rava raises a difficulty: <b>If so, say the latter clause</b> of that same mishna: <b>A person can fulfill his obligation with</b> <i>matza</i> from this type of dough <b>on</b> the first night of <b>Passover.</b> Since by Torah law this mitzva must be fulfilled with <i>matza</i> made from a grain, evidently the principle that one substance that imparts flavor to a greater amount of a different substance affects its status applies by Torah law."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rather,</b> one must say that according to Reish Lakish, in a case of <b>a type</b> of food mixed <b>with</b> food <b>not</b> of <b>its</b> own <b>type,</b> such as wheat flour and rice flour, whose tastes are different, the status is determined <b>by the flavor.</b> Therefore, if the dough tastes like wheat, it has the <i>halakha</i> of a dough made from wheat. But if it is <b>a type</b> of food mixed <b>with</b> food of <b>its</b> own <b>type,</b> e.g., a mixture of <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i> meat, which is the case addressed by Reish Lakish, the status of the mixture is determined <b>by the majority.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>But let us estimate</b> in a case of <b>a type</b> of food mixed <b>with</b> food of <b>its</b> own <b>type as</b> though it were a mixture of <b>a type</b> of food mixed <b>with</b> food <b>not</b> of <b>its</b> own <b>type,</b> and if so, the minority is not nullified if it is substantial enough to impart flavor to the majority. <b>As we learned</b> in the mishna: If the blood of an offering <b>was mixed with wine, one considers it as though it is water.</b> Although blood and wine certainly have different flavors, in the case of the mishna the determinative factor is not the taste of the mixture, but the appearance. Since they share the same appearance, they are considered a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. <b>What, is it not</b> correct to explain the mishna as stating that <b>one views</b> the <b>wine as though it is water,</b> i.e., a substance of a different type, and if the mixture would have the appearance of blood if the wine were water it is fit for presentation, despite the fact that the blood is not the majority?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> this is not the explanation of the mishna. Rather, it means that <b>one views the blood as though it is water,</b> i.e., it is unfit for presentation, since it is as though one presented water on the altar. The Gemara questions this explanation: <b>If so,</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>should have</b> said: The blood is <b>nullified.</b>",
            "<b>And furthermore, it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Mikvaot</i> 7:4): With regard to a ritually impure bucket containing a certain amount of white wine or milk that one immersed in a ritual bath, <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Although the appearance of the white wine or milk is not discernible in the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket, <b>one views</b> the white wine or milk <b>as though it is red wine,</b> and makes the following determination: <b>If its</b> conjectured red <b>appearance would pale</b> due to the water that enters the bucket, the wine or milk is nullified by the water. Therefore, the act of purification is <b>fit,</b> and the bucket is ritually pure.",
            "Rabbi Yehuda continues: <b>But if</b> its conjectured red appearance would <b>not</b> pale, the act of purification is <b>unfit,</b> and the bucket remains ritually impure. This is a case in which a substance was mixed with another substance of similar appearance, as white wine and milk have a similar appearance to the water, and yet it is treated as a mixture of a substance with a different type of substance, and it is not nullified in a majority.",
            "The Gemara explains: One cannot cite a proof from the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as this <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> and the ruling follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. <b>As it is taught</b> in that <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a ritually impure <b>bucket in which there is white wine or milk, and one immersed it</b> in a ritual bath, <b>one follows the majority,</b> i.e., if the majority of the contents of the bucket is now water from the ritual bath, it is pure. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: One views</b> the white wine or milk <b>as though it is red wine</b> and makes the following determination: <b>If its</b> conjectured red <b>appearance would pale</b> due to the water that enters the bucket, the act of purification is <b>fit,</b> and the bucket is ritually pure. <b>But if</b> its conjectured red appearance would <b>not</b> pale, the act of purification is <b>unfit,</b> and the bucket remains ritually impure.",
            "<b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda from a mishna (see <i>Mikvaot</i> 10:6): If one had an impure <b>bucket that is filled with spittle and one immersed it</b> in a ritual bath, the spittle is considered an interposition between the water of the ritual bath and that of the bucket, and therefore it is <b>as though he did not immerse</b> it.",
            "If the impure bucket was full of <b>urine</b> and he immersed it, although urine is slightly different in appearance than water, <b>one views</b> the urine <b>as though it is water,</b> and therefore once the urine is in contact with the ritual bath it is considered connected to the water, and it is not an interposition preventing the bucket from becoming ritually pure.",
            "The mishna continues: If the impure bucket was <b>filled with water of purification,</b> the bucket is not purified <b>until the water</b> of the ritual bath that enters the bucket <b>becomes greater</b> in quantity <b>than</b> the <b>water of purification</b> it contains, thereby nullifying it in a majority.",
            "The Gemara explains the contradiction: <b>Whom have you heard who accepts</b> this reasoning of: <b>One views,</b> which appears in this mishna with regard to urine? It is <b>Rabbi Yehuda,</b> as stated in the <i>baraita</i> cited above. <b>And</b> yet the mishna <b>teaches that a majority suffices</b> to nullify the water of purification that became mixed with water, and it is not considered as though it is red wine. This conflicts with the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to white wine and milk.",
            "<b>Abaye says:</b> This is <b>not difficult;</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>this</b> statement, that the water of purification is nullified in a majority of water, is <b>his,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yehuda’s, own opinion, whereas <b>that</b> statement, in the <i>baraita</i>, that white wine is not nullified in a majority of water, is <b>his teacher’s</b> ruling, i.e., that of Rabban Gamliel, who is stringent with regard to a mixture of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabban Gamliel: Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says</b> there is a different resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna that states that water of purification is nullified in a majority of water of a ritual bath and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the <i>baraita</i> with regard to white wine mixed with water: In the mishna, <b>we are dealing with a bucket whose internal</b> surface is <b>ritually pure, and</b> only <b>its external</b> surface is <b>impure.</b> The significance of this is <b>that by</b> Torah <b>law it suffices for</b> the water of the ritual bath to enter the bucket <b>in any amount</b> to purify its external surface, and therefore the water of purification in the bucket does not prevent the purification of the bucket at all.",
            "Rava continues: <b>And it is the Sages who decreed with regard to</b> this case that the internal surface must be purified as well, <b>lest</b> the owner wish to <b>spare</b> the water of purification <b>and not</b> to <b>nullify</b> it from its sanctity. In that case he would wish to avoid allowing water from the ritual bath to enter the vessel, and might immerse it in a manner which would not allow even the full external surface to come in contact with the water. Therefore, the Sages required that one immerse the entire vessel. <b>But once there is a majority</b> of water in the bucket from the ritual bath, he does <b>not need</b> to enable any more water to enter the vessel, as by Torah law it is already pure.",
            "§ <b>Rava says,</b> in summary of these <i>halakhot</i>: <b>The Sages said that</b> the status of an item in a mixture is determined <b>by the taste,</b> i.e., if the taste of one substance is noticeable in a mixture with another substance it is not nullified, <b>and the Sages said</b> that a prohibited item is nullified <b>by the majority, and the Sages</b> also <b>said</b> that the status of an item in a mixture is determined <b>by the appearance,</b> i.e., if the appearance of a substance is recognizable in a mixture it is not nullified. Rava elaborates: With regard to <b>a type</b> of food mixed <b>with</b> food <b>not</b> of <b>its</b> own <b>type,</b> the nullification is determined <b>by the taste.</b> In the case of <b>a type</b> of food mixed <b>with</b> food of <b>its</b> own <b>type,</b> the nullification is determined <b>by the majority.</b> In a case <b>where there is</b> a possibility to determine the status of an item based on <b>appearance,</b> the nullification is <b>by appearance.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the opinion of Reish Lakish that prohibited items, such as <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and ritually impure meat, nullify one another. The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> Reish Lakish <b>disagrees</b> with the statement <b>of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: Just as</b> items used in the performance of <b>mitzvot do not nullify one another,</b> despite the fact that one is of greater volume than the other or imparts flavor to it, <b>so too,</b> items to which <b>prohibitions</b> apply <b>do not nullify one another.</b>",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>Whom did you hear who says</b> that items used in the performance of <b>mitzvot do not nullify one another? It is Hillel, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>They said about Hillel the Elder that</b> when eating the Paschal offering, <i>matza</i>, and bitter herbs on the first night of Passover, <b>he would wrap them</b> all <b>at once and eat them</b> together, <b>because it is stated</b> with regard to the Paschal offering: <b>“They shall eat it with <i>matzot</i> and bitter herbs”</b> (Numbers 9:11), which indicates that these three foods should be eaten together. Hillel was not concerned that the taste of the bitter herbs would nullify the taste of the <i>matza</i>."
        ],
        [
            "§ The Gemara continues its discussion of cases involving a mixture of one substance in contact with the same type of substance, in which according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna the prohibited substance is not nullified. <b>The Sages taught</b> a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 5:3): In a case where <b>a broken earthenware</b> flask had absorbed the urine <b>of a <i>zav</i> or a <i>zava</i>,</b> whose urine is a primary source of ritual impurity, which imparts impurity to one who carries it, in such a case, if one poured water into this flask to clean it, after the <b>first time and</b> the <b>second</b> time one washed it, it remains <b>ritually impure,</b> but after the <b>third</b> time it is <b>ritually pure,</b> as the impure urine has been expelled from the flask.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is said <b>when one placed water into</b> the flask. <b>But</b> if he <b>did not place water into it,</b> but instead placed the urine of a ritually pure person into it, <b>even</b> after the <b>tenth</b> time he places this urine into the flask it remains <b>ritually impure,</b> as one substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified. <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says:</b> After the <b>third</b> time, <b>even though he did not place water into it,</b> but rather urine, it is <b>ritually pure.</b> The Gemara comments: <b>Whom did you hear who says</b> that <b>a substance</b> in contact <b>with</b> the <b>same</b> type of <b>substance is not nullified? Rabbi Yehuda,</b> and therefore he is the first <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i>.",
            "<b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from another <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 4:11): With regard to <b>flax that was woven by a menstruating woman,</b> although it has absorbed the spittle of a menstruating woman, which imparts impurity by being carried, <b>one who moves it</b> remains <b>ritually pure,</b> as the spittle has dried. <b>But if</b> the flax <b>was</b> still <b>moist, one who moves it</b> is rendered <b>impure due to the liquid of her mouth,</b> i.e., the spittle of the menstruating woman. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who wets</b> the flax <b>with water</b> is rendered <b>impure due to</b> the <b>liquid of her mouth, and</b> this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>even</b> if he wet the flax <b>a great deal,</b> several times, as the water does not nullify and expel the spittle. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yehuda’s claim with regard to the broken flask that was washed with water three times.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says: Spittle is different, as it is</b> thoroughly <b>absorbed</b> and adheres to the flax, and therefore washing the flax with water does not nullify the spittle.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If blood fit for presentation <b>was mixed with the blood of unfit</b> offerings, the entire mixture <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain,</b> and similarly, if blood fit for presentation became mixed with blood of exudate, it shall be poured into the drain, whereas Rabbi Eliezer deems the mixture fit for presentation. The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to what</b> principle <b>do</b> the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Eliezer <b>disagree?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Zevid says: They disagree with regard to</b> the question of whether the Sages <b>issue</b> a rabbinic <b>decree</b> of this kind <b>with regard to the Temple. As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> the first <i>tanna</i>, <b>holds</b> that the Sages <b>issue</b> a rabbinic <b>decree</b> with regard to the Temple, and therefore one may not present this mixture of blood, lest one present a mixture that contains a majority of blood of unfit offerings or blood of exudate. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that the Sages do <b>not issue</b> a rabbinic <b>decree</b> with regard to the Temple, and consequently this mixture of blood is fit for presentation.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa says</b> that there is a different explanation of the dispute: <b>Everyone</b> agrees that the Sages <b>issue</b> a rabbinic <b>decree</b> with regard to the Temple, and therefore in a case where blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it should be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and he deems the blood permitted only if it was mixed with blood of exudate.",
            "Rav Pappa continues: <b>And here they disagree with regard to</b> the question of whether it is <b>common for blood of exudate to be greater</b> in quantity <b>than blood of the soul,</b> i.e., the blood that emerges immediately following the slaughter of the animal. One <b>Sage,</b> the first <i>tanna</i>, <b>holds</b> that this is <b>a common</b> occurrence, and therefore the Sages issued a decree concerning all mixtures of blood of exudate and blood of the soul. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that this is <b>not a common</b> occurrence, and therefore the Sages did not issue a decree concerning a mixture of this kind.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Granted, according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Pappa</b> that Rabbi Eliezer’s lenient ruling applies only to a mixture with blood of exudate, but that he concedes to the first <i>tanna</i> that if blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings it is poured down the Temple courtyard drain, <b>this</b> explanation is consistent with <b>that which</b> the mishna <b>teaches:</b> If blood fit for presentation <b>was mixed with the blood of unfit</b> offerings, it <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain;</b> if blood fit for presentation <b>was mixed with blood of exudate,</b> it <b>shall be poured into the drain.</b> In other words, the fact that the mishna separates these two cases into different clauses makes sense, as Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling applies only to one case.",
            "<b>But according to</b> the interpretation of <b>Rav Zevid</b> that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with regard to both cases, <b>let</b> the mishna <b>combine them and teach them</b> together, as follows: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings or with blood of exudate, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard, and Rabbi Eliezer deems the mixtures fit for presentation. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the wording of the mishna poses <b>a difficulty</b> to the explanation of Rav Zevid.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If <b>the blood of unblemished</b> offerings was mixed <b>with the blood of blemished</b> animals unfit for sacrifice, the entire mixture <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain.</b> This is the <i>halakha</i> when the fit and unfit blood were mixed in one vessel. By contrast, if <b>a cup</b> of the blood of a blemished offering was intermingled <b>with cups</b> of blood fit for offering and it is unclear which blood is in the cup, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> Although it is prohibited to present all the blood due to the uncertainty, <b>if</b> it happened that a priest already <b>sacrificed,</b> i.e., presented, <b>one cup,</b> the blood in <b>all</b> the other <b>cups shall be sacrificed,</b> as the blood that was presented is assumed to have come from the unfit cup in the mixture. <b>And the Rabbis say: Even</b> if the blood in <b>all</b> the cups <b>was sacrificed except for one of them,</b> the remaining blood <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain.</b>",
            "With regard to blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line circumscribing the altar, e.g., blood of a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or a peace offering, <b>that was mixed with</b> blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line, e.g., blood of a sin offering, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The priest <b>shall</b> initially <b>place</b> the blood of the mixture <b>above</b> the red line for the sake of the sin offering, <b>and I view</b> the blood that was to be placed <b>below</b> that was in fact placed <b>above as though it is water, and</b> the priest shall <b>again place</b> blood from the mixture <b>below. And the Rabbis say:</b> It <b>shall</b> all <b>be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain.</b> Even according to the Rabbis, <b>if</b> the priest <b>did not consult</b> the authorities <b>and placed</b> the blood above the red line, the offering is <b>fit,</b> and he should then place the remaining blood below the red line."
        ],
        [
            "In a case of the blood of an offering <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed</b> on the altar <b>with one placement that was mixed with</b> the blood of another offering <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed</b> on the altar <b>with one placement,</b> e.g., the blood of a firstborn offering with the blood of another firstborn offering or the blood of an animal tithe offering, the blood <b>shall be placed with one placement.</b> In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with <b>four placements</b> that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar <b>with four placements,</b> e.g., the blood of a sin offering with that of another sin offering, or the blood of a burnt offering with that of a peace offering, the blood <b>shall be placed with four placements.</b>",
            "If the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with <b>four placements</b> was mixed with the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar <b>with one placement, Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The blood <b>shall be placed with four placements. Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> The blood <b>shall be placed with one placement,</b> as the priest fulfills the requirement with one placement after the fact.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to</b> Rabbi Yehoshua: According to your opinion, the priest <b>violates</b> the prohibition of: <b>Do not diminish,</b> as it is written: “All these matters that I command you, that you shall observe to do; you shall not add thereto, nor diminish from it” (Deuteronomy 13:1). One may not diminish the number of required placements from four to one. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to</b> Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, the priest <b>violates</b> the prohibition of: <b>Do not add,</b> derived from the same verse. One may not add to the one required placement and place four.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer said to</b> Rabbi Yehoshua: The prohibition of: <b>Do not add, is stated only</b> in a case <b>where</b> the blood <b>is by itself,</b> not when it is part of a mixture. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to</b> Rabbi Eliezer: Likewise, the prohibition of: <b>Do not diminish, is stated only</b> in a case <b>where</b> the blood <b>is by itself. And Rabbi Yehoshua also said: When you placed</b> four placements, <b>you transgressed</b> the prohibition of: <b>Do not add, and you performed a direct action. When you did not place</b> four placements but only one, although <b>you transgressed</b> the prohibition of: <b>Do not diminish, you did not perform a direct action.</b> An active transgression is more severe than a passive one.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, if a cup containing the blood of blemished animals became intermingled with cups holding the blood of fit offerings, and the blood in one of the cups was sacrificed, all the remaining cups are fit. <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Eliezer permitted</b> the rest of the cups <b>only</b> if they were sacrificed <b>two</b> by <b>two,</b> as at least one of them is certainly permitted; <b>but</b> he did <b>not</b> permit them to be sacrificed <b>one</b> by <b>one,</b> as he may be found to have presented the blood of the prohibited cup by itself.",
            "<b>Rav Dimi raises an objection</b> from the mishna: <b>And the Rabbis say</b> that <b>even</b> if the blood in <b>all</b> the cups <b>was sacrificed except for</b> the blood in <b>one of them,</b> the blood <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain.</b> This indicates that even in this case, where only one cup remains, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and permits the blood in the cup to be presented. <b>Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain</b> it <b>to you: What</b> does the mishna mean when it states: Except for the blood in <b>one</b> of them? It means except for <b>one pair,</b> i.e., two cups, as even Rabbi Eliezer did not permit the presentation of the cups one by one.",
            "§ The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis was also stated above with regard to a mixture of limbs from fit and unfit offerings. The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> it is <b>necessary</b> for the mishna to teach this dispute with regard to both cases, <b>as, if it were stated</b> only <b>with regard to that</b> case of the limbs, one would have said that it is <b>in that</b> case alone that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says</b> that the rest of the limbs are sacrificed, <b>because</b> the offering’s <b>atonement,</b> i.e., the presenting of the blood, <b>has</b> already <b>been performed,</b> as the limbs are sacrificed after the blood has been presented. <b>But in this</b> case of the blood in the cups, <b>say</b> that Rabbi Eliezer <b>concedes to the Rabbis</b> that the rest of the blood is unfit to be presented.",
            "<b>And</b> conversely, <b>if</b> the dispute <b>were stated</b> only <b>with regard to this</b> case of the cups, one would have said that it is <b>in this</b> case alone that <b>the Rabbis say</b> that the blood in the rest of the cups is unfit, <b>but in that</b> case of the limbs, <b>say</b> that the Rabbis <b>concede to Rabbi Eliezer</b> that the rest of the limbs are fit to be sacrificed, as the blood has already been presented. Therefore, it is <b>necessary</b> for the mishna to state that the dispute applies in both cases.",
            "§ The Gemara continues its discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. <b>We learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (<i>Para</i> 9:1): With regard to <b>a flask</b> containing water of purification <b>into which any amount of</b> regular <b>water fell, Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The priest <b>should sprinkle two sprinklings</b> on the ritually impure person, as in this manner he ensures that he will be sprinkled with some of the water of purification; <b>but the Rabbis disqualify</b> the mixture for purification.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>Granted,</b> one can understand why <b>the Rabbis</b> disqualify the mixture, as <b>they hold</b> three opinions: They hold that <b>there is mixing,</b> i.e., when two substances are mixed together each drop is assumed to contain a bit of each of them. <b>And</b> they hold that an act of <b>sprinkling</b> of the water of purification <b>requires</b> a minimum <b>measure</b> of water of purification, and in this case each sprinkling contained some of the regular water. <b>And</b> they hold that it is of no help to sprinkle the water twice, as <b>one cannot combine sprinklings,</b> i.e., two acts of sprinkling the water of purification do not combine to render one pure. Therefore, the person is not purified.",
            "<b>But what</b> does <b>Rabbi Eliezer hold? If he holds</b> that <b>there is no mixing,</b> i.e., when two substances are mixed together each drop is not assumed to contain a bit of each of them, then even <b>if one sprinkles two sprinklings, what of it? Perhaps</b> on <b>both</b> occasions <b>he sprinkles</b> regular <b>water. Rather,</b> one must say that Rabbi Eliezer <b>holds</b> that <b>there is mixing. If he holds</b> that the act of <b>sprinkling does not require</b> a minimum <b>measure, why do I</b> need <b>two sprinklings?</b> One act of sprinkling would be enough. <b>Rather,</b> you must say that Rabbi Eliezer <b>holds</b> that the act of <b>sprinkling requires</b> a minimum <b>measure. And if</b> Rabbi Eliezer <b>holds</b> that <b>one cannot combine sprinklings,</b> then even <b>if one sprinkles two sprinklings, what of it? And alternatively,</b> if he holds that <b>one combines sprinklings, who says that</b> the two sprinklings will <b>amount to</b> the minimum <b>measure?</b> Perhaps most of the water he sprinkled was regular water.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish says: Actually,</b> Rabbi Eliezer holds that <b>there is mixing, and sprinkling requires</b> a minimum <b>measure. And here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where</b> the two types of water <b>were mixed</b> together in a ratio of <b>one to one,</b> and therefore by performing two sprinklings the priest ensures that he has sprinkled the minimum measure of one sprinkling of water of purification.",
            "<b>Rava says: Actually,</b> Rabbi Eliezer maintains that <b>there is mixing, and sprinkling does not require</b> a minimum <b>measure.</b> Consequently, it should suffice for the priest to perform one sprinkling. <b>And</b> the requirement to sprinkle twice is <b>a penalty</b> that <b>the Sages imposed, so that</b> one who mixes regular water with the water of purification <b>would not benefit from this</b> act by diluting the valuable water of purification.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi states</b> a different explanation: Rabbi Eliezer holds that <b>there is no mixing,</b> and therefore if the priest sprinkles only once there is a concern that he might not have sprinkled any water of purification at all, and therefore he <b>sprinkles two sprinklings.</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i> against Reish Lakish’s opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds that sprinkling requires a minimum measure. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer</b> that if the priest performs two sprinklings the purification ritual is valid, <b>a sprinkling of any amount renders</b> the impure person <b>ritually pure,</b> as <b>sprinkling does not require</b> a minimum <b>measure,</b> and even <b>a sprinkling</b> that contains <b>half fit</b> water <b>and half unfit</b> water renders the individual ritually pure."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara adds: <b>And furthermore,</b> one can raise another difficulty against the opinion of Rav Ashi, who maintains that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no mixing, as it <b>is taught explicitly</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood of an offering, e.g., a sin offering, <b>which is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line <b>that was mixed with</b> blood of an offering, e.g., a burnt offering, <b>which is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The priest <b>shall</b> initially <b>place</b> the blood of the mixture <b>above</b> the red line for the sake of the sin offering, and the priest should then place blood from the mixture below the red line for the sake of the burnt offering, <b>and</b> both the blood placed above and <b>the</b> blood placed <b>below count for him</b> toward the fulfillment of the mitzva.",
            "The Gemara explains the difficulty from this <i>baraita</i>: <b>And if you say</b> that <b>there is no mixing, why</b> do both of the placements <b>count for him? Perhaps he placed</b> the blood of the mixture that belongs <b>above</b> the red line <b>below</b> it, <b>and the</b> blood that belongs <b>below</b> the red line <b>above</b> it.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where there is a majority</b> of blood that is to be placed <b>above</b> the line, <b>and</b> the priest <b>placed</b> blood <b>above</b> by the <b>measure</b> of the blood in the mixture that is to be placed <b>below</b> the line, <b>and</b> slightly <b>more</b> blood. In this manner he ensures that he must have placed above the red line some of the blood that belongs there.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches: The</b> blood placed <b>below counts for him</b> toward the fulfillment of the mitzva. According to this explanation, it is possible that all the blood of the burnt offering was placed above the red line. Why, then, has he fulfilled the mitzva by placing blood below the red line? The Gemara explains: The <i>baraita</i> does not mean that it counts for the mitzva of the placing of the blood of a burnt offering below the red line; rather, it means that it counts for him <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of the sin offering, which must be poured onto the base of the altar.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest <b>placed</b> the mixed blood <b>below</b> the red line <b>and did not consult</b> the authorities, what should he do now? <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> He <b>shall again place</b> the blood <b>above</b> the red line, <b>and the</b> blood placed <b>below counts for him.</b> Once again, the difficulty is that if Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is no mixing, why does the placement count for him? Perhaps he placed the blood of the mixture that belongs above the red line below it, and the blood that belongs below the red line above it.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Here too, we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where the majority</b> of blood belongs <b>above</b> the line, <b>and</b> the priest <b>placed</b> blood <b>above</b> from the <b>measure</b> of the blood in the mixture that belongs <b>below</b> the line, <b>and</b> slightly <b>more</b> blood. Again the Gemara asks: <b>But</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches: The</b> blood placed <b>below counts for him.</b> Since it is possible that all of the blood of the burnt offering was placed above the red line, why does the blood placed below count for him? The Gemara answers that the <i>baraita</i> means it counts for him <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the sin offering.",
            "The Gemara further suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest <b>placed</b> the mixed blood <b>above and did not consult</b> the authorities, both <b>these</b> Sages <b>and those</b> Sages, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, <b>concede that he shall again place</b> the blood <b>below</b> the red line, <b>and these</b> placements <b>and those</b> placements <b>count for him.</b> If Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is no mixing, he would not concede this point, as perhaps he placed the blood that belongs below the red line above it, and the blood that belongs above, below.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Here too,</b> this is referring to a case <b>where the majority</b> of blood belongs <b>above</b> the line, <b>and</b> the priest <b>placed</b> blood <b>above</b> in the <b>measure</b> of the blood in the mixture that belongs <b>below</b> the line, <b>and</b> slightly <b>more</b> blood. In this manner he fulfills the mitzva of the blood that is to be placed above the red line alone.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches: These and those count for him,</b> not only the blood that is to be placed above. The Gemara explains: <b>Does</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teach: These</b> Sages <b>and those</b> Sages <b>concede</b> that these placements and those placements count for him? It <b>teaches</b> only: <b>These and those count for him.</b> In other words, although the <i>baraita</i> states in the first clause that both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer concede that the priest returns and places the blood below the red line, this agreement does not apply to the next clause of the <i>baraita</i>, as in <b>the latter clause we come to</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis</b> alone, <b>who say</b> that <b>there is mixing,</b> which is why both placements count.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the mishna: In a case of the blood of an offering <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed</b> on the altar <b>with one placement that was mixed with</b> the blood of another offering <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed</b> on the altar <b>with one placement,</b> the blood <b>shall be placed with one placement. And if you say</b> that according to Rabbi Eliezer <b>there is no mixing, why shall they be placed with one placement? Perhaps he places from this</b> blood <b>and does not place from that</b> blood. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case <b>where</b> the measure of <b>one</b> placement of this blood <b>was mixed with</b> the measure of <b>one</b> placement of that blood, and no more. Consequently, he certainly placed both types of blood.",
            "The Gemara raises another difficulty: The mishna teaches that in a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with <b>four placements</b> that was mixed <b>with</b> the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar <b>with four placements,</b> the blood shall be placed with four placements. But if there is no mixing, perhaps he placed only the blood of one offering. The Gemara explains: <b>Here too,</b> it is referring to a case <b>where</b> the measure of <b>four</b> placements of this blood <b>was mixed with</b> the measure of <b>four</b> placements of that blood, and therefore he certainly placed blood from both offerings.",
            "The Gemara raises another difficulty: The mishna teaches that if the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with <b>four placements</b> was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar <b>with one placement,</b> Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood shall be placed with four placements. Here too, if there is no mixing according to Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps he placed the blood of only one of the offerings."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that <b>here too,</b> the mishna is discussing a case <b>where</b> the measure of four placements <b>was mixed with</b> precisely the amount of <b>one</b> placement, and therefore the priest certainly placed some blood of both offerings, <b>if so,</b> how would one explain the clause in the mishna that states: <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said to</b> Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, doesn’t the priest <b>violate</b> the prohibition of: <b>Do not add? From where</b> is the violation of: <b>Do not add, here?</b> After all, the priest places only the measure of one placement from the offering that requires one placement.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava says:</b> Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis <b>do not disagree with regard to</b> a case of actual blood <b>mixed</b> together. <b>When they disagree</b> it is <b>with regard to</b> a case of <b>cups</b> of blood that were intermingled, and it is unknown which blood is in which cup. The explanation <b>according to Rabbi Eliezer</b> is that he <b>is of</b> the opinion that <b>one views</b> the blood that was not placed properly as though it were water, and therefore it is permitted to present the blood; whereas the explanation <b>according to the Rabbis</b> is that they <b>are not of</b> the opinion that <b>one views</b> the blood that was not placed properly as though it were water, and consequently all of it must be poured into the Temple courtyard drain.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And do they not disagree with regard to</b> blood <b>mixed</b> together? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree</b> in a case <b>of blood of a sin offering that was mixed with blood of a burnt offering that</b> the mixture <b>shall be sacrificed,</b> or <b>in</b> a case of blood that was fit for presentation that was mixed with the blood of <b>an animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, that it shall not be sacrificed.</b> The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>With regard to what</b> case <b>did they disagree? With regard to blood of an unblemished</b> animal <b>that was mixed with blood of a blemished</b> animal, <b>as Rabbi Eliezer says</b> that it <b>shall be sacrificed, whether in</b> a case of blood <b>mixed</b> together <b>or in</b> a case of <b>cups</b> intermingled, <b>and the Rabbis say</b> it <b>shall not be sacrificed.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Eliezer,</b> i.e., when Rabbi Yehuda teaches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, <b>teaches</b> that the dispute applies <b>both in</b> a case of blood <b>mixed</b> together <b>and in</b> a case of intermingled <b>cups, but the Rabbis</b> who taught the mishna maintain that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis <b>disagree</b> only <b>in</b> a case of intermingled <b>cups.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if the blood of a sin offering, which is to be placed above the red line, was mixed with blood of a burnt offering, which is to be placed below the line, Rabbi Eliezer holds that it shall all be placed above the red line, and one views the blood of the burnt offering placed there as though it is water, and subsequently the priest shall place the blood below the red line. By contrast, the Rabbis rule that all the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Concerning this, <b>Abaye says:</b> The mishna <b>taught</b> that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the blood shall be poured into the drain <b>only</b> if the <b>first</b> portion of the blood <b>of a sin offering,</b> i.e., that blood which is to be placed above the red line, <b>and</b> the blood of <b>a burnt offering</b> were mixed.",
            "<b>But</b> if the <b>final</b> portion of the blood <b>of a sin offering,</b> i.e., the remainder of the blood that is poured onto the base of the altar (see Leviticus 4:25), <b>and</b> the blood of <b>a burnt offering</b> were mixed, <b>everyone agrees</b> that since <b>the place</b> of the blood <b>of a burnt offering,</b> below the red line, is the same as <b>the place of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a sin offering, as the remainder of the blood of a sin offering is poured on the base of the altar, the priest shall place all the blood on the side of the altar below the red line. <b>Rav Yosef said to</b> Abaye: <b>This is what Rav Yehuda says:</b> The places are not the same, as the <b>remainder</b> of blood <b>needs</b> to be placed on the <b>bench,</b> i.e., on the upper horizontal surface of the base itself, and not on the side of the altar as is the case with the blood of a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara notes that <i>amora’im</i> of Eretz Yisrael disagreed in the same manner as Abaye and Rav Yosef: <b>And likewise Rabbi Shimon</b> ben Lakish <b>says:</b> The mishna <b>taught</b> that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the blood shall be poured into the drain <b>only</b> if the <b>first</b> portion of the blood <b>of a sin offering and</b> the blood of <b>a burnt offering</b> were mixed. <b>But</b> if the <b>final</b> portion of the blood <b>of a sin offering and</b> the blood of <b>a burnt offering</b> were mixed, <b>everyone agrees</b> that since <b>the place</b> of the blood <b>of a burnt offering</b> is the same as <b>the place of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a sin offering, the priest shall place all the blood on the side of the altar below the red line. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say</b> it was <b>Rabbi Elazar</b> who says: This case of the remainder of blood of a sin offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering <b>is still</b> included in the <b>dispute</b> between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.",
            "<b>Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to firstborn animals: <b>“They are holy”</b> (Numbers 18:17). The emphasis of the term “they” serves to teach <b>that</b> even <b>if</b> the blood of a firstborn offering <b>was mixed with blood of other sacrificial</b> animals, the blood <b>shall be sacrificed,</b> as the blood of firstborn offerings is not nullified. <b>What, is it not</b> referring even to a case of the <b>final</b> portion of the blood <b>of a burnt offering and</b> the blood of <b>a firstborn</b> offering that were mixed, indicating that the priest places the mixture below the red line? <b>And</b> if so, one can <b>learn from</b> this <i>baraita</i> that <b>the place</b> of the blood <b>of a burnt offering,</b> which is also the place of the blood of a firstborn offering, is the same as <b>the place of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of blood of a sin offering. The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the <b>first</b> part of the blood <b>of a burnt offering and</b> the blood of <b>a firstborn</b> offering.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> if so, <b>what is</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>teaching us?</b> Is it teaching that the blood of offerings <b>that ascend</b> to the altar <b>do not nullify one another? This</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>is</b> already <b>derived from</b> the verse: <b>“And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat”</b> (Leviticus 16:18), from which it is understood that although the blood of the two animals is in the same vessel, they each retain their distinct identity. The Gemara answers: This <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as <b>there is</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>who derives</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from here, and there is</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>who derives it from there.</b>",
            "<b>Rava raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i> that discusses a verse describing a burnt offering: <b>“And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood”</b> (Leviticus 1:5). The superfluous second mention of the blood teaches that it is still called the blood of a burnt offering even after it was mixed with other blood, and therefore it should be sprinkled in its proper manner. <b>What</b> does it mean when"
        ],
        [
            "<b>the verse states</b> twice: <b>“Blood,” “blood”?</b> The <i>baraita</i> explains: If “blood” were written only once, one <b>might</b> have thought: <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that this <i>halakha</i> was stated with regard to a case <b>where this,</b> i.e., the blood of a burnt offering, <b>was mixed with</b> the blood of <b>its substitute, as even</b> if these offerings were intermingled <b>when</b> the animals were <b>alive,</b> the burnt offering and its substitute <b>shall be sacrificed. From where</b> is it derived <b>to include</b> even a case of the blood of <b>a thanks offering or a peace offering</b> that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as these offerings are not sacrificed if they became intermingled with a burnt offering while alive?",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: And even if one says: <b>I include</b> in this first mention of blood the case of the blood of <b>a thanks offering or a peace offering</b> that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, <b>as</b> they are similar in that <b>they</b> both <b>come as a vow</b> offering <b>and a gift</b> offering, <b>like</b> a burnt offering, <b>from where</b> is it derived <b>to include</b> even a case of the blood of <b>the guilt offering</b> that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as a guilt offering cannot be brought as a vow offering or a gift offering?",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: And even if one says: <b>I include</b> in this first mention of blood even a case of the blood of <b>the guilt offering</b> that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, <b>as</b> they are similar in that a guilt offering <b>requires</b> the <b>placement of</b> two placements that are <b>four, like</b> a burnt offering, <b>from where</b> is it derived that the same applies to the blood of <b>a firstborn</b> offering, <b>and</b> the animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>and</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> whose blood is placed once on the altar? Therefore, <b>the verse states</b> twice: <b>“Blood,” “blood.”</b> This repetition serves to teach that in any case where the blood of a burnt offering became mixed with the blood of another offering that is placed below the red line, this blood is presented.",
            "The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: <b>What, is it not</b> referring even to a case of the <b>final</b> portion of the blood <b>of a burnt offering and</b> the blood of <b>a firstborn</b> offering that were mixed? <b>And</b> if so, one can <b>learn from</b> this <i>baraita</i> that the <b>place</b> of the blood <b>of a burnt offering</b> is the same as the <b>place of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a firstborn offering.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the <b>first</b> part of the blood <b>of a burnt offering and</b> the blood of <b>a firstborn</b> offering. <b>But</b> if so, <b>what is</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>teaching us?</b> Is it teaching that the blood of offerings that <b>ascend</b> to the altar <b>do not nullify one another?</b> This <i>halakha</i> is already <b>derived from</b> the verse: <b>“And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat”</b> (Leviticus 16:18). The Gemara explains: This <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as <b>there is</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>who derives</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from here, and there is</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>who derives it from there.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara has cited three different verses as the source for the <i>halakha</i> that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17); “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18); “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The Gemara notes: <b>And these</b> other <b><i>tanna’im</i> do not derive</b> this principle <b>from</b> the verse: <b>“And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat,”</b> as <b>they maintain</b> that the High Priest <b>does not mix</b> the blood of the bull with the blood of the goat in order <b>to</b> place the blood on the <b>corners</b> of the golden altar; rather, each type of blood is placed separately. Additionally, these other <i>tanna’im</i> <b>do not derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the repeated mention of: <b>“Blood,” “blood,”</b> as <b>they do not learn</b> anything from this repetition.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But what is the reason</b> that those other <i>tanna’im</i> <b>do not derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the verse: <b>“They are holy”</b> (Numbers 18:17)? The Gemara explains: <b>They hold</b> that the verse should be understood as follows: <b>“They are holy,”</b> i.e., <b>they,</b> the firstborn offerings themselves, <b>are sacrificed, but their substitutes are not sacrificed.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, i.e., the <i>tanna</i> who derives the <i>halakha</i> that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another from the verse: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17), from where does he learn that the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed? The Gemara explains: He <b>derives it from</b> the verse: <b>“Whether it be ox or sheep, it is the Lord’s”</b> (Leviticus 27:26). The emphasis of “it is” teaches that <b>it is sacrificed but its substitute is not sacrificed.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of whether the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place for the remainder of the blood of offerings. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood that is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood that is to be placed below the line, which according to the Rabbis must be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, if the priest <b>placed</b> the mixed blood <b>above and did not consult</b> the authorities, both <b>these</b> Sages <b>and those</b> Sages, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, <b>concede that he shall again place</b> the blood <b>below</b> the red line, and <b>these</b> placements <b>and those</b> placements <b>count for him.</b>",
            "The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: <b>What, is it not</b> referring to a case <b>where</b> the blood of <b>a sin offering and a burnt offering were mixed? And once</b> the priest <b>placed</b> blood of the sin offering <b>above</b> the red line, that which is left from the blood of the sin offering <b>is</b> considered the <b>remainder</b> of the blood. <b>And</b> yet the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches:</b> Both <b>these</b> Sages <b>and those</b> Sages <b>concede that he shall again place</b> the blood <b>below</b> the red line. <b>And</b> if so, one can <b>learn from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that the <b>place</b> of the blood <b>of a burnt offering</b> is the same as the <b>place of</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a sin offering.",
            "The Gemara relates: <b>When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, <b>he said</b> that <b>they say in the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael: <b>What are we dealing with here?</b> We are dealing not with a mixture of blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering, but with a case <b>where</b> the blood of <b>a sin offering</b> sacrificed on <b>the external</b> altar, which is placed above the red line, <b>was mixed with</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary. This remainder is poured on the base of the external altar. Consequently, once the priest has placed blood from the mixture above the red line, all that remains is a mixture of remainders, which are placed in the same location.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef: Why is it necessary to cite the case of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary? <b>But let the Master say</b> that it is referring to a case <b>where</b> the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar <b>was mixed with</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar. <b>Perhaps</b> you chose that case to indicate that <b>this</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us: Even according to the one who says</b> that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, nevertheless, if the remainder was merely <b>lacking,</b> as in this case, as some of the blood had been placed above the red line, this does <b>not disqualify</b> the offering.",
            "<b>Rava Tosfa’a said to Ravina:</b> How can that <i>baraita</i> be cited as proof for the issue at hand? <b>We</b> already <b>interpreted it</b> (80b) <b>with regard to</b> a mixture of blood that is to be placed above the red line with blood that is to be placed below the red line, which contains <b>a majority</b> of blood that is to be placed <b>above</b> the line, <b>and</b> the priest <b>places above</b> the red line <b>a measure</b> of blood that is to be placed <b>below</b> the line <b>and</b> slightly <b>more.</b> Ravina <b>said to him: That statement</b> applies <b>according to those who said initially</b> that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a mixture of blood, and that Rabbi Eliezer holds that <b>there is no mixing.</b> But according to <b>the conclusion,</b> Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis <b>disagree with regard to cups</b> of blood that were intermingled, and therefore the above interpretation of the <i>baraita</i> was rejected.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> Blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed</b> on three locations <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, i.e., between the staves, on the Curtain, and on the golden altar, <b>that was mixed with</b> blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary on the external altar in the Temple courtyard, has no remedy, as one may not change the location of the placement of the blood of one to fulfill his obligation with the other type of blood. Therefore, all the blood <b>shall be poured into the</b> Temple courtyard <b>drain.</b> If the priest, on his own initiative, <b>placed</b> the mixture of blood <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>and again placed</b> the mixture of blood <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, the offering is <b>fit.</b>",
            "If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>and again placed</b> the mixture of blood <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>Rabbi Akiva deems</b> the blood placed outside <b>disqualified, and the Rabbis deem</b> it <b>fit. As Rabbi Akiva says: Any blood</b> that is to be presented outside <b>that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified; but the Rabbis say:</b> That is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood of an external <b>sin offering alone,</b> as it is written: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The status of <b>a guilt offering</b> is like that of a sin offering <b>as well, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”</b> (Leviticus 7:7), i.e., there is one <i>halakha</i> for them. That is not the case with regard to the blood of other offerings.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary was mixed with blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary, all the blood should be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and there is no opposing opinion recorded in the mishna. The Gemara asks: <b>And let Rabbi Eliezer disagree</b> even <b>with regard to this</b> case, just as he disagrees with regard to a mixture of blood that is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood that is to be placed below the red line, where he holds that the improperly placed blood is considered as though it were water.",
            "The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer does not disagree in this case, as <b>how should</b> the priest <b>act?</b> If one says that he <b>should</b> first <b>place</b> blood from the mixture on the altar <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>and again place</b> blood from the mixture <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, this is not allowed. <b>Just as</b> it is <b>a mitzva to give precedence</b> to the blood that is to be placed <b>above</b> the red line <b>over</b> the blood that is to be placed <b>below</b> the line, e.g., the presentation of the blood of a sin offering precedes the presentation of the blood of a burnt offering, since a sin offering serves to effect atonement, <b>so too</b> is it <b>a mitzva to give precedence</b> to the blood that is to be placed <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>over</b> blood that is to be placed <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And</b> if you suggest that the priest <b>should</b> first <b>place</b> blood from the mixture <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>and again place</b> blood <b>outside,</b> on the altar, although this resolution is applicable to most offerings whose blood is placed outside, nevertheless the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna chose to omit this case. The reason is that <b>since there are a sin offering and a guilt offering,</b> concerning <b>which,</b> according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, <b>when their blood enters</b> the Sanctuary <b>they are disqualified</b> from being placed on the external altar, the <i>tanna</i> could <b>not</b> teach this <i>halakha</i> <b>categorically.</b> In other words, as the <i>tanna</i> could not issue a categorical ruling that applies to all types of offerings, he omitted the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer here.",
            "§ The mishna teaches <b>that Rabbi Akiva would say:</b> Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified. The Gemara discusses the source for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling. The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). How does Rabbi Akiva apply this <i>halakha</i> to all offerings whose blood is presented on the external altar? <b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says:</b> Hear <b>a parable: To what is this matter comparable? To a student who mixed</b> wine <b>with hot water for his teacher. And</b> the teacher <b>said to him: Mix</b> another drink <b>for me.</b> The student <b>said to him: With what</b> should I mix the wine, hot or cold water? The teacher <b>said to him: Aren’t we dealing with hot</b> water? <b>Now</b> that I requested that you mix me another cup, I mean that you should mix it <b>either in hot</b> water <b>or in cold.</b> Otherwise, the teacher would not have needed to say anything.",
            "<b>Here too, since we have been dealing with a sin offering</b> in that passage (see Leviticus 6:17–22), <b>why do I</b> need the term <b>“sin offering” that the Merciful One writes</b> in this verse? Even without this term it is clear that the Torah is referring to a sin offering. <b>Rather,</b> as in the parable, the Torah mentions a sin offering to teach: <b>I do not say this</b> <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a sin offering</b> alone, i.e., that only the blood of a sin offering is disqualified when it is brought inside the Sanctuary, <b>but</b> the blood of <b>all sacrificial</b> animals is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this</b> explanation: Accordingly, one should reach the opposite conclusion: <b>Since all sacrificial</b> animals that are sacrificed <b>on the altar are included</b> in this passage of the Torah <b>with regard to scouring and rinsing,</b> as derived by the Sages, despite the fact that this requirement is stated in connection with a sin offering (see Leviticus 6:21), it is already established that this chapter is speaking of all offerings. Consequently, <b>why do I</b> need the term <b>“sin offering” that the Merciful One writes</b> with regard to the matter of blood that entered the Sanctuary? <b>Learn from</b> the verse that in the case of <b>a sin offering</b> whose blood entered the Sanctuary, <b>yes,</b> it is disqualified, but if the blood of any <b>other</b> offering entered the Sanctuary, <b>no,</b> it is not disqualified.",
            "Rav Huna addresses Shmuel’s parable: <b>And</b> if you wish to provide a comparison, it <b>is comparable only to a student who</b> initially <b>mixed</b> wine <b>for his teacher with both hot and cold</b> water, and <b>his teacher</b> then <b>said to him: Mix</b> wine <b>for me only</b> with <b>hot</b> water.",
            "Rav Huna continues: <b>Rather, the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva</b> is <b>from</b> the fact that the verse does not state simply: <b>“Sin offering,” but</b> states: <b>“Any sin offering”;</b> this serves to include all other offerings. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And any <b>sin offering,</b> whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). <b>I have</b> derived that this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>only</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering; from where</b> is it derived that it also applies to <b>offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And from where</b> is it derived that it also applies to <b>offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>Even</b> if <b>you include</b> offerings in this manner from the verse <b>all day long, I</b> will <b>not listen to you. Rather,</b> this verse is referring to a sin offering alone, and it should be expounded as follows: The verse states: <b>“Sin offering”; I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that this <i>halakha</i> applies to <b>the sin offering of an individual. From where</b> is it derived that the same applies to <b>a communal sin offering? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And</b> one can still say: <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that this <i>halakha</i> applies to <b>a male sin offering; from where</b> is it derived that the same applies to <b>a female sin offering? The verse states: “And any</b> sin offering.”",
            "The Gemara asks: Why is it assumed that the application of this <i>halakha</i> to a male sin offering is more obvious than to a female sin offering? <b>Isn’t it the opposite [<i>kelapei layya</i>],</b> as the standard sin offering of an individual is a female? <b>Rather, this</b> is what Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>is saying:</b> One can still ask: <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that this <i>halakha</i> applies to <b>a female sin offering; from where</b> is it derived that the same applies to <b>a male sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili hold</b> that <b>this verse comes for this</b> purpose, to teach the <i>halakha</i> of sin offerings whose blood was brought inside the Sanctuary? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: As we have found the entire matter</b> that is stated in the verse: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23), is not stated with regard to a standard sin offering improperly brought inside the Sanctuary; rather, it <b>speaks only about bulls that are burned and goats that are burned.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yosei HaGelili elaborates: These are unique sin offerings, and the Torah states that their blood should be brought inside the Sanctuary. The verse is stated with regard to these sin offerings both in order to command the Jewish people <b>to burn their disqualified ones in the Temple and</b> in order <b>to establish a prohibition with regard to their consumption.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If you expound the verse in this fashion, then <b>from where</b> is it derived that a standard <b>sin offering whose blood entered the innermost sanctum,</b> the Holy of Holies, must be burned? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>said to them</b> that it is derived from the verse: <b>“Behold, its blood was not brought</b> into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the sin offering referred to in the verse been brought inside the Sanctuary, it should have been burned. In any event, with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse from Leviticus 6:23 in this manner, how can he interpret it differently in his dispute with Rabbi Akiva?",
            "The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>spoke according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva,</b> i.e., although Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse in a different manner, according to Rabbi Akiva’s explanation it should be understood as referring only to a sin offering, not to other offerings.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>a sin offering</b> whose blood placement is on the external altar <b>whose blood</b> the priest <b>collected in two cups,</b> if <b>one of them left</b> the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, <b>the</b> cup that remained <b>inside</b> the courtyard is <b>fit</b> to be presented. If <b>one of the</b> cups <b>entered inside</b> the Sanctuary and was thereby disqualified, <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems</b> the blood <b>in the</b> cup that remained <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, <b>fit</b> to be presented, <b>and the Rabbis deem it disqualified</b> from being presented.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said</b> in support of his opinion: The <i>halakha</i> is that if one slaughters an offering with the intent that its blood be presented outside of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified, but if his intention was that the blood be presented inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not disqualified. <b>Just as in</b> a case where part of the blood reached <b>a place where the intent</b> to present the blood there <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, i.e., <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, and yet when some of the blood is taken there it <b>does not render the</b> status of the <b>remaining</b> blood disqualified <b>like</b> that of blood that <b>leaves</b> the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached <b>a place where the intent</b> to present the blood there <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering, i.e., <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>is it not logical that we will not deem</b> the status of <b>the remaining</b> blood <b>like</b> that of blood that <b>entered</b> the Sanctuary?",
            "The mishna continues: If all of the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar <b>entered</b> the Sanctuary <b>to atone</b> through sprinkling, <b>despite</b> the fact <b>that</b> the priest <b>did not</b> actually sprinkle the blood to <b>atone,</b> the offering is <b>disqualified;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The offering is disqualified <b>only when he atones</b> and sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If he took</b> the blood <b>into</b> the Sanctuary <b>unwittingly,</b> the blood remains <b>fit</b> to be presented.",
            "With regard to <b>all the blood disqualified</b> for presentation <b>that was placed on the altar, the frontplate effects acceptance only</b> for offerings sacrificed <b>that</b> are <b>ritually impure.</b> Although it is written with regard to the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the sacred matters” (Exodus 28:38), this does not apply to all disqualifications of offerings. This is <b>because the frontplate effects acceptance for</b> offerings sacrificed <b>that</b> are <b>ritually impure but does not effect acceptance for</b> offerings <b>that leave</b> the courtyard.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis as to whether the blood of a sin offering in a second cup is disqualified if the blood in the first cup entered the Sanctuary, it <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said:</b> This is <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as in</b> a case where part of the blood reached <b>a place where</b> the <b>intent</b> to present the blood there <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, i.e., <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, and yet that <b>blood that</b> was taken <b>outside does not disqualify</b> the blood that is still <b>inside</b> the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached <b>a place where</b> the <b>intent</b> to present the blood there <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering, i.e., <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>is it not logical that</b> the <b>blood that</b> was taken <b>inside will not disqualify</b> the blood <b>that</b> is still <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary?",
            "The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: <b>But</b> the verse <b>states:</b> “And any sin offering, <b>whereof any of the blood is brought</b> into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that <b>even</b> if <b>part of its blood</b> is brought inside the Sanctuary, the sin offering is disqualified.",
            "Rabbi Yosei HaGelili <b>said to</b> the Rabbis: If you expound the verse in that manner, then <b>from now</b> one can derive <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>with regard to the</b> blood that <b>leaves</b> the courtyard: <b>And just as in</b> a case where part of the blood reached <b>a place where</b> the <b>intent</b> to present the blood there <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering, i.e., <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary, the <b>blood that</b> was taken <b>inside disqualifies</b> the blood that is still <b>outside,</b> i.e., in the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached <b>a place where</b> the <b>intent</b> to present the blood there <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, i.e., <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>is it not logical that</b> the <b>blood that</b> was taken <b>outside will disqualify</b> the blood <b>that</b> is still <b>inside</b> the courtyard? Why do the Rabbis deem this blood fit?",
            "The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili in response: <b>But</b> the verse <b>states:</b> “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood <b>is brought</b> into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This teaches that only blood <b>that enters</b> the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the blood in the courtyard, <b>but</b> the blood <b>that leaves</b> the courtyard <b>does not disqualify</b> the blood in the courtyard.",
            "In light of this discussion, the Gemara asks: <b>And let intent</b> to present the blood <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>disqualify</b> the offering <b>based on an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as in a place where</b> the part of the <b>blood that</b> went <b>outside does not disqualify</b> the rest of the blood <b>that is inside</b> the courtyard, and yet <b>intent</b> to present the blood in this place <b>disqualifies</b> the offering, i.e., <b>outside</b> the courtyard, so too, in <b>a place where</b> the part of the <b>blood that</b> went <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the rest of the blood <b>that is outside</b> the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, <b>is it not logical that intent</b> to present the blood in this place <b>will disqualify</b> the offering, i.e., <b>inside</b> the courtyard?",
            "The Gemara explains that one does not derive this <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the verse <b>states:</b> “And if it be eaten at all <b>on the third day,</b> it is <i>piggul</i>; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), and the Sages expounded this verse with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of intent while slaughtering an offering."
        ],
        [
            "This verse teaches that the <b>place where</b> improper intent disqualifies the offering <b>must be triply</b> functional: <b>For</b> the presenting of <b>the blood, for</b> the eating of <b>the meat,</b> and <b>for</b> the burning of <b>the sacrificial portions</b> of the offering that are consumed on the altar. In other words, it must be outside its designated place with regard to all three of these issues. Consequently, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary does not disqualify the blood.",
            "The Gemara suggests the opposite: <b>And</b> if so, <b>let intent</b> to present the blood <b>outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>not disqualify</b> the offering <b>based on an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as</b> in <b>a place where</b> the part of the <b>blood that</b> went <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the rest of the blood <b>that is outside</b> in the courtyard, and yet <b>intent</b> to present the blood <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering, so too, in <b>a place where</b> the part of the <b>blood that</b> went <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>does not disqualify</b> the rest of the blood <b>that is inside</b> the courtyard, <b>is it not logical that intent</b> to present the blood <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering?",
            "The Gemara answers that <b>the verse states:</b> “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is <i>piggul</i>; it shall not be accepted,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as follows: “On the <b>third</b> day” is referring to intent to perform its rites <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time;</b> “it is <b><i>piggul</i>”</b> is referring to intent to perform its rites <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b>",
            "A <i>baraita</i> teaches: The <b>meat</b> of offerings <b>that left</b> its designated area and was taken <b>to</b> a place that is <b>outside</b> its designated area for consumption, which is outside the wall of Jerusalem in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity and outside the wall of the Temple courtyard in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, is <b>disqualified</b> from being eaten. By contrast, meat of offerings <b>that entered inside</b> the Sanctuary is not disqualified and remains <b>fit</b> to be eaten.",
            "One might have thought <b>that it should be</b> derived <b>based on a logical inference that</b> this meat is <b>disqualified,</b> as follows: <b>And just as in a place where</b> the part of the <b>blood that</b> went <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>does not disqualify</b> the rest of the blood <b>that</b> remained <b>inside</b> the courtyard, yet <b>meat that leaves</b> and is taken <b>outside</b> the courtyard is <b>disqualified,</b> so too, in <b>a place where</b> the part of the <b>blood that</b> went <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the rest of the blood <b>that is outside</b> the Sanctuary, <b>is it not right that meat that enters</b> the Sanctuary <b>should be disqualified?</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> explains that one does not derive this inference, as the verse <b>states:</b> “And any sin offering, whereof any <b>of the blood</b> is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), which indicates that the <b>blood of</b> an offering that is brought inside is disqualified, <b>but not meat</b> that enters the Sanctuary.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>From now,</b> as it has been established that the meat of offerings that is brought inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified, one can suggest <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>And just as in a place where blood that</b> went <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>disqualifies</b> the blood <b>that</b> remained <b>outside</b> in the courtyard, and yet <b>meat that enters</b> the Sanctuary is <b>fit,</b> therefore, in <b>a place where</b> the <b>blood that</b> went <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>does not disqualify</b> the blood <b>that is inside</b> the courtyard, <b>is it not logical that meat that left</b> and was taken <b>outside</b> the courtyard should be <b>fit?</b>",
            "The Gemara explains that one does not derive this <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the verse <b>states: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field”</b> (Exodus 22:30). The apparently superfluous term “in the field” teaches a general <i>halakha</i>: <b>Once meat has left</b> and been removed <b>outside of its boundary,</b> i.e., the area in which it is permitted to consume it, it <b>has become prohibited.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the blood of a sin offering that entered the Sanctuary. <b>The Sages taught:</b> It is stated that when Moses questioned Aaron as to why a sin offering was not consumed, he said: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place <b>within”</b> (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the blood been brought within, Moses would have understood that the offering would have been disqualified and rendered prohibited for consumption. The <i>baraita</i> comments: <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that the offering is disqualified if the blood is brought <b>within,</b> i.e., into the Holy of Holies; <b>from where</b> is it derived that the same applies if it was merely brought into the <b>Sanctuary? The verse states: “Into the sacred place within,”</b> and this sacred place is the Sanctuary.",
            "The Gemara questions this derivation: <b>And let</b> the verse <b>state</b> only <b>“sacred place,” and</b> it need <b>not state “within.”</b> If blood that entered the Sanctuary is already disqualified, this <i>halakha</i> certainly applies if it was brought farther inside, to the Holy of Holies. <b>Rava says: This</b> verse <b>comes and teaches about that</b> verse. In other words, had the verse stated only “sacred place,” it would have been interpreted as referring to the Holy of Holies. The addition of “within” indicates that this sacred place is the Sanctuary, while the term “within” is referring to the Holy of Holies. The Gemara cites a similar example: This is <b>just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker.</b>",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> concerning <i>teruma</i>: The verse states: “A tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated” (Leviticus 22:10). <b>“A tenant”; this</b> is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been <b>acquired</b> as <b>a permanent acquisition,</b> i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. <b>“A hired worker”; this</b> is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been <b>acquired</b> for <b>an acquisition of</b> six <b>years,</b> the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> asks: <b>Let</b> the verse <b>say “tenant” and let it not say “hired worker,” and I</b> would <b>say:</b> If one who is <b>acquired</b> as <b>a permanent acquisition does not partake</b> of his master’s, i.e., the priest’s, <i>teruma</i>, as despite his status as a slave he is not considered his master’s property, is it <b>not all the more so</b> logical that one who is <b>acquired</b> for <b>an acquisition of</b> six <b>years</b> should not be permitted to partake of <i>teruma</i>?",
            "The <i>baraita</i> answers: <b>If so,</b> that the verse were stated in this manner, <b>I would say: “A tenant”; this is</b> one who was <b>acquired</b> for <b>an acquisition of</b> six <b>years,</b> as the term itself is ambiguous, <b>but</b> one who was <b>acquired</b> as <b>a permanent acquisition may partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, the term <b>“hired worker,”</b> which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, <b>comes and teaches about</b> the meaning of the term <b>“tenant,” that this</b> one was <b>acquired</b> as <b>a permanent acquisition and that</b> one was <b>acquired</b> for <b>an acquisition of</b> six <b>years, and</b> both this one and that one <b>may not partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. Similar reasoning applies in the above case concerning the terms “sacred place” and “within.”",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rava: Are these cases comparable? <b>Granted, there,</b> the tenant and the hired worker <b>are two bodies. And</b> this is significant, as <b>even though the verse could have written</b> explicitly that <b>a pierced</b> tenant <b>may not partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, from which the <i>halakha</i> of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, <b>and the other</b> case, that of a slave for six years, is therefore <b>a matter that can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, it need not be stated explicitly. Nevertheless, there is a principle: At times, with regard to <b>a matter that can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, the <b>verse</b> nevertheless <b>takes the trouble and writes it</b> explicitly. <b>But here,</b> the same blood enters the Holy of Holies via the Sanctuary, and <b>once it is disqualified in the Sanctuary, why is it necessary</b> for the verse to teach that this blood is disqualified when it enters <b>the innermost sanctum,</b> the Holy of Holies?",
            "<b>Rather, Abaye says:</b> This mention of “within” <b>is necessary only for</b> a case where the blood entered the Holy of Holies not via the Sanctuary but in <b>a roundabout manner,</b> e.g., from the roof or the loft of the Holy of Holies, without having entered the Sanctuary. <b>Rava said to</b> Abaye: <b>But</b> an expression of <b>bringing is written in</b> the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within,” which indicates a standard manner of bringing it into the Holy of Holies. <b>Rather, Rava says:</b> In <b>any</b> circumstance <b>where</b> the priest <b>intended</b> to bring the blood inside <b>the innermost sanctum, it is not disqualified</b> when it is only <b>in the Sanctuary,</b> and therefore it was necessary for the verse to teach both disqualifications.",
            "§ <b>Rava raises a dilemma:</b> With regard to the <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin and</b> the <b>goat for</b> a sin of <b>idol worship,</b> whose blood should be presented in the Sanctuary, if it occurred <b>that</b> the priest <b>brought their blood into the innermost sanctum, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: <b>Do we say</b> that since the verse states: <b>“Into the sacred place within”</b> (Leviticus 10:18) as a single phrase, and therefore <b>anywhere that we read</b> a prohibition against bringing the blood <b>“into the sacred place,”</b> i.e., that the blood is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary, <b>we</b> also <b>read</b> a prohibition against bringing the blood <b>“within,”</b> i.e., that it is likewise disqualified when it is brought into the Holy of Holies; but <b>anywhere that we do not read</b> a prohibition against bringing the blood <b>“into the sacred place,”</b> such as with regard to these offerings, whose blood is supposed to be brought into the Sanctuary, <b>we do not read</b> a prohibition against bringing the blood <b>“within”</b> the Holy of Holies? <b>Or perhaps,</b> since in any event the Holy of Holies <b>is not the</b> proper <b>place</b> for the blood <b>of these</b> offerings, it is disqualified.",
            "<b>And if you say that</b> the Holy of Holies <b>is not the</b> proper <b>place</b> for the blood <b>of these</b> offerings and they are therefore disqualified, one can raise another dilemma: In the case of the <b>bull and goat of Yom Kippur, where</b> the High Priest <b>sprinkled from their blood on the staves</b> of the Ark, as required (see Leviticus 16:14), <b>and he brought</b> their remaining blood <b>out to the Sanctuary and</b> subsequently <b>brought</b> it <b>in</b> again to the Holy of Holies, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is the blood disqualified by this improper second entrance into the Holy of Holies?",
            "Rava explains the sides of the question: <b>Do we say</b> that <b>it is its place,</b> as the High Priest is supposed to bring this blood into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur at some point? <b>Or perhaps</b> one should say that <b>since</b> the High Priest has performed the mitzva and the blood has been <b>brought out,</b> it has been <b>brought out,</b> and the Holy of Holies is no longer considered its place.",
            "<b>And if you say that since</b> the blood has been <b>brought out,</b> it has been <b>brought out,</b> one can raise another dilemma: If the High Priest <b>sprinkled from their blood on the</b> Sanctuary <b>Curtain</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> then <b>brought out</b> the blood <b>to the</b> golden <b>altar</b> in the Sanctuary and sprinkled the blood there, as required (see Leviticus 16:18), <b>but</b> subsequently <b>brought</b> the remainder of the blood <b>in</b> toward the Curtain dividing the Sanctuary from the Holy of Holies, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that <b>here</b> the area of the Curtain and the golden altar <b>is certainly one place,</b> as they are both in the Sanctuary, and therefore the blood should not be disqualified by being brought back toward the Curtain? <b>Or perhaps,</b> since <b>we call</b> the taking of the blood to the golden altar: <b>Going out,</b> in the verse: “And he shall go out unto the altar” (Leviticus 16:18), its return to the Curtain should be considered bringing in, and therefore the blood should be disqualified? No answers were found, and therefore the Gemara states that these dilemmas <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that the Sages disagree as to the <i>halakha</i> in a case where the priest carrying the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar <b>entered</b> the Sanctuary <b>to atone</b> through sprinkling, but in practice the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood. According to Rabbi Eliezer the blood is disqualified, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that the blood is disqualified only if the priest sprinkles it in the Sanctuary. Concerning this, it <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here:</b> “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting <b>to atone in the Sanctuary,</b> shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), <b>and it is stated there,</b> with regard to the service of the High Priest on Yom Kippur: <b>“And there shall be no man in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to atone in the Sanctuary,</b> until he comes out” (Leviticus 16:17).",
            "Rabbi Eliezer explains: <b>Just as there,</b> with regard to Yom Kippur, the phrase “when he goes in to atone” is referring <b>to</b> the stage <b>when</b> he <b>has not</b> yet <b>atoned, so too here,</b> with regard to the disqualification of blood brought inside the Sanctuary, the phrase “to atone in the Sanctuary” is referring <b>to</b> a situation where the blood enters the Sanctuary at a time <b>when</b> the priest <b>has not</b> yet <b>atoned.</b>",
            "Conversely, <b>Rabbi Shimon says: It is stated here: “To atone”</b> (Leviticus 6:23), <b>and it is stated there,</b> with regard to the conclusion of the service on Yom Kippur: <b>“And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to atone</b> in the Sanctuary, shall be taken outside the camp, and they shall burn in the fire” (Leviticus 16:27). <b>Just as there,</b> the phrase “to atone” is referring <b>to</b> the stage <b>when</b> he has already <b>atoned,</b> as the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned after their blood has been sprinkled, <b>so too here,</b> the phrase “to atone” is referring <b>to</b> a situation <b>where</b> he has already <b>atoned,</b> whereas merely bringing the blood into the Sanctuary does not disqualify it.",
            "The Gemara inquires: <b>With regard to what</b> principle <b>do</b> Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon <b>disagree?</b> The Gemara explains that one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that <b>one derives</b> a case of <b>outside,</b> i.e., the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar, which may not be brought inside the Sanctuary, <b>from</b> another prohibition of <b>outside,</b> the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary; <b>but one does not derive</b> a case of <b>outside from</b> the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, whose blood is brought <b>inside</b> the Sanctuary.",
            "<b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Shimon, <b>holds</b> that <b>one derives</b> a <i>halakha</i> involving <b>an animal,</b> i.e., a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar, <b>from</b> another <i>halakha</i> involving <b>an animal,</b> the bull and goat of Yom Kippur; <b>but one does not derive</b> a case of <b>an animal from</b> a prohibition involving <b>a person.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> If the priest took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presentation. The Gemara infers: <b>But</b> if his taking of the blood into the Sanctuary was <b>intentional,</b> it is <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara analyzes this <i>halakha</i>: Is the blood disqualified only <b>in</b> a case <b>where</b> he took the blood into the Sanctuary and <b>atoned,</b> by sprinkling it inside the Sanctuary, as claimed by Rabbi Shimon in the mishna; <b>or</b> even <b>in</b> a case <b>where</b> he took the blood in and <b>did not</b> yet <b>atone,</b> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer?",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya said</b> that one can cite a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From</b> the fact <b>that it is stated</b> with regard to the Yom Kippur service: <b>“And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary,</b> shall be taken outside the camp, and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung; and he who burns them shall wash his clothes” (Leviticus 16:27–28), one can ask the following question: <b>Why</b> must <b>the verse state: “And he who burns”?</b>",
            "The Gemara interrupts its citation of the <i>baraita</i> to question its line of inquiry. <b>Why</b> must <b>the verse state: “And he who burns”?</b> One can answer that this term <b>was necessary for itself,</b> to teach that the one who burns the bull and goat of Yom Kippur is thereby rendered ritually impure. <b>Rather,</b> this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: <b>Why</b> must <b>the verse state</b> twice: <b>“Sin offering,” “sin offering,”</b> with regard to the bull and the goat? It could have stated merely: And the bull and the goat of the sin offering.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> answers <b>that</b> if the term “sin offering” had appeared only once, <b>we</b> would <b>have learned only with regard to</b> the <b>bull and</b> the <b>goat of Yom Kippur that are burned in the place of the ashes</b> that <b>they render ritually impure</b> the <b>garments</b> of the one who carries them. <b>From where</b> is it derived that the same applies to <b>other</b> sin offerings that are <b>burned? The verse states: “Sin offering,” “sin offering,”</b> twice, to include all sin offerings that are burned. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Meir says: This</b> derivation from the repeated mention of sin offering <b>is not necessary. Now</b> consider, the verse <b>states: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering</b>…shall be taken outside the camp.” <b>As</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state</b> with regard to these offerings: “Whose blood was brought in <b>to atone</b> in the Sanctuary,” <b>why</b> must <b>the verse</b> nevertheless <b>state: “To atone”?</b> This <b>teaches with regard to all</b> offerings <b>that atone</b> inside the Sanctuary <b>that one who burns them renders</b> his <b>garments impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And Rabbi Yehuda does not learn</b> anything from the term <b>“to atone.” What is the reason</b> for this? Is it <b>not because he requires</b> this phrase <b>for a verbal analogy,</b> to derive that the blood of an external sin offering that was taken inside the Sanctuary is disqualified only if the priest sprinkled it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? This answers the Gemara’s question, as Rabbi Yehuda evidently follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> Certain unfit items, once they have been placed on the altar, are nevertheless sacrificed. The mishna teaches: <b>The altar sanctifies</b> only items <b>that are suited to it.</b> The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree as to the definition of suited for the altar.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any</b> item <b>that is suited to</b> be consumed by <b>the fire</b> on the altar, e.g., burnt offerings and the sacrificial portions of other offerings, which are burned on the altar, <b>if it ascended</b> upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>, <b>it shall not descend.</b> Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, <b>as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre</b> upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a burnt offering, which is suited to</b> be consumed by <b>the fire</b> on the altar, <b>if it ascended it shall not descend, so too,</b> with regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that is suited to</b> be consumed by <b>the fire</b> on the altar, <b>if it ascended it shall not descend.</b>",
            "<b>Rabban Gamliel says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that is suited to</b> ascend upon <b>the altar,</b> even if it is not typically consumed, <b>if it ascended, it shall not descend,</b> even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>, <b>as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar,”</b> from which it is derived: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a burnt offering, which is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, any</b> item <b>that is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend.</b>",
            "The mishna comments: <b>The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only</b> with regard to disqualified <b>blood and</b> disqualified <b>libations,</b> which are not consumed by the fire but do ascend upon the altar, <b>as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend,</b> as they are fit to ascend upon the altar, <b>and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend,</b> as they are not burned on the altar.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> Whether <b>the offering was fit and</b> the accompanying <b>libations</b> were <b>unfit,</b> e.g., if they became ritually impure or they were brought outside their designated area, or whether <b>the libations</b> were <b>fit and the offering</b> was <b>unfit,</b> rendering the accompanying libations unfit as well, and <b>even</b> if both <b>this and that were unfit, the offering shall not descend,</b> as it was sanctified by the altar, <b>but the libations shall descend.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that the altar sanctifies items that are suited to it, from which the Gemara infers: Items <b>suited to</b> the altar, <b>yes,</b> they are sanctified by it, but items <b>that are not suited to</b> the altar, <b>no,</b> they are not sanctified by it and descend from it even after ascending. The Gemara asks: This inference serves <b>to exclude what? Rav Pappa said:</b> It serves <b>to exclude handfuls</b> of flour that were removed from meal offerings by a priest in order to be burned on the altar, and <b>that were not sanctified</b> by being placed <b>in</b> a service <b>vessel</b> before they ascended upon the altar. Those handfuls did not yet become suited for the altar and therefore shall descend.",
            "<b>Ravina objects to</b> Rav Pappa’s assertion: In <b>what</b> way <b>is</b> this case <b>different from that of Ulla? As Ulla says: Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that</b> one <b>offered up</b> on the altar <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the offering’s <b>blood,</b> and are therefore not yet suited for the altar, <b>shall not descend,</b> as <b>they have become the bread of</b> the <b>altar,</b> i.e., they have been sanctified such that they must be burned.",
            "The Gemara responds that there is a difference between the cases: <b>These</b> sacrificial portions described by Ulla <b>do not lack</b> the performance of <b>an action with regard to themselves</b> that will render them fit for the altar; they lack only the sprinkling of the blood, an independent action. By contrast, <b>these</b> handfuls mentioned by Rav Pappa <b>lack</b> the performance of <b>an action with regard to themselves,</b> as they have yet to be sanctified through placement in a service vessel and never became fit for the altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any</b> item <b>that is suited to</b> be consumed by <b>the fire</b> on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar it shall not descend, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that any item suited for burning on the altar shall not descend. The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabban Gamliel also,</b> who holds that any item suited for the altar, whether it is to be burned or not, shall not descend, <b>isn’t it written</b> in the verse: <b>“Burnt offering on the pyre”?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>That</b> verse <b>comes</b> to teach the mitzva <b>to restore</b> to the pyre any parts of the offering that were <b>dislodged</b> from the pyre, and is not discussing unfit items at all.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, <b>from where does he</b> derive the requirement <b>to restore</b> to the fire sacrificial portions that were <b>dislodged</b> from it? The Gemara responds: <b>He derives it from</b> the verse: <b>“That the fire has consumed</b> of the burnt offering on the altar” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that items already partially consumed by the fire are restored to it even if they were dislodged from the pyre.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabban Gamliel, what does he derive from that verse? The Gemara responds: Rabban Gamliel <b>requires that</b> verse <b>to</b> derive that <b>you return</b> partially <b>consumed</b> parts <b>of a burnt offering</b> to the altar, <b>but you do not return</b> partially <b>consumed</b> parts <b>of an incense</b> offering that fell from the golden altar. <b>As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Minyumi, son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, teaches</b> that the verse <b>“that the fire has consumed of the burnt offering on the altar”</b> teaches that <b>you return</b> partially <b>consumed</b> parts <b>of a burnt offering</b> that fell from the pyre, <b>but you do not return</b> partially <b>consumed</b> parts <b>of an incense</b> offering that fell from the pyre.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, from where does he derive this distinction? The Gemara responds: Can it <b>not be learned by itself</b> from the straightforward meaning of the verse <b>that we restore</b> partially <b>consumed</b> parts <b>of a burnt offering</b> to the altar? Therefore, there is no need for an additional verse, as both <i>halakhot</i> can be derived from the same verse.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabban Gamliel says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that is suited</b> to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> according to <b>Rabbi Yehoshua as well, isn’t it written:</b> “Upon the <b>altar,”</b> and not merely: “On the pyre”? The Gemara responds: <b>That</b> term <b>is required</b> by Rabbi Yehoshua to teach: <b>What is the reason the Merciful One states</b> that <b>any</b> item <b>that is suited for the pyre</b> does not descend from the altar? It is because the <b>altar sanctifies</b> it.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabban Gamliel, from where does he derive that the altar sanctifies the items that ascend upon it? The Gemara responds: It is from the fact that the term <b>“altar” is written another</b> time, in the verse: “Whatever touches the altar shall be sacred” (Exodus 29:37). The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, why does he require two verses to teach the same <i>halakha</i>, i.e., that the altar sanctifies items that ascend upon it? The Gemara answers: <b>One</b> verse is necessary <b>for</b> a case <b>where</b> an item <b>had a time of fitness</b> for consumption by the fire and was then disqualified, e.g., it became ritually impure; <b>and one</b> verse is necessary <b>for</b> a case <b>where</b> an item <b>did not have a time of fitness,</b> e.g., an offering that became disqualified at the moment of its slaughter.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, Rabban Gamliel, why does he not require another verse to teach that even items that had no time of fitness shall not descend from the altar? The Gemara responds: <b>Once there are disqualified</b> items <b>that the Merciful One included</b> in the <i>halakha</i> that they shall not descend from the altar, it <b>is no different</b> if the item <b>had a time of fitness</b> and it <b>is no different</b> if the item <b>did not have a time of fitness.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> Whether <b>the offering was fit</b> and the accompanying libations were unfit, or whether the libations were fit and the offering was unfit, and even if both this and that were unfit, the offering shall not descend, but the libations shall descend. The Gemara elaborates: <b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The verse that teaches that fit items shall not descend from the altar states: “This is the law of the <b>burnt offering:</b> It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). From there it is derived: <b>Just as a burnt offering,</b> which is an item <b>that comes</b> upon the altar <b>for its own sake,</b> shall not descend, <b>so too, all items that come</b> upon the altar <b>for their own sake</b> shall not descend. <b>Excluded</b> are <b>libations, which come</b> upon the altar <b>for the sake of the offering,</b> not for their own sake; these shall descend.",
            "§ The Gemara cites another <i>baraita</i> relating to the mishna. <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From that</b> which <b>is stated: “Whatever touches the altar shall be sacred”</b> (Exodus 29:37), <b>I</b> would <b>derive</b> that the altar sanctifies any item that ascends upon it, <b>whether</b> it <b>is fit</b> for the altar <b>or whether</b> it <b>is unfit.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “Now this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two <b>lambs”</b> (Exodus 29:38), to teach: <b>Just as lambs</b> are <b>fit</b> for the altar and are sanctified by it, <b>so too, all</b> items <b>fit</b> for the altar are sanctified by it. <b>Rabbi Akiva says</b> that the verse states: <b>“Burnt offering,”</b> to teach: <b>Just as a burnt offering</b> is <b>fit</b> for the altar and is sanctified by it, <b>so too, all</b> items <b>fit</b> for the altar are sanctified by it.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the practical difference <b>between</b> these opinions? <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava said:</b> The case of <b>a disqualified bird burnt offering is</b> the practical difference <b>between them.</b> One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, who <b>cites</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the term <b>“burnt offering,”</b> includes a disqualified bird burnt offering in the <i>halakha</i> that the offering shall not descend, as it is a burnt offering. <b>And</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who <b>cites</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the term <b>“lambs,”</b> does not include a disqualified bird burnt offering in the <i>halakha</i>, as it is not similar to a lamb.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And according to the one who cites</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the term <b>“lambs,” isn’t it written: “Burnt offering”?</b> The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, <b>if “lambs”</b> had been <b>written and “burnt offering”</b> had <b>not</b> been <b>written, I would say</b> that <b>even</b> an animal that became disqualified and ascended upon the altar <b>while alive</b> shall not descend. Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes: “Burnt offering,”</b> indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to animals once they are fit to ascend the altar. Live animals are not fit to ascend the altar.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And according to the one who derives</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>from “burnt offering,” isn’t it written: “Lambs”?</b> The Gemara explains: According to Rabbi Akiva, <b>if “burnt offering”</b> had been <b>written and “lambs”</b> had <b>not</b> been <b>written, I would say</b> that any item fit to ascend the altar is included in the <i>halakha</i>, <b>even a meal offering.</b> Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes: “Lambs,”</b> indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to animal offerings and bird offerings, not to meal offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> difference <b>is there between</b> the opinions of <b>these <i>tanna’im</i>,</b> Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva, and the opinions of <b>these <i>tanna’im</i> of the mishna? Rav Pappa said:</b> The difference <b>between them is</b> with regard to <b>handfuls</b> of flour, removed from meal offerings, <b>that were sanctified in</b> a service <b>vessel</b> and were then disqualified. According <b>to our <i>tanna’im</i>,</b> i.e., those in the mishna here, those handfuls <b>shall not descend,</b> as they are fit for the altar and for consumption by the fire as well. According <b>to the <i>tanna’im</i> of the <i>baraita</i>,</b> those handfuls <b>shall descend,</b> as those <i>tanna’im</i> hold that the <i>halakha</i> applies only to animal offerings and bird offerings.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish says</b> in summary: With regard to <b>a meal offering that comes by itself</b> and does not accompany another offering, <b>according to the statements of all</b> of the <i>tanna’im</i> in the mishna, <b>it shall not descend</b> once it ascended, either because it is fit to be consumed by the fire, or because it comes by itself. <b>According to the statements of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "even that meal offering <b>shall descend,</b> as it is not similar to lambs. With regard to <b>a meal offering that comes with</b> an animal <b>offering,</b> either a burnt offering or peace offering, <b>according to the statements of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua, it shall not descend,</b> as it is meant for consumpion by the fire. <b>According to the statements of everyone</b> else, i.e., Rabbi Shimon and the <i>tannai’im</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, <b>it shall descend,</b> as it is neither offered by itself nor is it an animal.",
            "Reish Lakish continues: With regard to <b>libations that come by themselves, according to the statements of everyone,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Yehoshua, <b>they shall descend,</b> but <b>according to the statements of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Shimon, they shall not descend.</b> With regard to <b>libations that come with an animal offering, according to the statements of everyone, they shall descend,</b> while according to <b>the statement of Rabban Gamliel alone, they shall not descend.</b>",
            "The Gemara questions the need for such a summary: Isn’t it <b>obvious?</b> The Gemara answers: It <b>was necessary for</b> him to state the <i>halakha</i> in the case of <b>a meal offering that comes by itself, and</b> this is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rava. As Rava says: A person</b> can <b>volunteer</b> to bring <b>a meal offering</b> that normally accompanies libations, <b>on any day,</b> even without offering the libations and animal offering that it normally accompanies. Although the summary is itself obvious, it is nevertheless stated to indicate that it is possible to offer such a meal offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: If the intent of his summary is to express his agreement with the statement of Rava, then <b>let</b> Reish Lakish <b>teach us</b> explicitly that the <i>halakha</i> is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rava.</b> The Gemara answers: It <b>was necessary for</b> the case of <b>libations that come with</b> an animal <b>offering,</b> as the <i>halakha</i> in such a case is <b>that he may sacrifice</b> the libations <b>the next day and on a later [<i>ḥara</i>] day</b> sometime after sacrificing the animal offering that they accompany.",
            "Accordingly, it may <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since the Master says</b> that the verse: “And <b>their meal offering and their libations”</b> (Numbers 29:18), indicates that libations may be offered <b>at night,</b> and the phrase “and <b>their meal offering and their libations”</b> indicates that libations may be offered <b>the next day</b> and on a later day, perhaps libations offered on a later date than the animal itself are to be <b>considered as libations which come by themselves, and Rabbi Shimon</b> would <b>concede that they shall not descend.</b> Reish Lakish therefore <b>teaches us</b> the case of libations that accompany an animal offering, to indicate that such libations are still considered as those that accompany an animal offering and that they shall descend from the altar.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>These</b> are the items that even if they were disqualified, <b>if they ascended</b> the altar <b>they shall not descend:</b> Blood, sacrificial portions, or limbs of a burnt offering, any of <b>which were left overnight</b> off the altar, <b>or that emerge</b> from the Temple courtyard, <b>or that</b> become <b>ritually impure, or</b> that came from an animal <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to sacrifice it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> an offering <b>that</b> people <b>unfit</b> to perform the Temple service <b>collected and</b> then <b>sprinkled its blood.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> In the case of a sacrificial animal <b>that was slaughtered at night, or</b> one <b>whose blood was spilled</b> on the floor of the Temple without its being collected in a vessel, <b>or</b> one whose <b>blood emerged outside the curtains,</b> i.e., outside the Temple courtyard: Even <b>if it ascended</b> upon the altar <b>it shall descend. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> In all these cases, if it ascended <b>it shall not descend, because its disqualification</b> occurred <b>in sanctity. As Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> unfit offering <b>whose disqualification</b> occurred <b>in sanctity,</b> i.e., in the course of the Temple service, <b>the sacred</b> area <b>renders</b> the offering <b>acceptable,</b> and if it ascended onto the altar it shall not descend. But with regard to any offering <b>whose disqualification</b> did <b>not</b> occur <b>in sanctity</b> but rather was unfit initially, <b>the sacred</b> area <b>does not render</b> the offering <b>acceptable.</b>",
            "<b>And these are</b> the offerings <b>whose disqualification</b> did <b>not</b> occur <b>in sanctity: An animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and</b> an animal that was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship, <b>and</b> an animal that was <b>worshipped</b> as a deity, <b>and</b> an animal that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute <b>or</b> as <b>the price</b> of a dog, <b>and</b> an animal born of a mixture of <b>diverse kinds, and an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], and</b> an animal <b>born by caesarean section, and blemished</b> animals. <b>Rabbi Akiva deems blemished</b> animals <b>fit</b> in the sense that if they ascended they shall not descend. <b>Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: My father would reject blemished</b> animals <b>from upon the altar.</b>",
            "Concerning those animals that, if they ascended, do not descend, <b>just as if they ascended</b> the altar <b>they shall not descend, so too, if they descended they shall not</b> then <b>ascend. And all of them that</b> if they ascend they do not descend, if <b>they ascended to the top of the altar alive they descend,</b> as an animal is fit for the altar only after it is slaughtered. <b>A burnt offering that ascended to the top of the altar alive shall descend,</b> as one does not slaughter an animal atop the altar <i>ab initio</i>. But if <b>one slaughtered</b> the animal <b>at the top of the altar, he should flay</b> it <b>and cut it into pieces in its place,</b> and it is not removed from the altar.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The verse from which is derived the <i>halakha</i> that items that ascended upon the altar shall not descend, states: <b>“This</b> is the law of the burnt offering: <b>It is the burnt offering</b> on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). <b>These are three</b> terms of <b>exclusion</b> used in the verse: “This,” “it,” and “the,” from which it is derived that three instances are <b>excluded</b> from this <i>halakha</i>: A sacrificial animal <b>that was slaughtered at night, and</b> one <b>whose blood was spilled, and</b> one <b>whose blood emerged outside the curtains,</b> i.e., outside the Temple courtyard. With regard to these cases, the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that if</b> one of them <b>ascended</b> upon the altar <b>it shall descend.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> From the usage of the term <b>“burnt offering” I have</b> derived <b>only</b> with regard to <b>a fit burnt offering</b> that it shall not descend. <b>From where</b> is it derived that the verse also <b>includes</b> a sacrificial animal that was disqualified, such as one <b>that was slaughtered at night; or whose blood was spilled; or whose blood emerged outside the curtains,</b> i.e., outside the Temple courtyard; <b>or that was left overnight; or that emerged</b> from the Temple courtyard, <b>or that</b> became <b>ritually impure; or</b> that came from an animal <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to sacrifice it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area; or</b> an offering <b>that</b> people <b>unfit</b> to perform the Temple service <b>collected and</b> then <b>sprinkled its blood?</b>",
            "In addition, from where is it derived that the following are also included in this <i>halakha</i>: <b>Those</b> offerings whose blood is to be <b>placed below</b> the red line that divided between the upper and lower halves of the external altar, i.e., a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or a peace offering, but it <b>was placed above</b> the red line; <b>and</b> a sin offering, whose blood is to be placed <b>above</b> the red line, <b>that</b> had its blood <b>placed below</b> the red line; <b>and those</b> offerings <b>whose</b> blood is to be <b>placed outside,</b> on the external altar, <b>that</b> had their blood <b>placed inside,</b> in the Sanctuary; and those offerings whose blood is to be placed <b>inside that</b> had their blood <b>placed outside?</b>",
            "<b>And</b> in addition, with regard to <b>a Paschal offering or sin offering that were slaughtered not for their sake, from where</b> is it derived that if they ascended upon the altar they shall not descend? <b>The verse states: “The law of the burnt offering,”</b> which <b>included</b> in <b>one law all</b> items <b>that ascend</b> upon the altar, establishing the principle <b>that if they ascended</b> the altar <b>they shall not descend.</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I</b> should also <b>include an animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and</b> an animal that was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship, <b>and</b> an animal that was <b>worshipped</b> as a deity, <b>and</b> an animal that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute <b>or</b> as the <b>price</b> of a dog, <b>and</b> an animal born of a mixture of <b>diverse kinds, and</b> an animal that is <b>a <i>tereifa</i>, and</b> an animal <b>born by caesarean section.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “This,”</b> to exclude these types of disqualifications, which descend even after they have ascended the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what did you see</b> as reason <b>to include those and exclude these?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>After</b> noting <b>that</b> the verse <b>included</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> subsequently <b>the verse excluded,</b> I say the following claim with regard to what to include and what to exclude: <b>I will include those whose disqualification was in sanctity,</b> i.e., in the course of Temple service, and rule that if they ascended they shall not descend, <b>and I will exclude these whose disqualification was not in sanctity,</b> and rule that if they ascended they shall descend.",
            "<b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and does not deem it permitted for items whose disqualification occurred in sanctity to remain on the altar, yet agrees that those items listed in the beginning of the mishna, such as sacrificial portions left overnight, shall not descend, <b>he derives it from here,</b> as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>For what</b> reason <b>did</b> the Sages <b>say to us</b> that <b>in</b> the case of <b>blood</b> left overnight it is <b>fit,</b> i.e., if blood of an offering had been left overnight and was then placed on the altar it is not removed?",
            "This is <b>as</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>in</b> the case of <b>sacrificial portions,</b> which if they are <b>left overnight</b> are <b>fit.</b> From where is it derived that <b>in</b> the case of <b>sacrificial portions</b> that are <b>left overnight,</b> they are <b>fit?</b> This is <b>as</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>in</b> the case of <b>meat,</b> which if it is <b>left overnight</b> is <b>fit,</b> because the meat of a peace offering may be eaten for two days and one night.",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering that <b>emerges</b> from the Temple courtyard is then placed on the altar it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, <b>since</b> an offering that <b>leaves</b> its area is <b>fit in</b> the case of an offering brought on a private <b>altar,</b> as the entire notion of sacrifice on such an altar is that it may be performed anywhere.",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering that has become <b>ritually impure</b> is placed on the altar it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, <b>since</b> it is <b>permitted to</b> offer an impure offering in <b>the</b> case of <b>communal rites,</b> i.e., communal offerings. In cases of necessity, the communal offerings may be sacrificed even if they are ritually impure.",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time</b> [<i>piggul</i>] was placed on the altar, it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, <b>since</b> the sprinkling of its blood <b>effects acceptance</b> with regard to <b>its</b> status as <b><i>piggul</i>.</b> The status of <i>piggul</i> takes effect only if the sacrificial rites involving that offering were otherwise performed properly. This indicates that it still has the status of an offering, so it is not removed from the altar.",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> was placed on the altar, it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, <b>since</b> it is <b>juxtaposed to</b> an offering that was slaughtered with intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time.</b>",
            "From where is it derived that if an offering <b>that</b> people <b>unfit</b> for performing the Temple service <b>collected and</b> then <b>sprinkled its blood</b> was placed on the altar, it is not removed? This is derived <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>these</b> priests who are generally <b>disqualified</b> because they are impure, yet <b>who are fit to</b> perform <b>the communal rites,</b> i.e., to sacrifice communal offerings, in a case when all the priests or the majority of the Jewish people are impure.",
            "The Gemara questions the derivations of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>But can one deduce</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a matter that is not fit,</b> i.e., sacrificial portions that are disqualified due to having been left overnight, <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a matter that is fit,</b> i.e., the peace offering, which is permitted for eating for two days and one night? Similarly, how can the <i>baraita</i> derive the <i>halakha</i> of flesh that was removed from the Temple courtyard from the <i>halakha</i> of a private altar, which has no halakhic area surrounding it?",
            "The Gemara answers: The <b><i>tanna</i> relied on</b> the verse: “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: <b>This is the law of the burnt offering:</b> It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar all night until the morning; and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning there” (Leviticus 6:2), which <b>amplified</b> the application of the <i>halakha</i> stated in the verse, teaching that many types of disqualified offerings may be left upon the altar. The derivations written in the <i>baraita</i> are mere supports for those two <i>halakhot</i>. The explanations cited in the <i>baraita</i> for including these disqualifications are mentioned only to clarify why Rabbi Yehuda does not exclude them based on the terms “this,” “it,” and “that.”",
            "§ With regard to an offering that was slaughtered at night, which Rabbi Yehuda holds shall descend from the altar even if it ascended, <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who slaughters</b> a sacrificial <b>animal at night inside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>and</b> then <b>offers</b> it <b>up</b> on an altar <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i>, which is the punishment for one who sacrifices an offering outside the Temple courtyard. Although one is normally liable for sacrificing an offering outside the Temple courtyard only if it was fit to be offered on the altar within the Temple, and an animal slaughtered at night is disqualified and shall descend from the altar according to Rabbi Yehuda,"
        ],
        [
            "nevertheless, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters an animal at night <b>should not be less</b> stringent <b>than</b> that of one who <b>slaughters</b> an animal <b>outside</b> the Temple <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside.</b> With regard to that case, the mishna (106a) states that such a person is liable, even though an animal slaughtered outside the Temple is not fit to be offered on the altar inside the Temple and shall descend from the altar even if it has ascended.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin raises an objection</b> to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mishna (111a): <b>One who slaughters a bird inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offers</b> it <b>up</b> on an altar <b>outside</b> the Temple is <b>exempt,</b> as a bird offering is supposed to be pinched at the nape of the neck and not slaughtered with a knife. But if he <b>slaughtered</b> the bird <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>and offered</b> it <b>up outside</b> the Temple courtyard, he is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i>. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>let us say</b> that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters an animal inside the Temple <b>should not be less</b> stringent <b>than</b> that of one who <b>slaughters</b> an animal <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the Temple. Why, then, is such a person exempt?",
            "The Gemara responds: This is indeed <b>a conclusive refutation,</b> and the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is rejected. The Gemara adds a possible explanation: <b>If you wish, say</b> that one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a bird slaughtered inside the Temple from that of a bird slaughtered outside of it, because in the case of <b>the slaughter of a bird inside</b> the Temple, it is considered as if <b>he killed it.</b> By contrast, in the case of an animal slaughtered at night within the Temple, although it is disqualified, it is still considered a slaughtered animal, and its status may therefore be derived from that of an animal that is slaughtered outside the Temple.",
            "§ Concerning items that were inappropriately placed on the altar, <b>Ulla says: Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that</b> one <b>offered up</b> upon the altar <b>before the sprinkling of their blood,</b> which is the act that sanctifies such portions for the altar, <b>shall not descend,</b> as <b>they have become the bread of</b> the <b>altar.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said</b> in support of Ulla: <b>We learn</b> in the mishna <b>as well:</b> The sacrificial portions of an offering <b>whose blood was spilled, or whose blood emerged outside the curtains,</b> shall not descend if they ascended. From this one can infer: <b>And if there, where</b> the blood was spilled, <b>if he comes to sprinkle</b> it <b>he cannot sprinkle</b> it, as there is no blood with which to do so, and <b>you said</b> that <b>if they ascended</b> the altar <b>they shall not descend,</b> then <b>here,</b> where the blood is intact such <b>that if he comes to sprinkle</b> it <b>he sprinkles</b> it, which renders the sacrificial portions permitted for sacrifice upon the altar, is it <b>not all the more so</b> that if they ascended they shall not descend?",
            "The Gemara rejects the inference of Rabbi Zeira: <b>Interpret</b> the mishna as referring specifically <b>to offerings of the most sacred order,</b> whose sacrificial portions are sanctified for the sake of the altar before their blood is presented. Therefore, such sacrificial portions are considered fit for the altar and shall not descend if they ascended. It may be that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity are entirely unfit for the altar before the presentation of their blood.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But there is <b>a Paschal offering, which is an offering of lesser sanctity,</b> and it is mentioned in the same list of items that shall not descend if they ascended. The Gemara explains: <b>Interpret</b> the case of a Paschal offering as referring <b>to</b> where it was slaughtered <b>not for its sake,</b> but not to where its blood was spilled or emerged outside the curtains.",
            "<b>We learned</b> in the mishna: <b>And all of them that</b> if they ascend they do not descend, if <b>they ascended to</b> the top of <b>the altar alive, they descend. But</b> it may be inferred from here that <b>slaughtered</b> animals <b>shall not descend,</b> even if their blood was not presented. <b>What, is it not</b> that this inference applies to all offerings, and the <i>halakha</i> <b>is not different</b> with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, and it is not different</b> with regard to <b>offerings of lesser sanctity?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it is possible to infer as follows: <b>But</b> with regard to <b>slaughtered</b> animals, some <b>of them shall descend</b> and some <b>of them shall not descend.</b> The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> the mishna <b>teaches</b> that <b>all of them</b> shall descend if they ascended alive, in which case it must be inferred with regard to all of them that if they were slaughtered they shall not descend. The Gemara explains: When the mishna states: <b>All of them</b> shall descend, it is referring only <b>to</b> animals that ascended upon the altar while still <b>alive,</b> in order to emphasize that all fit animals that ascended while still alive shall descend and are not slaughtered atop the altar. The mishna did not intend to teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all slaughtered animals.",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t it <b>obvious</b> that live animals that ascended upon the altar shall descend? The Gemara answers: <b>Actually,</b> the mishna intends to teach the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to living</b> animals <b>but</b> is referring specifically <b>to</b> animals blemished on <b>the cornea of the eye, and</b> it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Akiva, who says</b> that in the case of such a small blemish, <b>if they ascended</b> the altar <b>they shall not descend.</b> The phrase: All of them shall descend, teaches that even Rabbi Akiva agrees that such animals that ascended while still alive shall descend.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>To what</b> case <b>did you interpret</b> this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna to be referring? You interpreted it as referring <b>to disqualified</b> offerings. <b>Say the latter clause: And likewise, a burnt offering that ascended to the top of the altar alive shall descend.</b> But if <b>one slaughtered</b> the animal <b>at the top of the altar, he should flay</b> it <b>and cut</b> it <b>into pieces in its place,</b> and it is not removed from the altar. <b>And if</b> the mishna is referring to <b>a disqualified</b> offering one must ask: Is a disqualified offering <b>fit for flaying and cutting? The Merciful One states:</b> “And he shall flay the burnt offering, <b>and cut it</b> into its pieces” (Leviticus 1:6), and the word <b>“it”</b> indicates an exclusion: Only <b>fit</b> offerings are flayed and cut, <b>and not</b> those that are <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: In <b>the latter clause we come to</b> refer to <b>a fit</b> offering. The Gemara asks: <b>And what does</b> this <b>teach us?</b> The Gemara answers: It teaches <b>that there is flaying and cutting at the top of the altar,</b> and it is not considered degrading to the altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But according to the one who says</b> that <b>there is no flaying and cutting at the top of the altar, what can be said?</b> The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, <b>what are we dealing with here?</b> We are dealing with a case <b>where</b> the animal that ascended while still alive <b>had a time of fitness,</b> during which it was slaughtered atop the altar and its blood was presented, <b>and</b> thereafter it <b>became disqualified. And</b> the last clause of the mishna <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Since the blood was sprinkled,</b> thereby <b>effecting acceptance of the flesh</b> of the offering for <b>a moment,</b> even if the offering then became disqualified, <b>he shall flay it and its hide</b> is given <b>to the priests,</b> and its flesh is burned.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the mishna is referring to an offering that became disqualified, then with regard to <b>that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> concerning the mishna: <b>What shall</b> he <b>do</b> with such an offering? He <b>takes the innards down</b> from the altar, placing them <b>below</b> it, <b>and</b> thereafter <b>rinses them, why do I</b> need to do so? Since the innards of a disqualified offering may not be returned to the altar once they have been removed from it, why should they be removed from the altar?",
            "The Gemara responds: Rather, <b>what should we do? Should we offer them with their dung?</b> Doesn’t the verse state: <b>“Present it now to your governor; will he be pleased with you? Or will he accept your person?”</b> (Malachi 1:8), and isn’t it derived from this verse that items considered repulsive to people are not fit for use as an offering for the Most High?",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>This is what we are saying:</b> Since one removes the innards of a disqualified offering from atop the altar and they may not be returned, <b>why do I</b> need to <b>rinse them?</b> The Gemara answers: The concern is <b>that if another priest chances</b> upon these innards <b>and does not know</b> that they are disqualified for the altar, <b>he will sacrifice them</b> upon the altar with their dung."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And shall we stand</b> and <b>do something for the priests through which they</b> shall <b>come to</b> encounter <b>a stumbling block?</b> Were these innards to remain unwashed, no priest would mistakenly sacrifice them upon the altar. The Gemara answers: <b>Even so,</b> rinsing disqualified innards is <b>preferable, so that the sanctified offerings of Heaven shall not be lying as a carcass.</b>",
            "With regard to the matter discussed by Ulla (85a), <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma:</b> In the case of <b>sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that</b> one <b>offered up before the sprinkling of their blood,</b> which is the act which sanctifies such portions for the altar, <b>shall they descend or shall they not descend?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Ami said to</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan: Instead of raising the dilemma of whether or not such portions shall descend, <b>you should raise the dilemma</b> of whether their ascension upon the altar sanctifies them with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> With regard to the <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>I do not raise the dilemma, as</b> certainly the rite of <b>sprinkling</b> and not their ascension to the altar <b>determines</b> their status <b>with regard to</b> the <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. <b>When</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>raised the dilemma</b> it was with regard to their <b>descent</b> from the altar. <b>And</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>resolved</b> his dilemma and ruled: If they ascended <b>they shall not descend, and they are not subject to</b> the prohibition of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches</b> the discussion in <b>this</b> manner: <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma:</b> In the case of <b>sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that</b> one <b>offered up</b> on the altar <b>before the sprinkling of their blood, are they subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse or not? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you should raise the dilemma</b> with regard to their <b>descent</b> from upon the altar. Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> With regard to their <b>descent I do not raise the dilemma, because</b> after these sacrificial portions ascend the altar <b>they become the bread of</b> the <b>altar</b> and shall not descend. <b>When I raise the dilemma</b> it is with regard to the <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. <b>And</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>resolved</b> his dilemma in <b>this</b> manner: <b>They shall not descend, and they are not subject to</b> the prohibition of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>And these are</b> the offerings <b>whose disqualification</b> did <b>not</b> occur in sanctity: An animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality…or blemished animals. Such offerings shall descend from the altar if they ascended. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit in the sense that if they ascended upon the altar they shall not descend.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only</b> those animals with small blemishes, such as <b>on the cornea of the eye, as</b> such blemishes <b>are fit with regard to bird</b> offerings <i>ab initio</i>. And <b>this</b> is the <i>halakha</i> only <b>when their consecration preceded their blemish,</b> since such an animal was fit for the altar at the time of its consecration. But if their blemish preceded their consecration, they shall descend, as they were never fit for the altar. <b>And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering</b> that it shall descend from the altar. Since only a male animal may be used for a burnt offering, <b>it is like</b> a case <b>where</b> the animal’s <b>blemish preceded its consecration.</b>",
            "The Gemara presents a discussion in which the opinion of Rabbi Akiva is cited: <b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises the dilemma: Is</b> the disqualification of <b>an animal that was the object of bestiality</b> applicable <b>with regard to birds, or is</b> there <b>no</b> disqualification of <b>an animal that was the object of bestiality with regard to birds? Did</b> the verse <b>say:</b> “When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering <b>of the animals”</b> (Leviticus 1:2), where the term “of” serves <b>to exclude</b> from being brought as offerings both <b>an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality,</b> in order to equate the two?",
            "If so, then derive from it that <b>anywhere that there is</b> a disqualification <b>of an animal that copulated with a person there is</b> a disqualification <b>of an animal that was the object of bestiality,</b> and <b>anywhere that there is no</b> disqualification <b>of an animal that copulated with a person there is no</b> disqualification <b>of an animal that was the object of bestiality.</b> Consequently, since birds cannot be the active party in an act of bestiality, the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality is also inapplicable to birds. <b>Or perhaps</b> the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality does apply with regard to birds, as nevertheless <b>a sin was committed with it?</b>",
            "<b>Rabba said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from the mishna: <b>Rabbi Akiva deems blemished</b> animals <b>fit</b> when the blemish is on the cornea, since such blemishes are fit with regard to bird offerings <i>ab initio</i>. <b>And if it is so</b> that a bird that was the object of bestiality is fit as an offering, then <b>let us also deem fit an animal that was the object of bestiality, since</b> such an offering is <b>fit with regard to birds.</b> From the fact that such animals are not deemed fit, <b>conclude from</b> the mishna that the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality applies to birds as well.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We learn</b> in the <i>baraita</i> <b>as well:</b> A bird <b>that was the object of bestiality, or</b> that was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship, <b>or</b> that <b>was worshipped</b> as a deity, <b>or</b> that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute <b>or</b> as the <b>price</b> of a dog, <b>or</b> that was a <b><i>tumtum</i> or</b> a <b>hermaphrodite,</b> in <b>all of</b> those cases, if its nape was pinched, it <b>renders</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows an olive-bulk from the carcass <b>ritually impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all unslaughtered carcasses of birds. Since the <i>baraita</i> lists a bird that was the object of bestiality among those disqualified offerings, <b>conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that such a bird is in fact disqualified.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest,</b> says: My father would reject blemished animals from upon the altar. The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is Rabbi Ḥanina <b>teaching us?</b> The first <i>tanna</i> already stated that blemished animals shall descend. The Gemara answers: <b>If you wish, say</b> that Rabbi Ḥanina <b>teaches us an incident,</b> to express that this <i>halakha</i> was not only stated theoretically but applied practically as well. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead: <b>What</b> is the meaning of the term: Would <b>reject?</b> It means that he would remove blemished animals from the altar <b>in a backhanded manner,</b> i.e., privately rather than publicly, so as not to disgrace the honor of the altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches with regard to those disqualified offerings that shall not descend from the altar if they ascended it: <b>Just as if it ascended</b> it does not descend, so too, if it descended it does not then ascend. <b>Ulla says:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>only</b> in a case <b>where the fire has not</b> yet <b>taken hold of</b> these offerings. <b>But</b> if <b>the fire has taken hold of</b> these offerings, then even if they descended from the altar <b>they shall ascend.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Mari teaches</b> that the statement of Ulla is referring <b>to the first clause,</b> i.e., to this mishna. <b>Rav Ḥanina of Sura teaches</b> that Ulla is referring <b>to the latter clause,</b> i.e., to the next mishna, which states: <b>The bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves</b> of a burnt offering; <b>when they are attached</b> to the flesh of the offering <b>they shall ascend</b> upon the altar and be sacrificed with the offering. If <b>they separated</b> from the flesh of the offering <b>they shall not ascend.</b> With regard to this <b>Ulla says:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> that if they separated from the flesh they shall not ascend <b>only</b> in a case <b>where the fire has not</b> yet <b>taken hold of them. But</b> if <b>the fire has taken hold of them,</b> then even if they separated from the flesh of the offering <b>they shall ascend.</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: According to <b>the one who teaches</b> Ulla’s statement, i.e., if the fire has taken hold of them they still ascend the altar, as referring <b>to the latter clause,</b> which discusses items that are not burned on the altar, <b>all the more so</b> will Ulla’s statement apply <b>to the first clause,</b> which discusses items that are burned on the altar but were disqualified. <b>And</b> according to <b>the one who teaches</b> Ulla’s statement as referring <b>to the first clause,</b> it applies only to those items that were to be burned on the altar but were disqualified. <b>But</b> with regard <b>to the latter clause</b> it does not apply, since the bones, tendons, and other items mentioned there <b>are not subject to burning</b> at all.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>And these</b> are the items that <b>if they ascended</b> upon the altar <b>they descend,</b> because they are completely unfit for the altar: <b>The meat of offerings of the most sacred order,</b> i.e., a guilt offering and a sin offering, the meat of which is eaten by priests; <b>and the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> which is eaten by the owners; <b>and the surplus of the <i>omer</i></b> meal offering brought on the second day of Passover after the handful was removed and burned on the altar; <b>and the two loaves</b> meal offering brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>; <b>and the shewbread; and the remainder of the meal offerings</b> after the handful was removed, which are all eaten by the priests; <b>and the incense</b> that ascended upon the external altar and not the golden altar where it should be burned.",
            "With regard to <b>the wool that is on the heads of the sheep</b> brought as burnt offerings, <b>and the hair that is in the beard of goats</b> that were sacrificed, <b>and the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves: When they are attached</b> to the flesh of the offering <b>they shall ascend</b> upon the altar and be sacrificed with the offering, <b>as it is stated: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke</b> on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9). If <b>they separated</b> from the flesh of the offering <b>they shall not ascend, as it is stated: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:27), and nothing else.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>“And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:9). The term “the whole” serves <b>to include the bones and the tendons and the horns and the hooves</b> among those items that are sacrificed on the altar. One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>even</b> if <b>they separated</b> from the flesh of the burnt offering they are sacrificed upon the altar. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that only those items and anything attached to them are sacrificed upon the altar.",
            "<b>If</b> one derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to bones and tendons from the phrase <b>“the flesh and the blood,”</b>"
        ],
        [
            "then one <b>might</b> have thought that a priest must first <b>remove</b> the <b>tendons and bones</b> from an offering <b>and</b> then <b>sacrifice the flesh upon the altar.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke</b> on the altar,” including the tendons and bones. <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled? If they were <b>attached</b> to the flesh, <b>they shall ascend.</b> If <b>they separated</b> from the flesh, then <b>even</b> if <b>they</b> are already <b>at the top of the altar, they shall descend.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>Who is the <i>tanna</i> that you heard that says</b> if <b>they separated they shall descend? It is Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>“And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar”</b> (Leviticus 1:9); the term “the whole” serves <b>to include the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves,</b> among those items that are offered on the altar, <b>even</b> if <b>they separated</b> from the flesh of the offering.",
            "<b>But</b> if so, <b>how do I realize</b> the meaning of the verse: <b>“And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:27), which indicates that only the flesh and blood of an offering ascend upon the altar? This verse is necessary <b>to tell you</b> an additional <i>halakha</i>, that <b>you return</b> the <b>consumed</b> flesh of <b>a burnt offering</b> to the fire if it is dislodged from it, <b>but you do not return</b> the <b>consumed tendons and bones</b> if they are dislodged from the fire.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> that <b>one verse states: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar,”</b> which <b>included</b> tendons and bones, <b>and one verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood,”</b> which <b>excluded</b> any part other than the flesh and the blood. <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled? If they were <b>attached</b> to the flesh, <b>they shall ascend.</b> If <b>they separated</b> from the flesh, then <b>even</b> if <b>they</b> are already <b>on top of the altar, they shall descend.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that items that are not meant for consumption on the altar, such as the bones and tendons, are sacrificed along with the flesh if they are attached to it. But if <b>they separated they shall not ascend. Rabbi Zeira said:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> that if they separated from the flesh they shall not ascend <b>only when they separated</b> from the offering <b>downward,</b> i.e., away from the altar, whereby they became distanced from the pyre when they were separated. <b>But</b> if they separated from the offering <b>upward,</b> i.e., they became closer to the pyre when they were separated from the offering, <b>they have become closer to consumption</b> and shall ascend. The Gemara asks: <b>And even</b> if <b>they separated,</b> shall they be offered? Doesn’t the mishna state that they shall ascend only if they are still attached to the flesh?",
            "<b>Rabba said: This</b> is what Rabbi Zeira <b>is saying:</b> It was necessary for the Sages to <b>teach</b> the <i>halakha</i>, that bones or tendons that separated from the flesh of an offering shall not ascend the altar, <b>only where they separated after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of its blood, since at the time that the flesh itself became permitted for the altar through the sprinkling, the bones and tendons were still attached to the flesh and therefore fit to be offered with it. <b>But</b> if <b>they separated</b> from an offering <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of its blood they shall certainly not ascend, as they were already separated from the flesh when it became permitted for the altar. Instead, the <b>sprinkling comes and permits them</b> for any use, just as the hide of a burnt offering is permitted to the priests upon the sprinkling of its blood. In fact, one may <b>even</b> use such tendons or bones <b>to fashion the handles of knives from them.</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: Rabba <b>holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:</b> It <b>is stated: “He shall have</b> the hide of the burnt offering that he has offered” (Leviticus 7:8), <b>with regard to a burnt offering, and</b> it <b>is stated:</b> “The priest that makes atonement, <b>he shall have it”</b> (Leviticus 7:7), <b>with regard to a guilt offering.</b> The following verbal analogy is derived from here: <b>Just as</b> after the blood of <b>a guilt offering</b> is presented <b>its bones</b> become <b>permitted</b> to the priest for any use, since only the portions intended for consumption on the altar are sacrificed whereas the rest of the animal is given to the priests, <b>so too,</b> with regard to <b>a burnt offering, bones</b> that are not attached to the flesh and therefore are not intended for the altar are <b>permitted.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes: The phrase “He shall have” is <b>free,</b> i.e., superfluous in its context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy, and there is a principle that such verbal analogies are not refuted. <b>As, if</b> these words were <b>not</b> considered <b>free,</b> the verbal analogy <b>can be refuted</b> by saying: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a guilt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that its meat is permitted</b> and its bones are therefore permitted as well, while the flesh of a burnt offering ascends upon the altar in its entirety. If so, <i>halakhot</i> may not be applied to one based on the other. Consequently, the phrase <b>“He shall have”</b> with regard to a burnt offering is considered as having been <b>written superfluously,</b> as it would have sufficed to state: The hide of the burnt offering that he has offered, to the priest.",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection</b> to the explanation of Rabba from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>the bones of sacrificial</b> animals, specifically sin offerings or guilt offerings, which are offerings of the most sacred order that are intended for consumption, <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of their blood, one who benefits <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, similar to the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order before their blood is sprinkled.",
            "<b>After</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of their blood, one who benefits <b>from them</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, as they are not intended for sacrificing upon the altar. <b>But</b> concerning the bones <b>of a burnt offering,</b> one who benefits <b>from them</b> is <b>always</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. This <i>baraita</i> contradicts the opinion of Rabba, who said that if the bones separated from a burnt offering before the sprinkling of its blood, it is permitted to derive benefit from them.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> meant the following: <b>But</b> concerning the bones <b>of a burnt offering,</b> if <b>they separated before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of its blood and its blood was then sprinkled, then one who benefits <b>from them</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. If they separated <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of its blood, one who benefits <b>from them</b> is <b>always</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "<b>And</b> Rabba <b>disagrees with Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says:</b> If the bones of a burnt offering <b>separated</b> from its flesh <b>before sprinkling,</b> one who benefits <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. If they separated <b>after sprinkling,</b> the Sages decreed that one <b>may not benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one benefitted from them after the fact, he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse,</b> since by Torah law they were permitted through the sprinkling of the offering’s blood.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>And all of</b> those disqualified offerings with regard to which it was taught (84a) that if they ascended they do not descend, in a case <b>where they were dislodged from upon the altar,</b> the priest <b>does not restore</b> them to the altar. <b>And likewise,</b> with regard to <b>an ember that was dislodged from upon the altar,</b> the priest <b>does not restore</b> it to the altar. As for <b>limbs</b> of a fit burnt offering <b>that were dislodged from upon the altar,</b> if they were dislodged <b>before midnight,</b> the priest <b>should restore</b> them to the altar <b>and</b> one is liable for <b>misusing them.</b> But if they were dislodged <b>after midnight,</b> the priest <b>does not restore them and</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing them,</b> as one is not liable for misuse of consecrated property after it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was designated.",
            "With regard to unfit items that if they ascended do not descend, <b>just as the altar sanctifies</b> items <b>that are suited to it, so too, the ramp sanctifies</b> items that are suited to it. <b>Just as the altar and the ramp sanctify</b> items <b>that are suited to them, so too, the</b> service <b>vessels sanctify</b> items that are placed in them.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that limbs of a fit burnt offering that were dislodged from upon the altar before midnight are returned to the altar, but that if they were dislodged after midnight they are not returned. The Gemara asks: <b>What are the circumstances? If</b> the limbs <b>have substance,</b> i.e., they were not yet consumed in their entirety by the fire, then <b>even</b> if they were dislodged <b>after midnight</b> the priest must return them to the fire. <b>If they do not have substance</b> and have been reduced to ash, then <b>even</b> if they were dislodged <b>before midnight</b> the priest does <b>not</b> return them to the altar. The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> it is <b>necessary</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>with regard to hardened</b> limbs that were dried by the fire but have not yet been reduced to ash. The mishna teaches that before midnight, such limbs should be returned to the altar. The Gemara asks: <b>From where is this matter</b> derived that midnight determines whether or not they shall be returned?",
            "<b>Rav says: One verse states: All night and he shall burn</b> the burnt offering, which indicates that there is a mitzva to burn the limbs of a burnt offering all night, as the verse states: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar all night until the morning” (Leviticus 6:2). <b>And one verse states: “All night</b> until the morning…<b>and he shall remove</b> the ashes that the fire has consumed of the burnt offering on the altar, and he shall put them beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:2–3), which indicates that one may remove the ashes at any time during the night, including the limbs of a burnt offering that were already hardened by the fire. How can these texts be reconciled?",
            "Rav explains: <b>Divide</b> the night into two parts: <b>Half of</b> the night, i.e., until midnight, is designated <b>for</b> the mitzva of <b>burning,</b> and during this time, that which is dislodged from the altar shall be returned; <b>and half of</b> the night, i.e., after midnight, is designated <b>for removing.</b>",
            "With regard to Rav’s assertion that one may begin to remove the ashes only after midnight, <b>Rav Kahana raises an objection</b> from a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 20a): <b>Every day</b> the priests would <b>remove</b> the ashes from <b>the altar</b> and place them on the east side of the ramp <b>at the rooster’s crow or close to</b> the time of its crowing, whether <b>before it or after it,</b> as there was no insistence on a precise time. <b>On Yom Kippur</b> they would remove the ashes <b>at midnight. On the Festivals</b> the ashes were removed even earlier, <b>at</b> the end of <b>the first watch.</b> Rav Kahana concludes his objection: <b>And if it enters your mind</b> that the proper time for removing the ashes <b>by Torah law</b> is <b>from midnight, how do we advance</b> the removal of the ashes on the Festivals, <b>and how do we delay</b> their removal the rest of the year?",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> The proper time of the removal of the ashes is based on the following: <b>From</b> the fact <b>that</b> it <b>is stated</b> with regard to the burning of the limbs: <b>“All night”</b> (Leviticus 6:2), <b>don’t I know that</b> he may burn a burnt offering <b>until the morning?</b> If so, <b>what</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “Until the morning”?</b> It means: <b>Add</b> another <b>morning to the morning of</b> the <b>night.</b> Arise before dawn, as that is the time for the removal of the ashes. Nevertheless, there is no specific hour fixed for performing this removal, and one may remove the ashes from the beginning of the night.",
            "<b>Therefore, every day,</b> performing the removal <b>at the rooster’s crow is sufficient. On Yom Kippur, due to</b> the <b>weakness of the High Priest,</b> who must perform the entire Temple service on that day, they would hasten to remove the ashes <b>from midnight. On the Festivals,</b> during <b>which</b> there are <b>many offerings</b> on account of the masses of <b>Jewish people</b> in Jerusalem on those days, who, in order to offer their sacrifices, would <b>arrive early</b> at the Temple, they would remove the ashes beginning <b>from</b> the end of <b>the first watch, as</b> the mishna <b>teaches</b> in <b>the latter clause</b> (<i>Yoma</i> 20a): <b>The call of the rooster would not arrive</b> on Festivals <b>until the Temple courtyard was filled with Jews.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara previously explained the mishna as saying that limbs that were hardened by the fire but not entirely consumed are not returned to the altar if they were dislodged from it after midnight, since the mitzva of burning has been performed and the limbs are considered to have been entirely consumed. It <b>was stated</b> that <i>amora’im</i> engage in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of limbs that <b>separated</b> from upon the altar <b>before midnight and</b> were <b>returned after midnight,</b> whereby the mitzva of burning was not completed by midnight, <b>Rabba says:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The <b>second midnight,</b> i.e., midnight of the following night, <b>renders them consumed,</b> and if they were dislodged from the altar thereafter they are not returned. <b>Rav Ḥisda says: Dawn</b> following the first evening <b>renders them consumed,</b> and if they were dislodged from the altar thereafter they are not returned.",
            "<b>They say</b> in <b>the school of Rav: What is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda,</b> who says that dawn renders these limbs consumed? It is the following <i>a fortiori</i> inference: <b>And if midnight, which does not cause</b> the disqualification of being <b>left overnight</b> with regard to limbs that were left off the altar until that time, still <b>causes consumption,</b> i.e., limbs burned on the altar until midnight are considered entirely consumed, then certainly with regard to <b>dawn, which causes</b> the disqualification of being <b>left overnight</b> with regard to limbs that were not left off the altar until that time, <b>isn’t it logical that it causes consumption?</b>",
            "These <i>amora’im</i> also dispute the <i>halakha</i> in a case where the limbs <b>separated</b> from the altar <b>before midnight and were returned</b> to the altar <b>after dawn: Rabba says</b> that the <b>second midnight renders them consumed,</b> and if they separated after this time they are not returned. <b>Rav Ḥisda says:</b> Since these limbs were not returned to the altar by dawn, <b>they are never subject to consumption</b> through the passage of time. Rather, they are returned to the altar and allowed to burn until they are reduced to ash. These two disputes between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda indicate that both agree that limbs not on the altar by midnight are not considered consumed.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef objects to this: And who shall say to us that midnight,</b> specifically when the limbs are <b>at the top of the altar, effects for them consumption? Perhaps anywhere that</b> the limbs <b>are found,</b> midnight <b>effects for them consumption.</b> The Gemara notes: <b>They sent from there,</b> i.e., Eretz Yisrael, that <b>the <i>halakha</i></b> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Yosef,</b> i.e., the passing of midnight renders all limbs consumed, regardless of their location at that time.",
            "It <b>was also stated</b> that <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says:</b> In the case of limbs that <b>separated</b> from upon the altar <b>before midnight and</b> were <b>returned</b> to the altar <b>after midnight,</b> one <b>may not benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one benefited from them after the fact he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, since the mitzva of burning is considered fulfilled after midnight has passed. <b>And bar Kappara also taught:</b> If <b>they separated</b> from upon the altar <b>before midnight and</b> were <b>returned</b> to the altar <b>after midnight,</b> the limbs <b>are removed from</b> being subject to liability for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And since they sent from there</b> that <b>the <i>halakha</i></b> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Yosef</b> that midnight effects consumption even for those items left off the altar, <b>and Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> this as well, <b>and bar Kappara also teaches</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i>, then <b>with regard to what do Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree?</b> Abaye <b>said to him:</b> They disagree <b>with regard to fatty</b> limbs, whose consumption is delayed due to their surrounding fat, and consequently midnight may not effect consumption for these limbs.",
            "§ <b>Rava raises a dilemma before Rabba:</b> Is the disqualification of <b>being left overnight effective</b> in disqualifying limbs that are situated <b>at the top of the altar</b> at dawn but were not placed on the pyre, <b>or is</b> it <b>not effective</b> in disqualifying limbs that are <b>at the top of the altar</b> but were not placed on the pyre? The Gemara clarifies: <b>What are the circumstances? If we say that</b> the limbs <b>have not descended</b> from the altar, then the <i>halakha</i> should be obvious: <b>Now</b> that with regard to limbs that were <b>left overnight in the Temple courtyard, you said</b> in the mishna (84a) <b>that</b> if they ascended upon the altar <b>they shall not descend,</b> then with regard to limbs left <b>on top of the altar,</b> is it <b>necessary</b> to teach that they shall not descend?",
            "<b>But rather,</b> the dilemma is in a case <b>where</b> they were left overnight on top of the altar and <b>descended</b> from it after dawn. Do <b>we compare</b> limbs left overnight on top of the altar <b>to</b> the <b>Table</b> of the shewbread, and they are therefore returned, <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 100a): <b>Even</b> if loaves of shewbread, which are supposed to be replaced every Shabbat, remained <b>on the Table many days</b> beyond Shabbat, there is <b>nothing</b> wrong <b>with that,</b> and the loaves are not disqualified by being left overnight. <b>Or perhaps we compare</b> the limbs <b>to</b> flesh left on the <b>ground</b> of the Temple courtyard, which is disqualified when left there until dawn, and they are not returned.",
            "Rabba <b>said to him: There is no</b> disqualification of limbs that are <b>left overnight at the top of the altar.</b> The Gemara asks: Did Rava <b>accept</b> this response <b>from</b> Rabba <b>or not?</b> The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof from that <b>which was stated:</b> With regard to <b>limbs that were left overnight in the Temple courtyard,</b> the priest may place them upon the altar to <b>burn</b> them <b>all night</b> long provided that they are placed there before dawn. With regard to a limb that was <b>left overnight at the top of the altar,</b> the priest may <b>burn</b> it <b>forever,</b> i.e., no matter how much time has passed.",
            "With regard to limbs that were left overnight on top of the altar and then <b>descended</b> from it, <b>Rabba says</b> that <b>they shall ascend,</b> while <b>Rava says</b> that <b>they shall not ascend. Conclude from it</b> that Rava <b>did not accept</b> the response <b>from</b> Rabba, as he holds here that limbs are disqualified when left overnight on top of the altar. The Gemara confirms: Indeed, <b>conclude from it</b> that this is so.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Just as the altar sanctifies</b> items, so too, the ramp and the service vessels sanctify items. With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, <b>the Sages taught:</b> The verse states: “Whatever <b>touches the altar</b> shall be sacred” (Exodus 29:37). From here <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that the <b>altar</b> sanctifies items. <b>From where</b> is it derived that the <b>ramp</b> sanctifies items as well? <b>The verse states:</b> “And you shall anoint…<b>the altar [<i>et hamizbe’aḥ</i>]”</b> (Exodus 40:10), and the addition of the word <i>et</i> serves to include the ramp. With regard to <b>service vessels, from where</b> is it derived that they sanctify items? <b>The verse states</b> with regard to them: <b>“Whatever touches them shall be sacred”</b> (Exodus 30:29).",
            "<b>Reish Lakish raises a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>whether service vessels sanctify disqualified</b> items? Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him: You learned</b> in the mishna that <b>just as the altar and the ramp sanctify</b> items <b>that are suited to them</b> even if those items are disqualified, <b>so too,</b> the service <b>vessels sanctify</b> items placed in them.",
            "Reish Lakish <b>said to him:</b> The mishna indicates that service vessels sanctify that which is placed in them in the sense that they may no longer be redeemed even if they become disqualified. <b>I raise the dilemma</b> with regard to whether service vessels sanctify disqualified items such that they may be <b>sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>.</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: <b>This also we learn</b> in a mishna (84a):"
        ],
        [
            "An offering <b>that</b> people <b>unfit</b> for performing the Temple service <b>collected and</b> then <b>sprinkled its blood</b> shall not descend from the altar if it ascended. <b>What, is it not</b> that the mishna means <b>that</b> people <b>unfit</b> for performing the Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood <b>and</b> people <b>unfit</b> for performing the Temple service <b>sprinkled</b> it as well, which disqualifies it from ascending the altar? But if the collection alone was performed by people unfit for performing the Temple service, although the offering becomes disqualified, those fit to perform the Temple service may sprinkle the blood and sacrifice the offering <i>ab initio</i>. The reason, apparently, is that service vessels sanctify disqualified blood such that it may be sprinkled <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "Reish Lakish rejects this proof: <b>No,</b> the mishna may be referring to two independent cases, i.e., <b>that</b> people <b>unfit</b> for performing the Temple service <b>collected</b> the blood, <b>or that</b> people <b>unfit</b> for performing the Temple service <b>sprinkled</b> the blood after it was collected by people who were fit for performing the Temple service. Accordingly, the mishna teaches only that if such offerings ascended the altar they shall not descend after the fact, but service vessels do not sanctify disqualified items such that they are offered <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "§ The Gemara raises a dilemma: Is the <b>airspace</b> above the <b>altar considered as</b> the <b>altar</b> itself, whereby items that enter this airspace shall not descend from the altar, <b>or</b> is it <b>not</b> considered like the altar? The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the mishna, which states: <b>Just as the altar sanctifies</b> items, <b>so too,</b> the <b>ramp sanctifies</b> items, and if they ascended upon it they shall be sacrificed upon the altar and shall not descend.",
            "<b>And if you say</b> that the <b>airspace</b> above the <b>altar</b> is <b>not considered as</b> the <b>altar</b> itself, then the <b>airspace</b> above the <b>ramp as well</b> should <b>not</b> be <b>considered as the ramp.</b> If so, <b>how</b> can one <b>elevate</b> the disqualified limbs of an offering <b>from</b> the <b>ramp to</b> the <b>altar?</b> The moment one elevates a limb from upon the ramp, <b>it is</b> considered to have <b>descended</b> from the ramp, and all disqualified items that descended shall not be returned.",
            "The Gemara responds: The mishna is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>drags</b> the offering up the ramp, but it never enters its airspace. The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> even if he drags it up the ramp, he must still lift it, as <b>there is a space between</b> the <b>ramp and the altar.</b> The Gemara responds: Since this gap is small, only a minority of the limb of an offering will be located over the gap as it passes from the ramp to the altar. Therefore, when <b>a majority of</b> the limb is <b>on the ramp,</b> the minority situated above the gap is considered <b>as</b> if it is on <b>the ramp.</b> Once <b>a majority of</b> the limb is <b>on the altar,</b> the minority situated above the gap is considered <b>as</b> if it is on <b>the altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, <b>resolve from this</b> mishna <b>the dilemma that was raised by Rami bar Ḥama: Is there a connection of</b> limbs that <b>ascend</b> upon the altar, i.e., is an offering considered a unit such that even those parts that do not ascend the altar shall be considered as if they are upon it, <b>or</b> is there <b>not,</b> and each part is considered independent? Based on the previous answer, <b>resolve</b> the dilemma by saying <b>that there is a connection</b> of limbs. The Gemara responds: <b>This</b> is <b>not difficult,</b> as one may indeed <b>resolve</b> Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma from here.",
            "<b>Rava bar Rav Ḥanan objects to</b> the assumption that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself: <b>But if you say</b> that the <b>airspace</b> above the <b>altar</b> is <b>considered as</b> the <b>altar</b> itself, then with regard to <b>a bird burnt offering that</b> one <b>disqualified by</b> having the <b>intention</b> to burn it beyond its designated time, i.e., the day after it was pinched, <b>how can you find</b> the circumstances for such a disqualification to take effect?",
            "One’s intent to burn an offering beyond its designated time disqualifies it only when he intended to burn it during a time that he may not do so. Since a bird burnt offering is pinched in the airspace above the altar, the <b>altar</b> has already <b>accepted it.</b> Therefore, even if one delayed burning it until the next day, it does not descend from the altar, like all other offerings that are disqualified by being left overnight.",
            "<b>Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to</b> the objection raised by Rava bar Rav Ḥanan: <b>Why</b> is it <b>not</b> possible for a bird burnt offering to be disqualified through the intention to burn it beyond its designated time? <b>You find it</b> in a case <b>where he says: I am hereby pinching it in order to take it down</b> from the altar <b>tomorrow and</b> thereafter <b>sacrifice it and burn it.</b> If he takes it down from the altar the next day, he may not subsequently return it there for burning, as all disqualified items that have descended from the altar shall not be returned to it. Accordingly, even if the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself, a bird burnt offering can still be disqualified with such intention.",
            "The Gemara questions the objection of Rav Shimi bar Ashi: <b>This works out well according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rava, who says</b> that the disqualification of <b>being left overnight</b> is <b>effective</b> even when the offering is <b>at the top of the altar.</b> Accordingly, if he were to take the bird burnt offering down from the altar the next day, he may not restore it to the altar for burning. <b>But</b> this is difficult <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba, who says:</b> The disqualification of <b>being left overnight</b> is <b>not effective</b> when the offering is <b>at the top of the altar,</b> and therefore even if the next day he removed the bird burnt offering from the altar, he must return it there to burn it, as it has not been disqualified. If so, <b>his intention is not</b> significant, i.e., he does not disqualify a bird burnt offering with such intention.",
            "Rav Shimi bar Ashi responds: <b>According to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba as well, you find</b> a case of a bird burnt offering that is disqualified due to one’s intention, <b>such as where he says: I am hereby pinching it in order to take it down</b> from the altar <b>before dawn and</b> to then <b>sacrifice it after dawn.</b> In such a case, where the offering is removed from the altar before dawn, even Rabba would agree that one’s intention renders a bird burnt offering disqualified by being left overnight.",
            "Rav Shimi bar Ashi adds: Irrespective of the validity of the proof of Rava bar Rav Ḥanan, <b>in any event, resolve</b> the issue <b>to this side,</b> i.e., in favor of the claim <b>that</b> the <b>airspace</b> above the <b>altar</b> is <b>considered as</b> the <b>altar</b> itself. <b>As if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that the <b>airspace</b> above the <b>altar</b> is <b>not considered as</b> the <b>altar,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "then with regard to the case of <b>a disqualified bird sin offering</b> that was pinched at the top of the altar, <b>how</b> does one <b>sprinkle from its blood</b> on the wall of the altar? When the priest raises the bird in his hand in order to sprinkle its blood, the bird <b>is</b> considered to have <b>descended</b> from upon the altar and he cannot sprinkle its blood, as the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all disqualified items is that once they have descended from upon the altar they shall not ascend. Likewise, concerning the blood of <b>other</b> offerings that were <b>disqualified</b> that ascended upon the altar, <b>how</b> does he <b>sprinkle from their blood,</b> since it is sprinkled from the airspace above the altar? Rather, it must be that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that in such cases one does not sprinkle the blood in its normal fashion, but in such a manner <b>that he presses it</b> against the wall of the altar immediately without the blood passing through the air. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: <b>Is this</b> considered <b>sprinkling?</b> It <b>is squeezing,</b> an act that is performed for a bird burnt offering, not for a bird sin offering. Likewise, if one sprinkles the blood of other disqualified offerings in this manner, is <b>this sprinkling? It is pouring.</b>",
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> with regard to a disqualified bird burnt offering, is <b>the manner of sprinkling in such</b> a fashion? And in the case of other disqualified offerings, is <b>the manner of sprinkling in such</b> a fashion? It is not. Rather, the airspace above the altar must be considered as the altar.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said: If</b> the question concerns a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>held</b> the blood or limbs while standing <b>at the top of the altar,</b> they would <b>indeed</b> be considered as having ascended the altar, and shall not descend from it. But <b>when</b> the dilemma was <b>stated</b> with regard to the airspace above the altar, it was with regard to an instance <b>where he suspended them with a pole</b> above the altar, while he himself stood on the floor of the Temple courtyard. <b>What</b> is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case? The Gemara responds that the dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The mishna elaborates on the <i>halakha</i> taught in the previous mishna (86a) that service vessels sanctify items placed in them. <b>The</b> service <b>vessels</b> used for <b>liquids sanctify</b> only <b>liquids</b> used in the service, <b>and</b> the service vessels that serve as <b>dry measures sanctify</b> only <b>dry</b> items used in the service. <b>The</b> service <b>vessels</b> used for <b>liquids do not sanctify dry</b> items, <b>and</b> the service vessels used for <b>dry</b> items <b>do not sanctify liquids.</b> With regard to <b>sacred vessels that were perforated, if one</b> continues to <b>utilize them</b> for a use <b>similar to the use for which they would utilize them</b> previously when <b>they</b> were <b>whole, they</b> continue to <b>sanctify</b> their contents. <b>And if not, they do not sanctify</b> their contents. <b>And all of</b> these vessels <b>sanctify</b> items <b>only</b> when they are <b>in the sacred</b> area, i.e., the Temple courtyard.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> With regard to the statement of the mishna that the vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry items, <b>Shmuel says:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>only</b> with regard to <b>measures</b> used for liquids, i.e., wine or oil. <b>But cups,</b> which are used for collecting the blood of offerings, <b>sanctify</b> dry items as well, <b>as it is stated</b> in the verse: “One silver cup of seventy shekels, after the shekel of the sanctuary; <b>both of them full of fine flour</b> mingled with oil for a meal offering” (Numbers 7:13), indicating that the cups were also fashioned for use with flour, a dry item.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina:</b> The <b>meal offering</b> of the verse <b>is</b> also considered <b>a liquid,</b> as it is mixed with oil, and one cannot derive from it the <i>halakha</i> with regard to items that are entirely dry. Ravina <b>said to him:</b> The verse cited by Shmuel <b>was only necessary to</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the dry</b> portions <b>of</b> a meal offering, teaching that even flour that remained dry because it did not get thoroughly mixed with the oil is sanctified by the cups as well. <b>If you wish, say</b> instead: <b>A meal offering,</b> even though it is mixed with oil, is, <b>in comparison to blood, considered as a dry</b> item. Accordingly, one can derive from the verse that the cups sanctify all dry items.",
            "Additionally, <b>Shmuel says: Service vessels sanctify</b> items <b>only</b> when the vessels are <b>whole,</b> i.e., they do not have a hole; <b>they sanctify only full</b> measures, i.e., when they contain a measurement fit for offering; and <b>they sanctify</b> items <b>only from within them</b> and not items that merely touched their exterior. <b>And some say</b> there is another version of the statement of Shmuel: Service vessels <b>sanctify</b> items <b>only</b> when the vessels are <b>whole, and</b> when they contain <b>full</b> measures, <b>and from inside.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the difference <b>between</b> these two versions? The Gemara responds: The difference <b>between them is</b> with regard to <b>heaping measures.</b> According to the first version, that service vessels sanctify only items that are within them, nothing that overflows is included. The Gemara notes that it <b>was taught in a <i>baraita</i></b> in accordance with both versions: Service vessels <b>sanctify</b> items <b>only</b> when they are <b>whole, and</b> only <b>full</b> measurements, <b>and from within them, and inside.</b>",
            "With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that service vessels sanctify only full measurements, <b>Rabbi Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>only when</b> the priest’s initial <b>intention</b> was <b>not to add</b> to that which was already placed inside the vessel. <b>But</b> if <b>his</b> initial <b>intention</b> was <b>to add,</b> then <b>each initial</b> amount placed in the vessel becomes <b>sacred,</b> no matter how small.",
            "<b>This</b> distinction <b>is also taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that service vessels sanctify <b>full</b> measurements, <b>full</b> measurements are <b>nothing other than whole</b> measurements. <b>Rabbi Yosei said: When</b> are full measurements whole ones? It is <b>at a time that</b> the priest’s <b>intention</b> was <b>not to add. But</b> if <b>his intention</b> was <b>to add, each initial</b> amount is <b>sacred.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>the</b> service <b>vessels</b> used for <b>liquids do not sanctify</b> dry items. With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, <b>Rav says, and some say</b> that <b>Rav Asi</b> says: The service vessels used for liquids <b>do not sanctify</b> dry items to permit them <b>for sacrifice</b> upon the altar, <b>but they sanctify</b> dry items in order for the items <b>to be disqualified</b> by them, i.e., dry items placed in such vessels may be disqualified by that which disqualifies only sanctified items, e.g., if they are touched by one who immersed that day, or if they emerged from the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>There are</b> those <b>who teach this</b> statement <b>with regard to this</b> <i>halakha</i>: <b>One may not bring meal offerings, or libations, or meal offerings</b> accompanying <b>an animal, or first fruits, from a mixture</b> containing <i>teruma</i>, since that which may not be consumed by all Jews may not be used for an offering. <b>And needless to say,</b> one may not bring these items <b>from</b> the fruit of a tree that is <b><i>orla</i>,</b> i.e., a tree during the first three years after its planting, from which it is prohibited to eat, <b>or</b> from <b>diverse kinds</b> sown <b>in a vineyard,</b> both of which are prohibited for consumption to priests as well. <b>And if he brought</b> an offering from them, it is <b>not sanctified.</b> With regard to this issue, <b>Rav says, and some say</b> that <b>Rav Asi</b> says: It is <b>not sanctified for sacrifice</b> upon the altar, <b>but</b> it is <b>sanctified</b> in order <b>to be disqualified.</b>",
            "§ With regard to perforated vessels, <b>the Sages taught:</b> In the case of <b>sacred vessels that were perforated, one may not melt them</b> in order to seal the perforation, <b>and one may not melt lead into them</b> for such a purpose. If the vessels <b>were damaged, one may not repair them.</b> Concerning <b>a knife that was damaged, one may not sharpen</b> the spot of <b>its damage.</b> If the blade <b>separated</b> from the handle, <b>one may not restore it. Abba Shaul says: There was</b> a certain <b>knife in the Temple</b> whose metal was soft and easily damaged, such that when used it would often <b>render</b> animals <b>prohibited,</b> thereby disqualifying them. Accordingly, the <b>priests voted concerning it, and</b> elected to <b>hide it.</b>",
            "<b>The Sages taught: Priestly vestments are not fashioned</b> by <b>needlework,</b> i.e., by stitching various parts together, but <b>rather</b> through <b>woven work,</b> whereby the entire garment is initially woven into one entity, <b>as it is stated: “Woven work”</b> (Exodus 28:32). If the garments <b>were soiled one may not launder</b> them, <b>neither with natron nor with soap,</b> two common detergents.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> may it be inferred from this that <b>with water one may launder</b> the priestly vestments? <b>Abaye said: This</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> If the dirtied garments have only <b>reached</b> the point where laundering them <b>with water</b> alone would suffice, <b>one may launder them with natron and soap,</b> as they are not considered soiled."
        ],
        [
            "But if the garments became so dirty that they <b>reached</b> a point that laundering them would require the use of <b>natron or soap,</b> then <b>one may not launder</b> them, <b>even with water. And some say: One may not launder</b> the priestly vestments <b>at all,</b> even if laundering them with water would suffice, <b>because there is no poverty in a place of wealth,</b> i.e., only priestly vestments that were clean as new should be worn, as is befitting the Temple service, and those that were laundered should not be worn.",
            "§ With regard to the priestly vestments, <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>The robe</b> of the High Priest <b>was</b> sewn <b>entirely of sky-blue wool, as it is stated: “And he made the robe of the ephod</b> of woven work, <b>all of sky-blue wool”</b> (Exodus 39:22). With regard to <b>its skirts,</b> concerning which it states: “And they made upon the skirts of the robe pomegranates of sky blue, and purple, and scarlet, twined” (Exodus 39:24), <b>how</b> were they fashioned? The tailor <b>brings sky-blue wool, and purple wool, and scarlet wool,</b> which are <b>twined</b> together, <b>and fashions them</b> to appear <b>as pomegranates that have not opened their mouths,</b> i.e., they are sewn in the appearance of pomegranates that are not yet ripe enough for the crown on top to open, <b>and as</b> the <b>cones [<i>konaot</i>] of</b> the <b>helmets [<i>kenasot</i>] that</b> are found <b>on the heads of children.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> in order to fulfill that which is stated: “And they made bells of pure gold, and put the bells between the pomegranates” (Exodus 39:25), he <b>brings seventy-two bells,</b> i.e., the outer part of bells, made from gold, <b>that</b> contain <b>inside them seventy-two bell clappers, and he suspends</b> them <b>on</b> the skirts: <b>Thirty-six</b> of each, i.e., pomegranates and bells, <b>on this side</b> of the robe, <b>and thirty-six</b> of each <b>on that side,</b> as the verse states: “A bell and a pomegranate, a bell and a pomegranate, upon the skirts of the robe around it” (Exodus 39:26). <b>Rabbi Dosa says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: There were thirty-six</b> bells suspended around the skirt, <b>eighteen from this side and eighteen from that side.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Inini bar Sason says: Just as</b> there is <b>a disagreement here</b> between <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to the total number of bells suspended around the skirt of the robe of the High Priest, <b>so</b> is there <b>a disagreement</b> between <i>tanna’im</i> <b>with regard to</b> the total number of <b>shades of</b> leprous <b>marks. As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 1:4): With regard to the total number of <b>shades of</b> leprous <b>marks, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says:</b> There are <b>thirty-six,</b> while <b>Akavya ben Mahalalel says:</b> There are <b>seventy-two.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara cites another statement of this sage: <b>And Rabbi Inini bar Sason says: Why</b> was <b>the passage</b> in the Torah that discusses <b>offerings</b> (Leviticus, chapters 1–7) <b>juxtaposed to the passage</b> that discusses the <b>priestly vestments</b> (Leviticus, chapter 8)? It was juxtaposed <b>to tell you</b> that <b>just as offerings effect atonement, so too, priestly vestments effect atonement.</b>",
            "The <b>tunic atones for bloodshed, as it is stated</b> with regard to the brothers of Joseph after they plotted to kill him: <b>“And they killed a goat, and dipped the tunic in the blood”</b> (Genesis 37:31). The <b>trousers atone for forbidden sexual relations, as it is stated</b> with regard to fashioning the priestly vestments: <b>“And you shall make them linen trousers to cover the flesh of their nakedness”</b> (Exodus 28:42). The <b>mitre atones for the arrogant. From where</b> is this derived? <b>Rabbi Ḥanina says:</b> It is logical that <b>an item</b> that is placed <b>at an elevation,</b> i.e., on the head of a priest, <b>shall come and atone for</b> the sin of <b>an elevated</b> heart.",
            "Rabbi Inini bar Sason continues: The <b>belt atones for thought of the heart.</b> The Gemara elaborates: The belt atones for the sins occurring <b>where it is</b> situated, i.e., over the heart. The <b>breastplate</b> of the High Priest <b>atones for</b> improper <b>judgments, as it is stated: “And you shall make a breastplate of judgment”</b> (Exodus 28:15). The <b>ephod</b> of the High Priest <b>atones for idol worship, as it is stated:</b> “And <b>without ephod or teraphim”</b> (Hosea 3:4), meaning that when there is no ephod, the sin of teraphim, i.e., idol worship, is found. Therefore, it may be inferred that if there is an ephod, there is no sin of idol worship.",
            "The <b>robe</b> of the High Priest <b>atones for malicious speech. From where</b> is this known? <b>Rabbi Ḥanina says:</b> It is logical that <b>an item that</b> produces <b>sound,</b> i.e., the robe, which has bells, <b>shall come and atone for an evil sound. And</b> the <b>frontplate</b> of the High Priest <b>atones for brazenness.</b> This is derived from the fact that <b>with regard to the frontplate it is written: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead”</b> (Exodus 28:38), <b>and with regard to brazenness it is written: “And you had a harlot’s forehead”</b> (Jeremiah 3:3).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is that so,</b> that the priestly vestments atone for these sins? <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say:</b> There are <b>two matters</b> that <b>we do not find for them an atonement with offerings, but we find for them an atonement from another place, and they are: Bloodshed and malicious speech.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>bloodshed,</b> its atonement comes <b>from</b> the <b>heifer whose neck is broken.</b> This is referring to a case where a murdered body is found but the identity of the murderer is not known. In such an instance, the Torah mandates that the neck of a heifer must be broken as an atonement for the murder. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>malicious speech,</b> its atonement comes <b>from incense, as Rav Ḥananya teaches</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived that <b>the incense effects atonement? As it is stated</b> after the Israelites spoke slanderously against Moses and Aaron and a plague was sent against them: <b>“And he put on the incense, and made atonement for the people”</b> (Numbers 17:12).",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And</b> similarly, <b>the school of Rabbi Yishmael teaches: For what does incense effect atonement?</b> It effects atonement <b>for malicious speech,</b> in order that <b>an item that</b> is offered <b>in private,</b> i.e., the incense, which is offered by a priest acting alone, <b>shall come and atone for an action</b> generally occurring in <b>private,</b> i.e., malicious speech.",
            "Accordingly, there is <b>a difficulty</b> between that which is stated with regard to <b>malicious speech and</b> that which is stated with regard to <b>malicious speech,</b> as according to Rabbi Inini bar Sason the robe atones for malicious speech, whereas according to the <i>baraita</i> it is only the incense that effects atonement for that transgression. Likewise, there is <b>a difficulty</b> between that which is stated with regard to <b>bloodshed and</b> that which is stated with regard to <b>bloodshed,</b> as according to Rabbi Inini bar Sason the tunic effects atonement for bloodshed, whereas according to the <i>baraita</i> only the heifer whose neck is broken effects atonement for it.",
            "The Gemara answers: With regard to bloodshed, it is <b>not difficult,</b> as <b>this,</b> the tunic, effects atonement for bloodshed in an instance <b>where it is known who killed</b> the victim, and <b>this,</b> the heifer, effects atonement in an instance <b>where it is not known who killed</b> the victim. The Gemara challenges: <b>If it is known who killed</b> the victim, that man <b>is deserving of death,</b> and there is no atonement for the community otherwise, as it is stated: “And no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed within it, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numbers 35:33). The Gemara responds: It is referring to a case where he murdered <b>intentionally but</b> witnesses <b>did not forewarn him</b> of the consequences of committing murder. Therefore, the court may not execute him, as no earthly punishment may be administered without forewarning.",
            "<b>And</b> with regard to the contradiction between that which is stated with regard to <b>malicious speech and</b> that which is stated with regard to <b>malicious speech,</b> it is <b>also not difficult. This,</b> the incense, effects atonement for malicious speech spoken <b>in private,</b> whereas <b>this,</b> the robe, on which the bells that produce noise are placed, effects atonement for malicious speech spoken <b>in public.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Any</b> offering <b>that is</b> more <b>frequent than another precedes the other</b> offering. Therefore, <b>the daily offerings precede the additional offerings,</b> which are sacrificed only on certain days. When Shabbat and the New Moon coincide, the <b>additional Shabbat offerings precede</b> the <b>additional New Moon offerings.</b> Likewise, the <b>additional New Moon offerings precede</b> the <b>additional New Year offerings.</b> The mishna cites the source for the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent: <b>As it is stated</b> with regard to the additional offerings of the first day of Passover: <b>“Besides the burnt offering of the morning, which is for a daily burnt offering, you shall offer these”</b> (Numbers 28:23). The verse indicates that the daily offering is sacrificed first, and then the additional offerings are sacrificed.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent? The Gemara expresses puzzlement at this question: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? One must say <b>that the reason is stated</b> in the mishna, which says that it is derived from the verse: <b>“Besides the burnt offering of the morning.”</b> The Gemara explains: If that verse is the only source, it could be claimed that <b>perhaps it is</b> only the <b>daily offerings that precede</b> the <b>additional offerings, because they are</b> far more <b>frequent,</b> as they are sacrificed daily. With regard to the precedence of a relatively frequent <b>additional offering over</b> a relatively less frequent <b>additional offering,</b> the question arises: <b>From where do we</b> derive this?",
            "<b>Rabbi Ile’a said</b> that it is derived from the fact <b>that the verse states</b> with regard to the additional offerings of Passover: <b>“Like these you shall offer daily, for seven days”</b> (Numbers 28:24). This verse, which immediately follows the one cited previously, indicates that the principle that governs <b>these</b> additional offerings shall be <b>like</b> the principle governing <b>those</b> daily offerings and additional offerings mentioned previously, i.e., the more frequent precedes the less frequent.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But that</b> verse <b>is required to</b> teach <b>its own</b> <i>halakha</i>, that the additional offerings of the first day of Passover recur on each day of Passover. The Gemara answers: <b>If so, let</b> the verse <b>write: These you shall offer daily.</b> Since the Torah writes: “Like these,” both the <i>halakha</i> that these additional offerings are brought on each day of Passover and the principle concerning precedence can be derived from this verse.",
            "The Gemara rejects this suggestion: <b>If</b> the verse <b>had written</b> only: <b>These you shall offer daily for the seven days, I would say</b> that <b>these</b> offerings mentioned in the previous verse are sacrificed in total, over <b>the seven days.</b> Therefore, the Torah writes: “Like these,” to teach that they are all sacrificed each day. The Gemara counters: That interpretation is not possible, as the phrase: “You shall offer <b>daily,” is written</b> in the verse, which indicates that these offerings are sacrificed on each of the seven days.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And still,</b> one can <b>say</b> that <b>these</b> specific offerings are required <b>for the</b> first <b>day; but</b> with regard to the <b>other days, I do not know how many</b> offerings are to be sacrificed. Therefore, the term “like these” is needed to teach this, and cannot be used for the principle that relatively frequent additional offerings precede relatively less frequent additional offerings. The Gemara answers: That interpretation is also not possible, as <b>the verse states: “You shall offer [<i>ta’asu</i>],”</b> indicating <b>that all the</b> sacrificial <b>rites [<i>asiyyot</i>]</b> on all the days of Passover <b>should be equal.</b> Therefore, the term “like these” is in fact superfluous and can be cited as the source of the principle of precedence.",
            "<b>Abaye said:</b> The application of the principle of precedence to all frequent offerings can be derived <b>from the verse itself,</b> cited in the mishna. The reason is that <b>if so,</b> that only the daily offering precedes less frequent offerings, <b>let the verse say</b> merely: <b>“Besides the burnt offering of the morning,” and remain silent</b> from the rest of the verse. <b>Why do I</b> need the additional phrase: <b>“Which is for a daily burnt offering”?</b> This serves <b>to say that this</b> offering <b>that is</b> more <b>frequent,</b> i.e., any more frequent offering, <b>should precede</b> any less frequent offering.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Any</b> offering <b>that is</b> more <b>sacred than another precedes the other</b> offering. The mishna elaborates: If there is blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering to be presented, <b>the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering because it effects acceptance,</b> i.e., atonement, for severe transgressions punishable by <i>karet</i>. Likewise, if there are limbs of a burnt offering and portions of a sin offering to be burned on the altar, the burning of <b>the limbs of</b> the <b>burnt offering precedes the portions of</b> the <b>sin offering, because</b> the burnt offering <b>is entirely</b> burned <b>in the flames</b> on the altar, whereas only part of the sin offering is burned.",
            "Similarly, although both effect atonement, <b>a sin offering precedes a guilt offering due to</b> the fact <b>that its blood is placed on</b> the <b>four corners</b> of the altar and the remnants of its blood are poured <b>on the base</b> of the altar, whereas the blood of the guilt offering is sprinkled on only two corners of the altar. <b>A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering and</b> the <b>nazirite’s ram due to</b> the fact <b>that it is an offering of the most sacred order,</b> and the others are offerings of lesser sanctity. <b>A thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram precede a peace offering due to</b> the fact <b>that they are eaten for one day,</b> like offerings of the most sacred order, whereas a peace offering is eaten for two days, <b>and</b> the thanks offering and nazirite’s ram <b>require loaves</b> to be brought with them, four types with the thanks offering and two types with the nazirite’s ram.",
            "Sacrifice of <b>the peace offering precedes</b> sacrifice of <b>the firstborn</b> offering <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> the peace offering <b>requires placing</b> the blood on the altar, in the form of two placements that are <b>four, and placing hands</b> on the head of the offering, <b>and libations, and the wavings of</b> the <b>breast and the thigh</b> by the priest and the owner; none of which is required for the firstborn offering. <b>The firstborn</b> offering <b>precedes the</b> animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>because it is sanctified from</b> the <b>womb,</b> i.e., unlike the animal tithe offering it does not require consecration, <b>and it is eaten by the priests,</b> whereas everyone may partake of the animal tithe offering.",
            "<b>The</b> animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>precedes bird</b> offerings <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that it</b> requires <b>slaughtering,</b> whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; <b>and there are</b> two elements <b>of</b> the animal tithe offering that have the status of <b>offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood</b> that is presented on the altar <b>and its portions</b> that are burned on the altar, whereas with regard to bird offerings only the blood is presented on the altar. <b>The bird</b> offerings <b>precede meal offerings due to</b> the fact <b>that they are types</b> whose <b>blood</b> is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The <b>meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering due to</b> the fact <b>that it comes</b> to atone <b>for a sin.</b> For the same reason the sacrifice of <b>the bird sin offering precedes</b> the sacrifice of <b>the bird burnt offering, and likewise with regard to its consecration,</b> the sin offering takes precedence."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that the placement of the blood of a sin offering precedes the sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, whereas the burning of the limbs of a burnt offering precedes the burning of the portions of a sin offering. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? The Gemara answers: This is <b>as the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> discussing a verse about the consecration of the Levites: “Then let them take a young bull, and its meal offering, fine flour mingled with oil; <b>and a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering”</b> (Numbers 8:8).",
            "The <i>baraita</i> explains: <b>If</b> this verse <b>comes to teach that they are two</b> bulls, this is superfluous, as it <b>is already stated: “And offer the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering”</b> (Numbers 8:12). <b>Why</b> must <b>the verse state: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering”? As</b> one <b>might</b> have thought <b>that</b> the <b>sin offering should precede all</b> the <b>rites of</b> the <b>burnt offering,</b> therefore <b>the verse states: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering,”</b> which indicates that the sin offering actually comes second to the burnt offering.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>If</b> the verse had stated only that the sin offering is the <b>second bull,</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that the <b>burnt offering precedes</b> the <b>sin offering with regard to all its rites.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And offer the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering,”</b> indicating that the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> verses be reconciled? The placement of the <b>blood of</b> the <b>sin offering precedes</b> the sprinkling of the <b>blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering because it effects acceptance,</b> whereas the burnt offering does not effect atonement. And burning the <b>limbs of</b> the <b>burnt offering</b> on the altar precedes burning the portions of the sin offering, in fulfillment of the phrase: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering.”",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But why</b> do all four placements of the blood of the sin offering precede the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering? <b>Let</b> only the <b>first placement</b> of blood, <b>which effects atonement, take precedence, and those</b> other placements should <b>not</b> come before the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering.",
            "<b>Ravina said:</b> In the verse <b>here, we are dealing with</b> the <b>sin offering</b> brought by <b>the Levites</b> for their consecration. <b>And even though</b> it does not effect atonement and <b>is</b> therefore <b>comparable to a burnt offering, the Merciful One states</b> that the sin offering <b>precedes</b> the burnt offering with regard to the presentation of the blood. This indicates that in general, all four placements of the blood of a sin offering precede the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering, despite the fact that only the first placement effects atonement. <b>In the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, <b>they say</b> there is another answer: <b>Once</b> the priest <b>commenced with the placements</b> of the blood of the sin offering, he <b>completes</b> all of them before sprinkling the blood of the burnt offering.",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If there is <b>blood of a sin offering and limbs of a burnt offering</b> to be sacrificed, <b>which of them precedes</b> the other? Does the <b>blood of</b> the <b>sin offering take precedence, due to</b> the fact <b>that it effects acceptance? Or perhaps</b> the <b>limbs of</b> the <b>burnt offering take precedence, due to</b> the fact <b>that they are entirely</b> burned <b>in the flames</b> of the altar.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear,</b> as the mishna teaches that the <b>blood of a sin offering precedes</b> the <b>blood of a burnt offering.</b> One can infer from this that the blood of the sin offering does not precede all elements of the burnt offering; it is only <b>with regard to the blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering that it takes precedence,</b> whereas it does <b>not take precedence with regard to the limbs of</b> the <b>burnt offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>On the contrary,</b> the opposite conclusion can be inferred <b>from the latter clause</b> of the mishna, which teaches that <b>limbs of a burnt offering precede the portions of</b> the <b>sin offering</b> consumed on the altar. This indicates that <b>it is</b> only <b>with regard to the portions of</b> the <b>sin offering</b> consumed on the altar <b>that</b> the limbs of the burnt offering <b>take precedence,</b> but they do <b>not take precedence with regard to the blood of</b> the <b>sin offering.</b> The Gemara concludes: <b>Rather, no</b> inference is <b>to be learned from this</b> mishna concerning this matter.",
            "<b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If there is <b>blood of a burnt offering</b> to be sprinkled <b>and portions of a sin offering</b> to be burned, <b>which of them precedes</b> the other? Does <b>the blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering take precedence, as it comes from</b> an offering that is burned in its <b>entirety</b> on the altar? <b>Or perhaps the portions of</b> the <b>sin offering</b> to be burned <b>take precedence because they come from</b> an offering that <b>effects atonement.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear,</b> as the mishna teaches that <b>the blood of</b> the <b>sin offering precedes the blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering.</b> One can infer from this that <b>it</b> is only <b>the blood of</b> the <b>sin offering that precedes the blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering, but the portions</b> of the <b>sin offering</b> to be burned do <b>not</b> take precedence.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>On the contrary,</b> the opposite conclusion can be inferred <b>from the latter clause</b> of the mishna, which teaches that <b>the limbs of</b> the <b>burnt offering precede</b> the <b>portions of</b> the <b>sin offering</b> to be consumed on the altar. This indicates that <b>it is</b> only <b>the limbs of</b> the <b>burnt offering that precede the portions of</b> the <b>sin offering</b> to be burned, <b>but the blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering</b> does <b>not.</b> The Gemara again concludes: <b>Rather, no</b> inference is <b>to be learned from this</b> mishna concerning this dilemma.",
            "<b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If there is <b>blood of a burnt offering and blood of a guilt offering</b> to be sprinkled on the altar, <b>which of them precedes</b> the other? Does the <b>blood of the burnt offering take precedence, as it comes from</b> an offering that is burned in its <b>entirety</b> on the altar? <b>Or perhaps the blood of a guilt offering takes precedence, as it effects atonement.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear,</b> as the mishna teaches that <b>the blood of</b> the <b>sin offering precedes the blood of</b> the <b>burnt offering.</b> One can infer from here: <b>But</b> the <b>blood of a guilt offering</b> does <b>not</b> precede the blood of a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>By right</b> the mishna <b>should have taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>blood of a guilt offering.</b> One could then have inferred that the blood of a sin offering, which takes precedence over the blood of a guilt offering, also precedes blood of a burnt offering. <b>But since</b> the mishna <b>wants to teach the latter clause:</b> The burning of <b>the limbs of a burnt offering precedes the portions of a sin offering,</b> it also mentions a sin offering in the former clause.",
            "The Gemara explains why the latter clause had to mention a sin offering rather than a guilt offering: <b>As, had</b> the mishna <b>taught</b> this principle of the latter clause with regard <b>to the portions of a guilt offering, I would say</b> that <b>it is</b> only <b>the portions of a guilt offering</b> over <b>which</b> the limbs of a burnt offering <b>take precedence,</b> but they <b>do not take precedence over the portions of a sin offering,</b> as a sin offering is of greater sanctity than a guilt offering. <b>Due to this</b> reason the mishna in the former clause also <b>taught</b> this principle with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> and one cannot infer from this that its <i>halakha</i> does not apply to the guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear,</b> as the mishna states that <b>a sin offering precedes a guilt offering.</b> One can infer from this that <b>it</b> is only <b>a sin offering that precedes a guilt offering, but a burnt offering</b> does <b>not. What, is</b> the mishna <b>not</b> referring to the sprinkling of the <b>blood,</b> which would indicate that the blood of a burnt offering does not precede the blood of a guilt offering?",
            "The Gemara rejects this explanation: <b>No,</b> it is referring <b>to the</b> precedence of the <b>sacrificial portions</b> consumed on the altar. The Gemara adds that the language of the mishna <b>is also precise</b> in this regard, <b>as it teaches</b> that the sin offering takes precedence <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that its blood is placed</b> on the four corners of the altar, rather than simply teaching: It is placed on the four corners of the altar, as it would have taught had it been speaking of the blood. One can therefore <b>conclude from</b> the statement of the mishna that its subject is the sacrificial portions burned on the altar, not the blood.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>A sin offering precedes</b> a guilt offering due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar and the remainder of its blood is poured on the base of the altar. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary,</b> the <b>guilt offering</b> should <b>precede</b> the sin offering, <b>as it has a fixed</b> minimal <b>value</b> of two shekels, as stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:15), whereas the sin offering has no minimal value. The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that the sin offering requires <b>more</b> placements of the blood <b>on the altar</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "The mishna further teaches: <b>A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering</b> and the nazirite’s ram due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary, the thanks offering and</b> the <b>nazirite’s ram</b> should <b>precede</b> the guilt offering, <b>as they require loaves</b> to be brought with them. The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that the guilt offering is an <b>offering of the most sacred order</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "The mishna teaches: <b>A thanks offering and</b> the <b>nazirite’s ram</b> precede a peace offering due to the fact that they are eaten for only one day. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary, peace offerings</b> should <b>precede</b> the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram, <b>as they are</b> offered <b>by the community as well as by the individual.</b> A communal peace offering is sacrificed on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, but there is no communal thanks offering or nazirite’s ram. The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram <b>are eaten for</b> only <b>one day</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "<b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If there is <b>a thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram</b> to be sacrificed, <b>which of them precedes</b> the other? Does the <b>thanks offering take precedence, as it requires four types of loaves,</b> whereas the nazirite’s ram requires only two? <b>Or perhaps</b> the <b>nazirite’s ram takes precedence, as there are other</b> offerings whose <b>blood</b> is placed on the altar together <b>with</b> the nazirite’s ram. A nazirite is required to sacrifice a burnt offering and a sin offering, as well as a ram. The Gemara answers: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> that explicitly discusses this case: <b>This</b> offering <b>precedes that</b> offering, <b>as this</b> offering, i.e., the thanks offering, <b>requires four types of loaves, and that</b> offering, the nazirite’s ram, <b>requires only two types of loaves.</b>",
            "The mishna teaches: <b>And the peace offering precedes the firstborn</b> offering due to the fact that the peace offering requires two placements of the blood on the altar that are four, and the placement of hands on the animal’s head, and libations, and the wavings of the breast and thigh. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary,</b> the sacrifice of the <b>firstborn</b> offering should <b>precede</b> the peace offering, <b>as it is sanctified from</b> the <b>womb and it is eaten</b> only <b>by the priests,</b> whereas the peace offering may be eaten by non-priests. The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that <b>additional mitzvot</b> are performed in the case of the peace offering is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "The mishna further teaches: <b>The firstborn</b> offering <b>precedes</b> the animal tithe offering because it is sanctified from the womb and is eaten only by the priests. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary,</b> the animal <b>tithe</b> offering should <b>precede</b> the firstborn offering, <b>as</b> if one mistakenly called the ninth or eleventh animal that emerged from the pen the tenth, those animals that came out <b>before or after</b> the tenth are also <b>sanctified.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that the firstborn is <b>sanctified from</b> the <b>womb</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "The mishna teaches: The animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>precedes bird</b> offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; and furthermore, there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood, which is presented on the altar, and its portions that are burned on the altar. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary, bird</b> offerings should <b>precede</b> the animal tithe offering, <b>as</b> they are <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> whether they are burnt offerings or sin offerings. The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that the animal tithe is a <b>type of</b> offering that requires <b>slaughtering</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "§ <b>Ravina bar Sheila says</b> with regard to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar: <b>Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood are disqualified. And the <i>tanna</i></b> of the mishna also <b>taught:</b> The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that it</b> requires <b>slaughtering, and there are</b> two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of <b>offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood and its sacrificial portions</b> consumed on the altar.",
            "The Gemara explains how Ravina bar Sheila interprets the mishna in support of his opinion: <b>Granted, there are no sacrificial portions</b> consumed on the altar <b>from a bird</b> offering, <b>but</b> its <b>blood at least is</b> sprinkled. Why, then, does the mishna mention the blood? <b>Rather, is it not</b> mentioned in order to <b>teach us</b> that the status of the <b>sacrificial portions</b> consumed on the altar from the animal tithe offering and other offerings of lesser sanctity is <b>comparable to</b> the status of <b>its blood?</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the implications of this comparison. <b>Just as its blood</b> referred to in the mishna is blood <b>before</b> its <b>sprinkling</b> on the altar, as afterward it no longer has any sanctity, <b>so too,</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> mentioned in the mishna are from <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, <b>and</b> the mishna <b>calls them</b> at this stage <b>offerings of the most sacred order. And</b> therefore one can infer from this that <b>just as</b> the animal tithe’s <b>blood is disqualified by leaving</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>so too,</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> to be burned on the altar <b>are disqualified by leaving</b> the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara attempts to prove the opinion of Ravina bar Sheila. <b>Let us say</b> that the following dispute between <i>amora’im</i> <b>supports his</b> statement: With regard to <b>flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood, Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that it is <b>fit</b> and <b>Reish Lakish says</b> that it is <b>disqualified.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies this dispute: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that it is <b>fit, since it will ultimately leave</b> the Temple courtyard, as offerings of lesser sanctity may be eaten anywhere within the walls of Jerusalem. <b>Reish Lakish says</b> that it is <b>unfit,</b> as <b>its time to leave</b> the Temple courtyard <b>has not yet arrived</b> because the flesh cannot be taken out until after the sprinkling of the blood. The Gemara infers that these <i>amora’im</i> <b>disagree only with regard to</b> the <b>flesh</b> of the offering, which will eventually leave the Temple courtyard. <b>But with regard to</b> the <b>sacrificial portions</b> of the offering, which will never leave the courtyard, they do <b>not</b> disagree, as Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes that those portions are disqualified.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>The same is true with regard to</b> the <b>sacrificial portions,</b> i.e., these <i>amora’im</i> <b>also disagree</b> in that case, as Rabbi Yoḥanan holds they are fit. <b>And</b> the reason <b>that</b> they <b>disagree</b> explicitly <b>with regard to</b> the <b>flesh is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of</b> the opinion of <b>Reish Lakish, as even</b> with regard to the <b>flesh, which will ultimately leave</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>he says</b> that it is disqualified, because <b>its time to leave</b> the courtyard <b>has not yet arrived.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that this dispute between <i>amora’im</i> is <b>parallel to</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>:</b> With regard to the <b>sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood, Rabbi Eliezer says</b> that one who benefits <b>from them</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> one <b>is not liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for them due to</b> prohibitions against eating <b><i>piggul</i></b> or <b><i>notar</i>, or</b> for partaking of the flesh while he is <b>ritually impure.</b> All these prohibitions apply only if the sacrificial portions are otherwise fit for sacrifice. <b>Rabbi Akiva says</b> that one who benefits <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>and</b> one <b>is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>them due to</b> the prohibitions of <b><i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or</b> partaking of the flesh while he is <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>What, is it not</b> correct to say that they <b>disagree with regard to</b> a case <b>where</b> after taking the portions to be burned out of the Temple courtyard one <b>then brought them</b> back <b>into</b> the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood? <b>And,</b> if so, it is <b>with regard to this</b> very point that <b>they disagree: As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that the portions <b>are disqualified by leaving</b> the courtyard, <b>and</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>holds</b> that the portions <b>are not disqualified by leaving</b> the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara rejects this claim: <b>Rav Pappa said</b> that <b>with regard to</b> a case <b>where</b> after taking these portions out of the Temple courtyard one <b>then brought them</b> back <b>into</b> the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, <b>everyone agrees</b> they are fit. <b>And here</b> they <b>disagree with regard to</b> a case <b>where</b> these portions <b>are outside</b> the courtyard when the blood is sprinkled on the altar. <b>And they disagree with regard to this</b> following matter: <b>As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>is not effective</b> with regard <b>to</b> those portions that were <b>taken out</b> of the courtyard, i.e., it does not render them fit, <b>and</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Akiva, <b>holds</b> that the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>is effective</b> with regard <b>to</b> those portions that were <b>taken out</b> of the courtyard, i.e., it renders them fit.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> Rav Pappa’s statement here apparently contradicts his claim concerning the two loaves brought with the two sheep on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>. The sprinkling of the blood of the sheep renders those two loaves fit for consumption by the priests, and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva also applies in that case. The Gemara elaborates: <b>Rav Pappa is</b> the one <b>who said</b> that <b>with regard to</b> a situation <b>where</b> the two loaves <b>are outside</b> the Temple courtyard when the blood of the two sheep is sprinkled on the altar, <b>everyone,</b> even Rabbi Akiva, <b>agrees</b> that the sprinkling does not render the two loaves fit, and therefore if one eats them he is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition against eating <i>piggul</i>. Rather, the <i>tanna’im</i> <b>disagree with regard to</b> a case <b>where</b> one <b>returned</b> the loaves <b>to within</b> the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>This statement</b> of Rav Pappa applies only <b>to</b> the <b>two loaves, as</b> they <b>are not</b> part of <b>the offering itself. But</b> with regard to the <b>sacrificial portions, which are</b> part of <b>the offering itself,</b> everyone agrees that they are rendered fit if they are within the Temple courtyard at the time the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva <b>disagree</b> only <b>with regard to</b> a case <b>where they are outside</b> the Temple courtyard when the blood is sprinkled on the altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: The <b>bird</b> offerings <b>precede</b> meal offerings due to the fact that they are types whose blood is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary, meal offerings</b> should <b>precede</b> bird offerings, <b>as they are</b> sacrificed both as <b>communal</b> offerings and <b>as individual</b> offerings, whereas there are no communal bird offerings. The Gemara explains: <b>Even so,</b> the fact that bird offerings are <b>types</b> whose <b>blood</b> is sprinkled is of <b>greater</b> importance.",
            "The mishna further teaches: <b>The meal offering of a sinner</b> precedes a voluntary meal offering. The Gemara challenges: <b>On the contrary, a voluntary meal offering</b> should <b>precede</b> the meal offering of a sinner, <b>as it requires oil and frankincense.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>Even so, the meal offering of a sinner, which comes due to a sin,</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance, <b>as</b> it <b>effects atonement.</b>",
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: With regard to <b>the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>,</b> a woman suspected by her husband of having committed adultery, <b>and a voluntary meal offering</b> being brought by someone at the same time, <b>which of them precedes</b> the other? Does the <b>voluntary meal offering take precedence, as it requires oil and frankincense? Or perhaps the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> takes precedence, as it comes to clarify</b> the woman’s <b>transgression,</b> as part of the rite performed with a <i>sota</i>.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear,</b> as the mishna states that <b>the meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering.</b> One can infer from this that <b>it is</b> only <b>the meal offering of a sinner that precedes a voluntary meal offering, but the meal offering of a <i>sota</i></b> does <b>not.</b> The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Is</b> the mishna <b>teaching</b> that the meal offering of a sinner takes precedence <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that it effects atonement?</b> The mishna <b>teaches: Due to</b> the fact <b>that it comes</b> because <b>of a sin, and</b> the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> <b>also comes</b> because <b>of a sin,</b> as she secluded herself with another man.",
            "The Gemara further suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the statement of a <i>baraita</i>: <b>This</b> meal offering <b>precedes that</b> meal offering, <b>as this</b> meal offering <b>comes from wheat, and that</b> meal offering <b>comes from barley. What, does</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>not</b> refer to the precedence of <b>a voluntary meal offering to the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>?</b> The Gemara rejects this proof as well: <b>No,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the precedence of <b>the meal offering of a sinner over the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the meal offering of a sinner, why is its precedence to the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> derived from the fact that the meal offering of a sinner comes from wheat, whereas the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> is brought from barley? <b>I</b> could <b>derive</b> the precedence of the meal offering of the sinner <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> the meal offering of a sinner <b>effects atonement and</b> the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> <b>does not effect atonement.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: <b>Rather, what</b> is the <i>baraita</i> referring to? Is it referring to the precedence of <b>a voluntary meal offering</b> over the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>? If so, <b>I</b> could <b>derive</b> its precedence from the fact <b>that this</b> voluntary meal offering <b>requires oil and frankincense and that</b> meal offering of a <i>sota</i> <b>does not require oil and frankincense. Rather,</b> one cannot prove anything from the omission of an alternative explanation, as whichever way one interprets the <i>baraita</i> it clearly <b>cited one of two reasons.</b>",
            "§ The mishna states: The sacrifice of <b>the bird sin offering precedes</b> the sacrifice of the bird burnt offering. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? The Gemara answers: This is <b>as the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the bird sin offering and the bird burnt offering that a poor sinner sacrifices instead of an animal sin offering. The verse states: <b>“And he shall offer that which is for the sin offering first”</b> (Leviticus 5:8). <b>Why</b> must <b>the verse state</b> this? <b>As</b> there is <b>no</b> need for <b>the verse to state</b> this in order <b>to teach that</b> the sin offering <b>is sacrificed first, as</b> it <b>is already stated: “And he shall prepare the second for a burnt offering”</b> (Leviticus 5:10).",
            "<b>Rather, this</b> verse <b>established a paradigm for all sin offerings,</b> teaching <b>that they should precede the burnt offering that comes with them; whether</b> in the case of <b>a bird sin offering</b> taking precedence <b>over a bird burnt offering, whether</b> in the case of <b>an animal sin offering</b> taking precedence <b>over an animal burnt offering, and even</b> with regard to <b>a bird sin offering</b> taking precedence <b>over an animal burnt offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara summarizes: <b>Therefore,</b> the precedence of <b>a bird sin offering over a bird burnt offering</b> is learned <b>from</b> the verse: <b>“And</b> he shall prepare <b>the second</b> for a burnt offering.” The precedence of <b>an animal sin offering over an animal burnt offering</b> is derived <b>from</b> the fact <b>that the Merciful One extends</b> the <i>halakha</i> derived from the sin offering of the Levites (see 89a). Finally, the precedence of <b>a bird sin offering over an animal burnt offering</b> is derived <b>from</b> the principle stated in this <i>baraita</i>, that <b>this</b> verse <b>established a paradigm</b> for all sin offerings, teaching that they should precede the burnt offering that comes with them.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a further proof from a <i>baraita</i>. The Torah states that a woman who has given birth must bring a sheep as a burnt offering and a bird as a sin offering. If she is poor she may bring two birds: “One for a burnt offering and the other for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:8). <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> In <b>every</b> other <b>instance where</b> a bird offering <b>is exchanged</b> for an animal <b>sin offering,</b> the <b>sin offering precedes</b> the burnt offering. For example, in the case of the sliding scale sin offering brought for entering the Temple while ritually impure, where a poor person brings two birds, one as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering, the sin offering comes first. <b>But here, in</b> the case of <b>a woman who gave birth,</b> the <b>burnt offering takes precedence,</b> as it takes the place of an animal burnt offering, mentioned first in the verse: “She shall bring a lamb in its first year for a burnt offering, and a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering (Leviticus 12:6).",
            "Furthermore, in <b>every instance where</b> the sin offering <b>comes</b> because <b>of a sin,</b> the <b>sin offering precedes</b> the burnt offering. <b>But here,</b> in the case of a poor woman who gave birth, where the sin offering effects ritual purity rather than atonement, the <b>burnt offering precedes</b> the sin offering. <b>And</b> in <b>every instance where two</b> birds <b>come instead of</b> an animal for <b>a sin offering,</b> the <b>sin offering precedes</b> the burnt offering. <b>But here,</b> in the case of a poor woman who gave birth, the bird burnt offering replaces the animal burnt offering of a rich woman, whereas the bird sin offering is sacrificed even by a rich woman who gave birth. Therefore, in this particular case of a woman who gave birth, the <b>burnt offering precedes</b> the sin offering.",
            "The straightforward reading of this <i>baraita</i> contradicts the statement of the previous <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering. In order to reconcile the two <i>baraitot</i>, <b>Rava said:</b> The fact that <b>the verse mentions</b> the animal burnt offering <b>first</b> is only <b>with regard to reading</b> it, but in practice the sin offering is sacrificed first.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another <i>baraita</i> which apparently contradicts this principle. When there are different animal offerings to be sacrificed, <b>bulls precede rams, and rams precede sheep,</b> and <b>sheep</b> precede <b>male goats.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>What, is it not</b> referring to the additional offerings <b>of the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i>? If so, the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that bulls, rams, and sheep, which are burnt offerings, precede the sin offerings of male goats. The Gemara answers: <b>No,</b> with regard to all these animals the <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to gift</b> offerings. The Gemara interprets the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with this explanation: <b>Bulls precede rams, as</b> they require <b>a greater</b> quantity <b>of libations; and likewise rams</b> precede <b>sheep</b> for the same reason. <b>Sheep</b> precede <b>male goats,</b> although their libations are identical, <b>as</b> the portions of the sheep consumed on the altar are <b>greater;</b> the sheep’s <b>tail</b> is burned, whereas the goat’s tail is not.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> which seems to contradict the principle that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering: <b>The bull of</b> the <b>anointed priest,</b> i.e., the High Priest, which he sacrifices if he issues and then acts upon an erroneous halakhic ruling, <b>precedes</b> the <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin,</b> sacrificed if the Sanhedrin issues an erroneous halakhic ruling and the community then acts upon it. Similarly, the <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin precedes</b> the <b>bull</b> sacrificed as a burnt offering to atone <b>for</b> an unwitting communal sin involving <b>idol worship.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: The <b>bull</b> sacrificed as atonement <b>for</b> communal <b>idol worship precedes</b> the <b>male goats</b> that atone <b>for idol worship,</b> i.e., the goat sacrificed together with the bull. This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even though</b> the <b>bull</b> that atones <b>for idol worship</b> is <b>a burnt offering, and</b> the <b>male goats</b> sacrificed as atonement <b>for idol worship</b> are <b>sin offerings.</b> This <i>baraita</i> seems to contradict the statement of the previous <i>baraita</i> that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>But</b> you can <b>say</b> that the opposite conclusion is derived <b>from the first clause</b> of that <i>baraita</i>, as at least the first clause supports the principle that sin offerings take precedence: The <b>bull for an unwitting communal sin,</b> which is a sin offering, <b>precedes</b> the <b>bull</b> sacrificed to atone <b>for</b> an unwitting communal sin involving <b>idol worship,</b> which is a burnt offering.",
            "The Gemara dismisses this answer: <b>In any event, with regard to</b> offerings that are both of <b>one species</b> of animal, <b>we did not say</b> there is any doubt <b>that a sin offering takes precedence. When we say</b> there is a contradiction between the rulings of the <i>baraitot</i>, it is <b>with regard to</b> offerings of <b>two species.</b> According to the earlier <i>baraita</i>, even a bird sin offering precedes an animal burnt offering, whereas here <b>we find a burnt offering that precedes a sin offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>They say in the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, <b>in the name of Rava bar Mari:</b> The <b>sin offering</b> sacrificed to atone <b>for idol worship is</b> written <b>without an <i>alef</i></b> (see Numbers 15:24). <b>It is written <i>lamed</i>, <i>ḥet</i>, <i>tet</i>, <i>tav</i>.</b> This indicates that it is different from other sin offerings in that it does not precede the burnt offering. <b>Ravina says</b> that the term <b>“according to the ordinance” is written with regard to</b> the offerings sacrificed to atone for idol-worship, in the verse: “The congregation shall offer one young bull…according to the ordinance, and one goat for a sin offering” (Numbers 15:24). This mention of an ordinance indicates that they must be sacrificed in the precise order stated by the verse.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Now that you have arrived at this</b> explanation, the previous <i>baraita</i> can be explained in a similar manner: <b>Even</b> if <b>you say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the <b>bulls</b> and other offerings <b>of the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i>, there is <b>also</b> no difficulty with regard to the burnt offering sheep taking precedence over the sin offering male goats, as the term <b>“according to their ordinance” is written concerning</b> these offerings as well (see Numbers 29:33).",
            "<b>A dilemma</b> ensuing from the conclusion of the previous discussion <b>was raised before</b> the Sages: If there is <b>a bird sin offering, and an animal burnt offering, and</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering to be sacrificed, <b>which of them precedes</b> the others? If you say that <b>the bird sin offering should take precedence, there is</b> the animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>that</b> generally <b>precedes it,</b> since it requires slaughtering, as stated by the mishna. If you say that the animal <b>tithe</b> offering <b>should take precedence, there is</b> the <b>animal burnt offering that precedes it,</b> as the burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order. If you say that the <b>animal burnt offering should take precedence, there is the bird sin offering that precedes it,</b> as the Gemara previously concluded.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Here,</b> in Babylonia, <b>they explained</b> that the fact that the animal tithe offering is <b>a type of</b> offering that requires <b>slaughtering</b> is of <b>greater</b> importance than the other factors. Therefore, the animal tithe offering is sacrificed first, followed by the bird sin offering, and finally the animal burnt offering. <b>In the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, <b>they say:</b> The <b>animal burnt offering has an effect on the bird sin offering</b> sacrificed with it <b>and raises its</b> importance <b>above</b> that of the animal <b>tithe</b> offering. Therefore, the bird sin offering is sacrificed first, followed by the animal burnt offering, and finally the animal tithe offering.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>All the sin offerings</b> mandated <b>by the Torah take precedence over the guilt offerings,</b> as explained in the previous mishna (89a), <b>except for the guilt offering of a leper, because it comes to</b> render one <b>fit.</b> One who has been cured of leprosy must undergo a process through which he is rendered ritually pure before coming into contact with consecrated items. Although he must also bring a sin offering, his guilt offering is more central to that process of purification and therefore it takes precedence over the sin offering.",
            "<b>All the guilt offerings</b> mandated <b>by the Torah come</b> as rams <b>in their second year, and come worth</b> two <b>silver shekels, except for the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, as they come</b> from sheep <b>in their</b> first <b>year, and do not</b> need to <b>come worth</b> two <b>silver shekels,</b> as they have no fixed value.",
            "<b>Just as</b> the more sacred offerings <b>precede</b> other offerings <b>with regard to their sacrifice,</b> as taught in the previous mishna (89a), <b>they</b> also <b>precede</b> the others <b>with regard to their consumption.</b> If one has <b>a peace offering from yesterday and a peace offering from today,</b> the peace offering <b>from yesterday precedes</b> the peace offering <b>from today.</b> If one has <b>a peace offering from yesterday</b> and <b>a sin offering or a guilt offering from today,</b> the <b>peace offering from yesterday precedes</b> the others; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:</b> The <b>sin offering precedes</b> the peace offering, <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that it is an offering of the most sacred order.</b> Likewise, the guilt offering precedes the peace offering, as it is also of the most sacred order.",
            "<b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of</b> the offerings that are eaten, <b>the priests are permitted to alter</b> the manner of <b>their consumption</b> and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted <b>to eat them roasted, or boiled, or cooked,</b> and <b>to place in</b> the cooking pot <b>non-sacred spices or <i>teruma</i> spices.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: One may not place <i>teruma</i> spices in it,</b> so <b>that he will not bring the <i>teruma</i> to</b> a state <b>of disqualification.</b> Consumption of consecrated foods is permitted only for a limited period, after which they are disqualified and burned. Adding <i>teruma</i> spices might cause those spices to be similarly disqualified.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: The <i>mishnayot</i> (89a) taught that a frequent offering precedes other offerings, and also that an offering of greater sanctity precedes others. If there is <b>a frequent</b> offering <b>and</b> an offering <b>of</b> greater <b>sanctity</b> to be sacrificed, <b>which of them precedes</b> the other? Does the <b>frequent</b> offering <b>take precedence, due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> it is <b>frequent, or perhaps</b> the offering <b>of</b> greater <b>sanctity takes precedence, as</b> it is <b>of</b> greater <b>sanctity?</b> The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the ruling of the first mishna in this chapter, that the <b>daily offerings precede</b> the <b>additional offerings</b> because they are frequent."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And even though</b> the <b>additional offerings</b> are <b>of</b> greater <b>sanctity,</b> as they are sacrificed due to the sanctity of Shabbat, the frequent offering precedes the offering of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Is that to say</b> that the sanctity of <b>Shabbat affects</b> the sanctity of the <b>additional offerings</b> but does <b>not affect</b> the <b>daily offerings</b> brought on Shabbat? Rather, the sanctity of Shabbat elevates the sanctity of the daily offerings as well, and as both are of equal sanctity, the frequent daily offering precedes the additional offerings.",
            "The Gemara cites another proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the continuation of this mishna: The <b>additional Shabbat offerings precede</b> the <b>additional New Moon offerings</b> because they are more frequent, despite the fact that the New Moon elevates the sanctity of its additional offerings. The Gemara rejects this proof in a similar manner: <b>Is that to say</b> that the sanctity of the <b>New Moon affects</b> the sanctity of <b>its additional offerings</b> but <b>does not affect the additional offerings of Shabbat?</b> These additional offerings are also imbued with the sanctity of the New Moon.",
            "The Gemara cites another proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the continuation of this mishna: The <b>additional New Moon offerings precede</b> the <b>additional New Year offerings</b> because they are more frequent, <b>even though the New Year</b> is <b>of</b> greater <b>sanctity.</b> The Gemara rejects this proof as well: <b>Is that to say</b> that the sanctity of <b>the New Year affects</b> the sanctity of <b>its additional offerings</b> but <b>does not affect the additional offerings of</b> the <b>New Moon?</b>",
            "The Gemara cites another proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Berakhot</i> 5:25) that discusses the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the order of blessings in <i>kiddush</i>. After stating one reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel that one recites the blessing on the wine before the blessing of the sanctity of the day, the <i>Tosefta</i> adds: <b>Alternatively,</b> Beit Hillel say: <b>The blessing over wine</b> is recited <b>frequently, and the blessing over the day is not</b> recited <b>frequently, and</b> there is a principle: When <b>a frequent</b> practice <b>and an infrequent</b> practice clash, the <b>frequent</b> practice <b>takes precedence</b> over the infrequent practice. This applies <b>even though the blessing of the day</b> is <b>of</b> greater <b>sanctity,</b> as it is recited due to the sanctity of Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: <b>Is that to say</b> that the sanctity of <b>Shabbat affects</b> the sanctity of <b>the blessing of the day</b> but <b>does not affect</b> the sanctity of <b>the blessing on the wine?</b>",
            "The Gemara cites another proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> If one did not recite the additional prayer on Shabbat until the time of the afternoon prayer arrived, the <b><i>halakha</i></b> is that <b>a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer,</b> as the afternoon prayer is more frequent. This ruling applies despite the fact that the additional prayer is of greater sanctity. Once again the Gemara rejects the proof: <b>Is that to say</b> that the sanctity of <b>Shabbat affects</b> the sanctity of <b>the additional prayer</b> but <b>does not affect</b> the sanctity of <b>the afternoon prayer?</b>",
            "The Gemara cites yet another proof. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the mishna: If one has <b>a peace offering from yesterday</b> and <b>a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes</b> the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. One can infer from this that if both <b>this</b> offering <b>and that</b> offering are <b>from today,</b> the <b>sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, and</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even though the peace offering</b> is more <b>frequent,</b> as people sacrifice voluntary peace offerings more often than sin offerings or guilt offerings.",
            "<b>Rava said</b> in response: <b>Are you speaking</b> of <b>a common</b> offering? Although peace offerings are sacrificed more often than sin offerings, there is no obligation to sacrifice them at any particular frequency. <b>We raise the dilemma</b> only with regard to a clash between <b>a frequent</b> offering and one of greater sanctity, but <b>we do not raise the dilemma</b> with regard to <b>a common</b> offering.",
            "<b>Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Is that to say</b> that <b>a common</b> obligation is <b>not</b> considered tantamount to <b>a frequent</b> obligation? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to positive mitzvot whose intentional neglect results in the punishment of <i>karet</i> but whose unwitting transgression does not entail the sacrifice of a sin offering: <b>I should exclude</b> the neglect of <b>the Paschal offering</b> from the obligation to sacrifice a sin offering, <b>as it is not frequent, and I should not exclude</b> the neglect of <b>the</b> mitzva of <b>circumcision, as it is frequent?</b> Circumcision is considered a frequent mitzva, as it is performed more often than the Paschal offering, despite the fact that there is no obligation to perform circumcisions at any particular frequency.",
            "Rava answers: <b>What</b> is the meaning of <b>frequent</b> in that context? It means that circumcision is <b>frequent in</b> terms of the numerous <b>mitzvot</b> commanded with regard to its fulfillment. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that <b>circumcision in relation to</b> the <b>Paschal offering is considered like a frequent</b> obligation, as it occurs far more often, whereas peace offerings are brought only somewhat more often than sin offerings. In sum, one cannot infer from the mishna that an offering of greater sanctity precedes a frequent offering.",
            "§ An additional <b>dilemma</b> with regard to precedence <b>was raised before</b> the Sages: If the priest had two offerings to sacrifice, <b>a frequent</b> offering <b>and an infrequent</b> offering, <b>and</b> although he should have initially sacrificed the frequent offering <b>he slaughtered the infrequent</b> offering <b>first, what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we say</b> that <b>since</b> he already <b>slaughtered</b> the infrequent offering he also proceeds to <b>sacrifice it? Or perhaps</b> he does not yet sacrifice it but <b>gives</b> it <b>to another</b> priest, <b>who stirs its blood</b> to prevent it from congealing, <b>until</b> he <b>sacrifices</b> the <b>frequent</b> offering; <b>and then</b> he <b>sacrifices the infrequent</b> offering.",
            "<b>Rav Huna from Sura said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> an answer from the mishna: If one has <b>a peace offering from yesterday</b> and <b>a sin offering or a guilt offering from today,</b> the peace offering <b>from yesterday precedes</b> the sin offering <b>from today.</b> It can be assumed that the mishna is not discussing a case where none of the offerings have been slaughtered, as the peace offering would not take precedence in this situation. Rather, it is discussing a peace offering from yesterday that was slaughtered but its blood has not yet been presented. One can infer from this that only a peace offering from yesterday takes precedence in this situation, <b>but</b> in the case of a peace offering <b>from today</b> that is <b>similar</b> in other aspects <b>to</b> a peace offering <b>from yesterday,</b> the peace offering does not take precedence.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>And what are the circumstances</b> of this case? This is a situation <b>where</b> one <b>first slaughtered the peace offering</b> from today. In this case the <b>sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence,</b> although the peace offering is already slaughtered, as both of them are of greater sanctity. The same should apply to an infrequent offering that was slaughtered before a frequent offering: The frequent offering is slaughtered before the blood of the infrequent offering is presented.",
            "The Gemara rejects this answer: <b>Perhaps</b> when the mishna makes reference to <b>a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today,</b> the circumstances should be understood differently. <b>How can you find these</b> other circumstances? The mishna discusses a case <b>where</b> the priest already <b>slaughtered both of them,</b> the peace offering and the sin or guilt offering, and the blood of both awaits presentation on the altar. <b>But</b> had he <b>not</b> yet <b>slaughtered both of them,</b> but only the peace offering, <b>you</b> can still <b>raise the dilemma</b> of whether the priest should set aside the blood of the peace offering in order to slaughter the sin offering first, due to its greater sanctity.",
            "The Gemara cites another proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>: <b>Alternatively,</b> Beit Hillel say: With regard to the order of blessings in <i>kiddush</i>, <b>the blessing on wine</b> is recited <b>frequently and the blessing of the day is not</b> recited <b>frequently, and</b> there is a principle: When <b>a frequent</b> practice <b>and an infrequent</b> practice clash, the <b>frequent</b> practice <b>takes precedence</b> over the infrequent practice. The obligation to recite the blessing of the day is due to the sanctity of Shabbat and applies at the start of Shabbat, before wine is placed on the table. Nevertheless, the blessing on the wine takes precedence due to its frequency. So too, the slaughtering of the frequent offering should take precedence, even if the priest had already commenced the sacrificial rites of the infrequent offering.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Here too,</b> with regard to <i>kiddush</i>, the circumstances are different, <b>since</b> wine is available when one recites <i>kiddush</i>, and therefore the obligation of both blessings <b>come</b> together. This means that it is <b>comparable to</b> a situation <b>where one</b> already <b>slaughtered both</b> animals.",
            "The Gemara cites yet another proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> The <b><i>halakha</i></b> is that <b>a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer,</b> despite the fact that the obligation of the additional prayer applies first, which is similar to an offering slaughtered first. The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Here too, since the time of the afternoon prayer has</b> now <b>arrived,</b> one is obligated in both prayers, and again this is <b>comparable to</b> a situation <b>where one</b> already <b>slaughtered both</b> animals.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina</b> that an answer to this dilemma can be found in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 61a): If one <b>slaughtered</b> the Paschal offering <b>before midday</b> it is <b>disqualified, because it is stated in its regard: “In the afternoon”</b> (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it <b>before the daily</b> afternoon <b>offering</b> was slaughtered it is <b>valid,</b> even though the daily offering should be sacrificed first, <b>but</b> someone <b>should stir its blood</b> to prevent it from congealing <b>until</b> he slaughters and <b>sprinkles the blood</b> of the daily offering. Although the infrequent Paschal offering is already slaughtered, the priest first slaughters the frequent daily offering and then sprinkles the blood of the Paschal offering.",
            "The Gemara rejects this proof as well: <b>Here we are dealing with</b> a case <b>where</b> he <b>gave precedence to the daily offering</b> and <b>slaughtered it first,</b> and then slaughtered the Paschal offering before sprinkling the blood of the daily offering. Since the blood of both offerings requires sprinkling on the altar, the blood of the daily offering takes precedence. <b>Rav Aḥa the Elder said to Rav Ashi</b> that the wording of <b>the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled, and does not teach: Until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood.</b> This indicates that the daily afternoon offering has already been slaughtered. The Gemara affirms: <b>Conclude from</b> its wording that this is the meaning of the mishna.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>And with regard to all of</b> the offerings that are eaten, <b>the priests are permitted</b> to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> for this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: The <b>verse states,</b> with regard to the gifts of the priesthood: “Of all the consecrated items of the children of Israel to you have I given them <b><i>lemoshḥa</i>”</b> (Numbers 18:8). <i>Targum Onkelos</i> renders this term as: <b>For greatness,</b> indicating that the flesh of the offerings should be eaten <b>in</b> the <b>manner that kings eat</b> their food, i.e., prepared in any way they want.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard</b> for consumption by the priests and you seek to ascertain its nature, you <b>do not need to ask what it is. Rather,</b> it is <b>left over</b> from the oil <b>of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites</b> after they smeared a bit of oil on them, <b>or</b> it is left over from the <b><i>log</i> of oil of a leper</b> after a small amount of the oil was placed on him.",
            "<b>If you saw oil that is placed on the flames</b> of the altar in the manner of an offering, you <b>do not need to ask what it is. Rather,</b> it is <b>left over</b> from the oil <b>of the wafers of the meal offering of priests, or</b> it is the leftover oil from <b>the meal offering of the anointed priest,</b> which requires a great deal of oil and which is burned in its entirety on the altar. The mishna adds: One cannot say that the oil distributed to priests or burned on the altar was brought as a gift offering, <b>as one may not contribute oil</b> as a gift offering. <b>Rabbi Tarfon says: One may contribute oil</b> as a gift offering."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Shmuel says: According to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon</b> that oil may be sacrificed as a gift offering, in the case of <b>one who contributes oil,</b> a priest <b>removes a handful of</b> the oil and sacrifices it on the altar, <b>and its remainder is eaten</b> by the priests. <b>What is the reason</b> for the ruling of Shmuel? The <b>verse states:</b> “And when one brings <b>a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 2:1). The superfluous word <i>korban</i> <b>teaches that one may contribute oil, and</b> its status is <b>like</b> that of <b>a meal offering: Just as</b> with regard to <b>a meal offering</b> the priest <b>removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too</b> with regard to <b>oil,</b> the priest <b>removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said</b> that <b>we learn</b> this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna <b>as well: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard, you do not need to ask what it is; rather,</b> it is <b>left over</b> from the oil <b>of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites, or</b> it is left over from the <b><i>log</i> of oil of a leper, as one does not contribute</b> oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Zeira learns <b>by inference</b> from the mishna <b>that</b> according to <b>the one who says</b> that <b>one may contribute</b> oil, it is <b>distributed</b> to the priests for consumption and it is not sacrificed entirely.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rabbi Zeira: <b>Say the last clause</b> of the mishna: <b>If you saw oil that is placed on the flames</b> of the altar, <b>you do not need to ask what it is; rather,</b> it is <b>left over</b> from the oil <b>of the wafers of the meal offering of priests or</b> it is left over from <b>the meal offering of the anointed priest, as one does not contribute oil</b> as a gift offering. Abaye learns <b>by inference</b> from the mishna <b>that according to the one who says</b> that <b>one may contribute</b> oil, it is burned in its <b>entirety in the flames</b> on the altar. This contradicts Shmuel’s statement that according to Rabbi Tarfon only a handful of the oil is burned on the altar. The Gemara comments: <b>For Abaye</b> the inference from <b>the first clause</b> of the mishna is <b>difficult,</b> while <b>for Rabbi Zeira</b> the inference from <b>the last clause</b> is <b>difficult.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>Granted,</b> according <b>to Rabbi Zeira,</b> the inference from <b>the first clause</b> that the oil is distributed for consumption by the priests can be explained as referring <b>to</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the oil, whereas the inference from <b>the last clause</b> that the oil is burned on the altar is referring <b>to</b> the <b>handful</b> removed from the oil. <b>But</b> according <b>to Abaye,</b> the contradictory inferences pose <b>a difficulty.</b> The Gemara answers: One cannot infer anything from the first clause, as the mishna <b>taught the first clause due to the last clause.</b> That is, as the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna wishes to teach the last clause in a certain manner, he teaches the first clause in a similar style, despite the fact that one might come to an erroneous conclusion from the wording of the first clause.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> a <i>tanna</i> may <b>teach the last clause</b> of a mishna <b>due to the first clause,</b> i.e., a <i>tanna</i> might teach in a similar formulation to one he had already used. <b>But would</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>teach the first clause</b> of a mishna <b>due to the last clause?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Yes; they say in the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, that a <i>tanna</i> <b>taught the first clause due to the last clause.</b>",
            "The Gemara cites a proof: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i>: If one contributes <b>wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva</b> that one may contribute wine, it is poured <b>into the basins</b> adjacent to the corner of the altar. If one contributes <b>oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon</b> that one may contribute oil, it is burned <b>in the flames</b> of the altar. <b>What, is it not</b> possible to infer <b>from</b> the fact <b>that</b> the <b>wine</b> is poured in <b>its entirety into the basins</b> that the <b>oil</b> is likewise burned in <b>its entirety in the flames</b> of the altar, contrary to Shmuel’s statement? The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Are the cases comparable? This</b> case is <b>as it is and that</b> case is <b>as it is,</b> i.e., the donations of wine and the oil are separate cases, and the two statements of the <i>baraita</i> need not accord with each other.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said:</b> Shmuel’s statement is <b>like</b> one side of a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who contributes <b>oil</b> should <b>not</b> bring <b>less than a <i>log</i>. Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: Three <i>log</i>.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>With regard to what</b> principle <b>do</b> the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>disagree? The Sages said this before Rav Pappa:</b> They disagree with regard to the nature of an inference by means of verbal analogy or juxtaposition: Is the secondary case equated to the primary case in all aspects, in accordance with the exegetical principle: <b>Infer from it and</b> again <b>from it;</b> or does the comparison extend only to one specific issue derived from the primary case, in accordance with the principle: <b>Infer from it but interpret</b> the <i>halakha</i> according <b>to its</b> own <b>place,</b> i.e., in all other aspects the cases are not equated?",
            "The Gemara explains that this <b>is</b> the difference <b>between them, as the Rabbis hold</b> by the principle: Infer from it and again from it. The Gemara explains the application of this principle: <b>Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed,</b> as inferred from the verse addressing the meal offering. <b>And</b> again one infers <b>from</b> this source: <b>Just as a meal offering</b> requires <b>a <i>log</i> of oil, so too here,</b> an offering of oil alone must be <b>a <i>log</i> of oil. And just as</b> with regard to <b>a meal offering</b> the priest <b>removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too</b> with regard to <b>oil,</b> the priest <b>removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.</b>",
            "<b>And the other,</b> Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds by the principle: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place. The Gemara explains that here too, one infers <b>from</b> the case of <b>a meal offering: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed. But</b> with regard to all other aspects of this <i>halakha</i>, <b>interpret</b> the <i>halakha</i> according <b>to its</b> own <b>place,</b> and its status is <b>like</b> that of wine <b>libations,</b> which are similar to oil in that they are also poured onto the altar: <b>Just as</b> one contributes <b>libations</b> of <b>three <i>log</i>, so too,</b> when one contributes <b>oil</b> one contributes <b>three <i>log</i>; and just as libations</b> are poured in <b>their entirety into the basins, so too,</b> the <b>oil</b> is burned in <b>its entirety in the flames</b> of the altar.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>cited</b> the source of the gift offering of oil <b>from</b> the verse addressing the <b>meal offering</b> he would not disagree with the Rabbis, <b>as everyone</b> employs the principle of: <b>Infer from it and</b> again <b>from it. Rather, Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>derives</b> the gift offering of oil <b>from</b> a verse that deals with libations: “All that are <b>homeborn</b> shall do these things after this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire” (Numbers 15:13). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from here that just as one may contribute wine libations, so too, one may contribute oil. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi compares oil to wine libations: Just as one contributes libations of three <i>log</i>, so too, one contributes three <i>log</i> of oil.",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that,</b> i.e., that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the source of the gift offering of oil is not from the meal offering? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And when one brings <b>a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 2:1), that the superfluous word <i>korban</i> <b>teaches that one may contribute oil?</b> The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>And how much</b> must one contribute? <b>Three <i>log</i>.</b> The Gemara explains the question: <b>And whom did you hear who says</b> the gift offering of oil is <b>three <i>log</i>? This is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>and</b> yet he <b>cites</b> the source of the gift offering of oil <b>from</b> the word <b><i>korban</i>,</b> which is referring to a meal offering. Rav Pappa <b>said to him: If</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>is taught, it is taught;</b> and I cannot take issue with it.",
            "§ <b>Shmuel says: One who contributes wine brings</b> it <b>and sprinkles it on the flames</b> of the altar. <b>What is the reason</b> for this? <b>The verse states: “And you shall present for the libation half a <i>hin</i> of wine, for an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord”</b> (Numbers 15:10). The verse indicates that there is a type of wine libation which is an offering made by fire. The Gemara challenges: <b>But he</b> thereby <b>extinguishes</b> the fire on the altar, and the Torah states: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). The Gemara explains: <b>Extinguishing in a partial</b> manner <b>is not called extinguishing;</b> in other words, this act is not included in the prohibition.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable</b> for violating the prohibition: “It shall not go out”? The Gemara answers: This statement is referring to a situation <b>where there is only this</b> coal on the altar, and therefore the fire is entirely extinguished. <b>If you wish, say</b> instead that even if partial extinguishing is prohibited, <b>extinguishing</b> for the sake <b>of a mitzva,</b> as in the case of sprinkling wine on the altar, <b>is different,</b> and is permitted.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> <b>that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov teaches: Since the Torah gave</b> a mitzva <b>to remove</b> the ashes of the offerings from the altar, one <b>might</b> have thought that it is permitted to <b>extinguish</b> the coals so that they become ashes <b>and</b> then to <b>remove</b> them. Therefore, <b>you say: He shall not extinguish,</b> in accordance with the verse: “It shall not go out.” Although this is a case of extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, the <i>baraita</i> deems it prohibited. The Gemara explains: It <b>is different there,</b> as it is <b>possible</b> for the priest <b>to sit and wait</b> until some of the coals become ashes, and then remove them. By contrast, with regard to wine, there is no alternative to sprinkling the wine on the fire, and therefore it is permitted.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> that prohibits sprinkling wine on the fire of the altar: If one contributes <b>wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva</b> that one may contribute wine, it is poured <b>into the basins</b> on the altar. If one contributes <b>oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon</b> that one may contribute oil, it is poured <b>onto the flames</b> of the altar. <b>And</b> it <b>is furthermore taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The <b>wine libation</b> is poured <b>into the basins.</b> The <i>baraita</i> suggests: <b>Or</b> perhaps it is <b>not</b> so; <b>rather,</b> it is poured <b>onto the flames.</b> Therefore, <b>you say: He shall not extinguish.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: This is <b>not difficult,</b> as <b>that</b> <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who holds that even an unintentional action, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues, is prohibited; and <b>this</b> statement of Shmuel is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> who maintains that a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues is permitted. The Gemara asks: <b>Is this to say that Shmuel holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon? But doesn’t Shmuel say: One may extinguish a piece of white-hot metal in a public thoroughfare</b> on Shabbat <b>so that the masses will not be injured by it;</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>but</b> one may <b>not</b> extinguish <b>a wood coal,</b> because extinguishing it is prohibited by Torah law? <b>And if it enters your mind</b> that Shmuel <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> it should be permitted to extinguish <b>even a wood coal.</b> Rabbi Shimon maintains that extinguishing a coal is prohibited by Torah law only when one intends to use the extinguished coal. Otherwise, this constitutes a labor performed on Shabbat which is not necessary for its own sake, which is not prohibited by Torah law.",
            "The Gemara answers: Shmuel’s statements are not contradictory, as <b>with regard to an unintentional act,</b> he <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon.</b> But <b>with regard to labor not necessary for its own sake, he holds</b> that it is prohibited by Torah law, <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rav Huna says:</b> With regard to wine <b>libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement</b> of wood <b>by themselves and burns them</b> there, without removing them from the Temple courtyard. This is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that it is stated</b> with regard to a disqualified sin offering: <b>“In the sacred place…it shall be burned with fire”</b> (Leviticus 6:23). This requirement of burning in the sacred place applies to all offerings that are meant to be sacrificed on an altar and became disqualified. <b>This is also taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>the blood, the oil, the meal offerings, and the libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement</b> of wood <b>by themselves and burns them</b> there.",
            "The Gemara relates: <b>Shmuel said to Rav Ḥana of Baghdad: Bring me an assembly of ten</b> men <b>and I will tell you in their presence</b> this <i>halakha</i> that I wish to disseminate: With regard to <b>libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement</b> of wood <b>by themselves and burns them</b> there.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>the blood of a sin offering</b> designated for presentation <b>that was sprayed on a garment, that</b> garment <b>requires laundering,</b> as is stated with regard to a sin offering: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment, you shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled in a sacred place” (Leviticus 6:20). <b>Although the verse is speaking only of</b> sin offerings <b>that are eaten</b> and whose blood is presented on the outer altar, <b>as it is stated: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten”</b> (Leviticus 6:19), the principle is not exclusive to eaten sin offerings. With regard to the blood of <b>both</b> the sin offerings <b>that are eaten and the</b> sin offerings that are wholly burned and not eaten and whose blood is presented on the <b>inner</b> altar, garments sprayed with blood from each of these offerings <b>require laundering. As it is stated</b> at the start of that passage: “This is <b>the law of the sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 6:18), it is understood: There is <b>one law for all the sin offerings.</b>",
            "That is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to sin offerings fit for sacrifice. With regard to <b>a disqualified sin offering, its blood does not</b> cause a garment to <b>require laundering whether</b> the offering <b>had a period of fitness</b> when its blood was fit for presentation <b>or whether it did not have a period of fitness. Which</b> offering <b>is</b> the disqualified sin offering <b>that had a period of fitness?</b> It is one <b>that was left overnight</b> and then became disqualified; <b>or</b> it is one <b>that became ritually impure; or</b> it is one <b>that emerged</b> from the Temple courtyard. <b>Which</b> offering <b>is</b> the disqualified sin offering <b>that did not have a period of fitness?</b> It is one <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to eat it or present its blood <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area; or</b> it is one whose blood was <b>collected</b> by people <b>disqualified</b> for Temple service <b>and</b> they <b>sprinkled its blood.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches: In the case of <b>the blood of a sin offering that was sprayed</b> on a garment, the garment must be laundered, and this is the <i>halakha</i> concerning the blood of sin offerings that are eaten and sin offerings that are wholly burned, as it is stated: “This is the law of the sin offering”; there is one law for all sin offerings. The Gemara asks: <b>And if</b> there is <b>one law for all sin offerings, even</b> the blood of <b>a bird sin offering</b> should <b>also</b> require laundering. If so, <b>why is it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that the <b>blood of a bird sin offering requires laundering.</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states: “This</b> is the law of the sin offering.” The word “this” teaches that the <i>halakha</i> is to be restricted to the blood of an animal sin offering and it does not apply to the bird sin offering.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara: The verse states:</b> “This is the law of the sin offering…<b>shall</b> the sin offering <b>be slaughtered”</b> (Leviticus 6:18). <b>The verse is speaking</b> specifically <b>of</b> sin offerings <b>that are slaughtered</b> and not of bird offerings, which are killed by pinching the nape of the neck, rather than slaughtering with a knife.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And I</b> might <b>say</b> that the <i>halakha</i> is to be learned in another manner, and <b>the verse is speaking</b> specifically <b>of</b> sin offerings <b>that are eaten, as it is written: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten”</b> (Leviticus 6:19); <b>but internal</b> sin offerings, which are not eaten, should <b>not</b> be included. The Gemara explains: <b>The Merciful One amplifies</b> the <i>halakha</i> by stating: “This is <b>the law of</b> the sin offering,” which includes all sin offerings, even those that are not eaten.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>If so,</b> then <b>even</b> the blood of <b>the bird sin offering</b> should be included. The Gemara explains: <b>The Merciful One restricts</b> the <i>halakha</i> by stating: <b>“This</b> is the law,” which excludes bird offerings.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what did you see</b> that indicated that the verse is to be understood as including internal sin offerings and excluding bird offerings, and not the opposite? The Gemara answers: <b>It stands to reason that internal animal sin offerings should have been included</b> by the inclusive language of the verse, <b>as</b> internal sin offerings resemble eaten animal sin offerings in several ways: Each variety is a large <b>animal</b> and not a bird; each variety is subject to <b>slaughter on the north</b> side of the Temple courtyard; <b>and</b> the blood of each requires <b>collection</b> in <b>a vessel;</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> their blood is placed on the <b>corner</b> of the altar; <b>and</b> the blood is placed with a priest’s <b>finger; and</b> the blood is placed on <b>the edge of</b> the corner of the altar; <b>and</b> parts of each are consumed in <b>flames</b> upon the altar. None of these apply to bird sin offerings.",
            "The Gemara raises an objection: <b>On the contrary, the bird sin offering should have been included</b> and likened to the eaten animal sin offerings, <b>as</b> the blood of bird sin offerings is presented on the <b>outer</b> altar <b>like</b> an animal sin offering that is eaten, <b>and</b> the bird sin offering has portions set aside for <b>eating, like it.</b> The Gemara rejects the reasoning for including bird offerings: <b>Those</b> features that are common to internal sin offerings and eaten animal sin offerings <b>are more numerous</b> than the features common to bird sin offerings and eaten animal sin offerings.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef said:</b> There is another way to prove that the blood of a bird sin offering is not required to be laundered out if it is sprayed on a garment. With regard to laundering, <b>the verse states:</b> “The priest that offers it for sin <b>shall eat it”</b> (Leviticus 6:19); the obligation described applies <b>to it,</b> i.e., the eaten animal sin offering, <b>and not to another</b> similar sin offering. Consequently, <b>the verse is excluding</b> a case <b>within</b> the broad category of <b>eaten</b> sin offerings, and one is not required to launder out the blood of a bird sin offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the exclusion of bird offerings is derived from this verse, then <b>why do I</b> need the derivation from the verse: <b>“This</b> is the law of the sin offering”? The Gemara answers: <b>If not</b> for the derivation from <b>“this,” I would say</b> that the term <b>“shall eat it”</b> is simply <b>the manner</b> of speech <b>of the verse,</b> so that it does not indicate any exclusion. Therefore, the word “this” <b>teaches us</b> that a sin offering is excluded, and the term “shall eat it,” demonstrates that the excluded sin offering is one that is eaten.",
            "<b>Rabba said</b> that there is a different explanation. Internal sin offerings cannot be excluded from the requirement of laundering sprayed garments, as the verse speaks specifically of internal sin offerings, as <b>the verse states: “It shall be sprinkled”</b> (Leviticus 6:20). <b>The verse is speaking of</b> sin offerings that require <b>sprinklings,</b> and sprinkling is mentioned specifically with regard to internal sin offerings (see Leviticus 4:6), unlike eaten animal sin offerings, with regard to which the Torah uses a term of placing to describe the presenting of its blood (see Leviticus 4:25).",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: Can one say that the passage about laundering applies specifically to internal sin offerings? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in the mishna: <b>Although the verse is speaking only of</b> sin offerings <b>that are eaten,</b> indicating that the passage certainly applies to sin offerings that are eaten? The Gemara answers: The mishna’s statement pertains <b>to the matter of scouring and rinsing</b> copper vessels in which a sin offering was cooked (see Leviticus 6:21), which is relevant only to sin offerings that are eaten. <b>But in the matter of laundering:</b> “You shall launder that on which <b>it shall be sprinkled”</b> (Leviticus 6:20) <b>is written,</b> and the term “it shall be sprinkled” indicates only internal sin offerings. By contrast, eaten sin offerings are included only through the amplification in the verse: “The law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> that the verses prescribing laundering are primarily discussing internal sin offerings, and eaten sin offerings are included only through a derivation, then with regard to the statement in the mishna: <b>Both</b> the sin offerings <b>that are eaten and the internal</b> sin offerings, is this statement not misleading? Rather, the <i>tanna</i> <b>should have</b> stated: <b>Both the internal</b> sin offerings <b>and</b> the sin offerings <b>that are eaten,</b> first mentioning the offerings most clearly indicated in the verse. The Gemara answers: <b>Teach</b> it as: <b>Both the internal</b> sin offerings <b>and the</b> sin offerings <b>that are eaten.</b>",
            "<b>If so,</b> that the requirement of laundering applies to those sin offerings with regard to which the Torah uses the term sprinkling, the blood of <b>a bird sin offering</b> should require laundering <b>as well,</b> as sprinkling is also mentioned with regard to it (see Leviticus 5:9). The Gemara answers: <b>The Merciful One excludes</b> bird offerings by stating: <b>“This</b> is the law of the sin offering.” The Gemara challenges: <b>If so,</b> that the function of this verse is to be understood as a restriction, <b>an external</b> sin offering <b>also</b> should <b>not</b> require laundering. The Gemara responds: <b>The Merciful One amplified</b> the <i>halakha</i> to include external sin offerings by stating: <b>“The law of.”</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what did you see</b> that convinced you to exclude bird offerings and include external sin offerings? The Gemara answers: <b>It stands to reason</b> that the eaten <b>animal sin offering should have been included, as</b> the eaten animal sin offering resembles the internal sin offering in several respects: Each is a large <b>animal;</b> each is subject to <b>slaughter on the north</b> side of the courtyard; <b>and</b> the blood of each requires <b>collection in a vessel; and</b> their blood is placed on the <b>corner</b> of the altar; <b>and</b> the blood is placed with a priest’s <b>finger; and</b> the blood is placed on <b>the edge of</b> the corner of the altar; <b>and</b> parts of each are consumed in <b>flames</b> upon the altar. None of these apply to bird sin offerings.",
            "The Gemara raises an objection: <b>On the contrary,</b> the <b>bird sin offering should have been included</b> in the requirement for laundering, <b>as</b> the offering of the blood of the bird sin offering is termed <b>sprinkling,</b> just <b>like it</b> is in the case of the internal sin offering. The Gemara answers: <b>Those</b> features common to internal sin offerings and eaten animal sin offerings <b>are more numerous</b> than the features common to internal sin offerings and bird sin offerings.",
            "§ The Gemara indicated that the blood of the bird sin offering is not received in a vessel, unlike that of animal sin offerings. With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, <b>Rabbi Avin asks:</b> When the blood of an eaten animal sin offering is brought into the Sanctuary in a vessel, this disqualifies it. In the case of <b>a bird sin offering,</b> which is killed by pinching the nape of its neck, <b>whose blood</b> a priest <b>brought inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>in its neck, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is <b>its neck comparable to a service vessel,</b> since it is from its neck that the blood is presented, <b>and</b> therefore it is <b>disqualified</b> if brought into the Sanctuary this way?",
            "<b>Or perhaps</b> is its neck <b>comparable to the neck of</b> a large <b>animal</b> offering, about which <b>the Merciful One states</b> in the Torah: <b>“Of whose blood</b> is brought into the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 6:23), which teaches that its blood is disqualified when brought inside in a service vessel, <b>but</b> the blood is <b>not</b> disqualified when the animal’s <b>flesh</b> is brought inside. What is the status of the bird’s neck? The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i>: If, after its nape is pinched, a bird sin offering <b>convulsed and</b> consequently <b>entered inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>and</b> then it <b>returned</b> to the courtyard, it remains <b>valid;</b> its blood may be sprinkled and its meat eaten. It can be inferred that the bird offering remains valid if it has entered on its own, <b>but</b> if a priest has <b>brought it in,</b> it is <b>disqualified</b> because of the blood in its neck.",
            "The Gemara rejects the proof: <b>But according to your reasoning,</b> one might draw a faulty inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a convulsing offering, as follows. <b>With regard to</b> an animal <b>offering of the most sacred order,</b> about <b>which it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If, after being slaughtered appropriately on the north side of the courtyard, the animal <b>convulsed, and</b> consequently it <b>went out to the south</b> side of the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>returned</b> to the north side, it remains <b>valid;</b> should it be inferred: <b>But</b> if a priest <b>took it out</b> to the south side it becomes <b>disqualified?</b> The sacrifice is certainly not disqualified by being taken to the south side of the courtyard, and the inference is incorrect.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> it must be assumed that <b>this</b> <i>halakha</i>, that of the convulsing animal that moved from the northern side to the southern side, is taught for another purpose. It <b>was necessary for</b> the <i>baraita</i> to teach this <i>halakha</i> in order to establish a contrast with an animal that <b>went out to the outside</b> beyond the courtyard, which is disqualified even if it goes out by itself. <b>Here, too,</b> with regard to the bird sin offering, the <i>halakha</i> of the convulsing animal that moved into the Sanctuary is taught for another purpose. This <i>halakha</i> <b>was necessary for</b> establishing a contrast with a bird offering that <b>went out to the outside</b> beyond the courtyard, which is disqualified even if it goes out by itself. Accordingly, this may not be used to resolve Rabbi Avin’s dilemma.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Avin asks</b> another question about the blood of a bird offering, which is sprinkled directly from the body of the bird and not collected in a service vessel. With regard to the blood of a large animal, which spills on the floor before it is received in a service vessel, it becomes disqualified for presentation (see 25a), but if it spills after it is received in a vessel, it may be collected from the floor and presented (see 32a). If the blood of a bird offering <b>spilled onto the floor and</b> the priest <b>collected it</b> from the floor in order to sprinkle it, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "Is it simply that <b>the Merciful One did not require a service vessel</b> for the collection of the bird’s blood, <b>and therefore</b> a priest <b>may collect it</b> from the floor <b>and</b> it remains <b>fit</b> for sprinkling on the altar? <b>Or perhaps the Merciful One rendered a service vessel unfit for</b> sprinkling <b>it</b> in any case, and the blood must be sprinkled directly from the bird’s body, <b>and therefore,</b> if it spills on the floor and the priest <b>collects it,</b> it is <b>unfit</b> for sprinkling.",
            "<b>Rava said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof, deduced from a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>the blood of a bird sin offering would require laundering</b> if sprayed on a garment. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “This</b> is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), which excludes the bird sin offering. <b>But if it enters your mind</b> that <b>the Merciful One rendered</b> a vessel <b>unfit for</b> sprinkling the blood of a bird, this interpretation is unnecessary. <b>I will deduce</b> the <i>halakha</i> that a bird’s blood does not require laundering <b>because</b> the blood <b>becomes disqualified</b> even by merely passing <b>into the airspace of a vessel.</b> Consequently, the blood is disqualified when coming into the airspace of the garment, which is considered a vessel, and, as disqualified blood, it does not subsequently require laundering.",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:</b> The <i>baraita</i> provides no decisive proof, as even if a bird’s blood is disqualified by passing into the airspace of a vessel, the word “this” must still be interpreted to exclude the blood of a bird sin offering from the requirement of laundering. The interpretation of the verse accounts for cases in which the blood reaches the vessel without first passing into its airspace, as <b>in</b> a case when the priest <b>affixes a vessel to</b> the bird’s <b>neck.</b> Consequently, no resolution can be derived for Rav Avin’s question.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to the primary subject of the mishna, the requirement of laundering garments from the sprayed blood of a sin offering. <b>Levi asked</b> Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If the blood of an offering <b>sprayed from</b> one <b>garment to</b> another <b>garment, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>By</b> contact with the <b>first garment,</b> is the blood thereby <b>dismissed</b> with regard to the requirement <b>of laundering,</b> such that a subsequent garment would not require laundering? <b>Or perhaps not.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi <b>said to him: This</b> is an excellent <b>question;</b> and the answer is: The garment <b>requires laundering whichever</b> way <b>you</b> look at it. <b>If</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that with regard to blood that sprayed onto a garment the priest <b>may collect it and</b> it is still <b>fit</b> for presentation on the altar, then <b>this</b> blood is also <b>fit.</b> Consequently, even the second garment must be laundered. <b>And if</b> you say that with regard to blood that sprayed onto a garment if <b>he collects it, it is unfit</b> for presentation, <b>I hold in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva, who says:</b> If the offering <b>had a period of fitness and</b> then <b>was disqualified, its blood requires laundering.</b> Accordingly, since the blood upon the second garment was initially collected in a service vessel, it too had a period of fitness."
        ],
        [
            "§ In a related matter, <b>Rami bar Ḥama asked of Rav Ḥisda:</b> If the blood of a sin offering <b>sprayed onto a ritually impure garment,</b> so that the blood became impure and unfit for presentation, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Does the garment require laundering? <b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: From</b> the fact <b>that</b> Rami bar Ḥama <b>asked</b> the question in <b>this</b> manner, with regard to ritually pure blood that sprayed onto an impure garment, and not with regard to blood that was already impure that sprayed onto a garment, <b>conclude from it</b> that he holds that even if the sin offering <b>had a period of fitness and</b> then <b>was disqualified,</b> a garment onto which <b>its blood</b> sprayed <b>does not require laundering.</b>",
            "His question, therefore, is: Does <b>this statement</b> apply only when <b>one</b> event, the spraying of the blood, occurs <b>after the other</b> event, i.e., the disqualification of the blood? <b>But</b> if the spraying and the disqualification occur <b>simultaneously,</b> as in this case, perhaps the principle does <b>not</b> apply, and the garment must be laundered. <b>Or, perhaps</b> there <b>is no difference</b> whether the events occur this way or that way, and even if the offering becomes unfit only as the blood touches the garment, it still does not require laundering? Rav Ḥisda <b>said to</b> Rami bar Ḥama: The matter is subject to <b>the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the Rabbis, in accordance with</b> the explanation <b>of Rabba, and as Abaye resolves</b> it.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> With regard to <b>water of purification, which</b> has been sanctified by the ashes of the red heifer, even if the water is <b>rendered impure</b> it nevertheless performs its function and <b>purifies</b> a person from the ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. This is evident <b>because</b> those performing the rite would <b>sprinkle</b> water of purification even <b>on a menstruating woman</b> who has been rendered impure by a corpse. Although her menstruation impurity renders the water of purification impure when it touches her, it is effective in removing the ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Rabbi Elazar’s opinion is in opposition to that of the Rabbis.",
            "<b>And</b> concerning this dispute, <b>Rabba says:</b> Although it would seem that the water of purification applied to a menstruating woman does not become impure until it touches her, the case may still provide precedent for all water of purification that has become impure, as follows: <b>Rabbi Elazar stated</b> his opinion <b>in accordance with the opinion of his teacher Rabbi Akiva, who says</b> that <b>passing a vessel</b> containing water of purification <b>over</b> the <b>place</b> where <b>a ritually impure</b> item is renders the vessel <b>considered as</b> if <b>resting</b> there, so that the water becomes impure. Consequently, just as the water of purification is effective for the menstruating woman although it has become impure when hovering above her, water of purification always remains effective after having contracted ritual impurity.",
            "That is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, <b>as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 10:5): There is a dispute with regard to the case of a ritually pure person who <b>was standing beyond an oven,</b> which stood between him and the wall, <b>and</b> a carcass of <b>a creeping animal,</b> which imparts impurity, was <b>in the oven; and</b> the person <b>stretched out his hand to the window and took the jug [<i>halagin</i>]</b> containing water of purification <b>and passed it over the opening of the oven. Rabbi Akiva deems</b> the water of purification <b>impure,</b> although the jug has merely passed over the oven’s opening and has not come to rest on it, <b>and the Rabbis deem</b> the water <b>pure. And</b> according to Rabba, <b>in this</b> manner <b>do they disagree: That Rabbi Akiva holds</b> that the jug is <b>considered as</b> if <b>resting</b> on the opening of the oven, <b>and the Rabbis hold</b> that the jug is <b>not considered as</b> if <b>resting</b> there.",
            "<b>And Abaye raised an objection to</b> Rabba’s interpretation from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Para</i> 10:6): Although he deems the water of purification impure in the previous case, <b>Rabbi Akiva concedes</b> that <b>in</b> the act of <b>sprinkling,</b> in <b>which</b> the person <b>passed</b> the water of purification <b>over an impure earthenware vessel</b> or <b>over</b> an impure item designated for <b>lying or sitting,</b> the water remains <b>pure.</b> This is so <b>because there is nothing that renders impure</b> all that is in the airspace directly <b>above</b> it, <b>like</b> anything <b>below</b> that touches it, <b>other than an olive-bulk from a corpse and all other</b> items which impart ritual impurity to those items <b>which overlie</b> them, <b>including a stone marked</b> with leprosy. Such a stone also imparts overlying impurity, rendering impure anything under the same roof or, if there is no roof, in the airspace directly above it up to the sky.",
            "<b>Rather, Abaye said: Everyone</b> agrees that a vessel containing water of purification passing over an item that is ritually impure <b>is not considered as</b> if it is <b>resting</b> on it. <b>And here,</b> with regard to the jug being taken over the oven, <b>they disagree about this: Rabbi Akiva holds</b> that <b>we decree</b> that the vessel contracts impurity by rabbinic law, since <b>perhaps</b> a vessel carried above an impure item <b>will</b> come to <b>rest</b> directly on that impure item. <b>And the Rabbis hold: We do not decree</b> that the vessel contracts impurity in such a case. <b>And Rabbi Akiva concedes</b> that <b>in</b> the act of <b>sprinkling,</b> while the water passes over an impure item, <b>once it has set forth</b> into the air, <b>it has set forth.</b> Since the water has left the person’s hand, the person cannot leave it to rest upon an impure item.",
            "The Gemara asks: If so, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis would agree that the water of purification does not become impure before touching a menstruating woman. <b>And,</b> if so, then <b>Rabbi Elazar and the Rabbis,</b> who disagree as to whether impure water of purification renders one pure, <b>with regard to what</b> case <b>do they disagree? Abaye said: They disagree with regard to</b> whether one may <b>derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>impurity</b> rendered <b>earlier,</b> before sprinkling the water of purification, <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>impurity</b> rendered <b>at that</b> very <b>moment</b> that the purification occurs, as in the case of the menstruating woman.",
            "One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Elazar, <b>holds:</b> One <b>derives</b> the <i>halakha</i> in this manner, and, therefore, the water effects purification even if the water has become impure first. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> the Rabbis, <b>holds</b> that one does <b>not derive</b> this <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, Rav Ḥisda’s answer to Rami bar Hama is that, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, if the impurity occurs in the moment that the sin offering’s blood touches the impure garment, the <i>halakha</i> is the same as it is when the blood has become impure before reaching the garment. In both cases, the garment is exempt from laundering. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, the <i>halakha</i> is not the same in both cases: If the blood becomes impure at the very moment it reaches the garment, laundering is required.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> The case of sprinkling water of purification upon a menstruating woman has no bearing upon the case of the sprayed garment, <b>as everyone</b> holds that one does <b>not derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> of impurity incurred earlier from the <i>halakha</i> of impurity incurred at that very moment.",
            "Rava continues: <b>But here,</b> with regard to the precedent of the menstruating woman, <b>they disagree about this: Rabbi Elazar holds</b> that <b>sprinkling</b> the water of purification <b>requires</b> a specific <b>measure</b> of the water, <b>but</b> sprinklings of small quantities <b>combine to</b> constitute <b>sprinklings</b> of the required measure. Therefore, if the initial sprinkling on the woman does not contain a sufficient measure of water, the small quantity of water of purification first becomes impure, but it later combines with the subsequent sprinkling to purify her. Consequently, water of purification that has already become impure may effect purification. <b>But the Rabbis hold</b> that <b>sprinkling</b> of the water <b>does not require a measure.</b> Accordingly, the woman is purified by the initial sprinkling, although the purification water becomes impure at the very moment that it reaches her; and this does not have any bearing on a case in which the purification water is impure before it touches the person upon whom it is sprinkled.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>a disqualified sin offering,</b> a garment on which its blood is sprayed does not require laundering, whether the offering had a moment of qualification when its blood was fit for sprinkling or whether it did not have a moment of qualification. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a garment on which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, the verse states: “And when any <b>of its blood</b> shall be sprinkled on a garment” (Leviticus 6:20), teaching that laundering is required when some <b>of the blood of a fit</b> sin offering is sprayed on the garment, <b>but</b> this is <b>not</b> so in the case <b>of the blood of a disqualified</b> sin offering. <b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> If the sin offering <b>had a period of fitness and</b> then <b>was disqualified,</b> a garment onto which <b>its blood</b> sprayed still <b>requires laundering.</b> If it <b>did not have a period of fitness</b> at all <b>and was</b> then <b>disqualified,</b> a garment onto which <b>its blood</b> sprayed <b>does not require laundering.</b>",
            "<b>And Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to <b>both this</b> sin offering that had a period of fitness <b>and that</b> sin offering that did not, a garment onto which <b>its blood</b> sprayed <b>does not require laundering. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>It is written</b> in the Torah with regard to laundering the blood of a sin offering: “Every male among the priests may eat <b>it”</b> (Leviticus 6:22), and only it. <b>And it is written</b> earlier in that same section: <b>“Of its blood”</b> (Leviticus 6:20), but not all its blood. Therefore, there are two exclusionary terms; <b>one</b> excludes laundering <b>for</b> the situation <b>where</b> the unfit offering <b>had a period of fitness,</b> and the other excludes a situation in which the offering did not have a period of fitness.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>Rabbi Akiva</b> interpret these verses? From the term “of its blood” he derives that the offering that has no period of fitness is excluded. The exclusion indicated by the word <b>“it”</b> teaches that the requirement for scouring and rinsing a copper vessel in which sacred food was cooked <b>excludes <i>teruma</i>,</b> i.e., scouring and rinsing is not required for a vessel in which <i>teruma</i> was cooked. <b>And</b> rejecting Rabbi Akiva’s understanding, <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> conforms <b>to his</b> line of <b>reasoning, as he says: Offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing</b> as explained on 96b, <b>and all the more so</b> does <b><i>teruma</i></b> not require this. Consequently, Rabbi Shimon does not need a verse to exclude <i>teruma</i>, and he interprets the verse to exclude both a sin offering that had a period of fitness and a sin offering that did not have a period of fitness.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If the blood of a sin offering <b>sprayed from the neck</b> of the animal <b>onto a garment,</b> the garment <b>does not require laundering.</b> If the blood was collected in a vessel and sprinkled on the altar and sprayed <b>from the corner or from the base</b> of the altar onto the garment, the garment <b>does not require laundering,</b> as the blood was already sprinkled and its mitzva was fulfilled. If the blood <b>spilled</b> from the neck <b>onto the floor</b> before it was collected in a vessel, <b>and</b> the priest <b>collected</b> the blood and it sprayed on a garment, the garment <b>does not require laundering.</b> It is <b>only</b> with regard to <b>blood that was received in</b> a sacred <b>vessel and is fit for sprinkling</b> that the garment <b>requires laundering.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara cites sources for the <i>halakhot</i> mentioned in the mishna. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that if blood <b>sprayed from the neck</b> of the animal <b>onto a garment,</b> the garment <b>should require laundering.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “On <b>which it shall be sprinkled”</b> (Leviticus 6:20), which teaches: <b>I told you</b> that a garment requires laundering <b>only with regard to</b> blood which is <b>fit for sprinkling,</b> which must be collected in a vessel directly from the neck of the animal. <b>It is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that if blood <b>sprayed from the corner or from the base</b> of the altar, the garment <b>should require laundering.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “On <b>which it shall be sprinkled,” excluding that</b> blood <b>that was already sprinkled.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If the blood <b>spilled</b> from the neck <b>onto the floor</b> before it was collected in a vessel, and the priest collected the blood and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering. It is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is fit for sprinkling that the garment requires laundering."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to the statement that only blood that was collected in a vessel and is fit for sprinkling requires the laundering of the garment on which it sprayed, the Gemara asks: <b>Why do I also</b> need <b>this?</b> After all, it was already taught that if blood spilled from the neck onto the floor before it was collected in a vessel, and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering. The Gemara answers: This is not an additional <i>halakha</i>, but rather the mishna <b>is saying: What is the reason? What is the reason</b> that if the blood <b>spilled</b> from the neck <b>onto the floor</b> before it was collected in a vessel, <b>and</b> the priest <b>collected it</b> and it sprayed on a garment, the garment <b>does not require laundering?</b> This is <b>because</b> it is <b>only</b> with regard to <b>blood that was received in</b> a sacred <b>vessel and is fit for sprinkling</b> that the garment <b>requires laundering.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: It is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is <b>fit for sprinkling</b> that the garment <b>requires laundering.</b> The Gemara asks: As it was already taught that when disqualified blood is sprayed on a garment, it does not require laundering, this reiteration serves <b>to exclude what?</b> The Gemara answers: It serves <b>to exclude</b> the case where a priest <b>received less</b> blood <b>than</b> is <b>sufficient for sprinkling in this vessel, and less than</b> is <b>sufficient for sprinkling in that vessel,</b> and then he mixed together the blood from the two vessels. In such a case, even though the combined amount is now enough for sprinkling, the blood did not become fit for sprinkling.",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the sanctification of water of purification, <b>Rabbi Ḥalafta bar Shaul says:</b> If a priest <b>sanctified less than</b> is <b>sufficient for sprinkling in this vessel and less than</b> is <b>sufficient for sprinkling in that vessel,</b> and he then mixed together the water from the two vessels, he <b>has not sanctified</b> it to become water of purification.",
            "In a related issue, <b>a dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If a priest did this <b>for</b> the <b>blood</b> of an internal sin offering, collecting less than is sufficient for sprinkling in each vessel and then mixing all the blood together, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Is</b> Rabbi Ḥalafta’s statement about the water of purification <b>a <i>halakha</i></b> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, <b>and we do not learn from</b> such <b>a <i>halakha</i></b> an application to a different matter?",
            "<b>Or, perhaps: What is the reason there,</b> that the combined water of purification is not fit for sprinkling? It may be <b>because it is written</b> about sprinkling the water: <b>“And dip it in the water”</b> (Numbers 19:18), stressing that it is to be dipped in precisely the same water that was first placed in the vessel. This indicates that from the outset there must be an amount sufficient for sprinkling. If so, then <b>here also</b> there is comparable language employed with regard to the blood of a sin offering. <b>It is written: “And</b> the priest shall <b>dip</b> his finger <b>in the blood,</b> and sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6). Does this prove that from the outset there must be sufficient blood for sprinkling?",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof, <b>as Rabbi Zerika says</b> that <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Even in</b> the case of the <b>blood</b> of a sin offering, if one collected two insufficient amounts and then mixed them together, he <b>did not sanctify</b> the blood to make it fit for sprinkling on the altar, and therefore, if it sprays on a garment, one is not required to launder the garment.",
            "§ <b>Rava says: It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the internal sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled in the Sanctuary: The verse states: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall dip</b> his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6); <b>and</b> there must be enough blood in the vessel for the priest to dip his finger in it so that he does <b>not</b> need to <b>wipe</b> blood from the sides or the bottom of the vessel onto his finger. The verse states: <b>“In the blood,”</b> teaching that the blood is unfit for sprinkling <b>unless there is a measure of the blood</b> fit for <b>dipping</b> in the vessel <b>from the outset,</b> and the blood is disqualified if more blood is added to a vessel that initially contained less than the required measure. The verse states: “Sprinkle <b>of the blood,”</b> which teaches that he must sprinkle <b>of the blood that is</b> mentioned <b>in</b> this <b>matter,</b> which is the blood in the vessel.",
            "<b>And it was necessary</b> for the Torah <b>to write</b> the term: <b>“In the blood,”</b> as well as the term: “And the priest shall dip.” <b>As, had the Merciful One written</b> only: <b>“And</b> the priest <b>shall dip,” I would say</b> that if there is sufficient blood at the time of dipping, <b>even though there was not a measure</b> of blood fit for <b>dipping</b> in the vessel <b>from the beginning,</b> it is nevertheless fit for dipping. Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes: “In the blood,”</b> to teach that there must be sufficient blood from the beginning.",
            "<b>And if the Merciful One had written</b> only: <b>“In the blood,” I would say</b> that if at the beginning there was an appropriate measure of blood, it is not necessary for the vessel to retain a measure of enough blood throughout the whole rite, and <b>even</b> if he eventually <b>wipes</b> blood off of the vessel onto his finger, it is sufficient for sprinkling. Therefore, <b>the Merciful One writes: “And</b> the priest <b>shall dip,”</b> to teach that there must remain enough blood to dip his finger each time.",
            "The cited <i>baraita</i> states: The verse states: “Sprinkle of the blood,” which teaches that he must sprinkle <b>of the blood that is</b> mentioned <b>in</b> this <b>matter,</b> which is the blood in the vessel. The Gemara asks: In order <b>to exclude what</b> was this mentioned? <b>Rava said:</b> This serves <b>to exclude the remainder</b> of the blood <b>that is on the</b> priest’s <b>finger</b> after sprinkling, which may not be used for further sprinkling, as he must dip his finger in the blood again for each sprinkle. Rava continues: This <b>supports</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: The remainder</b> of the blood <b>that is on the</b> priest’s <b>finger</b> after sprinkling is <b>unfit</b> for further sprinkling.",
            "<b>Ravin bar Rav Adda said to Rav,</b> i.e., Rava: <b>Your student says</b> that <b>Rav Amram says: We</b> already <b>learn</b> a <i>baraita</i> opposing Rabbi Elazar’s opinion: If a priest <b>was sprinkling</b> the blood of an internal sin offering, <b>and a sprinkle sprayed from his hand</b> onto a garment, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. If it sprayed <b>before he sprinkled,</b> the garment <b>requires laundering,</b> but if it sprayed <b>once he has sprinkled,</b> it <b>does not require laundering.</b>",
            "Ravin bar Rav Adda explains: <b>What, is it not this</b> that the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> If the blood sprayed on a garment <b>before</b> the priest <b>concluded sprinkling,</b> the garment <b>requires laundering,</b> even if it sprayed from the remainder on his finger; but if it sprayed <b>once</b> the priest <b>has concluded sprinkling, it does not require laundering?</b> This indicates that blood sprayed from the remainder on his finger requires laundering, so it must be fit for sprinkling. Rava replied: <b>No, this</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> If the blood sprayed on a garment <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling has left his hand, it requires laundering,</b> but if it sprayed <b>once</b> the <b>sprinkling has left his hand,</b> the remainder on his finger <b>does not require laundering</b> if it then sprays onto a garment.",
            "<b>Abaye raised an objection to</b> Rabbi Elazar’s opinion from what is taught about sprinkling the blood of the red heifer in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:9): When the priest has <b>concluded sprinkling</b> the blood, <b>he wipes his hand on the body of</b> the red <b>heifer.</b> Evidently, if he <b>concluded</b> sprinkling, <b>yes,</b> he does wipe his hand; but if he <b>did not conclude</b> sprinkling, he does <b>not</b> wipe his hand, even though a remainder is left on his finger. Evidently, this remainder is fit for sprinkling. Rava <b>said to him:</b> The mishna is to be understood otherwise: If he <b>concluded</b> sprinkling, <b>he wipes his</b> entire <b>hand on the body of the</b> red <b>heifer;</b> but if he <b>has not concluded</b> sprinkling, <b>he wipes</b> only <b>his finger</b> after each sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> if he <b>concluded</b> sprinkling, <b>he wipes his hand on the body of</b> the red <b>heifer, as it is stated: “And the heifer shall be burned in his sight;</b> its skin, and its flesh, and its blood” (Numbers 19:5), indicating that the remaining blood must be incinerated together with the flesh. <b>But on what does he wipe his finger</b> after each sprinkling, since he must not wipe it on the body of the heifer, which might cause hair to stick to his finger, interfering with the sprinkling? <b>Abaye said:</b> He wipes his finger <b>on the lip of</b> the <b>bowl</b> holding the blood for sprinkling, <b>as it is written: “Atoning bowls [<i>keforei</i>] of gold”</b> (Ezra 1:10). The atoning bowls are so named because the priest wipes his finger on them, and the word <i>keforei</i> indicates cleansing by way of wiping (see <i>Ḥullin</i> 8b).",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> Apropos laundering the blood of a sin offering from garments onto which it sprayed, the mishna discusses what is considered a garment. If the blood of a sin offering <b>sprayed onto the hide</b> of an animal <b>before it was flayed</b> from the animal, the hide <b>does not require laundering,</b> because its status is not that of a garment, which is susceptible to ritual impurity. If the blood sprayed onto the hide <b>after it was flayed, it requires laundering;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar says: Even</b> if the blood sprayed onto the hide <b>after it was flayed, it does not require laundering</b> until it is crafted into a vessel or garment that is actually susceptible to ritual impurity. This is the principle with regard to laundering: A garment must be laundered <b>only</b> in the <b>place</b> where <b>the blood</b> was sprayed, <b>and</b> only if it is <b>an item that is fit to become ritually impure, and</b> only if it is an item <b>fit for laundering.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>the garment</b> mentioned explicitly in the Torah, <b>and the sackcloth, and the hide, all</b> of these <b>require laundering. And the laundering</b> must be performed <b>in a sacred place,</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>and the breaking of an earthenware vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked must be performed <b>in a sacred place, and scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked must be performed <b>in a sacred place.</b> With regard to <b>this</b> matter, <b>a stringency</b> applies <b>to a sin offering</b> more <b>than</b> it applies to <b>offerings of the most sacred order.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> With regard to blood sprayed on a flayed hide, <b>from where are these matters,</b> i.e., the divergent opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, derived? The Gemara explains: They are derived <b>as the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: It is stated with regard to laundering: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on <b>a garment”</b> (Leviticus 6:20). <b>I have</b> derived <b>only a garment; from where</b> do I <b>include</b> an animal’s <b>hide after it was flayed? The</b> same <b>verse states: “You shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled,”</b> to include any item on which the blood sprayed.",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I</b> would <b>include a hide</b> even <b>before it was flayed.</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states: “Garment.”</b> Consequently, <b>just as</b> any manner of <b>garment</b> is an item <b>fit to become ritually impure</b> if one intends to use it, e.g., making it a patch for his clothing, <b>so too</b> the requirement of laundering applies to <b>any</b> item <b>that</b> becomes <b>fit to become ritually impure</b> when one intends to use it as is. A hide is fit to become ritually impure after it has been flayed, when one intends to use it for a rug or the like; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar</b> holds that, even after it is flayed, the hide does not require laundering. In interpreting the verse, he <b>says:</b> The verse states: <b>“Garment,”</b> and from this <b>I have</b> derived <b>only a garment; from where</b> do I <b>include sackcloth</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and all types of garments</b> made of other materials in the requirement of laundering? <b>The verse states: “You shall launder that on which</b> it shall be sprinkled.” One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I include</b> an animal’s <b>hide after it was flayed.</b> That <b>verse states: “Garment,”</b> to teach that <b>just as a garment is an item that is susceptible to ritual impurity</b> as is, <b>so too any</b> comparable <b>item that is</b> a ready utensil and therefore <b>susceptible to impurity</b> must be laundered. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar holds that merely flaying a hide is insufficient to render it an item that must be laundered.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the practical difference <b>between</b> the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar? Is there an item that is fit to become ritually impure, but is not actually susceptible to impurity? <b>Abaye said: A patch</b> of cloth <b>less than three</b> by three fingerbreadths presents a practical difference <b>between</b> the two opinions. According to <b>the one who says</b> that any garment <b>fit</b> to become ritually impure must be laundered, <b>this</b> patch of cloth <b>is also fit</b> to become ritually impure, <b>as if</b> the owner <b>wants, he can intend it</b> for a specific use, as in patching his garment. According to <b>the one who says</b> that only <b>an object</b> already <b>susceptible to impurity</b> must be laundered, <b>this</b> patch, <b>in any event, is not</b> yet <b>susceptible to impurity</b>, so it does not require laundering.",
            "<b>Rava said: A garment upon which</b> an individual initially <b>intended to</b> place <b>an image</b> constitutes a practical difference <b>between</b> the two opinions. Since the garment was initially intended to have an adornment, the garment is considered incomplete and not yet susceptible to impurity until the image is added. According to <b>the one who says</b> that any garment <b>fit</b> to become ritually impure requires laundering, <b>this</b> garment <b>is also fit</b> to become ritually impure, <b>as if</b> the owner <b>wants</b> to, <b>he can void his intention</b> to add the image, and the garment will be automatically susceptible to impurity. According to <b>the one who says</b> that only <b>an item</b> already <b>susceptible to impurity</b> requires laundering, <b>now, at least,</b> this garment <b>is not susceptible to impurity</b> and does not require laundering.",
            "According to a different version, <b>Rava said: An unfinished hide [<i>utzeva</i>] that one intended to trim</b> in a precise manner constitutes a practical difference <b>between</b> the two opinions. According to <b>the one who says</b> that any garment-like item <b>fit</b> to become ritually impure must be laundered, <b>this</b> hide must be laundered, since it <b>is also fit</b> to be susceptible to impurity if he voids his intention. According to <b>the one who says</b> that only <b>an item</b> already <b>susceptible to impurity</b> must be laundered, <b>this</b> hide does not require laundering since it <b>is not susceptible to impurity until he trims it.</b> This explanation may be corroborated, as <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: An unfinished hide that</b> one <b>intended to trim is ritually pure until he trims it.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: A garment <b>requires laundering</b> only in the place that the blood was sprayed; but the entire garment does not require laundering. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? They are derived from a verse, <b>as the Sages taught:</b> The verse states: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment.” One <b>might</b> have thought that even if the blood <b>sprayed</b> only <b>on part of a garment, the entire garment should require laundering.</b> To counter this, <b>the</b> same <b>verse states:</b> “That on <b>which it shall be sprinkled.”</b> This is to be understood: <b>I told you</b> that laundering is required <b>only</b> in <b>the place</b> that the <b>blood</b> was sprayed.",
            "The mishna also teaches: A garment must be laundered only if it is <b>an item that is fit to become ritually impure,</b> and only if it is an item fit for laundering. The Gemara observes: Evidently, <b>the unattributed</b> portion of the mishna is taught <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda.</b> This statement is unlike the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that only an item that is presently susceptible to impurity requires laundering.",
            "The mishna also teaches: Only an item <b>fit for laundering</b> must be laundered. The Gemara observes: This qualification serves <b>to exclude a vessel</b> from the requirement of laundering, <b>as it is suitable for scraping</b> blood off of it. Laundering is necessary only for material or fabric into which blood is absorbed.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>the garment</b> mentioned explicitly in the Torah, <b>and the sackcloth,</b> and the hide, all of these must be laundered. Apparently, <b>that is to say that a hide,</b> i.e., leather, <b>is suitable for laundering. And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> between that assumption and a mishna that discusses laundering on Shabbat (<i>Shabbat</i> 142b): If <b>there were bird droppings [<i>lishleshet</i>] on</b> the cushion, one <b>wipes it with a</b> dry <b>rag,</b> but one may not rinse it with water because of the prohibition against laundering. If <b>it was on</b> a cushion <b>of leather, he applies water to it until</b> the filthy substance <b>dissolves.</b> Evidently, cleaning leather with water is not considered laundering.",
            "<b>Abaye said:</b> This contradiction is <b>not difficult. That</b> mishna in tractate <i>Shabbat</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> and <b>this</b> mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>others. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> about the blood of a sin offering: If blood sprays onto <b>a garment or</b> onto <b>sackcloth, he launders it;</b> but if it sprays onto a <b>vessel or</b> onto <b>leather, he scrapes it</b> off. <b>Others say:</b> If it sprays onto <b>a garment, or</b> onto <b>sackcloth, or</b> onto <b>leather, he launders it; but</b> if it sprays onto <b>a vessel, he scrapes it</b> off. According to this <i>baraita</i>, the Rabbis hold that laundering is not applicable to leather, and the opinion attributed to: Others say, holds that it is applicable.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>In accordance with whose</b> opinion <b>is that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said: Many times I would stand before Rav</b> on Shabbat <b>and place water on his</b> leather <b>shoes,</b> which he did not consider laundering on Shabbat? <b>In accordance with whose</b> opinion is it? It is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis</b> in this <i>baraita</i>.",
            "§ <b>Rava said: And is there anyone who says</b> that <b>leather is not suitable for laundering? But isn’t it written</b> with regard to leprosy: <b>“And the garment, or the warp, or the woof, or any article of leather that you shall wash”</b> (Leviticus 13:58)? <b>Rather, Rava said: The verse</b> that speaks of leprosy <b>and the mishna</b> that speaks of the sin offering are ruling <b>with regard to soft</b> leather, which is considered subject to laundering. In the <i>baraita</i>, <b>when</b> the Rabbis and the others <b>disagree,</b> it is <b>with regard to</b> an item that is made of <b>hard</b> leather; as the Rabbis hold that laundering does not apply to hard leather.",
            "The Gemara challenges Rava’s explanation: <b>But didn’t Rav Ḥiyya</b> bar Ashi <b>say: Many times I would stand before Rav</b> on Shabbat <b>and place water on his</b> leather <b>shoes,</b> which he did not consider laundering on Shabbat? Since shoes are normally made of soft leather, according to Rava’s explanation, this should have constituted laundering on Shabbat. The Gemara resolves the difficulty: It was a case <b>of hard</b> leather shoes, <b>and</b> Rav acted <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> that laundering does not apply to hard leather.",
            "<b>Rava then said:</b> That <b>which I said,</b> that the verse about leprosy relates to soft leather, <b>is not correct. Shall we stand</b> and <b>say of the verse that when</b> leather articles <b>are written,</b> it is only <b>of soft</b> leather articles that the Torah <b>writes?</b> A verse cannot be constrained in such a manner. <b>Are we not</b> also <b>dealing with articles of hard leather [<i>aksilgiyya</i>] that come from overseas, and</b> yet <b>the Merciful One says</b> in the verse that <b>they require laundering?</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rava said:</b> Although the verse also relates to hard leather, this does not mean that all opinions must agree that laundering is always applicable to hard leather. The hard leather in the verse is an exception, because in the case of <b>leprosy, since</b> leprosy <b>sprouts from</b> within the garment <b>itself, it loosens it and renders it soft</b> so that its halakhic status is that of soft leather. <b>Rava said:</b> Nevertheless, <b>if</b> something poses <b>a difficulty for me,</b> according to my opinion that everyone agrees that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to laundering applies to soft leather, <b>this</b> is what poses <b>a difficulty for me:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Cushions and blankets that are</b> of <b>soft</b> leather, and for which the <i>halakha</i> with regard to laundering should be relevant, <b>and</b> yet <b>we learned</b> about them in the mishna (<i>Shabbat</i> 142b): If the filth <b>was</b> on a cushion <b>of leather, he applies water to it until</b> the filth <b>dissolves,</b> which indicates that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to laundering is not applicable even to soft leather. <b>Rather, Rava said:</b> With regard to <b>any laundering that does not include rubbing,</b> it <b>is not considered laundering.</b> Consequently, one may apply water to a soft leather cushion, but soft leather remains subject to laundering, so long as there is rubbing.",
            "<b>And that</b> statement <b>that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said: Many times I would stand before Rav</b> on Shabbat <b>and place water on his</b> leather <b>shoes,</b> may be explained accordingly. With regard to <b>placing</b> water on leather, <b>yes,</b> that is permitted, <b>but</b> with regard to <b>laundering,</b> which includes rubbing, it is <b>not</b> permitted. This may be explained as follows: <b>If</b> Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi spoke <b>of soft</b> leather shoes, then <b>all agree</b> that only placing water is permitted. And <b>if</b> Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi spoke <b>of hard</b> leather shoes, the distinction between placing and rubbing <b>accords with</b> the opinion of <b>the others,</b> who hold that the requirement of laundering sprayed blood applies even to hard leather.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If that is so,</b> that placing water upon something is not considered laundering so long as one does not also rub the item, then with regard to a non-leather <b>garment as well,</b> one should be allowed to place water upon it on Shabbat. Why does the cited mishna state that one may wipe it only with a dry rag? The Gemara answers: With regard to <b>a garment, its soaking is its laundering,</b> and merely placing water on it is forbidden.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Rava</b> conforms <b>to his</b> standard line of <b>reasoning; as Rava says:</b> If one <b>cast a cloth into water</b> on Shabbat, he is <b>liable</b> for laundering on Shabbat, as it is made of fabric like any garment; and if <b>one cast flax</b> seeds <b>into water,</b> he too is <b>liable.</b> The Gemara analyzes this statement: <b>Granted,</b> if he casts <b>a cloth</b> into water, he <b>performs laundering; but</b> with regard to <b>flaxseed, what is the reason</b> that one may not cast it into water on Shabbat?",
            "<b>And if you would say</b> that it is prohibited <b>because it sprouts</b> in the water and constitutes the prohibited act of planting, <b>if so,</b> with regard to <b>wheat and barley,</b> it should <b>also</b> be forbidden to place them into water. The Gemara explains: Casting the flax into the water is not prohibited because of planting but because <b>these</b> flax seeds <b>have discharges</b> when soaked. <b>If so,</b> with regard to <b>hides,</b> it should <b>also</b> be prohibited to place them into water, because they too produce discharges in water. The Gemara answers: <b>There,</b> with regard to flaxseed, it is prohibited because it <b>effects kneading,</b> as the discharges cause the seeds to combine together, which is not true of hides.",
            "The Gemara relates: <b>Rava taught</b> in public: It is <b>permitted to launder a shoe on Shabbat. Rav Pappa said to Rava: But didn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi say: Many times I would stand before Rav</b> on Shabbat <b>and place water on his</b> leather <b>shoes?</b> Evidently, <b>placing</b> water upon leather, <b>yes,</b> that is permitted, <b>but laundering,</b> which includes rubbing, is <b>not</b> permitted. <b>Rava went back and placed an interpreter before him</b> so that he could tell the public that he had been wrong, <b>and taught</b> in public: The <b>statements that I said before you</b> earlier <b>are my error. Truly,</b> the Sages <b>said like this: Placing</b> water upon shoes is <b>permitted,</b> but <b>laundering</b> them is <b>prohibited.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>The laundering</b> must be performed <b>in a sacred place,</b> and the breaking of an earthenware vessel must be performed in a sacred place, and the scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel must be performed in a sacred place. <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>As the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning a garment on which blood was sprayed, the verse states: <b>“You shall launder</b> that on which it shall be sprinkled <b>in a sacred place”</b> (Leviticus 6:20). <b>From where</b> is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>the breaking of an earthenware vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked derived? <b>The</b> subsequent <b>verse states: “And the earthenware vessel in which it is cooked shall be broken”</b> (Leviticus 6:21). <b>From where</b> is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <b>scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked derived? <b>The verse states</b> immediately thereafter: <b>“And if it be cooked in a copper vessel, it shall be scoured, and rinsed in water.”</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>this</b> matter, <b>a stringency</b> applies <b>to a sin offering</b> more than it applies to offerings of the most sacred order. The Gemara asks: <b>And are there no more</b> <i>halakhot</i> specific to a sin offering? <b>But there is</b> this <i>halakha</i>: <b>That its blood enters the innermost sanctum</b> to be sprinkled. The Gemara answers: The mishna is dealing <b>with external sin offerings,</b> and this <i>halakha</i> applies only to internal sin offerings.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But there is the stricture <b>that if its blood enters into</b> the Sanctuary it becomes <b>disqualified.</b> The Gemara explains: This mishna is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva, who says: Every</b> offering’s <b>blood,</b> not only that of a sin offering, <b>that enters the Sanctuary to atone</b> becomes <b>disqualified;</b> therefore, this is not a <i>halakha</i> specific to a sin offering.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But there is the <i>halakha</i> <b>that</b> external sin offerings <b>atone for those who are liable to</b> receive excision, <b><i>karet</i>,</b> through unintentional sins. The Gemara explains: The mishna includes an offering that does not have that <i>halakha</i>, as its principles also apply <b>to a sin offering</b> brought <b>for hearing the voice,</b> i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by <i>karet</i>.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But there is the stricture <b>that</b> the blood of a sin offering <b>requires four placements</b> on the altar, unlike other offerings of the most sacred order. The Gemara explains: This mishna is composed <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yishmael, who says</b> that <b>all blood</b> of offerings <b>requires four placements,</b> one <b>upon</b> each of the <b>four corners</b> of the altar; accordingly, this is not a <i>halakha</i> limited to the sin offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> even <b>according to your reasoning,</b> can it be said that there is only one <i>halakha</i> that applies to a sin offering but does not apply to other offerings? <b>Isn’t there</b> the requirement to place a sin offering’s <b>blood</b> on the <b>corner</b> at the top of the altar? <b>Isn’t there</b> the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his <b>finger? Isn’t there</b> the requirement to place it on <b>the edge of</b> the altar? Therefore, it should not be assumed that this is the only <i>halakha</i> unique to a sin offering, but <b>rather</b> that the mishna simply <b>cited one of two</b> or <b>three stringencies.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>a garment</b> upon which the blood of a sin offering was sprayed <b>that went outside the curtains,</b> i.e., the Temple courtyard, before being laundered, the garment <b>reenters</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> one <b>launders it in a sacred place.</b> If the garment <b>became ritually impure outside the curtains,</b> one <b>tears</b> the garment in order to render it ritually pure, <b>enters</b> the courtyard with it, <b>and launders it in a sacred place.</b> With regard to <b>an earthenware vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked <b>that went outside the curtains,</b> the vessel <b>reenters</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> one <b>breaks it in a sacred place.</b> If the vessel <b>became ritually impure outside the curtains,</b> one <b>punctures</b> the vessel to render it ritually pure, <b>and</b> one <b>enters</b> the courtyard with it <b>and breaks it in a sacred place.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>a copper vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked <b>that went outside the curtains,</b> the vessel <b>reenters</b> the courtyard, <b>and</b> one <b>scours it and rinses it in a sacred place.</b> If the vessel <b>became ritually impure outside the curtains, one breaks</b> the vessel by boring a large hole in it to render it ritually pure <b>and enters</b> the courtyard with it <b>and scours and rinses it in a sacred place.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches: If the garment became ritually impure outside the curtains, one tears the garment in order to render it ritually pure, enters the courtyard with it, and launders it in a sacred place. <b>Ravina objects to this:</b> How can the mishna say that <b>one tears it? The Merciful One states</b> in the Torah that one must launder <b>“a garment”</b> (Leviticus 6:20), <b>and</b> once this article is torn, <b>this is no</b> longer <b>a garment,</b> but only a scrap of cloth.",
            "The Gemara answers: The mishna describes a scenario <b>when he leaves</b> untorn a fragment <b>of</b> the garment that is size <b>enough for a small cloth. Is that so?</b> If he leaves such a portion intact, is he still permitted to bring the garment back into the courtyard? <b>But doesn’t Rav Huna say:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> that an impure garment, most of which has been torn, loses its impurity <b>only when</b> one <b>did not leave of it enough for a small cloth, but if he left enough of it</b> untorn <b>for a small cloth, it is</b> considered <b>a joining</b> of the pieces, and the garment remains ritually impure. Accordingly, leaving a piece that size would not serve any purpose with regard to ritual impurity."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara answers that Rav Huna’s statement means that <b>it is</b> ritually impure <b>by rabbinic law,</b> since the Sages decreed the small cloth impure lest one fail to tear a garment enough to render it truly pure. By Torah law, this small cloth is torn enough to be ritually pure, so that one may bring it back into the Temple courtyard to launder it.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>an earthenware vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked <b>that went outside</b> the curtains and became ritually impure outside the curtains, one punctures the vessel to render it ritually pure, brings the vessel back into the courtyard, and breaks it there. The Gemara asks: Why is there a need to break the earthenware vessel after puncturing it? <b>The Merciful One states:</b> “The earthenware <b>vessel…</b>shall be broken” (Leviticus 6:21), <b>and,</b> once it is punctured, <b>it is not a vessel.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>When it is punctured</b> with a hole only the size <b>of a small root,</b> the earthenware vessel is purified from the ritual impurity it contracted, but it remains a vessel for other purposes, such as holding fruit.",
            "The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>a copper vessel</b> in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains and became ritually impure outside the curtains, <b>one breaks</b> the vessel by boring a large hole in it to render it ritually pure, brings the vessel back into the courtyard, and scours and rinses it there. The Gemara asks: Why should the copper vessel be scoured and rinsed? After all, once the hole is bored, <b>this is not a vessel</b> anymore. The Gemara explains: <b>When he hammers</b> it and refashions it into a vessel, he must scour and rinse it.",
            "§ Earlier (94b–95a), the Gemara discusses a garment upon which the blood of a sin offering has sprayed; if it has contracted ritual impurity outside of the Temple courtyard, it must be torn before it is brought back into the courtyard to be laundered. <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> If the <b>robe</b> of the High Priest upon which the blood of a sin offering has sprayed <b>has contracted ritual impurity</b> outside of the Temple courtyard, one does not tear it; rather, <b>he brings it in</b> to the courtyard gradually, in portions <b>less than</b> the measure of a garment susceptible to impurity, which is <b>three by three</b> fingerbreadths, <b>and</b> he <b>launders it</b> section by section as the robe crosses the threshold. The ritually impure robe must be brought into the courtyard in this manner <b>because it is stated</b> with regard to the High Priest’s robe: <b>“It shall not be torn”</b> (Exodus 28:32).",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection</b> based upon a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 28:8): <b>The</b> particularly <b>thick</b> garments <b>and the soft</b> garments <b>are not subject to</b> the standard measure of <b>three by three</b> fingerbreadths, with regard to determining their susceptibility to becoming ritually impure. Because of their particular qualities, such garments are useful only when they are larger and are not considered significant items when they measure three by three. Since the High Priest’s robe is a thick garment, why must one bring it into the courtyard only in portions of less than three by three?",
            "The Gemara answers: With regard to the whole robe of the High Priest, which is a garment of particular significance, even the small portions of the robe <b>are significant due to their source</b> garment, and are susceptible to impurity in portions measuring three by three fingerbreadths.",
            "§ The Gemara asks a fundamental question with regard to the procedure for laundering a garment upon which the blood of a sin offering has sprayed: <b>But isn’t</b> it so that laundering <b>requires seven</b> abrasive <b>substances? As Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: Blood of a sin offering</b> that has sprayed on a garment, <b>and shades of</b> leprous <b>marks</b> on garments, which are subject to laundering (see Leviticus 13:54), <b>require</b> the <b>seven</b> abrasive <b>substances</b> used as laundering agents; and these substances include urine (<i>Nidda</i> 61b). <b>And it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>But urine is not brought into the Temple,</b> because it is inappropriate for the Temple, although urine is theoretically suitable for use in the preparation of the incense spices. Accordingly, how is a garment laundered in the Temple?"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara rejects a solution: <b>And if you would say that</b> the urine <b>is absorbed together with</b> the rest of the <b>seven</b> abrasive <b>substances</b> used as laundering agents, <b>and one applies all of them at once</b> to the garment, such that the urine is not discernable separately, that is difficult: <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna that this method is invalid? The mishna states (<i>Nidda</i> 62a): If one <b>applied them not according to their</b> prescribed <b>order, or</b> if one <b>applied all seven</b> substances <b>simultaneously, he has done nothing,</b> and the laundering has not been effective.",
            "The Gemara rejects another solution: <b>And if you would say that</b> the urine <b>is absorbed together with</b> only <b>one of the</b> cleansing <b>substances,</b> that is difficult: <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in that mishna: <b>One must rub</b> the garment <b>three times with each and every one</b> of those substances independently? The Gemara resolves: <b>Rather,</b> it must be explained <b>that</b> the urine <b>is absorbed in tasteless saliva,</b> which comes from one who has not eaten since waking; <b>as Reish Lakish says: Tasteless saliva must accompany each and every one</b> of the substances applied to the garment.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Whether</b> with regard to a copper vessel <b>in which</b> one <b>cooked</b> the meat of an offering <b>or whether</b> with regard to one <b>into which</b> one <b>poured</b> the <b>boiling</b> meat of an offering, <b>whether</b> the meat is from <b>offerings of the most sacred order or whether</b> it is from <b>offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> such vessels <b>require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> Vessels in which <b>offerings of lesser sanctity</b> were cooked or poured <b>do not require scouring and rinsing.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> Concerning the statement in the mishna that these <i>halakhot</i> also apply to a vessel into which a boiling cooked dish was poured, the Gemara notes that <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a sin offering, the verse states: <b>“In which it is cooked”</b> (Leviticus 6:21). <b>I have</b> derived <b>only that</b> this applies to a vessel <b>in which</b> one <b>cooked</b> the sin offering. <b>From where</b> do I derive that it applies also to a vessel <b>into which</b> one <b>poured a boiling</b> cooked dish? <b>The verse states</b> more fully: <b>“But</b> the earthenware vessel <b>in which it is cooked shall be broken.”</b> Since the verse employs the phrase: “In which it is…shall be broken,” that teaches that if the hot meat is in the vessel, whether cooked or poured into the vessel, these <i>halakhot</i> apply to it, and if it is an earthenware vessel it must be broken.",
            "§ <b>Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma:</b> If one <b>suspended</b> the meat of a sin offering <b>in the airspace of</b> an earthenware <b>oven</b> in order to roast it, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? When the verse requires the breaking of the earthenware vessel, <b>is it</b> only <b>with regard to</b> both <b>cooking and</b> the resultant <b>absorption</b> of the offering’s flavor into the vessel <b>that the Merciful One is particular?</b> If so, an oven would not need to be broken simply because an offering has been roasted within its airspace. <b>Or perhaps,</b> is the Merciful One particular even <b>about cooking</b> in the vessel <b>without absorption</b> of the flavor, and therefore, if meat is roasted while suspended in this oven, the vessel must still be broken?",
            "<b>Rava said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof, deduced from the mishna: <b>Whether</b> with regard to a copper vessel <b>in which</b> one <b>cooked</b> the meat of an offering <b>or whether</b> with regard to one <b>into which</b> one <b>poured</b> the <b>boiling</b> meat of an offering, the earthenware vessel must be broken. Therefore, the vessel must be broken even if the meat was not cooked in it but only absorbed in its walls, indicating that even if cooking and absorption do not occur together, just one of the two should suffice to require the breaking of the vessel.",
            "The Gemara rejects the proof: The <i>halakha</i> in a case of the <b>absorption</b> of flavor into an earthenware vessel <b>without cooking</b> the meat in that vessel, as in the case of pouring, <b>was not raised as a dilemma to us.</b> If the boiling offering has been poured into a vessel, the vessel certainly must be broken, since earthenware never fully emits all that it absorbed. <b>When</b> a scenario <b>was raised</b> as <b>a dilemma to us,</b> it was with regard to <b>cooking</b> meat in the vessel <b>without absorption</b> of the flavor by that vessel, as in the case of roasting suspended meat. In such a case, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a proof, deduced from <b>that which Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: The oven of the Temple was</b> fashioned <b>of metal. And if it enters your mind</b> that with regard to <b>cooking</b> in a vessel <b>without absorption,</b> the Merciful One <b>is not particular</b> and does not require the breaking of a vessel used in such a fashion, then the oven <b>should be made of earthenware.</b> The Gemara rejects this proof: <b>Since there are the remainders of meal offerings, whose baking</b> is performed <b>in the oven, and there is</b> both <b>cooking and absorption</b> into the oven, as the remains of the meal offerings would be baked directly on the walls of the oven, for this reason alone the oven would have to be broken if it were fashioned of earthenware. Consequently, <b>we fashion</b> it <b>of metal.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara relates: There was <b>a certain oven that was smeared with</b> animal <b>fat</b> all over its walls and floor. <b>Rabba bar Ahilai prohibited eating bread</b> baked in that oven <b>forever, and</b> he prohibited <b>even</b> eating the bread <b>with salt</b> alone, <b>lest one come to eat it with <i>kutaḥ</i>,</b> a dish made from milk, water, salt, and bread crumbs. According to Rabba bar Ahilai, the oven will never fully eliminate the fat.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to this from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to baking bread, <b>one may not knead the dough with milk, and if one</b> nevertheless <b>kneaded</b> the dough with milk, <b>all of the bread</b> made from that dough is <b>forbidden, because</b> one might become <b>accustomed to sin.</b> As one habitually eats bread with meat, he might also eat this bread with meat and unwittingly transgress the prohibition against eating meat with milk.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Similarly,</b> one may <b>not smear [<i>tashin</i>] the</b> inside of <b>an oven with</b> the fat of a sheep’s <b>tail,</b> because the fat of the tail has the <i>halakha</i> of meat. <b>And if</b> one nevertheless <b>smeared</b> the oven with the fat of the tail, <b>all of the bread</b> baked in it is <b>forbidden, until</b> one <b>kindles the oven</b> and burns off this fat. Evidently, the bread baked after the oven is kindled again is permitted, because the oven is considered cleansed of the meat fat. Therefore, <b>the refutation of</b> the opinion of <b>Rava bar Ahilai,</b> who says that the oven never fully eliminates the fat, is indeed <b>a conclusive refutation.</b>",
            "<b>Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Since</b> the statement of <b>Rava bar Ahilai was conclusively refuted, why does Rav say</b> that <b>pots</b> that were used for leavened bread <b>must be broken</b> before <b>Passover?</b> Presumably, the leavened bread could be burned out of them through kindling instead. Rav Ashi <b>said to him: Rav construes that</b> ruling of the <i>baraita</i>, according to which the fat can be burned out of the oven, as referring <b>to</b> an oven fashioned <b>of metal,</b> which cleanses the fat when kindled. In the case of earthenware vessels, additional kindling is insufficient, because the flavor absorbed within it cannot be cleansed by fire.",
            "<b>Or if you wish, say</b> instead that the <i>baraita</i> is also referring <b>to an earthenware oven,</b> and there is another distinction. <b>This</b> oven <b>is kindled from the inside,</b> and a fire kindled inside the oven suffices to cleanse absorbed flavor. <b>But that</b> pot <b>is kindled from the outside</b> while it rests on the stove, and the heat absorbed in that manner is insufficient to cleanse absorbed flavor.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>And let us</b> also <b>perform</b> the <b>kindling</b> of the pot <b>from the inside,</b> in order to cleanse that which has been absorbed. The Gemara answers: This solution is not feasible; the owners of such pots might be <b>concerned for them, as they</b> are apt to <b>break</b> if the heat becomes too great. Consequently, the owners will not apply sufficient heat to ensure that the absorbed flavor will be completely cleansed. The Gemara concludes: <b>Therefore,</b> with regard to <b>this earthenware tile [<i>kuvya</i>],</b> which is used on the fire as a baking pan and <b>its kindling is from the outside,</b> it becomes <b>prohibited</b> for subsequent use by the flavors absorbed within, which cannot be cleansed."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> according to the opinion that earthenware vessels can be cleansed of their absorbed substances by the process of kindling, with regard to <b>pots</b> used in <b>the Temple, why does the Merciful One state</b> in the Torah that <b>they should be broken? Let us</b> simply <b>return them to</b> the <b>kilns</b> in which pots are made to be sure that the pots will be cleansed by the extreme heat of the kilns. <b>Rabbi Zeira said:</b> The pots cannot be returned to kilns <b>because,</b> as taught in a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Bava Kamma</i> 82b), <b>kilns are not built in Jerusalem</b> because of the great quantity of smoke they produce.",
            "The Gemara presents an objection to Rabbi Zeira’s answer. <b>Abaye said: But</b> if, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches, there are no kilns in Jerusalem, <b>are scrap heaps</b> of earthenware <b>assembled in the Temple courtyard?</b> The same <i>baraita</i> also teaches that there are no scrap heaps in Jerusalem. What, then, is done with the shards of earthenware vessels that must be broken in the courtyard? The Gemara dismisses the question: Abaye raised that objection only because <b>that which Shemaya taught in Kalnevo escaped him;</b> Shemaya taught there: In the Temple, <b>shards of earthenware vessels were</b> miraculously <b>absorbed in their place.</b>",
            "The Gemara returns to the topic of kindling earthenware vessels and asks: <b>But</b> if kindling from within cleanses everything absorbed in an earthenware oven, what is the reason for <b>that which Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: The oven in the Temple was</b> fashioned <b>of metal? Let us fashion</b> it <b>of earthenware, as</b> an oven’s <b>kindling is from the inside,</b> and, accordingly, it would be possible to cleanse it?",
            "The Gemara answers: The reason the oven must be fashioned of metal is <b>because there are the two loaves,</b> i.e., the public offering on <i>Shavuot</i> of two loaves from the new wheat, <b>and the shewbread,</b> i.e., the bread baked each week in a special form and displayed for the duration of one whole week on the table in the Sanctuary, <b>whose baking is</b> done <b>in the oven, and</b> also <b>whose sanctification</b> occurs <b>in the oven.</b> Because these offerings are not kneaded in a service vessel, they are sanctified only by being placed in the oven, and therefore the oven <b>is a service vessel; and we do not make a service vessel of earthenware.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>And even Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says only</b> that a service vessel may be fashioned <b>of wood,</b> which is a somewhat significant material, <b>but</b> with regard to a service vessel fashioned <b>of earthenware,</b> he holds that this is <b>not</b> valid.",
            "§ The Gemara relates an incident related to the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing. <b>Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda was</b> initially <b>accustomed</b> to study Torah <b>before Rami bar Ḥama.</b> After some time, <b>he left him and went to</b> study before <b>Rav Sheshet. One day</b> Rami bar Ḥama <b>met him</b> and <b>said to him</b> colloquially: Did you assume, as many do, that when <b>the chief of taxes [<i>alkafta</i>] grasped me</b> by the hand, <b>the fragrance</b> of his hand <b>came to</b> my <b>hand?</b> Do you think that <b>because you went</b> away from me in order to study <b>before Rav Sheshet, have you become like Rav Sheshet</b> merely by association?",
            "Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda <b>said to him:</b> It is <b>not due to that</b> reason that I went to study before Rav Sheshet, but for another reason. As for you, <b>Master, when I ask</b> with regard to any <b>matter,</b> Master <b>resolves</b> the question <b>for me through reasoning.</b> Consequently, <b>when I find a mishna</b> that opposes that reasoning, it <b>refutes</b> Master’s proposed resolution. As for <b>Rav Sheshet, when I ask of him</b> a question concerning any <b>matter,</b> he <b>resolves</b> the question <b>for me by</b> citing <b>a mishna.</b> Consequently, <b>when I also find a mishna, and</b> that mishna <b>refutes</b> the proposed resolution, <b>it is</b> a dispute between one <b>mishna and</b> another <b>mishna,</b> which does not necessarily refute the mishna that he cited.",
            "Rami bar Ḥama <b>said to him: Ask me</b> about <b>a matter, which I</b> will <b>resolve for you in accordance with a mishna.</b> Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda <b>asked him:</b> If one <b>cooked</b> a sin offering <b>in</b> only <b>part of a vessel, does</b> the entire vessel <b>require scouring and rinsing, or does it not require</b> scouring and rinsing? Rami bar Ḥama <b>said to him:</b> The entire vessel <b>does not require</b> scouring and rinsing, <b>just as it is</b> taught concerning <b>sprinkling</b> the blood of a sin offering upon a garment. In the latter case, the mishna teaches (93b) that one must launder only the part of the garment on which the blood sprayed.",
            "Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda replied: <b>But the <i>tanna</i> does not teach this</b> explicitly. Rami bar Ḥama <b>said to him:</b> Nevertheless, <b>it stands to reason</b> that the scouring and rinsing of a vessel in which sacred meat was cooked should be <b>like</b> the laundering of <b>a garment,</b> as follows: <b>Just as a garment requires laundering only</b> in the <b>place</b> where <b>the blood</b> was sprayed, <b>so too,</b> it must be that <b>a vessel requires scouring and rinsing only in the place</b> where the meat underwent the process of <b>cooking.</b>",
            "Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda <b>said to him: Are</b> the situations <b>comparable? Blood does not spread</b> and penetrate all parts of the garment, but in the case of <b>cooking,</b> the flavor of the meat <b>spreads</b> throughout the entire vessel. <b>Additionally,</b> your reasoning opposes that which <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 10:15): A certain <b>stringency</b> applies <b>to sprinkling</b> more <b>than</b> it applies to <b>scouring and rinsing; and</b> a certain <b>stringency</b> applies <b>to scouring and rinsing</b> more <b>than</b> it applies to <b>sprinkling.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: The <b>stringency</b> that applies <b>to sprinkling</b> is <b>that</b> the <i>halakha</i> of the <b>sprinkling</b> of blood on a garment <b>applies to external sin offerings,</b> brought on the altar in the Temple courtyard, <b>and to internal sin offerings,</b> whose blood is sprinkled on the altar in the Sanctuary; <b>and</b> the <i>halakha</i> of blood sprayed onto a garment <b>applies</b> if it sprays <b>before</b> the required <b>sprinkling</b> of the offering’s blood on the altar; <b>which is not so in</b> the case of <b>scouring and rinsing.</b> Scouring and rinsing are required only for external sin offerings, whose meat is eaten and therefore cooked; and it applies only after the sprinkling of blood on the altar, after which the meat may be eaten.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: The <b>stringency</b> that applies <b>to scouring and rinsing</b> is <b>that the scouring and rinsing</b> of vessels <b>is practiced both for offerings of the most sacred order and for offerings of lesser sanctity;</b> and even if one <b>cooked in</b> only <b>part of the vessel, the entire vessel requires scouring and rinsing, which is not so in</b> the case of errantly <b>sprinkling</b> blood onto a garment, for which one must launder only the place on which the blood sprayed.",
            "Rami bar Ḥama <b>said to him: If</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>is taught, it is taught,</b> and I cannot take issue with it. The Gemara then clarifies: <b>And what is the reason</b> that an entire vessel requires scouring and rinsing even if one cooked the meat of an offering in only part of the vessel? The reason is that <b>the verse states: “And if it be cooked in a copper vessel,</b> it shall be scoured and rinsed in water” (Leviticus 6:21). From the phrase “in a copper vessel” it is derived that <b>even</b> if the meat is cooked <b>in</b> only <b>part of a vessel,</b> the entire vessel must be scoured and rinsed.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Whether</b> the meat is from <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> or whether it is from offerings of lesser sanctity, the vessels in which it is cooked must be scoured and rinsed. The Gemara cites a related <i>baraita</i>: <b>The Sages taught:</b> The Torah introduces the mitzva of scouring and rinsing with the qualifying statement: “This is the law of the <b>sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 6:18). From this verse <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to scouring and rinsing applies to vessels in which <b>a sin offering</b> was cooked. <b>From where</b> do I derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies to vessels used for <b>all sacrificial</b> meat? <b>The verse states:</b> “Every male among the priests may eat of it; <b>it is most sacred”</b> (Leviticus 6:22), to teach that this <i>halakha</i> applies to vessels used for all of the sacrificial meat that the priests eat.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I</b> should <b>include</b> vessels used for cooking <b><i>teruma</i>,</b> the portion of the produce designated for the priest, as well, as it is also sacred and may be eaten only by a priest (see Leviticus 22:14). To counter this, <b>the verse states:</b> “Every male among the priests may eat <b>of it;</b> it is most sacred” (Leviticus 6:22). The emphatic qualifier “of it” <b>excludes <i>teruma</i>;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: Offerings of the most sacred order require scouring and rinsing,</b> but <b>offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing, as it is written: “Most sacred.”</b> Accordingly, with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, yes,</b> scouring and rinsing is required; but for <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, no,</b> it is not required.",
            "The Gemara asks: The <i>baraita</i> explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning; <b>what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Since</b> the qualifying term <b>“of it” was necessary to exclude <i>teruma</i>, by inference,</b> it must be <b>that</b> vessels used for <b>offerings of lesser sanctity require scouring and rinsing.</b> If even offerings of lesser sanctity are excluded from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, it would be self-evident that the vessel used for <i>teruma</i> is exempt from scouring and rinsing. Accordingly, the direct exclusion of <i>teruma</i> indicates that the vessels used for offerings of lesser sanctity are not excluded. <b>And Rabbi Shimon</b> could have <b>said to you:</b> The term <b>“of it”</b> teaches a different <i>halakha</i> and excludes a disqualified sin offering from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, <b>as we say</b> earlier in this chapter (93a).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is it correct that with regard to a copper vessel used to cook <b><i>teruma</i>, it does not require rinsing and scouring? But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 8:16): With regard to <b>a pot in which</b> one <b>cooked meat,</b> one <b>may not cook milk in it; and if</b> one <b>cooked</b> milk in it, the meat absorbed in the pot renders the milk forbidden if it <b>imparts flavor</b> to it. Similarly, if one cooked <b><i>teruma</i></b> in a pot, one <b>may not cook non-sacred</b> food <b>in it; and if</b> one <b>cooked</b> non-sacred food in it, the absorbed <i>teruma</i> renders the mixture sacred if it <b>imparts flavor</b> to it. Therefore, a pot requires purging with boiling liquid in order to expel the flavor of <i>teruma</i> from it.",
            "Three <i>amora’im</i> address the apparent inconsistency that while the Torah excludes vessels used for <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that these vessels must be purged. <b>Abaye said:</b> When the verse excludes <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, this <b>is necessary only for</b> that <b>which the Master said:</b> If one <b>cooked in</b> only <b>part of</b> the <b>vessel, the entire vessel requires scouring and rinsing.</b> By contrast, in <b>this</b> case, if <b><i>teruma</i></b> was cooked in only part of a vessel, one <b>must</b> perform scouring and rinsing <b>only</b> in <b>the place of</b> the <b>cooking,</b> and not in the whole vessel.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> When the verse excludes <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, that <b>is necessary only for</b> that <b>which the Master said:</b> The verse specifies: “It shall be scoured and rinsed <b>in water”</b> (Leviticus 6:21), <b>but</b> the vessel is <b>not</b> to be scoured and rinsed <b>in wine.</b> It must be scoured and rinsed <b>“in water,” but not in diluted</b> wine. By contrast, in <b>this</b> case, i.e., the vessel in which <i>teruma</i> was cooked, it may be scoured and rinsed <b>even in wine, and even in diluted</b> wine.",
            "<b>Rabba bar Ulla said:</b> When the verse excludes <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, this <b>is necessary only for</b> that <b>which the Master said:</b> One must perform <b>scouring and rinsing with cold</b> water, in addition to purging a vessel of its absorbed flavors with boiling water. By contrast, in <b>this</b> case, i.e., with regard to the vessel in which <i>teruma</i> was cooked, one may cleanse the vessel <b>even</b> by performing only the purging <b>with boiling</b> water, which removes the residue of the forbidden food, and omitting the cold water processes entirely.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that <b>scouring and rinsing</b> are performed <b>with cold</b> water; <b>but according to the one who says</b> that <b>scouring</b> is done by purging <b>with hot</b> water, <b>and rinsing</b> is a different procedure performed <b>with cold</b> water, <b>what can be said?</b> According to this opinion, the verse is also referring to purging; and if the verse excludes vessels used for <i>teruma</i>, how does the <i>baraita</i> teach that such vessels must be purged? The Gemara answers: According to the opinion that differentiates scouring, which is done with boiling water, from rinsing, which is done with cold water, the Torah excludes vessels used for <i>teruma</i> only from <b>the additional rinsing</b> that the Torah requires after the scouring.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Tarfon says:</b> If one <b>cooked</b> a sin offering in a copper vessel <b>from the beginning of the</b> pilgrimage <b>Festival,</b> one <b>may cook in it</b> for <b>the entire</b> pilgrimage <b>Festival;</b> he need not scour and rinse the vessel after every use. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> One may not continue using it in this manner; rather, one must perform <b>scouring and rinsing before</b> the end of the <b>period</b> during which <b>partaking</b> of the particular cooked offering is permitted. <b>Scouring</b> is <b>like the scouring of</b> the inside of <b>a cup,</b> the cleaning done when wine sticks to the cup, <b>and rinsing</b> is <b>like the rinsing of</b> the outside of <b>a cup. Scouring and rinsing</b> are both performed <b>with cold</b> water."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>the spit and the</b> metal <b>grill [<i>askela</i>],</b> one <b>purges them in hot water.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that Rabbi Tarfon says: If one cooked a sin offering in a vessel from the beginning of the Festival, one may cook in it for the entire Festival without scouring and rinsing the vessel after every use and without being concerned that he is eating forbidden leftover meat. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reasoning of Rabbi Tarfon?</b> The Gemara answers: It is <b>as the verse states</b> with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall roast and eat it in the place that the Lord your God shall choose; <b>and you shall turn in the morning, and go to your tents”</b> (Deuteronomy 16:7). Although one does not leave Jerusalem on the first morning of Passover, <b>the verse has rendered all of those</b> days over which one remains there equal to <b>one morning.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami objects to this:</b> Can it be that all of the days of the Festival are considered a single day? <b>But is there no</b> prohibition against bringing <b>an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [<i>piggul</i>] during a pilgrimage Festival? And is there no</b> prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>,</b> consuming sacrificial meat beyond its appointed time, <b>during a pilgrimage Festival?</b> Both these prohibitions are based on the premise that each offering may be eaten over a limited time far less than the duration of the entire Festival.",
            "<b>And if you would say: Indeed,</b> neither <i>piggul</i> nor <i>notar</i> apply during a Festival, that is difficult: <b>But it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Natan says: Rabbi Tarfon said</b> that an entire Festival is considered a single day <b>only</b> with regard to <b>this,</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of scouring and rinsing, <b>alone,</b> and not with regard to other <i>halakhot</i>, including <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i>. Evidently, his opinion is not based on the cited verse.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>Rather,</b> one must explain that Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion accords <b>with that which Rav Naḥman says</b> citing <b>Rabba bar Avuh. As Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says:</b> Scouring and rinsing does not need to be done every day in order to avoid eating the taste of forbidden leftover meat, because while the vessels are used for repeatedly cooking various types of sacrificial meat, the meat of <b>each and every day becomes a purging agent for the other</b> food, that which is already absorbed in the vessel from the prior day. Therefore, only after the Festival, when the vessel is not being used, must the pot be scoured and rinsed.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> One may not continue using it in this manner; rather, one must perform scouring and rinsing <b>before</b> the end of the <b>period</b> during which <b>partaking</b> of the particular cooked offering is permitted. <b>What</b> is the mishna <b>saying? Rav Naḥman said</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh said: One waits for</b> the copper vessel <b>so long as</b> it remains <b>the period of partaking, and then</b> he <b>performs scouring and rinsing on it.</b>",
            "<b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Abba Yosei bar Abba: It is written</b> about a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked: <b>“It shall be scoured and rinsed</b> in water” (Leviticus 6:21); <b>and it is written</b> in the following verse: <b>“Every male among the priests may eat</b> it.” <b>How so,</b> i.e., what are the verses teaching through this juxtaposition? One <b>waits with it until</b> the end of <b>the period of partaking and then performs scouring and rinsing on it.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Scouring</b> is <b>like the scouring of a cup,</b> and <b>rinsing</b> is <b>like the rinsing of a cup;</b> and scouring and rinsing are both performed with cold water. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Scouring and rinsing</b> are both performed <b>with cold</b> water; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. <b>And the Rabbis say: Scouring</b> is performed <b>with hot</b> water, <b>and rinsing</b> is performed <b>with cold</b> water.",
            "<b>What is the reasoning of the Rabbis?</b> They hold that this <i>halakha</i> is <b>just as it is with</b> regard to <b>purging</b> the used vessels acquired from <b>gentiles,</b> for which purging the forbidden absorptions must be performed with hot water. <b>And Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi could have <b>said to you: I do not say</b> this statement about <b>purging,</b> which must certainly be performed with hot water. Rather, <b>when I say</b> my opinion, it is <b>with regard to</b> the mitzva of <b>scouring and rinsing, which is</b> performed <b>after purging.</b>",
            "<b>And the Rabbis</b> could reply: <b>If so,</b> that scouring and rinsing are both performed in the same manner, <b>let the verse write</b> the same verb to describe both processes, namely <b>either:</b> It shall be <b>scoured</b> and <b>scoured</b> in water, <b>or:</b> It shall be <b>rinsed</b> and <b>rinsed</b> in water. <b>What</b> is meant by the formula: <b>“It shall be scoured and rinsed</b> in water”? <b>Conclude from</b> the use of two verbs that <b>scouring</b> is performed <b>with hot</b> water, <b>and rinsing</b> is performed <b>with cold</b> water.",
            "<b>And Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi could reply: <b>If it were written: It shall be scoured</b> and <b>scoured,</b> or: It shall be rinsed and rinsed, <b>I would say</b> that the vessel must be <b>scoured two times, or</b> that it must be <b>rinsed two times. Therefore, it is written: “It shall be scoured and rinsed,” to tell you</b> that even if both are performed with cold water, there are two distinct actions: <b>Scouring</b> is <b>like the scouring of</b> the inside of <b>a cup,</b> and <b>rinsing</b> is <b>like the rinsing of</b> the outside of <b>a cup.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If one <b>cooked in</b> one vessel <b>sacrificial</b> meat <b>and non-sacred</b> meat, <b>or</b> the meat of <b>offerings of the most sacred order and</b> the meat of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> the status of the food depends upon the taste of the stringent substance. <b>If there is</b> enough <b>of</b> the more sacred meat <b>to impart flavor</b> to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then <b>the lenient</b> components of the mixtures must <b>be eaten in accordance with</b> the restrictions of <b>the stringent</b> components <b>therein,</b> insofar as who may partake of them, as well as the time when and the place where they may be eaten. <b>And</b> the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked <b>do not require scouring and rinsing, and</b> the lenient components <b>do not disqualify</b> pieces of meat <b>through contact.</b> With regard to these principles, the lenient components do not assume the status of the stringent components.",
            "In the case of a fit <b>wafer that touched</b> an unfit <b>wafer or a piece</b> of sacrificial meat that touched an unfit <b>piece</b> of sacrificial meat, <b>neither all the wafers nor all the pieces</b> of meat <b>are forbidden. No</b> part is <b>forbidden other than</b> that which is <b>in the place where</b> the item <b>absorbed</b> taste from the unfit wafers or pieces.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> According to the mishna, if the more sacred meat imparts flavor to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then the lenient meat is to be treated in the same manner as the more sacred meat. Concurrently, their vessels do not require scouring and rinsing, and the lenient components do not disqualify pieces of meat through contact. The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the mishna <b>saying?</b> Is this not inconsistent? The Gemara answers: The mishna must be understood otherwise: <b>If there is</b> enough <b>of</b> the more sacred meat <b>to impart flavor</b> to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then <b>the lenient</b> components of the mixtures must <b>be eaten in accordance with</b> the restrictions of <b>the stringent</b> components. Moreover, the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked do <b>require scouring and rinsing, and</b> the lenient components do <b>disqualify</b> pieces of meat <b>through contact.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>If</b> the more sacred meat <b>is not sufficient to impart flavor</b> to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then <b>the lenient</b> components of the mixtures <b>are not eaten in accordance with</b> the restrictions of <b>the stringent</b> components. Moreover, the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked <b>do not require scouring and rinsing, and</b> the lenient components <b>do not disqualify</b> pieces of meat <b>through contact.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: If the offerings of the most sacred order do not impart taste to the offerings of lesser sanctity, <b>granted,</b> the vessels <b>do not require</b> scouring and rinsing commensurate with vessels used to cook <b>offerings of the most sacred order.</b> But isn’t it so that the vessels <b>should</b> nevertheless <b>require</b> scouring and rinsing by virtue of having been used for <b>offerings of lesser sanctity?</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said: What</b> is the meaning of: <b>Do not require, which</b> the mishna <b>states?</b> It means only that the vessels do not require scouring and rinsing commensurate with vessels used to cook <b>offerings of the most sacred order, but</b> they <b>do require</b> scouring and rinsing as vessels used to cook <b>offerings of lesser sanctity. Rava said:</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? <b>It is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says:</b> Vessels used to cook <b>offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing</b> at all.",
            "The Gemara analyzes: <b>Granted,</b> according <b>to</b> the opinion of <b>Rava, this</b> explanation is consistent with <b>that which</b> the mishna <b>teaches:</b> If one cooked in one vessel sacrificial meat and non-sacred meat, <b>or</b> the meat of <b>offerings of the most sacred order and</b> the meat of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity.</b> The mishna provides a second scenario in order to teach that vessels used to cook offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. <b>But</b> according <b>to Abaye, why do I</b> need <b>two</b> cases to teach the single principle that a substance is nullified if its presence is insufficient to impart flavor?",
            "The Gemara answers: Even according to Abaye, both cases <b>are necessary,</b> in order to teach a <i>halakha</i> with regard to nullification. <b>As, had</b> the mishna <b>taught</b> only the case of <b>sacrificial</b> meat <b>and non-sacred</b> meat, <b>I would say</b> that <b>it is non-sacred</b> meat <b>that can nullify sacrificial</b> meat, <b>as</b> sacrificial meat is <b>not its type. But</b> with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, I would say:</b> The offerings of lesser sanctity do <b>not</b> nullify those other offerings, because they are of the same type.",
            "<b>And had</b> the mishna <b>taught</b> only the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, I would say</b> that <b>it is sacrificial</b> meat <b>that is strong</b> enough <b>to nullify</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> meat; <b>but</b> with regard to <b>non-sacred</b> meat, <b>I would say:</b> It is <b>not</b> strong enough to nullify sacrificial meat. Therefore, it is <b>necessary</b> for the mishna to teach both cases.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: In the case of a fit <b>wafer that reached</b> an unfit <b>wafer</b> or a piece of sacrificial meat that touched an unfit piece of sacrificial meat, neither all the wafers nor all the pieces are forbidden. No part is forbidden other than that which is in the place where the item absorbed taste from the unfit wafers or pieces. In relation to this <i>halakha</i>, <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a sin offering, the verse states: <b>“Whatever shall touch</b> its flesh shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:20). One <b>might</b> have thought that this applies to all contact, <b>even</b> if the other piece <b>did not absorb</b> any flavor from the meat of the sin offering. To counter this, <b>the</b> same <b>verse states: “With its flesh [<i>bivsarah</i>]”</b> which can also be translated: In its flesh."
        ],
        [
            "This teaches that this <i>halakha</i> does not apply <b>unless</b> the other food <b>absorbs</b> something of the sin offering <b>into its meat.</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>if</b> the sin offering <b>touched part of a piece</b> of something that absorbed flavor from the sin offering, <b>the entire</b> piece <b>should become disqualified.</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states:</b> “Whatever <b>shall touch</b> its flesh shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:20), to teach that only the section <b>that touches</b> the sin offering is <b>disqualified. How so?</b> What can be done with an item when a section of it is disqualified? <b>One slices off the section</b> of the piece <b>that absorbed</b> the disqualified matter. Additionally, the verse states: “Whatever shall touch <b>its flesh,” but</b> an item is <b>not</b> disqualified if it touches the sin offering’s <b>sinews, nor</b> its <b>bones, nor</b> its <b>horns, nor</b> its <b>hooves.</b>",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> continues to interpret the same verse. “Whatever shall touch its flesh <b>shall be sacred,”</b> teaches: Whatever touches it <b>becomes like it,</b> with regard to its status. <b>How so? If</b> the sin offering <b>is disqualified,</b> due to any disqualification, whatever touches it <b>becomes disqualified. And if it is fit,</b> whatever touches it must <b>be eaten in accordance with the stringent</b> regulations <b>that</b> apply <b>to</b> the sin offering. Therefore, a piece of meat that touches the meat of a sin offering may be eaten only in accordance with the terms of the consumption of a sin offering, e.g., it may be eaten only by male priests, and only for one day and one night.",
            "The Gemara asks: If sacrificial meat touched the meat of a disqualified sin offering, <b>why</b> should the sacrificial meat become forbidden? <b>Should</b> not the <b>positive mitzva</b> of eating the sacrificial meat <b>come and override</b> the <b>prohibition</b> against eating the disqualified substance that was absorbed in it? <b>Rava said: A positive mitzva does not override a prohibition that</b> relates <b>to the Temple.</b>",
            "Rav’s opinion relates to that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>As it is stated</b> in a verse concerning the Paschal offering: <b>“Nor shall you break a bone of it”</b> (Exodus 12:46). <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Both a bone that contains marrow and a bone that does not contain marrow</b> are included in the prohibition. This statement is analyzed: If one means to break a bone in order to eat its marrow, <b>why</b> would that be prohibited? <b>Should</b> not the <b>positive mitzva</b> of eating the edible parts of the offering, including the marrow, <b>come and override</b> the <b>prohibition</b> of not breaking a bone of the Paschal offering? <b>Rather,</b> it must be that <b>a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition that</b> relates <b>to the Temple.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said:</b> If sacrificial meat touches a disqualified sin offering, this is not simply a case of a positive mitzva in conflict with a prohibition. Because the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh <b>shall be sacred”</b> (Leviticus 6:20), treating the item as consecrated <b>is</b> itself <b>a positive mitzva.</b> Consequently, both a positive mitzva and a prohibition stand in opposition to eating that sacrificial meat, <b>and a positive mitzva does not override</b> both <b>a prohibition and a positive mitzva.</b>",
            "§ With regard to a sin offering, the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh shall be sacred.” The Gemara asks: <b>We found</b> a source teaching <b>that</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> whatever it touches <b>becomes sanctified through that which is absorbed</b> from the sin offering. <b>From where do we</b> derive that this is also the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>the rest of the sacred</b> offerings? <b>Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:</b> It is stated: <b>“This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings”</b> (Leviticus 7:37). This verse connects all of the specified offerings, such that individual aspects of each offering are applicable to all of the offerings.",
            "The Gemara details these aspects. The verse states <b>“of the burnt offering”</b> to teach that all of the offerings are <b>like a burnt offering</b> in that <b>just as a burnt offering requires a utensil</b> in its preparation, <b>so too do all</b> animal offerings <b>require a utensil. What</b> is the <b>utensil? If we say</b> it is <b>a bowl,</b> a utensil used for collecting the blood, as was used in the burnt offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai, that cannot be correct, since the source for a vessel for collecting blood does not need to be derived from the use of one in a burnt offering. <b>With regard to communal peace offerings it is also written of them:</b> “And they offered burnt offerings, and they sacrificed peace offerings…<b>And Moses took half of the blood, and put it in basins”</b> (Exodus 24:5–6).",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the term: Utensil, must be stated <b>of a knife,</b> as the slaughtering may be performed only with a knife and not with a sharp stone or reed. The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>a burnt offering itself, from where do we</b> derive that it must be slaughtered with a knife? This is learned from <b>that which is written: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife</b> to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10); <b>and there,</b> Abraham was offering <b>a burnt offering, as it is written: “And offered it up for a burnt offering instead of his son”</b> (Genesis 22:13).",
            "The Gemara continues to expound the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 7:37). When the verse mentions <b>a meal offering,</b> it teaches that <b>just as a meal offering is eaten only by males of</b> the <b>priesthood</b> (see Leviticus 6:9–11), <b>so too are all</b> of the offerings mentioned in this verse <b>eaten only by males of</b> the <b>priesthood.</b> The Gemara asks: With regard to <b>what</b> offering <b>is it</b> that this <i>halakha</i> must be derived? <b>If</b> one suggests it is with regard to the <b>sin offering and</b> the <b>guilt offering,</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>is explicitly written of them.</b> With regard to the sin offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat it” (Leviticus 6:22); and with regard to the guilt offering, it is stated: <b>“Every male among the priests may eat of it”</b> (Leviticus 7:6).",
            "<b>And if</b> one suggests that the <i>halakha</i> must be derived with regard to <b>communal peace offerings,</b> i.e., the two lambs that were sacrificed as communal offerings on <i>Shavuot</i> together with the offering of the two loaves (see Leviticus 23:19), this <i>halakha</i> <b>is derived from</b> the <b>amplification of the verse</b> that is stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings. The verse states: <b>“In a most sacred place shall you eat of it; every male may eat it”</b> (Numbers 18:10), and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse <b>teaches with regard to communal peace offerings that they are eaten only by males of priestly</b> families.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>It is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>There is</b> one <i>tanna</i> <b>who derives it,</b> the <i>halakha</i> that only males of priestly families may eat of the communal peace offering, <b>from here,</b> i.e., the precedent mentioned explicitly with regard to the meal offering; <b>and there is</b> one <i>tanna</i> <b>who derives it from there,</b> i.e., the amplification of the verse stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings.",
            "The Gemara continues expounding the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings.” <b>“Sin offering”</b> teaches: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> whatever it touches <b>is sanctified through</b> the substance that becomes <b>absorbed, so too</b> for <b>all</b> offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch <b>is sanctified through</b> the <b>absorbed</b> portions.",
            "<b>“Guilt offering”</b> teaches: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a guilt offering, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred within it,</b> because a guilt offering is always male and as such never holds a fetal sac or a placenta, <b>so too</b> for <b>any</b> of the offerings mentioned in the verse, <b>a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred</b> if found <b>within it.</b> The Gemara notes: Evidently, this <i>tanna</i> <b>holds</b> that with regard to the <b>offspring of sacrificial</b> animals, <b>they are sanctified</b> only <b>as they are</b> from the moments of their births, but not in utero. <b>And</b> he also holds that <b>one derives</b> the <b>possible from</b> the <b>impossible,</b> so that the <i>halakha</i> of a fetal sac and of a placenta concerning female animals may be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a male animal.",
            "<b>“Inauguration offering”</b> teaches: <b>Just as</b> with regard to the <b>inauguration offering,</b> the rams and the bread of that offering, which were brought during the seven days of inauguration of the Tabernacle and which the priests ate, <b>their leftovers</b> were disposed of <b>by incineration,</b> as is stated: “And if any of the flesh of the inauguration offering, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder with fire” (Exodus 29:34), <b>and no living animals</b> were <b>among their leftovers</b> designated for incineration; <b>so too</b> for <b>all</b> offerings mentioned, <b>their leftovers are</b> disposed of <b>by incineration, and there are no living animals</b> counted <b>among their leftovers</b> to be incinerated. Accordingly, if one sanctifies two animals so that either one may be brought if the other is lost, when one animal is sacrificed, the surviving animal is not killed and incinerated.",
            "<b>“Peace offering”</b> teaches: <b>Just as</b> with regard to the <b>peace offering,</b> its components can <b>render</b> an animal disqualified as <b>an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [<i>piggul</i>] and</b> can be <b>rendered <i>piggul</i>; so too</b> with regard to <b>all</b> offerings mentioned in this verse, their components <b>render</b> an animal disqualified as <b><i>piggul</i> and</b> can be <b>rendered <i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "§ With regard to the verse at the center of the prior exchange (Leviticus 7:37), the Gemara states: <b>It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Akiva:</b> From the term <b>“meal offering,”</b> it is derived: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a meal offering,</b> whatever it touches <b>is sanctified through</b> the substance that becomes <b>absorbed,</b> as it is stated: “Whatever shall touch them shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:11); <b>so too</b> for <b>all</b> offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch <b>is sanctified through</b> the <b>absorbed</b> portions.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And it was necessary to write</b> the <i>halakha</i> of absorption with regard to <b>a meal offering, and it was necessary to write</b> the <i>halakha</i> of absorption with regard to <b>a sin offering. As, had</b> the Torah <b>taught us</b> this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to <b>a meal offering,</b> I would say <b>that since it is soft, it is absorbed</b> and, therefore it sanctifies what it touches. <b>But</b> with regard to the meat of <b>a sin offering, I would say</b> that it does <b>not</b> sanctify what it touches. <b>And had it taught us</b> this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to <b>a sin offering,</b> I would say that <b>because,</b> on account of its fattiness, it <b>oozes</b> into whatever it touches, it sanctifies it. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>a meal offering, I would say</b> that it does <b>not</b> sanctify what it touches. Therefore, it is <b>necessary</b> for the Torah to write both.",
            "The cited <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>“Sin offering”</b> teaches: <b>Just as a sin offering is brought only from non-sacred</b> animals <b>and</b> is sacrificed specifically <b>in the daytime, and</b> its service must be performed <b>with</b> the priest’s <b>right hand; so too all</b> offerings mentioned <b>are brought only from non-sacred</b> animals, <b>and</b> are sacrificed specifically <b>in the daytime, and</b> each one’s service must be performed <b>with</b> the priest’s <b>right hand. And</b> with regard to <b>a sin offering, from where do we</b> derive that it is brought only from non-sacred animals? <b>Rav Ḥisda said: The verse states: “And Aaron shall present the bull of the sin offering, which is his”</b> (Leviticus 16:11). This teaches that the animal must come <b>from his</b> cattle, <b>and not from communal</b> property, <b>and not from</b> money upon which the second <b>tithe</b> has been redeemed.",
            "The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering that an offering is sacrificed <b>in the daytime?</b> Is this principle not <b>derived from</b> the conspicuous expression: <b>“On the day of His commanding”</b> (Leviticus 7:38), which is understood to be referring to all offerings? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the <i>baraita</i> <b>cited</b> the principle from the model of a sin offering <b>for no reason [<i>kedi</i>],</b> and it was mentioned here on account of the other principles.",
            "The Gemara asks: Why must the <i>baraita</i> teach that the <i>halakha</i> of the sin offering teaches that the rites of an offering must be performed <b>with</b> the priest’s <b>right hand?</b> Is this not <b>derived from</b> the statement <b>of Rabba bar bar Ḥana? As Rabba bar bar Ḥana says</b> that <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> In <b>any place</b> in the Torah <b>that it is stated</b> that an action is performed with <b>a finger, or</b> that it is performed by <b>priesthood,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that the rite is performed <b>only</b> with the <b>right</b> hand. This is derived from the Torah’s statement with regard to the leper: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> <b>cited</b> the principle from the model of a sin offering <b>for no reason,</b> since it is actually derived from Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement.",
            "The Gemara suggest: <b>And if you wish, say</b> that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says:</b> Where the verse mentions <b>a finger,</b> it <b>is not necessary</b> for the verse to mention <b>priesthood;</b> but where it mentions <b>priesthood,</b> it <b>is necessary</b> for the verse to mention <b>a finger,</b> in order to teach that the rite must be performed with the right hand, which is not self-evident. With regard to the assorted offerings itemized in the verse (Leviticus 7:37), the Torah does not mention a finger; therefore, they must be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering.",
            "The cited <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>“Guilt offering”</b> teaches: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a guilt offering, its bones</b> have no sanctity and <b>are permitted</b> for any use, <b>so too</b> with regard to <b>any</b> mentioned offering, <b>its bones are permitted.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rava said:</b> It is <b>obvious to me</b> that"
        ],
        [
            "when the <b>blood of a sin offering is below and</b> the <b>blood of a burnt offering is above,</b> in a case in which the blood of a burnt offering is sprayed as a second layer on top of the blood of a sin offering that has already been sprayed and absorbed into a garment, the garment <b>requires laundering.</b>",
            "<b>Rava asks:</b> When the <b>blood of a burnt offering is below and</b> the <b>blood of a sin offering is above, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Is</b> one required to launder a garment to remove the blood of a sin offering <b>because</b> the blood <b>touches</b> his garment, <b>and</b> in this case, <b>this</b> blood <b>is touching</b> the garment? <b>Or perhaps is</b> one required to launder it <b>because of</b> the <b>absorption</b> of the blood into the garment, <b>and,</b> in this case, since the garment has already absorbed the other blood, <b>this</b> garment <b>did not absorb</b> the blood? Rava <b>then resolves</b> his dilemma, ruling <b>that</b> such garments <b>do not require laundering.</b>",
            "§ In a similar manner, with regard to the immersion of a garment that has become impure, <b>Rava said:</b> It is <b>obvious to me</b> that if there is <b>blood on</b> one’s <b>garment,</b> it <b>interposes</b> between the water of immersion and the garment, such that the immersion is ineffective. <b>But if he is a butcher,</b> used to having blood on his garments, a bloodstain <b>does not interpose,</b> and the immersion is effective, since a substance is not considered an interposition if the one immersing is not particular about it. Similarly, if there is a stain of <b>fat [<i>revav</i>] on one’s garment,</b> it <b>interposes. But if he is a fat seller,</b> such a stain <b>does not interpose. Rava asks:</b> If there is both <b>blood and fat on</b> one’s <b>garment</b> when he immerses it, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>?",
            "The Gemara challenges the question: <b>If he is a butcher, let me derive</b> that the stain interposes <b>due to</b> the <b>fat</b> that he is not used to having on his garments; <b>and</b> conversely, <b>if he is a fat seller, let me derive</b> that the stain interposes <b>due to</b> the stain of <b>blood</b> that he is not used to having on his garments. The Gemara explains: <b>No,</b> this question is not superfluous; it is <b>necessary</b> with regard to a person <b>who works</b> both as <b>this,</b> a butcher, <b>and</b> as <b>that,</b> a fat seller. In such a case, the question is: Is it that <b>he is not particular with regard to one</b> stain, but <b>he is particular with regard to two</b> stains, so that the immersion is ineffective? <b>Or, perhaps,</b> is it that he is <b>not particular</b> even with regard <b>to two</b> stains, as neither is unusual for him? The Gemara provides no answer, and the question <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> A priest who was ritually impure <b>who immersed that day</b> and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, <b>and</b> a priest <b>who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering to complete the purification process, e.g., a <i>zav</i> and a leper who did not bring their requisite atonement offerings, who are not yet permitted to partake of sacrificial meat, <b>do not receive a share of sacrificial</b> meat along with the other members of the patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, in order <b>to partake</b> of it <b>in the evening</b> after the offerings were sacrificed, even though after nightfall he would be permitted to partake of the offerings.",
            "A priest who is <b>an acute mourner,</b> i.e., if one of his relatives for whom he is obligated to mourn died that day, is permitted to <b>touch</b> sacrificial meat, as he is not ritually impure. <b>But he may not sacrifice</b> offerings, <b>and he does not receive a share</b> of sacrificial meat in order <b>to partake</b> of it <b>in the evening.</b>",
            "<b>Blemished</b> priests, <b>whether</b> they are <b>temporarily blemished</b> or <b>whether</b> they are <b>permanently blemished, receive a share and partake</b> of the offerings with their priestly brethren, <b>but do not sacrifice</b> the offerings.",
            "The principle is: <b>Any</b> priest <b>who is unfit for the service</b> that specific day <b>does not receive a share of the</b> sacrificial <b>meat, and anyone who has no</b> share <b>of the meat has no</b> share <b>in the hides</b> of the animals, to which the priests are entitled as well.",
            "<b>Even</b> if the priest was <b>ritually impure</b> only <b>at the time of the sprinkling of the blood</b> of the offering <b>and</b> he was <b>pure at the time of the burning of</b> the <b>fats</b> of that offering, he still <b>does not receive a share of the meat, as it is stated: “He that sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat, from among the sons of Aaron, shall have the right thigh for a portion”</b> (Leviticus 7:33). One who cannot sprinkle the blood does not receive a share in the meat."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that a priest who is unfit for the Temple service does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Reish Lakish said:</b> It is derived from a verse, <b>as the verse states</b> about a sin offering: <b>“The priest who effects atonement shall eat it;</b> in a sacred place shall it be eaten, in the court of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 6:19). This teaches that only <b>a priest who effects atonement</b> by performing the rites of the offering <b>shall partake</b> of its meat, but a priest <b>who does not effect atonement does not partake</b> of its meat.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And is</b> this an established <b>principle? But</b> there are <b>all the</b> priests of the <b>priestly watch</b> of that week in the Temple, <b>who do not effect atonement</b> for that offering, because the blood of a specific sin offering is presented by just one priest, <b>and</b> yet they all <b>partake</b> of its meat. The Gemara explains: <b>We</b> mean to <b>say</b> that any priest who is <b>fit for effecting atonement</b> may partake of it, even one who did not participate in the service.",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>But</b> there is the case of <b>a minor, who is unfit for effecting atonement, and</b> who nevertheless <b>partakes</b> of sacrificial meat. The Gemara explains: <b>Rather, what</b> is meant by the term: <b>“Shall eat it”?</b> It means that he <b>shall receive a share of it.</b> The <i>halakha</i> is therefore that a priest who is <b>fit for effecting atonement receives a share</b> of the meat, but a priest <b>who is unfit for effecting atonement does not receive a share</b> of the meat. Minors do not receive a share, though they may partake of meat given to them by others.",
            "The Gemara objects: But there is <b>a blemished priest, who is unfit for effecting atonement, and</b> yet he <b>receives a share</b> of its meat. The Gemara replies: <b>The Merciful One included a blemished</b> priest as an exception, as the verse that states: <b>“Every male among the priests</b> shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:22), serves <b>to include a blemished</b> priest.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>But say</b> that the phrase <b>“every male”</b> serves <b>to include one who immersed that day,</b> teaching that he may also receive a share in the sacrificial meat. Why should it be understood as referring specifically to a blemished priest? The Gemara replies: <b>It stands to reason</b> that the Torah <b>should include a blemished</b> priest for receiving his own share of the meat, <b>because</b> he may <b>partake</b> of sacrificial meat in any event. By contrast, one who immersed that day is impure and may not touch or partake of sacrificial meat.",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>On the contrary,</b> the Torah <b>should include one who immersed that day, because,</b> unlike a blemished priest, <b>in the evening he will be fit</b> to perform the service. The Gemara replies: <b>Now, in any event,</b> the one who immersed himself <b>is not fit.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Yosef said</b> another explanation: <b>Now what</b> is meant by the term: <b>“Shall eat it”?</b> It means: He <b>shall receive a share of it.</b> But if so, <b>let the Merciful One write: Shall receive a share of it. What</b> is the reason for writing: <b>“Shall eat it”? Learn from it</b> that only a priest who is <b>fit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat, which includes a blemished priest, <b>receives a share</b> in the meat; but a priest <b>who is not fit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat, e.g., one who immersed that day, <b>does not</b> receive a <b>share</b> in the meat.",
            "§ <b>Reish Lakish raises a dilemma:</b> If a priest is <b>blemished and he is impure, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Must the other priests <b>give him a share</b> of the meat? Perhaps we say that <b>since he is not fit</b> to perform the rite as a blemished priest <b>and</b> nevertheless <b>the Merciful One included him</b> to receive a share in the meat, there <b>is no difference: What</b> is the difference <b>to me</b> if he is <b>impure,</b> and <b>what</b> is the difference <b>to me</b> if he is only <b>blemished?</b> In any event he is not fit, yet the Torah allows him to receive a share in the meat. <b>Or perhaps</b> he may not receive a share in the meat, because only a priest who is <b>fit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat <b>receives a share</b> of the meat, but a priest <b>who is not fit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat <b>does not receive a share</b> of the meat.",
            "<b>Rabba said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a resolution to this dilemma from a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>a High Priest</b> is serving in the Temple and one of his immediate relatives dies, <b>he sacrifices</b> offerings even as <b>an acute mourner. But he does not partake</b> of sacrificial meat, <b>and he does not receive a share to partake</b> of it <b>in the evening. Conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that in order for the priest to receive a share in sacrificial meat, <b>we require</b> that he be <b>fit for partaking</b> of it, and accordingly, a blemished priest who is impure does not receive a share. The Gemara affirms: <b>Conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that this is so.",
            "§ <b>Rav Oshaya raises a dilemma:</b> If a priest is <b>impure,</b> then <b>in</b> a case of <b>communal offerings,</b> which may be offered by an impure priest, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Do the other priests <b>give him a share</b> of the meat, so that he may partake of it in the evening when he becomes pure? <b>Do we say</b> that <b>the Merciful One states:</b> “The priest <b>who effects atonement,” and</b> therefore any priest who is fit for effecting atonement receives a share, as derived earlier, and <b>this</b> priest <b>is also</b> one who may <b>effect atonement,</b> since this is a communal offering? <b>Or perhaps</b> he may not, due to the principle that only a priest who is <b>fit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat <b>receives a share</b> of the meat, but a priest <b>who is unfit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat <b>does not receive a share.</b>",
            "<b>Ravina said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a resolution to this dilemma from a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>a High Priest</b> is serving in the Temple and one of his relatives dies, <b>he sacrifices</b> offerings even as <b>an acute mourner, but he does not partake</b> of sacrificial meat <b>and he does not receive a share</b> of it <b>to partake in the evening. Conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that in order for a priest to receive a share in sacrificial meat, <b>we require</b> that he be <b>fit for partaking</b> of it at the time of the service, without regard to whether he can perform the service. The Gemara affirms: <b>Conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that this is so.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: A priest who is <b>an acute mourner</b> is permitted to <b>touch</b> sacrificial meat, <b>but he may not sacrifice</b> offerings. The Gemara asks: Is it in fact permitted for <b>an acute mourner</b> to <b>touch</b> sacrificial meat? <b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from another mishna (<i>Ḥagiga</i> 21a): <b>An acute mourner and one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, even after their respective disqualifications have expired, <b>require immersion</b> in order <b>to</b> eat <b>sacrificial</b> food. According to that mishna, an acute mourner who did not immerse may not touch sacrificial meat.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ami said</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said:</b> This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the ruling of the mishna is stated <b>with regard to</b> a case <b>where</b> the mourner <b>immersed</b> during his day of acute mourning. This is why he is permitted to touch the sacrificial meat. <b>There,</b> the ruling of the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i> is stated <b>with regard to</b> a case <b>where</b> the mourner <b>did not immerse.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> even <b>if</b> he <b>immersed, what of it? But</b> doesn’t his <b>acute mourning return to him? As Rabba, son of Rav Huna, says:</b> In a case of <b>an acute mourner who immersed</b> during his day of his acute mourning, <b>his acute mourning returns to him.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: This is <b>not difficult. That</b> case, in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, is one <b>where he was distracted</b> from safeguarding his state of purity, so he may not touch sacrificial meat in the event that he is impure. <b>This</b> case, in the mishna here, is one <b>where he was not distracted.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: If the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i> is discussing a case of <b>distraction,</b> then his status is like that of one who contracted ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, who <b>requires</b> sprinkling with water of purification on the <b>third and seventh</b> days of his impurity. <b>As Rabbi Yustai, son of Rabbi Matun, says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> One who experienced <b>a distraction requires sprinkling</b> with water of purification on the <b>third and seventh</b> days.",
            "The Gemara responds: This is <b>not difficult. That</b> statement, that he requires sprinkling, is discussing a case <b>where he was distracted</b> and careless <b>about</b> contracting <b>impurity imparted by a corpse. This</b> mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, stating that he requires immersion but not sprinkling, is discussing a case <b>where he was distracted</b> and careless <b>about</b> contracting <b>impurity imparted by</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: One who was careless about becoming <b>impure due to</b> the carcass of <b>a creeping animal is fully impure,</b> and so he requires not only immersion to become pure, but he also <b>requires sunset. And furthermore,</b> if the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i> is discussing this case, the mourner should be prohibited from touching <b>even <i>teruma</i>,</b> not just sacrificial meat. Why does the mishna mention only the latter?",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya said:</b> The mishna is discussing a case <b>where he says: I safeguarded myself from anything that would render me impure,</b> so I am certain that I did not contract impurity that requires waiting until sunset; <b>but I did not safeguard myself from anything that would render me unfit</b> for touching sacrificial meat.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But is there</b> such a concept of <b>partial care,</b> that one can claim to have safeguarded himself from one form of impurity but not another? The Gemara answers: <b>Yes, and it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If one was carrying a basket, and <b>the basket was still on his head,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and a shovel</b> was <b>in</b> the basket, <b>and he said: I am minding the basket,</b> that it not become impure, <b>but I am not minding the shovel,</b> then <b>the basket is pure, and the shovel is impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges the ruling of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>But</b> wouldn’t <b>the shovel render the basket impure?</b> The Gemara answers: There is a principle that <b>a vessel does not render</b> another <b>vessel ritually impure.</b> The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> wouldn’t <b>the shovel render that which is in</b> the basket, e.g., figs, <b>impure? Rava said:</b> The case is <b>where he says: I safeguarded it,</b> the shovel, <b>from anything that</b> would allow it to <b>render</b> another item <b>impure, but I did not safeguard it from anything that would render it</b> itself <b>unfit,</b> i.e., impure.",
            "The Gemara returns to discuss the contradiction between the mishna, which permits an acute mourner to touch sacrificial meat, and the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, which requires him to immerse. The Gemara relates: <b>The matter circulated and came before Rabbi Abba bar Memel. He said to</b> the Sages before him: <b>Have they not heard that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: One who partakes of <i>teruma</i></b> that has <b>third-</b>degree impurity, i.e., <i>teruma</i> disqualified through contact with an item with second-degree impurity, <b>is prohibited from partaking</b> of <i>teruma</i>, <b>but permitted to touch</b> <i>teruma</i>.",
            "Rabbi Abba bar Memel continued: <b>Apparently, in</b> a case of <b>partaking, the Sages imposed a higher standard,</b> whereas <b>in</b> a case of <b>touching, the Sages did not impose a higher standard.</b> Similarly, in a case of an acute mourner, the Sages require him to immerse before he may partake of sacrificial meat, as taught in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, but they do not impose this standard for touching the meat, as taught in the mishna here.",
            "§ The mishna teaches with regard to an acute mourner: <b>And he does not receive a share</b> of sacrificial meat in order <b>to partake</b> of it in the evening. The Gemara comments: The mishna indicates only that <b>he may not receive a share</b> of the meat, <b>but when</b> other priests <b>invite him</b> to join in their portions, <b>he may partake</b> of them in the evening.",
            "<b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 91b): <b>An acute mourner immerses and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but</b> he may <b>not</b> partake <b>of</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> meat.",
            "<b>Rav Yirmeya of Difti said:</b> This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the ruling of the mishna is stated <b>with regard to</b> the first night of <b>Passover,</b> whereas <b>there,</b> in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, the ruling of the mishna is stated <b>with regard to the rest of the days of the year.</b>",
            "What is the reason for the distinction between the two? <b>On</b> the first night of <b>Passover, since he partakes of</b> the <b>Paschal offering, he may also partake of</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> meat. But <b>on the rest of the days of the year, when he is unfit</b> to partake of sacrificial meat, <b>he is unfit. And what</b> does the mishna in <i>Pesaḥim</i> mean when it states: <b>But</b> he may <b>not</b> partake <b>of</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> meat? It means: <b>But</b> he may <b>not</b> partake <b>of sacrificial</b> meat <b>of all</b> of the rest of <b>the year,</b> other than the first night of Passover.",
            "<b>Rav Asi said</b> there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the <i>mishnayot</i>: This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the ruling of the mishna in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, which prohibits an acute mourner from partaking of sacrificial meat, it is referring to a case <b>where his</b> relative <b>died on the fourteenth</b> day of Nisan, <b>and he buried him on the fourteenth</b> itself, in which case he is still considered an acute mourner by rabbinic law that evening. <b>There,</b> in the ruling of the mishna in this chapter, it is referring to a case <b>where his</b> relative <b>died on the thirteenth</b> of Nisan, <b>and he buried him on the fourteenth</b> of Nisan. The reason the mourner may partake is that since <b>the day of burial</b> is not the day of death, it <b>does not take hold of its</b> following <b>night by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>Who</b> is the <i>tanna</i> who <b>taught</b> that <b>acute mourning</b> the following <b>night</b> is <b>by rabbinic law,</b> as opposed to by Torah law? This <b>is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Acute mourning at night is by Torah law;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> His status as <b>an acute mourner</b> at night <b>is not by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. Know</b> that this so, <b>as</b> the Sages <b>said: An acute mourner immerses and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but</b> he may still <b>not</b> partake <b>of</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> meat. If acute mourning at night were by Torah law, he would not be permitted to partake of the Paschal offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And does Rabbi Shimon hold</b> that <b>acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law</b> and that consequently an acute mourner partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon says: An acute mourner does not send his offerings</b> to the Temple to be sacrificed? <b>What, is it not</b> referring <b>even to a Paschal offering?</b> The Gemara rejects this: <b>No,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to all offerings <b>other than a Paschal offering.</b>",
            "The Gemara counters: <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the verse: “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace offerings [<i>shelamim</i>]” (Leviticus 3:1), <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The offering is called <b><i>shelamim</i></b> to teach that <b>when</b> a person <b>is whole [<i>shalem</i>],</b> i.e., in a state of contentment, <b>he brings</b> his offering, <b>but he does not bring</b> it <b>when he is an acute mourner. From where</b> is it derived <b>to include</b> that an acute mourner does not bring even <b>a thanks offering? I include the thanks offering because it is consumed in</b> a state of <b>joy, like a peace offering.</b>",
            "<b>From where</b> is it derived that the verse also serves <b>to include a burnt offering? I include the burnt offering because it comes as a vow</b> offering <b>and as a gift</b> offering, <b>like a peace offering. From where</b> is it derived that the verse also serves <b>to include a firstborn</b> offering, <b>and</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>and a Paschal offering,</b> which are not brought voluntarily? <b>I include a firstborn</b> offering, <b>and</b> an animal <b>tithe</b> offering, <b>and a Paschal offering, because they</b> too, like a peace offering, <b>do not come</b> to atone <b>for a sin. From where</b> is it derived <b>to include a sin offering and a guilt offering,</b> which atone for sins? <b>The verse states:</b> “And if his offering be <b>a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>]</b> of peace offerings,” which teaches that an acute mourner may not sacrifice any slaughtered offering [<i>zevaḥ</i>].",
            "<b>From where</b> is it derived <b>to include</b> even <b>the bird offerings, and the meal offerings, and the wine, and the wood, and the frankincense</b> brought for the Temple service? <b>The verse states:</b> “And if <b>his offering</b> be a sacrifice of <b>peace offerings [<i>shelamim korbano</i>],”</b> teaching that for <b>all offerings [<i>korbanot</i>] that</b> a person <b>brings, he brings</b> them <b>when he is whole [<i>shalem</i>], but he does not bring</b> them <b>when he is an acute mourner.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>In any event,</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>teaches</b> that it is prohibited for an acute mourner to bring <b>a Paschal offering,</b> even though he will cease to be an acute mourner that night; this contradicts the first <i>baraita</i>.",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda said:</b> The latter <i>baraita</i> mentions <b>a Paschal offering for no purpose.</b> In other words, the <i>halakha</i> that an acute mourner does not bring an offering does not actually apply to a Paschal offering, and the <i>baraita</i> mentions it only out of habit, since a firstborn-animal offering, the animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering are frequently mentioned together.",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet said: What</b> is meant in this <i>baraita</i> by the term: <b>Paschal offering?</b> It is referring to <b>the peace offerings of Passover,</b> i.e., the peace offering that is sacrificed along with the Paschal offering. The Gemara objects: <b>If so,</b> that <b>is</b> the same as <b>a peace offering,</b> which Rabbi Shimon already mentioned. The Gemara answers: He <b>taught</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>peace offerings that come on account of</b> the <b>Paschal offering, and</b> he <b>taught</b> separately the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>peace offerings that come on their own account.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: Rabbi Shimon needed to teach both cases explicitly, <b>because if he did not teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>peace offerings that come on account of</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> it would <b>enter your mind to say: Since they come on account of</b> the <b>Paschal offering, they are considered like</b> the <b>Paschal offering itself,</b> and the acute mourner offers them as well. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon <b>teaches us</b> that these peace offerings are also forbidden to an acute mourner.",
            "<b>Rav Mari said</b> a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon:"
        ],
        [
            "It is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Shimon holds an acute mourner may not send a Paschal offering, since acute mourning at night is by Torah law, it is referring to a case <b>where his</b> relative <b>died on the fourteenth</b> day of Nisan <b>and he buried him on the fourteenth</b> itself. <b>There,</b> the ruling in the mishna in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, which teaches that an acute mourner immerses and partakes of the Paschal offering in the evening, since acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law, is referring to a case <b>where his</b> relative <b>died on the thirteenth</b> day of Nisan <b>and he buried him on the fourteenth</b> of Nisan.",
            "Rav Mari explains: In a case where <b>his</b> relative <b>died on the fourteenth</b> day of Nisan <b>and he buried him on the fourteenth</b> itself, his acute mourning is due to <b>the day of death</b> and is therefore by Torah law. Consequently, it <b>takes hold of its</b> following <b>night by Torah law,</b> and the mitzva of the Paschal offering does not override it. By contrast, in a case where <b>his</b> relative <b>died on the thirteenth</b> day of Nisan <b>and he buried him on the fourteenth</b> of Nisan, the fourteenth is only <b>the day of burial,</b> and his acute mourning is therefore <b>by rabbinic law.</b> Consequently, <b>it takes hold of its</b> following <b>night only by rabbinic law,</b> and the mitzva of the Paschal offering overrides it.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But</b> if so, it is difficult to understand <b>that which</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches: Rabbi Shimon said to</b> Rabbi Yehuda: <b>Know</b> that this so, <b>as</b> the Sages <b>said: An acute mourner immerses</b> on the fourteenth of Nisan <b>and partakes of his Paschal offering</b> in the evening, <b>but</b> he may <b>not</b> partake <b>of</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> meat. According to your explanation of this statement, <b>let</b> Rabbi Yehuda <b>say to</b> Rabbi Shimon that this is no proof: <b>I am telling you</b> a <i>halakha</i> about <b>the day of death,</b> when acute mourning is <b>by Torah law, and you tell me</b> that you have a proof from a mishna that deals with <b>the day of burial,</b> when acute mourning is <b>by rabbinic law.</b> The Gemara concludes: This indeed poses <b>a difficulty</b> for Rav Mari.",
            "<b>Abaye said</b> a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon: It is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Shimon holds that an acute mourner may not send a Paschal offering, it is referring to a case <b>where</b> his relative <b>died before midday</b> on the fourteenth of Nisan. <b>There,</b> the ruling in the mishna in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, which teaches that an acute mourner immerses and partakes of the Paschal offering in the evening, it is a case <b>where</b> his relative <b>died after midday</b> on the fourteenth of Nisan. When his relative died <b>before midday,</b> in <b>which</b> case <b>he was not</b> ever <b>fit for</b> bringing <b>a Paschal offering</b> since the obligation begins at midday, the status of <b>acute mourning applies to him,</b> and it is prohibited for him to bring a Paschal offering. But if his relative dies <b>after midday, when he is</b> already <b>fit for</b> bringing <b>a Paschal offering,</b> the status of <b>acute mourning does not apply to him</b> with regard to this matter, so he may immerse and partake of the Paschal offering in the evening.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>And from where do you say that</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>is different</b> depending on <b>whether</b> his relative died <b>before midday</b> on the fourteenth of Nisan or <b>whether</b> he died <b>after midday? As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to a priest: “And for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that has had no husband, <b>for her may he become impure”</b> (Leviticus 21:3). From here it is derived that it is <b>a mitzva</b> for a priest to become impure in order to bury his deceased relatives, and if he <b>did not want</b> to do so, others must <b>render him impure against his will. And an incident</b> occurred <b>involving Yosef the priest, where his wife died on Passover eve, and he did not want to become impure,</b> as he wanted to offer the Paschal offering; <b>and his brethren the priests voted and rendered him impure against his will.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> the Sages <b>raise a contradiction</b> from another <i>baraita</i>: <b>What</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states</b> with regard to a nazirite: “He shall not become impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, <b>or for his sister</b> when they die; because his consecration unto God is upon his head” (Numbers 6:7)? If a nazirite <b>went to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son,</b> mitzvot for which failure to fulfill them is punishable by <i>karet</i>, <b>and he heard that</b> a relative <b>of his died,</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that he should <b>become impure</b> in order to bury his relative even if this will result in his not bringing the Paschal offering. <b>You</b> rather <b>say,</b> based on this verse, that <b>“he shall not become impure.”</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>just as he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>his sister, so too he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>a corpse with no one to bury it [<i>met mitzva</i>]. The verse states: “Or for his sister,”</b> teaching that <b>it is</b> only <b>to</b> bury <b>his sister that he may not become impure, but he does become impure to</b> bury <b>a <i>met mitzva</i>.</b>",
            "In the first <i>baraita</i>, contracting impurity from a dead relative is obligatory, and in the second <i>baraita</i> it is forbidden. Do you <b>not learn from</b> this contradiction that there must be a distinction between the cases? <b>Here,</b> in the first <i>baraita</i> concerning a priest, it must be referring to a case where the relative died <b>before midday,</b> so he was obligated to become impure before the obligation for the Paschal offering took effect. <b>There,</b> in the second <i>baraita</i> concerning a nazirite, it must be referring to a case where the relative died <b>after midday.</b> This distinction, between death before and after midday, also applies to acute mourning.",
            "The Gemara rejects this explanation: <b>From where</b> do you infer that this is the resolution to the contradiction? <b>Actually, perhaps I will say to you:</b> Both <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>and that</b> <i>baraita</i> are discussing deaths that occurred <b>after midday. And this</b> <i>baraita</i>, about a nazirite, is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yishmael, and that</b> <i>baraita</i>, about Yosef the priest, is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to a priest: “And for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that has had no husband, <b>for her may he become impure”</b> (Leviticus 21:3). This is <b>optional,</b> i.e., a priest is not obligated to become impure to bury his sister; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> It is <b>mandatory.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: This should <b>not enter your mind, because</b> it is <b>Rabbi Akiva</b> who <b>teaches the first clause of</b> the <i>baraita</i> about a nazirite. <b>As it is taught</b> in the full version of that <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states: “All the days that he consecrates himself unto the Lord he shall not come near to a dead body. He shall not become impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister when they die; because his consecration unto God is upon his head” (Numbers 6:7). <b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The term <b>“body [<i>nefesh</i>]”</b> is referring to <b>relatives.</b> The term <b>“dead [<i>met</i>]”</b> is referring to <b>non-relatives.</b>",
            "The verse specifies: <b>“For his father,”</b> even though his father is included among his relatives, to teach that <b>he may not become impure</b> to bury his father, <b>but he does become impure to</b> bury <b>a <i>met mitzva</i>.</b> The verse states: <b>“For his mother,”</b> to teach that even if <b>he was a priest and he was a nazirite,</b> and therefore doubly prohibited from becoming impure, nevertheless, <b>he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>his mother but he does become impure to</b> bury <b>a <i>met mitzva</i>.</b> The verse states: <b>“For his brother,”</b> to teach <b>that</b> even <b>if he was a High Priest,</b> who may not become impure even for his relatives, <b>and he</b> was also <b>a nazirite,</b> nevertheless, <b>he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>his brother but he does become impure to</b> bury <b>a <i>met mitzva</i>.</b>",
            "<b>What</b> is the meaning when <b>the verse states: “Or for his sister”?</b> If a nazirite <b>went to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son, and he heard that</b> a relative <b>of his died,</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that he should <b>become impure. You</b> rather <b>say</b> that <b>he may not become impure.</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>just as he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>his sister, so too he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>a <i>met mitzva</i>. The verse states: “Or for his sister,”</b> to teach that <b>he may not become impure to</b> bury <b>his sister but he does become impure to</b> bury <b>a <i>met mitzva</i>.</b> Consequently, the statement of the <i>baraita</i> concerning a nazirite represents the opinion of Rabbi Akiva."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rava said</b> there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon. Both <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>and that</b> <i>baraita</i> are discussing cases where the relative died <b>after midday</b> on the fourteenth of Nisan, <b>and</b> still it is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> his relative died <b>before</b> the priests would have <b>slaughtered</b> the Paschal offering <b>and sprinkled</b> its blood <b>on his account,</b> and he may not send the offering. <b>There,</b> the relative died <b>after</b> the priests <b>slaughtered</b> the Paschal offering <b>and sprinkled</b> its blood <b>on his account.</b> Since acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law, it is suspended to allow him to consume an offering that was already sacrificed.",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava:</b> In a case where one’s relative died <b>after</b> the priests <b>slaughtered</b> the Paschal offering <b>and sprinkled its blood,</b> why should he be permitted to partake of the Paschal offering? <b>What was, was,</b> and although the offering was sacrificed, isn’t he still an acute mourner by rabbinic law? <b>Ravina said to</b> Rav Adda bar Mattana: <b>Partaking of</b> the <b>Paschal offering is indispensable</b> for the mitzva, as is seen <b>from that which Rabba bar Rav Huna</b> taught, as the Gemara will explain. Therefore, the Sages did not prohibit the acute mourner from partaking of the Paschal offering as they do for other offerings, for which consumption of the meat is dispensable. Rava <b>said to</b> Rav Adda bar Mattana: <b>Listen to what your master,</b> Ravina, <b>told you,</b> as his explanation is correct.",
            "<b>What</b> is the statement <b>of Rabba bar Rav Huna</b> that teaches that partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable? <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>The day</b> that a person receives <b>tidings</b> that his relative died is considered <b>as</b> if it were <b>the day of burial</b> with regard <b>to the mitzva of</b> the <b>seven</b>-day mourning period, when he may not bathe or wear shoes, <b>and</b> with regard to the <b>thirty</b>-day period when he may not wear ironed garments. <b>And with regard to partaking of</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> the day he receives the tidings is <b>like the day of the gathering of</b> the <b>bones</b> of the deceased after the flesh decomposed (see <i>Pesaḥim</i> 92a). In <b>both this and that</b> case, <b>he immerses and partakes of sacrificial</b> meat <b>in the evening.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>This</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>itself</b> is <b>difficult.</b> At first <b>you say: The day of tidings</b> is considered <b>as</b> if it were <b>the day of burial for the mitzva of</b> the <b>seven</b>-day <b>and thirty</b>-day mourning periods; <b>and with regard to partaking of</b> the <b>Paschal offering,</b> it is <b>like the day of the gathering of bones,</b> when one may immerse and partake of sacrificial meat in the evening. <b>By inference,</b> one concludes <b>that</b> on <b>the day of burial, he</b> may <b>not partake</b> of the Paschal offering <b>even in the evening,</b> and all the more so other sacrificial meat. <b>And then</b> it <b>is taught:</b> In <b>both this and that</b> case, i.e., on both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones, <b>he immerses and partakes of sacrificial</b> meat <b>in the evening.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda said:</b> Whether it is permitted to partake of sacrificial meat the night after the day of burial <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as the Gemara will explain.",
            "<b>Rabba bar Rav Huna said:</b> This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the latter clause, where the <i>baraita</i> teaches that on both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening, it is referring to a case <b>where he heard tidings of his dead</b> relative <b>just before sunset, and likewise</b> a case <b>where they gathered</b> the <b>bones for him just before sunset, and likewise</b> a case <b>where his</b> relative <b>died and he buried him just before sunset. But there,</b> in the first clause, from which it is inferred that he may not consume any sacrificial meat the night after the day of burial, the burial occurred <b>after sunset,</b> i.e., on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan itself.",
            "The Gemara objects: If so, why not say that even if he gathered bones <b>after sunset,</b> then <b>what was, was?</b> Why did the Sages permit him to partake of the Paschal offering, as opposed to other sacrificial meat? <b>Rather, learn from</b> this <i>baraita</i> that <b>partaking of</b> the <b>Paschal offering is indispensable</b> to fulfilling the obligation, and due to the severity of the mitzva, the Sages suspended their decree prohibiting one from partaking of it.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said</b> there is another resolution to this question: <b>What</b> is meant by the latter clause in the <i>baraita</i>: In <b>both this and that</b> case? It does not mean both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones. Rather, <b>this</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying: Both</b> on <b>the day of tidings and</b> on <b>the day of</b> the <b>gathering</b> of bones, the mourner <b>immerses and partakes of sacrificial</b> meat <b>in the evening.</b> But after the day of burial, he may not partake of the Paschal offering, and all the more so of other sacrificial meat, as indicated in the first clause in the <i>baraita</i>.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And this</b> resolution <b>of Rav Ashi is a mistake, since</b> the <i>tanna</i> is already <b>discussing those</b> two cases and equating them. According to Rav Ashi’s resolution, it is extraneous to say: In both this and that case; the <i>tanna</i> <b>should have</b> simply said: In <b>this and that</b> case. <b>Rather, learn from</b> the language of the <i>baraita</i> that Rav Ashi’s resolution <b>is a mistake.</b>",
            "The Gemara returns to discuss Rav Ḥisda’s resolution: <b>And what</b> is the dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i></b> with regard to the night following the day of burial? <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Until when</b> does a person <b>mourn acutely for</b> his relative, such that he is prohibited to partake of sacrificial meat? <b>The entire day. Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: As long as</b> his relative <b>has not been buried.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What are we dealing with? If we say</b> we are dealing <b>with the day of death, is there</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>who does not hold that the day of death takes hold of its</b> following <b>night,</b> at least <b>by rabbinic law?</b> In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>, who says that the acute mourning is only during the day, and not at night?",
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> if we are dealing with the day of death, then when <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: As long as</b> his relative <b>has not been buried,</b> it indicates that <b>consequently,</b> once he <b>has buried him, it becomes permitted for him</b> to partake of sacrificial meat, even on the day of death itself. <b>But is there</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>who does not hold</b> that acute mourning extends for the entire day of death, even after burial? The verse states: “And I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentation; and I will bring up sackcloth upon all loins, and baldness upon every head; and I will make it as the mourning for an only son, <b>and the end thereof as a bitter day”</b> (Amos 8:10).",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet said:</b> The <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> is <b>discussing the day of burial</b> when it is not the day of death. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree whether the acute mourning lasts only until the burial, or until the end of the day of burial.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef objects</b> to this: <b>But</b> there is <b>that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One who hears</b> tidings <b>of his dead</b> relative is considered <b>as one who gathers</b> his relative’s <b>bones,</b> in that he may <b>immerse and partake of sacrificial</b> meat <b>in the evening. By inference,</b> on <b>the day of burial he may not partake even in the evening.</b> In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this?</b> This is the opinion of neither the first <i>tanna</i> nor Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. <b>Rather,</b> one must <b>answer</b> that the <i>baraita</i> means: <b>Until when</b> does a person <b>mourn acutely for</b> his relative? <b>That entire day</b> of burial <b>and its</b> following <b>night. Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> He continues into the night only <b>as long as</b> his relative <b>has not been buried; but</b> once he <b>is buried,</b> the acute mourning lasts only for the rest of the day, <b>without its night.</b>",
            "The Sages <b>said this</b> statement of Rav Yosef <b>before Rabbi Yirmeya.</b> Rabbi Yirmeya <b>said</b> in surprise: <b>Would a great man like Rav Yosef say this? Would he say</b> that the opinion <b>of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi is the more <b>lenient</b> of the two? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Until when</b> does a person <b>mourn acutely for</b> his relative? <b>As long as</b> his relative <b>has not been buried, even</b> if he remains unburied <b>from now until ten days</b> from now. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. <b>And the Sages say: He mourns acutely for</b> his relative <b>only on that</b> same <b>day.</b> The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is more stringent than that of the Sages.",
            "<b>Rather, answer like this: Until when</b> does a person <b>mourn acutely for</b> his relative? <b>That entire day</b> of burial, <b>without its night. Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> The acute mourning continues <b>as long as</b> his relative <b>has not been buried,</b> even for ten days, <b>and once he is buried,</b> that day <b>takes hold of its night.</b> This is the dispute to which Rav Ḥisda referred.",
            "The Sages <b>said this</b> statement <b>before Rava.</b> Rava said: <b>Since Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> that <b>the day of burial,</b> when acute mourning is by rabbinic law, <b>takes hold of its night by rabbinic law, by inference,</b> he must hold <b>that the day of death,</b> when acute mourning is by Torah law, <b>takes hold of its night by Torah law.</b> The Sages would not be more stringent with their ordinance than the parallel law of the Torah.",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>And does Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>hold</b> that <b>acute mourning at night is by Torah law? But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: On the last day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, after two of Aaron’s sons died, Aaron said to Moses: <b>“Behold,</b> today…there have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). The word “today” teaches that Aaron is saying: <b>I am prohibited</b> from partaking <b>today but permitted</b> to partake at <b>night; but for</b> future <b>generations,</b> an acute mourner is <b>prohibited</b> from partaking of sacrificial meat <b>whether during the day or at night.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> For future generations, <b>acute mourning at night is not by Torah law,</b> but <b>rather by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Actually,</b> Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that acute mourning on the night after death <b>is by rabbinic law,</b> not Torah law."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And</b> the same holds for the night after the day of burial, even though the acute mourning of that day itself is by rabbinic law, because <b>the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater</b> severity <b>than Torah</b> law.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: On the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, on which two of Aaron’s sons died, Moses spoke to Aaron and his sons using three different forms of the word command: <b>“For so I am commanded [<i>tzuveiti</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 10:13), <b>“as I commanded [<i>tziveiti</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 10:18), and <b>“as the Lord has commanded [<i>tziva</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 10:15). Moses said to Aaron: “And you shall eat it…<b>for so I am commanded,”</b> to teach that Aaron and his remaining sons <b>shall partake of</b> the offerings even <b>in acute mourning.</b> The statement: “You should certainly have eaten it…<b>as I commanded,”</b> Moses <b>said to them at the time of</b> the <b>incident,</b> when Aaron and his sons burned the sin offering for the New Moon. Moses said: <b>“As the Lord has commanded,”</b> to emphasize that it is <b>not of my own</b> initiative that <b>I say</b> this, but it is from the word of God.",
            "<b>And</b> the Sages <b>raise a contradiction</b> from another <i>baraita</i>: The sin offering <b>was burned due to</b> the <b>acute mourning</b> of Aaron and his sons, since they felt they could not partake of it. <b>Therefore,</b> it <b>is stated</b> in Aaron’s explanation: “There have befallen me such things <b>as these;</b> and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). Moses conceded to Aaron that he was correct (see Leviticus 10:20), indicating that it was not permitted for Aaron to partake of the sin offering in acute mourning.",
            "<b>Shmuel said:</b> This is <b>not difficult. This</b> first <i>baraita</i>, according to which Moses commanded Aaron and his sons to consume the sacrificial meat in acute mourning, is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda;</b> and <b>that</b> <i>baraita</i>, according to which they acted properly in refraining from eating it, is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya.</b>",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Aaron and his sons <b>burned</b> the sin offering <b>due to</b> their <b>acute mourning. Therefore,</b> it <b>is stated: “As these”;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say:</b> The sin offering <b>was burned due to ritual impurity. As, if you say</b> that it <b>was burned due to acute mourning,</b> they <b>should have burned</b> all <b>three of</b> the sin offerings offered that day. <b>Alternatively,</b> if it was burned due to acute mourning, <b>they would have been fit to partake of</b> the sin offerings <b>in the evening,</b> and there would have been no need to burn them. <b>Alternatively,</b> if it was burned due to acute mourning, <b>wasn’t Pinehas,</b> son of Elazar the priest, <b>with them?</b> He was not in mourning, and he could have partaken of the sin offering.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> Both <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>and that</b> <i>baraita</i> are in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya,</b> who holds that the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning. <b>And</b> this is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> according to which Moses commanded that Aaron and his sons partake of the offering as acute mourners is referring <b>to the offerings of</b> a particular <b>time,</b> i.e., the meal offering, which was unique to the inauguration ceremony. <b>There,</b> the <i>baraita</i> according to which they rightly burned the sin offering, due to acute mourning, is referring <b>to the offerings of</b> all future <b>generations.</b> That sin offering was brought for the New Moon of Nisan, and such an offering would be brought at every New Moon from that day onward. Moses conceded that such offerings should not be consumed by acute mourners.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>How</b> would <b>Rabbi Neḥemya reconcile these</b> apparently contradictory <b>verses</b> about the sin offering, <b>and how</b> would <b>the Sages reconcile these verses</b> (see Leviticus 10:17–20)?",
            "<b>Rabbi Neḥemya</b> would <b>reconcile them like this:</b> When Moses asked: <b>“Why have you not eaten</b> the sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:17), this is what <b>Moses said to Aaron: Perhaps the blood of</b> this sin offering <b>entered the innermost sanctum,</b> thereby disqualifying it (see Leviticus 6:23). Is this why you burned it? Aaron <b>said to him: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought</b> into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). Moses then asked: <b>Perhaps it went outside its partition,</b> i.e., it exited the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and was thereby disqualified? Aaron <b>said to him: It was inside the sacred</b> area at all times.",
            "Moses then suggested: <b>But perhaps you sacrificed it in acute mourning,</b> which is prohibited for ordinary priests, <b>and disqualified it.</b> Aaron <b>said to him: Moses, was it they,</b> i.e., my sons, <b>who sacrificed</b> the offering? <b>I sacrificed</b> the offering, and as High Priest, I may serve even as an acute mourner (see Leviticus 21:10–12). <b>And</b> Moses <b>said to him: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought</b> into the Sanctuary within,” <b>and it was inside the sacred</b> area at all times; therefore: <b>“You should certainly have consumed it</b> in the sacred area, <b>as I commanded”</b> (Leviticus 10:18), i.e., just as I commanded that the priests should <b>consume</b> today’s meal offering <b>in acute mourning.</b>",
            "Aaron <b>said to him:</b> “Behold, today have they sacrificed their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord, <b>and there have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?”</b> (Leviticus 10:19). <b>Perhaps you heard</b> the command to consume the offering <b>only with regard to offerings of</b> a particular <b>time,</b> i.e., the meal offering, which was unique to that day.",
            "<b>As, if</b> you claim that it also applies <b>to the offerings of</b> all <b>generations,</b> then one can prove this is not so via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the second <b>tithe,</b> for <b>which</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>is</b> more <b>lenient</b> than for sacrificial meat: <b>Just as</b> with regard to the second <b>tithe,</b> for <b>which</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>is</b> more <b>lenient, the Torah stated: “I have not eaten thereof in my mourning [<i>ve’oni</i>]”</b> (Deuteronomy 26:14), teaching that an acute mourner [<i>onen</i>] is prohibited from partaking of it, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that <b>with regard to the offerings of</b> all <b>generations,</b> an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of them?",
            "Moses <b>immediately conceded</b> to Aaron, as the verse states: <b>“And Moses heard, and it was good in his eyes”</b> (Leviticus 10:20). <b>And Moses was not embarrassed</b> and did not attempt to justify himself <b>by saying: I did not hear</b> of this <i>halakha</i> until now. <b>Rather, he said: I heard</b> it, <b>and I forgot</b> it, as the verse indicates by stating: “Moses heard.”",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And how</b> would <b>Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,</b> who hold that the sin offering was burned due to ritual impurity, <b>reconcile those</b> verses? <b>They</b> would <b>reconcile them like this:</b> When Moses said to Aaron and his sons: <b>“Why have you not eaten the sin offering in the place of the Sanctuary?”</b> (Leviticus 10:17), he meant: <b>Perhaps its blood entered the innermost sanctum,</b> disqualifying the offering. Aaron <b>said to him</b> in response: <b>“Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within”</b> (Leviticus 10:18).",
            "Moses then asked: <b>Perhaps it went outside its partition,</b> i.e., the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and was thereby disqualified? Aaron <b>said to him: It was inside the sacred</b> area at all times. Moses then asked: <b>But perhaps you sacrificed it in acute mourning and disqualified it?</b> Aaron <b>said to him: Moses,</b> was it my sons who <b>sacrificed</b> the offering, <b>that</b> their <b>acute mourning</b> would <b>disqualify</b> the offering? <b>I,</b> the High Priest, <b>sacrificed</b> the offering, and I may serve even in acute mourning.",
            "Moses then asked: <b>Or perhaps, due to your bitterness</b> in mourning, <b>were you neglectful of</b> the offering <b>and it became impure?</b> Aaron <b>said to him: Moses, am I in your eyes such</b> a person, <b>that I</b> would <b>treat</b> an offering <b>consecrated to Heaven with contempt? “There have befallen me such things as these”</b> (Leviticus 10:19), i.e., <b>even</b> if <b>these</b> tragedies <b>and</b> more <b>such as them</b> should befall me, <b>I</b> would <b>not treat</b> an offering <b>consecrated to Heaven with contempt.</b>",
            "Moses <b>said to him:</b> If so, <b>and if,</b> as you say: <b>“Behold, the blood of it was not brought</b> into the Sanctuary within,” <b>and</b> it <b>was inside the sacred</b> area at all times, then: <b>“You should certainly have eaten it in the sacred area, as I commanded,”</b> i.e., as I commanded that the priests should <b>consume</b> the meal offering even <b>in acute mourning.</b>",
            "Aaron <b>said to him: Perhaps you heard</b> the command to consume the offering <b>only with regard to the night</b> following the day of acute mourning, but during the day itself the prohibition stands. <b>As, if</b> you claim that it may be consumed <b>during the day</b> itself, I can prove that this is not so via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the second <b>tithe,</b> for <b>which</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>is</b> more <b>lenient</b> than for sacrificial meat: <b>Just as</b> with regard to the second <b>tithe,</b> for <b>which</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>is</b> more <b>lenient, the Torah stated: I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that in the <b>stringent</b> case of <b>sacrificial</b> meat, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of it?",
            "Moses <b>immediately</b> conceded to Aaron, as the verse states: <b>“And Moses heard,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and it was good in his eyes”</b> (Leviticus 10:20). <b>Moses was not embarrassed</b> and did not attempt to justify himself <b>by saying: I did not hear</b> this <i>halakha</i> until now. <b>Rather,</b> he said: <b>I heard</b> it, <b>and I forgot</b> it.",
            "The Gemara asks: According to this opinion, why was the sin offering burned? <b>They should have delayed its</b> consumption <b>and consumed</b> it that <b>night.</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Ritual impurity came</b> upon this sin offering <b>due to circumstances beyond</b> the priests’ <b>control,</b> and they were forced to burn it.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted, according to the Rabbis,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, <b>this is as it is written:</b> “And if I had consumed the sin offering <b>today,</b> would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord”? The verse indicates that Aaron could have eaten it at night. <b>But according to Rabbi Neḥemya,</b> who holds that Aaron distinguished between the offerings of that particular time and the offerings of all later generations, <b>what</b> did Aaron mean by the word <b>“today”?</b> The Gemara answers: He meant: And if I had eaten the sin offering of the New Moon, which is <b>today’s obligation,</b> would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, this is as it is written: “Behold, today</b> have they sacrificed their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord,” i.e., they offered it as the obligation of the day. <b>But according to the Rabbis,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, <b>what</b> did Aaron mean by the phrase “<b>behold [<i>hen</i>], today”?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> is what Aaron <b>is saying: Did they [<i>hen</i>],</b> my sons, <b>sacrifice</b> the offering today, which would have been prohibited to them in acute mourning? No, <b>I sacrificed</b> the offering, and as High Priest, I may perform the service in acute mourning.",
            "§ The Gemara continues to analyze the <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master says:</b> If the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, then the priests <b>should have burned</b> all <b>three of</b> the sin offerings offered that day. The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is meant by: All <b>three of</b> the sin offerings?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“And Moses diligently inquired for the goat of the sin offering,</b> and behold, it was burned” (Leviticus 10:16). When the verse states: “The <b>goat,” this</b> is referring to <b>the goat of Nahshon,</b> son of Amminadav, the prince of the tribe of Judah, who brought the offering on the first day of the Tabernacle’s inauguration (see Numbers 7:12). When the verse states: “The <b>sin offering,” this</b> is referring to the <b>sin offering</b> that the people brought on the <b>eighth</b> day of the inauguration (see Leviticus 9:13). The term <b>“inquired”</b> is referring to the <b>goat</b> sacrificed at every <b>New Moon</b> (see Numbers 28:15). The Tabernacle was erected on the New Moon of Nisan (see Exodus 40:17). These are the three goats that were sacrificed that day.",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that all <b>three of them were burned.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “And Moses diligently inquired for the goat of the sin offering, <b>and, behold, it was burned,”</b> to teach that <b>one</b> of the offerings <b>was burned, but not</b> all <b>three of them were burned.</b> The verse states: “And Moses <b>diligently inquired [<i>darosh darash</i>].” Why</b> were there <b>two inquiries?</b> Moses <b>said to them: For what</b> reason is <b>this sin offering burned, and</b> secondly, for what reason are <b>those left</b> unburned? The <i>baraita</i> comments: Still, <b>I do not know which of them</b> was burned. <b>When it states</b> with regard to the burned goat: <b>“And He has given it to you to bear the iniquity of the congregation”</b> (Leviticus 10:17), <b>you must say: This is the goat of the New Moon,</b> which atones for impurity in the Temple.",
            "The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon <b>say well to</b> Rabbi Neḥemya; if the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, then all three goats should have been burned. How would Rabbi Neḥemya respond? The Gemara explains: <b>Rabbi Neḥemya</b> conforms <b>to his</b> line of <b>reasoning, as he says: Acute mourning does not disqualify offerings of</b> a particular <b>time.</b> Therefore, they burned only the New Moon sin offering, which applies to future generations as well.",
            "<b>The Master says</b> in the <i>baraita</i>: If the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, why was it burned at all? <b>He should have eaten it in the evening.</b> The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon <b>say well to</b> Rabbi Neḥemya in posing this difficulty. How would he respond? The Gemara explains: He <b>holds</b> that <b>acute mourning in the evening</b> is <b>by Torah law,</b> and therefore the priests were not permitted to eat it even then.",
            "Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon also stated: <b>Alternatively, wasn’t Pinehas,</b> son of Elazar the priest, <b>with them?</b> He was not an acute mourner. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon <b>say well to</b> Rabbi Neḥemya. The Gemara explains: <b>He holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says</b> that <b>Rabbi Ḥanina says: Pinehas did not become a priest until he killed Zimri,</b> who had engaged in intercourse with a Midianite woman (see Numbers 25:6–8). <b>As it is written</b> only after that incident concerning Pinehas: <b>“And it shall be unto him and to his seed after him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood”</b> (Numbers 25:13). Before that incident, at the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, the only priests were Aaron and his sons.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said:</b> Pinehas did not become a priest <b>until he made peace among the tribes</b> at the time of the conquest of Eretz Yisrael, when the tribes east of the Jordan River built their own altar and nearly provoked a civil war. Before this, Pinehas was always referred to as: Son of Elazar the priest, but during this incident he is himself referred to as a priest for the first time, <b>as it is stated: “And Pinehas the priest, and the princes of the congregation, and the heads of the thousands of Israel</b> that were with him, <b>heard</b> the words that the children of Reuben and the children of Gad and the children of Manasseh spoke, and it pleased them well” (Joshua 22:30).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> for <b>the other</b> Sage, Rav Ashi, <b>as well, isn’t it written: “And it shall be unto him, and to his seed after him,</b> the covenant of an everlasting priesthood”? Apparently, Pinehas became a priest after he killed Zimri. The Gemara responds: <b>When that</b> verse <b>is written,</b> it is <b>with regard to</b> the <b>blessing that it is written,</b> that his descendants would always be priests. It did not indicate that Pinehas became a priest immediately.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> for <b>the other</b> Sages <b>as well,</b> who hold that Pinehas became a priest immediately after he killed Zimri, <b>isn’t it written: “And Pinehas the priest…heard”?</b> Apparently he became a priest only after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> verse serves <b>to entitle his descendants after him,</b> that they would continue as High Priests through his merit.",
            "§ <b>Rav says: Moses, our teacher,</b> was <b>a High Priest and would receive a share of offerings</b> consecrated <b>to Heaven, as it is stated:</b> “And Moses took the breast, and waved it for a wave offering before the Lord; <b>it was Moses’ portion of the ram of inauguration,</b> as the Lord commanded Moses” (Leviticus 8:29).",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection:</b> In the <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon claim that acute mourning was not the reason the sin offering was burned by asking: <b>Wasn’t Pinehas with them? And if it is so</b> that Moses could partake of sacrificial meat, <b>let them say: Wasn’t Moses, our teacher, with them?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>Perhaps Moses is different, since</b> as a prophet, <b>he was preoccupied with the Divine Presence,</b> and was not available. <b>As the Master says: Moses ascended</b> Mount Sinai <b>early in the morning, and</b> he <b>descended early in the morning.</b>",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rav’s statement from another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a blemished priest: <b>“He may eat the bread of his God, both of the most sacred, and of the sacred”</b> (Leviticus 21:22). <b>If offerings of the most sacred order are stated,</b> that a blemished priest may eat them, then <b>why</b> are <b>offerings of lesser sanctity</b> also <b>stated? And if offerings of lesser sanctity are stated, why</b> are <b>offerings of the most sacred order stated?</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> answers: <b>Had offerings of lesser sanctity not been stated, I would have said: It is</b> only <b>offerings of the most sacred order that</b> a blemished priest <b>may eat, as they were permitted</b> both <b>to a non-priest and to</b> the priests, but a blemished priest <b>may not eat offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> which were not permitted to non-priests. <b>And had offerings of the most sacred order not been stated, I would have said:</b> A blemished priest <b>may eat offerings of lesser sanctity, as they are of lesser sanctity,</b> but <b>he may not eat of offerings of the most sacred order,</b> as they are of higher sanctity. <b>Therefore, offerings of the most sacred order are stated, and therefore, offerings of lesser sanctity</b> are <b>stated.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the objection: <b>In any event,</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches: As they were permitted</b> both <b>to a non-priest and to</b> the priests. What non-priest is permitted to eat offerings of the most sacred order? Is this <b>not</b> referring to <b>Moses?</b> This indicates that Moses was not considered a High Priest, contrary to Rav’s statement. <b>Rav Sheshet said: No,</b> this is referring <b>to a non-priest</b> sacrificing <b>on</b> a private <b>altar.</b> Once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael, it was permitted for a time for them to build private altars, on which even non-priests could serve. <b>And</b> although only offerings of lesser sanctity were offered on private altars, this <i>baraita</i> is <b>in accordance with the statement of the</b> Sage who <b>says: There is a meal offering</b> that may be offered <b>on</b> a private <b>altar.</b> Meal offerings are of the most sacred order.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rav’s statement: When <b>Miriam</b> became a leper (see Numbers 12:10), <b>who</b> diagnosed and <b>quarantined her? If you say</b> that <b>Moses quarantined her,</b> that is difficult, as <b>Moses</b> was <b>a non-priest,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and a non-priest may not inspect the</b> shades of leprous <b>marks</b> to diagnose them. <b>And if you say</b> that <b>Aaron quarantined her,</b> that is difficult, as <b>Aaron</b> was <b>a relative,</b> Miriam’s brother, <b>and a relative may not inspect the</b> shades of leprous <b>marks. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, bestowed a great honor on Miriam at that time,</b> and said: <b>I</b> Myself <b>am a priest, and I</b> will <b>quarantine her</b> for seven days to see if the shades of leprous marks persist, and <b>I</b> will <b>declare her</b> a leper if she is impure, <b>and I</b> will <b>exempt her</b> if she is not impure.",
            "<b>In any event,</b> the midrash <b>teaches: Moses</b> was <b>a non-priest, and a non-priest may not inspect the</b> shades of leprous <b>marks,</b> which contradicts the statement of Rav that Moses was a priest.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:</b> The <i>halakhot</i> of the examination of <b>shades of</b> leprous <b>marks are different, because</b> specifically <b>Aaron and his sons,</b> and not Moses, <b>are written in the passage</b> that discusses them: “Then he shall be brought unto Aaron the priest, or unto one of his sons the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). Therefore, there is no proof from this <i>baraita</i> that Moses was not a priest.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rav’s statement from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Elisheva,</b> the daughter of Amminadav and the wife of Aaron, <b>had five more</b> reasons for <b>joy than</b> the other <b>daughters of Israel</b> on the day the Tabernacle was dedicated: <b>Her brother-in-law,</b> Moses, was <b>a king; her husband,</b> Aaron, was the <b>High Priest; her son,</b> Elazar, was the <b>deputy</b> High Priest; <b>her son’s son,</b> Pinehas, was the priest <b>anointed for war,</b> who would lead the army out to battle; <b>and her brother,</b> Nahshon, son of Amminadav, was <b>the prince of</b> the <b>tribe</b> of Judah, who brought his offering on that day, as the first of all the princes. <b>But</b> on that same day of joy she was <b>in mourning for her two sons,</b> Nadav and Avihu, who died on that day.",
            "<b>In any event,</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches: Her brother-in-law,</b> Moses, was <b>a king.</b> From this one can infer that <b>yes,</b> he was <b>a king,</b> but he was <b>not a High Priest,</b> contrary to Rav’s statement. The Gemara responds: <b>Say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> means: Moses was <b>a king as well,</b> in addition to being a High Priest.",
            "The Gemara comments: The question of whether Moses was a High Priest is <b>subject to</b> a dispute among <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When Moses was at the burning bush and expressed hesitation to deliver God’s message to Pharaoh, the verse states: <b>“And the anger of the Lord burned against Moses,</b> and He said: Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite? I know that he can speak well. And also, behold, he comes forth to meet you, and when he sees you, he will be glad in his heart” (Exodus 4:14). <b>Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says:</b> For <b>every burning anger that</b> is stated <b>in the Torah, its effect is</b> also <b>stated,</b> i.e., the Torah records an action or pronouncement as a consequence of that anger, <b>but</b> in <b>this</b> case <b>no effect of</b> the anger <b>is stated.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Even in this</b> case the anger’s <b>effect is stated, as it is stated</b> there: <b>“Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite?</b> I know that he can speak well.” <b>But isn’t</b> Aaron <b>a priest?</b> Why is he referred to as a Levite? <b>This</b> is what God <b>is saying</b> to Moses: <b>I</b> initially <b>said</b> that <b>you</b> would be the <b>priest and he</b> would be the <b>Levite; now he</b> will be the <b>priest and you</b> will be the <b>Levite.</b>",
            "<b>And the Rabbis say: Moses became a priest</b> for <b>the seven days of inauguration alone,</b> and after that his priesthood expired. <b>And some say:</b> The <b>priesthood expired only for the descendants of Moses,</b> but Moses himself remained a priest, <b>as it is stated: “But as for Moses the man of God, his sons are named among the tribe of Levi”</b> (I Chronicles 23:14). This verse indicates that it was his sons who were Levites, but he himself remained a priest. <b>And</b> so too the verse <b>states: “Moses and Aaron among His priests, and Samuel among them that call upon His name,</b> did call upon the Lord, and He answered them” (Psalms 99:6).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is meant by: <b>And</b> so too the verse <b>states?</b> Why did the <i>tanna</i> need to cite a second proof? The Gemara explains: <b>And if you would say</b> the first verse <b>is written only for</b> future <b>generations,</b> to include Moses’ descendants in the tribe of Levi but not to exclude him, then there is a second proof: <b>And</b> so too, the verse <b>states: “Moses and Aaron among His priests.”</b> The statement of Rav that Moses was a High Priest is in accordance with the opinion in this <i>baraita</i>.",
            "The Gemara challenges the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: <b>And</b> is it true that for <b>every burning anger that</b> is stated <b>in the Torah, its effect is</b> also <b>stated? But isn’t it written</b> with regard to Moses: <b>“And he went out from Pharaoh in hot anger”</b> (Exodus 11:8)? <b>And</b> Moses <b>did not say anything to</b> Pharaoh. <b>Reish Lakish said:</b> Moses <b>slapped him and left.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And does Reish Lakish</b> actually <b>say this? But isn’t it written:</b> “Go unto Pharaoh in the morning; lo, he goes out unto the water; <b>and you shall stand by the river’s brink to meet him,</b> and the rod which was turned to a serpent shall you take in your hand” (Exodus 7:15); <b>and Reish Lakish says:</b> God meant: Pharaoh <b>is a king, and</b> so you should <b>be amiable toward him, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> God meant: Pharaoh <b>is wicked, and</b> so you should <b>be insolent toward him.</b> If according to Reish Lakish Moses was commanded to greet Pharaoh with respect, how could he say that Moses slapped Pharaoh? The Gemara answers: <b>Reverse</b> the names of the Sages in this dispute; it is Reish Lakish who says that Moses was commanded to be insolent.",
            "With regard to the respect accorded to a king, <b>Rabbi Yannai says: Fear of</b> the <b>kingship should always be upon you,</b> even when the king does not deserve respect, <b>as it is written</b> that Moses said to Pharaoh: <b>“And all these your servants shall come down unto me</b> and bow down unto me, saying: Get you out, and all the people that follow you, and after that I will go out” (Exodus 11:8). He mentioned Pharaoh’s servants, <b>but he did not say</b> this <b>of</b> Pharaoh <b>himself,</b> even though this was the eventual outcome. Rather, he spoke to Pharaoh with the respect due to a king.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> Derive the principle <b>from here: “And the hand of the Lord was on Elijah, and he girded up his loins and ran before Ahab</b> to the entrance of Jezreel” (I Kings 18:46). Elijah the prophet ran before the evil king Ahab out of respect.",
            "The Gemara continues to discuss the roles of Moses: <b>Ulla says: Moses requested</b> that he be given the <b>kingship, but it was not given to him, as it is written: “Do not draw hither”</b> (Exodus 3:5); <b>and</b> the word <b>“hither”</b> refers to <b>nothing other than kingship, as it is stated:</b> “Then David the king went in and sat before the Lord, and he said: <b>Who am I, O Lord God,</b> and what is my house, <b>that You have brought me hither”?</b> (II Samuel 7:18).",
            "<b>Rava raises an objection</b> from the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier: <b>Rabbi Yishmael says:</b> Elisheva’s <b>brother-in-law,</b> Moses, was <b>a king.</b> This teaches that Moses was in fact granted kingship. <b>Rava said:</b> Ulla <b>is saying</b> that Moses did not receive kingship <b>for himself and for his descendants,</b> i.e., it was not bequeathed to his sons.",
            "The Gemara counters: <b>And</b> is it so that <b>anywhere that it is written “hither”</b> the verse <b>is</b> referring to kingship <b>for</b> future <b>generations</b> as well? <b>But isn’t it written about</b> the kingship of <b>Saul:</b> “They asked of the Lord further: <b>Is there yet a man who comes hither”</b> (I Samuel 10:22), and Saul was <b>indeed</b> a king, but <b>his descendants</b> were <b>not.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>If you wish, say: There was Ish-Bosheth,</b> Saul’s son, who was a king (see II Samuel 2:10), indicating that Saul’s kingship did pass to his son. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead: <b>Saul is different, because</b> the kingship <b>did not stand even for himself,</b> and this is why it did not pass on to his descendants.",
            "The second response is <b>in accordance with</b> that which <b>Rabbi Elazar</b> says that <b>Rabbi Ḥanina says: When greatness is apportioned to a person</b> in Heaven, it <b>is apportioned to him and to his descendants until the end of all generations, as it is stated: “He withdraws not His eyes from the righteous; but with kings upon the throne</b> He sets them forever, and they are exalted” (Job 36:7). <b>But if he</b> then <b>became arrogant, the Holy One, Blessed be He, humiliates him, as is stated</b> in the next verse: <b>“And if they be bound in fetters, and be held in cords of affliction”</b> (Job 36:8). This was the case with Saul.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Blemished</b> priests, <b>whether</b> they are temporarily <b>blemished</b> or permanently blemished, receive a share and partake of offerings, but do not sacrifice them. The Gemara explains: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>As the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the meal offering: <b>“Every male</b> among the sons of Aaron shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:11). The phrase “every male” serves <b>to include blemished</b> priests.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>For what</b> matter is this derivation necessary? <b>If</b> one suggests it is <b>for</b> the matter of <b>consumption, it is already stated</b> explicitly: “Any man of the seed of Aaron the priest who has a blemish…<b>He may eat the bread of his God, of the most sacred,</b> and of the sacred” (Leviticus 21:21–22). <b>Rather,</b> Leviticus 6:11 is necessary <b>for</b> the matter of <b>receiving a share,</b> teaching that blemished priests may do so along with the other priests. This is the source for the mishna’s statement.",
            "It <b>is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering: <b>“Every male</b> among the priests may eat thereof” (Leviticus 6:22). The phrase “every male” serves <b>to include blemished</b> priests. The Gemara explains: <b>For what</b> matter is this derivation necessary? <b>If</b> one suggests it is <b>for</b> the matter of <b>consumption, isn’t</b> that <b>already stated</b> in Leviticus, chapter 21? <b>If</b> one suggests it is <b>for</b> the matter of <b>receiving a share, isn’t</b> that <b>already stated</b> in verse 6:11? Rather, the verse is necessary <b>because</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest who was at first <b>unblemished and</b> later <b>became blemished. From where</b> is it derived that one <b>blemished from birth</b> also receives a share? <b>The verse states</b> here: <b>“Every male.”</b>",
            "It <b>is taught</b> in <b>another</b> <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the guilt offering: <b>“Every male</b> among the priests may eat thereof” (Leviticus 7:6). The phrase “every male” serves <b>to include a blemished</b> priest. The Gemara explains: <b>For what</b> matter is this derivation necessary? <b>If</b> one suggests it is <b>for</b> the matter of <b>eating, isn’t</b> that <b>already stated? And if</b> one suggests it is <b>for</b> the matter of <b>receiving a share, isn’t</b> that <b>already stated? And if</b> one suggests it is <b>for</b> a priest <b>blemished from birth, isn’t</b> that <b>already stated?</b> Rather, the verse is necessary <b>because</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>a permanently blemished</b> priest. <b>From where</b> is it derived that a <b>temporarily blemished</b> priest also receives a share? <b>The verse states</b> here: <b>“Every male.”</b>",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>Isn’t it the opposite [<i>kelapei layya</i>]?</b> Wouldn’t I have thought that a priest with a permanent blemish would be treated more stringently than one with a temporary blemish? <b>Rav Sheshet said: Reverse</b> the wording as follows: One might have thought that I have derived only the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest with a temporary blemish; from where is it derived that one with a permanent blemish also receives a share?",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said: Actually, do not reverse</b> the wording, <b>and</b> this is not difficult. It <b>was necessary</b> to teach that even a priest with a temporary blemish receives a share, because it might <b>enter your mind to say</b>"
        ],
        [
            "that the <i>halakha</i> of this priest is <b>like</b> that of <b>a ritually impure</b> priest: <b>Just as an impure</b> priest <b>may not partake as long as he is not pure, so too, this</b> priest with a temporary blemish <b>may not partake as long as he does not become fit.</b> The verse therefore <b>teaches us</b> that he may receive a share even before his blemish heals.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: The principle is: <b>Any</b> priest <b>who is unfit</b> for the service that day does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat. The Gemara objects: <b>But doesn’t</b> he? <b>Isn’t</b> there <b>a blemished</b> priest, <b>who is not fit for the service and</b> who nevertheless <b>receives a share</b> of the meat, as the mishna itself teaches? <b>And furthermore,</b> this principle indicates that only priests unfit for the service do not receive a share, <b>but</b> any priest who is <b>fit for the service</b> does <b>receive a share.</b> But <b>isn’t</b> there <b>an impure</b> priest, <b>who, with regard to offerings of the community, is fit for the service, and</b> who nevertheless <b>does not receive a share?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: The mishna <b>is saying</b> that any priest who is not <b>fit for partaking</b> of sacrificial meat does not receive a share. Blemished priests may partake of sacrificial meat, and impure priests may not.",
            "The Gemara objects: This indicates that any priest who is fit to partake may receive a share. <b>But isn’t</b> there a <b>minor, who is fit for partaking and</b> who <b>does not receive a share?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> inverse principle, that any priest who is fit to partake may receive a share, <b>is not taught.</b> The mishna means to teach only that any priest who is unfit does not receive a share.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>Now that you have arrived at this</b> conclusion, that the mishna’s statement only teaches what it says explicitly, one can say that the mishna <b>actually</b> means <b>what</b> the Gemara <b>said at the outset,</b> that no priest unfit for the service receives a share. <b>If</b> one raises an objection <b>with regard to an impure</b> priest, who is fit for the service of communal offerings but does not receive a share, answer that the mishna <b>does not teach</b> that every fit priest, even <b>an impure</b> one, receives a share, only the inverse. <b>And if</b> you raise an objection <b>with regard to a blemished</b> priest, who is unfit for the service but nevertheless receives a share, answer that <b>the Merciful One included him</b> as an exception by the phrase: Every male, as derived above (102a).",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Even</b> if the priest was <b>ritually impure</b> only <b>at the time of the sprinkling of the blood</b> of the offering, <b>and</b> he was <b>pure at the time of the burning of the fats,</b> he still <b>does not receive a share</b> of the meat. The Gemara notes: <b>Consequently,</b> one can infer that a priest who was <b>pure at the time of the sprinkling of the blood,</b> even one who was <b>impure at the time of the burning of the fats, does receive a share.</b>",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>The mishna is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Abba Shaul, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Abba Shaul says:</b> A priest <b>never partakes,</b> i.e., receives a share, of sacrificial meat, <b>unless he is pure from the time of sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats, as the verse states:</b> “He among the sons of Aaron <b>who sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat</b> shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). The verse <b>requires</b> that the priest be pure <b>even</b> at the time of <b>the burning of the fats.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Ashi raises a dilemma:</b> According to the opinion of Abba Shaul, in a case where the priest <b>became impure between</b> the sprinkling of the blood and the burning of the fats but became pure again before the latter, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we require</b> only that he be pure both <b>at the time of sprinkling and at the time of</b> the <b>burning</b> of the fats, <b>and there is</b> purity at these times? <b>Or perhaps</b> Abba Shaul meant that the priest may not receive a share in the meat <b>unless he is pure from the time of sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats,</b> without interruption. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that an impure priest who immersed that day, such that he will not be pure until sunset, and likewise an acute mourner and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, do not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening. <b>Rava says: I learned this <i>halakha</i> from Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said in the bathroom: You</b> can <b>contend</b> by way of a story: A priest <b>who immersed that day came and said</b> to a pure priest of the same patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, who was apportioning the sacrificial food: <b>Give me</b> a share <b>of a meal offering, and I will partake</b> of it in the evening.",
            "The pure priest <b>said</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> inference <b>to him: Just as with regard to</b> a matter <b>where your right is superior,</b> i.e., <b>in</b> the case of <b>your</b> own <b>sin offering,</b> to which you have a right even when your family is not serving in the Temple, <b>I</b> can nevertheless <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite</b> because you immersed today; <b>is it not logical that</b> with regard to a matter <b>where your right is inferior,</b> i.e., <b>in</b> the case of <b>your</b> own <b>meal offering,</b> as the meal offering of a priest is not eaten at all, that <b>I</b> can <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of the meal offering of an Israelite?</b>",
            "The priest who immersed that day responded: <b>But</b> even <b>if you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite</b> on the day I immersed, perhaps this is <b>since just as my right is superior</b> in the case of my own sin offering, <b>so too, your right is superior</b> in the case of your own sin offering. If so, is it necessarily so that <b>you</b> can <b>refuse me</b> a share <b>of</b> the <b>meal offering</b> of an Israelite, <b>where just as my right is inferior, so your right is inferior,</b> as neither of us may eat from our own meal offerings?",
            "The pure priest responded: The verse <b>states:</b> “And every meal offering that is baked in the oven, and all that is dressed in the stewing pan, and on the griddle, <b>shall be the priest’s that offers it”</b> (Leviticus 7:9). If you wish to receive a share of a meal offering, <b>come sacrifice and partake</b> of one. Since you cannot sacrifice a meal offering, having immersed only today, neither can you receive a share.",
            "The priest who immersed that day made another demand: <b>Give me</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite, and I will partake</b> of it in the evening when I am pure.",
            "The pure priest <b>said to him: Just as with regard to</b> a matter <b>where my right is inferior,</b> i.e., <b>in</b> the case of <b>my</b> own <b>meal offering,</b> which is not eaten, <b>I</b> can <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of the meal offering of an Israelite,</b> as I explained; so too, <b>is it not logical that</b> with regard to a matter <b>where my right is superior,</b> i.e., <b>in</b> the case of <b>my</b> own <b>sin offering,</b> to which I have a right even when my family is not serving in the Temple, <b>I</b> can <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite?</b>",
            "The priest who immersed that day <b>said to him: But if you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of the meal offering of an Israelite, where just as your right is inferior, so too my right is inferior,</b> is it necessarily so that <b>you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite, where just as your right is superior</b> in the case of your own sin offering, <b>so too my right is superior</b> in the case of my own sin offering?",
            "The pure priest responded: The verse <b>states</b> with regard to the sin offering: <b>“The priest who effects atonement shall eat it”</b> (Leviticus 6:19). If you wish to receive a share of a sin offering, <b>come effect atonement and partake</b> of one. Since you cannot perform the service of a sin offering, having immersed only today, you cannot receive a share in its meat either.",
            "The priest who immersed that day made another demand, and <b>said to him: Give me</b> a share <b>of</b> the <b>breast and thigh,</b> the portions that priests receive of peace offerings, <b>and I will partake</b> of it in the evening when I am pure.",
            "The pure priest <b>said to him: Just as with regard to</b> a matter <b>where your right is superior,</b> i.e., <b>in</b> the case of <b>your</b> own <b>sin offering,</b> to which you have a right to its meat in its entirety, <b>I</b> can <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite,</b> as I explained, so too <b>is it not logical that</b> with regard to a matter <b>where your right is inferior,</b> i.e., <b>in</b> the case of <b>a peace offering, of which you have only</b> the right to a share of the <b>breast and thigh, I</b> can <b>deny you</b> a share?",
            "The priest who immersed that day responded: But <b>if you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of a sin offering, where my right is inferior with regard to my wives and my slaves,</b> as a sin offering can be consumed only by male priests, is it necessarily so that <b>you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of</b> the <b>breast and thigh</b> of a peace offering, <b>where my right is superior with regard to my wives and my slaves,</b> who may also partake of them?",
            "The pure priest responded: The verse <b>states</b> with regard to the peace offering: <b>“It shall be the priest’s that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings</b> against the altar” (Leviticus 7:14). If you wish to partake of a peace offering, <b>come sprinkle</b> its blood <b>and partake</b> of it. Since you cannot perform this service, having immersed only today, you cannot receive a share of its meat either.",
            "The story concludes: The priest <b>who immersed that day left</b> in disappointment, with <b>his <i>a fortiori</i></b> inferences <b>upon his head,</b> as they did not help him. And along with him walked <b>an acute mourner on his right</b> and a priest <b>who had not yet</b> brought an <b>atonement</b> offering <b>on his left.</b> They too were denied shares, because they were unfit for the Temple service.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥai refutes</b> this: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, could have added to the contentions described in the story. <b>Let</b> the priest who immersed that day <b>say to</b> the pure priest: <b>Give me</b> a share <b>of a firstborn</b> offering, <b>and I will partake</b> of it in the evening.",
            "Perhaps it is <b>because</b> the pure priest could <b>say to him: Just as with regard to a sin offering, where my right is inferior with regard to my wives and my slaves,</b> since it may be eaten only by male priests, <b>I</b> can nevertheless <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of the sin offering of an Israelite,</b> as I explained; so too <b>is it not logical that with regard to a first-born, where my right is superior because all of</b> its meat <b>is mine,</b> as firstborn offerings are given to a specific priest, <b>I</b> can <b>deny you</b> a share <b>of it?</b>",
            "But the priest who immersed that day could respond: <b>But if you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of a sin offering, where just as your right is inferior, so is my right inferior;</b> is it necessarily so that <b>you</b> can <b>deny me</b> a share <b>of a firstborn</b> offering, <b>where just as your right is superior, so my right is superior?</b>",
            "The pure priest could respond: The verse <b>says</b> with regard to a firstborn offering: <b>“You shall sprinkle their blood on the altar and shall make their fat smoke</b> for an offering made by fire, for a pleasing aroma to the Lord. <b>And the flesh of them shall be yours,</b> as the breast and as the thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). If you wish to receive a share in the meat of a firstborn, <b>come sprinkle</b> its blood <b>and partake</b> of it. Why did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, not include this exchange as another stage in his story?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>But the other</b> priest, the one who immersed that day, could <b>refute</b> this proof: <b>Is it written: And the flesh of them shall be for the priest who sprinkles,</b> as is written with regard to a meal offering, a sin offering, and a peace offering? Rather, it <b>is written: “And the flesh of them shall be yours,”</b> indicating that it can be given <b>even to a priest other</b> than the one who sacrificed it. This is why Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, did not include this exchange in his story.",
            "The Gemara returns to Rava’s statement that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, taught this <i>halakha</i> in the bathroom. <b>And how did</b> Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, <b>do this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> It is <b>permitted to contemplate</b> matters of Torah <b>in all places except the bathhouse and the bathroom?</b> The Gemara answers: A case where the matter was <b>involuntary is different.</b> Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, was so preoccupied by the issue that he taught it even though he was in the bathroom."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>any</b> burnt offering <b>for which the altar did not acquire its flesh,</b> e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, the <b>priests did not acquire its hide, as it is stated</b> with regard to the burnt offering: “And the priest that sacrifices <b>a man’s burnt offering,</b> the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8), indicating that the priest acquires only the hide of <b>a burnt offering that satisfied</b> the obligation <b>of a man.</b>",
            "Nevertheless, in a case of <b>a burnt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake</b> but for the sake of another offering, <b>although it did not satisfy</b> the obligation <b>of the owner, its hide</b> goes <b>to the priests.</b> In addition, although the verse states: “A man’s burnt offering,” in the case of <b>both the burnt offering of a man and the burnt offering of a woman, their hides</b> go <b>to the priests.</b>",
            "<b>The hides of offerings of lesser sanctity</b> belong <b>to the owners; the hides of offerings of the most sacred order</b> belong <b>to the priests.</b> The right of priests to hides of offerings of the most sacred order is derived via <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>If</b> for <b>a burnt offering, for which</b> the priests <b>do not acquire its flesh,</b> as it is burned in its entirety, <b>they acquire its hide,</b> then for other <b>offerings of the most sacred order, for which</b> the priests <b>acquire its flesh, is it not right that they should acquire its hide?</b> And <b>there is no</b> room to contend that the <b>altar will prove</b> that this is not a valid inference, as it acquires the flesh of a burnt offering but not its hide, <b>since it does not have</b> the right to the <b>hide</b> of an offering <b>in any place.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase <b>“a man’s burnt offering”</b> in the verse mentioned above serves <b>to exclude the burnt offering of consecrated</b> property, meaning that the priests do not acquire the hides of such offerings. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:</b> The phrase serves <b>to exclude the burnt offering of converts.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>What</b> does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he says that the phrase serves <b>to exclude the burnt offering of consecrated</b> property? <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says:</b> He means it serves <b>to exclude a burnt offering that comes from</b> property that was <b>left over.</b> For example, if an animal consecrated as a guilt offering remains alive after its owner has achieved atonement by sacrificing another animal, the owner must wait until it acquires a blemish and then sell it. The proceeds are used to purchase a communal gift offering, which is sacrificed when there are no other offerings to be burned on the altar (see <i>Temura</i> 20b). Because it is a communal offering, it is not considered a man’s burnt offering, and the priests therefore have no right to the hide.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>This works out well according to the one who says: Leftover</b> consecrated property <b>goes toward communal gift</b> offerings. <b>But according to the one who says: Leftover</b> consecrated property <b>goes toward an individual’s gift</b> offering, <b>what can be said?</b> As this is a man’s burnt offering, the priests should have a right to the hides.",
            "The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, the <i>halakha</i> is <b>as Rava says:</b> The verse states: “And the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; and he shall lay <b>the burnt offering</b> in order upon it” (Leviticus 6:5). The verse states: “The burnt offering,” with the definite article, to teach that the daily burnt offering is the <b>first burnt offering</b> sacrificed each day in the Temple. <b>Here too,</b> the verse states: “The priest shall have to himself the hide of <b>the burnt offering</b> which he has offered,” to teach that the priest acquires the hide of <b>a first burnt offering,</b> i.e., an animal that was initially designated as a burnt offering, but not of a burnt offering purchased from proceeds left over from another offering.",
            "<b>Rabbi Aivu</b> says that <b>Rabbi Yannai says:</b> Rabbi Yehuda’s statement can be interpreted differently. The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves <b>to exclude</b> a case of <b>one who consecrates a burnt offering for Temple maintenance.</b> Since the owner seeks to shift its ownership to the Temple, the priests have no right to its hides.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>It is not necessary</b> to teach this <i>halakha</i> <b>according to the one who says</b> that <b>consecration for Temple maintenance applies by Torah law</b> to offerings already consecrated to the altar, as the animal in fact ceases to belong to the individual, and the priests clearly have no claim to its hide. <b>Rather, even according to the one who says</b> that it <b>does not apply</b> by Torah law, because the offering is already consecrated for the altar, <b>this matter</b> applies only to the <b>meat; but</b> as for the <b>hide,</b> the consecration for Temple maintenance <b>applies</b> and nullifies the priests’ claim to it.",
            "The Gemara returns to the explanation of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef and comments: <b>And so says Rav Naḥman</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says:</b> The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves <b>to exclude a burnt offering that comes from</b> property that was <b>left over.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose</b> statement is your opinion? It is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda.</b> But <b>didn’t</b> Rabbi Yehuda <b>retract</b> this statement? <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The mishna in tractate <i>Shekalim</i> (6:5) states that the Temple had <b>six</b> collection boxes shaped like horns, <b>for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings. These funds would go <b>toward burnt offerings that come from</b> money that was <b>left over.</b> For example, if someone dedicated money to purchasing an offering, and after his purchase some of the sum remained, he would put it in these boxes. The <i>halakha</i> is <b>that the priests have no right to the hide of</b> such an offering. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Neḥemya said to</b> Rabbi Yehuda, <b>and some say</b> that <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> said to him: <b>If so, you have nullified the interpretation of Jehoiada the priest. As it is taught</b> in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 6:6) that <b>Jehoiada the priest taught this interpretation:</b> The verse states: <b>“It is a guilt offering; he is certainly guilty before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 5:19). The phrase “before the Lord” teaches that if <b>any</b> money <b>comes on account of a sin offering or on account of a guilt offering,</b> i.e., it is left over after their purchase, <b>burnt offerings must be purchased with it,</b> and their <b>flesh</b> must be burned on the altar <b>to the Lord.</b> But <b>its hide</b> shall go <b>to the priests.</b> Rabbi Yehuda did not respond, indicating that he conceded that the hides of such offerings go to the priests.",
            "Rav Naḥman <b>said to</b> Rav Hamnuna: <b>But how does the Master interpret</b> the phrase: “A man’s burnt offering,” as meaning? Rav Hamnuna <b>said to him: I interpret it</b> as referring <b>to one who consecrates</b> all <b>his property,</b> including animals fit for burnt offerings. If these animals are later sacrificed as burnt offerings, the priests do not acquire the hides, since the offerings are consecrated property.",
            "<b>And</b> this is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 4:7): If <b>one consecrates his property</b> without specifying the purpose, generally speaking, it goes toward Temple maintenance. <b>But</b> if <b>among it were animals fit to</b> be sacrificed on the <b>altar,</b> either <b>male or female,</b> then <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> Animals that are fit for offerings must be sacrificed. Therefore, the <b>male</b> animals <b>shall be sold for the purpose of burnt offerings</b> to those who need to bring such offerings, and the <b>female</b> animals, which cannot be brought as burnt offerings, <b>shall be sold for the purpose of peace offerings</b> to those who need to bring such offerings. <b>And</b> because they were consecrated for Temple maintenance, <b>their proceeds shall be allocated with the rest of</b> the person’s <b>property for Temple maintenance.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> The donor intended that all animals fit for sacrifice be brought as burnt offerings, and the rest of his property be given for Temple maintenance. Therefore, the <b>males shall be sacrificed themselves</b> as <b>burnt offerings; and</b> the <b>females shall be sold for the purpose of</b> being sacrificed as <b>peace offerings, and he shall bring burnt offerings with their proceeds; and the rest of</b> his <b>property shall be allocated for Temple maintenance.</b>",
            "Rav Hamnuna explains: <b>And even according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua, who says</b> that <b>a person divides his consecrated</b> property, as he rules that the animals are themselves sacrificed while the other property is given for Temple maintenance, <b>this statement</b> applies specifically to the <b>flesh,</b> which is fit to be burned on the altar; <b>but</b> as for the <b>hide,</b> which is not, the fund for Temple maintenance <b>acquires</b> it from the outset, and the priests therefore have no right to it. This is the <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Yehuda derives from the phrase “a man’s burnt offering.”",
            "The <i>baraita</i> states: <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:</b> The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves <b>to exclude the burnt offering of converts.</b> The priests do not acquire the hides of such offerings. <b>Rav Simai bar Ḥilkai said to Ravina: Is that to say</b> that <b>a convert is not</b> included in the category of <b>a man?</b> Ravina <b>said to him:</b> Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, meant that the verse serves <b>to exclude</b> the burnt offering of <b>a convert who died and has no heirs.</b> The offering has no owner, and therefore the priests do not acquire its hide.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the priest that offers <b>a man’s burnt offering,</b> the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8). From this verse <b>I have</b> derived the <i>halakha</i> <b>only</b> with regard to <b>a man’s burnt offering,</b> i.e., that of a born-Jewish male. <b>From where</b> is the same derived with regard to <b>the burnt offering of converts, women, or</b> Canaanite <b>slaves? The verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering,”</b> and it thereby <b>included</b> these as well.",
            "<b>And if so, why</b> must <b>the verse state: “A man’s burnt offering”?</b> It serves to teach that the priests acquire the hide only of <b>a burnt offering that satisfied</b> the obligation <b>of a man,</b> i.e., <b>to exclude</b> a burnt offering <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intention of consuming it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> and was thereby disqualified. The verse teaches <b>that the priests have no right to the hide of</b> such an offering.",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I include</b> a burnt offering <b>that was not slaughtered for its own sake</b> but for the sake of another offering. <b>Since it does not satisfy</b> the obligation <b>of the owner,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "I might have thought that <b>the priests have no right to its hide.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering,”</b> to teach that <b>in any case</b> where the offering is not disqualified, the priests acquire its hide, even if it did not satisfy the owner’s obligation.",
            "And from the phrase <b>“the hide of the burnt offering” I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that the priests acquire <b>the hide of the burnt offering. From where</b> do I derive that they acquire <b>the hides of</b> all <b>offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering which he has offered,”</b> which serves to include any offering that the priests sacrifice. If so, one <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I include even offerings of lesser sanctity.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Burnt offering,”</b> and not simply: Offering, to teach that <b>just as a burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order, so too</b> the priests acquire the hides only of <b>all offerings of the most sacred order;</b> they do not acquire the hides of offerings of lesser sanctity.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>Rabbi Yishmael says</b> there is a different derivation. From the phrase <b>“the hide of the burnt offering,” I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that the priests acquire the hide of <b>the burnt offering. From where</b> is it derived that they acquire <b>the hides of</b> all <b>offerings of the most sacred order? It is</b> based on <b>a logical inference: Just as</b> in the case of <b>a burnt offering, for which</b> the priests <b>do not acquire its meat,</b> the priests nevertheless <b>acquire its hide,</b> then in the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order, for which</b> the priests <b>do acquire its meat, is it not logical that</b> they <b>acquire their hides?</b>",
            "One may counter: Let the <b>altar prove</b> that this is not a valid <i>a fortiori</i> inference, <b>as it acquires the meat, and</b> still <b>it does not acquire the hide.</b> One may respond: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about the altar?</b> It is notable <b>in that it does not acquire</b> hides <b>in any</b> instance. <b>Will you say</b> the <i>halakha</i> concerning the altar should teach the <i>halakha</i> <b>concerning</b> the <b>priests, who acquire</b> hides of <b>some of</b> the offerings, as the Torah explicitly grants them the hides of burnt offerings? Rather say: <b>Since</b> the priests <b>acquire</b> hides of <b>some of</b> the offerings, <b>they acquire</b> the hides of <b>all</b> offerings of the most sacred order.",
            "<b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> There is no need to derive that hides of offerings of the most sacred order go to the priests. <b>We need</b> the verse <b>itself only to</b> teach that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>the hide of the burnt offering. As</b> the Torah does not generally require that an offering be flayed, <b>in all</b> other <b>cases the hide</b> of the offering <b>follows the flesh</b> of the offering.",
            "For example, <b>bulls that are burned and goats that are burned</b> must be burned <b>themselves, and their hides burned with them,</b> as the Torah states explicitly (see Leviticus 4:11–12). <b>A sin offering, and a guilt offering, and a communal peace offering</b> are given as <b>a gift to the priest</b> (see Leviticus 7:7); if the priests <b>want,</b> they may <b>flay them</b> and use the hides, and if they <b>do not want</b> to use the hides, they may <b>eat</b> the offerings <b>together with their hides. Offerings of lesser sanctity</b> are given <b>to the owners;</b> if they <b>want,</b> they may <b>flay them</b> and use the hides, and if they <b>want,</b> they may <b>eat</b> the offerings <b>together with their hides.</b>",
            "<b>But with regard to a burnt offering it is stated: “And he shall flay the burnt offering, and cut it into its pieces”</b> (Leviticus 1:6). One <b>might</b> have thought that, because all the flesh of the burnt offering is burned on the altar, <b>the priests have no right to its hide.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “The priest shall have to himself <b>the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed”</b> (Leviticus 7:8).",
            "The phrase “the priest <b>shall have to himself”</b> serves <b>to exclude</b> a priest <b>who immersed that day and</b> a priest <b>who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and an acute mourner,</b> i.e., meaning that they do not receive a share of the hides, just as they do not receive a share of the meat. <b>As</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that although these priests <b>will not acquire the meat,</b> this is <b>because it is for consumption,</b> and they are not permitted to partake of it; but <b>they will acquire the hide, because it is not for consumption.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Shall have to himself,” to exclude</b> a priest <b>who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and</b> a priest <b>who immersed that day, and an acute mourner.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But let the first <i>tanna</i> also derive</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>logically,</b> as Rabbi Yishmael did. Why did he cite a verse? The Gemara answers: Often when there is <b>a matter that can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference, the <b>verse</b> nevertheless <b>takes the trouble and writes it</b> explicitly.",
            "<b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this</b> phrase: “The hide of the burnt offering <b>that he has sacrificed,”</b> from which the first <i>tanna</i> derives the <i>halakha</i>? He holds that it serves <b>to exclude</b> a priest <b>who immersed that day, and</b> a priest <b>who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and an acute mourner,</b> who do not receive a share in the hides.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But let</b> Rabbi Yishmael <b>derive</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the phrase: <b>“Shall have to himself,”</b> as does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara explains: <b>Rabbi Yishmael</b> conforms <b>to his</b> line of <b>reasoning,</b> that the phrase teaches a different <i>halakha</i>. <b>As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:</b> It <b>is stated: “Shall have to himself”</b> (Leviticus 7:8), <b>with regard to a burnt offering, and</b> it <b>is stated:</b> “The priest that makes atonement, <b>he shall have to himself”</b> (Leviticus 7:7), <b>with regard to a guilt offering.</b> The following verbal analogy is derived from here: <b>Just as there,</b> after the blood of a guilt offering is presented, <b>its bones</b> become <b>permitted</b> to the priest for any use, since only the portions intended for consumption on the altar are sacrificed whereas the rest of the animal is given to the priests, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to a burnt offering, <b>its bones</b> that are not attached to the flesh and are therefore not intended for the altar <b>are permitted.</b>",
            "With regard to this verbal analogy the Gemara comments: It must be that those terms <b>are free,</b> i.e., superfluous in their context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. <b>As, if they are not free,</b> the verbal analogy <b>can be refuted</b> as follows: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a guilt offering?</b> It is notable <b>in that its meat is permitted</b> to the priests, unlike the flesh of a burnt offering, which is burned upon the altar, and perhaps this is why the bones of a guilt offering are also permitted. Since the phrase: <b>“Shall have it to himself,” is a superfluous</b> term in each <b>verse,</b> the analogy stands, because a verbal analogy based on free terms cannot be refuted logically.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If <b>any offerings</b> of the most sacred order <b>were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not</b> go <b>to the priests;</b> rather, they are burned together with the flesh in the place of burning. If they were disqualified <b>after their flaying, their hides</b> go <b>to the priests. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said: In</b> all <b>my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of</b> Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, <b>we learned that</b> in a case where <b>one flays the firstborn</b> offering, <b>and</b> the animal is later <b>discovered to have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>],</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that the priests may derive benefit [<i>sheye’otu</i>] from its hide. And the Rabbis say:</b> The claim: <b>We did not see, is no proof; rather,</b> if after flaying it is discovered that the animal was unfit before it was flayed, the hide <b>goes out to the place of burning.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The previous mishna (103a) teaches: In the case of <b>any</b> burnt offering <b>for which the altar did not acquire its flesh,</b> e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, <b>the priests did not acquire its hide.</b> The mishna does not state any qualification, indicating that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even if</b> the priest <b>flayed the hide before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood on the altar. The Gemara posits: <b>Whose</b> opinion is this? <b>It is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself;</b> i.e., it effects acceptance of the hide only together with the flesh. Since the flesh is disqualified and the sprinkling does not effect its acceptance, the sprinkling does not effect acceptance for the hide either.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Say the latter clause,</b> i.e., the mishna here: If <b>any offerings</b> of the most sacred order <b>were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not</b> go <b>to the priests.</b> If they were disqualified <b>after their flaying, their hides</b> go <b>to the priests.</b> This indicates that once the hides are flayed, they go to the priests even if the flesh was disqualified before the sprinkling of the blood. If so, <b>we arrive at</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>who says: The blood effects acceptance of the hide,</b> i.e., renders the hide permitted to the priests, <b>by itself.</b> Can it be that <b>the former clause</b> of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,</b> and <b>the latter clause</b> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi?",
            "<b>Abaye said: Since the latter clause</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, it must be that <b>the former clause is also</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. <b>And</b> although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in principle the priests should acquire the hides if they are removed before the flesh is disqualified, in any case <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>concedes that</b> the <b>flaying is not</b> done <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling.</b> Since the offering cannot be disqualified before the hide is removed, practically speaking, the priests will never acquire the hides unless the altar acquires the flesh, as taught in the former clause.",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> On the contrary, <b>since the former clause</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,</b> it must be that <b>the latter clause is also</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.</b> When the mishna states that the priests acquire the hides if the flesh was disqualified after the flaying, it must mean that the flesh was disqualified after the sprinkling. Therefore, <b>what</b> does the mishna mean by the phrase: <b>Before flaying,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and what</b> does it mean by the phrase: <b>After flaying?</b> It means <b>before</b> the moment the offerings <b>became fit for flaying,</b> and <b>after</b> the moment <b>they became fit for flaying,</b> i.e., before and after the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>What</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>and what</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?</b> Their opinions are <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: The blood effects acceptance of the hide by itself,</b> after it has been flayed, even if the flesh is disqualified. <b>And</b> if, <b>when</b> the hide <b>is</b> still <b>with the flesh, a disqualification appears on</b> the flesh, <b>whether before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>or after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, then the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the hide <b>is parallel to</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the flesh: Both are burned.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself. And</b> if, <b>when</b> the hide <b>is</b> still <b>with the flesh, a disqualification appears on</b> the flesh <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, then the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the hide <b>is parallel to</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the flesh: Both are burned. If a disqualification develops on the flesh <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, the <b>flesh was</b> already <b>accepted for a time.</b> Therefore, even though the flesh is disqualified, the priest <b>may flay</b> the animal before it is burned, <b>and its hide</b> goes <b>to the priests.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Shall we say</b> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar <b>disagree about</b> the same principle as do <b>Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua?</b> As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: <b>“And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood,</b> upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> The verse teaches that <b>if there is no blood</b> sprinkled on the altar, <b>no flesh</b> may be burned on the altar, and <b>if there is no flesh</b> to be burned on the altar, <b>no blood</b> may be sprinkled on the altar.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The <b>blood</b> must be sprinkled <b>even if there is no flesh, as it is stated</b> in the continuation of the verse: <b>“And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out</b> against the altar of the Lord your God, and you shall eat the flesh.” <b>If so, what</b> is taught when <b>the verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”?</b> It is stated <b>to tell you: Just as blood</b> is placed on the altar <b>by sprinkling, so too,</b> the <b>flesh</b> is placed on the altar <b>by tossing. Consequently, you learn that there is a space between</b> the <b>ramp and the altar,</b> such that the priest must toss the flesh from the edge of the ramp.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Shall we say</b> that <b>the one who says</b> that the hide <b>is accepted</b> independent of the flesh holds <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer,</b> that the blood is sprinkled independent of the flesh, <b>and the one who says</b> that the hide <b>is not accepted</b> independent of the flesh holds <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua,</b> that if there is no flesh then the blood is not sprinkled?",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>According to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Eliezer,</b> who holds that the blood may be sprinkled even if the flesh is disqualified, <b>everyone agrees</b> that this sprinkling effects acceptance of the hide. <b>When they disagree,</b> it is <b>according to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehoshua.</b>",
            "<b>The one who says</b> that the hide <b>is not accepted</b> independently, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds <b>in accordance with</b> the straightforward meaning of the statement of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua;</b> once the flesh is disqualified, the blood cannot be sprinkled and does not effect acceptance of the hide. <b>The one who says</b> that the hide <b>is accepted,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, could <b>say to you: Rabbi Yehoshua says only there</b> that the blood may not be sprinkled <b>in</b> a case where nothing but the <b>flesh</b> was at stake, <b>where there is no loss for the priests,</b> who never receive meat from burnt offerings. <b>But</b> in cases where the <b>hide</b> would go to waste, <b>where there is a loss for the priests,</b> perhaps <b>even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes</b> that the blood effects acceptance.",
            "This latter interpretation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion with regard to the hides is <b>just as it is with regard to</b> disqualified flesh <b>after the fact. As we learned</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If the <b>flesh contracted ritual impurity or was disqualified, or</b> if it <b>emerged beyond the curtains</b> delineating its designated area, <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The priest must nevertheless <b>sprinkle</b> the blood on the altar. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> The priest <b>may not sprinkle</b> the blood on the altar. <b>And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if</b> the priest nevertheless <b>sprinkled</b> the blood, the offering <b>is accepted</b> after the fact. Apparently, the sprinkling is sufficiently valid to effect acceptance of the hide.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said:</b> In all my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning. The Gemara challenges: <b>And</b> is it so that he did <b>not</b> see? <b>Aren’t there bulls that are burned and goats that are burned</b> together with their hides as a matter of course?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>We are not saying</b> that Rabbi Ḥanina never saw hides go out to be burned <b>in accordance with their mitzva;</b> he certainly did. Rather, he never saw hides being burned because the offering was disqualified.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But <b>isn’t there</b> a case where an offering is disqualified <b>before flaying and before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, in which case all agree that the animal is burned with its hide? The Gemara answers: <b>We are saying</b> that Rabbi Ḥanina never saw a hide go out <b>stripped</b> from its flesh.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But isn’t there</b> a case where an offering is disqualified <b>after</b> the <b>flaying</b> of the hide <b>and before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, in which case the hide is burned <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rabbi Ḥanina holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, that the blood does effect acceptance of the hide in such a case, and so it would not be burned. <b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that you can <b>even interpret</b> the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,</b> as <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>concedes that</b> the <b>flaying is not</b> done <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling,</b> and so in practice Rabbi Ḥanina never saw a hide that was flayed before the offering was disqualified.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But isn’t there</b> the case of an animal that, after the hide was flayed and the blood was sprinkled, <b>was found</b> to have a wound <b>in</b> its <b>intestines</b> rendering it <b>a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> in which case the offering was already disqualified when the blood was sprinkled?",
            "The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina <b>holds</b> that in the case of an animal that <b>was found</b> to be <b>a <i>tereifa</i></b> due to a wound <b>in</b> its <b>intestines,</b> the sprinkling of the blood nevertheless <b>effects acceptance,</b> because the wound was unknown at the time of the sprinkling. The language of the mishna <b>is also precise, as it teaches: Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of</b> Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, <b>we learned that</b> in a case where <b>one flays the firstborn</b> offering, <b>and</b> the animal is later <b>discovered</b> to be <b>a <i>tereifa</i>,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that the priests may derive benefit from its hide.</b> This indicates that the sprinkling of the blood effects acceptance if the wound was unknown. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, <b>learn from</b> the mishna that this is so.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> if this is what Rabbi Ḥanina meant, then <b>what is Rabbi Akiva teaching us?</b> His statement seems unnecessary. The Gemara answers: <b>This</b> is what Rabbi Akiva is <b>teaching us:</b> This <i>halakha</i> applies not just in the Temple but <b>even in the outlying areas,</b> e.g., with regard to a blemished firstborn animal, which is slaughtered outside the Temple. If it is discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i> before its slaughter, it must be buried with its hide, but if it is slaughtered and later discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i>, then its slaughter renders the hide permitted to the priests, just as the sprinkling of the blood renders the hide permitted in the Temple.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> The <b><i>halakha</i></b> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva.</b> The Gemara adds: <b>And even Rabbi Akiva said</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>only</b> in a case <b>where an expert</b> verified the firstborn animal’s blemish and <b>permitted it</b> to be slaughtered. <b>But</b> if <b>an expert did not permit it,</b> then its slaughter does <b>not</b> render the hide permitted to the priest.",
            "The Gemara concludes: <b>And the <i>halakha</i></b> is <b>in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis,</b> not Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, the <b>flesh</b> is discarded <b>by burial and the hide by burning.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>bulls that are burned,</b> i.e., the bull of Yom Kippur, the bull of the anointed priest, and the bull brought for an unwitting communal sin, which are burned after their blood is sprinkled and their sacrificial portions burned on the altar, <b>and goats that are burned,</b> i.e., the goat of Yom Kippur and the goat brought for the unwitting communal transgression of the prohibition against idol worship, <b>when they are burned in accordance with their mitzva, they are burned in the place of the ashes</b> (see Leviticus 4:12) outside of Jerusalem, <b>and they render</b> the <b>garments</b> of the priests who tend to their burning <b>impure</b> (see Leviticus 4:25). <b>And if</b> these offerings <b>are not burned in accordance with their mitzva</b> because they were disqualified, and offerings that are disqualified are also burned, <b>they are burned in the place of</b> burning in <b>the <i>bira</i>, and they do not render</b> the <b>garments</b> of the priests who tend to their burning <b>impure.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The priests <b>would carry</b> the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended <b>on poles.</b> When <b>the first</b> priests, carrying the front of the pole, <b>emerged outside the wall of the</b> Temple <b>courtyard and the latter</b> priests <b>did not</b> yet <b>emerge, the first</b> priests <b>render</b> their <b>garments impure, and the latter</b> priests <b>do not render</b> their <b>garments impure until they emerge.</b> When both <b>these and those</b> priests <b>emerged, they render</b> their <b>garments impure. Rabbi Shimon says: They do not render</b> their <b>garments impure,</b> as this <i>halakha</i> applies only to those who burn the offerings. And even then their garments do not become ritually impure <b>until the fire is ignited in the majority of</b> the offerings. Once <b>the flesh is</b> completely <b>scorched,</b> with no moisture remaining, <b>one who</b> then <b>burns</b> the remains <b>does not render</b> his <b>garments impure.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if offerings of a type that are burned were disqualified, they are burned in a place of burning called the <i>bira</i>. The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the <b><i>bira</i>? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a place on the Temple Mount, and its name is <i>bira</i>,</b> and this is where they would burn these offerings. <b>And Reish Lakish says: The entire Temple is called</b> the <b><i>bira</i>, as it is stated</b> in the prayer of David: “And give unto Solomon my son a whole heart, to keep Your commandments, Your testimonies, and Your statutes, and to do all this, and to build <b>the Temple [<i>bira</i>] for which I have made provision”</b> (I Chronicles 29:19).",
            "§ <b>Rav Naḥman says</b> that <b>Rabba bar Avuh says: There are three places of the ashes.</b> First was the <b>great place of the ashes</b> that <b>was in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, where</b> the priests would <b>burn the disqualified offerings of the most sacred order, and the</b> disqualified <b>sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, and bulls that are burned and goats that are burned</b> if <b>they were disqualified prior to</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood.",
            "<b>And there was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where</b> the priests would <b>burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned</b> if <b>they were disqualified after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood. <b>And</b> the third place of the ashes was for the bulls and goats that were burned <b>in accordance with their mitzva, outside</b> the <b>three camps,</b> i.e., outside the walls of Jerusalem.",
            "<b>Levi teaches</b> a different version of this <i>baraita</i>: <b>There are three places of the ashes.</b> First was the <b>great place of the ashes</b> that <b>was in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, where</b> the priests would <b>burn the disqualified offerings of the most sacred order, and the</b> disqualified <b>sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, and bulls that are burned and goats that are burned</b> if <b>they were disqualified, whether prior to</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>or after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood. <b>And there was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where</b> the priests would <b>burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned</b> if <b>they were disqualified upon emerging</b> from the Temple courtyard. <b>And</b> the third was for bulls and goats burned <b>in accordance with their mitzva, outside</b> the <b>three camps.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:</b> The flesh of most offerings is disqualified by being left overnight. <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>being left overnight is effective to</b> disqualify <b>bulls that are burned and goats that are burned?</b> Given that their flesh is neither eaten nor burned on the altar, <b>do we say: When being left overnight is effective</b> to disqualify flesh, this is only <b>in</b> a case of <b>flesh that is fit for consumption,</b> either by the altar or by human beings; <b>but</b> in the case of <b>these</b> bulls and goats that are burned, <b>which are not fit for consumption,</b> being left overnight does <b>not</b> disqualify the flesh? <b>Or perhaps</b> this case <b>is no different,</b> and being left overnight disqualifies the flesh.",
            "<b>Rava said: This matter,</b> Rabbi Yirmeya’s <b>dilemma, was raised by Abaye, and I resolved it from this</b> <i>baraita</i>: The mishna (43a) records a dispute as to whether the sacrificial portions of bulls that are burned are subject to disqualification by intent to burn them beyond their designated time [<i>piggul</i>]. <b>But</b> the disputants <b>agree that if</b> the priest <b>intended for the consumption of</b> the <b>bulls’</b> meat <b>and their burning</b> to be beyond their designated time, <b>he did nothing,</b> as <i>piggul</i> applies only to flesh consumed by human beings or the altar. <b>What, is it not</b> the case that <b>since</b> the <b>intention</b> of burning after the designated time <b>does not disqualify</b> bulls that are burned, one can infer that <b>being left overnight also does not disqualify</b> bulls that are burned?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>But perhaps it is</b> only improper <b>intention that does not disqualify</b> such offerings, <b>but being left overnight does disqualify</b> them.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 9a): With regard to <b>bulls that are burned and goats that are burned,</b> one who benefits <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>from</b> the time <b>that they were consecrated.</b> Once <b>they have been slaughtered, they are susceptible to be rendered disqualified</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> being <b>left overnight</b> without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled. <b>What, is it not</b> referring to the <b>flesh</b> of bulls, indicating that the flesh is disqualified if <b>left overnight?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> the mishna indicates only that the offerings’ <b>sacrificial portions</b> are disqualified if <b>left overnight,</b> since they must be burned on the altar.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>But</b> evidence to the contrary can be adduced <b>from</b> the fact <b>that the latter clause</b> of the mishna <b>teaches:</b> In <b>all of those</b> cases, one who benefits <b>from them</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property if he derives benefit while they are burned <b>in the place of the ashes, until the flesh is</b> completely <b>incinerated.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>From</b> the fact <b>that the latter clause</b> is discussing <b>flesh,</b> infer that <b>the first clause also</b> discusses <b>flesh,</b> and not the sacrificial portions. The Gemara rejects this: <b>Are the cases comparable? The latter clause</b> discusses <b>flesh,</b> and <b>the first clause</b> discusses <b>sacrificial portions.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> that <b>which Levi teaches</b> in the <i>baraita</i>: There was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were <b>disqualified upon emerging</b> from the Temple courtyard. <b>What, is it not</b> referring to offerings disqualified by being <b>left overnight?</b> The Gemara rejects this: <b>No,</b> it is referring to <b>disqualification by</b> contracting <b>ritual impurity or disqualification by leaving</b> the courtyard before the blood was sprinkled on the altar. The dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya stands unresolved.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma:</b> In general, the flesh of offerings is disqualified by leaving the Temple courtyard. <b>What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to whether <b>leaving is effective to</b> disqualify <b>bulls that are burned and goats that are burned?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the dilemma he is raising?</b> Here it is a mitzva to burn the flesh of these offerings outside the Temple courtyard. <b>Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said:</b> Rabbi Elazar raises his dilemma <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of the one who says:</b> With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, even though the flesh may be consumed anywhere in Jerusalem, nevertheless, if it emerges from the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, it is disqualified, because <b>its time to leave</b> from the Temple courtyard <b>has not yet arrived.</b> Perhaps the same <i>halakha</i> applies to bulls and goats that are burned: Even though the flesh must eventually leave the Temple, if it leaves before its designated time, it is disqualified.",
            "The dilemma is: <b>Do we say</b> that <b>this matter,</b> disqualification by leaving the Temple courtyard prematurely, applies only to <b>flesh that need not eventually leave</b> due to an <b>obligation?</b> One may consume the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity in the Temple courtyard if he wishes. <b>But</b> perhaps <b>these</b> bulls and goats that are burned, <b>which</b> must <b>eventually leave</b> due to an <b>obligation,</b> are <b>not</b> disqualified by emerging prematurely. <b>Or perhaps here too</b> the flesh is disqualified if <b>its time to leave has not</b> yet <b>arrived.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> that <b>which Levi teaches</b> in the <i>baraita</i>: There was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if <b>they were disqualified upon emerging</b> from the Temple courtyard. <b>What, is it not</b> referring to <b>disqualification by leaving</b> the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood? The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> it is referring to <b>disqualification by</b> contracting <b>ritual impurity or disqualification by being left overnight.</b> The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar stands unresolved.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Elazar raises</b> another <b>dilemma:</b> With regard to <b>bulls that are burned and goats that are burned,</b> if <b>the majority of</b> the animal’s body <b>emerged</b> from the Temple courtyard, but it consists of a majority only <b>by</b> inclusion of <b>the minority of a limb,</b> the majority of which remains inside the courtyard, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? <b>Do we</b> determine the status of <b>this minority of a limb</b> by <b>casting it after the majority</b> of that limb, <b>and</b> the majority of <b>that</b> limb <b>did not leave? Or perhaps we</b> determine its status by <b>casting</b> it <b>after the majority of</b> the <b>animal,</b> and therefore a majority of the animal has left?",
            "The Gemara clarifies: Isn’t it <b>obvious that we do not disregard the majority of the animal and</b> instead <b>follow the majority of the limbs? Rather,</b> Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma must be as follows: In a case <b>where half of</b> the animal <b>emerged</b> from the courtyard such that <b>the majority of</b> a certain <b>limb</b> emerged, but a minority of the limb remained inside, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do <b>we</b> determine the status of <b>this minority of a limb</b>"
        ],
        [
            "by <b>casting it after the majority of</b> that <b>limb, and</b> the majority of <b>that</b> limb <b>did leave? Or perhaps we</b> determine its status by <b>casting it after</b> the half of <b>the animal,</b> which did not leave the courtyard. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "<b>Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches this</b> dilemma <b>with regard to people: In</b> a case where <b>five people are handling</b> an offering and carrying it out to be burned, <b>and three</b> of them <b>emerged and two of them remained</b> in the Temple courtyard, such that the animal is partly inside and partly outside, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Do <b>we follow the majority of the people handling</b> the offering, who have left the courtyard, <b>or</b> do <b>we follow</b> the <b>animal,</b> the majority of which did not yet leave? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar raises</b> another <b>dilemma:</b> If <b>bulls and goats that are burned left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>and returned, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the garments of those who carry them inside the courtyard? <b>Do we say: Once they left, they became impure? Or perhaps once they return, they return</b> and do not render garments impure?",
            "<b>Rabbi Abba bar Memel says: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> the mishna: <b>They would carry</b> the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended <b>on poles.</b> When <b>the first</b> priests, carrying the front of the pole, <b>emerged beyond the wall of the</b> Temple <b>courtyard and the latter</b> ones <b>did not</b> yet <b>emerge, the first</b> ones, <b>who emerged beyond the wall of the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, render</b> their <b>garments impure, but the latter</b> ones <b>do not render</b> their <b>garments impure until they emerge.</b> Rabbi Abba bar Memel explains: <b>And if it enters your mind</b> to say that <b>once they leave, they become impure, these</b> latter ones mentioned in the mishna <b>who are</b> still <b>inside should be rendered impure,</b> since the offering itself has emerged. It follows that if the offering returns, their garments are not rendered impure.",
            "<b>Ravina said: And can you understand</b> this as a proof? The reason that the latter ones’ garments are not rendered impure is that <b>I require</b> the fulfillment of the verse: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments, and bathe his flesh in water, <b>and afterward he may come into the camp”</b> (Leviticus 16:28). <b>And</b> since they have <b>not</b> yet left the camp, they cannot come into it, and therefore they do not contract the impurity described in the verse.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if they can become impure only after they leave, <b>how did Rabbi Elazar raise this dilemma?</b> The Gemara answers: He raised the dilemma with regard to a case <b>where they take</b> the offering <b>with staffs [<i>bevakulsei</i>],</b> i.e., after the offering is returned to the Temple courtyard, other people stand outside the courtyard and bring it out again using staffs. Does the offering render these people impure, even though they are standing outside the courtyard? The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar remains unresolved.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>bulls</b> that are burned, <b>and</b> a red <b>heifer, and the scapegoat</b> of the Yom Kippur service, <b>the one who sends</b> them, <b>the one who burns them, and the one who takes them out</b> of the Temple courtyard <b>render</b> their <b>garments impure. And</b> the animals <b>themselves,</b> after they emerge from the Temple courtyard, <b>do not render garments</b> that they touch <b>impure, but they render food and drink</b> that they touch <b>impure.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:</b> A red <b>heifer and bulls</b> that are burned <b>render food and drink impure,</b> but <b>the scapegoat does not transmit impurity</b> at all, <b>as it is</b> still <b>alive</b> when it leaves the Temple, <b>and a living being does not render food and drink impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara comments. <b>Granted, according to Rabbi Meir</b> there is no difficulty, as his opinion is <b>in accordance with</b> that <b>which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states that seeds can contract impurity from the carcass of a creeping animal only if they first come in contact with water: “And if any part of their carcass fall <b>upon any sowing seed</b> which is to be sown, it is pure. But if water be put upon the seed, and any part of their carcass fall thereon, it is impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38).",
            "<b>Just as</b> is the case for <b>seeds, which,</b> like any food, <b>can never contract impurity severe</b> enough to transmit it to human beings, <b>and they need</b> exposure to liquid to be <b>rendered susceptible</b> to their less severe level of impurity, <b>so too, all</b> items <b>that can never contract impurity severe</b> enough to transmit it to human beings <b>need</b> exposure to liquid to be <b>rendered susceptible</b> to their less severe level of impurity and to transmit it. This serves to <b>exclude the carcass of a kosher bird, which can contract impurity severe</b> enough to be transmitted to a human being who swallows it, <b>and</b> therefore <b>does not need</b> to be <b>rendered susceptible</b> to ritual impurity in order to transmit ritual impurity. According to this <i>baraita</i>, bulls that are burned, a red heifer, and a scapegoat, which are all sources of impurity for human beings, are able to transmit impurity to food and drink on their own, even if they have not been exposed to liquid and have not come in contact with any source of impurity. Rabbi Meir’s opinion accords with this principle.",
            "<b>But for</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who disagree with Rabbi Meir and say that a scapegoat does not transmit impurity to food and drink, this is difficult. <b>If they accept</b> that <b>which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught,</b> then <b>even the scapegoat</b> should transmit impurity to food and drink. And <b>if they do not accept</b> that statement, then <b>from where do we</b> derive that <b>even</b> a red <b>heifer and bulls</b> that are burned transmit impurity to food and drink?",
            "<b>When Rav Dimi came</b> to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he <b>said:</b> The Sages <b>in the West,</b> Eretz Yisrael, <b>say:</b> The opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir is that bulls that are burned and a red heifer <b>need</b> to <b>contract impurity from somewhere else</b> to be able to transmit impurity to foods. Since the scapegoat cannot contract impurity, as it is alive, it cannot transmit impurity.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma:</b> With regard to <b>bulls and goats that are burned, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to <b>whether they can transmit impurity to food and drink inside</b> the Temple courtyard, before they leave, <b>as</b> they do <b>outside</b> afterward? Is an offering <b>that has not yet left</b> the Temple <b>considered as</b> if it were an item for which a necessary <b>action has not yet</b> been performed, i.e., because it has not yet become a source of impurity to those who carry it, it also does not transmit impurity to food without being rendered susceptible by coming into contact with a liquid and then coming into contact with a source of impurity? <b>Or</b> perhaps <b>no,</b> because the offering will become a source of impurity to those who carry it once it leaves the Temple courtyard, it already transmits impurity to food without being rendered susceptible.",
            "<b>After</b> Rabbi Elazar <b>raised the dilemma, he then resolved it:</b> An offering <b>that has not yet left is considered as</b> if it were an item for which a necessary <b>action has not yet</b> been performed, and it does not transmit impurity to food without being rendered susceptible.",
            "§ <b>Rabbi Abba bar Shmuel posed</b> another <b>dilemma to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:</b> Food transmits impurity to other food or drink only if it is the volume of at least one egg-bulk and it is first rendered susceptible to impurity. The carcass of a kosher bird transmits impurity to a person who swallows it even if it is of the volume of at least one olive-bulk, and even if it has not been rendered susceptible to impurity. <b>According to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir,</b> that the carcass of a kosher bird transmits impurity to other food without first being rendered susceptible to impurity, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> as to the requisite measure? Does <b>the carcass of a kosher bird transmit impurity</b> to food even if it is of the volume of <b>an olive-bulk,</b> as it would to a person?",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>Do not raise the dilemma</b> in a case <b>where</b> the carcass <b>lies on the ground,</b> as in that case it certainly must be of the volume of an egg-bulk, like any other impure food. And <b>do not raise the dilemma</b> in a case <b>where</b> a person <b>holds</b> the bird’s flesh <b>in his mouth,</b> as it may be swallowed and transmit impurity to him even if it is of the volume of only an olive-bulk; in this case it certainly transmits impurity to food in the same measure. <b>When you raise the dilemma,</b> raise it in a case <b>where he holds</b> the bird’s flesh <b>in his hand.</b> When the flesh <b>has not yet been brought close</b> to being swallowed, is it <b>considered</b> to be <b>like</b> an item for which a necessary <b>action has not yet</b> been performed, in which case it is considered a normal food and must be of the volume of an egg-bulk, <b>or</b> perhaps <b>not?</b>",
            "<b>After</b> Abba bar Shmuel <b>raised the dilemma, he then resolved it:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "Even if the carcass of a kosher bird <b>has not yet been brought close</b> to being swallowed, it is still <b>not considered as</b> if a necessary <b>action has not yet</b> been performed, and an olive-bulk is sufficient to transmit impurity to food and drink.",
            "Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba <b>raised an objection to</b> Rabbi Abba bar Shmuel, based on a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 1:1): <b>Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them:</b> In order to be susceptible to impurity as a food, it <b>requires</b> a person’s <b>intention</b> that it be eaten; <b>and it does not need</b> to be <b>rendered susceptible</b> to such impurity by contact with liquid; <b>and it transmits ritual impurity of food in</b> the amount of <b>an egg-bulk.</b> In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? <b>What, is it not</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir?</b> If so, he holds that an egg-bulk of a carcass of a kosher bird is necessary to transmit impurity.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>No,</b> the mishna <b>is</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But the first clause</b> of that mishna <b>teaches:</b> In order to be susceptible to impurity as a food, it <b>requires</b> a person’s <b>intention</b> that it be eaten <b>and it does not need</b> to be <b>rendered susceptible</b> by contact with liquid. <b>And</b> from <b>whom do you learn this reasoning?</b> From <b>Rabbi Meir,</b> as was taught in the <i>baraita</i> (105a). <b>And since the first clause</b> is the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir,</b> it follows that <b>the latter clause</b> is <b>also</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Are the cases comparable?</b> Must both clauses be the opinion of the same <i>tanna</i>? <b>This</b> case is <b>as it is, and that</b> case is <b>as it is.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> one can still infer this <b>from</b> the fact <b>that the latter clause</b> of that mishna <b>teaches: The slaughter or the pinching</b> of the nape <b>of</b> a bird offering <b>purifies it from its impurity,</b> i.e., prevents it from assuming the impure status of a carcass, even if it is found to <b>have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>].</b> And from <b>whom did you learn this reasoning?</b> From <b>Rabbi Meir</b> (see 67a). Could it be that <b>the first clause and the last clause</b> represent the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir, and the middle clause</b> represents the opinion of <b>the Rabbis?</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Yes, the first clause and the last clause</b> represent the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir, and the middle clause</b> represents the opinion of <b>the Rabbis.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rav Hamnuna said to Rabbi Zeira: Do not sit down until you tell me</b> the resolution of <b>this matter:</b> In general, when a food touches a primary source of ritual impurity after having been rendered susceptible to impurity by contact with a liquid, it contracts first-degree impurity. If it then touches another food, it imparts to it second-degree impurity. <b>The carcass of a kosher bird, according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Meir,</b> transmits impurity to food without being rendered susceptible. Does one <b>count its first and second</b> degrees of impurity when it touches food or drink, treating it like a primary source of impurity? <b>Or</b> perhaps one <b>does not count first and second</b> degrees of impurity, but rather treats it as a food with first-degree impurity, which imparts second-degree impurity?",
            "Rabbi Zeira <b>said to him: Wherever</b> an item <b>can render a person impure through contact,</b> it is considered a primary source of impurity, and one <b>counts its first and second</b> degrees of impurity. And <b>wherever it cannot render a person impure through contact,</b> one <b>does not count its first and second</b> degrees of impurity. Since the carcass of a kosher bird does not render a person impure through contact, but only by being swallowed, it is treated as a food with first-degree impurity.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira posed a dilemma to Rabbi Ami bar Ḥiyya, and some say to Rabbi Avin bar Kahana</b> concerning <b>that which we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 8:8): <b>Connections between foods by liquid,</b> i.e., liquids in contact with two foods, a situation that causes the impurity of one food to be transmitted to the other and their sizes to be combined toward the minimum measure for transmitting impurity, are considered <b>a connection for</b> the <b>lenient impurity</b> of foods, <b>but</b> are <b>not</b> considered <b>a connection for impurity severe</b> enough to be transmitted to a human being. If two pieces of animal carcass are connected by a liquid, they do not combine to form the minimum measure for transmitting their impurity to a person, but they can transmit impurity to food.",
            "Rabbi Zeira asks: If these two pieces of animal carcass come in contact with food, does one <b>count its first and second</b> degrees of impurity and treat the pieces as a primary source of impurity, such that the food will impart second-degree impurity to other food? <b>Or</b> does one <b>not count its first and second</b> degrees of impurity, and treat the animal carcass as food with first-degree impurity?",
            "Rabbi Zeira <b>said to him: Wherever</b> an item <b>can render a person impure,</b> one <b>counts its first and second</b> degrees of impurity. And wherever it <b>cannot render a person impure,</b> one <b>does not count its first and second</b> degrees of impurity. Since the pieces of carcass cannot transmit their impurity to a person, they are treated as food with first-degree impurity.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: When both <b>these</b> priests <b>and those</b> priests <b>emerged,</b> all of their garments were rendered ritually impure. The Gemara explains: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>As the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat that are burned on Yom Kippur: “They shall be carried forth outside the camp” (Leviticus 16:27). <b>There,</b> elsewhere, the verse <b>states</b> that such bulls and goats are burned <b>outside three camps,</b> those of the Tabernacle, the Levites, and the Israelites, whereas <b>here,</b> the verse states only that they are taken outside <b>one camp,</b> i.e., the Tabernacle. This serves <b>to tell you: Once</b> the offering <b>emerges beyond one camp,</b> one who carries it <b>renders</b> his <b>garments impure,</b> as the next verse states: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28).",
            "The Gemara explains further: <b>And from where do we</b> derive <b>that</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>itself,</b> that the bulls and goats are burned outside the three camps? <b>As the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: It is stated about the bull brought as a sin offering of the High Priest: <b>“Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp</b> unto a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it” (Leviticus 4:12), meaning that he should take it <b>outside</b> the <b>three camps. Do you say</b> that he takes it <b>outside</b> the <b>three camps, or</b> is he required to take it outside <b>only one camp?</b>",
            "<b>When</b> the verse <b>states with regard to the bull</b> brought as <b>a communal</b> sin offering: “He shall carry the bull <b>outside the camp,</b> and burn it as he burned the first bull” (Leviticus 4:21), it requires explanation, <b>as there is no need</b> for the verse <b>to state</b> “outside the camp,” <b>since it is already stated</b> at the end of that same verse: <b>“And burn it as he burned the first bull,”</b> which indicates that all the <i>halakhot</i> of the bull brought as a sin offering of a High Priest apply to the bull brought as a communal sin offering. What then does the verse mean when it states “outside the camp”? <b>To give it a second camp,</b> i.e., it indicates that it must be removed not only from the camp of the Divine Presence, corresponding to the Temple, but also from the Levite camp, corresponding to the Temple Mount.",
            "And <b>when</b> another verse <b>states with regard to</b> the removal of <b>the ash:</b> “And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry forth the ashes <b>outside the camp</b> to a pure place” (Leviticus 6:4), that verse also requires an explanation, <b>as there is no need</b> for the verse <b>to state</b> this, <b>since it is already stated</b> with regard to the bull brought as a sin offering of a High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp to a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it on wood with fire; <b>where the ashes are poured out shall it be burned”</b> (Leviticus 4:12). The repetition of “outside the camp” indicates that he is required <b>to give it a third camp,</b> i.e., teaching that it is burned when outside the Israelite camp, corresponding to the land outside the walls of Jerusalem.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And what does Rabbi Shimon do with this</b> phrase, stated with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: <b>“Outside the camp”</b> (Leviticus 16:27), given that he holds that the garments do not become impure until the offering is burning? The Gemara answers: <b>He requires it for</b> that <b>which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here: “Outside the camp,” and it is stated there,</b> with regard to the red heifer: “He shall bring it <b>outside the camp”</b> (Numbers 19:3). <b>Just as here,</b> the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned <b>outside three camps, so too there,</b> the red heifer is burned <b>outside three camps. And just as there,</b> the red heifer is burned <b>east of Jerusalem,</b> since it must be burned “toward the front of the Tent of Meeting” (Numbers 19:4), opposite the entrance of the Temple, which is to its east,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>so too here,</b> the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned <b>east of Jerusalem.</b>",
            "<b>But according to the Rabbis,</b> then, <b>where</b> outside Jerusalem <b>do they burn them?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Where are</b> the bulls and goats <b>burned?</b> They are burned <b>north of Jerusalem, outside of</b> the <b>three camps. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: They are burned on the place of the ashes,</b> where the ashes from the altar were poured.",
            "<b>Rava said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to bulls that are burned: <b>“Where the ashes are poured out [<i>shefekh hadeshen</i>] shall it be burned”</b> (Leviticus 4:12). This teaches <b>that ashes must be there</b> already when the bulls are burned. <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:</b> This verse teaches <b>that its place should slope [<i>meshupakh</i>]</b> downward so that ashes from the burning will slide downhill.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rava: <b>Perhaps they disagree</b> only <b>about</b> whether <b>the place must slope,</b> but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agrees that it must be the place where the ashes from the altar were deposited.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28). This teaches that only <b>the one who burns</b> them <b>renders</b> his <b>garments impure, but the one who kindles the fire does not render</b> his <b>garments impure, and the one who sets up the arrangement</b> of wood <b>does not render</b> his <b>garments impure. And who is</b> considered <b>the one who burns? One who assists at the</b> actual <b>time of burning.</b>",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that this priest <b>renders</b> his <b>garments impure even after</b> the bull and goat <b>become ash.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “And he who burns <b>them”</b> (Leviticus 16:28), teaching that <b>they,</b> the whole bull and goat, <b>render garments impure, but they do not render garments impure once they become ash. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The word “them” teaches that <b>they render garments impure,</b> but once <b>the flesh is incinerated they do not render garments impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the difference <b>between</b> the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? <b>Rava said:</b> The difference <b>between them is when he turned it into a charred</b> mass, and the form of the animal has become distorted, but has not actually become ash. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that at this stage the offering still transmits impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>One who slaughters</b> an offering outside the Temple courtyard <b>and one who offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the Temple courtyard is <b>liable for the slaughter and liable for</b> the <b>offering up,</b> as each act involves an independent prohibition. If done intentionally, he is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>] for each act, and if done unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:</b> If <b>he slaughtered</b> an offering <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard, he is liable. But if <b>he slaughtered</b> it <b>outside,</b> thereby rendering it unfit, <b>and</b> then <b>he offered</b> it <b>up outside,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> for the offering up, <b>as he offered up only an item</b> that is <b>unfit,</b> and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> According to your reasoning, <b>even</b> in a case where <b>he slaughters</b> it <b>inside and offers</b> it <b>up outside,</b> he should be exempt, <b>since</b> the moment <b>that he took it outside</b> the courtyard, he thereby <b>rendered it unfit.</b> Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.",
            "<b>One who is ritually impure who ate</b> sacrificial food, <b>whether</b> it was <b>ritually impure sacrificial</b> food <b>or ritually pure sacrificial</b> food, is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> if he did so intentionally and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure</b> person <b>who ate pure</b> sacrificial food is <b>liable. But an impure</b> person <b>who ate impure</b> sacrificial food is <b>exempt, as he merely ate an impure item,</b> and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> According to your logic, this <i>halakha</i> would apply <b>even</b> in a case of <b>an impure</b> person <b>who ate</b> what had been <b>pure</b> sacrificial food, because <b>once he touched it, he</b> thereby <b>rendered it ritually impure.</b> Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.",
            "<b>And a pure</b> person <b>who ate impure</b> sacrificial food is <b>exempt, as</b> one is <b>liable</b> for eating sacrificial food in impurity <b>only due to</b> the <b>impurity of</b> one’s <b>body,</b> but not due to the impurity of the food.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if one both slaughters and offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable for each act, as they are independent prohibitions. The Gemara asks: <b>Granted</b> that one is liable for the <b>offering up,</b> as the <b>punishment</b> for this act <b>is written</b> in the Torah <b>and</b> the <b>prohibition</b> concerning this act <b>is</b> also <b>written</b> in the Torah. The <b>punishment</b> is <b>as it is written:</b> “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, <b>and will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,</b> to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The <b>prohibition</b> is <b>as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings</b> in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13). <b>And</b> this is <b>in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says</b> that <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated</b> in the Torah: <b>Observe,</b> or: <b>Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition.</b> Accordingly, the verse in Deuteronomy is understood as issuing a prohibition.",
            "<b>But</b> for the <b>slaughtering,</b> why is one liable? <b>Granted</b> that the <b>punishment</b> is stated in the Torah, <b>as it is written:</b> “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, <b>and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,</b> to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). <b>But from where do we</b> derive its <b>prohibition?</b> One is liable only in a case where the Torah specifies both the prohibition and the punishment. The Gemara answers: <b>The verse states</b> in the continuation of that passage: <b>“And they shall not slaughter anymore</b> their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i> after whom they go astray” (Leviticus 17:7).",
            "The Gemara questions the use of this verse as a source: But <b>this</b> verse is <b>necessary for</b> the purpose of expounding <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Elazar, as he says: From where</b> is it derived with regard to <b>one who slaughters an animal</b> as an offering <b>to Mercury,</b> a pagan deity, <b>that he is liable</b> even though this is not the established manner in which that deity is worshipped? <b>As it is written:</b> “And <b>they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings</b> to the <i>se’irim</i>.” <b>If</b> the verse <b>is not</b> needed to teach the <b>matter of</b> worshipping a deity <b>in accordance with its established manner,</b> as it is already taught that one is liable for this, <b>as it is written:</b> “Take heed to yourself…lest you inquire after their gods, saying: <b>How do these</b> nations <b>serve</b> their gods, so too will I do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), then <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of</b> worshipping a deity in a way <b>that</b> is <b>not in accordance with its established manner.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba said:</b> Both <i>halakhot</i> can be derived from the same verse. <b>Read into</b> the verse as though it stops after the phrase: <b>“And they shall not slaughter”</b> (Leviticus 17:7), and relates to the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, which was mentioned in the previous verses. <b>And</b> also <b>read into</b> the verse as relating to the verse’s continuation: <b>And not anymore</b> their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i>, which serves as the source for the prohibition against sacrificing offerings to false deities.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But the verse is <b>still necessary for</b> the purpose of expounding <b>that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). <b>Until this point,</b> the verse is <b>speaking about sacrificial</b> animals <b>that one consecrated during a period when the prohibition against</b> sacrificing on private <b>altars</b> was in effect, i.e., after the Tabernacle was erected, <b>and</b> then he also <b>sacrificed them during a period when the prohibition against</b> sacrificing on private <b>altars</b> was in effect."
        ],
        [
            "This is apparent, <b>as the punishment for</b> sacrificing <b>them is stated</b> in this verse: <b>“And</b> he did not bring it <b>to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,</b> to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people.” The <b>prohibition</b> is also explicit, <b>as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings</b> in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13).",
            "<b>From that</b> point <b>onward,</b> the verse is speaking <b>about sacrificial</b> animals <b>that one consecrated during a period when</b> there was <b>permission</b> to sacrifice offerings on private <b>altars,</b> i.e., before the Tabernacle was erected, <b>and</b> then <b>he sacrificed them</b> outside the Tabernacle <b>during a period when the prohibition against</b> sacrificing on private <b>altars</b> was in effect.",
            "This is apparent, <b>as it is stated: “In order that the children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices, which they slaughter</b> upon the open field, that they shall bring them to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:5). The phrase “their sacrifices, which they slaughter” is interpreted as referring to <b>offerings that I have previously permitted for you</b> to slaughter on private altars. This verse teaches that those offerings may now be sacrificed only inside the Tabernacle. The phrase <b>“upon the open field” tells you</b> that in the case of <b>one who slaughters</b> an offering on a private altar <b>during a period when the prohibition against</b> sacrificing on private <b>altars</b> is in effect, even if he sacrifices the offering to God, <b>the verse ascribes him</b> blame <b>as if he sacrificed</b> it <b>upon the open field</b> in idolatrous worship.",
            "The verse continues: <b>“That they shall bring them to the Lord.” This</b> is <b>a positive mitzva</b> to sacrifice in the Tabernacle even offerings that were consecrated before the Tabernacle was erected. <b>From where</b> is it derived that there is <b>a prohibition</b> against sacrificing them outside the Tabernacle? <b>The verse states: “And they shall not slaughter anymore</b> their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i> after whom they go astray; this shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7).",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that sacrificing these offerings outside the Tabernacle <b>would be punishable</b> by <b><i>karet</i>,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings consecrated after the Tabernacle was erected. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “This shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations”</b> (Leviticus 17:7). One can infer from this verse that <b>this,</b> the punishment for transgressing a positive mitzva and a prohibition, applies <b>to them, but no other</b> punishment applies <b>to them.</b> It is clear from this <i>baraita</i> that the verse “And they shall not slaughter anymore” is used to teach about the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Tabernacle those offerings that were consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, and not those offerings that were consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars.",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Avin says:</b> The prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple is derived through <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as in a case</b> in <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment</b> for a certain action, it nevertheless <b>prohibited</b> it, as is the case with regard to sacrificing outside the Temple an offering consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, so too, in <b>a case</b> in <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did prescribe punishment</b> for a certain action, as is the case with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple an offering consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars, <b>is it not logical that</b> the Torah <b>prohibited</b> the action?",
            "<b>Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If so,</b> that whenever the Torah states a punishment for a certain action, there is no need for it to state the prohibition, then <b>let</b> the Torah <b>not state a prohibition with regard to</b> eating forbidden <b>fat</b> of a kosher animal, <b>and</b> then <b>derive</b> the fact that it is prohibited through <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the prohibition against eating <b>an unslaughtered animal carcass: Just as</b> with regard to <b>a carcass,</b> even though the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment</b> for consuming it, it nevertheless <b>prohibited</b> consuming it, so too, with regard to animal <b>fat,</b> for <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that</b> the Torah <b>prohibited</b> its consumption?",
            "Rav Ashi <b>came before Rava</b> and <b>said to him:</b> The prohibition against eating animal fat <b>can also not be derived from</b> the prohibition of <b>a carcass, as</b> the <i>a fortiori</i> inference <b>can be refuted</b> as follows: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about a carcass?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> it <b>renders</b> other items <b>ritually impure</b> through contact with it. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency. The existence of a unique stringency undermines the possibility of using an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.",
            "Rav Ashi raises the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from various other prohibitions that, like forbidden fat, do not carry the stringency of being punishable by <i>karet</i>, and Rava rejects each one. Can one derive the prohibition against eating forbidden fat <b>from</b> the prohibition against eating carcasses of <b>ritually impure creeping animals</b> (see Leviticus 11:41)? One cannot, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about ritually impure creeping animals?</b> They are notable in <b>that they render</b> other items <b>ritually impure though</b> contact with <b>any amount</b> of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.",
            "Can one derive it <b>from</b> the prohibition against eating the carcasses of <b>ritually pure creeping animals</b> (see Leviticus 11:41), which do not have the capacity to render other items ritually impure? One cannot, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about ritually pure creeping animals?</b> They are notable in <b>that</b> with regard to <b>their prohibition</b> there is liability <b>for</b> consuming <b>any amount</b> of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency, as one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of it.",
            "Can one derive it <b>from</b> the prohibition against eating <b>the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>] or</b> from the prohibition against eating <b>diverse kinds in a vineyard,</b> for which one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of them, just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about <i>orla</i> and diverse kinds in a vineyard?</b> They are notable <b>in that they are items from which</b> deriving <b>benefit is prohibited.</b> Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.",
            "Can one derive it <b>from</b> the prohibition against eating <b>Sabbatical</b> Year produce, from which benefit is permitted just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as <b>what</b> is notable <b>about Sabbatical</b> Year produce? It is notable <b>in that it transfers</b> its sanctity to the <b>money</b> with which <b>it</b> is purchased. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.",
            "Can one derive it <b>from</b> the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of <b>the portion of the produce that is designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>]?</b> One cannot, <b>as</b> in the case of <i>teruma</i> there are <b>no</b> circumstances in which <b>its general prohibition was permitted.</b> The prohibition concerning <i>teruma</i> applies broadly, unlike in the case of forbidden fat, where the prohibition applies only to the fat of domesticated animals but not to the fat of undomesticated animals. Rava notes that the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat <b>from all of those</b> prohibitions can <b>also</b> be refuted based on this claim, <b>as</b> in those cases, too, there are <b>no</b> circumstances in which <b>their general prohibition was permitted.</b>",
            "<b>Rava said: If</b> there is <b>a difficulty for me</b> in accepting Rabbi Avin’s claim that the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, <b>this</b> is <b>difficult for me: That which we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Karetot</i> 2a), which enumerates the thirty-six cases for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The end of that mishna lists: One who neglects sacrificing the <b>Paschal offering and</b> one who does not undergo <b>circumcision,</b> which are <b>positive mitzvot,</b> unlike the other cases enumerated in the mishna, which are all prohibitions.",
            "Rava explains his difficulty: If Rabbi Avin is correct, <b>derive</b> that there is a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision <b>via an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the case of <b>one who leaves over</b> sacrificial meat beyond the allotted period for its consumption (see Leviticus 22:30): <b>Just as</b> in the case of <b>one who leaves over</b> sacrificial meat, <b>where</b> the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment</b> but nevertheless <b>prohibited</b> this act, so too, with regard to neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision, for <b>which</b> the Torah <b>did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that</b> the Torah actually <b>prohibited</b> neglecting them as well?",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said: I stated this</b> very <b>discussion before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: One cannot derive</b> a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering <b>from</b> the case of <b>one who leaves over</b> sacrificial meat via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, <b>as it can be refuted: What</b> is notable <b>about one who leaves over</b> sacrificial meat? He is notable <b>in that there is no remedy</b> once the prohibition has been violated. <b>Shall you say</b> the same about the neglect of the <b>Paschal offering,</b> for which <b>there is a remedy?</b> One who fails to bring it on the first <i>Pesaḥ</i> must bring it on the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>.",
            "The Gemara challenges the very premise of Rabbi Avin’s claim: <b>But can one</b> derive that the Torah <b>prohibits</b> an action <b>via</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference? Even the one who says</b> that the court <b>administers punishment</b> based <b>on</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference</b> concedes that <b>one does not</b> derive <b>a prohibition from</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference.</b> Therefore, Rabbi Avin’s claim is refuted.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard can be derived <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says:</b> It is <b>derived</b> from the prohibition against offering up outside the Temple through a verbal analogy between the reference to <b>bringing</b> stated with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple, and the reference to <b>bringing</b> stated with regard to offering up outside the Temple.",
            "With regard to slaughtering, it is stated: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and with regard to offering up, it is stated: “That offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The verbal analogy teaches that <b>just as there,</b> with regard to offering up, the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment</b> for an action <b>unless</b> it also explicitly <b>prohibited</b> the action, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to slaughtering, the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment unless it</b> also <b>prohibited</b> it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rava said:</b> The prohibition can be derived <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says:</b> It is <b>derived</b> from the verse: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word <b>“there”</b> in the first part of the verse to the word <b>“there”</b> in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that <b>just as there,</b> with regard to offering up, the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment unless</b> it also <b>prohibited</b> it, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to slaughtering, the Torah <b>did not prescribe punishment unless</b> it also <b>prohibited</b> it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.",
            "§ The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The Gemara asks: <b>We have found</b> that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be <b>burned inside</b> the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, <b>which</b> one then <b>offered up outside</b> the courtyard. The verse states: “He will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. <b>From where</b> is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be <b>burned outside</b> the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, <b>that</b> one then <b>offered up outside?</b>",
            "<b>Rav Kahana said:</b> The beginning of that <b>verse states: “And to them [<i>va’alehem</i>] you shall say”</b> (Leviticus 17:8). The term “<i>alehem</i>,” to them, written with the letter <i>alef</i>, is phonetically similar to the term <i>alehem</i>, about them, written with the letter <i>ayin</i>. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: <b>About that which is</b> written in the <b>adjacent</b> passage <b>you shall say.</b> The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.",
            "<b>Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? “And to them” is written,</b> and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. <b>Rather,</b> liability in this case is derived <b>as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:</b> The opening phrase: <b>“And to them you shall say,”</b> starts with the conjunction “and” <b>to mix</b> the <b>passages</b> of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said:</b> Liability in this case <b>is derived</b> through a verbal analogy between the reference to <b>bringing</b> stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to <b>bringing</b> stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that <b>just as there,</b> with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be <b>burned outside</b> the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, <b>so too here,</b> with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be <b>burned outside</b> the Temple, having been slaughtered there.",
            "<b>Rav Beivai objects to</b> these suggestions: But what about <b>that which we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Karetot</i> 2a): There are <b>thirty-six</b> cases <b>in the Torah</b> for which one is liable to receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b> The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, <b>there are thirty-seven, as there is</b> one case of <b>one who offers up</b> an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, <b>and</b> the other case of <b>one who offers up</b> an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is <b>difficult.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. <b>And</b> concerning <b>that which we learned</b> in a mishna (110a): <b>One who sprinkles part of</b> the <b>blood</b> of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, is <b>liable; from where do we</b> derive this? The <i>tanna</i> <b>derives it from that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: <b>“Blood shall be imputed</b> to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). This serves <b>to include</b> liability for <b>one who sprinkles</b> sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> It is derived from the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering <b>or sacrifice”</b> (Leviticus 17:8). The term “or” serves <b>to include</b> liability for <b>one who sprinkles</b> blood outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this</b> term “or” in “a burnt offering <b>or sacrifice”?</b> It serves <b>to divide</b> them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Akiva, from where does he</b> derive the <i>halakha</i> <b>to divide</b> them into two cases? <b>He derives it from</b> the next verse: “And <b>he will not bring it</b> to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:9). The term “it” is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.",
            "<b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yishmael,</b> why does he not derive that <i>halakha</i> from the term “it”? The Gemara answers: According to him, <b>that</b> term <b>is necessary</b> as the source for the <i>halakha</i> that one <b>is liable for</b> offering up <b>a complete</b> animal, <b>but</b> one <b>is not liable for</b> offering up <b>an incomplete</b> animal. The term “it” indicates an animal in its entirety. <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Akiva, he derives</b> this <b>from</b> the repetition of “it” in the continuation of the verse: “He will not bring it…<b>to sacrifice it</b> to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9).",
            "<b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yishmael,</b> how does he explain the repetition of “it”? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: <b>One</b> is referring <b>to</b> offerings that are fit to be <b>burned inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>that became incomplete and were</b> then <b>offered up outside. And</b> the other <b>one</b> is referring <b>to</b> offerings that are unfit and so will be <b>burned outside</b> the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, <b>that became incomplete and were offered up outside.</b> In both cases one is exempt. <b>And so it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yishmael says:</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be <b>burned inside</b> the Temple courtyard and <b>that became incomplete and were</b> instead <b>offered up outside,</b> one would be <b>liable.</b> To dispel this notion, <b>the verse states: “To sacrifice it,”</b> which indicates that <b>for</b> offering up <b>a complete</b> animal one is <b>liable, but</b> one is <b>not liable for an incomplete</b> animal.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Akiva,</b> who has already expounded both mentions of “it,” disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is <b>liable</b> for offerings that are fit to be <b>burned inside that became incomplete and were</b> instead <b>offered up outside.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse “Blood shall be imputed to that man.” The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this</b> verse: <b>“Blood shall be imputed</b> to that man”? He expounds it <b>to include</b> liability for the <b>slaughter of a bird</b> offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yishmael, he derives</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>from: “Or that slaughters</b> it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).",
            "<b>And Rabbi Akiva</b> could have <b>said to you</b> that he does not derive it from <b>that</b> verse, as he holds that it is <b>necessary to</b> teach that only <b>one who slaughters</b> a bird offering outside <b>is liable, but</b> one is <b>not liable for pinching its nape</b> outside. <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yishmael,</b> from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? <b>He derives it from</b> the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: <b>“This is the matter”</b> (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.",
            "Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel <b>that slaughters</b> an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse <b>I have</b> derived liability <b>only</b> for one who <b>slaughters an animal</b> offering outside; <b>from where do we</b> derive that one is liable if he <b>slaughtered a bird</b> offering outside? <b>The verse states: “Or that slaughters,”</b> to include liability for slaughtering a bird.",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>even one who pinches</b> the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. <b>And</b> there <b>is a logical inference</b> to support this: <b>If</b> with regard to the <b>slaughter</b> of a bird offering, <b>which is not</b> the valid <b>method of preparation inside</b> the Temple, one is nevertheless <b>liable</b> if he did it outside, then with regard to <b>pinching</b> the nape of a bird offering, <b>which is</b> the valid <b>method of preparation inside</b> the Temple, <b>is it not logical that</b> one <b>is liable</b> if he did it outside? To counter this, <b>the verse states: “This is the matter”</b> (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Akiva</b> could have <b>said to you</b> that he does not derive it from <b>that</b> verse, as he holds that it is <b>necessary for</b> expounding as part of <b>a verbal analogy</b> with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: “This is the matter that the Lord has commanded” (Numbers 30:2).",
            "§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. <b>And</b> concerning <b>that which we learned</b> in a mishna (112b): <b>One who takes a handful</b> from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, <b>and one who collects</b> the <b>blood</b> of an offering in a vessel <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is <b>exempt; from where do we</b> derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: <b>But from where would</b> it <b>be derived that</b> one is <b>liable</b> for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?",
            "The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest <b>deriving</b> it <b>through</b> a comparison to <b>slaughtering</b> outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about slaughtering?</b> It is notable <b>in that with regard to a Paschal offering,</b> if one slaughters it with the intent that it be <b>for</b> the sake of <b>those who cannot eat</b> it, it is thereby <b>disqualified.</b> The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.",
            "And if you suggest <b>deriving</b> it <b>through</b> a comparison to <b>sprinkling</b> blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about sprinkling?</b> It is notable <b>in that a non-priest</b> who sprinkles blood in the Temple is <b>liable</b> to be punished with <b>death</b> at the hand of Heaven <b>for</b> this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency."
        ],
        [
            "Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Gemara suggests: <b>Derive</b> it <b>through</b> a comparison to <b>the common element</b> shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.",
            "The Gemara rejects this: <b>If</b> that were <b>so,</b> and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then <b>let</b> the Torah <b>not state</b> that one is liable <b>for sprinkling</b> blood outside the Temple, <b>and</b> instead <b>derive</b> it <b>from the common element</b> shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.",
            "The derivation would be as follows: <b>And</b> if you suggest <b>deriving</b> liability for sprinkling <b>from</b> the liability for <b>slaughtering,</b> that could be refuted. <b>What</b> is notable <b>about slaughtering?</b> It is notable <b>in that, with regard to a Paschal offering,</b> if one slaughters it with the intent that it be <b>for the sake of those who cannot eat,</b> it is thereby <b>disqualified.</b> Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest <b>deriving</b> liability for sprinkling <b>from</b> the liability for <b>offering up,</b> that could also be refuted. <b>What</b> is notable <b>about offering up?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> liability for offering up also <b>exists with regard to a meal offering.</b> Sprinkling does not share this stringency. <b>But</b> it should still be possible to <b>derive</b> liability for sprinkling <b>from the common element</b> shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.",
            "The Gemara explains: It is <b>for this</b> very reason that <b>a verse is written</b> to teach the liability for sprinkling outside the Temple, <b>to say</b> to you <b>that</b> liability for performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple <b>cannot be derived from the common element</b> shared by two other cases; rather, it must be directly derived from a verse. Accordingly, the Gemara has demonstrated that there is no basis to have assumed that one who takes a handful from a meal offering, or collects blood, outside the Temple is liable.",
            "§ The Gemara cited a dispute concerning the source for the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it is derived from the verse in the passage about slaughtering outside the Temple: “Blood shall be imputed to that man” (Leviticus 17:4). According to Rabbi Akiva, it is derived from the verse in the passage about offering up outside the Temple: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). <b>Rabbi Abbahu says:</b> One who <b>slaughtered</b> an offering <b>and sprinkled</b> its blood outside the Temple in a single lapse of awareness, <b>according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael,</b> is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>one</b> sin offering, as liability for each transgression is derived from the same passage and they are subcategories of the same prohibition. <b>According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva,</b> one is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>two</b> sin offerings, as the liability for each transgression is derived from a different passage and they are considered independent prohibitions.",
            "<b>Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>only one</b> sin offering, <b>as the verse states</b> with regard to performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple courtyard: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and <b>there you shall do</b> all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). Since the first part of the verse makes reference to offering up, by inference, the term “you shall do” in the second part must be referring to all the other sacrificial rites. Therefore, <b>the verse has regarded all of</b> the sacrificial rites apart from offering up as <b>one rite</b> with regard to the prohibition against performing them outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "Rabbi Abbahu also said: One who <b>sprinkled</b> the blood of an offering <b>and offered</b> it <b>up</b> outside, in a single lapse of awareness, <b>according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael</b> is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>two</b> sin offerings. <b>According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>only one</b> sin offering.",
            "<b>Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva</b> he is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>two</b> sin offerings, as it is <b>for this</b> reason that <b>the verse differentiated</b> between the offering up and the slaughtering, as it states: <b>“There you shall offer up</b> your burnt offerings, <b>and there you shall do,”</b> in order to teach that one who performs both is liable for each one.",
            "Finally, Rabbi Abbahu adds the logical conclusion that with regard to one who <b>slaughtered</b> an offering <b>and sprinkled</b> its blood <b>and offered</b> it <b>up</b> outside, in a single lapse of awareness, <b>all agree</b> that he is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>two</b> sin offerings.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). Based on the first part of the verse: “That slaughters…<b>in the camp,”</b> one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south</b> of the courtyard, instead of in the north, where it should be slaughtered, <b>will be liable,</b> as he has slaughtered it outside the area in which it should be slaughtered. To counter this, <b>the</b> next part of the <b>verse states:</b> “That slaughters it <b>outside the camp,”</b> indicating that liability is incurred only for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: Three concentric areas, so-called camps, arranged according to decreasing level of sanctity, encompassed the Tabernacle and Temple: The camp of the Divine Presence comprised the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and later on, of the Temple. Surrounding that was the Levite camp and then the Israelite camp. If the verse had stated only: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” one <b>might</b> have thought that a person would be liable only for slaughtering an offering <b>outside</b> all <b>three</b> of the <b>camps.</b> To dispel this notion, the first part of <b>the verse states:</b> “That slaughters an ox, or lamb, <b>or goat, in the camp,”</b> which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside these camps. <b>From where</b> is it derived that one is liable <b>even</b> if he slaughters <b>inside the Levite camp? The verse states:</b> “That slaughters…<b>in the camp,”</b> which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside the three camps.",
            "<b>If</b> the verse stated only the term <b>“in the camp,”</b> which indicates that one is liable even for slaughtering inside the three camps, one <b>might</b> have thought that <b>one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south</b> of the courtyard, which is regarded as being outside of the holier northern section of the courtyard, where such an offering should be slaughtered, <b>will</b> also <b>be liable.</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states: “Or</b> that slaughters it <b>outside the camp.”</b>",
            "This indicates that <b>just as</b> the phrase <b>“outside the camp”</b> is <b>distinctive</b> in that it is referring to an area <b>that is not fit for slaughtering offerings</b> of the most sacred order <b>or for slaughtering any</b> other type of <b>offering,</b> so too, the term “in the camp” is referring to an area unfit for the slaughter of any offering. This <b>excludes</b> the <b>south</b> of the courtyard, <b>as even though</b> it is an area that is <b>not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order,</b> it is <b>fit for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity.</b> Therefore, no liability is incurred for slaughtering an offering in the south of the courtyard, even if it should have been slaughtered in the north.",
            "Based on this <i>baraita</i>, <b>Ulla says: One who slaughters</b> an offering <b>on the roof of</b> the <b>Sanctuary</b> is <b>liable</b> for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, <b>since</b> the roof is an area that is <b>not fit for the slaughter of any offering. Rava objects to this: If so, let the verse write</b> only: “Or that slaughters it <b>outside the camp,” and</b> it would <b>not</b> be <b>necessary</b> to write: “And he did not bring it <b>to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 17:4). <b>Why do I</b> need the verse to also write: “And he did not bring it <b>to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”?</b> Is it <b>not to exclude the roof of</b> the Sanctuary, as in the Temple the Sanctuary corresponded to the Tent of Meeting? Although the roof is an area that is not fit for slaughtering any offering, one should not be liable for slaughtering there since the offering was nevertheless brought to the Tent of Meeting.",
            "The Gemara questions Rava’s claim: <b>But according to Rava, if</b> that is <b>so</b> and one is exempt if he slaughtered on the roof of the Sanctuary as ultimately the offering was brought to the Tent of Meeting, then <b>let</b> the verse <b>write</b> only: <b>“And</b> he did not bring it <b>to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” Why do I</b> need the verse to also write <b>“in the camp”</b> and <b>“outside the camp”?</b> Is it <b>not</b> that the term “in the camp” indicates that there is a case where one is liable even when slaughtering inside the courtyard, which serves <b>to include</b> liability for slaughtering on <b>the roof of</b> the Sanctuary? According to this, the term “outside the camp” would then be necessary to exclude liability for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard.",
            "<b>Rav Mari said</b> in defense of Rava: No, the term “in the camp” is written <b>to include</b> liability for slaughtering an offering in a case where <b>its</b> body is <b>entirely inside</b> the courtyard <b>but its neck</b> is <b>outside</b> the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara modifies Rav Mari’s statement: If <b>its neck</b> is <b>outside</b> the courtyard, it is <b>obvious</b> that one is liable, as <b>about what</b> is <b>the Merciful One particular?</b> The Merciful One is particular <b>about</b> the <b>slaughter. And</b> in this case, the <b>slaughter is</b> done <b>outside</b> the courtyard. <b>Rather,</b> say instead that the term “in the camp” is written <b>to include</b> liability for slaughtering an offering where <b>its</b> body is <b>entirely outside</b> the courtyard <b>but its neck</b> is <b>inside</b> the courtyard.",
            "§ An amoraic dispute <b>was stated</b> with regard to <b>one who offers up</b> an offering outside the courtyard <b>today,</b> when there is no Temple: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> He is <b>liable. Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that he is <b>liable,</b> as he holds that the <b>initial consecration</b> of the Temple <b>sanctified</b> it <b>for its time and sanctified</b> it <b>forever,</b> and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed. Accordingly, it is still possible now to build an altar there and bring offerings upon it; therefore, one is liable if he instead offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard area. <b>Reish Lakish says</b> that he is <b>exempt,</b> as he holds that the <b>initial consecration</b> of the Temple <b>sanctified</b> it <b>for its time but did not sanctify</b> it <b>forever.</b> Accordingly, one can no longer bring offerings there; therefore, one is not liable for offering up outside that area.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish <b>disagree with regard to</b> the issue that is the subject of <b>the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 8:6): <b>Rabbi Eliezer said:</b> I heard that <b>when they were building the Sanctuary</b> in the Second Temple, <b>they would fashion</b> temporary <b>curtains for the Sanctuary</b> and temporary <b>curtains for the courtyards</b> to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was <b>only that in the Sanctuary,</b> the workers <b>built</b> the walls <b>outside</b> the curtains, without entering, <b>and in the courtyards,</b> the workers <b>built</b> the walls <b>within</b> the curtains.",
            "The mishna continues: <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that one sacrifices</b> offerings on the altar <b>even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order</b> in the Temple courtyard <b>even if there are no curtains, and</b> one partakes of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe</b> produce in Jerusalem <b>even if there is no wall</b> surrounding the city. This is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> the <b>initial consecration sanctified</b> the Temple and Jerusalem <b>for their time and</b> also <b>sanctified</b> them <b>forever.</b>",
            "The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one <b>not</b> learn <b>by inference</b> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer maintains</b> that <b>it did not sanctify</b> them forever? The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish would then directly parallel the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer.",
            "<b>Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where</b> do you draw this inference? <b>Perhaps everyone</b> maintains that the <b>initial consecration sanctified</b> the Temple and Jerusalem <b>for their time and</b> also <b>sanctified</b> them <b>forever. And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>stated that</b> tradition, <b>which he heard</b> from his teachers, <b>and</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yehoshua, <b>stated that</b> tradition, <b>which he heard</b> from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. <b>And if you would say: Why do I</b> need <b>curtains</b> at all <b>according to Rabbi Eliezer?</b> The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area as well. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established <b>merely for seclusion,</b> as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to have been visible to all.",
            "§ An amoraic dispute <b>was stated</b> with regard to <b>one who offers up</b> outside the Temple a limb of an offering <b>and</b> it <b>does not have</b> on it <b>an olive-bulk</b> of flesh, <b>but</b> the <b>bone completes</b> the measure <b>to</b> make <b>an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> He is <b>liable. Reish Lakish says:</b> He is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that he is <b>liable,</b> as he holds that an item <b>attached to</b> flesh that must be <b>offered up</b> on the altar, e.g., a bone attached to sacrificial flesh, is also regarded <b>as</b> an item that must be <b>offered up</b> on the altar. Even though if it were to become detached, there would be no requirement to offer it up, nevertheless, as long as it is attached it is considered part of the flesh and it contributes to the required measure of an olive-bulk. <b>Reish Lakish says</b> that he is <b>exempt,</b> as he holds that an item <b>attached to</b> flesh that must be <b>offered up</b> on the altar is <b>not</b> regarded <b>as</b> an item that must be <b>offered up</b> on the altar.",
            "<b>Rava raises a dilemma:</b> With regard to <b>one who offers up</b> outside the Temple courtyard"
        ],
        [
            "the <b>head of a pigeon</b> burnt offering <b>that does not have</b> on it <b>an olive-bulk</b> of flesh, <b>but</b> the <b>salt</b> that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), <b>completes</b> the measure <b>to</b> make <b>an olive-bulk, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is one liable for offering it up outside?",
            "<b>Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not</b> identical to <b>the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish</b> with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. <b>The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> Perhaps <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan states</b> his opinion <b>only there,</b> with regard to <b>a bone,</b> claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk <b>as it is</b> of <b>the</b> same <b>kind that flesh</b> is, i.e., they are both animal parts. <b>But</b> in the case of <b>salt, which is not</b> of <b>the</b> same <b>kind as a pigeon,</b> perhaps it would <b>not</b> contribute to the measure. And <b>the dilemma can</b> also <b>be raised according to Reish Lakish:</b> Perhaps <b>Reish Lakish states</b> his opinion <b>only there,</b> with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, <b>as if</b> the bone <b>separates from</b> the flesh, there is <b>no mitzva to offer</b> the bone <b>up</b> on the altar. <b>But here,</b> with regard to salt, concerning <b>which if it separates</b> from the pigeon there is <b>a mitzva to offer</b> it <b>up,</b> he would <b>not</b> rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. <b>Or perhaps</b> there <b>is no difference</b> between the cases.",
            "The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:</b> If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.",
            "While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>responded</b> to this challenge <b>on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What</b> is notable <b>about slaughtering</b> an offering <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offering</b> it <b>up outside?</b> It is notable in <b>that</b> the offering <b>had a period of fitness. Can you say</b> the same <b>about slaughtering</b> an offering <b>outside and</b> then <b>offering</b> it <b>up outside, where</b> the offering <b>never had a period of fitness?</b> It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded</b> to this challenge <b>on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What</b> is notable <b>about slaughtering</b> an offering <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offering</b> it <b>up outside?</b> It is notable <b>in that</b> even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the <b>sanctity</b> of the altar <b>renders</b> the offering <b>acceptable</b> and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). <b>Can you say</b> the same <b>about slaughtering</b> an offering <b>outside</b> and then offering it up outside, <b>where</b> the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the <b>sanctity</b> of the altar <b>does not render</b> the offering <b>acceptable?</b> Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the practical difference <b>between these</b> two responses? <b>Ze’eiri said:</b> The practical difference <b>between them is</b> a case of <b>slaughtering</b> an offering <b>at night</b> inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.",
            "<b>Rabba said:</b> The practical difference <b>between them is</b> a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the <b>collection</b> of the blood was done there <b>in a non-sacred vessel</b> and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: One who is <b>ritually impure who ate</b> sacrificial food, <b>whether</b> it was ritually impure <b>sacrificial</b> food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive <i>karet</i> if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili;</b> why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?",
            "<b>Rava said</b> in elaboration of the dispute: <b>Wherever</b> one is first <b>rendered impure</b> with <b>impurity of the body and</b> then <b>afterward</b> the sacrificial <b>meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that</b> he is <b>liable</b> if he eats the meat. This is <b>because</b> the prohibition due to the <b>impurity of</b> one’s <b>body,</b> which carries the punishment <b>of <i>karet</i>,</b> took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.",
            "<b>When they disagree</b> is in a case where first the <b>meat is rendered impure and</b> then <b>afterward the</b> person’s <b>body is rendered impure.</b> In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.",
            "Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, <b>as the Rabbis hold</b> that <b>we say</b> that <b>since</b> the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one’s body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. <b>And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says</b> that <b>we do not say</b> that <b>since</b> it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> even according to <b>Rabbi Yosei</b> HaGelili, <b>granted that we do not say</b> that <b>since</b> it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the <b>impurity of</b> a person’s <b>body, which</b> is <b>a more stringent</b> prohibition as it carries the punishment of <i>karet</i>, <b>should come and take effect upon</b> the prohibition due to the <b>ritual impurity</b> of the <b>meat</b> itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said: From where</b> is it apparent <b>that</b> the prohibition due to the <b>impurity of the</b> person’s <b>body is more stringent? Perhaps</b> the prohibition due to the <b>impurity of</b> the <b>meat is more stringent, as</b> impure meat <b>does not have</b> the possibility of <b>purification in a ritual bath,</b> whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person’s impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> There is <b>a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering</b> outside the Temple courtyard <b>than with regard to offering up</b> outside, <b>and</b> there is a greater stringency <b>with regard to offering up</b> outside <b>than with regard to slaughtering</b> outside.",
            "The mishna elaborates: The <b>greater stringency with regard to slaughtering</b> outside is <b>that one who slaughters</b> an offering outside the Temple courtyard even <b>for</b> the sake of <b>an ordinary</b> purpose, not for the sake of God, is <b>liable. But one who offers up</b> an offering outside the courtyard <b>for</b> the sake of <b>an ordinary</b> purpose is <b>exempt.</b> The <b>greater stringency with regard to offering up</b> outside is that <b>two</b> people <b>who grasped a knife and</b> together <b>slaughtered</b> an offering outside the courtyard are <b>exempt.</b> But if two <b>grasped a limb</b> from an offering <b>and</b> together <b>offered</b> it <b>up</b> outside, they are <b>liable.</b>",
            "If one unwittingly <b>offered up</b> part of an offering outside the courtyard <b>and then</b> in a different lapse of awareness <b>offered up</b> other parts of that offering <b>and then</b> again, in another lapse of awareness, <b>offered up</b> yet other parts, he is <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for each</b> act of <b>offering up;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says:</b> He is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>only one</b> sin offering.",
            "Rabbi Yosei adds: <b>And</b> one is <b>liable</b> for offering up an offering outside the courtyard <b>only once he offers</b> it <b>up at the top of an altar</b> that was erected there. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: Even</b> if <b>he offered</b> it <b>up on a rock or on a stone,</b> not an altar, he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara analyzes the first <i>halakha</i> of the mishna: <b>What is different</b> about <b>one who offers up</b> outside <b>for</b> the sake of <b>an ordinary</b> purpose, <b>that he is exempt? As it is written:</b> “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it <b>to the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But <b>with regard to slaughtering, isn’t it also written:</b> “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering <b>to the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 17:3–4)?",
            "The Gemara explains: It <b>is different there,</b> with regard to slaughtering, <b>as the verse states: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>]</b> of the house of Israel…that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>” teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But <b>also with regard to offering up it is written: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>]</b> of the house of Israel…that offers up a burnt offering” (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: <b>That</b> amplification <b>is necessary to</b> teach that <b>two people who offered up a limb</b> of an offering together outside the courtyard are <b>liable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, here too,</b> with regard to slaughtering, the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>” <b>should be</b> used <b>to</b> teach that <b>two</b> people <b>who grasped a knife and</b> together <b>slaughtered</b> an offering outside the courtyard are <b>liable,</b> contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: <b>It is different there,</b> with regard to slaughtering, <b>as the verse states:</b> “And <b>that</b> man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). The term “that man,” which is in the singular, indicates that only <b>one</b> who acts alone is liable, <b>but not two</b> who act together.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But <b>if so, also with regard to offering up, isn’t it written: “That</b> man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn’t that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: <b>That</b> term <b>is necessary</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>to exclude</b> from the liability for <i>karet</i> one whose violation was <b>unwitting,</b> or who was <b>compelled to act, or</b> who was <b>mistaken.</b> The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The Gemara challenges: <b>If so, here too,</b> with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is <b>necessary to exclude</b> one whose violation was <b>unwitting,</b> or who was <b>compelled to act, or</b> who was <b>mistaken.</b> How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?",
            "The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, <b>two</b> instances of the term <b>“that</b> man” <b>are written:</b> “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.",
            "The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>.” Accordingly, the Gemara asks: <b>But why do I</b> need the term <b>“to the Lord”?</b> The Gemara explains: It is written <b>to exclude</b> from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur <b>scapegoat</b> outside the courtyard.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: The <b>greater stringency</b> with regard to <b>offering up</b> outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.",
            "<b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>What</b> <i>halakha</i> is alluded to when <b>the verse states: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>]…</b>that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that <b>two people who grasped a limb</b> of an offering <b>and offered</b> it <b>up</b> together outside the courtyard are <b>liable.</b> It is necessary for the verse to teach this, <b>as</b> one <b>might</b> have thought to say: <b>Could this not be</b> derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference: If</b> with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, <b>one who slaughters for</b> the sake of <b>an ordinary</b> purpose is <b>liable,</b> and nevertheless, <b>two who grasped a knife and</b> together <b>slaughtered</b> an offering are <b>exempt,</b> then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where <b>one who offers up for</b> the sake of <b>an ordinary</b> purpose is <b>exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped</b> a limb and offered it up will also be <b>exempt?</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states “<i>ish ish</i>”</b> to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei says</b> that the <i>halakha</i> concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term <b>“that [<i>hahu</i>]</b> man” (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only <b>one</b> who acts alone is liable, <b>but not two</b> who act together. The <i>baraita</i> asks: <b>If so, what</b> <i>halakha</i> is alluded to when <b>the verse states “<i>ish ish</i>”?</b> The <i>baraita</i> explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term “<i>ish ish</i>” is that <b>the Torah spoke in the language of people,</b> and no <i>halakhot</i> are to be derived from it.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And Rabbi Shimon,</b> what does he derive from the term “that man”? The Gemara explains: <b>This</b> term: <b>“That</b> man,” <b>is necessary to exclude</b> from liability one whose violation was <b>unwitting,</b> or who was <b>compelled to act, or</b> who was <b>mistaken.</b> The Gemara notes: <b>And Rabbi Yosei</b> derives that <i>halakha</i> <b>from</b> the fact that the verse could have stated <b><i>hu</i></b> and instead stated <b>“<i>hahu</i>.”</b> The Hebrew word for: That, <i>hahu</i>, is formed of the definite article <i>ha</i> and the pronoun <i>hu</i>. <b>And Rabbi Shimon does not expound</b> any <i>halakhot</i> <b>from</b> the fact that the verse could have stated <b><i>hu</i></b> and instead stated <b>“<i>hahu</i>.”</b> He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> as for <b>Rabbi Yosei, from</b> the fact <b>that</b> he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase <b>“<i>ish ish</i>”</b> written with regard to offering up, as he holds that <b>the Torah spoke in the language of people,</b> then <b>also</b> with regard to <b>that</b> phrase: <b>“Any man [<i>ish ish</i>]”</b> (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that <b>the Torah spoke in the language of people,</b> he should not derive any <i>halakhot</i> from it. <b>But</b> if so, <b>from where</b> does he derive <b>that one who slaughters</b> outside <b>for</b> the sake of <b>an ordinary</b> purpose is <b>liable?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>He derives it from</b> the verse: <b>“Blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood”</b> (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that <b>even one who slaughters for</b> the sake of an ordinary <b>man</b> is liable.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly <b>offered up</b> part of an offering outside the courtyard <b>and then</b> in a different lapse of awareness <b>offered up</b> other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.",
            "The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> The <b>dispute</b> in the mishna <b>concerns four or five limbs</b> that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. <b>As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yosei, <b>holds: When it is written: “To sacrifice it”</b> (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the <i>halakha</i> that <b>for</b> offering up <b>a complete</b> item one is <b>liable but</b> that one is <b>not liable for</b> offering up <b>an incomplete</b> item, <b>it is written with regard to a whole animal.</b> Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. <b>And</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Shimon, <b>holds</b> that that verse <b>is written with regard to each and every limb</b> of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. <b>But</b> with regard to the offering up of <b>one limb</b> in parts, <b>everyone agrees</b> that a person is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>only one</b> sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The <b>dispute</b> in the mishna <b>concerns one limb</b> from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. <b>As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Shimon, <b>holds</b> that for offerings <b>that are</b> fit to be <b>burned inside</b> the Temple, <b>that became incomplete and were</b> instead <b>offered up outside</b> the Temple, one is <b>liable.</b> Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. <b>And</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yosei, <b>holds</b> that one is <b>exempt</b> for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. <b>But with regard to</b> offering up <b>four or five limbs, everyone agrees</b> that one is <b>liable for each and every limb,</b> as they understand that the phrase “to sacrifice it” is written with regard to each and every limb.",
            "<b>And</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>disagrees</b> with the opinion <b>of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone</b> in the mishna <b>concedes with regard to</b> offerings <b>that are</b> fit to be <b>burned inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>that became incomplete and were</b> instead <b>offered up outside</b> the courtyard, <b>that</b> one is <b>liable. They disagree only with regard to</b> offerings that, having been slaughtered outside <b>are</b> unfit and so will be <b>burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yosei, <b>holds</b> that one is <b>exempt, and</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Shimon, <b>holds</b> that one is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> there is a different version of Ulla’s statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yoḥanan. <b>Ulla says: Everyone</b> in the mishna <b>concedes with regard to</b> offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple <b>are</b> unfit and so will be <b>burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to</b> offerings <b>that are</b> fit to be <b>burned inside that became incomplete and were</b> instead <b>offered up outside. As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yosei, <b>holds</b> that one is <b>exempt, and</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Shimon, <b>holds</b> that one is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> the statement <b>of Shmuel’s father disagrees with the first version of Ulla’s</b> statement, <b>as Shmuel’s father says: In accordance with whose</b> opinion <b>do we restore</b> limbs <b>that were dislodged</b> from upon the altar <b>to the altar? In accordance with whose</b> opinion? It is <b>not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yosei</b> recorded in the mishna. Shmuel’s father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla’s opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: <b>And</b> one is <b>liable</b> for offering up an offering outside the courtyard <b>only once he offers</b> it <b>up</b> upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. <b>Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord,</b> and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord”</b> (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.",
            "The Gemara explains how each <i>tanna</i> interprets the verse that supports the other. <b>But also</b> according to <b>the other</b> opinion, Rabbi Shimon’s, <b>isn’t it written: “And</b> Noah <b>built an altar to the Lord”?</b> How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> verse is referring <b>merely</b> to <b>an elevated place</b> and not specifically to an altar. <b>But also</b> according to <b>the other</b> opinion, Rabbi Yosei’s, <b>isn’t it written: “And Manoah took</b>…and offered it up upon the rock”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in <b>that</b> case <b>was a provisional edict</b> issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative <i>halakha</i> from it.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> instead that <b>the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> that the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the <b>altar</b> of the Lord <b>at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, <b>but</b> a specifically erected <b>altar is not</b> required in order to offer up <b>on</b> a private <b>altar</b> during periods when it is permitted to do so. <b>Therefore, one who offered up</b> outside the courtyard <b>on a rock or on a stone</b> is <b>liable.</b>",
            "The Gemara questions the formulation of the <i>baraita</i>: If the <i>baraita</i> was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it <b>should have</b> concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: <b>This</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>is saying:</b> Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, <b>therefore, during a period when</b> the use of private <b>altars is prohibited,</b> one who <b>offers up</b> outside <b>on a rock or on a stone</b> is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a dilemma:</b> Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the <b>corner,</b> the <b>ramp</b> leading to the altar, the <b>base</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> the <b>square shape. What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>whether they are</b> also <b>indispensable for</b> the validity of a private <b>altar</b> during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The <b>corner,</b> the <b>ramp,</b> the <b>base, and</b> the <b>square shape are</b> all <b>indispensable for</b> the validity of <b>a great</b> public <b>altar, but they are not indispensable for</b> the validity of <b>a small</b> private <b>altar.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>both fit sacrificial</b> animals, <b>and unfit sacrificial</b> animals <b>whose disqualification occurred in sanctity,</b> i.e., in the course of the Temple service, <b>and one sacrificed them outside</b> the Temple courtyard, he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>One who offers up outside</b> the courtyard <b>an olive-bulk</b> made up <b>of</b> the flesh of <b>a burnt offering and of</b> its <b>sacrificial portions</b> is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to offering up outside the courtyard: <b>“That offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice,</b> and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:8–9). From the term “burnt offering” <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that one is liable for offering up <b>a burnt offering,</b> which is burned entirely on the altar. <b>From where</b> do I derive <b>to include</b> that one is liable for offering up outside the courtyard <b>the sacrificial portions of a guilt offering, the sacrificial portions of a sin offering, the sacrificial portions of offerings of the most sacred order, or the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “Sacrifice,”</b> which includes the sacrificial portions of all other offerings that are to be burned on the altar.",
            "<b>From where</b> is it derived <b>to include</b> that one is liable for offering up outside the courtyard <b>the handful</b> taken from a meal offering; <b>the frankincense</b> that was to be offered with it; <b>the incense,</b> which was offered each day in the Sanctuary; <b>the meal offering of priests; the meal offering of the anointed priest,</b> i.e., the High Priest, which he offered daily; <b>and</b> to include as liable <b>one who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of wine,</b> which is the volume of the smallest wine libation used in the Temple; <b>or</b> one who pours as a libation <b>three <i>log</i> of water</b> that was consecrated to be used as a libation during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? <b>The verse states: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that with regard to <b>any</b> offering that is fit to be <b>brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting</b> to be offered there upon the altar, one is <b>liable for</b> offering it up <b>outside</b> the courtyard.",
            "<b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that one is liable for offering up <b>fit offerings; from where</b> do I derive <b>to</b> also <b>include</b> liability for <b>unfit</b> offerings whose disqualification occurred in sanctity?",
            "<b>For example:</b> Sacrificial meat <b>that was left overnight, or</b> an offering <b>that went outside</b> the courtyard, <b>or</b> an offering <b>that</b> is <b>impure, or</b> an offering <b>that was slaughtered</b> with intent to consume it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> an offering <b>that an unfit</b> person <b>collected and sprinkled its blood, or</b> if <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed above</b> the red line encircling the altar <b>below</b> it, <b>or</b> if <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed below</b> the red line <b>above</b> it, <b>or</b> if <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed inside</b> the Sanctuary <b>outside</b> on the external altar, <b>or</b> if <b>one placed</b> the blood <b>that is</b> to be <b>placed outside</b> the Sanctuary <b>inside</b> it, <b>or a Paschal offering or sin offering whose</b> blood <b>was placed not for their sake?</b>",
            "Since the disqualification of these offerings occurred in sanctity, if they were to be, albeit unlawfully, placed upon the altar, the altar would render them acceptable such that they should not be removed from upon it. <b>From where</b> is it derived to also include liability for these unfit offerings? <b>The verse states:</b> “And <b>he will not bring it</b> to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, <b>to sacrifice</b> it to the Lord,” which indicates that with regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that is</b> rendered <b>acceptable</b> upon the altar <b>at</b> the <b>entrance of the Tent of Meeting,</b> even if it should not have been brought there <i>ab initio</i>, one is <b>liable for</b> offering <b>it</b> up <b>outside</b> the courtyard.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>One who offers up outside</b> the courtyard <b>an olive-bulk</b> made up <b>of</b> the flesh of <b>a burnt offering</b> and of its sacrificial portions is liable. The Gemara infers: The mishna states that for an olive-bulk combined of the flesh of <b>a burnt offering and</b> of <b>its sacrificial portions, yes,</b> one is liable. By inference, for an olive-bulk combined of the meat of <b>a peace offering and</b> of <b>its sacrificial portions,</b> one is <b>not</b> liable, because its meat is eaten, not burned on the altar.",
            "<b>We learn</b> in the mishna <b>that which the Sages taught</b> explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Me’ila</i> 1:28): The flesh of <b>a burnt offering and its sacrificial portions combine to</b> form the minimum measure of <b>an olive-bulk</b> to render one liable <b>for offering them up outside</b> the courtyard, <b>and to render</b> one <b>liable for</b> eating <b>them due to <i>piggul</i>,</b> i.e., if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent of sacrificing the offering after its designated time; <b><i>notar</i>,</b> i.e., if its flesh remained after the period in which it was permitted to sacrifice it; <b>or</b> for eating them while he was <b>ritually impure.</b> This <i>baraita</i>, too, states that only the flesh and sacrificial portions of a burnt offering combine. This indicates that the meat and sacrificial portions of a peace offering do not combine.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted,</b> with regard to <b>offering up</b> outside the courtyard, it is logical that for <b>a burnt offering, which is</b> entirely <b>consumed</b> upon the altar, that <b>yes,</b> everything will combine, and that for <b>peace offerings,</b> whose meat is not burned on the altar, the meat and sacrificial portions will <b>not</b> combine. <b>But</b> with regard to liability for <b><i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and</b> eating while <b>ritually impure, what is the reason</b> that the <i>baraita</i> differentiates between a burnt offering and a peace offering?",
            "The Gemara compounds its questions: <b>And didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 15a): <b>Anything that is <i>piggul</i> combines</b> together, <b>and anything that is <i>notar</i> combines</b> together, to form the measure of an olive-bulk to render one liable? The mishna indicates that this <i>halakha</i> applies to all types of offerings. Accordingly, the Gemara notes: The ruling about <b><i>piggul</i></b> in the <i>baraita</i> is <b>difficult,</b> as it is contradicted <b>by</b> the ruling about <b><i>piggul</i></b> in the mishna, and the ruling about <b><i>notar</i></b> in the <i>baraita</i> is <b>difficult,</b> as it is contradicted <b>by</b> the ruling about <b><i>notar</i></b> in the mishna.",
            "The Gemara resolves the difficulties: That the ruling about <b><i>piggul</i></b> in the <i>baraita</i> is contradicted <b>by</b> the ruling about <b><i>piggul</i></b> in the mishna is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the mishna, the ruling that they combine <b>concerns</b> liability for eating <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> whereas <b>there,</b> in the <i>baraita</i>, the ruling that only the parts of a burnt offering combine <b>concerns <i>piggul</i> intention.</b> An offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> only if one intends to eat an olive-bulk of it after the designated time for eating it or to sacrifice an olive-bulk of it after the designated time for sacrificing it. The <i>baraita</i> rules that for a burnt offering, if one has such intention for both half an olive-bulk of its meat and half an olive-bulk of its sacrificial portions, that is sufficient for the entire offering to be rendered <i>piggul</i>. For a peace offering, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> only if one has such intention about an olive-bulk comprised only of meat or only of sacrificial portions.",
            "The Gemara resolves the second difficulty: That the ruling about <b><i>notar</i></b> in the <i>baraita</i> is contradicted <b>by</b> the ruling about <b><i>notar</i></b> in the mishna is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the mishna, the ruling that they combine <b>concerns</b> liability for eating <b><i>notar</i>,</b> whereas <b>there,</b> in the <i>baraita</i>, the ruling that only the parts of a burnt offering combine <b>concerns</b> a case in <b>which</b> only an olive-bulk combined of both the flesh and the sacrificial portions <b>remained</b> from the offering, the rest having been destroyed, <b>before</b> its <b>blood was sprinkled.</b> Blood may not be sprinkled unless an olive-bulk of the offering remains. And if the blood is not sprinkled, the offering will never be rendered <i>notar</i>. The <i>baraita</i> rules that in the case of a burnt offering, the different parts of it combine to form an olive-bulk to permit the sprinkling of the blood. This does not apply to a peace offering, for which an olive-bulk of only meat or of only sacrificial portions must remain in order to permit the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And whose</b> opinion is expressed by the <i>baraita</i>? <b>It is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehoshua, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> With regard to <b>all the offerings that</b> are mentioned <b>in the Torah from which there remains</b> only <b>an olive-bulk of meat,</b> the rest having been destroyed or rendered impure,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>or</b> from which there remains only <b>an olive-bulk of</b> sacrificial portions, e.g., <b>fat</b> to be burned on the altar, one still <b>sprinkles the blood</b> of the offering on the altar and one thereby fulfills his obligation.",
            "But if all that remains is <b>half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, one may not sprinkle the blood,</b> as since the meat and the sacrificial portions are used differently, the former being eaten and the latter being burned on the altar, they cannot combine to form the minimum requirement of an olive-bulk. This applies only to offerings whose meat is eaten. <b>But for a burnt offering,</b> even if all that remains is <b>half an olive-bulk of flesh and half an olive-bulk of fat, one sprinkles the blood, because</b> since the offering is <b>consumed</b> upon the altar <b>in its entirety,</b> all of its parts combine together. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>a meal offering, even if all of it</b> still <b>exists, one does not sprinkle</b> the blood. It is apparent that Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion in this <i>baraita</i> is the one expressed in the <i>baraita</i>.",
            "The Gemara clarifies the final clause of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>What is the relevance of a meal offering</b> to the sprinkling of blood? In a meal offering there is no blood at all. <b>Rav Pappa said:</b> The <i>baraita</i> is referring to <b>a meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations that accompany</b> an animal <b>offering.</b> If the entire body of the offering was destroyed but the meal offering that accompanied it remains, one might have thought that it would be sufficient to allow for the sprinkling of the blood. The <i>baraita</i> teaches that this is incorrect.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the handful</b> of a meal offering, <b>the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of</b> the <b>anointed priest, and the meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings, in a case <b>where one sacrificed</b> even <b>an olive-bulk from</b> any <b>one of these,</b> which should be sacrificed on the altar, <b>outside</b> the Temple, he is <b>liable,</b> as the burning of an olive-bulk is considered a proper burning. <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> him <b>exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of</b> any one of these items outside the Temple. <b>But</b> Rabbi Eliezer concedes that with regard to <b>any of them that one sacrificed inside</b> the courtyard <b>but left over an olive-bulk from them and</b> then <b>sacrificed that</b> olive-bulk <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> with regard to <b>any of these</b> offerings <b>that were lacking any amount,</b> if <b>one sacrifices it outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "<b>One who sacrifices sacrificial</b> meat, which is eaten, <b>and sacrificial portions,</b> i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, <b>outside</b> the courtyard, is <b>liable</b> for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions. But he is not liable for sacrificing the meat.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Each morning and afternoon, a <i>peras</i>, i.e., half a <i>maneh</i>, of incense must be burned in the Sanctuary. Nevertheless, <b>one who burns</b> only <b>an olive-bulk</b> of incense <b>outside</b> the courtyard is <b>liable.</b> If one burns <b>half a <i>peras</i> inside</b> the Temple, he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "The Gemara addresses the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>It enters our mind</b> to explain: <b>What</b> is meant by: He is <b>exempt?</b> It means that <b>a non-priest,</b> for whom it is prohibited to perform the sacrificial rites in the Temple, is <b>exempt</b> if he burns incense inside the Temple. The Gemara rejects this: <b>Why</b> should he be exempt; this <b>is</b> an act of <b>sacrificial burning?</b> Even though he burned less than a <i>peras</i>, it is apparent from the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> that burning even an olive-bulk is considered an act of sacrificial burning.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said</b> that <b>Rav Ḥisda said</b> that <b>Rav Yirmeya, son of Abba, said</b> that <b>Rav said: What</b> is meant by: He is <b>exempt?</b> It means that if a priest burns half a <i>peras</i> inside the Temple, the <b>community</b> is thereby <b>exempt</b> from its obligation to burn incense despite the fact that less than the required amount was burned.",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said: If</b> there is something <b>difficult for me</b> with regard to this <i>baraita</i>, <b>this</b> is <b>difficult for me: That which Rav said concerning</b> this <i>baraita</i>: <b>With regard to this</b> <i>halakha</i>, that if a priest burns less than a <i>peras</i> of incense the community fulfills its obligation, <b>even Rabbi Eliezer concedes.</b> Rabbi Zeira explains: This is difficult for me <b>as Rabbi Eliezer</b> rules in the mishna that one who burns an olive-bulk of incense outside is exempt. Effectively, he is <b>saying</b> that burning less than the required amount <b>is not</b> an act of <b>sacrificial burning.</b> How then can he hold that the community fulfills its obligation by the burning of less than a <i>peras</i>?",
            "<b>Rabba said: With regard to</b> the <b>burning of</b> incense designated to be burned in the <b>Sanctuary</b> upon the golden altar, <b>everyone,</b> i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, <b>agrees</b> that the Torah does not specify the amount to be burned; the requirement to burn a <i>peras</i> is rabbinic. Accordingly, the obligation is fulfilled even if only an olive-bulk of incense is burned there, as the <i>baraita</i> states, and one who burns an olive-bulk of that incense outside the Temple is liable.",
            "<b>When they disagree</b> in the mishna, it is <b>with regard to</b> the <b>burning of</b> incense in the <b>inner</b> sanctum, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur. Concerning that obligation, the verse states: “And he shall take…his handful of sweet incense, beaten small, and bring it within the Curtain” (Leviticus 16:12). <b>As</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that <b>“his handful”</b> indicates that <b>specifically</b> that measure must be burned in order to fulfill the obligation. Accordingly, he also holds that one who burns only an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is exempt. <b>And</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that <b>“his handful”</b> does <b>not</b> indicate that <b>specifically</b> that measure must be burned, and the obligation can be fulfilled even with a lesser amount. Accordingly, they also hold that one who burns even an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is liable.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rabba: <b>But when</b> the term <b>“statute” is written</b> with regard to the Yom Kippur Temple service (see Leviticus 16:29), <b>it is</b> also <b>written with regard to</b> the <b>burning of</b> incense in the <b>inner</b> sanctum. The term “statute” stated with regard to a rite indicates that it is valid only if performed precisely in accordance with all the details mentioned in the Torah concerning it. Accordingly, the term “his handful” must be specific.",
            "<b>Rather, Abaye said: With regard to</b> the <b>burning</b> of incense <b>in</b> the <b>inner</b> sanctum, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, <b>everyone agrees</b> that the obligation is only fulfilled if a handful of incense is burned. Also, everyone agrees with regard to burning incense in the Sanctuary that the obligation is fulfilled even with an olive-bulk, as the <i>baraita</i> states, and one who burns an olive-bulk of incense outside the Temple is liable.",
            "<b>When they disagree</b> in the mishna, it is <b>with regard to</b> the <b>burning of</b> incense of the Holy of Holies <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard. One <b>Sage,</b> the Rabbis, <b>holds</b> that <b>we derive</b> the measure for liability for incense of the <b>inner</b> sanctum <b>from</b> incense of the <b>outer</b> sanctum, i.e., the Sanctuary. Just as for the latter one is liable for an olive-bulk, so too, for the former one is liable for an olive-bulk. <b>And</b> the other <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that <b>we do not derive</b> one from the other. Rather, since the obligation inside the Holy of Holies is fulfilled only with a handful of incense, one is liable for burning that incense outside the Temple only if he burns that amount.",
            "<b>Rava said</b> in rejection of Abaye’s understanding: <b>Now,</b> if <b>the Rabbis do not derive</b> the measure for liability for offering up outside the Temple courtyard, with regard to other rites performed in the <b>outer</b> sanctum, <b>from</b> incense of the <b>outer</b> sanctum, is it <b>necessary</b> to question whether they would derive the measure for liability for incense of the <b>inner</b> sanctum <b>from</b> incense of the <b>outer</b> sanctum? Certainly, they would not.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the rite that Rava is referring to in his response to Abaye? It is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>one who offers up</b> outside the courtyard <b>less than an olive-bulk of</b> the <b>handful</b> taken from a meal offering <b>or less than an olive-bulk of</b> the <b>sacrificial portions, or who pours as a libation</b> outside the courtyard <b>less than three <i>log</i> of wine</b> or who pours as a libation on <i>Sukkot</i> <b>less than three <i>log</i> of water,</b> that <b>he would be liable.</b> To counter this, <b>the verse states:</b> “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, <b>to sacrifice</b> it” (Leviticus 17:9). The term “to sacrifice it” indicates that one is <b>liable for the</b> sacrifice of <b>a complete</b> offering outside the courtyard <b>but one is not liable for the</b> sacrifice of <b>an incomplete</b> offering outside.",
            "The Gemara explains Rava’s inference: <b>But</b> the <i>baraita</i> states that for a libation of <b>less than three <i>log</i></b> outside the courtyard one is exempt despite the fact <b>that</b> the libation still <b>contains a few olive-bulks. And</b> it is apparent then, that <b>the Rabbis do not derive</b> the measure for liability for the rite of libation that should be performed in the <b>outer</b> sanctum <b>from</b> incense that should be burned in the <b>outer</b> sanctum. Certainly then, they would not derive the measure for liability for incense of the inner sanctum from incense of the outer sanctum.",
            "<b>Rather, Rava said</b> to resolve Rabbi Zeira’s difficulty: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis agree with regard to the incense of the Sanctuary, that the Torah does not specify an amount to be burned, and the community fulfills its obligation even if only an olive-bulk is burned, as is taught in the <i>baraita</i>. When they disagree in the mishna, it is in a case <b>where, for example, one designated two half-<i>peras</i></b> portions of incense, in accordance with the rabbinic requirement to burn one <i>peras</i>,"
        ],
        [
            "by placing them <b>in a vessel.</b> One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Eliezer, <b>holds</b> that the <b>designation of</b> a measure of incense larger than an olive-bulk by placing it in <b>a vessel is</b> a significant <b>matter</b> that renders one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed there. Therefore, one who then burned only an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is exempt. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> the Rabbis, <b>holds</b> that it <b>is nothing</b> and does not render one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed in the vessel. Therefore, one who then burned an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is liable.",
            "<b>Rava said: Now, according to the one who says</b> that <b>designation</b> by placing in a <b>vessel is nothing,</b> if <b>one designated</b> in a vessel <b>six</b> <i>log</i> of wine <b>as</b> a libation to accompany the sacrificing of <b>a bull,</b> which is the required amount, <b>and</b> then <b>removed four</b> <i>log</i> <b>from</b> it <b>and brought those</b> four <i>log</i> as a libation <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he would be <b>liable, as</b> a libation of four <i>log</i> of wine is <b>fit for</b> the sacrificing of <b>a ram</b> (see Numbers 28:14).",
            "Similarly, if one <b>designated</b> by placing in a vessel <b>four</b> <i>log</i> of wine <b>for</b> a libation to accompany the sacrificing of <b>a ram and</b> then <b>removed three</b> <i>log</i> <b>of</b> wine from it <b>and brought those</b> three <i>log</i> as a libation <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he would be <b>liable, as</b> three <i>log</i> of wine is a <b>fit</b> libation <b>for</b> the sacrificing of <b>a lamb</b> (see Numbers 28:14).",
            "But if those three <i>log</i> <b>were lacking any amount, and one brought them</b> as a libation <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he would be <b>exempt</b> because less than three <i>log</i> of wine is never a fit libation.",
            "Rava inferred from the <i>baraita</i> that the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the pouring of a libation, from one performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the burning of incense. From that he concluded that the Rabbis would certainly not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the inner sanctum from a rite performed in the outer sanctum. This refuted Abaye’s claim that the Rabbis derive the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the inner sanctum from the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the outer sanctum. <b>Rav Ashi said</b> in defense of Abaye’s opinion: Indeed, as is indicated by the <i>baraita</i>, <b>the Rabbis do not derive</b> the measure for liability for <b>pouring a libation</b> outside the courtyard <b>from</b> the measure for liability for <b>burning</b> incense, which are two different rites performed in the outer sanctum.",
            "Rav Ashi continues: <b>Even though</b> the Rabbis <b>do not derive</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of a rite performed in the <b>outer</b> sanctum <b>from</b> a different rite performed in the <b>outer</b> sanctum, <b>they do derive</b> the measure for liability for <b>burning</b> the incense of the outer sanctum <b>from</b> the identical rite of <b>burning</b> of the incense of the inner sanctum, <b>even though</b> it involves deriving the <i>halakhot</i> of a rite performed in the <b>outer</b> sanctum <b>from</b> one performed in the <b>inner</b> sanctum.",
            "§ After enumerating various items that are burned entirely on the altar, the mishna states: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>any of these</b> offerings <b>that were lacking</b> any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt. Concerning this ruling, <b>a dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: Is <b>a lack that</b> occurs to an offering <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>considered a lack</b> in order to exempt one who sacrifices the remainder outside the courtyard? <b>Or</b> is it <b>not considered a lack?</b>",
            "<b>Do we say</b> that <b>once</b> an offering <b>emerges</b> from the courtyard <b>it is</b> in any event <b>disqualified,</b> and yet the Torah deems one liable for offering it there, so <b>what</b> difference is there <b>to me</b> if there is an additional disqualification of being <b>lacking</b> and <b>what</b> difference is there <b>to me</b> if it is still <b>complete? Or perhaps</b> it is only with regard to <b>emerging</b> from the courtyard, <b>where it is</b> still <b>in its original state,</b> that <b>yes,</b> one is liable despite the fact that it was disqualified by emerging from the courtyard, but where it is <b>not in its original state,</b> one would <b>not</b> be liable.",
            "<b>Abaye said: Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a resolution from the mishna: <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> him <b>exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of</b> any one of these items outside the Temple. It is apparent then that the offering must remain complete.",
            "<b>Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye:</b> Can the <b>Master resolve</b> the dilemma <b>from</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Eliezer?</b> The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, and hold that one is liable for sacrificing even an olive-bulk, and the dilemma was raised according to their opinion.",
            "Abaye <b>said to him: I heard explicitly from Rav</b> that <b>the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only where</b> the offering <b>is</b> still <b>in its original form,</b> i.e., complete. <b>But where</b> it is <b>lacking, they concede to him</b> that one is not liable. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Was Rav <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where it became lacking outside</b> the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even according to the Rabbis a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: <b>No,</b> he was referring to a case <b>where it became lacking inside</b> the courtyard. Accordingly, this mishna cannot serve as a proof.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a resolution from the continuation of the mishna: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>any of these</b> offerings <b>that were lacking</b> any amount, if <b>one sacrifices them outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>exempt.</b> The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Is the mishna <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where it became lacking outside</b> the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: <b>No,</b> it is referring to a case <b>where it became lacking inside</b> the courtyard. Accordingly, this cannot serve as a proof.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>One who sacrifices sacrificial</b> meat, which is eaten, and sacrificial portions, i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, outside the courtyard, is liable for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions, but not for the meat. The Gemara asks: <b>Why</b> is he liable? If the meat is placed directly on the altar’s fire and then the sacrificial portions are placed upon the meat, <b>isn’t there an interposition</b> between the altar and the sacrificial portions? Since if they were offered in the Temple in that manner, one would not have fulfilled the obligation, one should not be liable if he offers them up in this manner outside the Temple.",
            "<b>Shmuel said:</b> The mishna is referring to a case <b>where he turned them over</b> and the sacrificial portions lay directly on the altar’s fire.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said</b> there is another explanation: <b>You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the mishna is referring to a case <b>where they did not turn them over. And</b> in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? It <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says</b> (108a) that <b>even if one offered it up on a rock</b> he is <b>liable.</b> According to him, it is clear that in order for one to be liable, the mode of offering up performed outside the Temple does not need to entirely parallel the mode of offering up in the Temple.",
            "<b>Rav said</b> there is another explanation: Even in the Temple, burning the sacrificial meat and sacrificial portions in this manner would be valid as both items are from the same animal, and <b>a substance</b> in contact <b>with</b> the <b>same</b> type of <b>substance does not interpose.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If there is <b>a meal offering</b> from <b>which a handful was not removed, and one sacrificed it outside</b> the Temple courtyard, he is <b>exempt</b> from liability, because until the handful is actually removed it is not fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple. But if a priest <b>took a handful from it and</b> then <b>returned its handful into</b> the remainder of the meal offering, <b>and one sacrificed</b> the entire mixture <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable,</b> as once the handful has been removed it is fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple, and one is liable for offering it up outside even though it is mixed into the remainder.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks about the final clause: <b>But why</b> is he liable? <b>Let</b> the <b>remainder</b> of the meal offering, which is certainly the majority of the mixture, <b>nullify the handful.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Zeira said:</b> A term of <b>burning is stated with regard to the handful</b> removed from the meal offering, <b>and</b> a term of <b>burning is stated with regard to the remainder</b> of the meal offering. With regard to the handful, referred to by the Torah as “the memorial part,” it is written: “And the priest shall burn the memorial part upon the altar” (Leviticus 2:2), and with regard to the remainder of the meal offering it is written: “Do not burn it as a fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). This provides a verbal analogy that teaches that <b>just as</b> with regard to the <b>burning of</b> the <b>handful,</b> if two handfuls are mixed together one <b>handful does not nullify another, so too,</b> with regard to the <b>burning of</b> the <b>remainder,</b> if the remainder and the handful are mixed together, the <b>remainder does not nullify</b> the <b>handful.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the consumption of the remainder of the meal offering by the priests. With regard to <b>the handful and the frankincense,</b> in a case <b>where one sacrificed</b> only <b>one of them outside</b> the Temple courtyard, he is <b>liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts</b> from liability one who burns only one of them <b>until he</b> also <b>sacrifices the second.</b> Since the remainder of the meal offering becomes permitted only once both have been burned, he considers each one alone to be an incomplete offering, and he holds one is not liable for sacrificing only one of them. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed <b>one inside</b> the courtyard <b>and one outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "The burning of two bowls of frankincense permits the consumption of the shewbread. With regard to the <b>two bowls of frankincense,</b> in a case <b>where one sacrificed</b> only <b>one of them outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts</b> from liability one who burns only one of them <b>until he</b> also <b>sacrifices the second,</b> since the shewbread becomes permitted only once both bowls of frankincense are burned. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed <b>one inside</b> the courtyard <b>and one outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna is based on the fact that it is permitted for the priests to consume the remainder of the meal offering only once both the handful and the frankincense have been burned. With regard to this, <b>Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raises a dilemma:</b> If one burned the <b>handful</b> but not the frankincense, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>whether</b> this <b>will permit</b> the consumption of <b>the corresponding</b> half <b>of the remainder?</b> Since the burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the entire remainder, it seems that each one of them affects half of the remainder. Accordingly, it is unclear whether burning one of them will entirely <b>permit</b> half of the remainder, <b>or</b> whether it will merely <b>weaken</b> the prohibition concerning the remainder, and it will still be prohibited to eat any of it.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>In accordance with whose</b> opinion did Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raise this dilemma? <b>If</b> it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Meir, who says: One can render</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> by having <i>piggul</i> intention <b>during half</b> of two acts that together <b>permit</b> the offering for consumption, i.e., during either one of them, then it should be obvious that the offering of the handful alone should entirely <b>permit</b> half of the remainder. The fact that Rabbi Meir holds that intention during just one of the acts can render the offering <i>piggul</i> demonstrates that he holds that each act alone has the power to permit part of the offering. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to Rabbi Meir’s opinion.",
            "<b>If</b> it is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> by having <i>piggul</i> intention <b>during half</b> of two acts that together <b>permit</b> the offering for consumption; rather, one must have <i>piggul</i> intention during both acts, then it is evident that neither act alone has the power to affect the offering, and so the burning of the handful alone should <b>neither permit</b> any of the remainder <b>nor weaken</b> the prohibition that applies to it. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to the Rabbis’ opinion.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the dilemma was raised <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Eliezer</b> as taught in the mishna. Rabbi Eliezer rules that one who sacrifices outside only the handful or the frankincense is not liable. Evidently, he holds that neither of these alone can permit the consumption of the meal offering. The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well: <b>Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render</b> an offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> by having <i>piggul</i> intention <b>during half</b> of two acts that together <b>permit</b> the offering for consumption. Accordingly, he would hold that the offering of only the handful neither permits any of the remainder, nor weakens the prohibition concerning it, and it would not make sense to raise the dilemma according to him.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> it must be that the dilemma was raised <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of the Rabbis that</b> is taught <b>here</b> in the mishna. They hold that one is liable even for sacrificing outside only the handful or only the frankincense. Evidently, they hold that each one alone has the power to affect the status of the remainder. Accordingly, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa asked concerning a case where one of them is burned on the altar in the Temple, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Does it entirely <b>permit</b> half of the remainder, <b>or</b> does it <b>weaken</b> the prohibition concerning the entire remainder?",
            "The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>One who sprinkles part of</b> the <b>blood</b> of an offering, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four, <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard"
        ],
        [
            "is <b>liable. Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water</b> consecrated for the libation <b>of the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>during the Festival, outside</b> the courtyard, is <b>liable. Rabbi Neḥemya says:</b> For the <b>remainder of the blood</b> of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and <b>that</b> instead <b>one sacrificed outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rava says:</b> Rabbi Elazar generally holds that one is liable for sacrificing outside only when he sacrifices a complete offering, <b>but Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to</b> the sprinkling of the <b>blood</b> of an offering, that one is liable for sprinkling outside even part of the blood, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four. This is clearly the <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings whose blood is sprinkled on the external altar, as a single sprinkling renders such an offering valid (see 36b), and it can be regarded as a complete offering. Rabbi Elazar concedes that this is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to offerings whose blood is sprinkled on the inner altar, despite the fact that such offerings are valid only once all the sprinklings have been completed.",
            "The fact that Rabbi Elazar concedes this point is apparent from that <b>which is taught</b> in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 60a) with regard to the numerous sprinklings of blood performed in the Holy of Holies, upon the Curtain, and on the inner altar, as part of the Yom Kippur Temple service: If during the sprinklings the blood spills and it is necessary to bring the blood of a second animal in order to complete them, <b>Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: From the place that</b> the High Priest <b>stopped</b> sprinkling the blood of the first animal, there <b>he begins</b> to sprinkle the blood of the second animal; it is unnecessary to repeat any of the sprinklings that have already been performed. From this ruling it is apparent that each sprinkling is considered an independent and complete act of service, and one will be liable for even a single act of sprinkling done outside the Temple.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water</b> consecrated for the libation <b>of the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>during the Festival, outside</b> the courtyard, is liable. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Menaḥem Yodfa’a: Rabbi Elazar said that</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his teacher, who says: The water libation</b> on <i>Sukkot</i> is a mitzva <b>by Torah law. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Akiva says</b> concerning the verse: “Beside the daily burnt offering, its meal offering, <b>and its libations”</b> (Numbers 29:31), the fact that the Torah makes reference to “libations” in the plural indicates that <b>the verse is speaking of two</b> types of <b>libations. One</b> is <b>the water libation,</b> which is unique to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>; <b>and</b> the other <b>one</b> is <b>the wine libation,</b> which always accompanies the daily offering. If the water libation was not a mitzva by Torah law, one would not be liable for pouring it as a libation outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: If</b> Rabbi Elazar derives the mitzva of the water libation through the derivation taught by Rabbi Akiva, according to which both the wine libation and water libation are derived from the same word, then he should hold that <b>just as there,</b> with regard to wine, one is liable only if he pours <b>three <i>log</i>, so too here,</b> with regard to water, one should be liable only if he pours <b>three <i>log</i>. But</b> in the mishna, <b>Rabbi Elazar says</b> simply: <b>Water of the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i>, which seems to include any amount. Furthermore, he should hold that <b>just as</b> with regard to pouring a libation of wine outside the Temple, one is liable for pouring a libation <b>during the rest of the days of the year</b> and not only on <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>so too,</b> with regard to pouring a libation of water, one should be liable for pouring a libation <b>during the rest of the days of the year. But</b> in the mishna <b>Rabbi Elazar says</b> that one is liable only if he pours the water libation <b>during the Festival.</b> It is apparent that Rabbi Elazar derived the mitzva of the water libation from a different source.",
            "<b>That which Rabbi Asi says escaped him, as Rabbi Asi says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Neḥunya, a man of the valley of Beit Ḥortan:</b> The <i>halakha</i> of <b>ten saplings,</b> the practice of taking <b>a willow</b> in the Temple during <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>and</b> the obligation to perform <b>the water libation</b> during <i>Sukkot</i>, each of these is <b>a <i>halakha</i></b> transmitted <b>to Moses from Sinai.</b> According to Rabbi Asi, the mitzva of the water libation is not derived from the same source as the wine libation, and it is possible that there will be differences in the <i>halakhot</i> that apply to them.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of water during the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i> <b>outside</b> the courtyard is <b>liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If he filled</b> a service vessel with the three <i>log</i> in order to consecrate <b>them for the sake of</b> the <b>Festival,</b> he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the difference <b>between</b> these two opinions? <b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They disagree with regard to</b> whether <b>there is</b> a precise <b>measure of water</b> that can be consecrated as a libation. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that even if one fills a service vessel with more than three <i>log</i>, the water is thereby consecrated. Therefore, if one then pours at least three <i>log</i> of that water outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar holds that if one attempts to consecrate more than three <i>log</i>, the consecration of the water is ineffective. Therefore, if one then pours three <i>log</i> of that water as a libation outside the courtyard, he is not liable.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>They disagree</b> with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement <b>with regard to</b> whether wine <b>libations were offered</b> in the Tabernacle <b>in the wilderness</b> before the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara will soon explain the logical connection between the two issues.",
            "<b>Ravina said:</b> Everyone agrees that wine libations are valid even if they are not first consecrated in a sacred service vessel. Therefore, one who pours a wine libation outside the courtyard is liable even if it was not first consecrated in a service vessel. <b>They disagree with regard to</b> whether the liability for pouring <b>a water libation can be derived from</b> that of <b>a wine libation.</b> The first <i>tanna</i> holds that it can; Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that it cannot.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of wine outside</b> the courtyard is <b>liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: And that is</b> in a case <b>where he</b> first <b>consecrated</b> the wine <b>in</b> a sacred service <b>vessel.</b>",
            "<b>What</b> is the difference <b>between them? Rav Adda bar Rav Yitzḥak said:</b> The difference <b>between them is</b> with regard to whether the <b>overfill of measuring vessels</b> is also consecrated. Both agree that one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard only if it was first consecrated in a service vessel. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the liquid that rises above the rim of a vessel is also consecrated, and if one collects three <i>log</i> of that liquid and pours it as a libation outside the courtyard he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that only the wine within the walls of the vessel itself is consecrated.",
            "<b>Rava, son of Rabba, said:</b> The difference <b>between them is</b> with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement as to whether wine <b>libations were offered on</b> private <b>altars.</b>",
            "He explains: <b>And</b> they disagree <b>with regard to</b> the issue that is the subject of <b>the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: An offering sacrificed on <b>a private altar does not need</b> to be accompanied by wine <b>libations;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> It does <b>require</b> wine <b>libations.</b> Service vessels are not used in the context of private altars. Therefore, if libations are brought on private altars then it is apparent that libations can be valid even if they were not first consecrated in a service vessel. Accordingly, one would be liable for pouring a libation outside the Temple even if it had not first been consecrated in a service vessel. If libations are not brought on private altars, then there is no precedent of a libation that was not first consecrated in a service vessel, and one would not be liable for pouring a non-consecrated libation outside the Temple.",
            "<b>And</b> the opinion of <b>these <i>tanna’im</i> is like</b> the opinion of <b>those <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In introducing the mitzva to bring wine libations together with animal offerings, the verse states: <b>“When you come</b> into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you” (Numbers 15:2), which indicates that the mitzva to bring libations began only once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. <b>The verse speaks</b> in order <b>to require</b> that <b>libations</b> be brought with animal offerings that are brought <b>upon a great</b> public <b>altar.</b> This assumes libations were not brought on a public altar in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required.",
            "<b>Do you say</b> that the verse is referring <b>to</b> offerings brought on <b>a great</b> public <b>altar, or is it even</b> referring <b>to</b> offerings brought on <b>a small</b> private <b>altar?</b> Perhaps libations were brought on the public altar in the wilderness, and it is therefore unnecessary to state that after entering Eretz Yisrael libations should continue to be brought on a public altar. Accordingly, the verse must be teaching that after the Jewish people have entered Eretz Yisrael, libations are required even on private altars. This suggestion is rejected: <b>When</b> the verse <b>states: “Into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you [<i>lakhem</i>],”</b> using the plural form of the word “you,” it is apparent that <b>the verse is speaking of</b> a public <b>altar that is used by everyone;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> Through its introductory clause: <b>“When you come,” the verse speaks</b> in order <b>to require</b> that <b>libations</b> be brought with animal offerings that are brought <b>upon a small</b> private <b>altar.</b> This assumes libations were already brought in the wilderness, and the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.",
            "<b>Do you say</b> that the verse is speaking of <b>a small</b> private <b>altar</b> outside the Temple? <b>Or is it only</b> referring <b>to a great</b> public <b>altar?</b> Perhaps libations were not brought on the public altar in the wilderness and the verse is necessary in order to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. <b>When</b> the verse <b>states: “Into the land of your dwellings,”</b> it is apparent that <b>the verse is speaking of an altar that is used in all your dwellings,</b> which certainly must be referring to private altars, as there was only one central public altar.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>When</b> you analyze the matter <b>you will find</b> that you can <b>say</b> that <b>according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, libations were not offered in the wilderness.</b> Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. <b>And according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva libations were offered in the wilderness.</b> Therefore, the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Rabbi Neḥemya says:</b> For the <b>remainder of the blood</b> of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and <b>that</b> instead <b>one sacrificed outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Neḥemya taught</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>in accordance with the statement of the one who says</b> that failure to pour the <b>remainder</b> of the blood at the base of the altar <b>disqualifies</b> the offering.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Neḥemya says</b> that for the <b>remainder of the blood</b> of an offering <b>that one sacrificed outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Isn’t</b> pouring <b>the remainder of the blood</b> considered <b>a non-essential mitzva,</b> which is not indispensable to the validity of the offering? Accordingly, one should not be liable for sacrificing the blood outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Neḥemya <b>said to him:</b> Sacrificial <b>limbs and fats</b> of a burnt offering <b>will prove</b> the matter, <b>as they are</b> considered <b>a non-essential mitzva, and</b> yet <b>one who sacrifices them outside</b> the courtyard is <b>liable.</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>said to him: No, if you said</b> that one is liable <b>with regard to</b> the burning of the <b>limbs and fats, which is the start of</b> a sacrificial <b>rite,</b> i.e., burning them is a sacrificial rite in and of itself, <b>shall you</b> also <b>say</b> that this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to</b> the pouring of the <b>remainder of the blood, which is not the start of</b> a sacrificial <b>rite,</b> but is just the conclusion of the sprinkling of the blood?",
            "The Gemara explains the challenge from the <i>baraita</i>: <b>And if it is so</b> that Rabbi Neḥemya holds that that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, <b>let</b> Rabbi Neḥemya <b>say</b> in response <b>to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>These too,</b> i.e., the pouring of the remainder of the blood, are considered to be a sacrificial rite in and of themselves because failure to pour out the remainder <b>disqualifies</b> the offering. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is <b>a conclusive refutation.</b>",
            "The Gemara qualifies its rejection: <b>And now that Rav Adda bar Ahava says:</b> The <b>dispute</b> between the <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood disqualifies the offering is only <b>with regard to</b> the <b>remainder of</b> blood that was presented on <b>the inner</b> altar, <b>but with regard to</b> the <b>remainder of</b> blood that was presented on <b>the external</b> altar <b>everyone agrees</b> that failure to pour it <b>does not disqualify</b> the offering; the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement and the <i>baraita</i> can therefore be resolved. <b>When Rabbi Neḥemya says</b> in the mishna that one is liable for sacrificing the remainder of the blood outside the courtyard, he is referring <b>to</b> the <b>remainder of</b> blood that was presented on <b>the inner</b> altar. The pouring of that blood is considered a rite in and of itself, and one is liable for sacrificing it outside the Temple. <b>When that</b> statement of Rabbi Neḥemya <b>is taught</b> in the <i>baraita</i>, it is referring <b>to</b> the <b>remainder of</b> blood that was presented on <b>the external</b> altar. Concerning such blood, Rabbi Neḥemya concedes that the pouring is not considered a rite in and of itself.",
            "In light of this, the Gemara explains the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Neḥemya: <b>And Rabbi Akiva did not know what Rabbi Neḥemya was saying.</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>thought</b> that <b>Rabbi Neḥemya was stating</b> a ruling about the pouring of the <b>remainder of</b> blood that was presented on the <b>external</b> altar. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva <b>responded to him</b> with a claim relating to the <b>remainder of</b> blood that was presented on <b>the external</b> altar and said that it is a non-essential mitzva. <b>And</b> then <b>Rabbi Neḥemya</b> answered him by <b>saying</b> a defense of his opinion <b>in accordance with</b> the misconception underlying <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>One who pinches</b> the nape of <b>a bird</b> offering <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard is <b>liable.</b> But if <b>one pinched</b> its nape <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard he is <b>exempt,</b> as pinching the nape of a bird outside the courtyard is not considered valid pinching. <b>One who slaughters,</b> with a knife, <b>a bird</b> offering <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard is <b>exempt,</b> as slaughtering a bird offering in the Temple courtyard disqualifies it as an offering."
        ],
        [
            "But if one <b>slaughtered</b> a bird offering <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside,</b> he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside</b> the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects <b>its exemption outside</b> the courtyard, and <b>the manner of its preparation outside</b> the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects <b>its exemption inside</b> the courtyard.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, one is also <b>liable for</b> having <b>offered</b> the animal <b>up outside</b> the courtyard after performing <b>a similar</b> act of killing <b>inside</b> the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>except with regard to one who slaughters</b> a bird <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard; he is exempt.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> In summarizing its rulings the mishna states: The manner of its preparation outside the courtyard effects its exemption inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: <b>This</b> term: The manner of <b>its preparation,</b> is inappropriate when referring to the slaughter of a bird offering, as a bird offering is not prepared by slaughtering; on the contrary, it is disqualified if slaughtered. The slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard <b>is</b> the reason for <b>its liability.</b> The Gemara concedes: Emend the mishna and <b>teach: Its liability.</b>",
            "§ The mishna cites the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt. The Gemara asks: <b>To what does he refer?</b>",
            "<b>If we say that he is referring to the first clause</b> of the mishna, which states: <b>One who pinches</b> the nape of the <b>bird</b> offering <b>inside and</b> then <b>offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> is <b>liable,</b> but if <b>one pinched</b> its nape <b>outside and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside,</b> he is <b>exempt; and</b> it is with the second part of this clause that <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> disagrees and <b>says to</b> the first <i>tanna</i>: <b>Just as</b> one who pinches the nape of a bird offering <b>inside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>liable, so too</b> one who pinches its nape <b>outside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>liable,</b> this is difficult. If <b>that</b> is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then instead of saying in the mishna: With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, <b>he should have</b> said: With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>inside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for a similar act of killing done outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first <i>tanna</i> on this issue.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the first clause and says to the first <i>tanna</i>: <b>Just as</b> one who pinches the nape of a bird offering <b>outside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>not liable, so too</b> one who pinches its nape <b>inside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>not liable.</b> The Gemara rejects this: If <b>that</b> is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then <b>he should have</b> said: With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>not liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first <i>tanna</i> on this issue either.",
            "<b>Rather, he is referring to the latter clause</b> of the mishna: <b>One who slaughters a bird</b> offering <b>inside and offers</b> it <b>up outside is exempt,</b> but if <b>one slaughtered</b> a bird offering <b>outside and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside,</b> he is <b>liable. And</b> it is with the second part of this clause that <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> disagrees and <b>says to</b> the first <i>tanna</i>: <b>Just as</b> one who slaughters a bird offering <b>inside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>not liable, so too</b> one who slaughters it <b>outside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>not liable.</b> The Gemara rejects this: If <b>that</b> is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then <b>he should have</b> said: With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is <b>not liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first <i>tanna</i> on this issue.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the latter clause and says to the first <i>tanna</i>: <b>Just as</b> one who slaughters a bird offering <b>outside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>liable, so too</b> one who slaughters it <b>inside</b> and then offers it up outside is <b>liable.</b> The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Shimon clearly does not hold <b>this,</b> as the mishna <b>teaches</b> that he concludes: This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>except with regard to one who slaughters</b> a bird <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard; he is exempt.",
            "If Rabbi Shimon is not referring to any of the rulings mentioned in the mishna, he must be disagreeing with the first <i>tanna</i> with regard to another issue. <b>Ze’eiri said:</b> The difference <b>between</b> the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Shimon <b>is</b> with regard to the <b>slaughter of an animal</b> offering <b>at night</b> inside the courtyard, <b>and this</b> is what the mishna <b>is saying:</b> The first <i>tanna</i> said: <b>And so too, one who slaughters an animal</b> offering <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>at night and</b> then <b>offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> is <b>exempt,</b> as by slaughtering the animal at night he caused it to become disqualified. But one who <b>slaughtered</b> an animal <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>at night and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside</b> is <b>liable.</b>",
            "It is with this ruling that <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> disagrees and <b>says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, one is also <b>liable for</b> having <b>offered</b> the animal <b>up outside</b> the courtyard after performing <b>a similar</b> act of killing <b>inside</b> the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>except with regard to one who slaughters</b> a bird <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard; he is exempt.",
            "The Gemara provides another suggestion: <b>Rava said</b> that the difference <b>between</b> the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Shimon <b>is</b> with regard to the <b>collection</b> of the blood of an offering <b>in a non-sacred vessel, and this</b> is what the mishna <b>is saying:</b> The first <i>tanna</i> said: <b>And so too, one who collects</b> the blood of an offering <b>in a non-sacred vessel inside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offers up</b> that offering <b>outside</b> is <b>exempt,</b> as receiving blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering. But <b>one who collects</b> the blood of an offering <b>in a non-sacred vessel outside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offers up</b> that offering <b>outside</b> is <b>liable.</b>",
            "It is with this ruling that <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> disagrees and <b>says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> act done with an animal, i.e., the collecting of its blood, concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up outside the courtyard, one is also <b>liable for</b> having <b>offered</b> the animal <b>up outside</b> the courtyard after performing <b>a similar</b> act <b>inside</b> the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>except with regard to one who slaughters</b> a bird <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and offers</b> it <b>up outside</b> the courtyard; he is exempt.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Now that Shmuel’s father, son of Rav Yitzḥak, has taught</b> a <i>baraita</i>, another explanation can be provided. The <i>baraita</i> teaches: <b>One who pinches</b> the nape of a <b>bird inside</b> the courtyard <b>and</b> then <b>offers it up outside</b> is <b>liable,</b> but one who <b>pinched</b> the nape of a bird <b>outside and</b> then <b>offered</b> it <b>up outside</b> is <b>exempt. And Rabbi Shimon</b> says that he is <b>liable.</b> It is apparent then that <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> in the mishna <b>is referring to there,</b> i.e., to the first clause of the mishna, and disagreeing with it. Therefore, one should emend the mishna <b>and teach:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> act of killing an animal concerning <b>which,</b> when it was performed <b>inside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable for</b> subsequently offering <b>it</b> up <b>outside</b> the courtyard, one is also <b>liable</b> for having offered the animal up <b>outside</b> the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup,</b> if he first <b>placed</b> its blood on an altar <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>and then placed</b> the remaining blood on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and then placed</b> the remaining blood on an altar <b>outside</b> the courtyard, in both cases he is <b>liable</b> for placing the blood outside the courtyard, <b>as</b> the blood in <b>its entirety is fit</b> to be placed on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard.",
            "If <b>one collected its blood in two cups</b> and <b>placed</b> the blood from <b>both of them</b> on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard he is <b>exempt</b> as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from <b>both of them</b> on an altar <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable,</b> as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from <b>one</b> cup <b>inside and</b> then placed the blood from the other <b>one outside,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b> By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from <b>one</b> cup <b>outside and</b> then placed the blood from the other <b>one inside,</b> he is <b>liable for the external</b> placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, <b>and the internal</b> placement <b>atones</b> for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.",
            "<b>To what is this matter comparable?</b> It is comparable <b>to</b> a case where one <b>separated</b> an animal for <b>his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another</b> animal <b>in its place, and thereafter, the first</b> animal <b>was found.</b> In that case, <b>both of them stand</b> before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If <b>he slaughtered both of them inside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>exempt.</b> If he slaughtered <b>both of them outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable,</b> as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered <b>one inside and</b> then slaughtered the other <b>one outside</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered <b>one outside and</b> then slaughtered the other <b>one inside</b> he is <b>liable for</b> slaughtering <b>the external</b> animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, <b>and the internal</b> animal <b>atones</b> for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.",
            "The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, <b>just as</b> placing <b>the blood of</b> the first animal <b>exempts</b> one who consumes <b>its meat</b> from liability for misuse of consecrated property, <b>so too, it exempts</b> one who consumes <b>the meat of its counterpart,</b> the second animal, from liability."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara discusses the first clause of the mishna: <b>Granted</b> that one is liable in a case where he first placed the blood on an altar <b>outside</b> the courtyard <b>and then placed</b> the remaining blood on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard; that is because, as the mishna explains: <b>As</b> the blood in <b>its entirety is fit to be</b> placed <b>inside</b> the courtyard. <b>But</b> in a case where he first placed its blood on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard <b>and then offered up</b> the remaining blood on an altar <b>outside</b> the courtyard, why he is liable? That blood <b>is</b> merely <b>a remainder,</b> and one should not be liable for offering it up outside.",
            "The Gemara explains: In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? It <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya, who says:</b> For the <b>remainder of the blood</b> of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and <b>that</b> instead <b>one sacrificed outside</b> the courtyard, one is <b>liable.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya,</b> then <b>say the latter clause:</b> If <b>one collected its blood in two cups</b> and <b>placed</b> the blood from <b>both of them</b> on the altar <b>inside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>exempt.</b> If he placed the blood from <b>both of them</b> on an altar <b>outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable.</b> If he first placed the blood from <b>one</b> cup <b>inside and</b> then placed the blood from the other <b>one outside,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b> By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup a mere remainder. The Gemara asks: How can this clause be attributed to Rabbi Neḥemya? <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Neḥemya say:</b> For <b>the remainder of the blood</b> of an offering <b>that one offered outside</b> the courtyard, he is <b>liable?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: In <b>the latter clause we arrive at</b> the opinion of <b>the first <i>tanna</i>,</b> who disagrees with <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. As</b> that <i>tanna</i> <b>says:</b> The placement of the blood from one <b>cup renders</b> the blood of <b>the other</b> cup as <b>disqualified.</b> Since it is actually disqualified and not merely a remainder, one is not liable for offering it up outside.",
            "§ The mishna presents an analogy for its ruling: <b>To what is this matter comparable?</b> It is comparable <b>to</b> a case where one <b>separated</b> an animal for <b>his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another</b> animal <b>in its place, and thereafter, the first</b> animal <b>was found.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need to ask: <b>To what is this matter comparable,</b> and provide an analogy to the mishna’s rulings? What does the analogy add? The Gemara explains: In accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> mishna? It <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>who says</b> (see <i>Temura</i> 22b): A sin offering that was <b>lost during the time of</b> the <b>separation</b> of a substitute, if it is later found and one of them is slaughtered as the person’s sin offering, the other one is <b>put to death.</b> Accordingly, it is actually disqualified from being used as an offering, and one is therefore not liable for offering it up outside.",
            "<b>And this</b> is what the mishna <b>is saying</b> by presenting its analogy: <b>The reason</b> that one is exempt from liability for offering up the unused sin offering outside is <b>that</b> it <b>was lost</b> at the time its substitute was separated and therefore it is considered disqualified. <b>But</b> if <b>one separated two sin offerings</b> from the outset <b>as a guarantee,</b> so that even if one is lost he can use the other, then if neither is lost and he sacrifices one of them, the other one is not put to death. Rather, it is left to graze until it becomes blemished, at which point it is sold and the proceeds used to purchase a voluntary burnt offering. It emerges that <b>from the outset, one of these</b> two animals, i.e., the one that was not ultimately sacrificed as his sin offering, <b>is a burnt offering,</b> and therefore if one offers it up outside the courtyard he is liable. The analogy teaches that with regard to blood collected in two cups, if one offers up blood from the unused cup outside, he is exempt only because the blood in that cup is considered disqualified, but he would not be exempt if it was considered a remainder.",
            "<b>And</b> this is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement that <b>Rav Huna</b> says that <b>Rav says, as Rav Huna says</b> that <b>Rav says: A guilt offering that was consigned to grazing</b> per the <i>halakha</i> to leave it to graze if its owner dies or achieves atonement through another guilt offering, <b>and</b> then instead of being left to develop a blemish, at which point it could be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a voluntary burnt offering, one <b>slaughtered it,</b> even with <b>unspecified</b> intent, the animal itself is <b>fit</b> to be sacrificed <b>as a burnt offering.</b> Similarly, the mishna assumes that in any case where an animal is consigned to grazing it is considered fit, and one would be liable for slaughtering it outside the courtyard.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Are</b> these cases <b>comparable? There,</b> in Rav’s ruling, it is logical that the animal is considered fit, as <b>a guilt offering</b> is <b>a male</b> animal <b>and a burnt offering</b> is <b>a male</b> animal, so it is possible to bring an animal as the latter even if it had been designated as the former. Therefore, a guilt offering left to graze is still considered fit. <b>But</b> in the mishna’s case, just because the animal is left to graze does not necessarily indicate that it itself is fit to be brought, as <b>a sin offering is a female</b> animal, which can never be brought as a burnt offering. Therefore, it should be considered unfit. <b>Rav Ḥiyya from Yostiniyya said:</b> The ruling of the mishna is <b>with regard to the goat of</b> the <b><i>Nasi</i>,</b> which is a male sin offering. Therefore, in a case where it is left to graze it is still considered fit, as it can be brought as a burnt offering.<br/>This chapter discussed two distinct prohibitions: That of slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard and that of offering up an offering by placing it upon an altar outside the Temple courtyard. Since they are considered two distinct prohibitions, one is liable even if he performs only one of them, and he is liable twice if he performs both.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the</b> red <b>heifer of purification that one burned outside its pit,</b> the pit being an excavation on the Mount of Olives opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary designated for its slaughter and its burning, <b>and likewise the scapegoat that one sacrificed outside</b> the Temple courtyard rather than casting it off a cliff as prescribed, he is <b>exempt</b> from punishment for violating the transgression of slaughtering and sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "The source for this is <b>as it is stated</b> with regard to slaughter of sacrificial animals outside the courtyard: “Whatever man…that slaughters outside the camp, <b>and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,</b> to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). From that verse it is derived: For <b>any</b> offering <b>that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting</b> for sacrifice on the altar, e.g., the red heifer and the scapegoat, <b>one is not liable for its</b> slaughter and sacrifice outside its place.",
            "With regard to <b>an animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or</b> an animal <b>that</b> was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship, <b>or</b> an animal <b>that was worshipped</b> as a deity, <b>or</b> an animal given as <b>the price</b> of a dog that was purchased, <b>or</b> an animal that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute, <b>or</b> an animal born of a mixture of <b>diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], or</b> an animal <b>born by caesarean section,</b> any of <b>which one sacrificed outside</b> the Temple courtyard, he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "The source for this is <b>as it is stated:</b> “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it to present it as an offering to the Lord <b>before the Tabernacle of the Lord.”</b> From this verse, it is derived: For <b>any</b> animal <b>that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting</b> for sacrifice on the altar, <b>one is not liable for its</b> slaughter and sacrifice outside the courtyard.",
            "For <b>blemished</b> animals, <b>whether</b> they are <b>permanently blemished</b> or <b>whether</b> they are"
        ],
        [
            "<b>temporarily blemished, which one sacrificed outside</b> the Temple courtyard, one is <b>exempt. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> For <b>permanently blemished</b> animals one is <b>exempt;</b> for <b>temporarily blemished</b> animals one is <b>liable for</b> violation of <b>a prohibition,</b> but it is not the type of prohibition for which he will receive <i>karet</i>, because ultimately the animal will be fit for sacrifice.",
            "With regard to <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has not arrived,</b> as they are fit for sacrifice only when they are older, after their wings assume a golden hue; <b>and pigeons whose time</b> of fitness <b>has passed,</b> as they are fit only when they are young and their wings did not yet assume a yellowish tint, <b>that one sacrificed outside</b> the Temple courtyard, he is <b>exempt. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> For <b>pigeons whose time</b> of fitness <b>has passed</b> one is <b>exempt, and</b> for <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness <b>has not</b> yet <b>arrived</b> he is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a prohibition.</b>",
            "With regard to an animal <b>itself and its offspring</b> that were slaughtered on the same day, where one violates a prohibition for slaughtering the second, <b>and</b> an animal <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived, if one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard he is <b>exempt. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> For an animal whose time has not yet arrived, <b>that</b> person is <b>in</b> violation of a mere <b>prohibition, as Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> sacrificial animal <b>that is fit to come</b> and be sacrificed <b>after</b> the passage of <b>time,</b> if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, <b>that</b> person is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a prohibition but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say: In any</b> case <b>in which there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i> there is no</b> violation of <b>a prohibition.</b>",
            "The mishna adds: An animal is defined as one <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived, <b>whether</b> it is <b>intrinsically</b> premature, e.g., doves whose wings have not yet assumed a golden hue or an animal less than seven days old (see Leviticus 22:27), or <b>whether</b> it is premature <b>for its owner.</b>",
            "<b>Which is</b> the animal <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived because it is premature <b>for its owner?</b> It is the animal of <b>a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>], and a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], and a woman after childbirth, and a leper</b> whose period of impurity is not yet complete, <b>where</b> these owners, who are ritually impure, <b>sacrificed their sin offerings or guilt offerings outside</b> the Temple courtyard. In this case <b>they are exempt,</b> as they are neither obligated nor permitted to bring those offerings. But if they sacrificed <b>their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside</b> the courtyard <b>they are liable,</b> as those offerings may be brought as gift offerings even if their owner is ritually impure.",
            "<b>One who offers up</b> outside the Temple courtyard a portion <b>of the meat of a sin offering</b> that is eaten; <b>of the meat of a guilt offering; of the meat of</b> other <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> that are eaten, e.g., the sheep sacrificed on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, or <b>of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> is exempt, as all these are eaten by the priests and not sacrificed on the altar. <b>And</b> for the same reason, one who sacrificed a portion of <b>the surplus of the <i>omer</i> offering,</b> a measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of the Hebrew month of Nisan, after the handful was removed; <b>or the two loaves,</b> i.e., the public offering on <i>Shavuot</i> of two loaves from the new wheat; <b>or the shewbread</b> arranged on the Table each Shabbat in the Sanctuary; <b>or the remainder of meal offerings,</b> is also exempt.",
            "<b>And</b> likewise with regard to <b>one who pours</b> oil onto a meal offering; <b>and one who breaks</b> the loaves of a meal offering into pieces; <b>and one who mixes</b> oil into the flour of a meal offering; <b>and one who salts</b> a meal offering or other offerings; <b>and one who waves</b> a meal offering; <b>and one who brings</b> a meal offering to the corner of an altar, if he performs these actions outside the courtyard; <b>and one who arranges</b> shewbread on <b>the table</b> outside the Sanctuary; <b>and one who removes the ashes</b> from <b>the lamps</b> of the Candelabrum; <b>and one who removes a handful</b> from a meal offering; <b>and one who collects</b> the <b>blood</b> of an offering in a vessel, if he did so <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard: In all of these cases he is <b>exempt.</b> This is because one is liable only if he performs an action similar to sacrifice that completes the sacrificial service, while all of these actions are ones that are normally followed by additional sacrificial rites.",
            "<b>And one is</b> likewise <b>not liable for</b> any of these actions, <b>neither due to</b> the prohibition against <b>a non-priest</b> performing the Temple service, <b>nor due to</b> the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of <b>ritual impurity, nor due to</b> the prohibition against a priest <b>lacking</b> the requisite priestly <b>vestments</b> while performing the Temple service, <b>nor due to</b> the prohibition against performing the Temple service <b>without washing</b> one’s <b>hands and feet.</b>",
            "<b>Until the Tabernacle was established,</b> private <b>altars were permitted and</b> the sacrificial <b>service</b> was performed <b>by the firstborn. And from</b> the time <b>that the Tabernacle was established,</b> private <b>altars were prohibited and</b> the sacrificial <b>service</b> was performed <b>by the priests. Offerings of the most sacred order were</b> then <b>eaten within the curtains</b> surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle in the wilderness <b>and offerings of lesser sanctity</b> were eaten <b>throughout the camp of Israel.</b> When the Jewish people <b>arrived at Gilgal</b> private <b>altars were permitted, offerings of the most sacred order were</b> then <b>eaten within the curtains, and offerings of lesser sanctity</b> were eaten <b>anywhere.</b>",
            "When <b>they arrived at Shiloh,</b> private <b>altars were prohibited. And there was no roof</b> of wood or stone <b>there,</b> i.e., in the Tabernacle in Shiloh; <b>rather</b> there was <b>only a building of stone below and the curtains</b> of the roof of the Tabernacle were spread <b>above it. And</b> the period that the Tabernacle was in Shiloh <b>was</b> characterized in the Torah as <b>“rest”</b> in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you” (Deuteronomy 12:9). <b>Offerings of the most sacred order were</b> then <b>eaten within the curtains</b> in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, <b>and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe</b> were eaten <b>in any</b> place <b>that overlooks</b> Shiloh.",
            "When Shiloh was destroyed (see I Samuel 4:18), the Jewish people <b>arrived</b> with the Tabernacle <b>at Nov, and</b> later at <b>Gibeon,</b> and private <b>altars were permitted. Offerings of the most sacred order were</b> then <b>eaten within the curtains</b> in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, and <b>offerings of lesser sanctity</b> were eaten <b>in all the cities of</b> Eretz <b>Yisrael.</b>",
            "When the Jewish people <b>arrived at Jerusalem</b> and built the Temple during the reign of Solomon, private <b>altars were prohibited, and</b> private altars <b>did not have</b> a subsequent period when they were <b>permitted. And</b> the Temple in Jerusalem <b>was</b> characterized as <b>“inheritance”</b> in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you.” <b>Offerings of the most sacred order were</b> then <b>eaten within the curtains,</b> i.e., in the Temple courtyard, and <b>offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe</b> were eaten <b>within the walls</b> of the city, whose legal status was that of the Israelite camp in the wilderness.",
            "With regard to <b>all offerings that one consecrated during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars and sacrificed during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars,</b> if he sacrificed them <b>outside</b> their designated area, for <b>these</b> animals he is <b>in</b> violation of both the <b>positive mitzva</b> to sacrifice the offering in the place chosen by God <b>and</b> the <b>prohibition</b> against sacrificing them on a private altar, <b>and he is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> doing <b>it.</b>",
            "If <b>one consecrated</b> the animals <b>during a period of permitting of</b> private <b>altars and sacrificed them during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars, outside</b> their designated area, for <b>these</b> animals he is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but he is not liable to</b> receive <b><i>karet</i> for</b> sacrificing <b>them.</b> If <b>he consecrated</b> the animals <b>during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars and sacrificed them during a period of permitting of</b> private <b>altars,</b> outside their designated area, for <b>these</b> animals he is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a positive mitzva</b> for failure to bring it to the Tabernacle, <b>but these</b> animals <b>are not subject to a prohibition,</b> as it is permitted to sacrifice on a private altar.",
            "<b>And these are</b> the <b>sacrificial</b> items that <b>are sacrificed</b> only <b>in the Tabernacle</b> even when private altars are permitted: <b>Sacrificial</b> animals <b>that were</b> presumed to be <b>consecrated for</b> sacrifice in <b>the Tabernacle.</b> Therefore, <b>communal offerings are sacrificed in the Tabernacle, but offerings of an individual</b> may be sacrificed <b>on</b> a private <b>altar.</b> In addition, with regard to <b>offerings of an individual that were consecrated</b> expressly <b>for</b> sacrifice in <b>the Tabernacle, one must sacrifice</b> them <b>in the Tabernacle. But if he sacrificed them on</b> a private <b>altar,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "<b>And what</b> is the difference <b>between the</b> private <b>altar of an individual and the public altar</b> at the site of the Tabernacle when it was located in Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon? It is that on a private altar there is no <b>placing</b> of <b>hands</b> on the head of an offering, no <b>slaughter in the north,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "no <b>placement</b> of blood <b>around</b> all sides of the altar in offerings for which this is required, no <b>waving</b> of meal offerings, <b>and</b> no <b>bringing</b> of meal offerings to the corner of the altar prior to removal of the handful. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no meal offering</b> sacrificed <b>on an altar</b> outside the Temple. <b>And</b> requiring a member of the <b>priesthood</b> to perform the sacrificial rites, the priestly <b>service vestments,</b> the <b>service vessels,</b> the <b>pleasing aroma</b> to God, the <b>partition for the blood,</b> i.e., the red line dividing the upper and lower halves of the altar, <b>and</b> the priest’s <b>washing of hands and feet</b> before his service all do not apply to sacrifice on private altars, as the service there need not be performed by priests nor follow all the protocols of the Temple service.",
            "<b>But the</b> intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated <b>time,</b> which renders the offering <i>piggul</i>; the <i>halakha</i> of portions of <b>the</b> offering <b>left over [<i>notar</i>]</b> beyond the time it may be eaten; <b>and the</b> prohibition against eating consecrated meat while <b>ritually impure are equal in this,</b> a private altar, <b>and that,</b> a public altar.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that one who burns the red heifer outside its pit is not liable for sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara clarifies: <b>What</b> is the meaning of: <b>Outside its pit? Reish Lakish said:</b> It means <b>outside the place that was inspected</b> to ensure that it is not a gravesite, which would render it impure. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: But is not all of Eretz Yisrael inspected</b> for impurity? Therefore, there is no need for the site of the burning of the red heifer to be specially inspected.",
            "<b>Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said:</b> The term: Outside its pit, is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>slaughtered</b> the red heifer <b>within the walls of Jerusalem</b> and not in the place outside the walls, as the Torah prescribes: “And it shall be brought outside the camp, and it shall be slaughtered before him” (Numbers 19:3).",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But let</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>interpret it</b> to be a case <b>where</b> the priest <b>slaughtered it outside the wall</b> but <b>not opposite,</b> i.e., not in the direction of, <b>the entrance</b> to the Temple, <b>as Rav Adda bar Ahava says:</b> If <b>he slaughtered it</b> in a location <b>not opposite the entrance,</b> it is <b>disqualified, as it is stated</b> with regard to the red heifer: “And you shall give it to Elazar the priest, and it shall be brought outside the camp, <b>and it shall be slaughtered</b> before him. And Elazar the priest shall take of its blood with his finger, <b>and sprinkle</b> of its blood toward the front of the Tent of Meeting seven times” (Numbers 19:3–4).",
            "The slaughter of the red heifer and the sprinkling of its blood are juxtaposed so that one will draw the following conclusion: <b>Just as its sprinkling</b> must be performed <b>opposite the entrance, so too, its slaughter</b> must be performed <b>opposite the entrance. And if you would say that</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan does <b>not juxtapose</b> the two verses for the purpose of this comparison, that is difficult: <b>But</b> it <b>was stated</b> with regard to a red heifer <b>slaughtered</b> in a location <b>not opposite the entrance</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> It is <b>disqualified,</b> as <b>“and it shall be slaughtered”</b> is juxtaposed with <b>“and sprinkle.” Reish Lakish says:</b> It is <b>fit,</b> since it is stated: “And it shall be brought <b>outside the camp, and it shall be slaughtered,”</b> indicating that it may be slaughtered in any location outside the camp.",
            "<b>And</b> it <b>was also stated</b> that <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to a red heifer that the priest <b>burned not opposite the entrance</b> to the Temple. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> It is <b>disqualified, and Rabbi Oshaya says:</b> It is <b>fit.</b> The Gemara explains their reasoning: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that it is <b>disqualified</b> because of an additional juxtaposition. It is stated: <b>“And</b> the heifer <b>shall be burned</b> in his sight; its skin, and its flesh, and its blood, with its dung, shall be burned” (Numbers 19:5), while in the previous verse it is stated: <b>“And sprinkle</b> of its blood toward the front of the Tent of Meeting.” This teaches that just as the sprinkling of the blood must be done opposite the entrance, so too must the burning be done opposite the entrance.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Oshaya says</b> that a red heifer that was burned in a location not opposite the entrance is <b>fit,</b> as the verse states: <b>“With its dung [<i>pirshah</i>], shall be burned,”</b> which is interpreted homiletically to mean: In <b>the place that</b> its soul <b>departs [<i>poreshet</i>] for death, there shall be its burning.</b> Just as no specific location is given for the soul’s departing, so too, the burning need not be performed in a specific location. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the red heifer must be slaughtered opposite the entrance to the Temple, why does he not understand the term: Outside of its pit, to be referring to its slaughter in any location not opposite the Temple entrance?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Say</b> that Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>is speaking</b> utilizing the style of: <b>It is not necessary,</b> as follows: <b>It is not necessary</b> for the mishna to teach that in slaughtering a red heifer <b>outside the wall</b> in a location not opposite the entrance, one does not transgress the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard. In that case it is clearly disqualified, <b>as he has distanced it</b> from where it is meant to be slaughtered. <b>But even</b> if one slaughtered it <b>inside the wall</b> of Jerusalem, so <b>that he brings it closer</b> to the Temple, <b>and</b> one might <b>say</b> that <b>it is a valid</b> way of slaughtering the red heifer, Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>teaches us</b> that nevertheless it is disqualified.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to the disagreement cited earlier: <b>The Master says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said to</b> Reish Lakish: <b>But is not all of Eretz Yisrael inspected</b> for impurity? Since Reish Lakish’s response to this question is not mentioned, the Gemara clarifies: <b>With regard to what do they disagree?</b> One <b>Sage,</b> Reish Lakish, <b>holds</b> that <b>the flood</b> in the time of Noah <b>descended upon Eretz Yisrael,</b> and its residents perished. It is therefore necessary to inspect the place where the red heifer is burned to ascertain whether it is a gravesite. <b>And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>holds</b> that the flood <b>did not descend</b> upon Eretz Yisrael, and there is no reason to suspect there are lost graves there.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: And both of them,</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, <b>interpreted the same verse,</b> stated by Ezekiel with regard to Eretz Yisrael, to derive their opinions. The verse states: <b>“Son of man, say to her: You are a land that is not cleansed, nor rained upon in the day of indignation”</b> (Ezekiel 22:24).",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan holds</b> that <b>the verse is asking</b> a rhetorical <b>question: Eretz Yisrael, are you not cleansed</b> from the impurity imparted by corpses? <b>Did</b> the <b>rains</b> of the flood <b>fall upon you on the day of indignation? And Reish Lakish holds</b> that this verse should be read <b>in accordance with its straightforward meaning,</b> i.e., as a statement, not a question: <b>You are a land that is not cleansed. Didn’t rains fall upon you on the day of indignation?</b> Therefore, the bodies of all of those who perished in the flood are somewhere in the ground.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> from a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:2): <b>Courtyards were built in Jerusalem on stone, and beneath</b> these courtyards there was a hollow <b>space due to</b> the concern that there was a lost <b>grave</b> in <b>the depths.</b> The space served as a barrier preventing the impurity from reaching the courtyards above. <b>And they</b> would <b>bring pregnant women, and</b> those women would <b>give birth</b> in those courtyards. <b>And</b> those women would <b>raise their children there,</b> thereby ensuring that the children never became impure. This would enable the children <b>to</b> assist in the rite of <b>the</b> red <b>heifer.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> once the children reached the appropriate age, the priests would <b>bring oxen</b> there. <b>And on the backs of</b> these oxen, they would place <b>doors, and</b> the <b>children</b> would <b>sit upon</b> the doors, so that the doors would serve as a barrier between them and any impurity in the depths, <b>and</b> they would hold <b>cups of stone,</b> which are not susceptible to ritual impurity, <b>in their hands,</b> and they would ride upon the oxen to the Siloam pool. <b>And</b> they <b>filled</b> the cups with water <b>and would sit</b> back <b>in their places</b> upon the oxen and be taken to the Temple Mount. The water in the cups would be used for the rite of the red heifer. Apparently, there is concern that hidden sources of impurity exist in Eretz Yisrael.",
            "<b>Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said</b> that Rabbi Yoḥanan would reply: The Sages <b>established a higher standard</b> for purity <b>in</b> the case of <b>the red heifer,</b> but generally speaking there is no concern for hidden sources of impurity in Eretz Yisrael caused by those who perished in the flood.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish</b> from a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Eduyyot</i> 3:3): <b>Once,</b> human <b>bones were found in the Chamber of the Woodshed, and</b> the Sages <b>sought to decree impurity upon Jerusalem,</b> i.e., to proclaim all who go there to be impure, as if a corpse can be found in a chamber of the Temple there is reason to be concerned that there are lost graves in other places as well. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua stood upon his feet and said: Is it not a shame and disgrace for us to decree impurity upon the city of our fathers</b> because of this concern? Show me: <b>Where are the dead of the flood,</b> and <b>where are</b> all of <b>the dead</b> killed by <b>Nebuchadnezzar?</b>",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan infers: <b>From</b> the fact <b>that</b> Rabbi Yehoshua <b>said this,</b> is this <b>not to say that there were no</b> lost graves in Jerusalem from the flood, because the flood did not take place there? Reish Lakish responds: <b>And according to your reasoning, so too were there not those killed by Nebuchadnezzar,</b> in and around Jerusalem, who were mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua? Certainly there were, as Nebuchadnezzar killed many people in Jerusalem. <b>Rather,</b> there <b>were, and</b> others <b>removed</b> the bodies. <b>Here too,</b> with regard to the dead of the flood, <b>there were, and</b> others <b>removed</b> the bodies. <b>And</b> it is possible to ask: <b>If they were removed,</b> why is it necessary to be concerned that there may be impurity in the place of the red heifer,"
        ],
        [
            "as <b>they were</b> already <b>removed.</b> One can respond: This <i>baraita</i> deals exclusively with Jerusalem. <b>Granted that</b> the bones of those who perished in the flood and at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar <b>were removed from Jerusalem,</b> but they <b>were not removed from all</b> of <b>Eretz Yisrael.</b> Therefore, outside Jerusalem, the red heifer may be slaughtered only in a place that has been inspected.",
            "<b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> the discussion should be inverted, and <b>Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> who holds that the flood did not affect Eretz Yisrael, from that <i>baraita</i>, as Rabbi Yehoshua said: <b>Where are the dead of the flood,</b> and <b>where are</b> all of <b>the dead</b> killed by <b>Nebuchadnezzar?</b> Reish Lakish said: <b>What, is it not</b> possible to infer from this question that <b>since those</b> slaughtered by Nebuchadnezzar <b>were</b> in Eretz Yisrael, <b>those</b> who perished in the flood <b>were also</b> there? Rabbi Yoḥanan responds: <b>Are the cases comparable? This</b> is <b>as it is and that</b> is <b>as it is,</b> i.e., the dead of Nebuchadnezzar were indeed in Eretz Yisrael, but the dead of the flood were not, as there was no flood there.",
            "Reish Lakish <b>raised an objection to</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to the flood, it is stated: “All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life, <b>whatsoever was on the dry land, died”</b> (Genesis 7:22). <b>Granted, according to my</b> opinion, <b>that I say</b> the <b>flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael, due to that</b> reason all living creatures on Earth <b>died,</b> even those in Eretz Yisrael. <b>But according to your</b> opinion that the flood did not descend on Eretz Yisrael, <b>why did they die</b> there? Rabbi Yoḥanan responds: They died <b>due to the heat</b> that accompanied the floodwaters, and that spread to Eretz Yisrael as well. Those corpses were then buried in known locations.",
            "The Gemara notes that this is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says:</b> The generation of the flood <b>sinned with boiling</b> heat, i.e., forbidden sexual intercourse, <b>and they were punished with</b> the <b>boiling</b> heat of the flood waters. <b>As it is written here,</b> with regard to the flood: “And God remembered Noah and every living creature and all the cattle that were with him in the ark; and God made a wind to pass over the earth <b>and the waters calmed [<i>vayashoku hamayim</i>]”</b> (Genesis 8:1); <b>and it is written there,</b> with regard to the execution of Haman: “So they hanged Haman on the gallows that he had prepared for Mordecai. <b>Then the king’s boiling anger was assuaged [<i>shakhakha</i>]”</b> (Esther 7:10). This latter verse indicates that a matter is assuaged from heat; similarly, the flood waters were hot.",
            "<b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> that this discussion should be inverted, and in fact <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish</b> from that verse: It is stated that <b>“whatsoever was on the dry land, died”</b> (Genesis 7:22). <b>Granted, according to my</b> opinion, <b>that I say</b> that the <b>flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael, due to that</b> reason, <b>there was</b> an area of <b>dry land</b> even during the flood, and all living creatures there died from the heat. <b>But according to your</b> opinion that the flood did descend upon Eretz Yisrael, <b>what</b> is the meaning of <b>“dry land”?</b> There was no dry land anywhere. Reish Lakish responds: The verse is referring to <b>land that had been dry initially,</b> before the flood.",
            "<b>And why</b> does the Torah <b>call it “dry land”</b> during the flood? There was no dry land during the flood. It is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: During the generation of the flood no decree was decreed upon the fish in the sea, as it is stated: “Whatsoever was on the dry land, died”</b> (Genesis 7:22), i.e., only those creatures that had been on dry land, <b>but not</b> the <b>fish in the sea.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted, according to the one who says the flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>this is</b> the explanation of the fact <b>that the <i>reima</i> remained there,</b> in Eretz Yisrael, and survived the flood. <b>But according to the one who says</b> the flood <b>descended</b> upon Eretz Yisrael, i.e., Reish Lakish, <b>how did the <i>reima</i> remain?</b> Given its large size, it clearly could not have fit into Noah’s ark. <b>Rabbi Yannai says:</b> They <b>brought</b> <i>reima</i> <b>cubs into the ark,</b> and they survived the flood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say: I have seen a day-old offspring of the <i>reima</i>, and</b> it <b>was</b> as large <b>as Mount Tabor. And how</b> large <b>is Mount Tabor?</b> It is <b>forty parasangs.</b> And <b>the length of</b> the cub’s <b>neck</b> was <b>three parasangs,</b> and <b>the place where its head rests,</b> i.e., its neck, was <b>a parasang and a half. It cast feces, and</b> thereby <b>dammed up the Jordan</b> river. Even the cub would have been too large for the ark.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They brought</b> only <b>the head of</b> the cub <b>into the ark,</b> while its body remained outside. The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t the Master,</b> i.e., Rabba bar bar Ḥana, <b>say</b> that the size of <b>the place where its head rests</b> was <b>a parasang and a half?</b> Consequently, even its head alone would not fit into the ark. <b>Rather, they brought the head,</b> i.e., edge, <b>of its nose into the ark,</b> so that it might breathe.",
            "The Gemara wonders why Rabbi Yoḥanan was compelled to give this answer: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say</b> that the <b>flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael?</b> According to his opinion, perhaps the <i>reima</i> survived by remaining there during the flood. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said</b> his answer <b>in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But the ark was moving</b> upon the water. How was it was possible to keep the nose of the <i>reima</i> in the ark? <b>Reish Lakish says: They tied its horns to the ark,</b> so that the <i>reima</i> would move with it. The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t Rav Ḥisda say</b> that <b>the people of the generation of the flood sinned with boiling</b> heat <b>and were punished with boiling</b> heat? How could the <i>reima</i> have survived the boiling water?",
            "The Gemara replies: <b>And according to your reasoning,</b> that it was impossible to survive the boiling water, <b>how did</b> the <b>ark</b> itself <b>move?</b> It was covered with pitch, which melts in boiling water. <b>Moreover, how did Og, king of the Bashan</b> (see Numbers 21:33–35), who according to tradition was of the generation of the flood, <b>stand,</b> i.e., survive the boiling water? <b>Rather,</b> it must be that <b>a miracle was performed for them,</b> namely <b>that</b> the water <b>on the sides of the ark cooled,</b> allowing the ark, the <i>reima</i>, and Og to survive.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> even <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,</b> that the flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael and the corpses of those who perished in the flood might impart impurity there, <b>though</b> the <b>flood did indeed descend upon Eretz Yisrael, no</b> trace of the dead <b>remains</b> there. <b>As Reish Lakish says: Why</b> is Babylonia <b>called Metzula</b> (see Isaiah 44:27)? It is <b>because all the dead of the flood,</b> throughout the world, <b>sank [<i>nitztalelu</i>] there. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why is</b> Babylonia <b>called Shinar?</b> It is <b>because all the dead of the flood were deposited [<i>ninaru</i>] there.</b> Evidently, even Reish Lakish says that all who died in the flood, including those from Eretz Yisrael, sank in Babylonia. The Gemara responds: <b>It is impossible that</b> the corpses of some of those in Eretz Yisrael who perished in the flood <b>were not stuck</b> in the mud and remained there.",
            "Having mentioned some explanations for the names of Babylonia, the Gemara adds: <b>Rabbi Abbahu says: Why is it called Shinar? Because it shakes [<i>shemena’eret</i>] its wealthy</b> people, i.e., they do not remain wealthy. The Gemara asks: <b>But we see that there are</b> wealthy people in Babylonia who remain wealthy. The Gemara responds: Their wealth <b>does not extend</b> for <b>three generations.</b>",
            "With regard to the statement that the corpses of those who perished in the flood came to Babylonia, <b>Rabbi Ami says:</b> Concerning <b>anyone who eats the dust of Babylonia,</b> it is <b>as if he eats the flesh of his ancestors,</b> since there is a great deal of dust from the dead there. <b>This is also taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning <b>anyone who eats the dust of Babylonia,</b> it is <b>as if he eats the flesh of his ancestors. And some say:</b> It is <b>as if he eats repugnant creatures and crawling things,</b> which also died in the flood and were absorbed by the ground of Babylonia.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if one sacrificed <b>the scapegoat</b> of Yom Kippur outside the Temple he is exempt from the prohibition against sacrificing outside, since the Torah states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and the scapegoat is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.",
            "<b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “To present it as an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4), and it is derived from the word “offering” that one who slaughters non-sacred animals inside the Temple is not liable. The <i>baraita</i> asks: <b>Or</b> perhaps from the word <b>“offering” I</b> would <b>derive</b> that the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple applies <b>even</b> to items <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance, as</b> they too <b>are called offerings, as it is stated</b> with regard to the spoils of the war against Midian: <b>“And we have brought the Lord’s offering,</b> what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). These were certainly not items consecrated for the altar.",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it”</b> (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to <b>that which is fit to come to</b> the entrance of the <b>Tent of Meeting,</b> i.e., is fit to be sacrificed. <b>Excluded</b> are items <b>consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not fit</b> for sacrifice.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: Perhaps <b>I shall exclude these,</b> i.e., items consecrated for Temple maintenance, <b>which are not fit</b> to be sacrificed upon the altar, from the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple, <b>but I shall not exclude the scapegoat, which is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “To present it as an offering <b>to the Lord,”</b> which serves <b>to exclude</b> from this prohibition <b>the scapegoat, which is not designated</b> as a sacrifice <b>to the Lord,</b> but is rather sent to Azazel. According to the <i>baraita</i>, the scapegoat is fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.",
            "The Gemara answers: This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> that states that the scapegoat is fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to <b>before</b> the <b>lottery,</b> wherein the two goats of the Day of Atonement are brought into the Temple courtyard, and the High Priest draws lots to determine which is to be sacrificed to the Lord, and which is for Azazel. <b>There,</b> the mishna that states that the scapegoat is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to <b>after</b> the <b>lottery,</b> at which point it is no longer fit for the Temple. The Gemara challenges: <b>After</b> the <b>lottery</b> it is <b>also</b> fit to be brought inside, as <b>there is</b> still an obligation for the High Priest to recite <b>confession</b> upon it in the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Mani said:</b> This is <b>not difficult,</b> as <b>here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> that states that the scapegoat may be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to <b>before</b> the <b>confession,</b> when it is still fit to enter the Temple. <b>There,</b> the mishna that states that it is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to <b>after</b> the <b>confession,</b> at which point it is no longer fit to be brought inside.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that with regard to <b>an animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality,</b> or another disqualified offering such as an animal that was designated for idol worship, or one that was worshipped: If one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt. This is because with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering outside, the Torah states: “He did not bring it, to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that there is no liability for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard an animal that is not fit to be sacrificed.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> with regard to <b>this too, derive from</b> the first part of that verse: <b>“To the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”</b> that, as in the case of the red heifer and the scapegoat, if an animal is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for slaughtering it outside."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Granted,</b> with regard to <b>an animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person or an animal that was the object of bestiality, you find</b> circumstances in which the exemption for one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard cannot be based on the fact that it is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, e.g., a case <b>where one initially consecrated it,</b> at which point it was fit to be brought to the Temple courtyard, <b>and then engaged in bestiality with it.</b> Since it was initially fit to be brought to the Temple courtyard, another verse is needed to exclude it.",
            "<b>But</b> with regard to an animal that was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship <b>or</b> one that was <b>worshipped,</b> this explanation is not tenable, since an animal that was already consecrated would not become disqualified because <b>a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his.</b> The Gemara responds that it is possible to disqualify a consecrated item <b>in</b> the case of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> such as a peace offering, <b>and in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: An offering of lesser sanctity is the property of the owner.</b>",
            "This is <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse states with regard to the obligation to bring a guilt offering for robbery for taking a false oath concerning unlawful possession of the property of another: “If anyone sin, <b>and commit a trespass against the Lord,</b> and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). The term “against the Lord” serves <b>to include</b> one who takes an oath with regard to another’s <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, since they</b> are <b>the property of</b> their owner. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.</b>",
            "The Gemara summarizes: <b>Therefore,</b> all of the cases listed in the mishna are cases in which the animal was initially fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting but was subsequently disqualified as an offering. <b>An animal that</b> actively <b>copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality</b> are disqualified after having been consecrated, due to <b>a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse.</b> An animal that was <b>set aside</b> for idol worship <b>or</b> one that <b>was worshipped</b> as an object of <b>idol worship</b> becomes forbidden after it was consecrated in the case <b>of an offering of lesser sanctity,</b> which according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is the property of its owner.",
            "In the case of an animal that was given as <b>payment</b> to a prostitute <b>or</b> as the <b>price</b> of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of <b>diverse kinds,</b> or an animal <b>born by caesarean section,</b> none of which could have occured at a time that the animal was fit to be sacrificed, the mishna is referring <b>to the offspring of sacrificial</b> animals that were given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog while in utero. These animals were fit to be brought as a sacrifice while they were still part of a consecrated animal, and only following birth are they considered to be unfit for sacrifice.",
            "Although these offspring are still part of a consecrated animal while in utero, and as such one might say that the status of payment to a prostitute or the price of a dog should not take effect with regard to them, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>holds</b> that with regard to <b>the offspring of sacrificial</b> animals, <b>they are sanctified</b> only <b>as they are</b> from the time of birth, but not in utero. Therefore, they can be disqualified by serving as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog.",
            "§ The mishna cites a disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon with regard to temporarily <b>blemished</b> animals: Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard violates a prohibition, as they will be fit for sacrifice after the passage of time, whereas the Rabbis hold that one is exempt. The mishna cites two similar disagreements: With regard to doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived that are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, and with regard to one who slaughters an animal <b>itself and its offspring</b> on one day, where the latter, which is not fit for being sacrificed until the next day, is slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>And</b> all of these cases <b>are necessary. As, if</b> the mishna had <b>taught</b> the disagreement only in the case of temporarily <b>blemished</b> animals, one would think that the Rabbis deem exempt one who sacrifices outside the Temple courtyard only in that case, <b>because they are repulsive; but</b> with regard to <b>doves</b> whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, <b>which are not repulsive</b> and which will be fit when their time arrives, <b>I will say</b> that this is <b>not</b> the <i>halakha</i>, and <b>that</b> the Rabbis <b>concede to Rabbi Shimon</b> that one does violate a prohibition.",
            "<b>And if</b> the mishna had <b>taught</b> the disagreement only in the case of <b>doves</b> whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, one could say that it is only in this case that Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside violates a prohibition, <b>because they are not</b> defined as: <b>Fit</b> for sacrifice <b>and rejected;</b> their time of fitness simply has not arrived. <b>But</b> with regard to temporarily <b>blemished</b> animals, <b>which were fit</b> for sacrifice <b>and</b> then <b>disqualified, I will say</b> that this is <b>not</b> the <i>halakha</i>, <b>as Rabbi Shimon concedes to the Rabbis</b> that one who sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard does not violate a prohibition, since they are not fit to be sacrificed as offerings.",
            "<b>And if</b> the mishna had <b>taught</b> only <b>these two</b> cases, i.e., temporarily blemished animals and doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, I would say that the Rabbis hold that one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable <b>because their disqualification</b> is <b>inherent. But</b> in the case of the animal <b>itself and its offspring,</b> where <b>the disqualification comes to</b> the offspring <b>from an external</b> factor, i.e., that its parent was slaughtered that day, <b>I will say</b> that <b>the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon</b> that one who slaughters an animal and its offspring outside the Temple courtyard does violate the prohibition. Therefore, it is <b>necessary</b> for the mishna to teach the disagreement in each case.",
            "§ The mishna teaches <b>that Rabbi Shimon says:</b> In the case of any sacrificial animal that is fit to be sacrificed after the passage of time, if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, he is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. Rabbi Shimon did not specify what prohibition is violated. The Gemara therefore asks: <b>What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon?</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Ile’a says</b> that <b>Reish Lakish says that the verse states: “You shall not do all that we do here this day,</b> every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes. For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God gives you” (Deuteronomy 12:8–9). <b>Moses said</b> the following <b>to the Jewish people: When you enter Eretz</b> Yisrael, <b>upright</b> offerings, i.e., offerings that one believes are proper to bring due to one’s own generosity, such as vow offerings and gift offerings, <b>you may sacrifice,</b> but <b>obligatory</b> offerings <b>you may not sacrifice,</b> even in the Tabernacle in Gilgal, until you arrive at “the rest,” i.e., Shiloh, at which point you may sacrifice them.",
            "<b>And</b> since obligatory offerings during the period of <b>Gilgal, in relation to</b> the period of <b>Shiloh,</b> are considered offerings <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived, <b>and Moses said to</b> the Jewish people concerning them: <b>“You shall not do,”</b> during that period, it follows that one who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not do.”",
            "<b>Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira:</b> Therefore, it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings whose time has not yet arrived, even if they are sacrificed in the Tabernacle as was the case in Gilgal. <b>If so,</b> anyone who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived, even if he sacrifices it inside the Temple courtyard,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>should also receive lashes</b> for sacrificing it, just as one would for violating other Torah prohibitions. <b>Why did Rabbi Zeira say</b> elsewhere that one who slaughters, inside the Temple courtyard, an offering whose time has not yet arrived does not receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23), which is the general prohibition against sacrificing animals that are not fit to be sacrificed. Rabbi Zeira explains that he does not receive lashes because <b>the verse has transmuted</b> the negative precept <b>into</b> a prohibition that is stated as <b>a positive mitzva,</b> in the verse: “But from the eighth day forward it may be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27). There is no punishment of lashes for violating such a prohibition. Rabbi Yirmeya is asking that one should still receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “You shall not do.”",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>That statement</b> of Rabbi Zeira applies only <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the mishna and hold that the verse that states: “You shall not do,” does not indicate that one who slaughters an animal whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of a prohibition. But <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> one would <b>indeed</b> receive lashes for slaughtering an animal whose time has not yet arrived inside the Temple.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:</b> Rabbi Zeira’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who also holds that one would not receive lashes for slaughtering inside the Temple courtyard an offering whose time has not yet arrived. A prohibition cannot be derived from the prohibition stated with regard to the Tabernacle in Gilgal, since <b>inside</b> the Tabernacle <b>in Gilgal, in relation to</b> the Tabernacle in <b>Shiloh, is considered like outside,</b> and the prohibition: “You shall not do,” pertains only to sacrificing an offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Rabba said: The reason of Rabbi Shimon</b> is not based upon: “You shall not do,” as Reish Lakish claims, but upon another verse. <b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that one who slaughters</b> his <b>Paschal offering on a private altar at a time</b> when it is <b>prohibited</b> to sacrifice offerings on private <b>altars</b> violates <b>a prohibition? The verse states: “You may not sacrifice the Paschal offering</b> within any of your gates; but at the place that the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell in, there you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:5–6).",
            "One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>even at a time</b> when it is <b>permitted</b> to sacrifice offerings on private <b>altars</b> this is <b>so.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Within any [<i>be’aḥad</i>] of your gates,”</b> which indicates that <b>I said</b> this prohibition <b>to you only when all of the Jewish people enter</b> the Temple <b>through one [<i>eḥad</i>] gate</b> in order to sacrifice their offerings. When there is no permanent communal altar, it is permitted to slaughter the Paschal offering on a private altar.",
            "Rabba analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: <b>When</b> was this Paschal offering, for which one violates a prohibition for slaughtering it during a time when it is forbidden to sacrifice on private altars, slaughtered? <b>If we say</b> that it was <b>after midday</b> on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the proper time for sacrificing the Paschal offering in the Temple, then one who sacrifices it then violates not only a prohibition, he should also <b>be deemed liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> as well,</b> as would anyone who slaughters a fit offering outside the Temple courtyard. <b>Rather, is it not</b> discussing one who slaughtered the Paschal offering on a private altar on the fourteenth of Nisan <b>before midday,</b> when its time had not yet arrived?",
            "The Gemara rejects Rabba’s explanation: <b>Actually,</b> the Paschal offering may have been sacrificed on a private altar <b>after midday</b> of the fourteenth of Nisan, <b>and</b> it is <b>referring to a time</b> when it is <b>permitted</b> to sacrifice on private <b>altars,</b> i.e., the periods of Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon. The verse teaches that although it was permitted to sacrifice voluntary vow offerings and gift offerings on a private altar, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed only on a great public altar.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>state: At a time</b> when it is <b>prohibited</b> to sacrifice offerings on private <b>altars?</b> The Gemara responds: The <i>baraita</i> means that it is <b>prohibited for</b> one to sacrifice the Paschal offering on a private <b>altar,</b> but it is <b>permitted</b> to use a private <b>altar for another</b> offering, i.e., a voluntary vow offering or gift offering.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that with regard to an offering <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived because it is premature for its owner, one who sacrifices it outside the Temple courtyard is exempt. This category includes a <i>zav</i>, a <i>zava</i>, and a woman after childbirth, any of whom sacrificed a sin offering or guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard during the days that they are counting toward purification. The Gemara asks: <b>And are these</b> individuals <b>subject to</b> the obligation to bring <b>guilt offerings? Ze’eiri said:</b> The text of the mishna should <b>teach: Leper, together with</b> the <i>zav</i>, <i>zava</i>, and woman after childbirth. A leper brings a guilt offering as part of his purification process.",
            "The mishna also teaches that if those whose time has not yet arrived sacrifice <b>their burnt offerings or their peace offerings</b> outside the Temple courtyard, they are liable. The Gemara asks: <b>And are these</b> individuals <b>subject to</b> the obligation to bring <b>peace offerings? Rav Sheshet said: Teach</b> the case of <b>a Nazirite</b> as part of the list in the mishna. A nazirite brings a peace offering at the conclusion of his term of naziriteship. The Gemara notes that the addition <b>of Ze’eiri</b> to the text of the mishna, i.e., the case of a leper, was <b>fixed</b> by <b>the <i>tanna’im</i></b> in the version of the mishna that they would teach, while the addition <b>of Rav Sheshet,</b> i.e., the case of a nazirite, was <b>not fixed</b> by <b>the <i>tanna’im</i></b> in the mishna that they would teach.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that if one whose days of purification are not complete, e.g., a leper, slaughters his guilt offering outside the courtyard, he is exempt, since the offering is not fit for sacrifice at that time. With regard to this, <b>Rabbi Ḥilkiya,</b> a Sage <b>from the school of Rav Tovi, says: They taught</b> this <b>only</b> with regard to one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard <b>for its own sake. But</b> if he slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard <b>not for its own sake</b> but for the sake of a different offering, he is <b>liable</b> for having sacrificed outside the courtyard. This is <b>because</b> it was <b>fit to</b> be sacrificed <b>not for its own sake inside</b> the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake is fit for sacrifice (see 2a).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> one who slaughtered the guilt offering <b>for its own sake should also be liable</b> for having slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, <b>since</b> it was <b>fit</b> to be slaughtered <b>not for its sake inside</b> the Temple courtyard. The Gemara answers: In order for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard to be considered fit to be sacrificed inside it, it first <b>requires uprooting</b> of its status, i.e., the one who slaughters it should intend explicitly that it be a different sacrifice. If its status as a guilt offering has not been uprooted, it is not considered fit to be sacrificed inside.",
            "<b>Rav Huna objects to</b> Rabbi Ḥilkiya’s statement that a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived is fit to be sacrificed inside if it is slaughtered not for its own sake: <b>And is there anything that is not fit</b> if its action is performed <b>for its own sake, but is fit</b> if its action is performed <b>not for its sake?</b> The Gemara replies: <b>And</b> is there <b>not? But</b> there is"
        ],
        [
            "the <b>Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year,</b> i.e., not on the fourteenth of Nisan after midday, when it is fit to be sacrificed, <b>which is not fit</b> if it was sacrificed <b>for its sake, but is fit</b> if it was sacrificed <b>not for its sake.</b> The Gemara responds: The <b>Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year is</b> considered to be <b>a peace offering,</b> not a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not for its sake.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that the following <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard, not for its own sake, is liable: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I exclude</b> from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering outside the courtyard <b>even</b> one who slaughters <b>a burnt offering whose time has not yet</b> arrived <b>due to</b> its being premature <b>for its owner,</b> e.g., a woman after childbirth whose term of impurity is not yet finished, <b>and</b> one who slaughters <b>the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper</b> before they are fit to sacrifice their offerings.",
            "To counter this, <b>the verse states</b> with regard to slaughter outside the courtyard: “Whatever person there be of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). <b>“Ox”</b> indicates <b>in any case</b> of an ox, <b>“lamb”</b> indicates <b>in any case</b> of a lamb, and <b>“goat”</b> indicates <b>in any case</b> of a goat, that one is liable for slaughtering them outside the courtyard; <b>while a sin offering</b> was <b>omitted</b> from the cases in the <i>baraita</i> where one who slaughters the offering outside the courtyard is liable.",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>What are we dealing with</b> in this <i>baraita</i> when it discusses the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper? <b>If we say</b> that it is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the courtyard <b>at its</b> proper <b>time, why</b> state that one is liable <b>specifically</b> for <b>a guilt offering?</b> One would be liable for slaughtering <b>a sin offering</b> outside the courtyard at its time <b>as well. Rather,</b> it is discussing a guilt offering that was slaughtered <b>not at its time,</b> i.e., when the nazirite or leper’s time had not yet arrived.",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>And what</b> is the <i>baraita</i> dealing <b>with? If we say</b> that it is dealing with one who slaughtered it <b>for its sake, why</b> would he be <b>liable</b> for <b>a guilt offering</b> that was slaughtered outside the courtyard if it is not fit for sacrifice? <b>Rather, is</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>not</b> dealing with one who slaughtered it <b>not for its sake,</b> and the <i>baraita</i> states that one would be liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya? The Gemara rejects this: <b>Actually,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with one who slaughtered a guilt offering outside the courtyard <b>at its</b> proper <b>time and not for its sake.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> although there is ostensibly no need for an additional verse from which to derive the <i>halakha</i> in this case, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake inside the courtyard is fit for sacrifice, the <i>baraita</i> <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, who says: We juxtapose a guilt offering with a sin offering</b> in the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; there is one law for them” (Leviticus 7:7), from which it may be derived that they have equivalent halakhic status. Therefore, a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified, and consequently one might say that one who slaughters a guilt offering not for its sake outside the Temple courtyard is exempt, as it is not fit for sacrifice. Therefore, the derivation from the verse is necessary.",
            "<b>And</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>taught:</b> Guilt offering, which, in this context, is <b>secondary</b> to the sin offering, as it is derived from the latter. <b>But the same is true</b> of the <b>primary,</b> i.e., the sin offering: One who slaughters it outside the courtyard not for its sake is liable.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> in support of Rabbi Ḥilkiya: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I include</b> in liability even one who slaughters <b>a burnt offering whose time has not yet</b> arrived because it is <b>intrinsically</b> lacking, i.e., eight days have not yet passed; <b>and</b> one who slaughters <b>a sin offering</b> whose time has not yet arrived, <b>whether</b> because it is <b>intrinsically</b> lacking <b>or</b> because it is premature for <b>the owner.</b>",
            "To counter this, <b>the verse states</b> with regard to one who slaughters outside the courtyard: <b>“And</b> has not brought it <b>to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”</b> (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that for <b>any</b> sacrifice <b>that is unfit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for</b> slaughtering it outside the courtyard. <b>But a guilt offering</b> whose time has not yet arrived was <b>omitted</b> by the <i>tanna</i>, from which it can be inferred that one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the courtyard is liable.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What are we dealing with? If we say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a case where one slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard <b>for its sake,</b> then one who slaughters <b>a guilt offering should also be exempt,</b> as it is an offering whose time has not yet arrived. <b>Rather, is it not</b> dealing with a case of one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard <b>not for its sake?</b> In this case, one would be exempt for slaughtering it outside the courtyard, as if it is slaughtered inside the courtyard not for its sake it is disqualified. But in the case of a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived one would be liable, since it is fit for sacrifice, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>Actually,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard <b>not for its sake. And</b> nevertheless, it may not be inferred that in the case of a guilt offering one would be liable, as this <i>baraita</i> may <b>be</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Eliezer, who juxtaposes a guilt offering with a sin offering;</b> and one who slaughters a guilt offering is also exempt. The <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> omitted mention of a guilt offering because he <b>taught:</b> Sin offering, which is the <b>primary</b> case of the disqualification of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, <b>and all the more so</b> it applies <b>to</b> the <b>secondary</b> case, i.e., the guilt offering.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> another proof for the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, <b>as when Rav Dimi came</b> to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael <b>he said</b> that <b>the school of Rabbi Livai taught</b> a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought <b>that I exclude</b> from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard <b>even</b> one who slaughters <b>a burnt offering whose time has not yet</b> arrived <b>due to</b> its being premature <b>for its owner,</b> or who slaughters <b>a guilt offering of a nazirite or the guilt offering of a leper</b> whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner. <b>From where</b> is it derived that one is liable for doing so? Rav Dimi added: <b>And</b> the Sages <b>brought a derivation</b> from a verse to prove that one is <b>liable, but I do not know what</b> the derivation <b>is.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies: <b>What is the</b> biblical <b>derivation? Ravina said</b> that it is derived from the verse cited above with regard to offerings that are slaughtered outside the courtyard, where <b>“ox”</b> indicates <b>in any case</b> of an ox, <b>“lamb”</b> indicates <b>in any case</b> of a lamb, and <b>“goat”</b> indicates <b>in any case</b> of a goat. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, as the <i>baraita</i> is discussing a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived that is slaughtered not for its sake, and contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna. The Gemara asks: <b>What contradiction</b> is <b>this?</b> It can be resolved <b>as you stated</b> earlier: That the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake at the proper time, and is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman said</b> that according to the opinion of Rav Dimi, the <i>baraita</i> cannot be interpreted as dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered at its proper time, <b>because he raises a contradiction between</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>that the school of Rabbi Livai taught</b> and a <i>baraita</i> <b>that Levi taught: The guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper that one slaughtered not for their sakes are fit, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.</b>",
            "If one <b>slaughtered them</b> in a case where the offering was <b>premature due to its owner, or</b> if the lambs <b>were in their second year</b> when one <b>slaughtered them,</b> and not in their first year as required, they <b>are disqualified,</b> and one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable. This contradicts the <i>baraita</i> taught by the school of Rabbi Livai.",
            "<b>And Rav Dimi answers:</b> This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> in the <i>baraita</i> that states that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is exempt, it is referring to a case where the animal whose time has not yet arrived was slaughtered <b>for its sake; there,</b> in the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is liable, it is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered <b>not for its sake.</b>",
            "Likewise, <b>Rav Ashi raises a contradiction between the mishna,</b> which teaches that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the courtyard is exempt, <b>and the <i>baraita</i>,</b> which teaches that one who does so is liable. <b>And</b> Rav Ashi <b>answers: Here,</b> the mishna that teaches that one is exempt is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered <b>for its sake. And there,</b> the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that one is liable is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered <b>not for its sake,</b> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.",
            "The Gemara says: If so, <b>shall we say</b> that this <b>is a conclusive refutation</b> of the opinion <b>of Rav Huna,</b> who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived not for its sake outside the courtyard is exempt?",
            "The Gemara replies that <b>Rav Huna</b> could have <b>said to you: What are we dealing with here,</b> in the <i>baraita</i> that deems one liable for a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake? We are dealing with a case <b>where</b> one <b>separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee,</b> so that atonement would be achieved through the sacrifice of the second if the first was lost, but before the proper time arrived he slaughtered one of them as a burnt offering rather than as a guilt offering. In this case there would be liability for slaughtering outside the courtyard, as is the case with one who slaughters a burnt offering outside the courtyard, <b>since one of them,</b> i.e., the one that will not effect atonement, <b>is a burnt offering from the outset.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "This is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement that <b>Rav Huna</b> says that <b>Rav says. As Rav Huna says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>a guilt offering</b> whose owner died or achieved atonement through a different guilt offering and which <b>was consigned to grazing</b> in the field until it develops a blemish, <b>and</b> prior to its being consigned one <b>slaughtered it without specification</b> of its purpose, it is <b>fit as a burnt offering.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>One who offers up</b> outside the Temple courtyard a portion <b>of the meat of a sin offering</b> that is eaten, or who offers up a portion of several other items, is exempt. With regard to the reasoning behind this <i>halakha</i>, <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived <b>that one who offers up</b> outside the Temple courtyard a portion <b>of the meat of a sin offering, or</b> a portion <b>of the meat of a guilt offering, or</b> a portion <b>of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, or</b> a portion <b>of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, or</b> a portion <b>of the surplus of the <i>omer</i> offering, or the two loaves, or the shewbread, or the remainder of meal offerings</b> is <b>exempt,</b> as all these are eaten by the priests and not sacrificed on the altar?",
            "<b>The verse states</b> with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard: “Whatever man…that sacrifices <b>a burnt offering</b> or sacrifice, and brings it not to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The term “burnt offering” teaches: <b>Just as a burnt offering is fit for offering up</b> upon the altar, <b>so too, anything that is fit for offering up</b> is included in the prohibition. All of the offerings listed in the <i>baraita</i> are not sacrificed upon the altar but given to the priests.",
            "<b>From where</b> is it derived <b>that even</b> with regard to <b>one who pours</b> oil onto the meal offering, <b>and one who mixes</b> the oil into the flour of the meal offering, <b>and one who breaks</b> the loaves of the meal offering into pieces, <b>and one who salts</b> the meal offering or other offerings, <b>and one who waves</b> the meal offering, <b>and one who brings</b> the meal offering to the corner of an altar that he constructs outside the courtyard, <b>and one who arranges</b> the shewbread on <b>the table</b> outside the Sanctuary, <b>and one who removes the ashes</b> from <b>the lamps</b> of the Candelabrum, <b>and one who removes a handful</b> from a meal offering, <b>and one who collects the blood</b> of an offering in a vessel, if he did so <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "<b>The verse states: “That sacrifices a burnt offering or sacrifice”</b> (Leviticus 17:8). <b>Just as sacrificing is the conclusion of</b> the sacrificial <b>service, so too, any</b> rite <b>that is the conclusion of</b> a sacrificial <b>service</b> is included. All of these are excluded from the prohibition, as there are rites that follow them.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>Until the Tabernacle was established,</b> private altars were permitted and the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn. The Gemara relates that <b>Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina was sitting before Rav Ḥisda and was reading</b> this verse with regard to the revelation at Sinai: <b>“And he sent the young men of the children of Israel,</b> who offered burnt offerings and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord” (Exodus 24:5). The young men referred to in the verse were the firstborn of the Jewish people. Rav Ḥisda <b>said to him: This</b> is what <b>Rabbi Asi said: They sacrificed</b> the offerings <b>and</b> then <b>ceased</b> to serve; after that day, the firstborn no longer performed the sacrificial service.",
            "Rav Huna <b>thought to raise a contradiction from the mishna,</b> which states that the firstborn performed not only the sacrificial service on that day, but also did so until the Tabernacle was established the following year. In the meanwhile, <b>he heard</b> Rav Ḥisda <b>say in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava</b> that the <b>burnt offering that the</b> children of <b>Israel sacrificed in the wilderness</b> before the establishment of the Tabernacle <b>did not require flaying</b> of the skin <b>and cutting</b> into pieces; it was sacrificed as it was. He therefore <b>raised the contradiction</b> from <b>a <i>baraita</i> that is equal with regard to both of them,</b> i.e., from which Rav Huna could raise a contradiction to both of Rav Ḥisda’s statements.",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Until the Tabernacle was established,</b> private <b>altars</b> were <b>permitted, the</b> sacrificial <b>service</b> was performed <b>by the firstborn, and all</b> animals were <b>fit to be sacrificed: A domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird; males and females; unblemished and blemished</b> animals. All animal sacrifices were brought from animals and birds that were <b>kosher, but not</b> from <b>non-kosher</b> species.",
            "<b>And all</b> offerings brought before the construction of the Tabernacle were <b>sacrificed</b> as <b>burnt offerings. And</b> the <b>burnt offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the wilderness</b> before the Tabernacle was established <b>required flaying</b> of the skin <b>and cutting</b> into pieces. <b>And today, gentiles are permitted to</b> sacrifice offerings on private altars. The <i>baraita</i> states explicitly that until the Tabernacle was constructed, the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn, and the burnt offering required flaying and cutting.",
            "Rav Ḥisda replied that with regard to the firstborn, it <b>is</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: God said to Moses on Mount Sinai: <b>“And let the priests also that come near to the Lord sanctify themselves,</b> lest the Lord break forth upon them” (Exodus 19:22). In other words, they should separate themselves and not approach the mountain. This command was given one day after the burnt offerings and peace offerings were sacrificed in anticipation of the revelation at Sinai. With regard to this command, <b>Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: This</b> command is a reference to <b>the separation of</b> the <b>firstborn,</b> as they functioned as priests. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: This</b> command is a reference to <b>the separation of Nadav and Avihu,</b> who were priests.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Granted, according to the one who says</b> that the command for the priests to sanctify themselves is referring to <b>the separation of Nadav and Avihu, this is</b> the meaning of that <b>which is written</b> after their death on the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “Then Moses said to Aaron: <b>This is it that the Lord spoke, saying: Through them that are near to Me I will be sanctified…</b>and Aaron held his peace” (Leviticus 10:3). Nadav and Avihu had already been warned not to draw too close: “Lest the Lord break forth upon them.”",
            "<b>But according to the one who says</b> that the command for the priests to sanctify themselves is referring to <b>the separation of</b> the <b>firstborn, where is the allusion</b> to the fact that God would be sanctified through Nadav and Avihu? The Gemara replies: <b>As it is written: “And there I will meet with the children of Israel; and it shall be sanctified by My glory”</b> (Exodus 29:43). <b>Do not read</b> it as <b>“by My glory [<i>bikhvodi</i>]”; rather,</b> read it as: <b>By My honored ones [<i>bimekhubadai</i>].</b> God will be sanctified by those considered honored by God when He reveals Himself in the Tabernacle.",
            "<b>The Holy One, Blessed be He, said this statement to Moses, but</b> Moses <b>did not know</b> its meaning <b>until the sons of Aaron died. Once the sons of Aaron died,</b> Moses <b>said to him: Aaron, my brother, your sons died only to sanctify the name of the Holy One, Blessed be He. When Aaron knew that his sons were beloved by the Omnipresent, he was silent and received a reward, as it is stated: “And Aaron held his peace [<i>vayidom</i>].”</b>",
            "<b>And likewise in</b> a verse written by <b>David</b> it <b>states: “Resign yourself [<i>dom</i>] to the Lord, and wait patiently [<i>vehitḥolel</i>] for Him”</b> (Psalms 37:7). <b>Although He strikes down many corpses [<i>ḥalalim</i>]</b> around <b>you, you be silent</b> and do not complain. <b>And likewise in</b> a verse written by <b>Solomon</b> it <b>states: “A time to keep silence, and a time to speak”</b> (Ecclesiastes 3:7). There are <b>times that</b> one <b>is silent and receives reward for the silence,</b> and at <b>times</b> one <b>speaks and receives reward for the speech.</b>",
            "<b>And this is what Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What</b> is the meaning of that <b>which is written: “Awesome is God out of your holy places”</b> (Psalms 68:36)? <b>Do not read</b> it as: <b>“From your holy places [<i>mimikdashekha</i>]”; rather,</b> read it as: <b>From your holy ones [<i>mimekudashekha</i>]. When the Holy One, Blessed be He, carries out judgment upon His holy ones, He is feared, and exalted, and praised</b> by all. In any event, there is no contradiction from the <i>baraita</i> which teaches that the firstborns perform the sacrificial service before the Tabernacle was established, as this matter is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>.",
            "<b>But</b> there is still <b>a difficulty</b> with regard to the <b>burnt offering,</b> as it was stated in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava that the burnt offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the wilderness did not require flaying of the skin or cutting into pieces, while the <i>baraita</i> states that it did. The Gemara replies: This <b>is</b> a dispute between the opinions of <b>two <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yishmael says:</b> The <b>general statements,</b> i.e., the principles of the Torah, <b>were said at Sinai, and</b> the <b>details</b> of the mitzvot that are explicated in Leviticus were said to Moses <b>in the Tent of Meeting.</b> This includes the <i>halakha</i> that the burnt offering must be flayed and cut into pieces. Consequently, it could not have been in effect before the construction of the Tabernacle.",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> Both <b>general statements and</b> the <b>details</b> of mitzvot <b>were said at Sinai and</b> later <b>taught again in the Tent of Meeting, and</b> taught <b>a third time</b> by Moses to the Jewish people <b>in the plains of Moab,</b> when he taught the Torah to the people (see Deuteronomy 1:1). According to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the <i>halakha</i> of flaying and cutting into pieces was in effect when the Torah was given, even before the construction of the Tabernacle.",
            "§ <b>The Master said</b> in the <i>baraita</i>: Before the Tabernacle was established, <b>all</b> animals were <b>fit to be sacrificed:</b> A domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Rav Huna said: As the verse states</b> with regard to the offering that was sacrificed after the flood: <b>“And Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure fowl,</b> and offered burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). The Gemara explains: <b>“Animal [<i>behema</i>],”</b> is understood <b>in accordance with its plain meaning,</b> a domesticated animal, and the same is true of fowl; <b>an undomesticated animal [<i>ḥayya</i>]</b> is <b>included in</b> the term <b>“<i>behema</i>”</b> that is stated in the verse."
        ],
        [
            "That which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: All animals were fit to be sacrificed: <b>Males and females, unblemished and blemished</b> animals, pertains to <b>that</b> which <b>the Master said</b> as a principle concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of sacrifices: The requirements that an offering must have <b>unblemished status and</b> that a burnt offering must have <b>male status</b> apply <b>to animal</b> offerings, <b>but</b> the requirements of <b>unblemished status and male status</b> do <b>not</b> apply <b>to birds.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> in the verses that recount Noah’s sacrifices upon exiting the ark, <b>a domesticated animal is juxtaposed with a bird,</b> in the verse: “Of every pure animal, and of every pure fowl” (Genesis 8:20), which teaches that kosher animals had a status identical to that of birds, and could be sacrificed whether male or female, unblemished or blemished.",
            "The Gemara adds: That which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>Unblemished and blemished</b> animals, serves <b>to exclude</b> animals that are <b>lacking a limb, which</b> were <b>not</b> fit for sacrifice. As <b>Rabbi Elazar says: From where</b> is it derived <b>that</b> an animal that is <b>lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah,</b> i.e., gentiles, to be used as a sacrifice? <b>The verse states</b> with regard to Noah: <b>“And of every living being of all flesh,</b> two of every sort shall you bring into the ark” (Genesis 6:19). With regard to the phrase: “And of every living being,” which is superfluous, <b>the Torah stated: Bring an animal whose limbs are</b> all <b>living,</b> not one lacking a limb, as that animal is disqualified from sacrifice.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But perhaps</b> this phrase: “And of every living being,” serves <b>to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>]</b> from being fit as a sacrifice. The Gemara explains: The disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> <b>is derived from</b> the phrase: <b>“To keep seed alive”</b> (Genesis 7:3), as a <i>tereifa</i> cannot propagate.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that <b>a <i>tereifa</i> cannot give birth.</b> In this case the disqualification of the <i>tereifa</i> is derived from the verse: “To keep seed alive,” while the disqualification of the animal lacking a limb is derived from the verse: “And of every living being.” <b>But according to the one who says</b> that <b>a <i>tereifa</i> can give birth, what can be said?</b> According to this opinion, a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be excluded by the phrase: “To keep seed alive.” The Gemara explains: <b>Doesn’t the verse state</b> with regard to the animals that were brought by Noah into the ark: “You shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive <b>with you”</b> (Genesis 6:19)? The term “with you” indicates that the verse is stated <b>with regard to</b> animals that are <b>similar to you,</b> not a <i>tereifa</i>.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But perhaps Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>.</b> If so, one cannot exclude a <i>tereifa</i> from the comparison of animals to Noah. The Gemara answers: <b>It is written about</b> Noah that he was <b>“complete”</b> (Genesis 6:9), which indicates that he was physically whole and unblemished. The Gemara challenges: <b>But perhaps</b> the verse means that <b>his ways were complete,</b> and it is not referring to Noah’s physical attributes. The Gemara explains: <b>It is</b> already <b>written about him</b> that he was <b>“righteous”</b> (Genesis 6:9), which means that his actions were perfect. Consequently, when the verse says that he was also complete, it must be referring to his body.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>But perhaps</b> the verse means that Noah was <b>complete in his manner,</b> and he was <b>righteous in his</b> good <b>deeds.</b> Accordingly, the verse would not exclude the possibility that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara responds: <b>If it enters your mind</b> to say <b>that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>, would the Merciful One have said to him: Bring in</b> <i>tereifot</i> <b>like you</b> to the ark, but <b>do not bring in whole</b> and perfect animals? It is not reasonable to say that there would be a preference for him to bring <i>tereifot</i>. Rather, Noah was certainly not a <i>tereifa</i>, and the fact that a <i>tereifa</i> is disqualified for sacrifice is derived from “with you.”",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And once we derive</b> the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> <b>from</b> the term <b>“with you,” why do I</b> need the phrase <b>“to keep seed alive”?</b> The Gemara answers: If one could derive only from <b>“with you,” you would say</b> that Noah brought the animals to the ark <b>only for</b> the purpose of <b>companionship,</b> and therefore <b>even</b> an animal that is <b>old</b> or <b>even one who is castrated</b> can come into the ark, provided that it is not a <i>tereifa</i>. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “To keep seed alive,” which <b>teaches us</b> that only animals that can bear offspring were allowed to be brought into the ark.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> also teaches that before the Tabernacle was constructed, sacrifices were brought from animals and birds that were <b>kosher, but not</b> from <b>non-kosher</b> species. This is based on the verse that describes what Noah sacrificed when he exited the ark: “And he took of every pure animal and of every pure fowl and offered burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). The Gemara asks: <b>And were there pure and impure</b> species <b>at that time,</b> during the period of Noah? The distinction between pure, i.e., kosher species, and impure, i.e., non-kosher species, was introduced only after the Torah was given (see Leviticus, chapter 11). <b>Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yonatan says:</b> The pure animals that Noah took were <b>from those that had not been used in the performance of sin.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where did</b> Noah and his sons <b>know</b> which animals had been used in the performance of a sin, in order to prevent them from entering the ark? The Gemara answers that it is <b>in accordance with</b> the statement <b>of Rav Ḥisda. As Rav Ḥisda says:</b> Noah caused all of the animals to <b>pass before the ark. All</b> animals <b>that the ark accepted,</b> i.e., drew in, were <b>known to be pure;</b> if <b>the ark did not accept them,</b> it was <b>known that they</b> were <b>impure.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Abbahu says</b> there is a different explanation as to how Noah knew which animals were pure or impure. <b>The verse states: “And they that went in,</b> went in <b>male and female</b> of all flesh” (Genesis 7:16), which means: Those <b>that went in on their own.</b> Consequently, Noah did not need to distinguish between pure and impure animals, as only the pure ones approached.",
            "§ In describing the sacrificial service before the Tabernacle was constructed, <b>the Master said: And all</b> offerings brought before the construction of the Tabernacle were <b>sacrificed</b> as <b>burnt offerings.</b> The Gemara infers: <b>Burnt offerings, yes,</b> were sacrificed, but <b>peace offerings</b> were <b>not</b> sacrificed. The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> with regard to the offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai at the time of the giving of the Torah, <b>it is written:</b> “And they offered burnt offerings, <b>and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord”</b> (Exodus 24:5). This event occurred prior to the construction of the Tabernacle. <b>Rather, say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> means: <b>All</b> offerings <b>sacrificed</b> were either <b>burnt offerings or peace offerings.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>And isn’t it taught</b> in another <i>baraita</i>: <b>But peace offerings</b> were <b>not</b> sacrificed before the construction of the Tabernacle; <b>rather, only burnt offerings</b> were sacrificed? Clearly, <b>burnt offerings, yes,</b> were sacrificed, but <b>peace offerings</b> were <b>not</b> sacrificed. The Gemara answers that this <i>baraita</i> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>the one who says</b> that <b>peace offerings were not sacrificed</b> by the <b>descendants of Noah. As it was stated</b> that there is a dispute between <b>Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina</b> with regard to this: <b>One says</b> that <b>the descendants of Noah sacrificed peace offerings, and one says</b> that <b>they did not sacrifice</b> peace offerings.",
            "The Gemara explains the two opinions: <b>What is the reasoning of the one who says</b> that <b>the descendants of Noah sacrificed peace offerings? As it is written: “And Abel, he also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of the fat thereof”</b> (Genesis 4:4). Abel, like all gentiles, is categorized as a descendant of Noah. The verse emphasizes that the fat was sacrificed. The Gemara analyzes: <b>What is an item,</b> i.e., an offering, <b>the fat of which is sacrificed upon the altar, but</b> that <b>is not sacrificed in its entirety upon the altar? You must say: This is the peace offering,</b> the meat of which is consumed.",
            "<b>What is the reasoning of the one who says</b> that <b>they did not sacrifice</b> peace offerings? <b>As it is written: “Awake [<i>uri</i>], O north; and come, south…</b>Let my beloved come into his garden, and eat his precious fruits” (Song of Songs 4:16). The Gemara interprets this homiletically: The <b>nation,</b> i.e., the nations of the world, who are the descendants of Noah, <b>whose acts,</b> i.e., sacrifices, are only <b>in the north,</b> i.e., they sacrifice only burnt offerings, which are slaughtered and their blood collected in the north of the Temple courtyard, <b>shall be removed [<i>titna’er</i>], and</b> in its place <b>shall come</b> the Jewish <b>nation, whose acts,</b> i.e., sacrifices, are <b>in the north and in the south,</b> as they sacrifice burnt offerings, whose rites are performed in the north, and peace offerings, whose rites may also be performed in the south, as the entire courtyard is fit for their rites.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And also</b> according to <b>the Master</b> who holds that the descendants of Noah did not sacrifice peace offerings, <b>isn’t it written: “And of the fat thereof,”</b> from which it may be derived that Abel sacrificed a peace offering? The Gemara answers: “The fat thereof,” does not mean that Abel sacrificed only the fats of his offerings; rather, it means that he sacrificed <b>the fattest of them,</b> i.e., the fattest and choicest of his animals.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And also</b> according to <b>the Master</b> who holds that the descendants of Noah did sacrifice peace offerings, <b>isn’t it written: “Awake, O north,”</b> from which it may be derived that the nations of the world do not sacrifice peace offerings? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, <b>that</b> verse <b>is written with regard to the ingathering of the exiles,</b> i.e., the Jewish exiles will come from the north and the south.",
            "With regard to the opinion that the descendants of Noah did not sacrifice peace offerings, the Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written: “And Moses said: You must also give into our hand sacrifices [<i>zevaḥim</i>] and burnt offerings, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God”</b> (Exodus 10:25)? This indicates that sacrifices [<i>zevaḥim</i>], i.e., peace offerings, were sacrificed before the Torah was given. The Gemara answers: In this context, <b>“<i>zevaḥim</i>”</b> is referring to animals to be used <b>for consumption,</b> as the word <i>zevaḥ</i> can also be translated as an animal for slaughter, <b>and “burnt offerings”</b> is referring to animals to be used <b>for sacrifice.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But isn’t it written</b> before the giving of the Torah: <b>“And Yitro, Moses’ father-in-law, took a burnt offering and sacrifices [<i>zevaḥim</i>]</b> for God” (Exodus 18:12)? Since the word <i>zevaḥim</i> there is referring to sacrifices, as the verse clearly states that Yitro took them for God, evidently peace offerings were sacrificed before the giving of the Torah. The Gemara answers: <b>That</b> verse <b>was written</b> with regard to the period <b>after the giving of the Torah,</b> when the Jewish people were permitted to sacrifice peace offerings.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>This works out well according to the one who says</b> that the episode with <b>Yitro was after the giving of the Torah. But according to the one who says</b> that the episode with <b>Yitro was before the giving of the Torah, what can be said? As it was stated: The sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi</b> engage in a dispute concerning this issue. <b>One says</b> that the episode with <b>Yitro was before the giving of the Torah, and one says</b> that the episode with <b>Yitro was after the giving of the Torah.</b> The Gemara answers: <b>The one who says</b> that the episode with <b>Yitro was before the giving of the Torah maintains</b> that <b>the descendants of Noah did sacrifice peace offerings.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara notes that the disagreement between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to when Yitro came to Mount Sinai is <b>like</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>:</b> The Torah states with regard to Yitro, before he came to Mount Sinai: <b>“Now Yitro, the priest of Midian, Moses’ father-in-law, heard</b> of all that God had done for Moses, and for Israel His people, how the Lord had brought Israel out of Egypt” (Exodus 18:1). <b>What tiding did he hear that he came and converted? Rabbi Yehoshua says: He heard</b> about <b>the war with Amalek, as it is written adjacent to</b> the verses that state that Yitro came: <b>“And Joshua weakened Amalek and his people with the edge of the sword”</b> (Exodus 17:13).",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i says: He heard</b> about <b>the giving of the Torah and came. As when the Torah was given to the Jewish people, the voice of</b> the Holy One, Blessed be He, <b>went from</b> one <b>end of the world to the</b> other <b>end, and all of the kings of the nations of the world were overcome with trembling in their palaces and recited a song</b> of praise, <b>as it is stated:</b> “The voice of the Lord makes the hinds to calve…<b>and in his palace all say: Glory”</b> (Psalms 29:9), i.e., each king in his own palace recited songs of praise to God.",
            "At that time, <b>all of</b> the kings <b>gathered around Balaam the wicked,</b> who was the greatest gentile prophet, <b>and said to him: What is the tumultuous sound,</b> i.e., the loud noise, <b>that we have heard? Perhaps a flood is coming to</b> destroy <b>the world, as it is stated: “The Lord sat enthroned at the flood”</b> (Psalms 29:10)? Balaam <b>said to them: “The Lord sits as King forever”</b> (Psalms 29:10), which means that <b>the Holy One, Blessed be He, already took an oath</b> after the flood <b>never to bring a flood to the world,</b> as it is stated: “And the waters shall no more become a flood” (Genesis 9:15).",
            "The kings <b>said to him: He will not bring a flood of water,</b> as he vowed, <b>but</b> perhaps <b>He will bring a flood of fire,</b> as in the future the Lord will punish the nations with fire, <b>as it is stated: “For by fire will the Lord contend,</b> and by His sword with all flesh; and the slain of the Lord shall be many” (Isaiah 66:16). Balaam <b>said to them: He already took an oath that He will not destroy all flesh</b> in any manner, as it is stated: “To destroy all flesh” (Genesis 9:15). Therefore, there will not be a flood of fire.",
            "They asked: <b>And</b> if so, <b>what is this tumultuous sound that we have heard?</b> Balaam <b>said to them: He has a good</b> and <b>precious item in His treasury, that was hidden away with Him</b> for <b>974 generations before the world was created, and He seeks to give it to his children, as it is stated: “The Lord will give strength to His people”</b> (Psalms 29:11). “Strength” is a reference to the Torah, which is the strength of the Jewish people. <b>Immediately, they all began to say: “The Lord will bless His people with peace”</b> (Psalms 29:11).",
            "The Gemara offers another explanation of what Yitro heard: <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: He heard</b> about <b>the splitting of the Red Sea and came, as it is stated</b> in a similar context with regard to the splitting of the Jordan in the days of Joshua: <b>“And it came to pass, when all the kings of the Amorites,</b> that were beyond the Jordan westward, and all the kings of the Canaanites, that were by the sea, <b>heard</b> how the Lord had dried up the waters of the Jordan from before the children of Israel, until they were passed over, that their heart melted, neither was there spirit in them anymore, because of the children of Israel” (Joshua 5:1). <b>And even Rahab the prostitute said to Joshua’s messengers: “For we have heard how the Lord dried up the water of the Red Sea</b> before you” (Joshua 2:10).",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is different there,</b> i.e., with regard to the splitting of the Jordan, <b>where</b> the verse <b>states: “Neither was there spirit in them anymore,” and what is different here,</b> i.e., in the statement of Rahab, <b>where</b> the verse <b>states: “Neither did there remain [<i>kama</i>] any more spirit in any man”</b> (Joshua 2:11)?"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara replies that Rahab used this phrase euphemistically, to say that their fear was so great <b>that</b> their male organs <b>were not even</b> able to <b>become erect,</b> as “<i>kama</i>” also means rise. The Gemara asks: <b>And how did</b> Rahab <b>know</b> this? The Gemara replies: <b>As the Master said: You do not have any prince or ruler</b> at that time <b>who did not engage in intercourse with Rahab the prostitute.</b>",
            "The Gemara adds that the Sages <b>said</b> with regard to Rahab: <b>She was ten years old when the Jewish people left Egypt, and she engaged in prostitution all forty years that the Jewish people were in the wilderness. After</b> that, when she was <b>fifty years</b> old, she <b>converted</b> when the two spies visited her. <b>She said: May</b> all of my sins of prostitution <b>be forgiven me as a reward</b> for having endangered myself with the <b>rope, window, and flax,</b> by means of which I saved Joshua’s two spies. Rahab first concealed the spies in stalks of flax, and later assisted them in exiting her home by lowering them from the window with a rope (see Joshua 2:6 and 2:15).",
            "§ <b>The Master said</b> in the <i>baraita</i> that discussed the sacrifice of offerings before the construction of the Tabernacle: <b>And today gentiles are permitted to do so,</b> i.e., to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple courtyard, despite the fact that this is forbidden for the Jews. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>As the Sages taught</b> with regard to the verses that prohibit the slaughter of offerings outside the Temple: <b>“Speak</b> to Aaron, and to his sons, and <b>to</b> all <b>the children of Israel”</b> (Leviticus 17:2). This indicates that only <b>Jews are commanded with regard to</b> offerings <b>slaughtered outside</b> the Temple, <b>but gentiles are not commanded with regard to</b> offerings <b>slaughtered outside</b> the Temple.",
            "<b>Therefore, each and every</b> gentile may, if he desires, <b>construct</b> a private <b>altar for himself, and sacrifice upon it whatever he desires. Rabbi Ya’akov bar Aḥa says</b> that <b>Rav Asi says:</b> Although it is permitted for gentiles to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple courtyard, it is <b>prohibited</b> for a Jew <b>to assist them or to fulfill their agency</b> in this matter, as sacrificing in this manner is forbidden for a Jew. <b>Rabba said: But to instruct them</b> how to sacrifice outside the Temple is <b>permitted.</b>",
            "This is <b>similar to that</b> incident in <b>which Ifera Hurmiz, the mother of King Shapur</b> of Persia, <b>sent an offering to Rava,</b> with which <b>she sent</b> this message <b>to him: Sacrifice this for me, for the sake of Heaven.</b> Rava <b>said to Rav Safra and to Rav Aḥa bar Huna: Go, take two</b> gentile <b>youths of the same age,</b> i.e., similar to one another, so that the sacrifice will be performed with maximal beauty, <b>and see where the sea</b> currently <b>raises silt [<i>sirton</i>],</b> which is a place that no one has used before. <b>And take new wood and bring out fire from new vessels, and</b> the two youths will <b>sacrifice</b> the offering <b>for her, for the sake of Heaven.</b>",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rava: <b>In accordance with whose</b> opinion was the instruction to sacrifice exclusively with new wood? Was it <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua? As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says: Just as</b> the <b>altar</b> is a place <b>that is not used by an ordinary</b> person, <b>so too,</b> the <b>wood</b> that will be used <b>must not be used by an ordinary</b> person. The Gemara asks: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua concede</b> that <b>in</b> the case of a private <b>altar</b> the wood need not be new?",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to David’s purchase of the site of the Temple, when he wished to build an altar there at God’s instruction, <b>one verse states: “So David gave to Ornan for the place six hundred shekels of gold by weight.</b> And David built there an altar to the Lord, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings” (I Chronicles 21:25–26). <b>And it is written</b> elsewhere: <b>“So David bought the threshing floor and the oxen for fifty shekels of silver.</b> And David built there an altar to the Lord, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings” (II Samuel 24:24–25). <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled?",
            "David would <b>collect from each tribe</b> of the twelve tribes <b>fifty</b> shekels, <b>which are</b> a sum of <b>six hundred</b> shekels. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says in the name of Abba Yosei ben Dostai</b> that there is another explanation: David purchased the <b>cattle and</b> the <b>wood and the site of</b> the <b>altar for fifty</b> shekels, <b>and</b> he purchased the site of <b>the entire Temple for six hundred</b> shekels.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says</b> likewise: David purchased the <b>cattle and</b> the <b>wood and the site of</b> the <b>altar for fifty</b> shekels, <b>and</b> the site of <b>the entire Temple for six hundred</b> shekels, <b>as it is written: “And Araunah said to David: Let my lord the king take and offer that which is good in his eyes; see the cattle for the burnt offering, and the threshing tools, and the implements of the cattle for the wood”</b> (II Samuel 24:22), to which David replied: “No, but I will buy it from you at a price” (II Samuel 24:24). Consequently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua, David purchased the threshing instruments and the furniture of the oxen for use as wood. <b>And Rava</b> could have <b>said to you</b> in response: <b>There too,</b> in the case of David, the verse is dealing <b>with new</b> vessels that had not yet been used.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> are <b>“the threshing instruments [<i>morigim</i>]”</b> mentioned in the verse? <b>Ulla said:</b> It is <b>a <i>turbal</i> bed.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is <b>a <i>turbal</i> bed? Abaye said:</b> It is <b>a heavy, serrated board [<i>dekurkesa</i>],</b> used <b>for threshing. Abaye said: What is the verse</b> from which the meaning of <i>morigim</i> is derived? <b>“Behold, I have made you a new threshing board [<i>morag</i>] having sharp teeth; you shall thresh the mountains, and beat them small, and shall make the hills as chaff”</b> (Isaiah 41:15). This verse indicates that a <i>morag</i> has grooves and teeth, and is used for threshing.",
            "With regard to the contradiction between the verses that relate the sum of shekels paid by David, the Gemara says that <b>Rava</b> was <b>teaching</b> these verses <b>to his son, and raised a contradiction between verses: It is written: “So David gave to Ornan…</b>six hundred shekels of gold by weight” (I Chronicles 21:25), <b>and it is written: “So David bought…</b>fifty shekels of silver” (II Samuel 24:24). <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled? David would <b>collect from each tribe</b> of the twelve tribes <b>fifty</b> shekels, <b>which are</b> a sum of <b>six hundred</b> shekels.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> these verses <b>are still difficult,</b> as they contradict <b>one another,</b> since <b>there</b> in the book of Samuel it is stated that David paid <b>silver</b> shekels, while <b>here</b> in Chronicles it is stated that he paid <b>gold</b> shekels. The Gemara replies: <b>Rather, this</b> is what the verses are <b>saying:</b> David would <b>collect</b> from each tribe <b>silver</b> shekels that had the value of fifty gold shekels in weight, so that the value of the final sum was equal to <b>six hundred gold</b> shekels.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that once the Tabernacle was established in the wilderness, <b>offerings of lesser sanctity</b> were <b>eaten throughout the camp of Israel. Rav Huna says:</b> This means that offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten <b>in any</b> of the <b>places</b> that <b>an Israelite</b> would be found. <b>But there was no</b> actual <b>camp,</b> outside of which it was prohibited to eat the offerings.",
            "<b>Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Rav Huna: And were there not camps</b> when the Jews were <b>in the wilderness? But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Kelim Bava Kamma</i> 1:12): <b>Just as</b> there was <b>a camp in the wilderness</b> that was divided into different sections, with each section having particular <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to the consumption of offerings and to the ritually impure individuals who were prohibited from entering there, <b>so too,</b> there is a corresponding <b>camp in Jerusalem:</b> The area <b>from</b> the walls of <b>Jerusalem to the Temple Mount</b> has the status of <b>the Israelite camp.</b> The area <b>from the Temple Mount to Nicanor’s Gate</b> at the entrance to the Temple courtyard has the status of <b>the Levite camp.</b>",
            "<b>From that</b> point <b>onward,</b> i.e., from the entrance to the Temple courtyard, the area has the status of <b>the camp of the Divine Presence; and</b> the Temple courtyard has the same status as the area within <b>the curtains</b> surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle <b>in the wilderness.</b>",
            "The Gemara replies: <b>Rather, say</b> that Rav Huna meant that when the Tabernacle was in the wilderness, offerings of lesser sanctity could be consumed <b>wherever the Israelite camp</b> was located. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that <b>obvious?</b> Wherever the Jews were located in the wilderness was where the Israelite camp was. The Gemara responds: <b>Lest you say</b> that during the periods of travel between encampments the offerings were taken outside the Israelite camp, and <b>were</b> thereby <b>disqualified due to</b> the meat’s <b>leaving</b> the area within the partitions, Rav Huna <b>teaches us</b> that the meat is not disqualified.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> why not <b>say</b> that this is <b>indeed so,</b> i.e., that the meat is disqualified because it left the camp? The Gemara answers that <b>the verse states: “Then the Tent of Meeting,</b> with the camp of the Levites, <b>shall travel</b> in the midst of the camps; as they encamp, so shall they travel” (Numbers 2:17), which indicates that <b>although it traveled</b> from its place <b>it is</b> still <b>the Tent of Meeting.</b> Similarly, the Israelite camp retains its status even while traveling.",
            "§ With regard to the division of Jerusalem into three camps, <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: There was an additional</b> camp in Jerusalem, within the area of the Temple Mount, <b>and it</b> was <b>the rampart of the women’s courtyard.</b> The Sages rendered it prohibited for certain ritually impure individuals to enter that area, <b>but they would not punish</b> them <b>for</b> entering <b>it,</b> as by Torah law it does not constitute a distinct section of the Temple Mount but has the status of the Levite camp. The <i>baraita</i> adds: <b>And</b> when the Tabernacle was <b>in Shiloh there were only two camps.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Which of</b> the three camps that were present in the wilderness <b>was not</b> present in Shiloh? <b>Rabba said: It stands to reason that the Levite camp was</b> present, but the Israelite camp was not. <b>As, if it enters your mind to say</b> that <b>the Levite camp was not</b> present in Shiloh,"
        ],
        [
            "it would consequently be <b>found</b> that both <b><i>zavim</i> and</b> those who are <b>ritually impure</b> from impurity imparted by <b>a corpse are sent out of one camp,</b> i.e., the camp of the Divine Presence, and both are permitted in the Israelite camp. <b>But the Torah said</b> with regard to sending the ritually impure out of the camp: “Outside the camp you shall put them; <b>that they will not defile their camps”</b> (Numbers 5:3).",
            "The use of the plural “camps” indicates: <b>Give</b> a specific <b>camp to this</b> group, i.e., those who are ritually impure from impurity imparted by a corpse, who may enter the Levite camp but are forbidden to enter the camp of the Divine Presence, <b>and</b> give a specific <b>camp to this</b> group, i.e., those who are <i>zavim</i>, who may enter the Israelite camp but are forbidden to enter the camp of the Divine presence or the Levite camp. If there were no Levite camp in Shiloh, it would follow that both a <i>zav</i> and one who is ritually impure from the impurity imparted by a corpse are sent out of only one camp, and there is no distinction between them.",
            "<b>Rava said to him: Rather, what</b> would you say instead? Would you say that <b>the Israelite camp was not</b> present in Shiloh? If so, it would be <b>found</b> that <b><i>zavim</i> and lepers are</b> both <b>sent to one place,</b> i.e., outside the Levite camp. <b>But the Torah said</b> with regard to the leper: <b>“He shall dwell alone;</b> outside the camp shall his dwelling be” (Leviticus 13:46). The word “alone” teaches <b>that another ritually impure person should not dwell with him.</b>",
            "<b>Rather,</b> it must be that <b>actually, all three</b> camps <b>were</b> present in Shiloh, <b>and what</b> is the meaning of that which was taught with regard to Shiloh: <b>There were only two camps?</b> It is <b>with regard to</b> the fact that the Levite camp did not provide <b>refuge</b> to one who unintentionally killed another. The Gemara asks: <b>By inference,</b> does this mean <b>that in the wilderness the Levite camp did provide refuge</b> to those who unintentionally killed others?",
            "The Gemara replies: <b>Yes, and so it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse concerning the cities of refuge. The verse states: “And one who did not lie in wait…<b>and I will appoint for you a place</b> where he may flee” (Exodus 21:13). The phrase “I will appoint for you” teaches that God said to Moses: There will be a place that provides refuge for unintentional murderers even <b>during your lifetime.</b> The term <b>“a place”</b> means that it will be from <b>your place,</b> meaning the Levite camp served as the place that provided refuge in the wilderness. <b>“Where he may flee” teaches that</b> the Jews <b>would exile</b> unintentional murderers <b>in the wilderness</b> as well, before they entered the land. <b>To where did they exile</b> unintentional murderers when they were in the wilderness? They exiled them <b>to the Levite camp,</b> which provided refuge.",
            "<b>From here</b> the Sages <b>said: A Levite who killed</b> unintentionally <b>is exiled from</b> one Levite <b>city to</b> another Levite <b>city. And if he was exiled to</b> another area within <b>his city, he is admitted to his city,</b> i.e., it provides him with refuge.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the verse</b> from which the principle is derived that one who was already exiled to a city of refuge and who then killed another person is exiled to another area in that same city? <b>Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says</b> that the verse: <b>“For in his city of refuge he shall dwell”</b> (Numbers 35:28), indicates that he can be exiled to <b>a city in which he was already admitted,</b> as the verse is referring to it as his city, and he shall continue to reside there.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that when the Jewish people <b>arrived at Gilgal</b> private altars were permitted. The Gemara elaborates: <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Any</b> offering that was brought due to <b>a vow, or contributed</b> voluntarily, <b>was sacrificed on</b> a private <b>altar;</b> and <b>any</b> offering <b>that is neither</b> brought due to <b>a vow nor contributed</b> voluntarily, but rather is compulsory, was <b>not sacrificed on</b> a private <b>altar.</b> Therefore, <b>a meal offering,</b> which is generally brought voluntarily, <b>and</b> offerings of <b>a nazirite,</b> which have the status of vow offerings as no one is compelled to become a nazirite, were <b>sacrificed upon</b> a private <b>altar.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Only burnt offerings and peace offerings were sacrificed</b> upon <b>a private</b> altar, not meal offerings or offerings of a nazirite.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Any</b> offering <b>that the public or an individual</b> could <b>sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness</b> could also be <b>sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal. What,</b> then, is the difference <b>between the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness and the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal?</b> During the period of <b>the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness</b> private <b>altars were not permitted</b> and offerings could be sacrificed only in the Tabernacle, while during the period of <b>the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal</b> private <b>altars were permitted. But</b> even if one desired to sacrifice an offering upon <b>his</b> private <b>altar on his roof,</b> he could still <b>sacrifice upon it only burnt offerings and peace offerings.</b>",
            "<b>And the Rabbis say: Any</b> offering <b>that the public</b> could <b>sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness</b> could also be <b>sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal, and here,</b> in the Tabernacle in Gilgal, <b>and there,</b> upon private altars, <b>only burnt offerings and peace offerings were sacrificed</b> for <b>an individual. Rabbi Shimon says: Even</b> the <b>public</b> did not sacrifice every type of offering in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal; they <b>sacrificed only Paschal offerings</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and compulsory</b> public offerings <b>that have a set time</b> to be sacrificed, e.g., daily offerings and additional offerings. Public offerings that do not have a set time were not sacrificed upon the great public altar in Gilgal.",
            "§ The Gemara explains the various opinions cited in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>What is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of Rabbi Meir</b> that only vow offerings and gift offerings, such as nazirite offerings and meal offerings, were sacrificed upon a private altar during the period of Gilgal? It is <b>as the verse states: “You shall not do all that we do here this day,</b> every man whatsoever is fitting in his own eyes. For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance” (Deuteronomy 12:8–9).",
            "<b>Moses said</b> the following <b>to the Jewish people: When you enter Eretz</b> Yisrael but have not yet arrived at Shiloh or Jerusalem and are therefore permitted to sacrifice upon private altars, you may not sacrifice whatever has been sacrificed in the wilderness, i.e., both obligatory offerings and gift offerings. Rather, the phrase “every man whatsoever is fitting [<i>hayashar</i>] in his own eyes,” means that <b>fitting</b> offerings [<b><i>yesharot</i></b>], i.e., offerings that are fitting in one’s eyes and are brought due to one’s own benevolence, <b>you may sacrifice,</b> but <b>you may not sacrifice obligatory</b> offerings. <b>Meal offerings and</b> offerings of <b>a nazirite are</b> included in the category of <b>fitting</b> offerings: Meal offerings are sacrificed as vow offerings or gift offerings while offerings of a nazirite are considered a vow offering, as becoming a nazirite is not compulsory.",
            "<b>And</b> what is the reason that <b>the Rabbis</b> disagree with Rabbi Meir and state that meal offerings and offerings of a nazirite were not sacrificed on a private altar? They hold that <b>a meal offering is not</b> ever sacrificed <b>upon</b> a private <b>altar</b> and that offerings of <b>a nazirite are</b> considered <b>compulsory.</b> While one assumes the status of a nazirite voluntarily, once he has become a nazirite he is required to bring the offering.",
            "With regard to this, <b>Shmuel says</b> that <b>the disagreement</b> between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis pertains only <b>to the sin offering and the guilt offering</b> brought by the nazirite. <b>But with regard to the burnt offering and the peace offering</b> that the nazirite brings, <b>all agree</b> that <b>they are</b> considered offerings that one deems <b>fitting</b> to sacrifice <b>and are</b> therefore <b>sacrificed</b> on a private altar.",
            "<b>Rabba raises an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> of <b>the breast and thigh</b> portions of peace offerings, which are given to the priests (see Leviticus 7:34), <b>and</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering,</b> i.e., the bread that was given to the priests from each of the four types of loaves that were brought with the thanks offering (see Leviticus 7:14), <b>apply</b> only <b>with regard to a great</b> public <b>altar, and do not apply with regard to a small</b> private <b>altar.</b> Rabba comments: <b>By contrast,</b> another of the priestly gifts, <b>the cooked foreleg</b> of the nazirite’s ram (see Numbers 6:19–20) was <b>omitted</b> by the <i>tanna</i>.",
            "Rabba notes: <b>Granted, if you say</b> that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis <b>disagree</b> even <b>with regard to</b> whether <b>a burnt offering and peace offering</b> of a nazirite may be sacrificed upon a private altar, then in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> <i>baraita</i> that omits the nazirite’s ram? It <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who hold that the peace offering of the nazirite was not sacrificed upon a private altar. <b>But if you say</b> that <b>they disagree</b> only <b>with regard to a sin offering and guilt offering,</b> while the Rabbis agree that the peace offering and burnt offering of a nazirite were sacrificed on a private altar, then in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> <i>baraita</i>?",
            "<b>Rather, if</b> this <b>was stated,</b> it <b>was stated like this: Shmuel said</b> that the <b>disagreement</b> between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis pertains only <b>to</b> the <b>burnt offering and peace offering</b> that were brought by the nazirite. <b>But with regard to</b> the <b>sin offering and guilt offering, all agree that they are compulsory, and</b> even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir they <b>are not sacrificed</b> upon a private altar.",
            "§ The Gemara continues to clarify the opinions in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>The Master,</b> i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, <b>said</b> that any offering that the public or an individual could sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness, including vow offerings, gift offerings, and compulsory offerings, could also be sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal. It was only on a private altar that the individual was limited to sacrificing burnt offerings and peace offerings. <b>And the Rabbis say: Any</b> offering <b>that the public</b> could <b>sacrifice in the Tent</b> of Meeting in the wilderness could also be sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal. An individual could sacrifice only burnt offerings and peace offerings, whether on a great public altar or on a private altar.",
            "The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: <b>What is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of the Rabbis</b> that only the public could sacrifice compulsory offerings on a great public altar? <b>The verse states</b> with regard to the period in which private altars were permitted: “You shall not do all that we do here this day, every <b>man whatsoever is fitting in his own eyes”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:8). This indicates that it is <b>“a man,”</b> i.e., an individual, <b>who may sacrifice only</b> offerings that he deems <b>“fitting,”</b> i.e., voluntary offerings, but <b>may not sacrifice compulsory</b> offerings. <b>But</b> the <b>public may sacrifice even compulsory</b> offerings."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And Rabbi Yehuda,</b> who holds that an individual may also sacrifice compulsory offerings on a great public altar, could have <b>said to you</b> that <b>when</b> the phrase “whatsoever <b>is fitting” is written,</b> indicating that individuals may sacrifice only vow offerings and gift offerings, <b>it is</b> with regard to <b>“in his own eyes” that it is written.</b> In other words, it is referring to a location that is fitting in his eyes for sacrifice, i.e., a private altar. <b>But on a great</b> public <b>altar, even compulsory</b> offerings <b>may be sacrificed.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> even if that derivation is correct, <b>isn’t “man” written</b> in that verse? <b>Isn’t that to say that</b> with regard to <b>“a man,”</b> i.e., an individual, <b>only</b> offerings that one deems <b>fitting</b> to sacrifice <b>may be sacrificed, but compulsory</b> offerings <b>may not be sacrificed?</b> The Gemara replies: <b>When “man” is written</b> in this verse, it is <b>to qualify a non-priest</b> to perform the sacrificial service on a private altar.",
            "The Gemara challenges: But the fact that <b>a non-priest</b> is qualified to perform the sacrificial service on a private altar is <b>derived from</b> the verse: <b>“And the priest shall dash the blood against the altar of the Lord</b> at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). The verse indicates that service at a great public altar may be performed only by a priest, from which it is inferred that the service on a private altar may be performed by a non-priest as well.",
            "The Gemara replies: <b>Lest you say</b> that whereas that verse indicates it is not required that the service on a private altar be performed by a priest, nevertheless <b>consecration of</b> the <b>firstborn</b> is <b>required</b> for this purpose, <b>as</b> was the case <b>initially,</b> i.e., before the Tabernacle was constructed. Perhaps the only non-priests who may perform the service on private altars are the firstborn sons. Therefore, the verse states: “Every man whatsoever is fitting in his own eyes,” which <b>teaches us</b> that with regard to private altars, each person may sacrifice his own offerings.",
            "§ The Gemara clarifies the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, by questioning: But the statement of <b>the Rabbis is</b> identical to the statement of <b>the first <i>tanna</i>,</b> i.e., the Rabbis cited at the beginning of the <i>baraita</i>, who say that on a private altar an individual sacrificed only burnt offerings and peace offerings. What is the difference between the first <i>tanna</i> and the Rabbis?",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said:</b> The difference <b>between them</b> is whether <b>libations were offered in the wilderness</b> along with burnt offerings and peace offerings. According to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, libations were not offered in the wilderness, nor were they offered in Eretz Yisrael during the period of Gilgal. According to the Rabbis in the latter section of the <i>baraita</i>, libations were offered in the wilderness and in Gilgal.",
            "§ <b>The Master said</b> in the <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> that even the public did not sacrifice all offerings in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal; they sacrificed only Paschal offerings and compulsory public offerings that have a set time. The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> for the opinion <b>of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And the children of Israel</b> encamped <b>in Gilgal;</b> and <b>they kept the Passover</b> on the fourteenth day of the month at evening in the plains of Jericho” (Joshua 5:10).",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t it <b>obvious</b> that they brought the Paschal offering? The Paschal offering is compulsory. <b>Rather, this</b> verse <b>teaches us that</b> in Gilgal, <b>only compulsory</b> offerings <b>similar to</b> the <b>Paschal</b> offering, i.e., that have a set time, <b>were sacrificed, but</b> offerings that are <b>not similar to</b> the <b>Paschal</b> offering <b>were not sacrificed.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> how does <b>the other</b> <i>tanna</i>, i.e., the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that during the period of Gilgal other offerings were sacrificed by the public, interpret the verse?",
            "The Gemara responds: <b>It is necessary for</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>that</b> was taught <b>by Rabbi Yoḥanan. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bena’a:</b> If <b>an uncircumcised</b> Jew contracted ritual impurity from a corpse, he <b>may receive sprinkling</b> of the water containing the ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh days of his purification, despite the fact that he is uncircumcised. In the time of Joshua, the Jewish people became circumcised after they were purified from impurity imparted by a corpse.",
            "§ With regard to the Paschal offering and compulsory public offerings that have a set time mentioned by Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara relates that <b>a <i>tanna</i> taught</b> a <i>baraita</i> <b>in the presence of Rav Adda bar Ahava: The difference between a great</b> public <b>altar,</b> e.g., the altar in Gilgal, <b>and a small</b> private <b>altar is only</b> that the <b>Paschal offering and compulsory</b> offerings <b>that have a set time</b> may be sacrificed upon a great public altar, but not upon a private altar. Rav Adda bar Ahava <b>said to him: From where</b> would <b>an individual</b> sacrifice <b>compulsory</b> offerings <b>that have a set time?</b> There is no such offering brought by an individual. It was therefore unnecessary for the <i>tanna</i> to state that this type of offering is not sacrificed on a private altar.",
            "The <i>tanna</i> <b>said to him:</b> If so, <b>shall I remove it</b> from the text of the mishna, and teach only: Paschal offerings? Rav Adda bar Ahava <b>said to him:</b> That is not necessary; <b>interpret your mishna</b> as referring <b>to a compulsory burnt offering,</b> i.e., the burnt offering of appearance brought on the pilgrimage Festivals by every individual, which is not sacrificed on a private altar, <b>as there is,</b> conversely, <b>a voluntary burnt offering</b> that may be sacrificed on a private altar. This <i>baraita</i> must be discussing a burnt offering brought by an individual, <b>as if it is</b> referring to <b>a sin offering</b> brought by <b>an individual, are there compulsory</b> sin offerings <b>that have a set time?</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And let him establish</b> the <i>baraita</i> as referring <b>to</b> the <b>compulsory meal offering</b> of an individual, which has a set time, <b>as there is</b> the <b>griddle-cake</b> offering that the High Priest was obligated to sacrifice every day and that may be sacrificed only upon a great public altar, not upon a private altar. The Gemara replies: Rav Adda bar Ahava <b>holds</b> that <b>there is no meal offering</b> sacrificed <b>upon an altar</b> outside the Temple, even a great public altar.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that when <b>they arrived at Shiloh,</b> private altars were prohibited. There was no roof of wood or stone in the Tabernacle in Shiloh; there was only a building of stone below, and the curtains of the roof of the Tabernacle were spread above it. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One verse states,</b> with regard to Hannah bringing Samuel to the Tabernacle: <b>“And she brought him to the house of the Lord in Shiloh”</b> (I Samuel 1:24), <b>and one verse states: “And He forsook the Tabernacle of Shiloh, the tent that He had made to dwell among men”</b> (Psalms 78:60). <b>And</b> in addition, <b>it is written: “Moreover he abhorred the tent of Joseph and chose not the tribe of Ephraim”</b> (Psalms 78:67).",
            "One verse describes the Tabernacle in Shiloh as a house, while the other describes it as a tent. <b>How</b> can <b>these</b> texts be reconciled? As the mishna states: <b>There was no roof</b>  of wood or stone <b>there; rather,</b> there was <b>stone below,</b> and it was therefore described as a house, <b>and</b> the <b>curtains</b> of the Tabernacle were spread <b>above it,</b> and it was therefore described as a tent. <b>And</b> the period that the Tabernacle was in Shiloh <b>was</b> characterized in the Torah as <b>“rest”</b> in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you” (Deuteronomy 12:9).",
            "§ The mishna teaches that during the period of Shiloh, <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> were eaten within the curtains, and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe were eaten in any place that overlooks Shiloh. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? <b>Rabbi Oshaya said: As</b> in the context of the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Tabernacle, <b>the verse states: “Take heed to yourself that you do not offer your burnt offerings in every place that you see”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:13), from which it may be inferred: <b>You may not offer up in every place that you see, but you may eat</b> the offerings <b>in every place that you see.</b>",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Say</b> instead the following inference: <b>You may not offer up</b> offerings upon an altar <b>in every place that you see, but you may slaughter</b> offerings <b>in every place that you see.</b> It would therefore be permitted to slaughter offerings in any place that overlooks Shiloh.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yannai said</b> that <b>the</b> subsequent <b>verse states:</b> “But in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, <b>there you shall offer</b> your burnt offerings, <b>and there you shall do</b> all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). This verse teaches that all of the sacrificial service is performed in the place that the offering is burned, and only the consumption of offerings of lesser sanctity is permitted in any place that overlooks Shiloh.",
            "<b>Rabbi Avdimi bar Ḥasa said</b> that when describing the boundaries of the portions of Eretz Yisrael of the children of Joseph, wherein Shiloh was located, <b>the verse states:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>“And</b> the border turned about eastward to <b>Taanath Shiloh”</b> (Joshua 16:6), a place adjacent to Shiloh. Why did it bear the name of Taanath Shiloh? It is because it was the <b>place</b> from <b>which whoever saw</b> the Tabernacle in Shiloh after its destruction would <b>moan [<i>mitane’aḥ</i>] for it with regard to the consumption of sacrificial</b> animals from offerings of lesser sanctity that had been previously permitted there, but was now no longer permitted.",
            "<b>Rabbi Abbahu says</b> that a different biblical allusion may be found in what <b>the verse states</b> in the context of Jacob’s blessing to Joseph: <b>“Joseph is a fruitful vine, a fruitful vine by a fountain [<i>ayin</i>]”</b> (Genesis 49:22). The Gemara interprets the word fountain homiletically: <b>An eye [<i>ayin</i>] that did not wish to partake or derive benefit from something that was not his,</b> i.e., the wife of Potiphar, <b>shall merit</b> to have offerings of lesser sanctity <b>consumed</b> in Shiloh, in Joseph’s portion of Eretz Yisrael, <b>to the fullest</b> extent <b>of its eyes,</b> i.e., from wherever Shiloh can be seen.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says</b> that another allusion may be found in the context of Moses’ blessing to Joseph: <b>“And the good will of Him Who dwelt in the bush [<i>seneh</i>]”</b> (Deuteronomy 33:16). The Gemara interprets the word “<i>seneh</i>” homiletically: <b>An eye that did not wish to derive benefit from something that was not his shall merit</b> to have offerings of lesser sanctity <b>consumed among the haters [<i>senu’in</i>].</b> In other words, offerings of lesser sanctity may be consumed in any place that overlooks Shiloh, even in the portions of the other tribes, who are described by the Torah as hating Joseph (see Genesis, chapter 37).",
            "§ With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that during the period of Shiloh offerings of lesser sanctity could be eaten in any place that overlooks Shiloh, it was <b>taught:</b> The term: <b>Overlooks, that</b> was <b>stated</b> in the mishna, means that one <b>sees</b> it in <b>its entirety, and</b> there is <b>nothing that obstructs between</b> the seer <b>and</b> the surrounding area. <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakum said to Rabbi Elazar: I shall explain</b> this type of seeing <b>to you: For example, the synagogue of Maon,</b> which was adjacent to the city of Tiberias, and from where Tiberias could be seen. <b>Rav Pappa said</b> that the term: <b>Overlooks, that was stated</b> does <b>not</b> mean that one must <b>see</b> the Tabernacle in Shiloh in <b>its entirety, but</b> rather even if one <b>sees</b> it <b>partially,</b> offerings of lesser sanctity may be consumed there.",
            "With regard to the definition of overlooking, <b>Rav Pappa raises a dilemma:</b> If one is in a place where he <b>stands and sees</b> Shiloh, but if he <b>sits</b> he <b>does not see</b> Shiloh, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Is this considered overlooking? Likewise, <b>Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:</b> If one is in a place where he can <b>stand upon</b> the bank of <b>the stream and see</b> Shiloh, but if he is <b>in the stream he does not see</b> Shiloh, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? No resolution is found for either of these questions, and the Gemara concludes: These dilemmas <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ <b>When Rav Dimi came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, <b>he said</b> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi said: <b>The Divine Presence rested upon the Jewish people in three places: In Shiloh, and Nov and Gibeon, and the Eternal House, and in all of those</b> the Divine Presence <b>rested only in the portion</b> of the tribe <b>of Benjamin, as it is stated</b> in Moses’ blessing to Benjamin: “The beloved of the Lord shall dwell in safety by Him; <b>He covers him all the day</b> and He dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12), meaning: <b>All coverings,</b> i.e., times of resting of the Divine Presence upon the Jewish people, <b>shall be only in the portion of Benjamin.</b>",
            "The Gemara relates that <b>when Abaye went</b> to study Torah with Rav Yosef, <b>he said</b> the statement of Rav Dimi <b>before Rav Yosef.</b> Rav Yosef <b>said</b> in response: <b>Kaylil,</b> Abaye’s father, <b>had one son, and he is not proper. But isn’t it written</b> with regard to the Tabernacle in Shiloh: <b>“And He forsook the Tabernacle of Shiloh”</b> (Psalms 78:60); <b>and it is written: “Moreover He abhorred the tent of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephraim”</b> (Psalms 78:67)? These verses indicate that the Tabernacle in Shiloh was in the portion of Joseph, not of Benjamin.",
            "<b>Rav Adda said: What</b> is Rav Yosef’s <b>difficulty</b> from that verse? <b>Perhaps</b> the Tabernacle was in both the portion of Benjamin and that of Joseph. The <b>Divine Presence</b> was <b>in the portion of Benjamin, and</b> the <b>Great Sanhedrin,</b> which sits adjacent to the location of the Divine Presence, was <b>in the portion of Joseph.</b> This is similar to <b>what we found in</b> the case of <b>the Eternal House, where</b> the <b>Divine Presence</b> was <b>in the portion of Benjamin and</b> the <b>Sanhedrin</b> was <b>in the portion of Judah.</b>",
            "Rav Yosef <b>said to him</b> in response: <b>How can</b> these cases <b>be compared? There,</b> in the Temple in Jerusalem, <b>the portions</b> of Benjamin and Judah were <b>close to each other,</b> and a division in which the Temple was located in the portion of one tribe while the Sanhedrin was located in the portion of another was possible. <b>Here,</b> with regard to Shiloh, <b>are</b> Shiloh and the portion of Benjamin <b>close</b> to each other? The Gemara replies: <b>Here too they are close, as Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A strip</b> of land <b>protruded from the portion of Judah and entered into the portion of Benjamin, and the altar</b> in the Temple <b>was built on</b> that strip. <b>And</b> the tribe of <b>Benjamin the righteous would agonize over it,</b> desiring <b>to take it</b> into its portion, due to its unique sanctity.",
            "<b>Here too,</b> with regard to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, <b>a strip</b> of land <b>protruded from the portion of Joseph</b> and entered <b>into the portion of Benjamin,</b> which connected Shiloh to the portion of Benjamin, and it was upon that strip, which had the status of Benjamin’s portion, that the Tabernacle stood. <b>And that is</b> what it means concerning that <b>which is written</b> with regard to the boundary of Joseph: “And the border turned about eastward to <b>Taanath Shiloh”</b> (Joshua 16:6), which in this context, is interpreted as meaning that the tribe of Benjamin would bemoan the fact that the Tabernacle in Shiloh was not located entirely in its portion.",
            "The Gemara notes that the dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the tribe in which the Tabernacle in Shiloh was located is <b>like</b> a dispute between <b><i>tanna’im</i>,</b> as it is taught with regard to Moses’ blessing to Benjamin: <b>“He covers him”; this</b> is a reference to the <b>First Temple. “All the day”; this</b> is a reference to the <b>Second Temple. “And He dwells between his shoulders”; this</b> is a reference to <b>the messianic era.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: “He covers him”; this</b> is a reference to <b>this world. “All the day”; this</b> is a reference to <b>the messianic era. “And He dwells between his shoulders”; this</b> is a reference to <b>the World-to-Come.</b> According to the opinion of the Rabbis, the Divine Presence dwelled in the portion of Benjamin from the first Temple period and onward, but not during the period of the Tabernacle in Shiloh, when it was in the portion of Joseph. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the entire period that the Divine Presence dwelled in this world, including the period of Shiloh, it did so in the portion of Benjamin.",
            "§ With regard to the duration of the different periods mentioned in the mishna, <b>the Sages taught: The days of the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness</b> were <b>forty years, less one</b> year. <b>The days of the Tent of Meeting that</b> were <b>in Gilgal</b> were <b>fourteen</b> years: <b>Seven</b> years during <b>which</b> the Jews <b>conquered</b> the land <b>and seven</b> years during <b>which they divided</b> the land among the tribes. <b>The days of the Tent of Meeting that</b> were <b>in Nov and Gibeon</b> were <b>fifty-seven</b> years, until the Temple in Jerusalem was constructed. Since the Temple was constructed 480 years after the Exodus from Egypt (see I Kings 6:1), it follows that there <b>remain for</b> the period of the Tabernacle in <b>Shiloh 370</b> years <b>less one.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that <b>the days of the Tent of Meeting that</b> were <b>in the wilderness</b> were <b>forty</b> years <b>less one? As the Master said</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In <b>the first year</b> after the Exodus from Egypt, <b>Moses constructed the Tabernacle;</b> in the <b>second</b> year <b>the Tabernacle was erected, and Moses sent spies.</b> Because of the sin of the spies, the Jewish people remained in the wilderness for forty years. It follows that the Tabernacle in the wilderness stood for thirty-nine years.",
            "<b>From where do we</b> derive <b>that</b> the Tabernacle remained <b>in Gilgal</b> for <b>fourteen</b> years, <b>seven</b> years during <b>which</b> the Jews <b>conquered</b> the land <b>and seven</b> years during <b>which they divided</b> it? <b>As Caleb,</b> son of Jephunneh, <b>said</b> to Joshua at the conclusion of the period of conquest before the land was divided: <b>“Forty years old was I when Moses, the servant of the Lord, sent me from Kadesh Barnea to spy out the land; and I brought him back word as it was in my heart”</b> (Joshua 14:7), <b>and it is written: “And now, I am this day eighty and five years old”</b> (Joshua 14:10).",
            "<b>When</b> the Jewish people <b>crossed the Jordan, how old was</b> Caleb? He was <b>seventy-eight</b> years <b>old:</b> The spies were sent by Moses in the second year after the Exodus from Egypt, and in the fortieth year they crossed the Jordan. <b>And</b> at the time of the division of the Land, <b>he said</b> that he was <b>eighty-five years old.</b> This indicates that it was <b>seven years</b> during <b>which</b> the Jews <b>conquered</b> the land.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And from where do we</b> derive that there were <b>seven</b> years during <b>which they divided</b> the land? <b>If you wish, say: Since</b> it was a period of <b>seven</b> years in <b>which they conquered</b> the land, it was presumably <b>also</b> a period of <b>seven</b> years in <b>which they divided</b> the land.",
            "<b>And if you wish, say</b> instead: <b>Because</b> otherwise, <b>you do not find</b> any plausible explanation for the date mentioned by the prophet Ezekiel in the verse: “In the beginning of the year, on the tenth day of the month, <b>in the fourteenth year after that the city was smitten”</b> (Ezekiel 40:1). This indicates that it was a Jubilee Year, unless capturing and dividing the land took a total of fourteen years, after which point they began to calculate Sabbatical and Jubilee Years.",
            "§ The <i>baraita</i> stated that the period of <b>the Tent of Meeting that</b> was <b>in Nov and Gibeon</b> was <b>fifty-seven</b> years. The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive this? <b>As it is written</b> in the description of the death of Eli the High Priest, upon being informed that the Ark was captured by the Philistines: <b>“And it came to pass, when he made mention of the Ark of God,</b> that he fell from off his seat backward by the side of the gate, and his neck broke, and he died” (I Samuel 4:18).",
            "<b>And</b> a <i>tanna</i> <b>taught: When Eli the priest died, Shiloh was destroyed and</b> the Jews <b>arrived at Nov,</b> where they erected the Tabernacle. At that time, Samuel began to lead the people. <b>When Samuel from Rama died, Nov was destroyed</b> by Saul (see I Samuel 22:19) <b>and they arrived at Gibeon,</b> where the Tabernacle remained (see I Chronicles 16:39).",
            "The Gemara determines the number of years from when the Ark was captured by the Philistines and Shiloh was destroyed: <b>And it is written: “And it came to pass, from the day that the Ark abode in Kiriath Jearim that the time was long; for it was twenty years; and all the house of Israel yearned after the Lord”</b> (I Samuel 7:2). The Ark was returned by the Philistines to Kiriath Jearim seven months after it was captured, and it remained there for twenty years, until David brought it to Jerusalem.",
            "The Gemara explains that <b>these twenty years</b> are calculated as follows: <b>Ten years that Samuel reigned alone,</b> from the death of Eli until the coronation of Saul, <b>and</b> one <b>year that Samuel and Saul reigned,</b> i.e., Saul reigned for one year during the lifetime of Samuel, <b>and two</b> years <b>that Saul reigned</b> alone after the death of Samuel. <b>And</b> in addition to these thirteen years, there were the <b>seven</b> years <b>of David’s</b> reign in Hebron, before the years of his reign in Jerusalem."
        ],
        [
            "<b>As it is written: “And the days that David reigned over Israel were forty years: Seven years he reigned in Hebron,</b> and thirty-three years he reigned in Jerusalem” (I Kings 2:11). In the first year that David reigned in Jerusalem he brought the Ark there from Kiriath Jearim. The Ark was therefore in Kiriath Jearim for twenty years. When the thirty-three years of David’s reign in Jerusalem are added to these, there are a total of fifty-three years from the destruction of Shiloh. During all of these years, and at the beginning of Solomon’s reign, the Tabernacle was in Nov and Gibeon (see I Kings 3:4).",
            "<b>And with regard to</b> the construction of the Temple in the time of <b>Solomon, it is written: “And he began to build it</b> in the second day of the second month, <b>in the fourth year of his reign”</b> (II Chronicles 3:2), which was the 480th year following the Exodus (see I Kings 6:1). When the forty years in the wilderness, the fourteen years that the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal, and the fifty-seven years that the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Gibeon, which totals 111 years, are subtracted from the 480, there <b>remain for Shiloh 370 less one</b> years in which the Tabernacle stood there.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that when Shiloh was destroyed and they <b>arrived at Nov and Gibeon,</b> private altars were permitted and offerings of lesser sanctity could be eaten in any city in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? they are derived <b>as the Sages taught:</b> The Jewish people were told that when they enter Eretz Yisrael they would be permitted to sacrifice on private altars, <b>“for you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:9), during which time those altars would be prohibited.",
            "The Gemara interprets the verse: <b>“To the rest”; this</b> is a reference to <b>Shiloh.</b> “The <b>inheritance”; this</b> is a reference to <b>Jerusalem.</b> One may ask: <b>Why</b> does the verse <b>divide them</b> into two terms, i.e., “rest” and “inheritance”? It is <b>in order to give permission</b> to sacrifice on private altars during the period <b>between this</b> one <b>and that</b> one. Therefore, it was permitted to sacrifice on private altars during the period of Nov and Gibeon.",
            "<b>Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Let</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>teach</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>second tithe as well.</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> Second <b>tithe is derived from</b> what was written with regard to <b>the Ark,</b> by means of the verbal analogy between <b>“there”</b> and <b>“there.”</b> With regard to second tithe, the verse states: “And there you shall eat before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:7), while with regard to the Ark, the verse states: “There you shall place the Ark of the Testimony” (Exodus 40:3). Due to the analogy between second tithe and the Ark, one can infer that <b>since there was no Ark</b> in Nov and Gibeon, as at that time it was in Kiriath Jearim, <b>there was also no</b> second <b>tithe</b> eaten there.",
            "Reish Lakish asked: <b>If</b> it is <b>so</b> that this is the source, then with regard to the <b>Paschal offering and</b> other <b>sacrificial</b> animals, which everyone agrees were consumed in Nov and Gibeon, it can <b>also</b> be said <b>that they are derived from the Ark</b> by means of the verbal analogy between <b>“there”</b> and <b>“there,”</b> and <b>since the Ark was not</b> in Nov and Gibeon <b>they too were not</b> there.",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him:</b> With regard to the one <b>who said this to you,</b> i.e., the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, from which you inferred that second tithe was not eaten in Nov and Gibeon, in accordance with <b>whose</b> opinion <b>is this</b> statement of his? <b>It is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says: Even</b> the <b>public sacrificed</b> upon a great public altar, e.g., in Nov and Gibeon, <b>only Paschal offerings and compulsory public offerings that have a set time. But compulsory</b> offerings <b>that do not have a set time were not sacrificed here or there,</b> i.e., on a great public altar or on a small private altar. This includes <b>an animal tithe</b> offering, which <b>is a compulsory offering that has no set time, and grain tithe is juxtaposed to animal tithe.</b> Since animal tithe offerings were not brought at that time, second tithe was not eaten there either.",
            "The Gemara asks: Based on this, may it be concluded <b>by inference that according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yehuda</b> that compulsory offerings for which there is no set time were sacrificed upon a great public altar, second tithe was eaten there and animal tithe offerings were <b>sacrificed?</b> The Gemara responds: <b>Yes, as Rav Adda bar Mattana says: Second tithe and animal tithe</b> offerings <b>were consumed in Nov and Gibeon according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b> The Gemara challenges: <b>But</b> these <b>require</b> the <b>Temple,</b> not a tent, to which people will come to eat tithes. The Gemara responds: <b>But didn’t Rav Yosef teach</b> a <i>baraita</i> that states: <b>There</b> were <b>three temples: Shiloh, Nov and Gibeon, and the Eternal House. He teaches it and he says it:</b> This is referring <b>to consuming second tithe, and</b> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches that when they <b>arrived at Jerusalem,</b> private altars were prohibited and there was no subsequent period in which they were permitted. And the Temple in Jerusalem was characterized as “inheritance.” With regard to this, <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse that discusses the permissibility of private altars states: <b>“For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:9). The Gemara interprets: With regard to <b>“rest,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Shiloh,</b> and with regard to <b>“inheritance,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Jerusalem.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> similarly, the verse that relates a prophecy with regard to Jerusalem <b>states:</b> “I have forsaken My house, I have cast off My inheritance…<b>My inheritance has become to Me as a lion in the forest”</b> (Jeremiah 12:7–8). <b>And</b> additionally, in that same prophecy the verse <b>states: “Is My inheritance to Me as a speckled bird of prey? Are the birds of prey against her round about?”</b> (Jeremiah 12:9). This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.</b>",
            "By contrast, <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to <b>“rest,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Jerusalem,</b> and with regard to <b>“inheritance,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Shiloh. And</b> this is evident from the verse that <b>says: “This is My resting place forever; here will I dwell, for I have desired it”</b> (Psalms 132:14). <b>And it states</b> in the previous verse: <b>“For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His habitation”</b> (Psalms 132:13), which indicates that the verses are referring to Jerusalem.",
            "The Gemara challenges: <b>Granted, according to the one who says</b> that with regard to <b>“rest,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Shiloh; that is, as it is written: “To the rest and to the inheritance,”</b> in chronological order, as the period of Shiloh preceded that of Jerusalem. <b>But according to the one who says</b> that with regard to <b>“rest,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Jerusalem,</b> and with regard to <b>“inheritance,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Shiloh,</b> the verse <b>should have stated: To the inheritance and to the rest.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>This</b> is what the verse <b>is saying:</b> When you enter Eretz Yisrael private altars will be permitted, and <b>it is not necessary</b> to say <b>that you have not arrived at</b> the <b>“rest,”</b> i.e., the Temple in Jerusalem, <b>but you have not even arrived at</b> the <b>“inheritance,”</b> i.e., the Tabernacle in Shiloh.",
            "§ With regard to the words “rest” and “inheritance” in the aforementioned verse, <b>the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught</b> that <b>this and that,</b> i.e., both terms, are a reference to <b>Shiloh. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: This and that</b> are a reference to <b>Jerusalem.</b> The Gemara asks: <b>Granted, according to the one who says</b> that with regard to <b>“rest,” this</b> is"
        ],
        [
            "a reference to <b>Shiloh,</b> and with regard to <b>“inheritance,” this</b> is a reference to <b>Jerusalem, or the reverse,</b> i.e., that “rest” is a reference to Jerusalem and “inheritance” is a reference to Shiloh, <b>this is as it is written: “To the rest and to the inheritance [<i>el hamenuḥa ve’el hanaḥala</i>],”</b> utilizing two different phrases. <b>But according to the one,</b> i.e., the school of Rabbi Yishmael, <b>who says</b> that <b>this and that</b> are both references to <b>Shiloh, or</b> according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai that both <b>this and that</b> are references to <b>Jerusalem,</b> the verse <b>should have</b> stated: For you have not as yet come to the <b>rest</b> and <b>inheritance [<i>menuḥa naḥala</i>].</b> The Gemara concedes that this is <b>difficult.</b>",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Granted, according to the one,</b> i.e., Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, <b>who says this and that</b> are references to <b>Shiloh,</b> each of the designations may be explained: It is called <b>“rest” because</b> during the period of Shiloh they <b>rested from</b> the <b>conquest</b> in the time of Joshua, and it is called <b>“inheritance” because</b> they <b>divided</b> the <b>portions</b> of land among the tribes <b>there, as it is written: “And Joshua divided</b> the land <b>for them, and he cast a lot for them in Shiloh according to the Lord”</b> (Joshua 18:10).",
            "<b>But according to the one,</b> i.e., the school of Rabbi Yishmael, <b>who says this and that</b> are references to <b>Jerusalem, granted</b> that <b>“inheritance”</b> is a reference to Jerusalem, since it is <b>an eternal inheritance. But</b> with regard to <b>“rest,” what rest</b> was there in the Temple in Jerusalem? The Gemara answers: <b>The rest of</b> the <b>Ark, as it is written: And when the ark rested.</b> In other words, verses occasionally refer to the Temple in Jerusalem as the resting place of the Ark.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>Granted, according to the one,</b> i.e., Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, <b>who says</b> that <b>this and that</b> are references to <b>Jerusalem,</b> and consequently private altars were forbidden only following the establishment of the Temple in Jerusalem, <b>but</b> during the period of the Tabernacle in <b>Shiloh</b> private <b>altars were permitted, this is as it is written: “So Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered them upon the rock to the Lord”</b> (Judges 13:19), i.e., he sacrificed them upon a private altar and not in Shiloh.",
            "<b>But according to the one,</b> i.e., the school of Rabbi Yishmael, <b>who says</b> that <b>this and that</b> are references to <b>Shiloh, and</b> private <b>altars were forbidden</b> during this period, <b>what</b> is the meaning of: <b>“So Manoah took,”</b> as it was forbidden to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple? The Gemara answers: Permitting this sacrifice <b>was a provisional edict</b> issued in exigent circumstances.",
            "The Gemara notes that with regard to the disagreement between the <i>tanna’im</i> over the interpretation of the words “rest” and “inheritance,” there is another version of that which <b>the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught,</b> which is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says</b> that <b>this and that</b> are references to <b>Jerusalem. And your mnemonic</b> to remember this is: <b>The man pulled the men,</b> meaning: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who is an individual, pulled, i.e., convinced, the members of the school of Rabbi Yishmael to adopt his opinion.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that with regard to <b>all offerings</b> that one consecrated during a period of the permitting of private altars and sacrificed outside their designated area during a period of prohibition of private altars, one is in violation of a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but he is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for sacrificing them. With regard to this, <b>Rav Kahana says: They taught</b> that <b>only with regard to slaughter</b> of these animals outside the designated area is one not liable to receive <i>karet</i>. <b>But with regard to offering up,</b> one would <b>also</b> be <b>liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "<b>What is the reason</b> for this? It is <b>that</b> immediately following the Torah’s description of an offering that was consecrated during a period of the permitting of private altars <b>the verse states</b> the penalty for sacrificing outside the designated area: <b>“And to them [<i>va’alehem</i>] you shall say”</b> (Leviticus 17:8). The term “<i>alehem</i>,” to them, the first letter of which is the letter <i>aleph</i>, is phonetically similar to the term: <i>Alehem</i>, about them, the first letter of which is the letter <i>ayin</i>. Therefore, the verse can be understood to mean: <b>About that which is</b> written in the <b>adjacent</b> passage <b>you shall say.</b> The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so although there is no penalty of <i>karet</i> for their slaughter, one is liable for <i>karet</i> for sacrificing them upon a private altar.",
            "<b>Rabba objects to this: Is it written: And about them you shall say? “To them” is written, and we read</b> it as <b>“to them.”</b> The verse means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage.",
            "<b>And additionally, it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Shimon would say four principles with regard to sacrificial</b> animals: With regard to offerings that one <b>consecrated during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars, and slaughtered and offered up outside</b> their designated area <b>during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars,</b> for <b>these</b> one is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a positive mitzva and a prohibition, and they carry</b> the punishment of <b><i>karet</i>.</b> With regard to one who <b>consecrated them during a period of</b> the <b>permitting of</b> private <b>altars, and slaughtered and offered</b> them <b>up during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars,</b> for <b>these</b> one is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but they do not carry</b> the punishment of <b><i>karet</i>.</b>",
            "With regard to one who <b>consecrated them during a period of prohibition of</b> private <b>altars, and slaughtered and offered</b> them <b>up outside</b> their designated area <b>during a period of</b> the <b>permitting of</b> private <b>altars,</b> for <b>these</b> one is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a positive mitzva, but</b> one has <b>not</b> violated <b>a prohibition with regard to them.</b>",
            "With regard to one who <b>consecrated them during a period of</b> the <b>permitting of</b> private <b>altars, and slaughtered and offered</b> them <b>up during a period of</b> the <b>permitting of</b> private <b>altars,</b> he is <b>exempt from all</b> violations. The <i>baraita</i> states explicitly that there is no distinction between slaughtering and offering up on a private altar: In both cases, one who consecrated the offering during a period of the permitting of private altars and slaughtered or offered it up during a period of prohibition of private altars is exempt from the punishment of <i>karet</i>. The Gemara concludes: <b>The refutation of</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Kahana,</b> who distinguished between slaughter and offering up, is <b>a conclusive refutation.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>And these are the consecrated</b> items, and lists components of the sacrificial service that were performed only on a great public altar, i.e., in the Tabernacle, and not on a private altar. The Gemara clarifies the source of each ritual on the list: The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>placing hands</b> on the head of an offering is <b>as it is written:</b> “If his offering be a burnt offering…he shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, that he may be accepted <b>before the Lord. And he shall lay</b> his hand upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:3–4).",
            "The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>slaughtering</b> offerings of the most sacred order in the <b>north</b> is <b>as it is written:</b> “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar <b>northward before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 1:11). The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>placement</b> of the blood of a burnt offering <b>around,</b> i.e., on all four sides of, the altar, is <b>as it is written: “And</b> Aaron’s sons, the priests, <b>shall…sprinkle</b> the blood <b>roundabout against the altar</b> that is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 1:5).",
            "The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>waving</b> of those offerings that require waving is <b>as it is written: “And the priest</b> shall take one of the lambs, and offer it for a guilt offering, and the <i>log</i> of oil, and <b>wave</b> them for a wave offering <b>before the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 14:12). The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning <b>bringing</b> meal offerings to the corner of the altar before the removal of the handful is <b>as it is written: “And he shall bring it to the altar”</b> (Leviticus 2:8). The definite article before the word “altar” indicates that this applies only to the altar in the Tabernacle, and not on a private altar.",
            "§ With regard to the question of whether a meal offering was sacrificed upon an altar outside the Temple, the mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no meal offering</b> sacrificed <b>on an altar</b> outside the Temple, even a great public altar, e.g., the Tabernacle in Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon. <b>Rav Sheshet says: According to the statement</b> of <b>the one who says there is a meal offering</b> sacrificed <b>on an altar</b> outside the Temple, <b>there are</b> also <b>bird</b> offerings sacrificed <b>on an altar</b> outside the Temple. <b>According to the statement of the one who says there is no meal offering</b> sacrificed <b>on an altar</b> outside the Temple, <b>there are</b> also <b>no bird</b> offerings sacrificed <b>on an altar</b> outside the Temple.",
            "The reason for this is that the Torah is referring to offerings that were sacrificed during the period of the permitting of private altars as: Slaughtered offerings [<i>zevaḥim</i>], in the verse: “And sacrifice them for sacrifices of [<i>vezaveḥu zivḥei</i>] peace offerings” (Leviticus 17:5), from which it may be inferred: <b>Slaughtered offerings but not meal offerings; slaughtered offerings but not bird</b> offerings, i.e., neither meal offerings nor bird offerings were sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple, including a great public altar.",
            "The Gemara continues detailing the distinctions between great public altars and small private altars: <b>And a priest</b> is required only at a public altar, <b>as it is written: “And the priest shall sprinkle</b> the blood against the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). Priestly <b>service vestments</b> are required only at a public altar, as it is written: “And they shall be upon Aaron, and upon his sons when they go into the Tent of Meeting or when they come near to the altar <b>to minister in the sacred place”</b> (Exodus 28:43).",
            "<b>And</b> with regard to <b>service vessels,</b> it is written: “And they shall take all the service vessels <b>wherewith they serve in the sacred place”</b> (Numbers 4:12). With regard <b>to a pleasing aroma,</b> i.e., that limbs that had previously been roasted off the altar should not be placed upon the altar, it is required only on a public altar, <b>as it is written:</b> “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood against the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and the priest shall make the fat smoke <b>for an aroma pleasing to the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 17:6).",
            "<b>A partition for</b> the <b>blood,</b> i.e., the red line that divides the altar, as the blood of some offerings, e.g., a sin offering, was sprinkled above the line, and the blood of other offerings, e.g., a burnt offering, was sprinkled below the line, was required only on a public altar, <b>as it is written: “And the net may reach halfway up the altar”</b> (Exodus 27:5). The definite article before the word “altar” indicates that this applied only to the altar in the Tabernacle. With regard to the requirement for <b>washing of hands</b> and feet before the service, it is required only on a public altar, <b>as it is written:</b> “When they went into the Tent of Meeting <b>and when they came near to the altar, they shall wash”</b> (Exodus 40:32).",
            "§ Concerning the <i>halakha</i> requiring a partition for the blood, and other <i>halakhot</i> that did not apply to a private altar but did apply to a great public altar, <b>Rami bar Ḥama said:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> that there is no requirement for a partition <b>only with regard to</b> consecrated <b>sacrificial</b> items to be used on <b>a small</b> private <b>altar, and which</b> one <b>sacrificed upon a small</b> private <b>altar. But in</b> the case of consecrated <b>sacrificial</b> items to be used on <b>a small</b> private <b>altar that were sacrificed upon a great</b> public <b>altar, there is a partition.</b>",
            "<b>Rabba raised an objection</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> of waving the <b>breast and</b> the <b>thigh</b> of a peace offering and <b>the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering applies with regard to sacrificial</b> items <b>of a great</b> public <b>altar and does not apply with regard to sacrificial</b> items <b>of a small</b> private <b>altar,</b> even if they were sacrificed upon a great public altar. The Gemara responds: <b>Say</b> that the text of the <i>baraita</i> should be the following: The <i>halakha</i> of waving the breast and thigh and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering <b>applies to a great</b> public <b>altar,</b> even with regard to a sacrificial item of a small private altar, <b>but does not apply to a small</b> private <b>altar.</b>",
            "<b>Some say</b> that <b>Rami bar Ḥama said:</b> The Sages <b>taught</b> that there is a requirement for a partition <b>only with regard to sacrificial</b> items of <b>a great</b> public <b>altar</b> that <b>were sacrificed upon a great</b> public <b>altar. But in</b> the case of <b>sacrificial</b> items of <b>a small</b> private <b>altar, even though they were sacrificed upon a great</b> public <b>altar, there is no partition.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that the following <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion <b>of</b> Rami bar Ḥama: Waving of the <b>breast and thigh</b> of a peace offering <b>and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering applies to sacrificial</b> items <b>of a great</b> public <b>altar, and does not apply to sacrificial</b> items <b>of a small</b> private <b>altar.</b>",
            "The Gemara responds: No proof may be brought from here, as <b>I will say</b> that it means the <i>halakha</i> of waving the breast and thigh and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering <b>applies to a great</b> public <b>altar,</b> even with regard to the sacrificial items of a private altar, <b>and does not apply to a small</b> private <b>altar.</b> The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> this latter version of Rami bar Ḥama’s statement <b>disagrees with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: A burnt offering of a private altar that one brought inside,</b> i.e., into the area of a great public altar, is <b>absorbed,</b> i.e., sanctified, by the <b>partitions for all matters.</b>",
            "With regard to the previous matter, <b>Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma:</b> With regard to <b>a burnt offering of a private altar</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>that one brought inside and</b> subsequently <b>took outside, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Does it have the status of a sacrificial item of a public altar? The Gemara clarifies the question: <b>Do we say</b> that <b>once</b> it was <b>brought in the partition</b> has already <b>absorbed it,</b> and all <i>halakhot</i> of sacrificial items of a public altar apply; <b>or perhaps once it returns,</b> i.e., was taken outside again, <b>it returns</b> to its prior status as an offering of a private altar?",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Isn’t this</b> issue <b>a disagreement between Rabba and Rav Yosef? As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 2a): With regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> e.g., a sin offering or a guilt offering, <b>that were slaughtered in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard, and not in the north as dictated by <i>halakha</i>, and are therefore disqualified, one who derives benefit <b>from</b> them is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>and</b> despite the fact that they should not ascend the altar, <b>if they ascended they shall not descend.</b>",
            "<b>And a dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: If they <b>did descend</b> the altar, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>ascending</b> again? <b>Rabba says: They shall not ascend, and Rav Yosef says: They shall ascend.</b> Consequently, they disagree with regard to the issue of whether an item that is not fit to be sacrificed in a consecrated area acquires the sanctity of that area even if it is removed from there.",
            "The Gemara responds: The disagreements are not identical, as <b>the dilemma can be raised according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba,</b> and <b>the dilemma can be raised according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Yosef.</b> The Gemara elaborates: It is possible to <b>raise the dilemma according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba,</b> as <b>Rabba says</b> his statement: Offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south shall not descend if they ascended, <b>only with regard to the altar, as</b> the altar <b>consecrates that which is fit for it,</b> while it <b>does not consecrate that which is not fit for it. But</b> with regard to the <b>partition</b> of the public altar, <b>even though</b> an offering that was consecrated for a private altar <b>is not fit for</b> that altar, the partition nevertheless <b>absorbs</b> the offering and it is sacrificed there. Consequently, all the <i>halakhot</i> of the public altar apply to that offering, even if it is taken outside.",
            "<b>Or perhaps</b> the dilemma of the burnt offering of a private altar can be raised <b>even according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef states</b> his opinion <b>there,</b> that offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard and descended the altar shall ascend again, <b>only because</b> the altar and the offering are both located in <b>one place,</b> i.e., the Temple courtyard. <b>But here</b> in Rabbi Zeira’s case, <b>where</b> the private altar and public altar <b>are two</b> separate <b>places,</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of the public altar do <b>not</b> apply if the offering was taken outside the designated location. <b>Or perhaps</b> there <b>is no difference,</b> and the opinions of Rabba and Rav Yosef in one case are identical to their opinions in the other. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "The Gemara notes that <b>a matter that is obvious to Rabba on one side,</b> i.e., that these offerings shall not ascend the altar again, <b>and to Rav Yosef on</b> the other <b>side,</b> i.e., that they shall ascend again, <b>was raised as a dilemma by Rabbi Yannai. As Rabbi Yannai raises a dilemma: What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>the limbs of a burnt offering of a private altar that ascended the altar and descended?</b> The Gemara notes: In a case <b>where the fire has not</b> yet <b>taken hold of them, do not raise the dilemma,</b> as they certainly shall not ascend again. <b>When should you raise the dilemma?</b> Raise it in a case <b>where the fire has taken hold of them: What</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved.",
            "§ Additionally, with regard to a private altar it <b>was stated:</b> With regard to <b>the slaughter of</b> offerings at <b>night on a private altar, Rav and Shmuel</b> disagree: <b>One says</b> that it is <b>valid, and one says</b> that it is <b>not valid.</b> The Gemara explains: <b>And they disagree with regard to</b> the resolution to a contradiction that was raised <b>by Rabbi Elazar.</b>",
            "<b>As Rabbi Elazar raised a contradiction between</b> two <b>verses: It is written</b> in the context of Saul’s war with the Philistines: “And the people flew upon the spoil and took sheep and cattle and calves and slew them on the ground; and the people ate them with the blood. Then they told Saul, saying: ‘Behold, the people sin against the Lord in that they eat with the blood. <b>And he said: You have dealt treacherously; roll a great stone to me this day”</b> (I Samuel 14:32–33). That stone was made into a private altar upon which offerings could be slaughtered and sacrificed. Evidently, Saul was particular about slaughtering offerings during the day and not at night, despite the fact that it was a private altar and not a public altar.",
            "<b>And</b> immediately thereafter <b>it is written: “And Saul said: Disperse yourselves among the people and say to them: Bring me here every man his ox and every man his sheep, and slay them here and eat and sin not against the Lord in eating with the blood. And all the people brought every man his ox with him that night, and slew them there”</b> (I Samuel 14:34). This verse states explicitly that the slaughter took place at night and not during the day.",
            "Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the resolution of this contradiction: One <b>Sage answers</b> that <b>here,</b> i.e., when the slaughter took place at night, it was <b>of non-sacred</b> animals, while <b>there,</b> i.e., when Saul was particular about slaughtering during the day, it was the slaughter <b>of sacrificial</b> animals. According to this opinion, the sacrificial service was performed only during the day, even on a private altar. <b>And</b> the other <b>Sage answers</b> that both verses are referring to the slaughter of offerings: <b>Here,</b> in the verse that states that Saul was particular about slaughtering during the day, it is referring <b>to the sacrificial</b> animals <b>of a great</b> public <b>altar,</b> while <b>there,</b> in the verse that states that the slaughter took place at night, it is referring <b>to sacrificial</b> animals <b>of a small</b> private <b>altar.</b>",
            "§ It <b>was stated</b> that with regard to <b>the burnt offering of a private altar, Rav says: It does not require flaying and cutting</b> into pieces, which the Torah requires of a burnt offering (see Leviticus 1:6), <b>and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It does require flaying and cutting</b> into pieces. The Gemara explains: <b>And they disagree with regard to</b> the meaning of a statement <b>of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The burnt offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the wilderness,</b> i.e., at Mount Sinai before the establishment of the Tabernacle, <b>did not require flaying and cutting</b> into pieces, <b>because</b> the requirement of <b>flaying and cutting</b> into pieces applied <b>only from the Tent of Meeting and onward,</b> as this <i>halakha</i> was first taught in the Tent of Meeting.",
            "One <b>Sage,</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>holds</b> that <b>from the Tent of Meeting and onward</b> there is a requirement of flaying and cutting into pieces, and there <b>is no difference</b> whether the offering is brought upon <b>a great</b> public <b>altar, and</b> there <b>is no difference</b> whether it is brought upon <b>a small</b> private <b>altar. And</b> one <b>Sage,</b> Rav, <b>holds</b> that <b>with regard to a great</b> public <b>altar, yes,</b> flaying and cutting are required, but <b>with regard to a small</b> private <b>altar</b> they are <b>not.</b>",
            "<b>It is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> What are the <b>matters that are different between a great</b> public <b>altar and a small</b> private <b>altar?</b> The <b>corner</b> of the altar, the <b>ramp,</b> the <b>base</b> of the altar, <b>and</b> the <b>square</b> shape are required <b>in a great</b> public <b>altar, but</b> the <b>corner,</b> the <b>base,</b> the <b>ramp, and</b> the <b>square</b> shape <b>are not</b> required <b>in a small</b> private <b>altar.</b> The <b>Basin and its base</b> are required <b>in a great</b> public <b>altar, but</b> the <b>Basin and its base are not</b> required <b>in a small</b> private <b>altar.</b> The <b>breast and thigh</b> of a peace offering, which are given to a priest, are waved <b>at a great</b> public <b>altar, but</b> the <b>breast and thigh are not</b> waved <b>at a small</b> private <b>altar.</b>",
            "And there are other <b>matters</b> in <b>which a great</b> public <b>altar is identical to a small</b> private <b>altar: Slaughter</b> is required <b>at</b> both <b>a great</b> public <b>altar and a small</b> private altar. <b>Flaying</b> a burnt offering <b>and cutting</b> it into pieces is required <b>at</b> both <b>a great</b> public altar <b>and a small</b> private altar. Sprinkling the <b>blood permits</b> the meat to be eaten, <b>and</b> if at that time the priest thought of eating or sacrificing this offering outside its appropriate time, this <b>renders</b> the offering <b><i>piggul</i></b> both <b>at a great</b> public altar <b>and</b> at <b>a small</b> private altar. Likewise, the <i>halakha</i> that <b>blemishes</b> disqualify an offering <b>and</b> the <i>halakha</i> that there is a limited <b>time</b> for eating offerings are in effect <b>at</b> both <b>a great</b> public altar <b>and a small</b> private altar.",
            "§ Following the detailing of the differences between a communal altar and a private altar, the mishna teaches: <b>But</b> the <i>halakha</i> that portions of the offering <b>left over [<i>notar</i>]</b> beyond the time it is permitted must be burned and that one who eats them incurs <i>karet</i>, <b>and the</b> <i>halakha</i> that intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated <b>time</b> renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, <b>and the</b> prohibition against performing the sacrificial service or eating consecrated meat while <b>ritually impure are equal in this,</b> i.e., a private altar, <b>and that,</b> i.e., a public altar.",
            "With regard to this <b>the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where</b> is it derived that <b>time,</b> i.e., the <i>halakha</i> that an offering left over beyond its designated time is disqualified, in the case <b>of a small</b> private <b>altar should be made equivalent to</b> the <i>halakha</i> in the case <b>of a great</b> public <b>altar? The Torah stated:</b> An offering that was <b>left overnight</b> must <b>be burned, and</b> likewise the Torah stated that <b>an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>]</b> must <b>be burned.</b> Therefore, another parallel may be drawn between them: <b>Just as <i>piggul</i> is disqualified</b> in the case <b>of</b> a private <b>altar, so too,</b> an offering that was <b>left overnight</b> is <b>disqualified</b> in the case <b>of</b> a private <b>altar.</b>",
            "<b>Or go this way,</b> and say that <b>because the Torah stated:</b> An offering that was <b>left overnight must be burned, and</b> likewise, the Torah stated that an offering that <b>leaves</b> the Temple courtyard <b>must be burned,</b> the following conclusion may be drawn: <b>Just as</b> an offering that <b>leaves</b> the Temple courtyard is <b>valid in</b> the case of a private <b>altar</b> because it has no set perimeter, <b>so too,</b> an offering that was <b>left overnight</b> is <b>valid in</b> the case of a private <b>altar,</b> and it may therefore be concluded that the <i>halakha</i> of time does not apply to offerings on a private altar. The Gemara asks: <b>And is it not an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference <b>from</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>bird</b> offerings that in the case of a private altar, time should render an offering disqualified?"
        ],
        [
            "<b>If bird</b> offerings, whose <i>halakhot</i> are more lenient in <b>that a blemish does not disqualify them, are</b> nevertheless <b>disqualified by time,</b> then with regard to <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>of a small</b> private <b>altar, which are disqualified by a blemish, is it not logical that they</b> should be <b>disqualified by time?</b>",
            "The Gemara questions the inference: <b>What</b> is notable <b>about bird</b> offerings? They are notable <b>in that a non-priest is not fit to</b> sacrifice <b>them. Shall you say</b> the same <b>with regard to</b> offerings sacrificed on <b>a small</b> private <b>altar, where a non-priest is fit?</b> No, and consequently they <b>should not be disqualified by time.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And this is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings”</b> (Leviticus 7:11), which equates all peace offerings, <b>to render</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>time</b> with regard to <b>a small</b> private <b>altar identical to</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>time</b> with regard to <b>a great</b> public <b>altar.</b>"
        ]
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Daf",
        "Line"
    ]
}