
## DSCOPE: A Cloud-Native Internet Telescope

Eric Pauley, Paul Barford, Patrick McDaniel

University of Wisconsin–Madison




### Why Measure the Internet?






### Why Measure the Internet?





### Why Measure the Internet?






#### Honeypots: emulating vulnerable services (1970s-)

Idea: pose as vulnerable service

Pro: interactivity Con: limited coverage (one IP)






#### Honeynets: networks of honeypots (1999)

Deploy many honeypot IPs Bonus: virtualize routing

Pro: interactivity and coverage! Con: still limited footprint






#### **Telescopes: Large-scale measurement (2001)**


Passively measure large IP blocks (/8) E.g., UCSD-NT, Merit

- Pro: Massive footprints Cons:
- limited interactivity
- homogeneous IP Space



**N A N O G**<sup>\*\*</sup>

### The space of (inbound) Internet Measurement



- Emergent Threats
- Botnets
- Backscatter
- Routing
- Misconfigurations

#### The Changing Internet (Measurement) Landscape



Rise of Public Clouds Adversaries target valuable IP ranges



Semantics Moving up Protocol Stack Passive measurement is incomplete



Sophisticated & Distributed Adversaries Fixed footprints miss adversarial response



#### **An Internet Telescope for the Modern Internet**



- **Representative Traffic**
- Deployed to targeted cloud IP address ranges globally

7	
('	


Interactivity Collects application-layer banner information Elicits deeper adversarial behavior



• Agile through the IP address space IP footprint varies over time








Cloud provider IP footprints and costs:


Provider	IPs	#/8s	Cost (USD/IP-Hr)
GCP [15]	11.5 M	34	0.005
Azure [3]	35.7 M	13	0.044
AWS [2]	134 M	82	0.0016






#### iptables -j DNAT










**N** A N O G<sup>\*\*</sup>

#### DSCOPE: A Global, Dynamic, Interactive Cloud Telescope and Analysis Platform!





### **DSCOPE by the numbers**



2+ years of collected traffic



6.3M IPv4s



110k /24 networks

More than any other telescope



**NANOG** 

>15M source IPs measured

#### \$461.57 \$14.89 46 Costs (\$) $\mathcal{N}$ հ 16 Mav-07 Mav-11 May-15 May-19 Mav-23

Average daily cost

Usage type count

Mav-27

May-31

Total cost

May-03

#### **Results: 18 findings on cloud-based Internet measurement**

	Finding	Metric		
Cloud Tar	geting (Section 4)			
(F1)	An interactive cloud telescope receives traffic from substantially more IP addresses.	73% more traffic		
(F2)	Cloud IP traffic is more variable than darknets.	95% higher $\sigma_{IP}$		
(F3)	Scanners target cloud IP ranges or avoid telescopes.	$450 \times$ higher than expected under $H_0$		
(F4)	Scanners that are seen by both darknet/cloud telescopes are largely untargeted.	N/A		
(F5)	Scans targeting existing telescopes are primarily random.	N/A		
Interactivi	ty & Service Lifecycle (Section 5)			
(F6)	Some scanner IPs demonstrate clearly non-random behavior.	1.7% of traffic $(p < 10^{-4})$		
(F7)	Delayed scanners leverage information from other sources to target responsive IPs.	> 90% discernible source		
(F8)	Delayed scanners are not seen by existing darknet telescopes.	90% telescope avoidance ( $p < 10^{-4}$ )		
Intra-clou	d Targeting (Section 6)			
(F9)	Quantity of scanners differs across cloud regions, but intra-region variance dominates	$\pm 0.3\sigma$ variation between regions		
(F10)	Source IP variance differs between regions.	$6 \times$ variation in $\sigma$		
(F11)	Scanners target cloud IP addresses based on outdated data.	21% fewer scanners to 2021 AWS IPs		
(F12)	Traffic to individual regions is largely consistent with untargeted scanning.	< 10% regional targeting		
(F13)	Some sophisticated scanners precisely target physical regions within cloud IP blocks.	$4 \times$ background rate for region/port		
(F14)	Scanners show minimal preference to groups of regions in similar geographies.	0.02 lower overlap in same-geography		
Optimizin	g Collection (Section 7)			
(F15)	Observed traffic increases over time after instance deployment, but only to a point.	67% increase		
(F16)	Scanners targeting ORION are less likely to be reactive.	34% increase		
(F17)	Short-lived use of IP addresses maximizes economical yield of new behavior.	< 10 min for max yield		
(F18)	Extended measurement on a given IP is not necessary to achieve high coverage.	90% IP coverage at 72 minutes		




#### **Results: 18 findings on cloud-based Internet measurement**

		Finding	Metric
	Cloud Tar	geting (Section 4)	
	(F1)	An interactive cloud telescope receives traffic from substantially more IP addresses.	73% more traffic
	(F2)	Cloud IP traffic is more variable than darknets.	95% higher $\sigma_{IP}$
Coverage	(F3)	Scanners target cloud IP ranges or avoid telescopes.	$450 \times$ higher than expected under $H_0$
	(F4)	Scanners that are seen by both darknet/cloud telescopes are largely untargeted.	N/A
	(F5)	Scans targeting existing telescopes are primarily random.	N/A
	Interactivi	ty & Service Lifecycle (Section 5)	
	(F6)	Some scanner IPs demonstrate clearly non-random behavior.	1.7% of traffic ( $p < 10^{-4}$ )
	(F7)	Delayed scanners leverage information from other sources to target responsive IPs	> 90% discernible source
nteractivity ('	(F8)	Delayed scanners are not seen by existing darknet telescopes.	90% telescope avoidance ( $p < 10^{-4}$ )
	Intra-clou	d Targeting (Section 6)	
	(F9)	Quantity of scanners differs across cloud regions, but intra-region variance dominates	$\pm 0.3\sigma$ variation between regions
	(F10)	Source IP variance differs between regions	$6 \times$ variation in $\sigma$
Validity	(F11)	Scanners target cloud IP addresses based on outdated data.	21% fewer scanners to 2021 AWS IPs
	(F12)	Traffic to individual regions is largely consistent with untargeted scanning.	< 10% regional targeting
	(F13)	Some sophisticated scanners precisely target physical regions within cloud IP blocks.	$4 \times$ background rate for region/port
	(F14)	Scanners show minimal preference to groups of regions in similar geographies.	0.02 lower overlap in same-geography
	Optimizing	g Collection (Section 7)	
	(F15)	Observed traffic increases over time after instance deployment, but only to a point.	67% increase
	(F16)	Scanners targeting ORION are less likely to be reactive.	34% increase
Cost	(F17)	Short-lived use of IP addresses maximizes economical yield of new behavior.	$< 10 \mathrm{min}$ for max yield
		Extended measurement on a given IP is not necessary to achieve high coverage.	

**N A N O G**<sup>\*\*</sup>

#### Coverage: Is Internet Scanning Random?


**Recall: Null-Hypothesis of Random Scanning** 



**N A N O G**<sup>\*\*</sup>

#### Coverage: Is Internet Scanning Random?

#### **Recall: Null-Hypothesis of Random Scanning**





### Coverage: Is Internet Scanning Sequential?

ORION

DSCOPE

IPv4 /8 around Merit's ORION telescope:

Question: Are IPs near ORION more likely to share traffic?


Answer: No difference (not sequential)



DScope: A Cloud-Native Internet Telescope

#### **C** Interactivity: Service Lifecycle and follow-on scans


#### Does interactivity induce adversarial response?





#### ( Interactivity: Service Lifecycle and follow-on scans


#### Does interactivity induce adversarial response?





#### **C** Interactivity: Service Lifecycle and follow-on scans

#### Does interactivity induce adversarial response?




#### **A** Cloud Traffic Distributions & Statistical Validity



- IP address history
- Latent configuration


DSCOPE's large footprint allows for elimination of confounding factors.



Scanners Targeting us1?



#### **A** Geographic Targeting: An Example




Hilbert Diagram of port 445 traffic seen by 3.0.0.0/8 IP addresses





#### **Cost Optimization: How long should DSCOPE hold IPs?**


Goal: Max coverage with min cost (IP-hours)



**N A N O G**<sup>\*\*</sup>

#### Cost Optimization: How long should DSCOPE hold IPs?

#### Goal: Max coverage with min cost (IP-hours)



**N** A N O G<sup>\*</sup>

### **DSCOPE achieves:**



Representative Traffic and Global Coverage



**(**] Interactivity & Service Lifecycle



e Agility through IP Space



Price Performance




Useful data...?



### **BDSCOPE.ORG** and Open Data

- Data Products
  - Standard formats (JSON, PCAP)
  - 2+ years of data (more daily)
  - Data sharing agreements WIP
- Interactive Visualizations
  - Emergent Threats
  - Cloud Scanning
  - Deployment Health





### What data does DScope provide?

- Broad Application-layer traffic
- Cloud-targeted phenomena
- General-purpose telescope data



### **App-layer Data: Vulnerabilities**

Data: Traffic matches against IDS rulesets


#### Analyses:

- CVE trends
- Exploit Sources




• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	× +						~
$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ <b>C</b> $\bullet$ dscope.org/visuals/vulr	nerabilities/				* *		
DScope							٨
	n DScope: A C	loud-Native Inter		isuals/Vulnerabil	ities		
Navigation	Vulnerat	oilities					
About Architecture Publications	All CVEs	s seen b	y DScop	e			
Datasets	CVE	First seen by	•CVE Publicati	Days seen by	DScope	IPs hit	
Server Metas	2022-35748	2022-11-29	2023-05-31T1	1		1	
	2022-47966	2023-07-14	2023-01-18T1	1		1	
tcp_syns	2022-44877	2023-02-20 2022-10-15	2023-01-05T2 2022-10-18T1	1		5	
Visuals	2022-40684	2022-10-15	2022-10-1811 2022-10-13T1	12		16	
Cloud Scanning	2022-42889	2022-12-29	2022-10-03T0	4		3	
Cloud Service Health	2022-35914	2022-11-23	2022-09-19T1	17		17	
Log4Shell	2022-31269	2021-03-21	2022-08-25T2	7		54	
Vulnerabilities	2022-20858	2021-11-03	2022-07-21T0	14		146	
vuiterabilities	2022-20857	2021-03-15	2022-07-21T0	568		66,976	
	2022-26138 + Dats 40,000 - 30,000 - 26,000 - 26,000 - 10,000 - 10,000 - 10,000 - 10,000 -	2022-08-04	2022-07-20T1	2 Martin Martin	mulan	2 1	

#### **App-Layer Data: Is DScope representative?**






### **Example: Log4Shell**





### **Measuring Cloud Squatting**





- Idea: Cloud IPs receive traffic intended for previous tenants
- Measurement: Identify vulnerable configurations through traffic analysis

### **Cloud Squatting: Vulnerability at Scale**

<u>Cloud Services</u> >5M messages 4 cloud services



- Third-Party Services
- >3M messages
- Numerous Services



<u>DNS</u>

- 5400 Websites
- 23 top-1000





### **General-Purpose Telescope Data**

- Raw PCAPs
  - Application layer or synthetic-darknet
  - Limited to TCP traffic
- Scanning Events
  - Caveats: non-linear address space



### **Building Future Vantage Points**

Goal: Quality > Quantity

- DScope achieves quality by using diverse cloud IPs
- Fewer IPs yield more representative phenomena
- What are we trying to gain coverage of?

Approach: Increase footprint diversity

- Spread across operators, geographies, services
- Collaborations with industry to instrument networks
- Get in touch for more details!

**N A N O G**<sup>\*\*</sup>

# Thanks!



**epauley@cs.wisc.edu** 

