

Spam Wars

Chronicles of Our Fight for
Network Integrity





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**Customer Support Team Lead
within a Hosting company:**

Over 70,000 tenants across B2B and B2C
sectors, spanning 80+ industries

**Engineering Manager of the
IPXO Platform team:**

Planning and implementation of changes
of Network Infrastructure

IPXO primarily focuses on IP leasing

PROBLEM



We monitor IP reputation both during and after leases to ensure clean resources



Increased IP leases led to a rise in abuse reports



Most abuse reports were related to SPAM




Resolving SPAM cases was time-intensive and often ineffective



Our reputation suffered as SBL (Spamhaus Blocklist) listings increased faster than resolutions



Our Journey in Defending the Network from SPAM



Our Journey in Defending the Network from SPAM

2023-04



**Pointer Record
(PTR) & Reverse Domain
Name Service (rDNS)**

2023-05



**Know Your
Customer (KYC)**


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
**Resource Public
Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)**



— /24s listed in Spamhaus SBL



— Spam Cases — All Cases



First Focus:

PTR & rDNS

PTRs primarily serve to enhance email deliverability

Noticed a pattern of abusive behavior using PTRs

- Some PTRs would lead to obviously fake domains (e.g. Microsoft.com)
- The PTRs would get changed once a week or sometimes even more frequently

The changes we made

- ✔ Introduced automatic PTR scanning
- ✔ Improved monitoring to detect clients who frequently modify PTRs
- ✔ Developed a feature to disable rDNS and PTR control/configuration in the event of detected anomalies
- ✔ Disabled rDNS control by default

Expected results

- Reduced number of subnets listed in Spamhaus blocklists
- Negative customer feedback
- Chargebacks and temporary decline in sales followed by a return to previous


Positive Outcome

- ✓ Received less SPAM reports
- ✓ Overall decrease in SBL listings
- ✓ Overall better report statistics



— /24s listed in Spamhaus SBL



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Not all rainbows and sunshine



- Customer backlash & Chargebacks increased after policy changes

The changes proved to be effective, but more issues resurfaced

Next Focus:

KYC



Initially, SPAM reports decreased but then surged to levels higher than before




Malicious clients began using alternative entities to access our services




A strategic decision was made to prioritize enhancing our KYC procedures

— Registered users — Approved users



Abuse Cases by industry



KYC improvements


- ✔ Only allow companies with working email, website, and in some cases, legal documents
- ✔ Conduct lookups in international USA and EU sanction lists
- ✔ Review client abuse handling policies
- ✔ Perform client domain reputation scans
- ✔ Implement additional procedures for high-risk countries

Projected challenges and downsides


- Banning clients who do not comply with the updated KYC policy
- Addressing negative customer feedback
- Managing even more chargebacks

Outcome

- Initial approve rate fell from 50% to 25%
- Improved KYC processes lead to higher risk indicators in 12 industries




- **Banned over 10% of customers in two phases**
- **7 countries received the highest risk assessment scores, resulting in bans**
- **Experienced Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks for approximately two weeks**



It seemed great, but...

- **More chargeback & DDoS attacks**
- **SPAM reports indicated unused IPs were mostly involved**
- **Focus shifted to new abuse type: Route Hijacking**



Focus:

RPKI




Hijacks significantly damage our reputation and finances

Resolving hijack cases required extensive manual intervention

After the PTR and KYC policy changes, the majority of SPAM cases originated from hijacked resources

Abuse reports (like SPAM) from hijacked IPs may wrongly implicate our legitimate users


KYC changes and ban waves



— /24 subnet hijacks over time

Hijack case handling time

KYC changes and ban waves



— AVG case handling time

— The 90th percentile of case handling time


Implement changes

- Prepare infrastructure for RPKI control
- Introduce Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) parking for route security
- Automate RPKI control for handling hijack cases
- Establish subnet quarantine and associated handling fees
- Introduce Autonomous System Number (ASN) control (bans)

Expected challenges

- Persuade clients to grant us control of RPKI
- Clients unwilling to pay fees for handling abuse cases

— /24 subnet hijacks over time




Hijack case handling time



**KYC changes
and ban waves**

**RPKI control adoption
Automated hijack handling**




— AVG case handling time

— The 90th percentile of case handling time


Hijack case handling time (with RPKI controlled comparison)

RPKI control adoption
Automated hijack handling





- **AVG case handling time**
- **The 90th percentile of case handling time**
- **AVG case handling time for non-RPKI onboarded**
- **AVG case handling time for RPKI onboarded**

All Customer Journey Improvements



Before and after implementations





Our iterative approach

- Began with changes on the PTR use policy, monitoring and automation
- Updated our TOS and KYC, which helped us get rid of malicious clients
- Deployed infrastructure for BGP parking, hijack monitoring, RPKI control
- Introduced service quarantine and fees for abuse case handling

Key learnings

- No single solution exists; it's best to combine complementary approaches
- Data collection is key for validating decisions
- Achieving significant results demands bold actions
- Do not expect immediate results
- Be prepared to lose some customers and revenue



Thanks

Feel free to reach out

 **Ignas Anfalovas**

