Removing Barriers to RPKI Adoption

Cecilia Testart
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02.03.2026

Georgia Tech

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In collaboration with:
Josephine Wolff, Romain Fontugne and Deepak Gouda

Georgia Tech

There is consensus on RPKI benefits

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CLOUDFLARE

RPKI and BGP: our path to securing Internet Routing

2018-09-19

Jérôme Fleury Louis Poinsignon

kentik

How much does RPKI ROV reduce the propagation of invalid routes?

Doug Madory & Job Snijders

August 24, 2022 Internet Analysis RPKI

Reachability / Visibility

Percentage of Kentik's BGP vantage points with routes to the monitored prefixes.



CableLabs

INFORMED™ BLOG | by CableLabs

Improving the Resilience of Cable Networks Through RPKI

CISCO ThousandEyes EN US

Visualizing the Benefits of RPKI

By Kemal Sahjta

July 19, 2019 | 8 min read



All Dutch govt networks to use RPKI to prevent BGP hijacking

By Bill Toulas April 9, 2023 11:21 AM 0

fastly EN Menu

War story: RPKI is working as intended

Job Snijders
Principal Software Engineer, Fastly

November 05, 2024

CDN & Delivery Security

FCC OFFICE OF THE CHAIRWOMAN

Media Contact:
MediaRelations@fcc.gov

For Immediate Release

FCC CHAIRWOMAN PROPOSES INTERNET ROUTING SECURITY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Broadband Providers Would Need BGP Security Plans and Largest Providers Would File Quarterly Reports

WASHINGTON, May 15, 2024—FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel today proposed requiring the largest broadband providers to file confidential reports on Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security so the FCC and its national security partners can for the first time collect more up-to-date information about this critical internet routing intersection. BGP is the technology used for routing information through the physical and digital infrastructure of the internet.

And global ROA adoption over 50%



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

Research Questions

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- How can we support the RPKI adoption processes to reach higher levels of adoption?

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Research Questions

- How can we support the RPKI adoption processes to reach higher levels of adoption?
  - What are the barriers?
  - What approaches have been successful?
  - How to target efforts?

Methodology

Methodology



- **Semi-structured interviews:** 13 network operators substantially involved in RPKI decision-making.

Methodology



- **Semi-structured interviews:** 13 network operators substantially involved in RPKI decision-making.



- **Measurement study:** Combining BGP, WHOIS, IP delegation and RIR specific data.

The Technology Adoption Perspective



The Technology Adoption Perspective



RPKI in Late Majority phase!

RPKI Adoption is not uniform

RPKI Adoption is not uniform

Region

RPKI Adoption is not uniform

Region

Size

RPKI Adoption is not uniform

Region

Type

Size

RPKI Adoption is not uniform

Region

Type

Size

8.0.0.0/8

IP delegation complexity

RPKI Adoption is not uniform

Region

Type

Why?

Size

8.0.0.0/8

IP delegation complexity

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

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IP resource management

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IP resource management

Awareness and training

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

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Awareness and training

Software tools for RPKI

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

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Awareness and training

Software tools for RPKI

Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

IP resource management

Awareness and training

Software tools for RPKI

Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

> *“ our prefixes [that] are not covered by ROAs [...] is because of the years and years of **IP allocation and poor record keeping**. And then that's a big challenge.”*

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

IP resource management

Awareness and training

Software tools for RPKI

Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

*"Just because you're a **routing jockey doesn't mean you're familiar with RPKI**. I had to educate some people that it's not going to knock some people off the network."*

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

IP resource management

Awareness and training

Software tools for RPKI

Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

*“I was doing presentations and **education of upper management** to get their buy-in.”*

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

IP resource management

Awareness and training

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Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

*"So […] **how do you teach people about NANOG that don't know about NANOG?** […] How do you reach out to Joe's Bait & Tackle Internet service?"*

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

IP resource management

Awareness and training

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Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

… where RIRs play a pivotal role

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

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

The Role of RIRs in RPKI Adoption

Cecilia Testart[1] and Josephine Wolff[2]

[1]Georgia Institute of Technology
[2]Tufts University

August 2025

Abstract

Recognizing the relevance of securing inter-domain routing to protect traffic flows in the Internet, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standardized the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a framework to provide networks with a system to cryptographically validate routing data. Despite many obstacles, RPKI has emerged as the consensus to improve routing security and currently about 50% of routed IP address blocks are part of the system. The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) are in charge of allocating address space in five different geographical zones and play a crucial role in RPKI: they are the roots of trust of the cryptographic system and provide the infrastructure to host RPKI certificates and keys for the Internet resources allocated in their region. Organizations and networks wanting to issue RPKI records for their address space need to follow the process from the RIR that delegated their address space. In this paper, we analyze the RIRs' implementation of RPKI infrastructure from the

… where RIRs play a pivotal role

Four key areas for RPKI adoption…

IP resource management

Awareness and training

Software tools for RPKI

Tooling for routing monitoring and incident investigation

ROA Planning example

Prefix	Origin ASN
208.186.48.0/20	AS21541

ROA Planning example

	Prefix	Origin ASN
1. Who can issue ROAs?	208.186.48.0/20	AS21541

ROA Planning example

	Prefix	Origin ASN
1. Who can issue ROAs?	208.186.48.0/20	AS21541
	Allstream Business US, LLC	

ROA Planning example

1. Who can issue ROAs?
2. Are there more specific prefixed being routed?

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Allstream Business US, LLC

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Prefix		Origin ASN
208.186.48.0/20		AS21541
Allstream Business US, LLC		
➡208.186.56.0/24	→	AS21542
➡208.186.62.0/24	→	AS21543

ROA Planning example

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Prefix		Origin ASN
208.186.48.0/20		AS21541
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3 Origin ASNs	⇒	**3 ROAs!!**

ROA Planning example

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2. Are there more specific prefixed being routed?
3. Are there other organizations involved?

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101Netlink

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

ROA planning can be complex due to multiple factors!

ROA Planning example

Prefix	Origin ASN
173.211.80.0/21	AS22773

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➡173.211.80.0/24	→	AS19437
➡173.211.81.0/24	→	AS396356
⋮		

ROA Planning example

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7 Origin ASNs	⇒	**7 ROAs!!**

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Internet Utilities NA LLC		

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

ROA planning can be complex due to multiple factors!

A framework for issuing ROA



A framework for issuing ROA



Are you RPKI ready?



https://ru-rpki-ready.iss.cc.gatech.edu/

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



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



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



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



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Recommended ROAs





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

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

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Search by Origin ASN



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

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

https://ru-rpki-ready.iss.cc.gatech.edu/

Find information for routes missing ROAs

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
195.64.121.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0C
195.64.120.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0C
86.105.104.0/22	RIPE	INVALID	steel-axis LLC	N/A	N/A	510B419F0C17B4C8BE217F64388D268D
195.64.123.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0C
203.168.136.0/21	RIPE	INVALID	truview LLC	N/A	N/A	1BA51A0BC0F0AFEBBF6D5D927FE1F981
154.207.0.0/19	AFRINIC	INVALID	Cloud Innovation Ltd	N/A	N/A	25D63E08EABE7CFA6785D4C1D6D34116
2001:57a:900::/40	ARIN	INVALID,MORE-SPECIFIC	Cox Communications Inc.	N/A	N/A	C72E9901927544C7EF035D39BCBE17F0
209.51.72.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	Apogee Telecom Inc.	BOLDYN-RHODE-ISLAND-COLLEGE-24	REASSIGNMENT	0BEBFC67373D77621542953FAE61DD56
198.252.246.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Norfolk, Virginia	N/A	N/A	N/A
192.150.113.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	SeaSpace Corporation	N/A	N/A	N/A

https://ru-rpki-ready.iss.cc.gatech.edu/

Recommended ROAs to cover route

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A

Recommended ROAs to cover route

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A



Recommended ROAs to cover route



PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A



Prefix Search | ASN Search | Organization | Recommend ROAs | API Access | About

Search by IP Prefix

204.236.32.0/19 [Search]

Prefix Information [Download JSON]

PREFIX:	ORIGIN ASN:	RPKI STATUS:	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY:
204.236.32.0/19	AS22773	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa

CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION:	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE:	ALLOCATION STATUS:	RIR:
N/A	N/A	ALLOCATION	ARIN

RPKI CERTIFICATE:
N/A

TAGS:
ROA Not Found | Uncertified | Diff SKI pfx,ASN | Covering | Frag-Int | No ROA Org | Medium Org | (L)RSA

ROUTED SUBPREFIXES (3):
204.236.32.0/20 204.236.60.0/22 204.236.63.0/24

Recommended ROAs to cover route



PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A



Recommended ROAs to cover route

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A

Prefix Search | ASN Search | Organization | Recommend ROAs | API Access | About

Search by IP Prefix

204.236.32.0/19 [Search]

Prefix Information [Download JSON]

PREFIX:	ORIGIN ASN:	RPKI STATUS:	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY:
204.236.32.0/19	AS22773	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa

CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION:	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE:	ALLOCATION STATUS:	RIR:
N/A	N/A	ALLOCATION	ARIN

RPKI CERTIFICATE: N/A

TAGS: ROA Not Found | Uncertified | Diff SKI pfx,ASN | Covering | Frag-Int | No ROA Org | Medium Org | (L)RSA

ROUTED SUBPREFIXES (3): 204.236.32.0/20 | 204.236.60.0/22 | 204.236.63.0/24

Recommend ROAs

(●) Minimal ROAs (grouped by Origin ASN) ( ) Most-Specific ROAs

204.236.32.0/19 [Recommend]

Recommended ROAs - Minimal (Grouped by Origin ASN) [Download JSON]

Total: 5 ROAs grouped into 2 Origin ASNs

▼ **Origin ASN: AS20097** (4 ROAs)

PREFIX	MAX LENGTH
204.236.32.0/20	20
204.236.63.0/24	24
204.236.60.0/22	22
204.236.63.0/24	24

▼ **Origin ASN: AS22773** (1 ROA)

PREFIX	MAX LENGTH
204.236.32.0/19	19

Recommended ROAs to cover route



Recommended ROAs to cover route

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A

Prefix Search | ASN Search | Organization | Recommend ROAs | API Access | About

Search by IP Prefix

204.236.32.0/19 — Search

Prefix Information — Download JSON

PREFIX:	ORIGIN ASN:	RPKI STATUS:	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY:
204.236.32.0/19	AS22773	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa

CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION:	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE:	ALLOCATION STATUS:	RIR:
N/A	N/A	ALLOCATION	ARIN

RPKI CERTIFICATE: N/A

TAGS: ROA Not Found | Uncertified | Diff SKI pfx,ASN | Covering | Frag-Int | No ROA Org | Medium Org | (L)RSA

ROUTED SUBPREFIXES (3): 204.236.32.0/20 | 204.236.60.0/22 | 204.236.63.0/24

Recommend ROAs

(●) Minimal ROAs (grouped by Origin ASN) ( ) Most-Specific ROAs

204.236.32.0/19 — Recommend

Recommended ROAs - Minimal (Grouped by Origin ASN) — Download JSON

Total: 5 ROAs grouped into 2 Origin ASNs

▼ **Origin ASN: AS20097** (4 ROAs)

PREFIX	MAX LENGTH
204.236.32.0/20	20
204.236.63.0/24	24
204.236.60.0/22	22
204.236.63.0/24	24

▼ **Origin ASN: AS22773** (1 ROA)

PREFIX	MAX LENGTH
204.236.32.0/19	19

Recommended ROAs to cover route

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
204.236.32.0/19	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa	N/A	N/A	N/A

Prefix Search | ASN Search | Organization | Recommend ROAs | API Access | About

Search by IP Prefix

204.236.32.0/19 — Search

Prefix Information — Download JSON

PREFIX:	ORIGIN ASN:	RPKI STATUS:	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY:
204.236.32.0/19	AS22773	NOTFOUND	City of Tulsa

CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION:	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE:	ALLOCATION STATUS:	RIR:
N/A	N/A	ALLOCATION	ARIN

RPKI CERTIFICATE: N/A

TAGS: ROA Not Found | Uncertified | Diff SKI pfx,ASN | Covering | Frag-Int | No ROA Org | Medium Org | (L)RSA

ROUTED SUBPREFIXES (3): 204.236.32.0/20 | 204.236.60.0/22 | 204.236.63.0/24

Recommend ROAs

(●) Minimal ROAs (grouped by Origin ASN) ( ) Most-Specific ROAs

204.236.32.0/19 — Recommend

Recommended ROAs - Minimal (Grouped by Origin ASN) — Download JSON

Total: 5 ROAs grouped into 2 Origin ASNs

▼ **Origin ASN: AS20097** (4 ROAs)

PREFIX	MAX LENGTH
204.236.32.0/20	20
204.236.63.0/24	24
204.236.60.0/22	22
204.236.63.0/24	24

▼ **Origin ASN: AS22773** (1 ROA)

PREFIX	MAX LENGTH
204.236.32.0/19	19

Find information for misconfigured ROAs too!

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
195.64.121.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0(
195.64.120.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0(
86.105.104.0/22	RIPE	INVALID	steel-axis LLC	N/A	N/A	510B419F0C17B4C8BE217F64388D268D
195.64.123.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0(
203.168.136.0/21	RIPE	INVALID	truview LLC	N/A	N/A	1BA51A0BC0F0AFEBBF6D5D927FE1F981(
154.207.0.0/19	AFRINIC	INVALID	Cloud Innovation Ltd	N/A	N/A	25D63E08EABE7CFA6785D4C1D6D34116
2001:57a:900::/40	ARIN	INVALID,MORE-SPECIFIC	Cox Communications Inc.	N/A	N/A	C72E9901927544C7EF035D39BCBE17F0
209.51.72.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	Apogee Telecom Inc.	BOLDYN-RHODE-ISLAND-COLLEGE-24	REASSIGNMENT	0BEBFC67373D77621542953FAE61DD56
198.252.246.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Norfolk, Virginia	N/A	N/A	N/A
192.150.113.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	SeaSpace Corporation	N/A	N/A	N/A

https://ru-rpki-ready.iss.cc.gatech.edu/

Find information for misconfigured ROAs too!

PREFIX	RIR	RPKI STATUS ▲	RPKI ISSUING AUTHORITY	CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION(S)	CUSTOMER ALLOCATION TYPE(S)	RPKI CERTIFICATE
195.64.121.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0C
195.64.120.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0C
86.105.104.0/22	RIPE	INVALID	steel-axis LLC	N/A	N/A	510B419F0C17B4C8BE217F64388D268D
195.64.123.0/24	RIPE	INVALID	Chiron Software LLC	N/A	N/A	60FCD55B9130858D8EA583C0987DAD0C
203.168.136.0/21	RIPE	INVALID	truview LLC	N/A	N/A	1BA51A0BC0F0AFEBBF6D5D927FE1F981
154.207.0.0/19	AFRINIC	INVALID	Cloud Innovation Ltd	N/A	N/A	25D63E08EABE7CFA6785D4C1D6D34116
2001:57a:900::/40	ARIN	INVALID,MORE-SPECIFIC	Cox Communications Inc.	N/A	N/A	C72E9901927544C7EF035D39BCBE17F0
209.51.72.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	Apogee Telecom Inc.	BOLDYN-RHODE-ISLAND-COLLEGE-24	REASSIGNMENT	0BEBFC67373D77621542953FAE61DD56
198.252.246.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	City of Norfolk, Virginia	N/A	N/A	N/A
192.150.113.0/24	ARIN	NOTFOUND	SeaSpace Corporation	N/A	N/A	N/A

https://ru-rpki-ready.iss.cc.gatech.edu/

Invalid ROA to be fixed





https://console.rpki-client.org/rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/3d/82233d-ec07-42fb-8799-ed30b9bb12d5/1/gxtTMluPb7DYJgy3wd0DpvfzwWM.roa.html

Are you RPKI ready?





https://ru-rpki-ready.iss.cc.gatech.edu/

Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs



Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs



Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs



Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs



Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs

ARIN



Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs

ARIN



~720 organizations

Most 3:

- Level 3
- Optimum
- HostPapa

Breakdown of IPv4 Prefixes without ROAs



Needs careful planning

ru-RPKI-ready can help!

High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

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

High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

- Recommendations:



High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

- Recommendations:

New channels for awareness and training



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

More software tools for RPKI



High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

- Recommendations:

New channels for awareness and training

More software tools for RPKI

Community knowledge sharing



High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

- Recommendations:

New channels for awareness and training



More software tools for RPKI

Community knowledge sharing



ru-RPKI-ready: the Road Left to Full ROA Adoption

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Abstract

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has emerged as a standard for enhancing the security of Internet routing. Currently, more than 50% BGP prefixes are covered by RPKI Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), enabling networks to validate the origin of prefix advertisements in BGP. Despite this progress, ROA adoption remains non-uniform, with key stakeholders encountering significant barriers in the adoption process. In this paper, we combine a product adoption framework with data-driven analysis of global RPKI adoption to identify persistent disparities and pinpoint the stages of the adoption process that hinder broader growth. Our study reveals that, although RPKI awareness has grown, the complex-

lacks a built-in mechanism for validating the information networks share and use to select global routes for data traffic. This is a major security problem potentially allowing for surveillance, loss of traffic, or other forms of interference [19, 30, 31, 42, 45]. Furthermore, attackers have leveraged this vulnerability to steal cryptocurrencies and fake traffic on multiple occasions over the past years [16, 17, 29, 51].

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has worked to standardize additional protocols to secure BGP. In 2012, the IETF standardized the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a framework that provides a mechanism for networks to issue cryptographic records that can then be used to validate data in BGP mes-



High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

- Recommendations:

New channels for awareness and training



More software tools for RPKI

Community knowledge sharing





ru-RPKI-ready: the Road Left to Full ROA Adoption

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Abstract

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has emerged as a standard for enhancing the security of Internet routing. Currently, more than 50% BGP prefixes are covered by RPKI Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), enabling networks to validate the origin of prefix advertisements in BGP. Despite this progress, ROA adoption remains non-uniform, with key stakeholders encountering significant barriers in the adoption process. In this paper, we combine a product adoption framework with data-driven analysis of global RPKI adoption to identify persistent disparities and pinpoint the stages of the adoption process that hinder broader growth. Our study reveals that, although RPKI awareness has grown, the complex-

lacks a built-in mechanism for validating the information networks share and use to select global routes for data traffic. This is a major security problem potentially allowing for surveillance, loss of traffic, or other forms of interference [19, 30, 31, 42, 45]. Furthermore, attackers have leveraged this vulnerability to steal cryptocurrencies and fake traffic on multiple occasions over the past years [16, 17, 29, 51].

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has worked to standardize additional protocols to secure BGP. In 2012, the IETF standardized the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a framework that provides a mechanism for networks to issue cryptographic records that can then be used to validate data in BGP mes-



The Role of RIRs in RPKI Adoption

Cecilia Testart[1] and Josephine Wolff[2]

[1]Georgia Institute of Technology
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August 2025

Abstract

Recognizing the relevance of securing inter-domain routing to protect traffic flows in the Internet, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standardized the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a framework to provide networks with a system to cryptographically validate routing data. Despite many obstacles, RPKI has emerged as the consensus to improve routing security and currently about 50% of routed IP address blocks are part of the system.

High-levels of RPKI adoption will require support

- Recommendations:

New channels for awareness and training

More software tools for RPKI

Community knowledge sharing





ru-RPKI-ready: the Road Left to Full ROA Adoption

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

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If you have a story/insight/journey that you'd like to share, please reach out!

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