

Mastering Value-Based Care Contracting: A Guide for Healthcare Leaders



Overview

There is no one short answer to help providers negotiate value-based care (VBC) contracts with payers. However, a checklist with some guidance is definitely a worthy attempt. This quick guide provides a few pointers to use while negotiating or reviewing a contract's exposure to the provider organization.

We have attempted to make this guide simple and digestible, covering what matters most—the factors to address while negotiating a value-based contract. Use the table of contents to navigate more quickly to sections of interest, as each section is designed to stand on its own.

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Benchmark

The **benchmark** is a key component of any shared savings contract, as the benchmark methodology will often dictate what target will be assigned to compute expected expenditure in a shared savings value-based arrangement.

How is the benchmark expenditure calculated? There are three standard ways payers compute benchmark expenditure:

Risk Adjusted: The benchmark expenditure is computed based on the risk adjustment of members. Risk adjustment is usually carried out on demographics and existing disease conditions. Risk-adjusted models help to ensure the expenditure is rightfully adjusted if the provider organization has more sick members in the portfolio. Although, over time this model can result in diminishing returns as the provider can only do so much cost of care reduction on an annual basis on members with the same or diminishing risk.

Market Adjusted: In this model, benchmark expenditure is not provided upfront by the payer. Although savings are computed by the efficiency created in expenditure compared to the market, (i.e. if the cost of care increase for the provider

organization members was lower than the market) then that delta is assumed to be savings. This model is more sustainable than a risk model as long as the provider continues to outperform the competition. However, the risk is that the provider organization lacks a specific goal to work towards and only finds out where they stand at the end of the year.

Hybrid: This model incorporates the positive attributes of both aforementioned models. Both the market and a healthcare organization's patient populations are risk-adjusted and then the cost growth rate delta between the population and the market provides savings.

Make sure the **risk model** used to compute a risk-adjusted benchmark **is clearly spelled out in the contract.**

Ensure that benchmarking is not based on a comparison with a random cohort selected from the market (e.g., Blues in many states choose random cohorts for risk adjustment, which can lead to trust issues for provider groups).

Shared Savings

The next question to ask is how shared savings are computed.

It is common for shared savings percentages to be negotiated upfront between providers and payers as part of value-based contract negotiations. 50% is a standard percentage as this represents an equal share between provider and payer (equal share of success).

However, from a financial standpoint, when the share rate is set at 50%, this often represents a maximum that can be impacted by performance on agreed-upon quality measures. It is becoming commonplace for quality measures to serve as a "gatekeeper" or "lightswitch" to create eligibility for financial shared savings incentives to be applied, or "in play." The quality component of shared savings calculations is often derived from an overall composite score based on the performance of many measures.

To arrive at a composite quality score that can be used as part of the shared savings calculation, the quality multiplier is either based on percentile or

absolute quality performance of quality measures, and scores for quality measures are averaged or weighted to arrive at a composite score.

Applying a quality multiplier on shared savings is acceptable, but ensure the percentile-based quality multiplier is not too sensitive. This can cause undesirable returns at mid-market level performance.

Don't negotiate and agree to quality measures which are inherently more difficult for providers to document and/or it is hard to generate data to demonstrate performance. Read more on this topic in the quality measures section.

Shared Savings Calculator

| | Measurement Pe | eriod | |
|-----|--|-------------|-------------|
| Key | Field | Amount | Formula |
| | | | |
| | a) Member Months | 25,000 | |
| | b) Allowed Spend | \$5,000,000 | |
| | c) ACO Customer Expenses | \$1,000,000 | |
| | d) Excess Medical Claims | \$500,000 | |
| | e) Risk Score | 1.12 | |
| | | | |
| | f) Measurement Period Adjusted Net Spend | \$3,500,000 | = b - c - d |
| | | | |
| | g) Measurement Period Adjusted Net PMPM | \$140.00 | = f / a |

| Baseline Period | | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Key | Field | Amount | Formula |
| | | | |
| h) | Member Months | 24,000 | |
| i) | Allowed Spend | \$5,500,000 | |
| j) | ACO Customer Expenses | \$900,000 | |
| k) | Excess Medical Claims | \$600,000 | |
| ľ | Risk Score | 1.15 | |
| | | | |
| m) | Baseline Period Adjusted Net Spend | \$4,000,000 | = i - j - k |
| | | | |
| n) | Baseline Period Adjusted Net PMPM | \$166.67 | = m / h |

| | Trend A | djustments | |
|-----|--------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| Key | Field | Amount | Formula |
| | | | |
| | o) Budgeted Trend | 1.20% | |
| | p) Actual Trend | 1.10% | |
| | q) Adjusted Trend | 1.15% | = o - 0.5 (p - o) |
| | | | |
| | r) Net to Allowed Change | -3.75% | =((f/b)/(m/i))-1 |
| | | | |
| | s) Risk Score Change | -2.61% | =l-e |

| | | Target Adjustments | |
|-----|----------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Key | Field | Amount | Formula |
| | | | |
| | t) Adjustment Factor | 95% | =(1+q)(1+r)(1+s) |
| | u) Target Spend PMPM | \$158.03 | =n*t |
| | v) Target Spend | \$3,950,714 | =v*a |

| | Shared Sav | rings | |
|-----|--------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Key | Field | Amount | Formula |
| | | | |
| | w) Total Shared Savings Amount | \$450,714 | = v - f |

Downside Risk / Upside Risk / Two-Sided Risk Models

There are three different value-based contract risk models: upside risk, downside risk, or a combination of the two (a two-sided model).

- Upside risk, or a one-sided risk model, allows those who participate to share in the savings if they meet all criteria. Providers are eligible to earn a percentage of the shared savings that their care has produced. If they do not exceed the agreed-upon benchmark, then there is no payment to them, but there is also no financial penalty. This is the model most providers prefer, as they are not liable for losses.
- The downside risk option is designed to mitigate losses in the situation where a provider's care (medical services and treatment) exceeds agreed-upon financial and clinical thresholds. In the case that the provider has a cost that exceeds the agreed-upon benchmark, they must refund the payer for a portion of the losses.
- A two-sided risk model combines both the upside and downside portions of the aforementioned models. The maximum and minimum of this model tend to be lower than the minimum of the downside or the maximum of the upside model. Thus, this model will typically yield less savings than the other models as it is a blend of the risk from the other models.

In 2017, CMS announced that **438 out of the 480** total Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACOs are in Track 1, an **upside risk-only model.**¹

Min/Max Savings/Loss Ratio

Having a floor and ceiling on loss or savings is a good idea to ensure the provider organization understands its limit and risk exposure. Having a maximum loss percentage of benchmark expenditure is important to include in the contract, and it is likely the payer will, in return, ask for a maximum savings percentage to be outlined in the contract.

In addition to establishing maximum savings and loss percentages, most payers ensure provider groups are eligible for shared savings only when they hit minimum savings as a percentage of benchmark expenditure.

25% of ACOs fail to achieve shared savings despite reducing the cost of care below the benchmark expenditure because they don't meet their negotiated minimum savings rate. While negotiating this aspect of a contract can be challenging, they should aim for a minimum savings rate as low as 2%.

Truncation/Stop Loss

To eliminate the outlier effect from cost savings generated, **truncation**, or limiting an amount, is usually applied. For example, if truncation is \$100,000, the cost of care towards per member per month (PMPM)

model for members where the cost of care beyond \$100,000 is capped at \$100,000. Having a truncation clause in the contract is important to eliminate outlier sensitivity from cost savings as it can skew results.

Cost Carve Outs

The primary intent of a value-based contract is to reduce the cost of care. It is the delta between the expected and actual cost of caring for populations where savings, and subsequently shared savings, can be generated. In order to accurately measure the difference between expected and actual cost of care for a population, it is important to call out which service lines in cost of care are included, and more specifically, not included in the management of a population in a value-based contract. Usually, in commercial VBC contracts, medication costs are excluded, as typically they are not something the provider has a large amount of direct control in terms of spend.

Most **provider groups** try to **carve out medication costs** from the total cost of care to manage under the VBC contract in the Commercial Line of Business. This is because **rising medication costs are not in their control** and it is the highest rising service line which could impact them if included.

Quality Measures

In many contracts, quality measure performance is linked directly to shared savings. In many other contracts, payouts are provided for every measure met, such as payouts for **pay for performance (P4P)**. Thus, it is important to ensure providers meet their quality measures. In many cases, quality measures involve the physician having to do more work and/or documentation without payouts, which are tougher to meet, such as "depression screening with follow-up" or "screening for fall risk." They should try to avoid such measures in the contract, especially if its performance is linked directly to shared savings more so than pay for performance.

Some payers try to complicate pay-for-performance (P4P) payouts with relative percentile ranking, weights, and point systems which can be a challenge to operationalize and predict. Providers should **try to structure P4P payouts as simply as possible. Payout per member for each measure closed** or PMPM payout if a measure performs beyond a set benchmark are the two simpler structures to operationalize.


Relationship Between Quality and Shared Savings

In most value-based contracts, quality measure performance acts as either a gatekeeper or a direct correlation to shared savings. Quality measure as a gatekeeper is potentially limiting to a provider, i.e. if quality measure performance hits a particular threshold, the provider is eligible for shared savings. If the quality performance does not cross the threshold established, no shared savings payment would be made to a provider, even when the total cost of care is below the benchmark negotiated.

A better approach than using quality as a gatekeeper is to have quality measure performance as a



multiplier of shared savings. The table below shows an example of shared savings incentives when quality is used as a multiplier.



| Quality Performance | Maximum Shared Savings Rate | Shared Savings Rate Paid to Provider |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| | | |
| 80% of target achieved | 50% | (80% x 50%) = 40% savings rate |
| 90% of target achieved | 50% | (90% x 50%) = 45% savings rate |

It is important to understand how composite quality performance is computed. Is it based on relative or absolute performance, or is it based on a point system for each measure wherein one measure has more weight than the other? Answers to these questions can help providers negotiate attainable targets so as not to dilute the shared savings rate as illustrated above.

Pay For Performance

Beyond the quality performance relationship with shared savings, provider groups can also be incentivized to meet quality measures in isolation. Pay for performance can be paid on different models:

| Per gap closure: | Per measure performance: | Overall measure performance: |
|--|--|--|
| \$40 for breast cancer screening done | A measure for performance that meets target criteria, PMPM for all members or members in | A number of measures that meet performance criteria based on a point system, a PMPM payout |
| \$10 for A1C under control — essentially a separate dollar amount for every gap on every patient closed | denominator paid | is scheduled depending on the performance brackets |

Supplemental Reporting

Most payers give some leeway to provider groups in how they access a list of members with care gaps for all quality measures. Also, provider groups can send evidence of gap closures using clinical data sent back to the payer to close open gaps.

The methodology and format for back-and-forth data communication between payer and provider groups should be clearly documented in the contract and should include verbiage on frequency and data samples. This process ensures providers will be able to take advantage of submitting additional information necessary to maximize performance on negotiated quality measures.



Data Sharing

Both payer and provider groups need to understand how, how often, and what data will be shared between them. Usually, these data exchanges are:

Claim and eligibility:

On a regular basis (weekly/monthly), the payer must send these files for attributed and sometimes assignable members to the provider group.

Cost & utilization reports:

The payer must send monthly / quarterly on cost and utilization break-up, at least high-level metrics such as:

- PMPM is split into inpatient, outpatient, professional, DME, and Rx
- Utilization per 1000: IP discharges, ED visits, SNF admits, primary care visits
- LoS (Length of stay): Inpatient admit days / 1000 and inpatient average. LoS for short-term, rehab, physc, SNF

High cost members:

Sometimes, the payer also gives out a list of members with the cost of care. Having costs from the payer on high-cost members is an added value.

Quality reports:

Ideally, the payer should provide a monthly report on which members have not qualified quality measures in this performance year (for the provider group to give evidence back in supplemental reporting).

Supplemental reporting:

The provider group and payer should pre-define a format on how the provider group will share clinical evidence back to the payer to meet criteria for qualifying quality measures for its managed members.

ADT and Pre-Auth:

Payers have access to **ADT** and **pre-auth** feeds for all members with a slight lag. Although provider groups might want to connect to a more real-time ADT feed to better manage transitions in care, having a daily file from the payer on ADTs and pre-auths is not a bad idea to run some care management activities, especially **transition-in-care Management (TCM).**

Claims Data

The following attributes should be included in claims data sent over at least on a monthly basis:

| Claim Header | Claim Line | Pharmacy Claim | Additional Diagnosis | Additional Procedures |
|--------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | | | | |
| member ID* | member ID* | member ID* | member ID* | member ID* |
| member name* | claim ID* | claim ID* | claim ID* | claim ID* |
| birth date* | claim ID* | claim ID* | claim ID* | claim ID* |
| gender* | first date of service* | birth date* | diagnosis coding system | procedure coding system |



| first date of service* | procedure code* | start date* | modifier code 1 |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|
| last date of service* | procedure coding system | end data* | modifier code 2 |
| plan ID | modifier code 1 | plan ID | modifier code 3 |
| plan name | modifier code 2 | plan name | modifier code 4 |
| DRG Name | modifier code 3 | medication code* | modifier code 5 |
| DRG code* | modifier code 4 | medication name | |
| discharge disposition code | modifier code 5 | days of supply* | |
| primary diagnosis code* | service unit quantity | unit quantity | |
| diagnosis coding system | revenue center code* | dosage per unit | |
| claim submission date | servicing provider npi* | refill no* | |
| claim processing date | servicing provider | route of administration | |
| claim adjudication date | attending provider npi | charge amount | |
| claim approval date | attending provider | allowed amount | |
| admission type | other provider npi | amount paid by insurance* | |
| present at admission indicator | other provider | co pay | |
| claim type* | line - charge amount | pharmacy id | |
| type of bill* | line - amount paid by insurance* | pharmacy npi* | |
| place of service* | out of network flag* | pharmacy name | |
| servicing provider npi* | place of service | pharmacy street add1 | |
| servicing provider name | | pharmacy street add2 | |
| attending provider npi | | pharmacy city | |
| attending provider name | | pharmacy zip | |
| other provider npi | | pharmacy state | |
| other provider name | | pharmacy country | |
| facility npi | | pharmacy fax | |
| facility name | | pharmacy phone | |
| tax id* | | formulary id | |
| | | | |

| CCN | formulary name |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| billing tax organi- zation name | adjustment status* |
| charge amount | pharmacy service type code |
| allowed amount | drug enforcement agency |
| amount paid by insurance* | dispense as written |
| co pay | |
| deductible | |
| adjustment status* | |
| referral source code | |
| out network flag* | |

*Minimum required fields

Eligibility Data

It should contain demographics, attributed provider, eligibility indicators (dental, eye, etc.), and clarity on when this member is part of the plan or is inactive.

Cost and Utilization Reports

At least the following attributes should be reported on at least a quarterly basis:





IP Admits





Risk Scores





CT & MRI Events







Split of \$s & Utilization By Cost Centers

High Cost Members

List of top 5% members by total cost of care with costs, comorbidities, and changes from last year.

Quality Reports

The following attributes are required in quality reports on at least quarterly basis:

- Members who met what measures with evidence of
- Members who did not meet the measure

Supplemental Reporting


Consensus on the format to submit supplemental data back.

ADT

Daily feed on admit discharge transfer with at least member identification, demographics, diagnosis, facility, date and time, and discharge disposition details.

Glossary

- **ADT** Admission, discharge, and transfer. The ADT process is one of the most important parts of hospital workflows. An ADT system is a part of a hospital information system (HIS).
- **Benchmark** The goal set in the upcoming year, typically based on historical data and performance that the group must exceed to be eligible for savings.
- **Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR)** An indicator that shows the relationship between the relative costs and revenue for a proposed population or project.
- **Ceiling** This is the highest possible rate at which the shared savings or losses can be earned.
- Floor This describes the lowest possible rate at which the shared savings or losses can be earned.
- **Gatekeeper** It controls access to the created shared savings where certain standards must be met to become eligible for the next step.
- Maximum savings % The maximum amount a provider can earn from the creation of their shared savings.
- **Minimum savings** % The minimum amount of financial savings a provider must exceed in order to be eligible for shared savings.
- Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) The ratio between the premium revenues spent on clinical services and quality improvement.
- Pay For Performance (P4P) Also known as "value-based purchasing," is a payment model that offers
 financial incentives to physicians, hospitals, medical groups, and other healthcare providers to meet
 certain performance measures.
- Pre-Auth Pre-authorization is the process used by health insurance companies to determine if a
 prescribed procedure, service, or medication will be covered.
- Transition-in-Care Management (TCM) Addresses the hand-off period between the inpatient and community setting after a hospitalization or other inpatient facility stay (e.g., in a skilled nursing facility).
- Truncation/Stop Loss Occurs when the limit is set and whatever exceeds the limit amount is removed.



About Innovaccer

Innovaccer is the data platform that accelerates care innovation. The Innovaccer platform unifies patient data across systems and care settings, and empowers healthcare organizations with scalable, modern applications that improve clinical, financial, operational, and experiential outcomes. Innovaccer's EHR-agnostic solutions have been deployed across more than 1,600 hospitals and clinics in the US, enabling care delivery transformation for more than 96,000 clinicians, and helping providers work collaboratively with payers and life sciences companies. Innovaccer has helped its customers unify health records for more than 54 million people and generate over \$1.5 billion in cumulative cost savings. The Innovaccer platform is an industry-leading data and analytics platform and the #1 rated population health technology platform by Black Book.

For more information, please visit innovaccer.com.

Awards & Recognition









