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Vol. XXVI OCTOBER, 1933 No. 4

COLONEL WILLIAM BARTON'S SWORDS

The upper one is the dress sword presented by Congress to Colonel Barton, and the lower one is Colonel Barton's service sword.

These swords were recently presented to the Society by James A. Barton and George C. Barton, great-great-grandsons of Colonel Barton.

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Roger Williams, Apostle of Complete Religious Liberty

By MICHAEL FREUND

Translated by James Ernst

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

In *Der Idee Der Toleranz Im England Der Grossen Revolution,* published in 1927, Michael Freund presents a painstaking study of the historical development of the idea of toleration in England, and especially its many-sided expressions during the Civil War from 1642 to 1648. The study was prepared under the direction of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Munich, after a year of research in the British Museum, London, and deserves, therefore, more than a passing notice from those interested

in Roger Williams and his ideas. Freund gives Williams a place of importance second to none of the twenty-four Englishmen, from Sir Thomas More to Sir Henry Vane, whose writings are analyzed and whose philosophy of toleration is critically examined. Only the poet John Milton is given a greater number of pages in a discussion of his ideas of toleration, than are given to Williams; while such famous political thinkers as John Goodwin, Dr. Owen, James Harrington and Sir Henry Vane are accorded fewer pages each than are devoted to him.

This original and highly provocative analysis of the ideas of Williams on toleration and religious liberty must, however, be read with caution, for Freund was misled when he trusted so implicitly the biographies of Williams then available. I shall suggest only a few of the corrections necessary. (1) Williams is wrongly grouped with the Anabaptist thinkers. His contemporaries in England and New England recognized him as an Independent, and Freund should have grouped Williams with Dr. Owen, John Goodwin and the poet Milton. (2) His religious views were not of "baptisticher natur" at any time. Williams had become a Seeker in August, 1635. It was customary in the 17th century to call all who dissented from the established religions, "Anabaptists", in the same way as today in America all social radicals and political dissenters are called "Reds" and "Communists." (3) He agreed that the "reason of the law" is more important than the "will of the law." (4) He rejected the contemporary view of toleration and demanded "absolute soul-liberty" in religious matters. (5) Within fixed constitutional limits, Williams held that the power of the state, as representative of the majority of the people, ought to be absolute in civil things. Legal and just punishment of offenders against the civil laws he designated as "prosecution" as distinct from "persecution." (6) He held the state ought to give permission and protection to the "bodies and goods" of the churches and church-members, whether true or false, in

their civil relations, and that the churches ought to obey the civil laws and pray for the safety and welfare of the state, though pagan. (7) He was a Biblicist and not a Calvinist, after 1630. And although he took some of his ideas from John Calvin and Martin Luther, he never hesitated to disagree with each of them in certain matters. For example, he held to Luther's doctrines of Free-Grace and of conditional Election because he believed they were Pauline and Biblical. (8) Freund does not attempt to develop fully Williams' doctrines of government by the "free consent of the People" and the Rights of Man. These he discusses only as they relate to the idea of absolute toleration. (9) Nor does Freund bring out the close relation of Seekerism and the scientific movement of the 17th century with Williams' doctrine of religious liberty.

With these preliminary remarks as a guide, we are ready to begin the essay by Michael Freund: (*Der Idee Der Toleranz*. Halle, 1927. Pp. 241-268.)

Translation

The ripest fruit of the Baptist literature of Toleration is the work on Tolerance by Roger Williams. The toleration-idea of Williams found its most significant expression in his work entitled *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution*, but received, to be sure, further elucidation and exposition in his other writings. (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, (1664). Edited by R. A. Guild, N. C. P., Vol. II. *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, (1652). Edited by S. L. Caldwell, N. C. P., Vol. IV. A well-rounded portrait of his mind and character is given in the collected letters which J. R. Bartlett arranged and entitled *The Letters of Roger Williams*, N. C. P., Vol. VI.) Williams suffered persecution upon his own person. In 1631 he had come to New England, and soon thereafter was called to be the Teacher at Salem. His opinions brought him into sharp opposition to the church and state in New England, and

finally caused his banishment out of the colonies. (The exact causes of his banishment are in controversy: his opinions about tolerance — as the customary view maintains—indeed scarcely stand in the foreground. His doubt of the legality of the Patent of the colony, which according to his conception gave over illegally to foreign ownership the land of the Indian and his demand for a radical separation from the Anglican church stirred up a more vehement opposition than his conception of the relation of the state and church. The entire question is fully discussed by J. L. Diman in his introduction to *John Cotton's Answer to Roger Williams*, N. C. P., Vol. II. This discussion centers chiefly on the question of "rigid separation" and contributes also to clarify their controversy.) In the midst of a winter snowstorm—as he himself has often pathetically described —he was forced to seek for himself a new homestead. In 1636 he founded Providence, a new colony, upon his own land which he purchased from the Indian tribe. The members of the new colony promised to submit themselves to the majority in all matters: but only in civil things. Vane helped him to procure the charter for the colony. In 1643, because of disputes among the [New England] colonies, Williams went to London in order to obtain the authority for the settling of some of these disputes. The religious-political war then going on in England stimulated him into carrying forward a definitive discussion of his controversy with Cotton, his Puritan antagonist in New England. In this way originated, in 1644, *The Bloudy Tenent*, to which later on there was connected a lively controversy. The deliberations of the Westminster Assembly, (Translator's Note: The Westminster Assembly, composed of 120 Puritan and Scotch Presbyterian clergymen, was created in the summer of 1643 to assist Parliament in preparing a uniform system of church Order and polity. It was continuously in session without accomplishing any important matter until dismissed by Cromwell through Parliament in 1649) and in connection with it the joint publication of a pamphlet

by the Independent members, (Transl. Note: *Apologeticall Narration*, (1644) by The Five Dissenting Brethren. British Museum) called forth his *Queries of Highest Consideration*. His religious views were of "baptisticher Natur", but he finally separated himself from every religious association and passed his last days as a solitary "Seeker". America honors in him one of her greatest minds.

As previously stated, *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution* is a discussion with Cotton, who defended a relative-toleration position and whose opinions were in need of a clearer representation, wherewith Williams sets forth the historical significance of the idea in its true light. (Of course, Williams presents to Cotton also his opinions concerning "The Model of Church and Civil Power" of the New England churches, of which Cotton later on denies his co-authorship.) Cotton, as we shall see, also divided the spheres of state and church rather strictly: both have their own End, their own duties, and their own functions. Over the church stands God as the only Law-giver. The members of the church, as such, have no right to challenge the state-authority by offering any resistance against it. Insofar as opposition to the civil power is permitted, it is exercised by the church-members as members of the state and not as members of the church. Man does not live in society and the state as a religious being. Although both authorities are clearly separated from one another, they are not independent of one another: they are inseparably intangled one with the other; they grow and blossom together, and perish together. The decline of the state, says Cotton, has always been a sequel to the decay of the church. (*Bloudy Tenent of Persecution*, p. 191. Freund uses the edition of the Hanserd Knollys Society edited by Edward Bean Underhill. London, 1848.) The church educates the people to become good subjects and perfect members of society. State and church are mutually bound to govern and support each other. When the church disintegrates the state must re-

form it; and when the state strays from the path of justice, the church must lead it back onto the right course: therefore, one state, one church. Just as tolerant as the church ought to be to those within her own bosom, so little is an organized community able to tolerate different churches and sects side by side. "For our tolerating many religions in a state in several churches, besides the provoking of God, may in time not only corrupt, leaven, divide, and so destroy the peace of the churches, but also dissolve the continuity of the state, especially ours, whose walls are made of the stones of the churches, it being also contrary to the end of our planting in this part of the world, which was not only to enjoy the pure ordinances, but to enjoy them all in purity." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 240.) The church must, however, practice toleration in things not fundamental. Even in the sphere of the liturgy, she ought and must grant diversity and variety of forms. The principle must be one of unity and not uniformity. In things fundamental, however, which are so public and clear that only base desire opposes them, no tolerance dare be shown. After proper admonition, the church hands the heretic over to the state which may then deliver him to the executioner. Cotton also reiterates here in essentials the toleration-program of the sons of the Renaissance: that ideal of "Comprehension" which influenced Taylor (Transl. Note: Taylor, Jeremy, (1613-1667) *Liberty of Prophesying*, 1649) and Chillingworth (Transl. Note: Chillingworth, William, (1602-1644), *The Religon of Protestants a Safe Way of Salvation*, 1638) to foster the idea of tolerance, also influenced Williams' *The Bloudy Tenent*.

Sovereignty—which brings the opinions of Cotton in repeated collision with the idea of toleration and especially with the theory of the Rights of Man—is placed by Cotton under absolutely fixed limits and rules. The state has no authority to consider private morals. It has, moreover, no authority to judge in disputes between children and parents, and servants and masters. Matters of private morals

come under the competence of the church which settles disputes between members of the family and between servants and masters: "Domestic evils are best healed in a domestic way." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 284.) Only upon a request from the church may the state interpose its authority in this sphere of social life. More serious, however, is the limitation on the principle of the state's authority. The power of the state originates through the transfer of the rights and power of individuals to the highest civil authority; the people are, moreover, on this earth only the stewards of God and may not transfer this right and authority as they please. "And because the Word is a perfect rule, as well of righteousness as of holiness, it will be therefore necessary that neither the people give consent, nor that the magistrate takes power to dispose of the bodies, goods, lands, liberties of the people, but according to the laws and rules of the Word of God." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 219.) The civil authority may impose nothing by virtue of its authority alone; it is obliged, "to show the reason, not only the will." (*Ibid.* p. 220.) Nor may the state control and regulate "indifferent" matters, unless it has cogent reasons to give for such action. Not the state but divine truth creates the social right. This divine truth is indeed a "perfect rule," compulsory and unequivocal, and can therefore dispense with the interpreting power. Cotton recognizes the viewpoint of Hobbes. (Transl. Note: Hobbes, Thomas, (1588-1679) see *Works*) as the hostile principle opposed to his world of ideas which he restates in similar words and vigorously attacks: "Autoritas, non veritas facit legem." "He hath no power to make any such laws about indifferent things, wherein nothing good or evil is shown to the people, but only on principally the mere authority or will of the imposer for the observance of them." (*Ibid.* p. 220.) "The will of no man is regula recti, unless it be regula recta." (*Ibid.* p. 220) Not the will of the law-giver but the reason of the law must be the plumbline of the human conscience. Not

the authority of the supreme power, but the "Reason" of the law binds: "Ratio est rex legis et lex rex regis." (*Ibid.* p. 221.) . . .

Williams carries out the division between worldly and religious affairs much more sharply, consistently and radically than does Cotton. The separation is so thoroughly carried out that no bridges may lead across to reunite the two worlds. The two worlds, the spiritual and the civil, can no longer lay claims to each other. With this conception it is not possible to stretch a connecting-line across (from the spiritual world) to the Rights of Man . . . According to the conception of Williams, in contrast to that of Cotton, the two worlds are in themselves sovereign and do not mutually limit each other, since they exist on two such entirely different levels that they are completely separated.

For this reason Williams lays the stress upon it to indicate his intrinsic conclusion—the real self-sufficiency of the civil and social world. State and society are natural powers, forms and creations of nature. (Just for that reason, they are not comprehensible and conceivable through the doctrine of rights, because they in fact discard the spiritual "Existenz" to which rights alone are able to appeal.) In the blood relationship of families exists the prototype of states and, as people increase and propagate themselves independently and beyond religion of all kinds, so they in time also agree to form social combinations. "If none but true Christians, members of Christ Jesus, might be civil magistrates, and publicly entrusted with civil affairs, then none but members of churches, Christians, should be husbands of wives, fathers of children, masters of servants. But against this doctrine the whole creation, the whole world, may justly rise up in arms, as not only contrary to true piety, but common humanity itself." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 285.) "Magistracy is of God, but yet no otherwise than marriage is, being an estate merely civil and humane and lawful to all nations of the world." (*Bloody Tenent Yet*

More Bloody, p. 282.) Each state is legitimate just as life and nature are legitimate. Man is by nature a social creature, and enters social relationships long before he awakens to religion. "We shall find lawful civil states, both before and since Christ, in which we find not any tidings of the true God or Christ." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 247.) There is "a civil ministry, or office, merely human and civil, which men agree to constitute, called therefore a human creation, and is true and lawful in those nations, cities, kingdoms, etc., which never heard of the true God, nor his holy Son Jesus, as in any part of the world besides, where the name of Jesus is most taken up." (*Ibid.* p. 132.)

Society and state are integral wherever religious-liberty prevails in the entire state. The civil state is in itself entire and competent, "which compactness may be found in many towns and cities of the world where yet has not shined any spiritual or supernatural goodness." (*Ibid.* p. 211.) All over the world with its thousand-fold religious differences, the object, nature and origin of the civil authority is always the same. The origin is everywhere the choice and free consent of the people, and the object, the well being of the members or the safety of the people in property and life.

The state transcends religion. It receives from religion no enhancement of its authority, no more than is added to our animal life by our Christian confession. There is no longer any Christian state, but only purely a civil state. The state having developed into a pure "Existence form" and into a perfect abstraction has freed itself of all foreign accretions. "The civil nature of the magistrate we have proved to receive no addition of power from the magistrate being a Christian, no more than it receives diminution from his not being a Christian, even as the commonweal is a true commonweal, although it have not heard of Christianity." (*Ibid.* p. 304.)

If the Christian state had the right of persecution, then this right would not be merely peculiar to the Christian state but to the state in the abstract. When the Christian

state also imputes to itself the right of persecution, then it approves this right to all the states of the world. That would have a rather ominous effect upon the Christian religion; for of thirty parts of the world, twenty-five are non-Christian. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 161.) "And if so—that the magistrates receive their power of governing the church from the people—undeniably it follows, that a people, as a people, naturally considered of what nature or nation soever in Europe, Asia, Africa, or America, have fundamentally and originally as men, a power to govern the church, to see her do her duty, to correct her, to redress, reform, establish, etc." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 215.)

Interestingly, the idea of the essential equality of all states and the identity of the efficacy of all states re-enforces the democratic woof in the thought of Williams. For Williams, the state is not an independent principle, but a function of society and an organ of the "Nation", insofar as Williams understands it. Before the states there were the "Nations"—"Nations" which as phenomena of the natural world are essentially alike. "If the magistrate has received any such charge or commission from God in spiritual things, doubtless, as before, the people have received it originally and fundamentally as they are a people. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 189.) There is no right and no essence in the state which does not rest in the people. No group of people have, however, more rights than any other, as Williams viewed the people in a nature-rightly, unhistorical being. "Primarily and fundamentally they are the civil magistrate." (*Ibid.* p. 210. The sovereignty of the "Nations" implies, however, the sovereignty of the world. In the state the many govern inseparably; only a few are, however, elected. The state which Williams alone recognizes, the democratic state, can neither be the sovereignty of the Saints nor supply the place of religious authority. The sovereignty of the state over religion must, moreover, always imply anti-religious sovereignty, at least

a-religious force over religious matters, always a foreign-authority over the church of God . . .)

The internal detachment of the state from religion signifies especially for Williams the self-sufficiency of the state, the organization of the phenomenon "state" in its "ideal-typichen" purity. The mingling of state and church implies as well the negation of Christendom, as of the state: "It denies the principle of Christianity and civility." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 2.) The state burdened with religious duties and compassed with religious regulations is not a perfect state: (With this one may compare Karl Marx: "The so-called Christian state is an imperfect state and the Christian religion is permitted by the state as a complement and as a sanctification of its civil imperfection. The state is in this instance "Theologe ex professo", not yet state as a "state." *Zur Judenfrage.*) Persecution, therefore, is an inimical state principle: a "body-killing, soul-killing, state-killing doctrine." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 378.) It unites the legitimate civil relations which have at least according to Williams their origin in natural circumstances, on the condition of fixed religious qualifications, and denies them at the same time as their own rights. (Williams perceived in the principle of persecution not merely the negation of the state, but according to his state-theory a denial of the natural existence of mankind, of "nature," and the "world." Persecution demands of the "world" the religious proof of the "right to life," and denies thereby its right to existence in itself. For Williams, therefore, intolerance is the all-destroying power.) And so the taking-over of the function by the state is "a breach of civility." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 49.) It adds a foreign element to the state, turns it into a "six-fingered monster," (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 454) and cripples it thereby. Intolerance is therefore "opposite to the very essentials and fundamentals of the nature of a civil magistrate." (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, p. 35.) By means of it is "civil society plucked up by the roots." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*,

p. 207.) Persecution is "dangerously destructive to the very roots . . . of any civil being of the world itself." (*Ibid.* p. 238.)

Thus the state exists in itself and is set free in every way from all fixed duties concerning religious matters. It exists instead as a civil state, and only as a civil state. Upon it God's people have no claims. "It is plausible, but not reasonable, that God's people should, considering the drift of these positions, expect more liberty under a Christian than under a heathen magistrate." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 340.) The state may deliver none of its essence or its functions over to religion. "Peace" says to "Truth," this pamphlet is in the form of a dialogue between Peace and Truth: "I know you would not take from Caesar ought, although it were to give to God." (*Ibid.*, p. 294.) The state is entirely withdrawn from any religious authority. As a "Stück Natur," according to its inner essence, the state is incapable of responding in general to the claims of religion; for that purpose it is without an "organ." It is a dead thing, soulless, unspiritual: "Spiritual cannot reach to artificial or civil." (*Ibid.* p. 247.) Cotton had made it clear that the walls of the New England states were built out of the stones of the church, to which Williams replied: "The walls of earth or stone about a city, are the natural or artificial wall or defence of it." (*Ibid.* p. 246.) Only the "natural" can protect the "natural." Only the natural can operate upon the state which is without an "organ" for the commands and claims of religious matters. Christ has never made any promises to the state. "It pleased not the Lord Jesus to give by himself or his apostles to the civil magistrates, king or governor, any particular rules or directions concerning their behaviour or carriage in civil magistracy, as they have done expressly concerning the duty of fathers, mothers, children, masters, servants, yea, and of subjects toward magistrates." (*Ibid.* p. 85.) The words to Peter to put his sword into the sheath are directed to the church of Christ and not to the state which for that

reason retains the power over life and death. The sword is also not to be drawn in defence of religion, especially when it is endangered. (*Ibid.* p. 360.)

The need of releasing the states from religious rule is especially manifest in the impetuous slaughtering of the religious wars. Williams speaks sorrowfully "of the nations and peoples slaughtering each other for their several respective religions and consciences." (*Ibid.* p. 37.) The decline of the religious wars is largely owing to the more temperate adherents of the idea of toleration. The "Politisierung of Politik" had indeed already made such advances that it was possible even to subordinate foreign-politics to the End of religious propaganda. Especially is this true of Cromwell's very Protestant-tinged foreign politics which is, to be sure, always only a device to interfere for tolerance and the protection of the menaced Protestant interests, and only set up as his aim in the conquest of Ireland (according to his idealogy) an extension of the Protestant religion by force of arms. Milton had expressly restricted the hindrance of the Catholic faith, which he promoted, to national boundaries. The extension of Catholics, he held, must be obstructed: "I mean in our natives and not foreigners, privileged by the laws of nations." (*Of True Religion, Heresy, and Schism*, p. 142.) Cotton also refuses to permit his relative-tolerance to reach beyond the state: "It becomes not the spirit of the gospel to convert aliens to the faith . . . with fire and brimstone." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 106.)

Williams viewed the religious wars, however, as the inevitable consequence of the "bloodie tenent." Seldom does persecution halt at the national boundaries. And why should it? The duty to root out the heretic extends out beyond national borders. And whoever believes in this duty, "must needs force on and press after an universal conquest of all consciences, and under that (like those bloody Spaniards, Turkes and Popes) lay under their fair cloak, the rule and dominion over all the nations of the earth." (*Bloody*

Tenent Yet More Bloody, p. 337.) Characteristic of Williams is his repeated warning and fear of it that intolerance in this religious conquest may in turn consider itself as a sovereign power of a world kingdom. What slaughter must then follow after this principle of intolerance if all the millions of heretics should be put to death? (*Ibid.* pp. 288, 337. *Queries of Highest Consideration*, p. 27.) Williams always kept the world situation of religion constantly in view. Intolerance must involve the Christian state in a mad war against the whole world, and by it constantly threaten mankind by plunging all the nations in a war among one another. Back of intolerance lurks continually a world conflagration. The intolerance of Queen Elizabeth had almost set the whole world in flames. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 350.)

From the basic concept of Williams, moreover, there follows not only peace for the "Christian" states with the heathen world around them, but also the inner justification of the heathen states as the proving ground and as the rulers of the Saints. All spiritual restraints are cleared away from economic and civil-social associations. The children of God may turn to the pagan states to obtain from them justice in social-civil matters. As members of society they may have traffic with pagans, Jews and Turks. Paul—Williams maintains—shows by his appeal to Caesar the legality of having civil intercourse with such persons (idolators), with whom it is not permitted to have any intercourse in spiritual matters: "secretly foretelling that magistrates and people, whole states and kingdoms, should be idolatrous and anti-Christian, yet with whom, notwithstanding, the Saints and churches of God might lawfully cohabit, and hold civil commerce and conversation." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 88.) "And, in that sense, who doubts but God's people may appeal to the Roman Caesar, an Egyptian Pharaoh, a Philistian Abimelech, an Assyrian Nebuchadnezzar, the great Mogul, Prester John, the great Turk, or an Indian Sachem?" (*Ibid.* p. 130.) The expansion of the geographical horizon has perhaps influenced the conception of this idea; the public inclusion of non-Christian powers in the play of politics, and the requirement of a pacific English-colonial penetration made possible later on to draw from it its "Legitimierung." With it colonial politics could throw many an ideological ballast overboard.

As a natural structure, the state stands also beyond good and evil. It can do evil in order to prevent greater evils, "as for instance, in the civil state, usuary, for the preventing of a greater evil in the civil body, as stealing, robbing, murdering, perishing of the poor, and the hindrance, or stop, of commerce and dealings in the Commonwealth." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 139.)

The questions of conscience are generally separated from the social life in a moral sense. The people have indeed no longer any relation in and to the state as religious beings; their action in the civil state is also no longer a question of spiritual judgment of conscience. Therefore the social action may not be involved in the sphere of those actions which flow out of human conscience. As soon as the state appears in religious drapery, then either one must subscribe to the state unfailingly, "or else there are no lawful kingdoms, cities, or towns in the world, in which a man may live, and unto whose civil government he may submit; and then, as I said before, there must be no world, nor is it lawful to live in it, because it hath not a true discerning spirit to judge them that fear or not fear God." (*Ibid.* p. 184.) From it results the penetrating power of the civil order, so that all scruples of conscience are taken over by it from the subjects of the state.

However, Williams also eliminates the question of conscience in another sense: in social life there dare be no possibility of appealing upon restraint of conscience as the basis for disobeying any civil laws; in the state those actions will be punished, which result from the impulse of conscience, if they affect the civil peace and order. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 88.) Williams could say with Selden,

(Transl. Note: Selden, John, (1584-1654) Puritan, member of Parliament, jurist and publicist) man may not be permitted "to pretend conscience against law." Because Society is changed by spiritual crises of liberated relationships an externally regulated "Komplex" — "Soulless," "Conscienceless" — for that reason the development of liberty of conscience into common Rights of Man has hitherto been frustrated. However, the theory of the Rights of Man proceeds on the basis of the acknowledgment of a "social conscience." Of it Williams like Selden feared that the revolt against all social order would borrow thereby a protecting-shield. In opposition to the conscience of the individual, he postulates a higher right, "The Conscience of the State": "The conscience of the magistrate must incite him to civil punishment, as a Lord Mayor of London once answered, that he was born to be a judge when a thief pleaded that he was born to be a thief." (*Ibid.* p. 143.)

The position of Williams on the question of the persecuting state seems at first glance a wavering one. On the one hand, there is held forth the idea of absolute subjection. The persecuting state exists as a civil state in its unshaken right whenever it deals with civil and social matters. Persecution is only to be kept off from interference with the soul (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 304.) (Transl. Note: Williams made this distinction: to punish for religious opinions is *persecution;* but the civil state may punish for civil offences which he calls *prosecution.*) On the other hand, persecution appears as much the dissolving factor of social relations as the enemy of society, so that this right to take steps for its own preservation should not be granted to society. Thus Williams justifies the English Revolution as a rebellion against persecution. Indeed, at the very outset Williams takes up the right of the "civil magistrate" to execute vengeance on tyranny. (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, p. 26.) The same "civil magistrate" who under circumstances is able to be the revolutionary "magistrate" of rank, has the right to draw the sword against the persecutor. (*The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, pp. 195, 204, 320.) "All persecutors of all sorts ought by the civil sword to be restrainted and punished as the destroyers of mankind and all civil and peaceable beings in the world according to the light of their cruel and murderous oppressions." (*Ibid.* p. 481.) So in this also quietistic resignation is condemned.

Through the separation of the church from the civil state, Williams hopes to arrive at an emphasis of the proper civil functions, and, as it were, to direct for its social purpose the surplus power which becomes free for the state through the abandonment of its religious duties. Cotton had taken the matters of dispute between members of the family and masters and servants away from the judgment and sentence of the state: and the existing patriarchal order of society placed, in fact, even the workingman under the family-discipline and family-right. The withdrawing of authority to judge over disputes within the family had to receive a tremendously significant place in the regulation of the state in the social development. And Williams reproaches Cotton: "I observe, furthermore, how they (the doctrines of Cotton) take away from the magistrate that which is his proper cognizance, as the complaints of servants, children, wives, against their parents, masters, husbands, etc. Families as families, being as stones which make up the common building, and are properly the object of the magistrate's care in respect of civil government, civil order, and obedience." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 134.) "To whom should the servant or child or wife petition or complain against oppression unless to the public father, master and husband of the Commonweal." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 284.) In this the civil order of Williams is more nearly like a patriarchal civil-being, than the civil "laisser faire, laisser aller" of the Rights of Man. Cotton mentions in addition to the "Komprehension" within the church, also a word for the toleration of lesser evils within the state. Williams excludes toleration in the latter as well as in the former. (*Ibid.* pp. 108, 138.) His civil state

plunges—freed from impeding admixtures—with unceasing aggression into its duties and labors. Williams complains vigorously that the "Model of Church and Civil Power" which the New England churches worked out, even in the spirit of confining civil authority, prohibits the civil state from punishing expressed evils: "so they take away and disrobe him of that authority, which God has clothed him with." (*Ibid.* p. 284. At the same time he refers to the indications of prosperity which the economic life of the nations experiences because of toleration. Williams repeatedly applies the example of Holland to this thesis: the weakening of the economic power of countries is emphasized by their persecutions.)

"Heathen" states are not only legitimate and lawful, but their civil efficacy, the success of their commonweales, suffers no diminution through the heathen nature. The Christian religion can not claim any right over the well-being of the commonweale: according to the nature of religion any influence upon the affairs of Nature is forbidden her. States with corrupt religions enjoy prosperity and well-being. Williams declares that he could not well believe it when Cotton says, "that outward civil peace cannot stand where religion is corrupt. When so many stately kingdoms and governments in the world have long and long enjoyed civil peace and quiet, notwithstanding that religion is so corrupt, as that there is not the very name of Jesus Christ among them." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 216.) It were an exceedingly dangerous opinion, namely, that the social and spiritual beings, the state and the church, "are like Hypocrates twins, they are born together, grow up together, laugh together, weep together, sicken and die together." (*Ibid.* p. 286.)

The intrinsic justification which Williams in all these ways allows to be assigned to the civil and social life, he also extends to the "particularity" and "self-hood" of the civil world. He affirms the latter in the fulness of its forms and meanings, and fights angrily against Cotton who might

thereby squeeze all civil matters into one scheme since he (Cotton) declares the essences of the Mosaic order of society as eternal and unchangeable. Williams acknowledges instead of a free historical movement, the historical evolution of the civil world. The order of nature is unchangeable throughout all time: "Civil alters according to the constitutions of peoples and nations." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 80.) Indeed, certain moral principles in the laws of Moses are eternal; but only in the substance, not in the material circumstances. Whatever remains in them that is timeless must also work itself out "according to the nature and constitutions of the several nations and peoples of the world." (*Ibid.* p. 485.) Williams fights through with Cotton particularly this question about the problem of the punishment for adultery which Cotton wishes to adapt to Mosaic law: for it Christ has established no fixed punishment, but "leaves the several nations of the world to their own several laws and agreements, . . . according to their several natures, dispositions, and their common peace and welfare." (*Ibid. p.* 487.) Thus Christ approved "the several human ordinances or creations." (*Ibid.* p. 488.) Cotton's intolerance must deny the legality of the several and heterogeneous governments and forms of government, and force them all "to one common law." (*Ibid.* p. 488.) One dare not, however, overrate the inner affirmation of the different nature of the world in space and time. Plainly it is the historical change which Williams calls forth to draw on the eternal and timeless lawful religion from its influence over the changeable state. He emphasizes the historical change so much in order to be able to defend the religious matter before them, and affirms it in favor of the civil-social sphere, because he has withdrawn religion out of this sphere. Like many other theorists of tolerance, he enters into the revolutionary change of religious opinions of the English nation, how they changed with their sovereigns from Roman Catholic to Anglican, from Anglican to Protestant, and so forth, "as the longest

sword and strongest arm of flesh carries it." (*Letters*, p. 219. "Letter to Endicott.") "The fathers have made their sons heretics, and the sons their fathers." (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, p. 20.) The historical change is to Williams, indeed, very frequently an indication of the transitoriness of the creature: "Vain uncertain and changeable mutations of the present evil world." (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, p. 20.) "Certain uncertainties of friends, treasures, revenues, armies, forts, magazines, castles, ships, and navies, crowns and lives." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 16.) This charge plainly makes the civil world of inferior merit and dignity. With this corresponds also Williams' view of history: prevailing, undeceived princes (Karl V; Philip II) and the deception of the English nation by the usurper Warbeck: transitoriness and deception of earthly beings.

The affirmation of the individual rights of states is so frequently united by Williams to the discussion of the right of resistance against heretical princes. Intolerance seems to him to embrace in itself the doctrine of the dethronement of heretical princes. He who objects to the social right of existence of the subjects because of a religious disqualification, will also not permit the heretical princes to have authority in his civil life. He who believes in his duty to have to eradicate the heretic from the face of the earth, will also not make a stop before heretical princes: "such kings and magistrates ought as well as thousands of his subjects in like case to be put to death." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 420. Likewise, *Ibid.* pp. 86, 205.) "All persecutors hold the Pope's traiterous doctrine of deposing heretical princes." (*Ibid.* p. 302.) Persecution is synonymous with the "Popish bloody doctrine of deposing heretical kings." (*Ibid.* p. 281.) It is the "Theory of the Powder Plot." (*Ibid.* p. 497.)

Under such presentations, Williams therefore has certain difficulties about the toleration of the Catholics, whose Popes explicitly defended and practised this right. (Against

it, the toleration of the Jews is urged with unreserved energy.) The Catholic religion seemed, nevertheless, so loaded with doctrines hostile to civility that in Williams' time very few had ventured to speak of tolerating Catholics. In favor of it, Williams goes about to explain that doctrine about the deposing of heretical princes as alien to the true basic dogma of the Catholics. The Catholics had given proof of their loyalty in many Protestant countries; many in England had taken the Oath of allegiance. One entire Catholic kingdom (France) had spoken out in 1610 against the disloyal book of the Jesuit Mariana and thereby shown how even the Catholic religion can be reconciled with civil matters, and how unjust Cotton is "to chain up all Papists in an impossibility of yielding civil obedience." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 311.) Williams however held the toleration of Catholics to fixed stipulations: the state may require them to take the Oath of civil engagement and to yield up their arms, and the state may also mark them "as the Jews are in some parts by some distinction of or on their garments." (*Ibid.* p. 314.)

That it was possible for Williams, from his broadly laid-out rejection of the deposing of heretical princes to infer a reciprocal duty of the princes and to guard the civil-social rights of his heretical subjects, is due to the peculiar social-civil conception of Williams. This conception rests in the identity of the civil and social rights and relations. The state leads no independent life without society and, that which makes it lawful, makes legitimate also the whole body of social relationships, and to dispute its self-designed immanent legitimacy signifies an abolition and a negation of all social relations. One may compare, for example, the following utterance of Williams: "And hence it is true, that a Christian captain, Christian merchant, physician, lawyer, pilot, father, master, and so consequently magistrate, etc., is no more a captain, merchant, physician, lawyer, pilot, father, master, magistrate, etc., than a captain, merchant, etc., of any other conscience or

religion." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 341.) The state appears here as the product of the social division of labor: the essence of the state resting entirely on the existence of a portion of the governing classes. This portion has an occupation among other occupations, as a special social group among other groups. The civil being is also dissolved into the social being. One can also say Williams robs, as it were, the state of its public nature, in that, he identifies it with the remaining social relations and constituents. The legitimacy of the state becomes the legitimacy of a social vocational-group; its immanent "legitimacy" differs not at all in principle from the "authorization" of the business of a merchant and the legality of a mercantile business. (Transl. Note: See Ernst: *Roger Williams*, Part III, Chapt. 12. The state is a public service corporation. See also, *The Political Thought of Roger Williams.*) A "Christian" state would in the conception of Williams presuppose a "Christian" banking business, a "Christian" fishery, a "Christian" medical science, and so forth. Thus Williams is able to defend the biblical phrase to give Caesar what is Caesar's into making legitimate the "Totalität" of social relationships and to place the affirmation of the state beyond all religious presumptions on a parity with the claims of all citizens, like that religious qualification, on all social right to property and life. "Although that a man is not godly, a Christian, sincere, a church member, yet to deprive him of any civil right or privilege due to him as a Man, a Subject. a Citizen, is to take from Caesar that which is Caesar's, which God endures not though it be given to himself." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 414.) Thus whilst Williams deprives religion of any connection with the state, he also disestablishes the state.

As Williams has justified the non-religious state as a civil state in the fulness of its essence and being, he in addition proceeds to defend on the basis of this legitimacy the full-rights of non-religious citizens as unassailable. Just as each state is "complete" as a state beyond its religious

creeds, so is also each citizen as a citizen. The social functions of the subject are not able, because of his religious creed, to possess the least enhancement, improvement, influence, not even a coloring or a toning down. "And I ask whether or not such as hold forth other worships or religions Jews, Turks, or anti-Christians, may not be peaceable and quiet subjects, loving and helpful neighbors, fair and just dealers, true and loyal to the civil government." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 112.) The society moves by its own impulsive power. Social and religious morals are two different forces. The social moral is something natural, and grows inevitably out of the social, immanent and natural necessities. There is a social moral which needs no religious impulse: "There is a moral virtue, a moral fidelity and honesty, which other men besides churchmembers are by good nature and education, by good laws and good examples nourished and trained up in." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 365.) There is a "civil faithfulness, obedience, honesty, chastity." (*Ibid.* p. 207.) These differentiate themselves naturally from religious obedience, religious faithfulness and religious virtue. It is dangerous "to confound the nature of civil and moral goodness with religious." (*Ibid.* p. 406.) On that account it is an error to assume that "religious" sins are able to menace the civil state. Individual sins indeed may affect and trouble the social life. "But blindness of the soul, hardening of the heart, the inclination to choose this or that God, this or that Christ besides the true one, these injure not even remotely the commonwealth, since they do not affect it, but only the spiritual kingdom." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 328.) Even persons without any religion can be put into possession of that social morality, which makes them suitable members of society.

Thus the social being experiences no suggestion or pressure because of religious powers. Neither the society as a whole nor the individual social trade groups suffer a declension through the religious changes. "Yea, though

the whole worship of the city of Ephesus should be altered, yet if men be true and honestly ingenuous the city covenants, combinations and principles, all this might be without the least impeachment or infringement of the peace of the city of Ephesus." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 47.) The change in religion becomes the more significant, if within the society there is established a religious congregation which represents itself as a process of continual organizing and dissolving of the religious union in which persons assemble spontaneously to disunite and again break up when its purpose is accomplished. Such a voluntary union is the religious congregation, in fact one of the "companies and societies voluntarily entering into combinations which are distinct from the city." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 69.) No political and social theorist, not even Locke, (Locke, John, (1632-1704) *Toleration*, (1685), and *Two Treatises of Government*. (1690) has so ruggedly worked out the idea that the church is an "association," a corporation with private rights: "The church, or company of worshippers, whether true or false, is like unto a body or college of physicians in a city—like unto a corporation, society, or company of East India or Turkey merchants, or any other society or company of London; which companies may hold their courts, keep their records, hold disputations, and in matters concerning their society may dissent, divide, break into schisms and factions, sue and implead each other at the law, yea, wholly break up and dissolve into pieces and nothing, and yet the peace of the city not be in the least measure impaired or disturbed; because the essence of the city, and so the well-being and peace thereof, is essentially distinct from those particular societies; the city courts, city laws, city punishments distinct from them. The city was before them, and stands absolute and entire when such a corporation or society is taken down." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 46.)

Christianity and religion have lost entirely their social effectiveness. Religion has nowhere become flesh, and has

nowhere assumed a characteristic form. Christianity is without any formative power for the things of this earth. There are no "Christian states"; there is no "Christian world." Christianity, as Williams conceives it, loses its outward form and its visibility. It would be deprived of its original essence, if it entered into a combination with the things of this world. It is not able to impress its stamp on the earthly things, and there are in this world no longer any sacred things. The idea which we have so frequently come upon, that Christ removed the distinction between holy and unholy, pure and impure, Williams modifies in many different ways. Upon this earth no longer lies the shadow of Holiness; the holy nowhere any longer becomes characteristic form. Williams falls upon this idea in order particularly to destroy essentially the superiority of the Christian world over the non-Christian. The nations are all alike pure and impure. None can thereby exalt itself above the others, in that it boasts of its religious perfection, and because it claims for itself a peculiar Holiness. All nations stand equal before God. Since the New Testament times there is no longer any "holy nation": the Israel of the Old Testament was a prototype of the holy nation of Christ, which is chosen out of the few Elect whom Christ has called out of the nations of the earth. No nation is called unanimously. Even the "Christian" nations are equal to the others before God. Williams offers vehement objections against "this sanctifying of a new land of Canaan." (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, p. 19.) "Are not all the nations of the earth alike clean unto God? Or rather, alike unclean until it pleaseth the Father of mercies to call some out to the knowledge and grace of his Son, making them to wash in the blood of the Lamb of God?" (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 281.) "But now the partition-wall is broken down, and in respect of the Lord's special propriety to one country more than another, what difference between Asia and Africa, between Europe and America, between England and Turkey, London and Con-

stantinople?" (*Ibid.* p. 275.) For Williams also made war on the colonial policy of annexation by force which makes an appeal to the inner spiritual "religious" pre-eminence of Christian nations. Out of this sanctification and religious glorification of Christian nations follows "the sin of the patents, wherein Christian kings, so-called-(!) are invested with the right by virtue of their Christianity to take away and give away the lands and countries of other men," who are not Christian. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 461.) In a more interesting way this interpretation provides Williams also with a means to rebuke the overbearing manner of the colonies towards Mother England. In Cotton's mind there had arisen on American soil a land of God and a kingdom of Christ, which was exalted spiritually far above religious-corrupt England. Against this notion, Williams says: "I for myself acknowledge the land of England not to be inferior to any under heaven." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 407.) Through this denial of the spiritual superiority of New England, he hopes also to be able to break the persecution of New England, "stopping New England's persecutions by the mercy of Old England, the mother of dissenting consciences." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 463.)

Christianity, as Williams understands it, ceases therefore to compromise with the Forms of this earth, because it itself remains with fixed Form as a permanent Pattern. Every established pattern in religious things signifies for our logician, — to neglect religion and the godly matters with a "Kreatural Bildhaftigkeit," to run counter to the command of God not to make an image of Him. This begins even with the earliest religious experience of the individual. Even here Williams struggles against a fixed, bound and rigid pattern. The religious belief ought to be a constant spiritual struggle, a continual flowing, becoming and bubbling of the spirit. (Naturally it ought not be denied that, with the belief in predestination, in Williams who accepted the belief of individual "Election," that is,

security and irrevocability, there are also other heterogeneous motives operative.) Perseverance in the once attained Truth, lethargy in religious truth, is sinful confidence in natural insight. The belief in the insecurity of human knowledge could become a natural motive in favor of tolerance. In fact, Williams constructs in part his ideas of tolerance upon the insecurity of human knowledge; (Transl. Note: Williams was closely associated with the scientific movement of the seventeenth century, and so emphasized experience, experiment and inquiry in life and thought.) No one can know whether he follow in a heresy and not the Lord: "It is a dangerous thing to put this to the may-be, to the venture or hazard, to the possibility." (*Letters*, "To Endicott," August 1651, p. 225.) "May not the most High be pleased to hide from his (the persecutor's) as well as from the eyes of his fellow servants, fellow mankind, fellow English? And if God hide from his, from any, who can discover?" (*Ibid.* p. 216.) It was a "holy purpose" of God to permit all the duplicity of religious knowledge in which the individual, thrown about erring and reeling, is placed, "as it displays Himself only perfect and excellent and all the rest of men in all ages but farthing candles, yea, smoking firebrands." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 39.) Thus are the people: "poor dust and ashes, like stones once rolling down the Alps, like Indian canoes or English boats loose and adrift, where stop we until infinite mercy stop us, especially, when a false fire of zeal and confidence drives us." (*Letters*, "To Endicott," p. 226.)

Neither does Williams hold to the belief in a true church now existing in the world. Nor does religious essence here take on form; nor ought it here become an earthly image. The children of God are obscured, and divided in opinions. They are not able to be reconciled since they live entirely ignorant of themselves and the world. "The rich mines of golden truth lie hid under barren hills, and in obscure holes and corners." (*Bloudy*

Tenent, p. 150.) Thousand of God's Elect live in the national, diocesan and parish churches and go about among the mass of "Idolaters." "God's people in their persons are His, most dear and precious, yet in respect of the Christian worship, they are mingled amongst the Babylonians." (*Ibid.* p. 40.) They are nearest to God, "that separate both from one and the other, yet are divided also among themselves into several professions." (*Ibid.* p. 302.) "But as the lily is among the thorns, so is Christ's love among the daughters; and as the apple-tree among the trees of the forest, so is her beloved among the sons." (*Ibid.* p. 65.) "What are two or three or more of regenerate or godly persons in such communions, but as two or three roses or lilies in a wilderness? A few grains of good corn in a heap of chaff? A few sheep among herds of wolves or swine, or (if more civil) flocks of goats? A little good dough swallowed up with a whole bushel of leaven? Or a little precious gold confounded and mingled with a whole heap of dross?" (*Ibid.* p. 421.)

The religious opinion of Williams is therefore represented variously as a religion of escape—as an escape from the business and evil ways of the world. The flower of religion blossoms in hidden places, and the church—Williams returns frequently to this comparison — is like an enclosed and hedged in garden into which penetrates no "breath from the agitated world." Separation from the world, isolation, is the mark of the religious adjustment of Williams. "A false religion out of the church will not hurt the church, no more than weeds in a wilderness hurt the enclosed garden or poison hurts the body when it is not touched or taken, yea, and antidotes are received against it." (*Ibid.* p. 167.) "If the weeds be kept out of the garden of the church, the roses and lilies therein will flourish, notwithstanding, that weeds abound in the field of the civil state." (*Ibid.* p. 156.) He charges the adherents of the state-church, that they wish to make the garden and the wilderness a unity. (*Ibid.* p. 170.) Cotton wishes to make the dung-heaps of the world the blossoming gardens of Christ.

In all this sticks at bottom a goodly piece of hardheaded religious egoism. Without the weeds may flourish, if only in my garden the roses blossom; and without the storm may howl and the ships be shattered to pieces, if only my ships lie safely at anchor. Williams is filled with the fear that the purity of his soul and his religion might suffer alarm and dangers of the world; but the world may be destroyed if only my soul suffers no harm! He speaks of "the lamentable ship-wreck of mankind" (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 3) from which it is worthwhile to save oneself. He longs to be of the true church: "also separated from the rubbish of anti-Christian confessions and desolations." (Ibid. p. 41.) "Having bought truth dear, we must not sell it cheap, not the least grain of it, for the whole world; no, not for the saving of souls." (*Ibid.* p. 9.) He reminds Parliament:

Therein is contained also the analysis of the tolerance-scheme of Cotton. Here contend not merely tolerance and intolerance, but also one idea of tolerance with another. Within the church (Cotton admits certain toleration even without the church — even if hemmed in by reservations and disqualifications.) Cotton desires to tolerate everything which is at one with things fundamental. Williams throws out headlong the idea of toleration within the church. Cotton wishes to transplant the stinking weeds into the garden of God. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 142.) "Komprehension" Williams holds is a disgrace to the church of God. Everything, even the smallest tares must be weeded out of the garden of Christ. Williams conceives the notion of heretics more strictly than does Cotton: the opposition to God even in the smallest matters makes one an heretic. (*Ibid.* p. 99.) The question which has been presented to all plans of Comprehension: Where is the borderline? What belongs to fundamental truths? is also raised by Williams, (*Ibid.* p. 117.) In addition Williams is radically opposed to every presentation of a Christian unified-front which at best brings such plans to naught; his more sublime religious standpoint removes all current Christianity at so great a distance that the removal of it from non-Christian religion diminishes to a vanishing point. The "Christiani omnes sumus" has in him an embittered opponent. His tolerance is a tolerance of ultimate intolerance; a tolerance of spiritual abandonment and of spiritual resignation of "the world").

"Be not so busy about the earthly state, no nor the heavenly estate of others, as to forget to make sure you own vocation and election." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 15.) We dare not expose ourselves to the dangers of the world, not even to save a soul. Each for himself, and God for all of us. "Christ commands his disciples to let the blind man go until he falls into the grave." (*Bloudy* Tenent, p. 19.)

One pulse of the heart is indistinguishable from the others. Williams is a strict adherent of Calvinistic predestination, (Transl. Note: Freund fails to distinguish between "unconditional" and "conditional" election. Williams held the Lutheran position of "conditional election." Or in other words Williams took the idea of "predestination" more nearly in the sense in which Paul presents the idea in the New Testament. See Ernst: *Roger Williams*, Part IV, Chapter 2, "The Seeker Religion"), and constructs in part his idea of tolerance upon it. About condemnation and sanctification God alone has the determination and him whom he has chosen for eternal peace, no errors can trouble. (Transl. Note: Freund is in error here, for Williams admits that even the elect are uncertain of their election. See Ernst: *Roger Williams*, "The Seeker Religion.") The Elect need no protection: God's sheep are safe in his eternal hand. "Dead men cannot be infected. The civil state, the world, being in a natural state, dead in sin, whatever be the state-religion unto which persons are forced, it is impossible it should be infected. Indeed, the living, the believing, the church and spiritual state, that and that only is capable of infection; for whose help we shall presently see what preservatives and remedies the Lord Jesus hath appointed. Moreover, as we see in a common plague or infection, the names are taken, how many are to die, and not one more shall be struck than the destroying angel hath names of: so here whatever be the soul-infection breathed out from the lying lips of a plague-stricken Pharisee, yet the names are taken, not one elect

or chosen of God shall perish. God's sheep are safe in his eternal hand and counsel, and he knows his material, knows also his mystical stars, their numbers, and calls them every one by name. None fall into the ditch on the blind Pharisee's back, but such as were ordained to that condemnation, both guide and followers. The vessels of wrath shall break and split, and only they, to the praise of God's eternal justice. (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 97.) "Who can pluck these sheep, the elect, out of his hand." (*Ibid.* p. 115.) Intolerance builds upon the Popish doctrine of free will, as if "it lay in their own power and ability to believe upon the magistrate's command." (*Ibid.* p. 222.)

A religious positiveness flows through the entire thinking of Williams. He does not let the seducer of men in religious matters get away without combat, and of a spiritual toleration of these whom he wrests away from the gallows of the state there is no word: in the state the law demands—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life; and in the kingdom of the church the law—a soul for a soul. (*Ibid.* p. 96.)

At the bottom of every religious theory of Williams, reposes the refusal of any spiritual conquest of the world. This has been denied because it would presuppose secular "sovereignty." To Williams, moreover, each "domination" represents a menace to true religiousness. The divine illumination is vouchsafed only to the lower classes of people, for the most part in their wholeness of religious sensibility. A profound spiritual aversion of the demon of power and authority overcomes our thinker, and a vehement mistrust of the upper classes of society. In the dedication (to the Parliament) of the *Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody* and in a "Letter to Endicott" (Letters, p. 214) he speaks of a particular seduction for which the rulers are censured. Their spiritual welfare is more powerfully exposed to danger than that of all the others; therefore, true Christianity shines very seldom upon the leaders of social and civil life. To let the rulers decide upon the

religion of the state signifies from thence always the sovereignity of the unreligious persons over the church. God is "Maximus in minimis." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 4.) Even culture and knowledge through which the great world shines, does not guarantee the religious truth which is the grace and gift of God. "God delights to befool the wise and high." (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 209.) "The Most High and glorious God hath chosen the poor of the world and the witnesses of truth are clothed in sackcloth, not in silk and satin." (*Bloudy Tenent*, p. 151.) This so-called poverty is however not the poverty of the proletarian suffering, but the "plainness" of the middle class. The kings of the earth seldom enter into heavenly glory: Williams trembles approvingly as he tells how Buchanan on his deathbed directed these words to King James — "Remember my humble service to his majesty, and tell him Buchanan is going to a place where few kings come." (*Ibid.* p. 151.) "Not many wise and good are called but the poor receive the Gospel, as God hath chosen the poor of the world to be rich in faith." (*Ibid.* p. 355.) Thus Williams can express the conviction that persecution oppresses predominately those saints of God who indeed never share in that civil power which does the persecuting. It is only a "seeming impartiality," if among the heaps of slaughtered an anti-Christian is found here and there. (*Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, p. 34.)

From hence it is not much further to a spiritual depreciation of the order of tolerance which makes light the cross for the Saints of Christ. Williams has at the bottom of his soul very little faith in the universal realization of toleration. Oppression will forever be the distinctive mark of the people of God, and will remain so. The Saints have flourished the most in grace and piety under persecution. Constantine was more fatal to the church of God than Nero. (*Ibid.* p. 334.) Thus the idea of toleration will not be in the form of a universal world order, but merely a criterion of the Saints and a means of spiritual justification.

The papists ought to be tolerated, so that this forbearance may witness against them and their persecution, and crush them under their disgrace. (*Ibid.* p. 27.) The idea of toleration is, as a whole, not to be considered favorable to the liberation of mankind in general from guilt and evil, but a part of that scheme of salvation of the privileged of God out of the universal "lamentable ship-wreck of mankind."

Queen's Fort

Mr. Norman M. Isham calls attention to the mention of "The Queen's Fort, so called" as early as December 1724 in the *R. I. Colonial Records* IV, p. 349. This establishes the fact that the Queen's Fort was called by that name within the lifetime of persons who had lived through King Philip's War. For an account of Queen's Fort see *R. I. Hist. Soc. Collections* for October, 1931.

Notes

The following persons have been admitted to membership in the Society:

Rev. Paul C. Burhoe
Mrs. John R. Freeman
Mrs. C. H. Horton