ioXt Google Nest Doorbell (battery) and Camera (battery) Security Assessment

Google
August 16, 2021 – Version 3.0

Prepared for
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Prepared by
NCC Group ioXt Test Lab
Executive Summary

Overview and Scope

NCC Group was contracted by Google to conduct a security assessment of the Google Nest Doorbell (battery) and Camera (battery) devices. This assessment was specifically focused on determining whether the device complies with The ioXt Security Pledge.¹ This assessment was performed in over a period in May 2021, and was authorized by Google.

The devices being assessed are differing form factors of residential camera device. A “development” device for each model was provided by Google and “production” devices were acquired separately. The firmware versions for the devices are:

- **Doorbell (battery)**
- 1.57 OPENMASTER 259659 test-keys stable-channel

- **Camera (battery)**
- 1.57 OPENMASTER 259052 test-keys stable-channel

Key Findings

Within the test parameters, the security posture of the production devices was found to be strong. All BLE and WiFi traffic was secured using best practices, with up to date TLS. Factory reset functionality reset the device to its original state securely. Google provided information regarding security of firmware integrity and update protections, as well as encryption of data at rest. An unprivileged production-testing debug service was available via TCP which Google confirmed is not provided by external facing production builds.

With respect to the ioXt Residential Camera Profile, both devices met the minimum certification requirements, but some of the higher level requirements were not met, as further described in the following section.

Limitations

As this device is pre-release some aspects of testing were based on documented procedures and policy with engineers, as public documentation has not been released yet.

All assessments performed as part of the ioXt pledge certification program are intended to be time-limited black box audits. These reviews are simply focused on determining the basic security hygiene of the product and the compliance with the eight pledge principles. Therefore, NCC Group performed this shallow review in a limited time-frame, and did not explore deeply any portion of the device. For instance, NCC Group did not review the kernel, or look for remotely-exploitable memory corruption issues in network-listening services. This type of work is best suited for a white-box audit where product source code is available.

Additionally, a number of relevant services and applications were out of scope for the purposes of this assessment. In particular, NCC Group did not assess the back-end microservices or perform an assessment of the applications running on the device. The companion mobile application was also out of scope.

¹https://www.iotalliance.org/the-pledge
## Nest Doorbell (Battery) ioXt Summary

This section serves to summarize the device's compliance with the ioXt Residential Camera Profile version 1.8².

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<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
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<td>Automatically applied updates</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>Updates were available to the user, and Google have a maintenance programme for regular security updates, including for more urgent updates when required. Update details such as the installed version number for each device are visible to the user through the Google Home mobile application and updates are applied to devices automatically when available.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vulnerability reporting program</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>Google has a public vulnerability reporting program in place applicable to this and many other devices.³ NCC Group has confirmed that this program meets the ioXt requirements, including ISO29147⁴ compliance. This program accepts external researcher submissions, and meets acceptance criteria for monitoring security relevant components. A public researcher rewards programme was in place.</td>
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<td>Security expiration date</td>
<td>1*/1</td>
<td>Google shared internal documentation regarding the EOL support of various devices including this one, meeting the requirements of this pledge item. Google indicated that this information will be publicly available at <a href="http://support.google.com/product-documentation/answer/10231940">http://support.google.com/product-documentation/answer/10231940</a> by August 31, 2021.</td>
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<td>No universal passwords</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>With only a single button interface for local access, this device does not have an interface which requires authentication by password locally. Client account credentials are required to remotely interact with the device, and these credentials, along with WLAN connectivity, are required to render the device operable. Note also that Client account authentication can be backed by two-factor authentication. The device does not implement user voice operation, and requires both the user’s Google account credentials and WiFi credentials to operate over a network interface.</td>
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<td>Proven cryptography</td>
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<td>Google provided a broad description of the cryptography used in various aspects of device functionality including network communication, firmware verification, and provisioning. The cryptography choices were reviewed and compliant with currently accepted best practices.</td>
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<td>The device returns to its initialization state after factory reset and is no longer able to access the wifi network it was connected to. The device also had no externally accessible storage available.</td>
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²[https://www.ioxtalliance.org/s/ioXt_Residential_Camera_Profile.pdf](https://www.ioxtalliance.org/s/ioXt_Residential_Camera_Profile.pdf)
³[https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/](https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/)
⁴[https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html](https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html)
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\(^6\)https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/
\(^7\)https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html
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Security level 3
SI117
Google needs per-account data encryption in the cloud. It was not indicated that any such mechanism exists, and this lack was later confirmed by Google.

Security level 4
SI106
The device processor must have clearly documented hardware-based power side channel attack mitigations.
.ioXt Security Pledge Methodology

This section describes the criteria used by NCC Group when testing a product for alignment with the ioXt Security Pledge. While many of the questions posed below are answered manually by reviewing and testing the product, in the interest of time, some may be answered based on the ioXt Pledge Questionnaire that the OEM fills out to provide NCC Group with a detailed technical understanding of the product and its security controls.

The set of tests that were explicitly performed are detailed in the member-accessible ioXt Test Case Library. This summary provides a broader perspective of the considerations that NCC Group reviewed in alignment with the overall ioXt pledge.

The ioXt Security Pledge is composed of eight clear principles:

1. **No universal passwords**
   The pledge states:
   
   The product shall not have a universal password; unique security credentials will be required for operation.
   
   In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the device:
   
   • All device passwords are unique at the earliest opportunity (out-of-box experience or manufacturing) and not resettable to any universal default value.
   • The minimum strength and verification method of the password render brute force attacks difficult even at scale.
   • The device does not use any hard-coded credentials or identity.

   With respect to any methods by which the device authenticates to remote endpoints and functionality, NCC Group further reviewed the following:
   
   • Establish the set of identifiers that uniquely identify a device and consider the use and sensitivity of each.
   • Establish that each device must prove its unique identity and authenticate to exercise any remote functionality using a proven secure mechanism.

2. **Secured interfaces**
   The pledge states:
   
   All product interfaces shall be appropriately secured by the manufacturer.
   
   In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the device:
   
   • JTAG/SWD and debug interfaces are disabled on release products.
   • All sensitive interfaces, including device-internal interfaces, are encrypted and authenticated.
   • Authorization is performed for any privileged access to device functionality.
   • Sufficient input validation is performed on all external interfaces.

3. **Proven cryptography**
   The pledge states:
   
   Product security shall use strong, proven, updatable cryptography using open, peer-reviewed methods and algorithms.
   
   In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the device:
   
   • Establish where the product uses cryptography.
   • Establish that wherever cryptography is used, it is considered standard and best-practice.
   • Establish that wherever TLS is used, it is version 1.2 or greater.

4. **Security by default**
   The pledge states:
Product security shall be appropriately enabled by default by the manufacturer.

In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the device:

• There are no RMA/debug modes enabled in release firmware.
• There are appropriately implemented privacy modes/buttons.
• There is no means to trivially bypass user authentication.
• All device keys are managed securely.
• There are no unnecessary network-facing services, and those that are necessary restrict access accordingly.
• The manufacturer provides consumers with clear and transparent information about how their personal data is being used, by whom, and for what purposes, for each device and service. This also applies to third parties that can be involved, including advertisers.
• Where personal data is processed on the basis of consumers' consent, this consent is obtained in a valid way, and that consent is revocable by the consumers at any time, allowing the consumers to permanently delete all previously collected data and prevent future collection.
• Logging on the device does not expose personal private information of the user.

5 Signed software updates
The pledge states:

The product shall only support signed software updates.

In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the device:

• Firmware updates are downloaded over TLS, and the certificate of the firmware host that the device verifies should be pinned.
• The firmware images are encrypted until installation.
• The firmware images are signed, and they are verified on the device prior to installation.
• The device supports secure boot.
• The device supports downgrade prevention.

6 Automatically applied updates
The pledge states:

The manufacturer shall act quickly to apply timely security updates.

In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the manufacturer:

• The device supports a secure firmware over-the-air update mechanism.
• The manufacturer is able to distribute firmware updates remotely using this mechanism.
• The consumer can be informed in a timely manner that an update is required or available. The urgency of each update is communicated to the consumer.
• Where possible, the device will continue to provide a basic level of functionality during an update.
• The manufacturer maintains awareness of both internally developed and externally sourced firmware running on the device and is responsive in distributing updates to both in the presence of a discovered vulnerability.

7 Vulnerability reporting program
The pledge states:

The manufacturer shall implement a vulnerability reporting program, which will be addressed in a timely manner.

In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group engaged the manufacturer to answer the following questions:

• Have you ever had to deal with an external security vulnerability report?
• Have you defined patching criteria which guarantee that vulnerabilities must be patched within a reasonable time frame from initial disclosure?
• When a security update is published, how are vulnerability details disclosed publicly to stakeholders including customers?

Furthermore, NCC Group has reviewed the following aspects of the manufacturer:

• Security contact information and vulnerability reporting guidelines are published on the manufacturer’s website.
• The contact information is easily discoverable.
• Any documentation provided by the company related to their vulnerability disclosure program and its parameters.
• The company participates in a bug bounty program, and the details thereof.

8 Security expiration date
The pledge states:

The manufacturer shall be transparent about the period of time that security updates will be provided.

In order to test this best-practice, NCC Group engaged the manufacturer to answer the following questions:

• After the product is released, what is the earliest possible date that it will no longer be supported via security patches before End Of Life?
• How is this information communicated to stakeholders including customers?