

The G77 and China: Post-Copenhagen Symptoms

Antto Vihma, MSc The Finnish Institute of International Affairs antto.vihma@upi-fiia.fi

"Judging from the post-Copenhagen political debate, the political and historical reasons behind the genesis of the G77, and especially its functioning in today's rapidly changing world, are not sufficiently understood."



Negotiations History

- G77 and China: Product of the political economy and the North/South divide
 - Bandung conference in 1955
 - UNCTAD in the 1960s
 - Exclusion, terms of trade, commodity price stabilization
 - Cold War
- 1972 Stockholm [UNCHE]; 1992 Rio de Janeiro [UNCED]; 2002 Johannesburg [WSSD]; 2009 Copenhagen [UNFCCC]
- The South: From "contestation" to "participation" to "engagement"?



- BASIC
 - Emerging economies China, India, Brazil, South Africa
- AOSIS
 - 42 small island states
- African Group
 - 53 members of the African Union
- LDCs
- 49 least developed countries
- OPEC
 - 12 oil-exporting countries, led by Saudi Arabia
- ALBA
 - Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador



Key trends in G77

- Rise of the BASIC
 - Surprising to most analysts: close coordination, China's leading role
 - China: non-interference and sovereignty
 - China: mutual dependency with the rest of G77?
- Radicalisation in the climate agenda
 - ALBA geopolitics, anti-americanism, anti-capitalism
 - Sudan the public voice of China?
 - Feelings of marginalisation feed sympathy for ALBA?



Key trends in G77 II

- Against the Copenhagen Accord
 - ALBA: geopolitics in democracy rhetoric
 - OPEC: Saudi Arabia strongly opposes, UAE and Algeria associate
 - Tuvalu and some other AOSIS: insufficient content
- Ambivalence on the Accord compromise
 - China and India, domestic debate on MRV
- Pro Copenhagen Accord
 - Maldives and some other AOSIS: vocal support, importance of para 15
 - Many African and Latin American countries



Strategic implications I

- Lesson I: US continues on a fundamentally unilateralist strategy
 - multilateralism "in accordance with domestic law"
 - rules of e.g possible flexibility mechanisms are to be made in D.C.?
- Lesson II: China revealed its strategy and internalization of China's climate actions is not in it
 - clear signs of obstructionism in Copenhagen
- Lesson III: EU is not a last minute "deal breaker" but an agenda setter nevertheless
 - there is no such thing as "G2"
 - Copenhagen Accord is peppered with European ideas



Strategic implications II

- Lesson IV: the G77 is fragmented on key issues
 - BASIC and the rest –dynamics?
 - functioning of UNFCCC and multilateralism as a whole?
- Lesson V: "multilateralism is not dead, it is in intensive care"
 - negotiations may lead to a legally binding treaty (on a long term)
 - or a "soft law", bottom up framework
 - or endless talks like Doha round in WTO

• Lesson VI: in 2010-11, clarity is needed on

- the status of the Accord and future of the KP
- can the near future COPs restore faith in UNFCCC (and multilateralism)?



Elephant in the room: The new G77 and China dynamics in climate talks http://www.upi-fiia.fi/en/publication/118/

Thank You!