THE SECURITY STRATEGIES
OF THE US, CHINA, RUSSIA
AND THE EU

LIVING IN DIFFERENT WORLDS

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INTRODUCTION

Every state needs to have some basic ideas about how to ensure national security and how to allocate resources dedicated to this purpose. Nowadays, many states produce public documents laying out their national security strategy. These strategies generally aim to fulfill two functions: goal-setting and problem-solving. In other words, they define national interests in a goal-oriented manner and identify the necessary means for advancing these interests. This also requires identifying the main threats to national security. The very meaning of national security, which is by no means an easily defined concept, should also be illuminated in the strategies. National security in turn is linked to the respective nation’s values.

Traditionally, the question of how to apply existing resources in order to achieve specific goals, such as victory in war, has been a core issue for security strategists.\(^1\) In recent decades, however, the conception of national security has broadened, with security strategies considering states’ vital interests at times of both peace and war. The border between peace and war has become more ambiguous, and the balance between military and a variety of non-military tools for providing state security is much debated among policy-makers as well as academics.\(^2\)

Security strategies are deemed most valuable when they provide a grand strategy that takes a broad view of the international environment, the actor’s own place in it, goals related to shaping the strategic environment, and policies for achieving these goals. Comprehensive grand

\(^1\) Baylis et al. 2015.

\(^2\) Stolberg 2012, 15.
strategies cover at least the following components: physical security, economic prosperity and some degree of value projection.\(^3\)

Making the security strategy public can serve a number of purposes that go beyond the definition of strategic goals and instruments. The public documents provide a common set of guidelines for all domestic authorities, so as to promote consensus among different state institutions on key issues pertaining to national security. In particular, they offer a framework for the allocation of resources for security purposes. In addition, the strategies have important strategic communication purposes at home and abroad. They can help to generate broad-based domestic consensus behind the security policy vision of state leadership. Strategy documents can also be oriented to external audiences, as they provide both allies and adversaries with a conception about the commitments, intentions and resources of the actor in question.\(^4\) Strategy documents may serve as policy-relevant guidebooks, but they may also focus instead on communicating a narrative to domestic and/or external audiences that frames and justifies a certain course of action. The two goals are obviously not mutually exclusive.

This paper aims to explore and compare the security strategies of four major international actors: the US, China, Russia and the EU. This exercise seems particularly justified at the present time of uncertainty about the direction of change. The current world order is under strain and according to many assessments giving way to something qualitatively new, although the contours of the future order are not yet visible. An effort to analyze the security strategies of some of the most prominent state actors will hopefully help us envisage the pathways ahead.

The view that the era of American hegemony is coming to an end has become increasingly popular also in the US itself.\(^5\) Several analysts have suggested that this might mean the collapse of the rules-based liberal international order built after WWII. The central role of Western liberal values in the existing order has made it difficult to analytically unpack the decline of Western dominance from a possible future shape of rules-based order. Yet core parts of the existing order were constructed in the context of Cold War bipolar order and fierce competition between the two superpowers of the time. The end of the Cold War opened the way for Western hegemony and the global spread of liberal values, but on

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3 Smith 2011.
4 Stolberg 2012.
the other hand, unipolarity has also been a source of problems for both Western unity and global multilateralism.  

The return of geopolitical competition along the lines of the realist school of international relations has been seen as one of the alternative paths distancing the world from the current order. In this line of thought, geographical factors, notably control over certain territories, routes and resources, are seen as an ever-important concern for states. As states seek to maximize their military, economic and political power, competition between them over spheres of influence is inevitable, and conflicts over territories are hard to avoid. Furthermore, the realist school sees antagonism and zero-sum competition between major powers as inherent characteristics of international relations. When the major powers find an equilibrium or balance of power, fighting may cease – until a revisionist power appears on the scene and disrupts the equilibrium again. According to the realist view, great powers are the actors that determine the nature of the international order, whereas the role of smaller states is essentially to align with a stronger actor. The role of international institutions is largely instrumental: states can use them as instruments of power politics.

At the same time, the realist conception of geopolitical competition is challenged by an understanding that the world order is increasingly shaped by networks and flows rather than a realist balance of power – ‘the chessboard versus the web’, as described by Slaughter. In her vision, the ‘chessboard strategy’ of big power deals is still relevant, but increasingly accompanied by a world where global developments are shaped by a variety of actors and the connections between them. Another strand of thought places key emphasis on global supply chains and flows of energy, data and so forth, arguing that the security of such connections matters more than the traditional notion of security bound to territories and borders. The resilience of critical infrastructure and basic government functions becomes a growing concern for states in the networked world. What is common to the different versions of network-based views is their emphasis on the importance of connections as a source of power and a factor impacting security. The networked world can be portrayed either as a contemporary version of realist geopolitics, dominated by competition over who controls connections, or as a challenge best addressed by updating the liberal order to a less state-centric version.

This paper focuses on questions raised by the concept of a grand strategy, aiming first of all to analyse and compare the conceptions of the four

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6 See Ikenberry 2018.
7 Slaughter 2017, 19.
8 Khanna 2016.
powers with regard to **world order, the self-defined position of each actor in it, and their possible aspirations to shape and change the existing order**. These questions aim to grasp the worldviews of major powers, with worldviews being subjective constructions that condition policies and actions and help us to understand the interests and motivations of each actor.⁹

More specifically, we explore whether anything is said in the strategies about **unipolarity and multipolarity** as major organizing principles of the international system, and the way in which the strategies describe and foresee the relationships and balance of power between major actors/the ‘poles’ (partners and adversaries). We ask whether the strategies are inclined to zero-sum thinking about international relations, or whether they value international cooperation and pursue win–win relationships. These questions are closely related to understandings about (the relevance of) **international norms and institutions**. In addition, looking beyond major powers and the power balance among them, we explore how each actor perceives the importance of cross-border and global **flows, connections, networks and interdependencies**, which can be seen to constitute an organizing feature or fabric of the global order that challenges the very idea of polarity.¹⁰ Furthermore, we examine what the strategies say about the **values** of each actor, and about possible ambitions to project and promote one’s values abroad.

The second set of questions turns to the problem-solving purpose of strategies. What resources are allocated for the pursuit of key goals and interests? How do the strategies define security threats and risks? How are the threats and risks addressed; for example, what is the balance between military and non-military means?

Differences exist between the four cases, which pose some methodological challenges. The US, Russia and the EU have fairly recently published the kind of strategy documents described above (see text box below). These documents are the primary empirical source of our analysis. Yet we do not just analyze the texts, but also consider the background, political context and practical relevance of the strategies.

In the case of the US, the fairly recent change of power poses the challenge of gauging the extent of longer-term strategic change beneath the dramatic shifts and turns of daily appearances under President Trump. Due to the importance of the question of what has changed in US strategy, this case study pays particular attention to comparing the strategy adopted in December 2017 to the previous one adopted under President Obama in 2015.

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¹⁰ E.g. Slaughter 2017 on the networked world; see also Khanna 2016.
China has no public security strategy document at all, but indications of its way to position itself in the world can be traced from a number of relevant public texts.

The latest Russian security strategy dates from 2015 and thus reflects the shift in Russia’s strategic outlook towards overt confrontation with the West. It replaces the document prepared under President Dmitry Medvedev that was approved on May 12, 2009.

The EU Global Strategy adopted in 2016 stands out due to the unique nature of the EU as an actor in international relations. Possessing some state-like features, while not being a state nor a major power in the traditional understanding of the concept, the EU-internal functions of the strategy stand out more clearly in this case than in the other three.

The following four chapters analyze each of the strategies separately, while trying to find answers to the common set of questions formulated above. In conclusion, the paper sums up the main similarities and differences between the four cases.

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**THE LATEST SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**UNITED STATES**


**CHINA**


**RUSSIA**


**EUROPEAN UNION**
1. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY FROM 2015 TO 2017

In the US democratic system, a change of administration from one party to another usually means that agendas change in a relatively oppositional fashion. The incoming administration is likely to formulate its policy lines and objectives in contrast to its predecessor, especially if the presidents come from different parties. However, in the longer term, the pendulum tends to swing towards the mainstream of political consensus. It is likely that this rule also applies to the Trump administration, which came to power in marked opposition to the main tenets of the Obama era. Whereas Obama’s focus was on strategic patience, Trump has highlighted strategic ambiguity. Where Obama wanted to stress US soft power, Trump sought to push through notable defence budget increases, at least verbally demanded the sharper use of power, and downscaled the State Department. However, in many ways, America’s foreign policy is expected to show signs of continuity and to stay within the bounds marked by the Republican and Democratic-leaning foreign policy establishments. The US has maintained and even increased its programme to reassure the European NATO allies, has continued the sanctions against Russia, while even toughening them, recommitted to the Afghanistan operation, and maintained the anti-ISIS operation. However, at the same time, the controversies over the actual and possible multilateral agreements – such as TPP, NAFTA, the Paris Agreement, the agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme, and the North Korea issue – have continued with the Trump administration.
and especially the President himself taking more unilateralist, bilateralist, and transactionalist stances. In order to chart the bounds and possible patterns of change as well as to contextualize an individual National Security Strategy, it is useful to compare and contrast the Obama 2015 and the Trump 2017 strategies.

The National Security Strategy is a document prepared for Congress usually once every administration in order for the latter to detail how it defines America’s national interests and prioritizes among them.\textsuperscript{11} National Security Strategies commonly articulate and justify contemporary foreign policy. They also tend to embellish past achievements and deflect criticism against notable failures. In this sense, they are not strategies in the sense of being fully forward-looking. However, they present and signal a systematic vision of how administrations see America’s place in the world and what the main tools are for implementing such a desired position. Although they rarely innovate or offer straightforward strategic doctrines, they give substance to how administrations position themselves vis-à-vis the three long–term consensus areas of US foreign policy, namely that the US should have a global role and sustainable means to carry it out; that the US should remain engaged through a mixture of softer and harder measures; and that the US should carry out its commitments and responsibilities while simultaneously preventing others from freeriding on alliances and partnerships. These key broad frames are likely to endure and matter despite the Trump administration’s strong rebuke of Obama–era policies, such as unfavourable trade agreements, too much strategic restraint, the failed Russia reset, the weak Iranian nuclear agreement, not adopting a competitive view on multilateralism, unnecessary climate change policies, and unrealistic support for human rights.

Upon closer inspection, there are considerable differences between the two National Security Strategies. The 2015 NSS was expansive and wide–ranging. It presented a broad and inclusive framework for the US global role, engagement, and commitment. The 2017 NSS, by contrast, is much narrower and more focused. It emphasizes harder forms of power as a key resource facilitating the US position in a fiercely competitive world. US national power and the sustainment of its might are clearly kept on the table. The objectives of the 2017 NSS are more clear–cut as tricky global complexities and the tackling of global challenges have been weeded out of the document. The 2017 NSS reverts to concentrating on prevailing in the global great–power competition. The 2015 NSS endeavoured to clarify the maintenance of the US unilateral and multilateral roles and agencies,

\textsuperscript{11} Ettinger 2017.
whereas the 2017 NSS has an exclusive focus on the enablers of US unitary agency in the face of potentially fierce competitors.

TOWARDS A MORE LIMITED BUT SHARPER US GLOBAL ROLE

The 2017 NSS adopts a considerably more transactional approach as to when and where US security engagements and investments might or might not happen, depending on the national security benefits. It also contains a more strongly worded demand for allies and partners to contribute their fair share. The overall security scenario – of prevailing against global competitors – distills many of the extended roles, engagements, and commitments that the US has hitherto been sustaining; however, it includes a more back-to-basics articulation of key US interests à la “America First”. In terms of the Administration, the 2017 NSS focuses on a more limited “fair” vision that is not concerned with the broad scope of global multilateral issues since the viewpoint is that the US should not shoulder significantly more responsibilities than others, especially China, are willing to take on.

In both strategies, the offset advantage – in terms of the US technological advantage – in some key domains is taken to be a resource that offers new types of methods for containing geopolitical challenges posed by possible competitors. The Obama NSS, for instance, recommended leveraging America’s privileged position in the financial realm to pull strings that have geopolitical effects. The most notable expression of this has been the imposition of targeted sanctions to condition Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The same emphasis is also highlighted in the 2017 NSS. In other words, US power resources can be used to restrict the access of unfair competitors to the dollar economy, financial flows, and to advanced American technology.

This idea of power stemming from the functional control of global trade and financial circulations has long roots in US geostrategy. It focusses on US control over the key sea-lines of communication facilitating global trade. The modern version of this understanding of geopolitics applies the maritime trade-related logic to other competitive domains. Hence, US national power is viewed not only in the sense of territorial geopolitics where direct and indirect territorial control over principal resources is the key to a great-power position, but increasingly in the sense of functional control over the key resource flows understood in terms of domains such as maritime, air space, space, and cyberspace. It is important to note

Feaver 2017.
that much of this focus remains in the 2017 NSS. What has disappeared is the idea that competitors like China and Russia will not challenge the US position. Namely, the 2017 NSS sees the global domains as inherently competitive, something which is also indicated in the terminology that is used. The 2015 NSS calls the domains “shared spaces”, emphasizing the preference for win–win or less competitive multilateralism. The 2017 NSS simply calls them “domains”, highlighting a focus on the more unilateral zero–sum strategic vision.

**SUSTAINING THE RESOURCES OF US NATIONAL POWER**

In the introduction to the 2015 NSS, President Barack Obama echoed his previous foreign policy rules of thumb, such as “leading from behind” and “not doing stupid stuff”. He then went on to argue: “In a complex world, many of the security problems we face do not lend themselves to quick and easy fixes”. This call for “strategic patience” was also meant as an antidote for “overreach that comes when we make decisions based on fear”. The emphasis was on caution, patience, and on using American economic resources wisely.

The 2017 NSS emphasizes patience as well. This is a different kind of patience, premised on safeguarding US national interests, sovereignty, and unitary actoriness. As Donald Trump states in his introduction to the NSS: “The United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in recent years”. The 2017 NSS states that the guiding principle is US–centric: “We are not hiding from the challenges we face. We are confronting them head–on and pursuing opportunities to promote the security and prosperity of all Americans”. The onus is on concentrating on finding the right answers, limiting entanglements that might lead to strategic overstretch and a waste of resources. The difference is that, for Obama, a key danger lay in ignoring looming global problems such as climate change, while for Trump, the danger resides in the overstretch that could lead to the dilution of US national interest by over–committing to broad multilateral agreements that ignore how competitors, such as China, Russia or Iran, can take self–interested advantage of them.

The 2015 NSS noted that “power among states is more dynamic” than before, and recognized a key trend: “power is shifting below and beyond the nation–state”, catalyzed by global economic interdependence and technological innovations. This diffusion of power will empower new types of actors and cause vulnerability for those states that do not adapt
to this overall trend in a timely fashion. The 2017 NSS highlights the need to maintain and advance an offset position. However, it presents a vision where the US can, and should, maintain the capacity to act irrespective of its global interdependencies. The 2017 NSS sees the world in a competitive manner, where zero-sum logic prevails over win-win formulations. As such, the US needs to utilize those asymmetries in the interdependency that favour it in competition with those actors who are challenging US interests. It can be argued that this smarter side of US national power is a key aspect of both NSS documents. However, the 2015 NSS saw this in terms of smarter uses of softer forms of power, whereas the 2017 NSS views it in terms of sharper utilization of harder combinations of power.

THE US IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD: ALLIES, PARTNERS, AND PREVENTING PEER COMPETITORS

The 2017 NSS defines the role of allies and partners as one that facilitates the broader US geopolitical vision, for example in tackling the challenge posed by China or Russia, as well as facilitating the US mission of fighting global terror organizations. This increasingly conditional definition of the roles for allies and partners has long roots. However, the more transactional premise is clear. If an ally or partner expects a security contribution from the US it has to contribute its fair share as defined by US regional and global interests. The 2015 NSS presented a more value-based model for the inclusion of other states as allies or partners. In the 2017 NSS this common shared value-base is very broadly defined, whereas the interest-based definition occupies the concrete foreground. The fair burden-sharing of military expenses occupies a prominent position. The US expects its allies and partners to contribute their share besides expressing shared values, and it is more hesitant to support over-reliant allies and partners who cannot provide for US security interests.

Both strategies view China as the likeliest challenger to US power, as a peer competitor. The 2017 NSS makes it clear that the US will approach any competitive behaviour from China from “a position of strength”. The discussion concerning the rebalancing of US military power away from the Middle East towards Asia should be seen a key long-term pre-emptive move by the States. On this last point, the Obama and Trump strategies converge. They both argue that the US has to maintain and reinvest in military capabilities and maintain alliances in order to respond to China’s challenge.

13 E.g. Paterson 2018, 41.
Both strategies recognize that the US faces numerous external challenges. The 2015 NSS lists threats in the following manner:

Violent extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies. Escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases all give rise to anxieties about global security.

This list is meant to be inclusive in the sense of detailing the expansive nature of possible insecurities. The 2017 listing is more exclusive: rogue regimes developing nuclear weapons and missiles, radical Islamist terror groups taking control of vast territory, rival powers aggressively undermining American interests around the globe, porous borders and unenforced immigration laws, criminal cartels bringing drugs and crime into the US, unfair international trade practices, skewed burden-sharing in alliances, inadequate investment in defence. The list is more focused on conventional great-power competition and on those actors who are seen as abusing the asymmetries.

The main threat pertaining to the national threat scenario of both strategies is the emergence of a hostile peer competitor. The 2015 NSS saw the US in a good position for expanding its alliances and partnerships. The 2017 NSS takes a different stance by seeing the world as competitive even now: “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence”. The 2017 NSS sees that the US has been naive about this state of affairs and has given its competitors an unnecessary headstart: “These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false”. China is set to be a rival, although a favourable balance of power and great-power bargains can be pursued based on mutual respect. Its actions can and should be contained in order to reach such a balance, however fleeting it might be.

The 2015 NSS noted that shared spaces “are the arteries of the global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due to increased competition and provocative behaviors”. The 2017 NSS states that “[f]ree access
to the seas remains a central principle of national security and economic prosperity, and exploration of sea and space provides opportunities for commercial gain and scientific breakthroughs. The flow of data and an open, interoperable Internet are inseparable from the success of the U.S. economy”. While both strategies highlight the importance of the key global domains, they also stress the need for the US to be able to use its position as the key flow hub to pursue its interests.\textsuperscript{14} As the practice of financial sanctions indicates, access can be restricted and regulated by the principal stakeholder in the order, the US. When it comes to the purposes of “sustainable” and “persistent” US leadership, access-control policies to various domains have the potential to limit the diffusion of power away from US hands.\textsuperscript{15} These new and still developing tools also limit the use and especially the over-extension of US military resources. While the 2015 NSS was still relatively coy about the use of the US’s privileged position over the domains, the 2017 NSS recommends further development of hybrid tools because America’s adversaries are already doing so.

Both the Obama and Trump NSS documents envision a world where the use of new capabilities can be more effective than military force, and can cause less blowback to the US in comparison with the more recent large-scale ground-based stability operations. The strategies set a goal whereby the US will remain dominant in every domain, although fierce competition is also recognized – especially in the 2017 NSS. The goal seems to be that globally critical lifelines – from the high seas to cyberspace and space – will remain available and secure for, and secured by, the US and its allies, and that access by those states or groups that break the rules – further defined by US interests – can be restricted.

**CONCLUSION**

The 2017 NSS takes a bleak view of the global realities. The struggle for power is on. Multilateral efforts to cope with global challenges are out. Multilateralism is viewed as competitive at best. Other possible peer competitors – especially China – are seen as having abused their asymmetrical positions to bias multilateral agreements and institutions in ways that do not best serve the US national interest. Bilateral transactionalism, especially among the great powers, might be the preferred route to steady and remedy the overall situation. In this way, the 2017 NSS highlights a world where the multilateral order has to be revamped. The US has to more

\textsuperscript{14} On this theme, see e.g. Aaltola, Käpylä and Vuorisalo 2014.

\textsuperscript{15} On the power transformation and diffusion dynamic, see e.g. Nye 2010.
jealousy safeguard its interests against the other self-interested great powers within the institutions of the global order. Furthermore, some of the multilateral arrangements of the liberal international era have become too risky for the US to remain signed into. However, the key question is if this overall stance of the Trump administration is likely to be relative. Is it ostensibly going to present an extreme position in its rhetoric, especially during the first two years, and is its, in the longer term, positions likely to be more contained within the three aforementioned broadly understood areas of relative national consensus?\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} E.g. Ansley 2017.
2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF CHINA

THE ROAD TO CHINA’S FIRST NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2014–15

In January 2015, the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) passed an “Outline of the National Security Strategy”. The strategy, produced by the Central National Security Commission under the direct leadership of Xi Jinping, was the first of its kind.\textsuperscript{17} It has not been published, however, and the full text is not accessible anywhere. Hence, while no details about the strategy are available, the official state media has published a few statements and comments about the strategy, which make it possible to draw some conclusions about its premises, goals, and conclusions. Certain clues to its content can also be found in some documents which served as antecedents, as well as developments after it was launched.

In January 2014, the National Security Commission of the CPC was established. In April that same year, the Commission held its first meeting, and issued a statement on the Comprehensive National Security Outlook. The goal of the meeting was to address the evermore complicated, domestic and international security situations by promoting “national security with Chinese characteristics”. The Commission’s Chairman, Xi Jinping, stated that domestically China should seek development, reform, and stability, and internationally the country should seek peace, cooperation, and mutual benefit. The meeting listed ten categories of security, namely security of political rule, national territory, military affairs, the

\textsuperscript{17} People.com.cn 2015.
economy, culture, society, information, ecology, natural resources, and nuclear security.  

Xi elaborated on the “comprehensive national security outlook” by saying that “the security of the people is the objective, political security is the foundation, economic security is the basis, military, cultural, and societal forms of security are the guarantees, and international security is the support”. Xi furthermore stressed that China should put equal emphasis on external and internal security, territorial security and the security of citizens, traditional and non-traditional security, development issues and security issues, as well as personal and collective security. Internally, China should seek development, reform, and stability, while externally, the country should seek peace, cooperation and mutual benefits. With regard to traditional and non-traditional security, he listed political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, and societal security as well as security of science and technology, information, the ecosystem, natural resources, and nuclear energy. He said that security is the prerequisite for development, but only a rich nation can have a strong military capable of protecting its development. In terms of collective security, China’s aim is to build “a community of a common destiny for humankind”. 

The “community of a common destiny for humankind” has been Xi Jinping’s central foreign policy slogan since 2012, aimed at describing how China sees the future of international relations. It is based on the idea that the development of one country is closely intertwined with that of other countries. It also includes an aspect of collective security, based on the understanding that no country can single-handedly seek absolute security for itself. 

May 2014 saw the publication of the “Research Report on China’s National Security”. It was published as a printed book (in Chinese) by a printing house of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and carried an alternate title, namely the “Blue Book on National Security”. It thus belongs in the category of semi-official reference literature which cannot be quoted as government policy, but which usually reflects official policies to some degree. It was the first Blue Book on national security ever published in China.

The Blue Book makes a distinction between domestic and international security. Domestic security is divided into the following subcategories: Terrorism, unemployment and societal unrest, security of political rule

18 Xinhuawang 2014.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
and political power, environmental security and food safety. Among these, the emphasis is on terrorism and threats to societal stability.\textsuperscript{22}

According to the Blue Book, China’s ideological security is stable on the whole, but it is threatened by the promotion of democracy by the Western countries, the cultural hegemonism of the Western countries, the profligate dissemination of news and media on the internet, and religious infiltration. The promotion of Western democracy is a means for the strategy of “peaceful evolution” aimed at undermining socialism. The cultural hegemonism of the West threatens China’s socialist values. In particular, the internet provides a channel for breaking China’s ideological and national cohesion. The terrorist attacks during the recent past have been predominantly religiously motivated, which gives cause for grave concern, the Blue Book concludes.\textsuperscript{23}

International security was said to be threatened by strategic competition, as well as US, Russian and EU attitudes and policies towards China, serving to endanger the country’s territory and maritime interests. The conclusion in regard to international security, as interpreted by Vice President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Feng Zhongping, was that China must “seek unity with Russia, seek engagement with the EU, and seek stability with the US”.\textsuperscript{24}

China’s military strategy was published online (in both Chinese and English) by the State Council in May, 2015.\textsuperscript{25} It repeats the same overall assessment of the general security situation as the Blue Book from 2014. Furthermore, it states that, on the one hand, “China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace” and, on the other, that “building a strong national defence and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive and a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development”.\textsuperscript{26} In particular, China needs “to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests”.\textsuperscript{27} National unification refers first and foremost to the Taiwan Issue and the fact that while China officially promotes peaceful reunification, it has never relinquished the military option. Unification also relates to countering the “separatist forces for ‘East Turkestan independence’ and ‘Tibet independence’.”\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{22} Fenghuangwang 2014.
    \item \textsuperscript{23} Zhongguo Xinwenwang 2014.
    \item \textsuperscript{24} Fenghuangwang 2014.
    \item \textsuperscript{25} Xinhua 2015.
    \item \textsuperscript{26} Preface. In Xinhua 2015.
    \item \textsuperscript{27} Chapter I. National Security Situation. In Xinhua 2015
    \item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
The strategy lists the US “rebalancing” strategy, Japan’s efforts to overhaul its military policies, the “busy meddling in the South China Sea” by “some external countries”, and the uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula as factors endangering security and stability on China’s periphery.²⁹

The last chapter of the strategy outlines military and security cooperation. “Pursuing a security concept featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, China’s armed forces will continue to develop military-to-military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. They will strive to establish fair and effective collective security mechanisms and military confidence-building measures (CBMs), expand military and security cooperation, and create a security environment favorable to China’s peaceful development.”³⁰

Russia is mentioned as the main cooperation partner within the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,³¹ with the aim of promoting military cooperation in more fields and at more levels. The US armed forces are mentioned second, and the relationship should conform to the New Model of Major-Country Relations³² by strengthening defence dialogues, exchanges and cooperation as well as improving confidence-building measures in order to prevent risks and manage crises. This is clearly in line with the Blue Book’s implicit recommendation that China seek unity with Russia and stability with the US.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2015

The decision on passing the Outline of the National Security Strategy by the CPC Politburo was announced on 23 January 2015. According to the announcement, the premise of the national security strategy is that China needs to prepare itself for all kinds of foreseen and unforeseen security challenges. These are arising because the international situation is changing, the Chinese economy is changing, the reforms are at a crucial stage, and because many societal conflicts are increasing.³³ The strategy is thus needed to enable the continued march along the road of socialism with

²⁹ Ibid.
³¹ China has different types of partnerships with a large number of countries, and it is not always meaningful to try to put the different partnerships in order of significance in accordance with their titles. However, titles including both “Comprehensive” and “Strategic” signify greater importance than others.
³² Xi Jinping’s formulation of the direction in which China wants to develop great-power relations.
³³ CPC News 2015.
Chinese characteristics. Its goal is to safeguard China’s socialist system, governing ability and core interests.34

According to the Politburo meeting conclusions, drafting and implementing the Outline of the National Security Strategy address the needs to perfect the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and to advance China’s governance system and ability. In order to safeguard national security in a changing environment, China must embark on the road of national security with Chinese characteristics, which is to be guided by a comprehensive national security outlook, and targeted towards protecting China’s core and major interests, with the aim of protecting the security of the people, and promoting security amidst development and reforms.35

“The socialist system with Chinese characteristics” has been the guiding ideology of the CPC since the Deng Xiaoping era (1977–1992). In October 2017, Xi Jinping announced the beginning of a New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics which will lead to the completion of “socialist modernization” by 2035, and China’s emergence as one of the leading nations in the world with a world-class military in the 2050s.

Furthermore, the meeting concluded that in addition to actively protecting China’s own interests, China also promotes joint prosperity in the world by bringing about comprehensive, joint, cooperational and sustainable security, and by adhering to the correct view on justice and interests. China is contributing to world peace and development by its formulation of great-power relations and its model for a secure environment in its neighbourhood, by strengthening cooperation and unity with the developing countries, and by its active participation in regional and global governance.36 The “correct view on justice and interests” is often presented as the core principle of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy.

The meeting stressed that national security is the cornerstone of “internal peace and stability of governance” (anbang–dingguo, 安邦定国),37 which points to an unwavering commitment to the absolute leadership of the CPC in national security as well as commitment to a centralized, unified, and fully authoritative leadership of security-related work. The meeting called for the strengthening of education to raise awareness of national security and the building of a professional national security contingent.38

34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 The more customary translation of the phrase, “bringing peace and stability to the country”, does not befit the context in the best possible way, and I have therefore chosen to use a more literal translation.
38 People.com.cn 2015.
The comprehensive security outlook has been discussed in many different contexts since 2015, such as the national economy and the work of the judiciary. One authoritative commentary was recently published in the ideological mouthpiece of the CPC, Qiushi. According to its analysis, the vitality of the comprehensive security outlook requires the following elements:

1. **Strong party leadership**

2. **Giving priority to the security of the people**, which calls for securing living and working conditions by, inter alia, resolutely fighting against terrorism, and protecting China’s overseas interests, as well as Chinese citizens living abroad.

3. **Creating the “security of a strong power with Chinese characteristics”**. This calls for strengthening both economic security and continuing the modernization of the military. China’s soft power must also be increased. Furthermore, China must protect the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macao, as well as resolutely oppose Taiwan independence. This also requires international cooperation, including healthy and stable relations with the USA, strategic cooperation with Russia, and increased connections to Europe.

4. **Building a Community of a Common Destiny for Humankind**. China’s national security requires a secure international environment. China is committed to peaceful development, and is self-confident enough not to seek hegemony. Its self-confidence is a result of its great contribution to the world, namely the modernization of its society of 1.3 billion people. Many challenges are international in nature and require wide cooperation, and China has already earned global praise for its efforts in promoting cooperation, such as the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China wants the international community to stop resorting to the “law of the jungle”, and to build companionships for mutually beneficial, win-win cooperation. In February 2017, the Community of a Common Destiny for Humankind was written into a United Nations resolution for the first time.

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41 This refers to draft resolution E/RES/2017/11 by the 55th UN Commission for Social Development on African development, adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 8 June 2017. The English version uses the phrase “a shared future, based upon our common humanity” whereas the Chinese uses “renlei mingyun gongtongti”, translated in China as ‘the community of a common destiny for humankind’.
ANALYSIS

The “Outline of the National Security Strategy” can be seen as a necessary follow-up to the Chinese Dream, coined by Xi Jinping in 2012. The realization of the Chinese Dream, which unlike the individualistic “American Dream” is in reality “the dream of China” – the Communist Party-orchestrated dream of China as a unified, strong nation – calls for “the grand national rejuvenation” as its final goal in 2049.

During Xi Jinping’s era, concrete steps towards achieving the national rejuvenation have already been taken in China’s foreign policies. These include actions aimed at “redefining” the status quo in the South China Sea, integrating China’s neighbours into closer economic cooperation (through the Belt and Road Initiatives), and stronger resistance to the US rebalancing efforts (the pivot to Asia).42

Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed the need for a comprehensive national security outlook as a necessary guarantee for the realization of the grand national rejuvenation. Domestically, ideological security is needed to protect the mission of the CPC. Cultural security means boosting self-confidence about China’s own cultural values. Without internet security, there is no national security, Xi has said.43 Furthermore, according to Xi, the comprehensive security outlook also has an international dimension. The outlook aims to replace such “old views” as zero-sum game and military alliances with an all-inclusive security ideal, based on Chinese wisdom, namely the Community of a Common Destiny for Humankind.44

Furthermore, the “Outline of a National Security Strategy” seems to be an outcome of the Blue Book’s recommendations. The Blue Book called for a national security strategy, security laws, and security policies.45 The emphasis on the “security of ideology” also stems from the Blue Book. This is linked to a tendency to see national security in terms of internal peace and stability of governance, which is said to be challenged by the West.

Even now, China is positioning itself as a counterweight to the “West”. This is mostly achieved in terms of ideology, and includes China’s denial of the universality of human rights and other values. “To seek common ground while putting aside differences” has been a stock phrase in China’s foreign policy since the 1970s.46 Similarly, “democratization of interna-
tional relations” has been part of China’s rhetoric throughout the last two decades. The White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, issued in 2017, stated that the “rules of individual countries should not automatically become ‘international rules’”. This reflected the sentiment expressed in an internal Party document in 2013: “Promoting ‘universal values’ in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership”.

This denial is closely related to the CPC’s desire to control the ideological sphere by keeping unwanted influences out. At the same time, talking about Chinese values is an articulation of the self-confidence that the CPC wishes to project towards the nationalist-minded population. The Party Congress gave indications that China is now presenting its experiences as a development model suitable for countries that want fast economic growth without needing to sacrifice their existing political systems or cultural values. The Community of a Common Destiny for Humankind is a rhetorical tool, aimed at emphasizing China’s peacefulness, and at demonstrating the country’s self-confidence in introducing its indigenous ideals into the discourse of international relations.

Russia’s anti-Western and culturally conservative attitudes serve China’s interests, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is useful from the point of view of the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the strategic partnership, Russia is of secondary importance compared to the USA. China recognizes that it needs cooperation with the USA to maintain stability in East Asia and globally, and the USA is its most important foreign relationship. This is in line with the idea presented in 2014 that China should seek unity with Russia and stability with the USA.

As for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it can also be seen as part of China’s challenge to the West. The BRI is a loose collection of projects aimed at expanding infrastructure networks connecting China to Europe and Africa, and boosting trade and economic growth in Central and Southeast Asia. It has a maritime dimension in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Arctic, and a land dimension in the form of different rail projects in Asia and Europe. China has established funding mechanisms to support the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, which can be regarded either as complementing or competing with the existing institutions. So far, the security aspects of

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50 See Zarroli 2015.
the BRI have officially been downplayed in China, despite the obvious geopolitical linkages of the projects. This is likely to change as the BRI has now been enshrined even in the Chinese Communist Party charter, making it China’s most important tool for outward power projection.

CONCLUSION

All in all, China’s new national security strategy seems to be a result of historical path-dependency. The historical narrative of the CPC stresses the humiliations inflicted upon China by the colonial powers (including Japan) over a period of one hundred years, and brought to an end only with the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, under the leadership of the CPC. The grand national rejuvenation, or the realization of the Chinese Dream, means ridding China of the last remnants of those past humiliations. The key to reaching that goal is the CPC’s continued, tight leadership. National security is instrumental in safeguarding the realization of the national rejuvenation, and therefore its ultimate goal must be safeguarding the leadership of the CPC.

All aspects of China’s national security strategy are therefore subject to the goal of national rejuvenation. China promotes a multipolar world because it aims to rise economically, politically and militarily to an equal or close-to-equal position. This goal, set for the 2050s, was clearly stated in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Congress of the CPC in October 2017.

China’s strongly worded but nevertheless sober comments on the new US National Security Strategy and National Defence Strategy can be seen against this background as well. The Chinese Foreign Ministry urged the US to “abandon the Cold War mentality and the outdated concept of a zero-sum game”. Unlike the US, China adheres to the “strategy of mutual benefit and win-win results”. According to the Ministry, “China and the United States should properly handle their differences on the basis of respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns”. China’s Ministry of National Defence stressed that China follows defensive national defence policies, and does not seek military expansion. Hence, there is no need for the USA to play up the Chinese military threat.

51 See Wuthnow 2017.
52 “Full text of resolution on amendment to CPC Constitution” 2017.
53 Xi Jinping 2017.
54 Xinhuane 2017.
55 Xinhuane 2018.
The reason why China promotes win-win cooperation, and is against a zero-sum game, is a result of the gap between the country’s goals for the 2050s and its current resources. China is modernizing its military with a special aim of increasing its combat abilities, but its overall strength is still far behind that of the USA or even Russia. This is true in arenas other than the military, such as experience and expertise in international organizations. China continues to need economic growth in order to reach its ambitious goals, set for the coming decades, and the most important prerequisite for growth is stability.
3. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF RUSSIA

RECENT CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

President Putin signed the National Security Strategy on December 31, 2015. It is slightly longer than the previous strategy adopted in May 2009 by President Medvedev, although the main structural elements have not been changed. The strategy has six main chapters, of which Chapter (4) on the “protection of national security” is the longest. It lays down the comprehensive security outlook for Russia, including such topics as national defence, state and public security, improving the quality of life of Russian citizens, economic growth, science, technology and education, public health, culture, ecology of living systems and rational use of natural resources and, last but not least, strategic stability and the equal strategic partnership.

This type of superficial comparison seems to suggest that little has changed in the strategy over the past six years. However, a more detailed content analysis of the texts allows one to pinpoint significant differences in the strategic outlook. The new strategy sees the world through the prism of “strategic stability”, whereby the military component of national security is emphasized and Russia’s position in the world depends on the ‘correlation of forces’ – the country’s ability to use the full spectrum of means in the competition for power and prestige. The re-framing of the idea of integration exemplifies this change. The 2009 document identifies sub-regional, regional and global levels of economic integration and suggests that Russia’s success in the global competition depends on the

56 Egorov 2015b.
“transition of the national economy towards an innovation-based development trajectory”.\textsuperscript{57} The statement summarizes the “technological modernization” vision of the Medvedev presidency (2008–2012), which sought to improve Russia’s international position through science and technological development (without political changes).\textsuperscript{58}

The current version of the strategy rejects this technocratic starting point. It frames “integration” as an arena of geopolitical power projection, abandoning the idea of economic and technological transformation as a route to Russia’s global economic competitiveness. At the root of this change is Putin’s third presidential term, when the development of the defence industry was identified as the driver of Russia’s technological modernization.\textsuperscript{59} The new strategy merely registers this ideational transformation. Accordingly, the “innovation-based development trajectory” of the 2009 document has become the “innovation-based development of the Russian Federation’s defence industry complex”.\textsuperscript{60}

The integration theme also exemplifies another major trend in the strategic outlook. The 2009 strategy echoed the Russian debate on economic modernization by acknowledging that obstacles to further integration into the global economy were inherent in the Russian system. In the revised Strategy, the underperformance of the Eurasian integration project is attributed to “the West’s stance aimed at countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region”.\textsuperscript{61} The negative view of the Europe-centred integration project is accompanied by an alternative project based on Russian culture. The Russian language serves as “the basis of the development of integration processes in the post-Soviet area, and a means of meeting the language and cultural requirements of compatriots abroad”.\textsuperscript{62} Such connotations were absent from the previous version, which only referred to the use of “Russia’s cultural potential in the service of multilateral international cooperation”.\textsuperscript{63} Before these trends are explored in more detail, the following section briefly outlines the political context and the process of strategic planning in Russia.

\textsuperscript{57} Russian National Security Strategy 2009, Article 19.  
\textsuperscript{58} Pynnöniemi 2014.  
\textsuperscript{59} Pynnöniemi 2010.  
\textsuperscript{60} Strategy 2015, Article 37.  
\textsuperscript{61} Strategy 2015, Article 17.  
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., Article 81.  
\textsuperscript{63} Strategy 2009, Article 83
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY’S PLACE IN THE RUSSIAN PLANNING MATRIX

The decision made by the Security Council to review the National Security Strategy was publicly announced in May 2015. Writing in the Russian armed forces newspaper, Krasnaya Zvesda, in May 5, 2015, the secretary of the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, argued that revision of the previous strategy was needed due to the changing security environment. He referred explicitly to the “Arab Spring” in Syria and Iraq, as well as the continuing conflict in Ukraine. According to Patrushev, the major powers use “indirect measures” to further their interests, including the use of the protest potential of the masses, radical and extremist organizations, and private military companies in advancing state interests.64

Later in July 3, 2015 – two days after the publication of the United States National Military Strategy, the Security Council held a meeting where the president Putin instructed the review of the national security strategy, based on the analysis of the whole spectrum of potential challenges and risks – political, economic, informational and other. Furthermore, the foreign policy concept would also be reviewed, although in this context Putin emphasized that Russia would be open for “equal cooperation that would not endanger the country’s sovereignty”.65

This was in fact the second Strategy that had been prepared by the Security Council under Patrushev. Before becoming Secretary of the Security Council in 2008, he had served as the head of the FSB (the Federal Security Service). As noted in one of the interviews given by Patrushev, the Security Council used a wide array of experts from the business sector, the Russian Academy of Science, federal ministries and agencies, the presidential administration and the government in the process.66 When compared with other strategic documents prepared around the same time, the wording of the Strategy stands out rhetorically (the West is identified as responsible for the conflict in Ukraine) and in terms of threat perception (NATO is singled out as a threat to Russia). The current analysis does not, however, provide the scope for estimating the importance and weight of different agencies in preparing the document.

The intended administrative and policy consequences of the strategy are clearly stipulated in the text. The function of the Strategy is outlined in Article 4, where it is stated that it forms “the basis for shaping and implementing state policy in the sphere of safeguarding the Russian Fed-

64 Patrushev 2015; Vzglyad 2015; Bogdanov 2015.
65 Gordeev 2015.
66 Egorov 2013b.
eration’s national security”. More concretely, the strategy is intended to “consolidate” the policies and actions of different state agencies and civil society actors in an effort to create “favourable internal and external conditions for the realization of the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities”. This is, in essence, a key paragraph in the strategy, for it expresses both the function of the strategy (as a guideline for policy-making), and the direction of the policy (the creation of favourable internal and external conditions). At the same time, it is declared (as in the 2009 document) that the Strategy is based on the “unbreakable interconnection and interdependence of the Russian Federation’s national security and the country’s socioeconomic development”. Although the wording is the same, the context has changed, as noted in the previous section.

The following sections explore the way in which the Strategy defines Russia’s place in the world, and who it identifies as friends or enemies. This is followed by an analysis of how different spheres of security are linked in the strategy, namely, what kind of comprehensive security is envisioned in this text. Finally, the focus will turn to what has changed in the definition of the asymmetric approach, and what it means.

**RUSSIA IN A POLYCENTRIC WORLD: PARTNERS, COMPETITORS AND ENEMIES**

The National Security Strategy delineates a full-spectrum view of security or, to use a term more familiar in the EU debates, comprehensive security. This is evident in the structure of the document as it has sections ranging from defence policy and culture to public health. The 2009 document merely described different policy areas that were meaningful for ‘national security interests’, whereas the current version suggests that different spheres of security are a resource in shaping a polycentric world. Accordingly, it is stated that “a solid basis has been created at this time for further increasing the Russian Federation’s economic, political, military, and spiritual potentials and for enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world”. This is the first paragraph of the section titled “Russia in the Modern World”. It argues that these different means are
used in strengthening Russia’s position, and with it, a polycentric world. The use of military force (the country’s defence potential) is only one part of this spectrum.\textsuperscript{72}

The strategy identifies “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”, along with national defence, as long-term national strategic interests. It asserts that the traditional spiritual and moral values “are being revived and a proper attitude towards Russia’s history is being shaped”.\textsuperscript{73} The erosion of these values, the weakening of the “historical unity of the peoples of Russia”, and the external cultural and information expansion are identified as threats “to national security in the sphere of culture”.\textsuperscript{74} Accordingly, references to cultural cooperation with the EU were dropped from the current version. In fact, the strategy portrays the EU, along with NATO and the US negatively. At the same time, the strategy also calls for “harmonization of integration processes in Europe and on the post-Soviet territory”. This can be interpreted as a reference to the institutionalization of cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, something Russia has long been advocating.\textsuperscript{75}

The muted references to the conflict with the West are voiced in the passive, although the direction of the critique (and blame) is made clear. Thus, for example, “the practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking intrastate instability and conflicts” is spreading, as are “territories affected by armed conflicts”, which, in turn, “are becoming the basis for the spread of terrorism, interethnic strife, religious enmity, and other manifestations of extremism”.\textsuperscript{76} Terrorism and extremism are clearly identified as threats in multiple places throughout the document, including in the context of the state and public security, although the main threats to this sphere include intelligence and other activities by the special services and organizations of foreign states (as in the Military doctrine). The strategy outlines that “terrorist and extremist organizations” could carry out major attacks, including with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, the strategy identifies “radical public associations”, “foreign and international nongovernmental organizations”, “financial and economic structures”, and even “individuals” as aiming to destroy “the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the domestic political situation – including

\textsuperscript{72} Gerasimov 2013.
\textsuperscript{73} Strategy 2015, Article 11.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., Article 79.
\textsuperscript{75} Strategy 2009, Article 16; Strategy 2015, Articles 16, 17, 97.
\textsuperscript{76} Strategy 2015, Article 18.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., Article 43.
through inciting ‘colour revolutions’ – and destroying Russian religious and moral values”.\(^\text{78}\)

What does the document say about Russia’s partners? First of all, the partner states and organizations are located in Asia. With China, Russia is “developing relations of all-embracing partnership and strategic cooperation”, while increasing cooperation with the BRICS and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization. The CIS is mentioned as the main area of cooperation, as usual. But the main trick is to include contested territories, such as South-Ossetia as an equal “participant” in this cooperation regime.\(^\text{79}\)

Overall, Russia’s objective is to have “as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world”. Accordingly, Russia is “interested in establishing full-fledged partnership with the United States on the basis of coincident interests”. The basis for partnership is framed in Cold War parlance with reference to the “influence of Russo-American relations on the state of international relations”. Concretely, this means arms control negotiations, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and expanded cooperation in the fight against terrorism.\(^\text{80}\)

The US and the European Union feature in multiple roles. Both are identified as responsible for “creating a chronic seat of instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders”. The location of NATO military infrastructure closer to Russian borders is “creating a threat to national security”, while at the same time, it is argued that the increase in migration flows has demonstrated “the non-viability of the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic Region based on NATO and the European Union”. Thus, the European security architecture is declared both a threat to Russia and a non-viable entity at the same time.\(^\text{81}\)

However, the main concept operationalized in the strategy is competition rather than a threat concept. The polycentric world is shaped by the open-ended struggle for “resources, access to markets, and control over transportation arteries”. Furthermore, “competition between states is increasingly encompassing social development values and models and human, scientific, and technological potentials”.\(^\text{82}\) The Strategy reflects the idea that traditional military power, although important in intimidating Russia’s weaker neighbours, is not sufficient for protecting Russia’s strategic interests amid the changing security landscape. The new situation requires an “asymmetric approach” whereby Russia’s strengths (the

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\(^\text{78}\) Ibid., Article 43.
\(^\text{79}\) Strategy 2015, Article 89.
\(^\text{80}\) Ibid., Article 28, 30, 88, 98.
\(^\text{81}\) Ibid., Article 15, 16, 17.
\(^\text{82}\) Ibid., Article 13.
weaponization of information, technology and organizations) are coupled with its relative weakness in military–technological (force) development. The main objective of this approach is expressed in Article 36, where it is stated that:

Interrelated political, military, military–technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts. These measures are intended to prevent the use of armed force against Russia, and to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.\(^83\)

This paragraph summarizes Russia’s strategy of active defence whereby a set of non–military measures (informational, political, economic, organizational and cyber resources) are activated in order to neutralize a potential threat to Russia’s national interests.\(^84\) A similar formulation was written into the 2009 Strategy. However, at that time the text envisaged the use of asymmetric measures in “reducing the threat of destructive action on the part of a state aggressor”,\(^85\) without naming the form and potential impact of the aggression, whereas the current formulation does not leave room for doubt in this regard. An entirely different question is whether this change signals a real change in the threat perception, or is intended to serve the needs of domestic (and foreign policy) political rhetoric. Naturally, it can do both at the same time. In either case, the goal Russia is striving for is “strategic stability” with the significant Other.

**STRATEGIC STABILITY**

Russia’s long–term strategic interest is to consolidate the country’s “status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world”.\(^86\) This definition nicely summarizes the main point already mentioned above in the context of an “asymmetric approach”. The question not only concerns matters that deny space for aggressive actions (nuclear and non–nuclear strategic weapons systems), namely deterrence by denial, but rather the maintenance of strategic stability is about active

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83 Ibid., Article 36. Emphasis added.
84 Gareev 2008.
86 Strategy 2015, 30.
changing of the world. In other words, “stability” is not measured as being contingent on “military balance”, but rests on the “correlation of forces”. This term was used by Soviet theoreticians partly to avoid military capability comparisons that were unfavourable to the Soviet state, while maintaining the possibility of claiming equal status with the global US power. To compensate for the relative weakness in the military-technological resources, the Soviet authorities sought to manipulate the domestic political situation in the target country. In the current conditions, an acceptable ‘correlation of forces’ requires:

Active foreign policy geared to creating a stable and enduring system of international relations relying on international law and based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, noninterference in states’ internal affairs, mutually beneficial cooperation, and a political settlement of global and regional crisis situations.

The message written into the Strategy is Moscow’s anticipation that it is in a better position than previously to protect its core interests. Thus, it is argued that: “Russia has demonstrated the ability to safeguard sovereignty, independence, and state and territorial integrity and to protect the rights of compatriots abroad”. Furthermore, it is stated that “there has been an increase in the Russian Federation’s role in resolving the most important international problems, settling military conflicts, and ensuring strategic stability and the supremacy of international law in interstate relations”. Presumably, this refers to Russia’s role in Syria. The list of positive factors includes the revival of Russian spiritual and moral values, the consolidation of civil society around these common values, and the ability of the Russian economy to “maintain and strengthen its potential in conditions of world economic instability and the application of restrictive economic measures”.

After acknowledging these positive achievements, the strategy identifies threats to Russia’s newly gained “independence”, that is, the country’s status as one of the great powers. First and foremost, “the Russian Federation’s implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeing to retain their dominance in world affairs”. In order to

87 Aspaturian 1980; on the organizational weapon and active measures, see e.g. Pynnöniemi and Rácz 2016.
88 Strategy 2015, Article 87.
89 Ibid., Article 8.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., Articles 9 and 11.
“contain Russia”, the US and its allies are exerting “political, economic, military and informational pressure on it”.  

This marks a major change in the vocabulary, as the previous strategies provided vaguer explanations by referring, for example, to “a number of states” that seek to “weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways”, or implied that “disagreements between the main participants in world politics” had a “negative influence on the assurance of Russia’s national interests”. The new strategy does not leave anything unsaid in this regard: Russia’s ability to assert its interests in the global sphere has led to a situation whereby other countries seek to contain Russia by means of political, economic, military and informational pressure.

CONCLUSION

The overall message of the strategy is clarified in a change to its structure. Paragraphs that explain where Russia stands in the world, with whom to quarrel, and where to seek mutually beneficial partnerships are no longer under the “Russia and the world” title, but appear in the section on strategic stability and equal strategic partnership. This framing highlights Moscow’s vision of world politics as a competition between major powers, which is an end in itself. The geographical scope of Russia’s strategic interests is mainly limited to the post-Soviet space and other immediate neighbours. But the aspiration for the status of “leading power” requires a show of force in other parts of the world as well. Still, the understanding of global challenges and their importance for Russia, apart from a few references to global climate change, remains thin, if not non-existent. Thus, while this strategy is useful in maintaining the self-perception of a country encircled by enemies, it does not provide the requisite strategic foresight for coping with the global challenges.

92 Ibid., Article 12.
93 Strategy 2000, Section X.
4. THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

THE DIFFICULT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXT OF THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

The EU is not a state and not a major power in the traditional sense, not least due to its very limited ability to project military force. From a realist perspective, it has been characterized as a small or medium power. Despite the EU’s efforts to move towards a post-Westphalian or post-sovereign conception of external affairs, foreign and security policy remains a realm where member states hold onto their sovereignty. The EU’s foreign policy performance has often been constrained by the lack of political unity, strategic thinking, and common strategic culture. For all these reasons, it has been questioned whether an actor such as the EU can actually have a grand strategy. The position taken here, however, is that the EU has generated what can be called a collective grand strategy, which is complementary to the strategies of its individual member states. At the same time, the complex structure of the EU’s collective foreign policy and its often tense relationship to the national foreign policies of the member states are factors that undeniably constrain the formulation and application of an EU strategy.

95 Toje 2011.
96 Spence & Batora 2015.
97 de France and Whitney 2013.
98 Smith 2011.
99 Balfour et al. 2015.
The EU adopted a new Global Strategy (EGS) in June 2016, at a moment when the Union’s unity and even existence was being questioned more than ever before in its history.\(^{100}\) The strategy drew on a Strategic Review adopted in June 2015, and replaced the European Security Strategy of 2003. Building a “stronger union” based on a “unity of purpose” is an explicit goal of the strategy. The internal functions of the strategy, namely to build unity and increase the legitimacy of the Union in the eyes of its member states and citizens, played an important role in the process of drafting the paper.\(^{101}\)

Another driving force was the perceived need, both inside the Union and outside among partners, for Europe to become a more capable foreign and security policy actor. During the Cold War, the US safeguarded security in Western Europe, whereas early efforts by the EU’s predecessors to develop a common European security policy were thwarted.\(^{102}\) The end of the Cold War opened up space for the EU to develop a collective foreign and security policy after decades of focusing on economic integration. Yet for hard security, Europe remained – and still remains – dependent on the US.

The EGS reflects the radical worsening of the EU’s security environment since the previous strategy of 2003. In 2003, the external environment also had its difficulties. The US war on terror, launched after 9/11, created tensions in the trans-Atlantic relationship due to its unilateralism and militarism. In 2003, Europe was sharply divided between countries that joined the US-led coalition for the invasion of Iraq, including the UK, Spain and Central and Eastern European countries, and a group opposing the Iraq war, led by Germany and France. The ESS had an important unity-building function in that context. It succeeded in establishing consensus on five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. At the same time, the ESS deemed military aggression against any member state ‘improbable’. Hence, the Common Security and Defence Policy focused on crisis management abroad.

By 2016, the threats identified in the previous strategy had intensified and were complemented by new ones, including military aggression by Russia against Ukraine, turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East, the concomitant migration crisis, and so-called hybrid threats including cyber-attacks, disinformation and election-meddling aimed at destabilizing European states and societies. A number of internal EU crises – the

\(^{100}\) European Union 2016.

\(^{101}\) See Tocci 2017 on the process.

\(^{102}\) See Howorth 2014.
financial and eurozone crisis, the rise of populism, and the migration crisis – were also exacerbating the EGS context.

Against the backdrop of such internal turbulence, in the field of security the EU was relatively successful in generating a new sense of unity, in comparison to the more strongly divisive issues of migration policy and eurozone reform. Increased vulnerability and insecurity created a strong push for member states to seek unity in spite of their different national foreign and security policy priorities.

THE GLOBAL ORDER AND THE EU’S PLACE IN IT

In response to the changed security environment, defence cooperation, countering terrorism and hybrid threats emerged as strong priorities in the implementation of the EGS. At the same time, the strategy reconfirmed the EU’s strong commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based global order. Europe has been a key ally of the US in building the liberal order, and has a strong self-interest in defending this order. As stated in the EGS, “the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter”. The self-perception of Europe as a promoter of the liberal rules-based order is strongly reflected in the EGS. This view builds on a strong consensus on multilateralism and international law among the member states, most of them being small states. The strategy also notes the need to transform the existing multilateral order.

The EGS explicitly rejects a realist worldview by stressing the EU’s commitment to a win-win approach and even calling the very possibility of zero-sum games an ‘illusion’. Realism is also rejected by avoiding notions such as uni-/multipolarity, hegemony or polycentrism. The EU’s engagement with other actors, including Russia and China, is reiterated to happen on the basis of the rule of law. The EU also stresses its openness to partnering with a wide range of actors, including not only states, but also civil society actors and the private sector. The transatlantic relationship has a special role among the EU’s partnerships, however. Another priority is to work with neighbouring countries in the East and South.

The strategy expresses strong concern about the “European security order”. In line with the liberal worldview, it condemns Russia’s actions in Ukraine and demands “full respect for international law and the principles underpinning the European security order”. Russia is all but explicitly named as a threat, and the EU’s relationship with Russia is defined as a “key strategic challenge”.

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In the EU strategy, the liberal notion of international order is accompanied by an effort to adjust to an increasingly networked world. In the scholarly discussion, the unique features of the EU as an international actor have often been a source of inspiration for alternative visions of an international order. It is thus not surprising that the EU has been characterized as a prime example of a network-based worldview, which is first of all operating inside the Union, and secondly guiding its global strategy. The EU is probably the most strongly rules-based entity that goes beyond the nation-state, challenging the state-centric view of international relations. A networked world might therefore seem a perfect match for the EU, which is not a traditional foreign policy actor in a state-centric vision of the world. Accordingly, the EGS pays attention to the variety of actors in the global order, including “international and regional organizations, states and non-state actors”.

The need to transform the existing order and adapt to the increased importance of connections is based on the understanding of the world being “increasingly connected, contested and complex”, as we live in an “age of global power shifts and power diffusion”. Interconnectedness is portrayed as a strength of the EU in a world where links are more important than poles or centres of power.

Power diffusion also implies the increasing importance of “regional orders”: “regions represent critical spaces of governance in a de-centred world”. The EGS sees ‘voluntary’ (!) forms of regional governance in very positive terms and promises that the EU will “promote and support cooperative regional orders” – however, with a reservation of doing so “where possible and when in line with our interests”. The careful formulations reflect a debate about the Eurasian Economic Union and the wish of some member states to highlight that Moscow’s way of putting heavy pressure on post-Soviet states to join the Russian-led Eurasian integration project is unacceptable.

NEW FOCUS ON RESILIENCE AND DEFENCE COOPERATION

While the EGS expresses strong continuity in terms of the EU’s understanding of a (preferred) global order, it also indicates a clear shift when it comes to the assessment of the regional security situation and subsequent European response. The strategy expresses a heightened sense of insecurity, which necessitates a new focus on self-protection. The main
concern is external threats coming from the neighbourhood, east and south, including “terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity” that “endanger our people and territory”. In response, the strategy identifies three core tasks for the EU in the field of security: responding to external conflicts and crises; building the capacities of partners; and protecting the Union and its citizens.

Thus, the EU’s attention has shifted from projecting stability beyond the Union’s borders to defending oneself against external instability. In comparison to the earlier strongly value-based agenda aimed at transforming the neighbourhood and beyond, the EU has become less idealist and more inward-looking. The promotion of values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights had a central place, at least rhetorically, in the EU’s post-Cold War foreign policy. In recent years, however, the intensified global contestation over values and the emergence of new security threats has led to a debate about the continued relevance of an idealist, liberal value-oriented approach. A shift to a more ‘realist’ policy was subject to lively discussions in the context of preparing the EGS.105 As a result, values did not disappear from the strategy, but the EU’s rhetoric on values acquired a more inward-looking and defensive dimension. The EGS stresses “adherence to our values” and the need to “foster the resilience” of democracies in the member states. It rejects the earlier tendency to juxtapose values and interests and formulates the promotion of “our values” globally as an interest of the EU.

The search for a new balance between idealist goals and what appears to be an increasingly realist world has been most visible in discussions over the EU’s role as a regional power. The EU’s immediate ‘neighbourhood’ has had a special place in its nascent strategy-building.

Increased instability in the neighbourhood has led to a reconsideration of the EU’s approach. The earlier emphasis on supporting transformation (political and economic reforms) and extending European norms and values achieved little success. At the same time, the EU neglected security problems in the neighbouring regions, which transformed into direct threats to the Union itself.

The new approach shifts the focus to improving the ‘resilience’ of neighbours and helping them build up their own capabilities for improving their security. Yet perhaps the change is not so radical after all – the continued importance of norms and values is reflected in the EU’s understanding of resilience. The EGS claims that a “resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state”. The EU continues to shy away from hard

105 Tocci 2017; Lehne 2014; Youngs 2015; Vimont 2015.
security issues in nearby regions and tries to develop a distinct approach to regional security, now defined through the notion of resilience.

At the same time, the increased concern about defending the EU’s own territory and citizens has necessitated the rise of military aspects of security on the EU agenda. The importance of strengthening European defence, including military capability, is underlined in the strategy and has been a key priority in the implementation process. This marks a clear shift from the 2003 strategy where military capability played a marginal role and the EU aspired to develop a distinct approach to security, characterized as comprehensive and cooperative, highlighting the importance of non-military aspects of security, dialogue, multilateralism and a less state-centric approach. Back then, the EU highlighted the need to address the root causes of conflicts such as socio-economic development, respect for human rights and sustainable climate and energy policies. The EGS still stresses the EU’s ‘soft power’, but notes that the concept of an exclusively ‘civilian power’ is not compatible with the surrounding reality.

Progress in the field of defence cooperation has indeed been the most visible achievement in the implementation of the EGS thus far. Member states and the European Commission launched work on a number of new initiatives in this field soon after the adoption of the strategy. In December 2017, 25 member states agreed to join the so-called permanent structured cooperation on defence (PESCO), which entails binding commitments to joint projects for developing defence capabilities and enhancing operational readiness. The participating member states also signed up to “regularly increasing defence budgets in real terms in order to reach agreed objectives”. The European Defence Fund, also established in 2017, contributes money from the EU budget for joint projects of defence research and capability development. Both initiatives aim at reducing duplication and fragmentation among the member states.

The EGS also highlights the need to pursue the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ – an issue that is covered at length but with a high degree of ambiguity, not least due to different views among member states. The strategy notes that NATO defends its members from external attack and stresses EU–NATO ‘complementarity’. Strengthening defence cooperation among EU member states is defined as a matter of credibility. It is arguably essential for both the EU, NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Soon after the adoption of the EGS, the election of Donald Trump as President...
of the US ushered in new uncertainties regarding the US commitment to Europe, revitalizing the argument that Europeans needed to take more responsibility for their own security. However, the quest embedded in the EGS for Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ is best described as aspirational, its achievement being unrealistic in the short to medium term. Deepening defence cooperation within the EU has been pursued hand-in-hand with developing new forms of cooperation between the EU and NATO.\textsuperscript{110}

**CONCLUSION**

To conclude, the EGS reflects the anxiety of the EU and its member states about increased insecurity and instability globally and regionally. The EU’s vision of the world order can still be characterized as liberal idealist, stressing the importance of multilateralism and rules-based cooperation. However, increased global contestation between major powers as well as violent conflicts in nearby regions to the EU’s east and south have pushed the Union towards a more realist and defensive approach to the outside world. The need for Europeans to do more for their own security has become a strong leitmotif in the implementation of the strategy, motivating the EU’s recent efforts to activate defence cooperation among the member states. At the same time, the new attention to security and defence has been an attempt to address EU–internal concerns and increase the Union’s legitimacy and unity.

\textsuperscript{110} European Union and NATO 2016.
CONCLUSIONS

The four security strategies analyzed in this paper indicate some shared views on how world politics is changing, but also notable differences as to how each power sees the global order and its own place in it.

The US strategy has shifted from the Obama-era focus on global structural problems and cooperative ways of solving them to prioritizing competition between great powers based on a zero-sum logic. Russia and China are identified in the US strategy as adversaries whose increasing influence is to be contained. The way to do this is primarily through US unitary agency utilizing its uniquely superior power resources. The importance of global commitments and responsibilities as well as alliances is downgraded in comparison to previous strategies.

Correspondingly, the strategies of both Russia and China aim at building a counterweight to the US power and share an interest in pursuing a multipolar order. However, there are significant differences between the Chinese and Russian approaches. China is preoccupied with stability, which is needed for the long-term building up of the Chinese position and resources. The goal of a multipolar world and an equal position for China among major powers is to be reached gradually. At the same time, the Chinese strategy highlights interdependence, mutual benefit and win-win results. Russia is seen as the main partner, but this cooperation is secondary to the wish to maintain a stable relationship with the US.

Russia, by contrast, takes a distinctly more aggressive approach to the goal of “strategic stability” in a “polycentric world” and is explicitly hostile towards the US, the West and the EU. The Russian strategy is more explicit on how competition between major powers plays out in a variety of fields, ranging from access to markets and resources to social models.
and values. The Russian view on stability also appears quite different from the Chinese one: strategic stability is a goal to be achieved through Russia’s increasingly assertive role. The Russian and US strategies share a rather negative view on interdependence, seeing it as a constraint to one’s own unitary agency and capacity to pursue national interests.

This seems to leave the EU as the sole liberal idealist in the world of fierce great-power competition. The EU strategy is unique among the four cases in its clear rejection of a worldview centred around zero-sum rivalry among major states. There is some similarity, however, between the European and Chinese emphasis on win-win games and a rather positive outlook on interdependencies as a factor that favours cooperation and stability.

All four strategies reflect the complex nature and multiplicity of threats, and hence the need for a broad range of responses. Terrorism, economic security and vulnerabilities in the spheres of cyber and energy are broadly shared concerns. The increased emphasis on military power is reflected in each strategy – even the EU, which has previously downplayed the very relevance of military force and lacked any serious capability in this field, has now made defence cooperation a priority in the implementation of its strategy. At the same time, military power is complemented with various other instruments in sophisticated ways, notably in Russia’s “asymmetric approach”, whereby Russia’s strengths such as the weaponization of information, technology and non-state organizations are used as a way to compensate for the relative weakness in the military-technological field. Correspondingly, the US stresses the need to be prepared to operate across multiple domains at once, in conflict scenarios possibly involving political, military, economic and cyber spheres.

Yet another common concern that obtains different responses is increased competition and contestation over values. Advancing values such as freedom, democracy and human rights, once a declared cornerstone of both US and European foreign policies (in different variations), is still present in the strategies of both the EU and the US, but in a less central and more defensive form in comparison to their earlier rhetoric. Both China and Russia stress their own particular values and the need to defend these against external influences.

In spite of the differences, all four strategies tackle the rapid change of global structures and instruments of power and try to identify ways to shape these dynamics and adapt. A major common theme in the strategy documents is increased competition among major powers, which plays out in military, political and economic fields as well as at the level of values. At the same time, the multiplicity of actors and diffusion of power is reflected in different ways in all four approaches.
Table 1. Summary of the key positions expressed in the security strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership in the world order</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shift from responsibility for global order to more focus on great-power competition</td>
<td>build counterweight to the West</td>
<td>build counterweight to the West</td>
<td>diffusion of power; emphasis on cooperation; “This is no time for global policemen”</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views on other major powers</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>special role of great powers to define rules of the game; resist diffusion of power</td>
<td>aim at unity with Russia, stability with the US</td>
<td>US and EU as adversaries; China as partner</td>
<td>solid partnership with US; engage China based on the rule of law; Russia a ‘key strategic challenge’</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partners, alliances</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>downgrade of enduring partnerships, shift to more transactional approach</td>
<td>Russia as partner, but of secondary importance compared to US</td>
<td>importance of strategic independence; alliances as constraint</td>
<td>importance of transatlantic alliance, but aim at increased strategic autonomy; cooperation with a broad range of partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zero-sum/win-win logic</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shift to more zero-sum approach</td>
<td>interdependence, need for win–win cooperation, explicit rejection of zero–sum game</td>
<td>world politics viewed as zero–sum game</td>
<td>explicit commitment to win–win approach; zero–sum game ‘an illusion’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multipolarity/polycentrism</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unique power of US</td>
<td>promotion of multipolar world</td>
<td>polycentrism</td>
<td>strong emphasis on rules–based order, multilateralism, international law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateralism</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>downgrade of multilateralism</td>
<td>in the context of trade relations and arms control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionalism</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rise of regional power centres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>increasing importance of regional orders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Networks, connectivity</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>need to control global lifelines; more interconnected world making power harder to use</td>
<td>control of transport arteries identified, independence</td>
<td></td>
<td>increasingly connected world, power diffusion, multiplicity of actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shift to less emphasis on values</td>
<td>importance of Chinese values; concern about ideological security</td>
<td>revival of Russian spiritual and moral values</td>
<td>‘We have an interest in promoting our values in the world’; need to increase resilience of democracies</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military vs. other aspects of power</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>importance of leading military capacity; technological innovation</td>
<td>need to build stronger military</td>
<td>military together with other forms of power</td>
<td>increased attention to military capability, but primacy of other forms of power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat perceptions</th>
<th>US (shifts from Obama to Trump)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>threats becoming more complex and fluid</td>
<td>new threats, including internet security</td>
<td>heightened sense of dangers, struggle and competition for power and resources</td>
<td>singles out terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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guojia anquan xin pianzhang." QSTheory.cn.
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THE SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE US, CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE EU

LIVING IN DIFFERENT WORLDS

This report analyzes and compares the security strategies of four major international actors: the United States, China, Russia and the European Union. The rules-based liberal international order is increasingly under strain due to tightening geopolitical competition and the decline of the Western hegemony. In this context, the report explores the conceptions of the four major powers with regard to the world order, the self-defined position of each actor in it, and their possible aspirations to change the existing order. Furthermore, the report analyzes how each strategy defines security threats and risks, as well as ways to address these threats.

The report highlights the ongoing rapid change of global structures and instruments of power as a challenge addressed in all four strategies. Increased competition is visible not only in the field of military power, but also in economic relations and at the level of values. While the US strategy defines Russia and China as key adversaries whose increasing influence is to be contained, both Russia and China correspondingly aim at building a counterweight to the US power in a multipolar world. Among the four actors, only the EU maintains a strong commitment to the rules-based order and explicitly rejects a worldview centred around zero-sum rivalry between great powers.