

# GMM Implementation report

## SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT.

- **Platform Selection.**

There are several reasons why Uniswap V2 was chosen as the foundation for developing a solution to the problem at hand.

- Uniswap V2 is one of the most widely used and popular DEXs in the ecosystem, which means it has a large user base and a broad community familiar with its operation.
- The CPMM model implemented in Uniswap V2 is simple, making it ideal for introducing modifications.
- It is highly compatible with ERC-20 tokens and the Ethereum network, ensuring that any development on top of Uniswap V2 is broadly interoperable within this ecosystem.
- The extensive documentation and available information about this platform greatly facilitates development.
- The stability of Uniswap V2 makes it an excellent option for implementing enhancements and modifications.
- Any improvements and modifications can be scaled to other versions of Uniswap, such as Uniswap V3.
- Being open-source makes development even more accessible.

- **Liquidity and Fee Management.**

The first issue addressed was liquidity management. This is due to the fact that Uniswap V2, with its CPMM formula, only requires the liquidity within its own AMM, so no further considerations are needed. However, to implement a more global solution, it is necessary to query the liquidity of other AMMs.

This does not present major concerns, as long as a smart contract has access to the addresses of other AMMs—it can query their liquidity without any problem or additional cost, since querying does not alter the blockchain.

This has been developed through a function that allows adding the addresses of other AMMs, enabling a smart contract to take into account the liquidity of as many AMMs as desired, in addition to its own. Once the addresses are in the list, a simple loop is used to average the external liquidity and sum up the total.

Fees will be set at 0.3%, as in Uniswap V2. This will be done simply by subtracting 0.3% from the user based on what the formula calculates, if the user provides an amount of one cryptocurrency and the program must calculate how much of the other they should receive, or by adding that 0.3% to the user, if the user requests a specific amount of one cryptocurrency and the program must calculate how much they need to pay.

- **Application of the Formula.**

To compute the output amount in a swap, the following formula is used:

- $\min(y / (x + \Delta x), y_i / (x_i + \Delta x)) * \Delta x$

Here,  $x$  and  $y$  represent the reserves of the token pair on the main platform, while  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  are the reserves on an external platform.  $\Delta x$  is the amount of the input token provided by the user. The formula calculates the output by taking the smaller exchange rate between

the two sources and multiplying it by the input amount. This ensures a conservative and stable output based on the most limiting liquidity condition.

Example 1: Minimum comes from the main AMM

Let's say a user wants to swap 10 units of token X.

- Main AMM reserves:  $x = 100, y = 200$
- External AMM reserves:  $x_i = 100, y_i = 400$

We compute:

- $y / (x + \Delta x) = 200 / (100 + 10) = 200 / 110 \approx 1.82$
- $y_i / (x_i + \Delta x) = 400 / (100 + 10) = 400 / 110 \approx 3.64$

The minimum is 1.82  $\rightarrow$  Output =  $1.82 * 10 = 18.18$  tokens Y

Example 2: Minimum comes from the external AMM

Now consider:

- Main AMM reserves:  $x = 100, y = 200$
- External AMM reserves:  $x_i = 150, y_i = 100$

We compute:

- $y / (x + \Delta x) = 200 / (100 + 10) = 200 / 110 \approx 1.82$

- $y_i / (x_i + \Delta x) = 300 / (250 + 10) = 300 / 260 \approx 1.15$

The minimum is 1.15  $\rightarrow$  Output = 1.15 \* 10 = 11.5 tokens Y

- **Functional Requirements.**

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RF-01   |
| Description | The system must be able to calculate the exchange rates between two tokens. |
| Type        | Functional.   |
| Priority    | High.   |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RF-02   |
| Description | The system must be able to perform token swaps. |
| Type        | Functional.                                     |
| Priority    | High.   |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Identifier  | RF-03  |
| Description | The system must be able to manage liquidity across multiple platforms. |

|          |             |
|----------|-------------|
| Type     | Functional. |
| Priority | High.       |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RF-04   |
| Description | Each smart contract must be able to query the liquidity of other platforms. |
| Type        | Functional.   |
| Priority    | High.   |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Identifier  | RF-05  |
| Description | Each smart contract must have the addresses of the others. |
| Type        | Functional.  |
| Priority    | High.  |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RF-06   |
| Description | The system must be able to calculate the exchange rates between two tokens. |
| Type        | Functional.   |
| Priority    | High.   |

|             |                                  |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| Identifier  | RF-07                            |
| Description | GMM formula must be implemented. |
| Type        | Functional.                      |
| Priority    | High.                            |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Identifier  | RF-08  |
| Description | The system must be compatible with all ERC20 tokens. |
| Type        | Functional.  |
| Priority    | High.  |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Identifier  | RF-09  |
| Description | The system must be integrated into Uniswap V2. |
| Type        | Functional.                                    |
| Priority    | Media.   |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RF-10   |
| Description | The system must manage the fees for each transaction. |
| Type        | Functional.   |
| Priority    | High.   |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RF-11   |
| Description | The system must charge transaction fees in ETH. |
| Type        | Functional.                                     |
| Priority    | High.   |

- **Non-Functional requirements.**

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RNF-01  |
| Description | The system must be capable of handling a high volume of transactions. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.   |

|          |       |
|----------|-------|
| Priority | High. |
|----------|-------|

|             |                                 |
|-------------|---------------------------------|
| Identifier  | RNF-02                          |
| Description | Smart contracts must be secure. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.                 |
| Priority    | High.                           |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Identifier  | RNF-03   |
| Description | Smart contracts must be optimized to minimize gas costs on the Ethereum network. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.  |
| Priority    | Medium.  |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Identifier  | RNF-04   |
| Description | The user interface must be intuitive and accessible. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.                                      |
| Priority    | Medium.  |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RNF-05                                      |
| Description | The smart contract must be well-structured. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.                             |



|          |         |
|----------|---------|
| Priority | Medium. |
|----------|---------|

|             |                                       |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| Identifier  | RNF-06                                |
| Description | The smart contract must be efficient. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.                       |
| Priority    | High.                                 |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RNF-07  |
| Description | The system must consider applicable regulations across different jurisdictions. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.   |
| Priority    | High.   |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Identifier  | RNF-08  |
| Description | The system must handle exceptions in a way that no data is compromised in case of an error. |
| Type        | Non-Functional.   |
| Priority    | High.   |

## RESULTS

- Arbitrage.

The problem for which this solution is proposed is arbitrage. In order to observe if the proposed solution eliminates or minimizes this issue, a comparison can be made between the results, given by the cryptocurrency exchange of two users on two different platforms, with four liquidity sources being considered, where the first user makes exchanges at moments when the exchange rate is unfavorable to them, and the second user does so at the moments that are most beneficial for them.

For example, in one case, you can start with what is shown next.

| User1       | Token A (Both) | Token B (modified) |
|-------------|----------------|--------------------|
| User 1      | 10             | 30                 |
| User 2      | 10             | 30                 |
| Plataform 1 | 100            | 400                |
| Plataform 2 | 100            | 400                |
| Plataform 3 | 135            | 430                |
| Plataform 4 | 90             | 420                |

Now, the users will make the following transactions:

- Transaction 1: User 1 buys 5 tokens A from platform 1.
- Transaction 2: User 2 buys 2.5 tokens A from platform 2.

■ Transaction 3: User 2 sells 2.5 tokens A to platform 1.

■ Transaction 4: User 1 sells 2.5 tokens A to both platforms.

The results are shown below. The first table shows, for User 1, the amount of token A, token B using the original Uniswap V2, and token B using the proposed solution. The second table shows the same data but this time for User 2.

| User1         | Token A (both) | Token B (modified) | Token B (original) |
|---------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Start         | 10             | 30                 | 30                 |
| Transaction 1 | 15             | 10,36              | 8,89               |
| Transaction 2 | 15             | 10,36              | 8,89               |
| Transaction 3 | 15             | 10,36              | 8,89               |
| Transaction 4 | 10             | 29,77              | 29,34              |

| User2         | Token A (both) | Token B (modified) | Token B (original) |
|---------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Start         | 10             | 30                 | 30                 |
| Transaction 1 | 10             | 30                 | 30                 |
| Transaction 2 | 12,5           | 20,26              | 19,71              |
| Transaction 3 | 10             | 30,02              | 30,47              |
| Transaction 4 | 10             | 30,02              | 30,47              |

As can be seen in the tables, first, User 1, when buying 5 tokens A on Platform 1, simply exchanges them for the corresponding amount of tokens B. It can be observed that the amount is essentially the same in both the original and the proposed solution.

In the next two transactions, first, User 2 buys 2.5 tokens A on Platform 2, which still holds the initial tokens, and then sells them to Platform 1. As User 1 had previously purchased tokens A, these tokens now have a lower proportion than on Platform 2. Here, improvements can already be seen, as in the original, User 2 earns 0.47 token B, while in the proposed solution, they only earn 0.02, which is less than the fees charged.


Finally, in Transaction 4, User 1 tries to recover the initial tokens by selling their tokens A. However, since User 2 has already sold them, the proportion between the two platforms equalizes, resulting in a loss of 0.66 tokens B in the original case, while in the proposed case, only a loss of 0.33 occurs.

To summarize, it can be observed that arbitrage is eliminated, as User 2 earns 0.47 token B in the original case, while in the proposed case, they only earn 0.02, which is less than the fees charged.

### **Gas Cost.**

"Gas is the term for the amount of ether (ETH), the native cryptocurrency of Ethereum, required by the network for a user to interact with it. These fees are used to compensate Ethereum miners for the energy needed to verify a transaction and to provide a layer of security to the Ethereum network by making it too costly for malicious users to spam the network."

This is why it is important that it does not increase too much, as it would mean extra costs for users with every transaction they make. The following is an approximate graph, which corresponds to the cost of one transaction when involving one to six AMMs. This helps to observe how the gas cost evolves.




As shown, as more AMMs are taken into account, the gas cost increases, but not in a disproportionate way. Moreover, it can be adjusted since any number of AMMs can be considered. This means that the creator of each smart contract can choose the extent to which they prefer to address arbitrage or prioritize minimizing gas costs.

In summary, from the perspective of gas expenditure, it is viable, as the cost grows very slowly.

- Efficiency.

Another important aspect is code efficiency, since the calculations must be carried out across many nodes (computers) to validate a transaction. Therefore, any increase in computation time will affect all nodes.

The following figure shows a graph of the time it takes to execute a transaction of the proposed solution. In this context, the exact execution times are not particularly important, but rather how they grow. Since the same equipment is used for all tests, we can reliably assess the relative growth in computation time.



As shown, computation times increase slightly between using a single AMM and two AMMs, as this is where the most significant change occurs. However, beyond that, the increase is minimal each time liquidity from another AMM is added. Since the growth is barely noticeable, from an efficiency standpoint, this project is indeed viable. Using an excessively large number of AMMs might introduce some issues, but there's no practical reason to reach such high numbers.

## Lessons learned

The prototype implementation of the Global Market Maker (GMM) on top of UniswapV2 has exposed a set of practical insights that may guide future researchers attempting to integrate blockchain-wide liquidity into AMMs. Below we summarise what worked well, what proved difficult, and where open questions remain.

### **1. Start on a simple, well-known AMM.**

Uniswap V2's constant-product code is short, clear, and heavily audited, so adding new logic was quick. Porting the same idea to newer designs such as Uniswap V3 or Curve would take much more engineering. Future work should begin on a simple base, then migrate once core ideas are proven.

### **2. Reading outside reserves is cheap but finding pools is not.**

A contract can read reserves from other pools with no extra gas. The hard part is keeping a reliable list of pool addresses. Manual whitelists work in tests but will not scale. A public registry or oracle that lists active pools is the next step.

### **3. The “minimum-of-two” pricing rule works.**

Quoting the lower of (i) the local CPMM price and (ii) the global-reserve price keeps the pool from being drained and removes arbitrage in simple two-pool tests. The rule is easy to code and keeps the familiar CPMM price curve. It still needs a full game-theory study for many pools with different fees.

### **4. Gas cost rises slowly—up to a point.**

Gas and run time grow roughly linearly with the number of pools checked. Up to six pools the added cost is small; beyond that the benefit falls off. An adaptive design that only queries the pools that matter most could keep costs low.

### **5. Arbitrage drops, but fee rules may need tuning.**

Simulations show that most arbitrage profit disappears and the savings are shared between traders and liquidity providers. The fixed 0.3 % fee from Uniswap V2 may no longer be ideal. A fee that adjusts to the new depth might share value even better.

### **6. External data adds new risks.**

Depending on outside reserve data creates oracle risk. The contract also needs a full check for flash-loan edge cases. A formal audit and a public bug bounty are advised before a main-net launch.

### **7. Strong test tools are essential.**

Small “toy” trades help build intuition, but only large random test batches revealed rounding and fee-tracking bugs. A script that sends many varied trades, including adversarial ones, was key to finding corner cases.

Overall, GMM shows that a global-liquidity view can cut arbitrage and slippage without major cost, but it needs better pool discovery, careful cost control, and thorough security checks before production use.

## Test Vectors

| Test | x    | y    | x <sub>i</sub> | y <sub>i</sub> | Δx  | Expected Result = $\min(y / (x + \Delta x), y_i / (x_i + \Delta x)) * \Delta x$ |
|------|------|------|----------------|----------------|-----|---|
| 1    | 1445 | 275  | 1195           | 1357           | 67  | $\min(275 / 1512, 1357 / 1262) * 67 = 12.19$                                    |
| 2    | 1173 | 835  | 1924           | 1236           | 68  | $\min(835 / 1241, 1236 / 1992) * 68 = 42.19$                                    |
| 3    | 1149 | 160  | 322            | 228            | 135 | $\min(160 / 1284, 228 / 457) * 135 = 16.82$                                     |
| 4    | 361  | 1023 | 1461           | 618            | 140 | $\min(1023 / 501, 618 / 1601) * 140 = 54.04$                                    |
| 5    | 918  | 331  | 787            | 592            | 53  | $\min(331 / 971, 592 / 840) * 53 = 18.07$                                       |
| 6    | 1412 | 625  | 679            | 410            | 114 | $\min(625 / 1526, 410 / 793) * 114 = 46.69$                                     |
| 7    | 1065 | 1763 | 1748           | 638            | 108 | $\min(1763 / 1173, 638 / 1856) * 108 = 37.12$                                   |
| 8    | 1036 | 170  | 1995           | 1058           | 65  | $\min(170 / 1101, 1058 / 2060) * 65 = 10.04$                                    |
| 9    | 1145 | 1350 | 337            | 414            | 89  | $\min(1350 / 1234, 414 / 426) * 89 = 86.49$                                     |
| 10   | 304  | 1477 | 1341           | 1347           | 128 | $\min(1477 / 432, 1347 / 1469) * 128 = 117.37$                                  |
| 11   | 339  | 262  | 1211           | 440            | 51  | $\min(262 / 390, 440 / 1262) * 51 = 17.78$                                      |
| 12   | 1705 | 1294 | 1696           | 600            | 126 | $\min(1294 / 1831, 600 / 1822) * 126 = 41.49$                                   |
| 13   | 1294 | 1465 | 495            | 1014           | 75  | $\min(1465 / 1369, 1014 / 570) * 75 = 80.26$                                    |
| 14   | 574  | 689  | 149            | 1529           | 123 | $\min(689 / 697, 1529 / 272) * 123 = 121.59$                                    |
| 15   | 1008 | 1686 | 1178           | 1577           | 50  | $\min(1686 / 1058, 1577 / 1228) * 50 = 64.21$                                   |
| 16   | 765  | 1714 | 664            | 842            | 105 | $\min(1714 / 870, 842 / 769) * 105 = 114.97$                                    |
| 17   | 368  | 1503 | 528            | 695            | 107 | $\min(1503 / 475, 695 / 635) * 107 = 117.11$                                    |
| 18   | 1186 | 1179 | 1822           | 1365           | 68  | $\min(1179 / 1254, 1365 / 1890) * 68 = 49.11$                                   |
| 19   | 111  | 1892 | 1275           | 1440           | 90  | $\min(1892 / 201, 1440 / 1365) * 90 = 94.95$                                    |



|    |      |      |      |      |     |   |
|----|------|------|------|------|-----|---|
| 20 | 1204 | 1345 | 1670 | 1645 | 82  | $\min(1345 / 1286, 1645 / 1752) * 82 = 76.99$   |
| 21 | 1026 | 1086 | 1541 | 974  | 147 | $\min(1086 / 1173, 974 / 1688) * 147 = 84.82$   |
| 22 | 938  | 469  | 485  | 1438 | 79  | $\min(469 / 1017, 1438 / 564) * 79 = 36.43$     |
| 23 | 1097 | 579  | 1893 | 1324 | 141 | $\min(579 / 1238, 1324 / 2034) * 141 = 65.94$   |
| 24 | 1975 | 730  | 1210 | 1867 | 139 | $\min(730 / 2114, 1867 / 1349) * 139 = 48.00$   |
| 25 | 479  | 541  | 1428 | 1715 | 58  | $\min(541 / 537, 1715 / 1486) * 58 = 58.43$     |
| 26 | 1311 | 1878 | 1292 | 130  | 116 | $\min(1878 / 1427, 130 / 1408) * 116 = 10.71$   |
| 27 | 1063 | 1015 | 971  | 1404 | 101 | $\min(1015 / 1164, 1404 / 1072) * 101 = 88.07$  |
| 28 | 1043 | 1348 | 941  | 1537 | 144 | $\min(1348 / 1187, 1537 / 1085) * 144 = 163.53$ |
| 29 | 1598 | 1013 | 551  | 1360 | 122 | $\min(1013 / 1720, 1360 / 673) * 122 = 71.85$   |
| 30 | 1058 | 623  | 1021 | 1627 | 141 | $\min(623 / 1199, 1627 / 1162) * 141 = 73.26$   |
| 31 | 1636 | 467  | 824  | 1659 | 86  | $\min(467 / 1722, 1659 / 910) * 86 = 23.32$     |
| 32 | 695  | 126  | 989  | 1004 | 81  | $\min(126 / 776, 1004 / 1070) * 81 = 13.15$     |
| 33 | 1869 | 857  | 274  | 408  | 79  | $\min(857 / 1948, 408 / 353) * 79 = 34.76$      |
| 34 | 1256 | 666  | 702  | 1625 | 74  | $\min(666 / 1330, 1625 / 776) * 74 = 37.06$     |
| 35 | 985  | 1635 | 1599 | 1499 | 133 | $\min(1635 / 1118, 1499 / 1732) * 133 = 115.11$ |
| 36 | 1276 | 1274 | 1701 | 1121 | 82  | $\min(1274 / 1358, 1121 / 1783) * 82 = 51.55$   |
| 37 | 1324 | 1050 | 300  | 1087 | 112 | $\min(1050 / 1436, 1087 / 412) * 112 = 81.89$   |
| 38 | 413  | 314  | 753  | 1762 | 109 | $\min(314 / 522, 1762 / 862) * 109 = 65.57$     |
| 39 | 642  | 851  | 1381 | 1802 | 83  | $\min(851 / 725, 1802 / 1464) * 83 = 97.42$     |
| 40 | 1310 | 1260 | 1278 | 1018 | 132 | $\min(1260 / 1442, 1018 / 1410) * 132 = 95.30$  |
| 41 | 1444 | 330  | 632  | 1744 | 61  | $\min(330 / 1505, 1744 / 693) * 61 = 13.38$     |
| 42 | 226  | 1597 | 385  | 1739 | 139 | $\min(1597 / 365, 1739 / 524) * 139 = 461.30$   |
| 43 | 1559 | 1333 | 283  | 1489 | 61  | $\min(1333 / 1620, 1489 / 344) * 61 = 50.19$    |

|    |      |      |      |      |     |   |
|----|------|------|------|------|-----|---|
| 44 | 1268 | 219  | 1451 | 1663 | 98  | $\min(219 / 1366, 1663 / 1549) * 98 = 15.71$    |
| 45 | 1182 | 892  | 1181 | 594  | 150 | $\min(892 / 1332, 594 / 1331) * 150 = 66.94$    |
| 46 | 836  | 981  | 596  | 1468 | 115 | $\min(981 / 951, 1468 / 711) * 115 = 118.63$    |
| 47 | 361  | 214  | 129  | 893  | 82  | $\min(214 / 443, 893 / 211) * 82 = 39.61$       |
| 48 | 409  | 129  | 1969 | 315  | 117 | $\min(129 / 526, 315 / 2086) * 117 = 17.67$     |
| 49 | 1976 | 1392 | 1609 | 1077 | 93  | $\min(1392 / 2069, 1077 / 1702) * 93 = 58.85$   |
| 50 | 1270 | 991  | 1907 | 1953 | 117 | $\min(991 / 1387, 1953 / 2024) * 117 = 83.60$   |
| 51 | 1183 | 904  | 1378 | 711  | 60  | $\min(904 / 1243, 711 / 1438) * 60 = 29.67$     |
| 52 | 1555 | 1768 | 928  | 1712 | 62  | $\min(1768 / 1617, 1712 / 990) * 62 = 67.79$    |
| 53 | 472  | 1138 | 1425 | 1959 | 53  | $\min(1138 / 525, 1959 / 1478) * 53 = 70.25$    |
| 54 | 1928 | 1036 | 512  | 1928 | 65  | $\min(1036 / 1993, 1928 / 577) * 65 = 33.79$    |
| 55 | 978  | 1649 | 731  | 104  | 89  | $\min(1649 / 1067, 104 / 820) * 89 = 11.29$     |
| 56 | 1162 | 1600 | 917  | 1474 | 88  | $\min(1600 / 1250, 1474 / 1005) * 88 = 112.64$  |
| 57 | 1318 | 1616 | 575  | 1825 | 107 | $\min(1616 / 1425, 1825 / 682) * 107 = 121.34$  |
| 58 | 1161 | 291  | 1111 | 1600 | 132 | $\min(291 / 1293, 1600 / 1243) * 132 = 29.71$   |
| 59 | 1983 | 368  | 814  | 842  | 76  | $\min(368 / 2059, 842 / 890) * 76 = 13.58$      |
| 60 | 1497 | 1188 | 762  | 931  | 147 | $\min(1188 / 1644, 931 / 909) * 147 = 106.23$   |
| 61 | 496  | 1062 | 440  | 2000 | 86  | $\min(1062 / 582, 2000 / 526) * 86 = 156.93$    |
| 62 | 849  | 1769 | 105  | 1467 | 138 | $\min(1769 / 987, 1467 / 243) * 138 = 247.34$   |
| 63 | 1007 | 413  | 591  | 579  | 143 | $\min(413 / 1150, 579 / 734) * 143 = 51.36$     |
| 64 | 1879 | 396  | 305  | 932  | 90  | $\min(396 / 1969, 932 / 395) * 90 = 18.10$      |
| 65 | 500  | 562  | 361  | 123  | 96  | $\min(562 / 596, 123 / 457) * 96 = 25.84$       |
| 66 | 249  | 1369 | 1513 | 331  | 118 | $\min(1369 / 367, 331 / 1631) * 118 = 23.95$    |
| 67 | 1634 | 1438 | 907  | 1397 | 138 | $\min(1438 / 1772, 1397 / 1045) * 138 = 111.99$ |
| 68 | 1846 | 1473 | 1054 | 1875 | 92  | $\min(1473 / 1938, 1875 / 1146) * 92 = 69.93$   |
| 69 | 1275 | 1656 | 928  | 1991 | 65  | $\min(1656 / 1340, 1991 / 993) * 65 = 80.33$    |

|    |      |      |      |      |     |   |
|----|------|------|------|------|-----|---|
| 70 | 385  | 257  | 422  | 1423 | 121 | $\min(257 / 506, 1423 / 543) * 121 = 61.46$     |
| 71 | 1821 | 870  | 1239 | 346  | 122 | $\min(870 / 1943, 346 / 1361) * 122 = 31.02$    |
| 72 | 986  | 839  | 897  | 1436 | 65  | $\min(839 / 1051, 1436 / 962) * 65 = 51.89$     |
| 73 | 548  | 1763 | 475  | 995  | 126 | $\min(1763 / 674, 995 / 601) * 126 = 208.60$    |
| 74 | 1563 | 206  | 1969 | 907  | 89  | $\min(206 / 1652, 907 / 2058) * 89 = 11.10$     |
| 75 | 1416 | 127  | 124  | 1164 | 136 | $\min(127 / 1552, 1164 / 260) * 136 = 11.13$    |
| 76 | 405  | 1035 | 1630 | 762  | 126 | $\min(1035 / 531, 762 / 1756) * 126 = 54.68$    |
| 77 | 338  | 536  | 801  | 924  | 146 | $\min(536 / 484, 924 / 947) * 146 = 142.45$     |
| 78 | 857  | 170  | 1251 | 256  | 110 | $\min(170 / 967, 256 / 1361) * 110 = 19.34$     |
| 79 | 702  | 926  | 572  | 569  | 110 | $\min(926 / 812, 569 / 682) * 110 = 91.77$      |
| 80 | 885  | 173  | 1189 | 175  | 97  | $\min(173 / 982, 175 / 1286) * 97 = 13.20$      |
| 81 | 535  | 616  | 1925 | 944  | 56  | $\min(616 / 591, 944 / 1981) * 56 = 26.69$      |
| 82 | 733  | 960  | 1771 | 1297 | 116 | $\min(960 / 849, 1297 / 1887) * 116 = 79.73$    |
| 83 | 639  | 608  | 1366 | 520  | 101 | $\min(608 / 740, 520 / 1467) * 101 = 35.80$     |
| 84 | 173  | 409  | 741  | 1858 | 86  | $\min(409 / 259, 1858 / 827) * 86 = 135.81$     |
| 85 | 567  | 1804 | 1954 | 770  | 86  | $\min(1804 / 653, 770 / 2040) * 86 = 32.46$     |
| 86 | 248  | 1451 | 182  | 329  | 62  | $\min(1451 / 310, 329 / 244) * 62 = 83.60$      |
| 87 | 1550 | 1525 | 1398 | 1964 | 103 | $\min(1525 / 1653, 1964 / 1501) * 103 = 95.02$  |
| 88 | 346  | 1375 | 1793 | 1364 | 149 | $\min(1375 / 495, 1364 / 1942) * 149 = 104.65$  |
| 89 | 610  | 793  | 702  | 1271 | 89  | $\min(793 / 699, 1271 / 791) * 89 = 100.97$     |
| 90 | 1646 | 961  | 582  | 583  | 96  | $\min(961 / 1742, 583 / 678) * 96 = 52.96$      |
| 91 | 1718 | 666  | 949  | 771  | 54  | $\min(666 / 1772, 771 / 1003) * 54 = 20.30$     |
| 92 | 314  | 617  | 845  | 892  | 116 | $\min(617 / 430, 892 / 961) * 116 = 107.67$     |
| 93 | 458  | 419  | 1915 | 878  | 55  | $\min(419 / 513, 878 / 1970) * 55 = 24.51$      |
| 94 | 1819 | 1632 | 887  | 1684 | 133 | $\min(1632 / 1952, 1684 / 1020) * 133 = 111.20$ |

|     |      |      |      |      |     |  |
|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|--|
| 95  | 176  | 304  | 1594 | 184  | 116 | $\min(304 / 292, 184 / 1710) * 116 = 12.48$    |
| 96  | 1683 | 102  | 1260 | 452  | 148 | $\min(102 / 1831, 452 / 1408) * 148 = 8.24$    |
| 97  | 1056 | 689  | 1098 | 678  | 91  | $\min(689 / 1147, 678 / 1189) * 91 = 51.89$    |
| 98  | 330  | 1812 | 830  | 1202 | 86  | $\min(1812 / 416, 1202 / 916) * 86 = 112.85$   |
| 99  | 1640 | 1806 | 245  | 1571 | 127 | $\min(1806 / 1767, 1571 / 372) * 127 = 129.80$ |
| 100 | 726  | 1864 | 407  | 1722 | 77  | $\min(1864 / 803, 1722 / 484) * 77 = 178.74$   |
| 101 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 100 | $\min(1000 / 1100, 1000 / 1100) * 100 = 90.91$ |
| 102 | 1000 | 1000 | 800  | 1000 | 100 | $\min(1000 / 1100, 1000 / 900) * 100 = 90.91$  |
| 103 | 1000 | 1000 | 2000 | 500  | 200 | $\min(1000 / 1200, 500 / 2200) * 200 = 45.45$  |
| 104 | 500  | 2000 | 1000 | 3000 | 50  | $\min(2000 / 550, 3000 / 1050) * 50 = 181.81$  |
| 105 | 2000 | 500  | 1000 | 1500 | 100 | $\min(500 / 2100, 1500 / 1100) * 100 = 23.81$  |

In this test vector,  $x$  and  $y$  refer to the tokens in the main platform, while  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  refer to the total amount of those tokens across all the platforms considered.  $\Delta x$  represents the variation of  $x$ , meaning the amount a user buys or sells.