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EDUCATION

Queen's University, Ph.D., Economics, 2012- 2017 (*expected completion date*)
Thesis title: "Authority and Discretion in Agency Models"
M.A., Economics, 2011-2012

University of Montreal, B.Sc. with Honors, Economics, 2008-2011

RESEARCH PAPERS

"Tournaments, Limited Liability and the Optimal Organizational Structure", March 2017
Job Market Paper

"Consociational Democracy and the Optimal Allocation of Power", March 2017

WORK EXPERIENCE

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- *Undergraduate Teaching Assistant*: The Emergence of Modern Economic Growth, Development Economics, Microeconomic Theory II, Introduction to Mathematical Economics, Labour Economics, Economic History of North America Before 1865, Introductory Statistics
- *Graduate Teaching Assistant*: Microeconomic Theory, Advanced Microeconomic Theory II
- *Fencing Coach* for Queen's University Fencing Club

OTHER EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Jan Zabojsnik - The Incentives Effects of Employee Stock Options
Research Assistant for Jan Zabojsnik - Firm Reputation and Employee Startups

FIELDS OF INTERESTS

Organizational Economics, Managerial Economics, Economics of Innovation and Entrepreneurship

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2012 Senator Frank Carrel Fellowship

CONFERENCES AND WORKHOPS

November 2016 Queen's University's Microeconomic Workshop
July 2016 27th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony
 Brook University

January 2017 University of Alberta's Economic Seminar

OTHER Canadian National Fencing Team Member (2005, 2007)

Ph.D. SUPERVISORS

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Abstract of Job Market Paper

This paper develops a theoretical framework that incorporates the deleterious effects of relative incentive pay on cooperation in order to generate a more complete theory of the optimal organizational structure. I study how well information will be generated by the agents and utilized by the decision maker(s) in either a centralized or a decentralized setting. One of the main results of this paper suggests that the introduction of a limited liability constraint will favor decentralization in a sufficiently productive environment. This constraint may even increase the agents' compensation, which is at odds with the literature. I show that tournaments can achieve what I refer to as the Constrained First Best outcome and I also argue that regions or industries with tighter labor markets are more likely to favor a centralized organizational structure. Finally, I show that managers might find it optimal to communicate less with highly motivated employees than regular employees.