

# **A Short Book on Long Words Touching Ethics and Related Matters**

(A theory of the nature of society by observation  
of facets without which it could not be)

Treating People as Ends (The object of Humanity)

## **A Unified Theory of Society**

(Its causes and its effect, being considered)

## Chapters

	I	After Comment	3 - 4
	II	Intention	5 - 15
	III	Thoughts )	16 - 20
		) Interchangeable	
	IV	Method of 'Thoughts')	21 - 27
	V	Ideals & their World	28 - 43
The invest- igation of trust	(VI(Ia)	Demonstration & Exposition: Judgement	44 - 54
	(VI(Ib)	Harmony in Denial	55 - 59
	(VI(IIa)	Ethics, Morals & Democracy	60 - 69
	(VI(IIb)	Ought & Is	70 - 81
States	(VII(I)	The State & States - The Good	82 - 84
	(VII(II)	After Thoughts Concerning People and States	85 - 92
	VIII	Apology Revisited	93 - 94
		Page Contents	95 - 99



## Chapter I

# After Comment

The first person to read these pages noted that there often seemed to be little or no connection of thought from one page to the next, "I frankly do not know", he said, "how all the parts hang together." Although there was little plan as I wrote, and the end was totally unknown from the beginning, after re-reading a definite order became evident to me, and this together with an indication of my motivation, I here below precis.

For long I had been confused by the seeming complete and furious disagreements among people when discussing politics. Even the most 'educated' ones seemed to be unable to avoid frequent frustration, when these affairs were broached. More particular this in my experience came, observing among those who named themselves 'Marxists,' and those who seemed not bound to idealology of such a scope and specific nature. (NB: This may be the weakness of some of Mr. Marx beliefs:- an over extended idealology often ignores the possibility, that though the demands of humanity<sup>3</sup> will (as necessities), always remain constant, the means of satisfaction will NOT). Often leaving such company I felt little satisfaction, but there was not absent admiration for the power of the terminology which Mr. Marx used. After only reading a few lines of his work many feel the core of this work to have become known.<sup>1</sup> How did this happen, and why? However, rather than commence with a critique of language, feelings also tell of myself, why did these words appeal to me?

- 
1. Each word is like a piece of a puzzle. Simple words are pieces which are uncomplicated parts of a picture, sky or clouds or bits of trees, they could fit into many pictures. Long words are pieces which have complex and very specific parts of a picture, like parts of a steam engine, in short they demand one picture and one view.

Two examples. Simple; skyscraper,  
and Long; Reactionery.

All of us sometime think in or with words, either as an alternative to pictures, or because picture thought is not sufficient, (this is explained later in some detail); with this in mind the power of words is revealed. Words can control the most powerful of minds and crush the mental control of the greatest stoic if once they enter into thought without careful consideration.<sup>2</sup>

2. NOTE<sup>1</sup> See page 72 Note 4.

So arose the question, "what is my nature?". For these reasons, and many other works which greatly encouraged this 'line of thought', for these reasons the order was as it is.

In answer to those most just observers of my poor style and argument form, which often make my attempt seem useless, rather than add parts to a work of emotion, explanation shall be made in a new series of pages called 'The nature of Democracy'. Neither will be of much use by themselves, but together, it is hoped, that one will throw light on the other. As an alternative may I suggest that you work through, stopping whenever some problem of understanding seems to arise, or when the going becomes tedious. Leave it awhile, and come back later - I took a month to write this down after ten years of preparation, to write a complete work would take many years, so I appeal to what is already yours, and hope this will prove sufficient.



## Chapter II

# Intention

It is a task of such a nature, that the fear that my attempts will prove to be of little worth is a constant companion; the practice of philosophy is most easily accused on an arrogance not befitting those who profess to aspire to the title of 'philosopher'. It seems that there are no bounds to the matters of the ones disposed to contemplation, the whole universe is at their disposal; the real, the supposed and even the hypothesis of the impossible.

It will be my aim to tell somewhat of humanity, but only by reference to myself at first, how I see things; in so doing this will encourage an exposition of my notion of myself in as far as I am an I;<sup>1</sup> once this attempt is made, on the principle that we should do to and treat those things, objects and people as their characters demand, e.g. on the principle that to be <sup>IN</sup> human to humans is as absurd as<sup>3</sup> to to treat fire as water, on this principle will we find a sure and secure basis for an exposition of the nature, and some of the content of, ETHICS.

Many will hold various criteria as to what will serve as a good basis for the attempted task below, as I have just outlined above. Some believe that all explanations must be on that common ground which, so they say is independent of, but can be<sup>2</sup> grasped by the human mind or brain; (which ever way they will have it the difference is of no vital importance both being involved with the same object but in different aspects). Others suggest that forgetting all the problems with the above statement, it is more important to

---

1. I am Some One.

2. You can't play dice in your mind.

3. This claim will become more clear having read more.

consider humans as humans, and in the case of myself - how I think I think.<sup>3</sup> The results from these two methods often clash; for evidence from one source may lead to claims that chemicals like those in a testube 'caused' our anger, and that much can be explained by little electrical impulses; whilst on the other hand the person concerned may explain why they thought this and how it lead to that, and hence,<sup>1</sup> they might say, "as far as I was concerned, that was why I was furious".

My bias lies with the latter, for all my understanding depends on how I think, including that of chemical reations, and especially that understanding of myself which is evident whenever the use of that word "I" occurs. It is not that the whole world must now be rejected as illusion, because we seem left no sound basis for objectivity of any sort on the grounds of the subjective view as here expressed, but rather, if we are to understand the world as humans, then we must consider those 'things' to which we can point as humans, wherefrom can be more easily shown to what things our humanity is owed. Some will say this approach may lead to contradictions with results gained by other methods, for what I think I think may<sup>2</sup> be far from what really is. In this distinction we can see the boundary between some schools of metaphysics (ONTOLOGY) and other areas of study - for what really is, and its nature when explained may be felt as an attack on common sense, and that is just what it frequently is, for the interest lies not in people or their limitations or nature, but in what there is.<sup>4</sup> It lies not with what we are limited and how we are limited in the area of our understanding. Thus the below following descriptions and demonstrations concerning us may be a million miles away from

---

1. The word hence is used here as it can be used both as a descriptive element and as an expositive one. 'Therefore' or 'implies' were not chosen because these are more bound by the rules of description and thus not open to use within overt demonstrations except as limited to descriptions of factors therewith involved. Later pages will, I hope, clarify this point.

2. What I think I think, may not be (But could be).  
What I think I think, could not be (and not:- But may be). } Thus "may" was used and not 'could'.

3. Cross reference, - Page 72 - Some observations on Language.

4. Nonsense is not the opposite of sense, but rather it is the complement thereof. NON SENSE.



what we really are - we may be Leibnitz's monads, but this is irrelevant to the question, "What is the object of humanity?" The reply shall be made as a human with the limitations and powers of a human, which at once both enchain and liberate us, and it is my hope that by agreement others will be of accord with my observations; a notion of humanity can only be grasped by humans, and then in this each is totally alone, - this is part of the personal nature of morality, and it is hoped that from such a position some respect for persons in the light of this necessity will be given.

Let me make clear distinction between the 'objective approach' and the subjective one. What is objective and what not can lend added confusion to compound the problem and we encounter what I here shall call the 'pseudo objective'.<sup>1</sup> An example of this we use daily, the calibration of clocks which often disagree with what time we personally think it ought to be, is a good example of this 'objective' approach. A clock-maker would never make the clocks slow down during the night and speed up at the moment of waking up, because the maker knows perfectly well that clocks are for the use of more than one person - they are for reference for all people. The nature of a clock is thus partially determined by the widest area of subjective agreement or compromise, as to how fast or slow the hands should move around its face,<sup>2</sup> and this comes down to making them go at a constant rate. Indeed the phenomena of the world outside manmade devices, heeds little to our subjective notion of time - how often I have been given a shock when looking at a thick crisp newly fallen layer of snow outside, fallen during my sleep!

It is not for long that this surprise lasts, and often we are quick to correct ourselves with some reference to, or realisation of the 'fact' that we have slept through several hours, and that it was only the peculiar nature

---

1. This is of interest with respect to the 'intersubjective' later considered.

2. Leap years were introduced to avoid the embarrassment of the seasons seeming to shift - winter can't be spring!; there were other factors, religious ones being most important, but these are bound up with the seasons if only in an associative contingent sense, as in:- "Christmas is not Christmas, without snow".



of sleep, that made time seem to go wrong. This process, and others similar, we use to correct our subjective notions as against those 'objective' elements, which are not natural to our understanding; is frequently used by all of us for all our lives, and every time we feel the need to look at a clock; is but one example which illustrates this point.

Even though we may refer to these instruments which are beyond our bodies reference alone does not give any evidence that we can understand what their real significance is, given the nature of our humanity. There is then, a two-fold distinction which can be made; of the understanding of people of themselves and of their limitations, and secondly, of peoples attempts to find some agreement with each other as to the nature of the world in which we live without conflicting with our personal notions of that world. There is also a difference in method; where humans and humanity are concerned the object of this subject is one which is full of psychological factors or human limitations and powers; it will be later seen how any explanation of ethics should take these into account. This is a most important observation for in one area, that of method, it permits the use of genetic explanations of how or why we should act in certain ways. This must be the case, for humans as will later be seen, live in the present and their information, as far as we are concerned, comes from the past, thus any judgement is sure to be limited to working back through past thought often proceeding from effect to cause - courts of law often use this device - so have countless detectives - often with great success.

(Above I have attempted to establish the outlook that will help to understand my approach - I do not worship 'the I' or the individual, rather I hope by an exposition of part of the nature of humans others will agree - if everyone agreed on their own subjectivity and their own uniqueness, then by Popper's criterion of objectivity, (i.e. intersubjective agreement), we would gain a pseudo objective recognition of our subjective natures. Everyone

would then be recognised as a real part vital for an actual whole;<sup>1</sup> society would not consist of toiling masses and capitalists, but of humans each as real and important as the next - a recognition of one's nature and an active expression of character would be as a complement to society, and such would be recognised as a vital contribution to that which really<sup>2</sup> keeps society together. (The ETHIC)).

In a strange way the importance people will attach to themselves as someone will diminish with this outlook - for I hope to achieve a partial<sup>3</sup> elimination of self importance by this exposition; once we know the nature of a subject's morality then we will be on much better ground to know how and why humans should treat one another humanly - how and why society<sup>4</sup> is seemed by some to be, as they say, "greater than all those within".<sup>3</sup> The dichotomy which arises from this last claim will now be considered.

'Society', a strange and ambiguous word at the best of times, misused I suspect frequently, and never clearly understood. It is a catch word of politicians today, those professional objectivists, a coin of the power of the detestable social engineer, a useful filler word akin to "relationship" in find<sup>2</sup> a type of word of which Orwell gave us warning. All would agree that in some way or another we are within the bounds of that enigmatic entity, or non-entity. One of the main expressions of the presence of society is the recognition by people who interact with one another of various 'objective' (pseudo objective), guide lines. These vary from a mechanical expression of time, to the use of language which, as with clocks, is endowed with certain common features of significance<sup>4</sup> when used amongst people.

- 
1. "Actual" is used here for though the formal I may be real, as far as we are concerned it is nothing but an effect. Later explanation may clarify this.
  2. "Actually" might be a better word to use here.
  3. Not, as a character from a play would have it, as an obsession:- "I am obsessed with the thought of my own insignificance".
  4. This may be tantological but the tantology is included to inform of the significance of significance.



When it is found useful to 'objectify' another feature<sup>1</sup> for the better health of society then just that happens, as has happened with time, distance and weight; I would stick my neck out further and say that this process is most advanced in the richer parts of the world, but these self same 'areas'<sup>2</sup> have maybe, a smaller degree of intersubjective agreement about one another as humans, than could be the case of some of the poorer people of this world in their countries.

Lets expand this consideration of 'Society' further. Problems may arise when the objective<sup>3</sup> calls of society seem to clash with the demands which arise from a recognition of morality. A recognition of the clash of the necessity of these objective needs, while at the same time a recognition of morals which arise out of recognition of the humanitive nature of all persons would render a solution to this clash.

Take an example of a possible clash between a moral inclination and a demand of necessity. There is a famine and much disease, many are hungry and some are dying - doctors are scarce, what is to be done? If the doctors are given more food to ensure the continuing of their beneficial work then the value of one is placed above that of another, or at least as if it were, some may even be left to die to save the doctors. Yet if a fair apportioning of food is chosen then society will suffer even more for even more will die - so what is to be done with a dilemma like this?

If all people held that same ethic and all respected the humanity of

- 
1. Frequently these have a most psychological nature.
  2. I was going to cross this out, but it is kept in to show a typical case of confusion which can arise from the simplest of words.
  3. That there are objective necessities is blindingly obvious, except to certain academics, i) Food is objective in nature  
ii) I will give  $\pounds 1 \times 10^6$  to the first academic who can bring me one who can survive without nourishment, and that usually means food. Some will deny this, then I don't write for supermen.



others then those who suffer would do so without bitterness as long as there was felt to be no disrespect for human life involved, and there was not a betrayal, or even a suspicion of a betrayal of trust - a trust that the doctors were working for the best, in intention, and hopefully in result. For this reason trust is the most important factor in all the dealings of people, the less trust the less recognition there is of the humanity of others - the more trust there is among us the better we treat one another and with a total trust there would be an end to the moralists works. It is in trust therefore, that the clash between the calls of morality and the demands of the world can be overcome. As trust can only be gained by trust, any other method, such as violence, remains a poor alternative to the spread of this 'trust'.

On pseudo objectivity, which may spring from subjective agreement, I should like to take one example how people recognise the importance of this factor, however let me make it clear, this factor does not have the same status as that of an object proper, or a thing; the 'objective' as it is claimed to be understood is not rejected by considering my ideas, (or even just considering them to reject them); it is only claimed to be not totally comprehensive in any one person's understanding and it is not claimed to be impossible or "not there". I am not a solipsist or any other name, I am I. I am not a marxist, as I am not a fascist, as much as if observed to walk, I would be a walkist.<sup>1</sup> In sharp define, I am myself.

To return to what I was talking about, the example:- It is often commented that when a crash has occurred that people who crowd around the disaster area are ghouls, but never do we ask, why does this occur? I believe this arises because of the nature of the inter-subjective of pseudo objective. Aeroplanes just do not fall out of the sky, even as time does not speed up or

---

1. Often those who say they are other than what they are, are lead by others most easily, for they have already surrendered their will to someone else. This instruction book mentality would be safe if the book was perfect, but we have yet to find one of these fantastical works!

go backwards, it seems to me that a crash gives a feeling of fascination, and often people stop to look because a new dimension/aspect of society is revealed when the inter-subjective character of society is questioned by such occurrences, which most clearly show us the things upon which everything else rests - the things which are, and belong to, the realm of the real.

I, like any other, am subject to at least three pressures, one or more of these may be mere illusion, but as illusion, the effect felt is just as great.

There lies beyond our thoughts the real world which contains things which are and the content of this world is what is for us. The world as we think it is, is real enough as far as each particular mind is concerned and this is reality for each person; however the personal reality of one will always be the unreality of another, for each person sees the world from THEIR point of view, as by physical necessity. From my point of view I would see the world as I see it, and as I am I and no-one else, then also as I cannot be someone else and myself at the same time, my view of the world through it will be reality for me, WILL NOT and CANNOT be anyone elses. "Ah! But we use language and this is evidence of commonality of thought and expression", the scholar might say! Apart from being unable to explain away the recently written suggestions, on what grounds are the scholars claims based? Are his or her thoughts their's or not? It's almost 'dotty' to claim that one can think thoughts which are not the thoughts you think! Either, I am I or I am not, or I am I and someone else!!<sup>1</sup> It is for this reason that the name of individualist has become an insult to many ears; for it is often seen to point to a strange arrogance of character which often goes with people who do not note this contradiction, when prone to be accused of that very same absurdity.

---

1. See note at the end of this chapter.

THE REAL

PHYSICS

Other facets of the real  
(e.g. There is an objective and existing world)  
or  $V=IR$  usually is a good prediction

1st STAGE TRUTHS

The Real produces US

The INTER-SUBJECTIVE — The 'WRONG' SUBJECTIVE

ETHICS

The SUBJECTIVE

US (REAL FACETS)

US (UNREAL FACETS)

(e.g. WITHOUT FOOD WE DIE) (e.g. We are all I<sub>s</sub>)

TALK

of what there is  
of what ought  
of humanity and humans

3rd STAGE TRUTHS

in me  
in us

The REAL produces,

CAUSES:

The SUBJECTIVE

Me, (REAL FACETS) (e.g. pain hurts)

ME, (UNREAL FACETS)

2nd STAGE TRUTHS

LOGIC

(e.g. I am motionless and timeless)



But for all my complaints we still use words and sentences everyday, and people seem able to grasp what we mean or intend when we use words, yet how can this be if we all have such subjective notions of the world? Language, like time, is a part of expression of society, it works only because we want and need it to work. With the use of language there is also intersubjective agreement as to what words are all about, words are only sounds and have no reality, beyond what each we want to consider as, otherwise they are only sounds like the wind, or the cracking of wood, or the roar of motor-cars. Language has a pseudo-objective nature, it depends on intersubjective agreement, which in turn depends on 2 factors, i) on each person's ability to understand, or have a notion of, what others intend to communicate when they speak, and ii) on the physical condition of the person or people concerned. i) and ii) are distinguished quite sharply if we refer back to the scheme on page 13; we see that talk may contain wrong opinions, the inter-subjective is not law bound by consistency, as we are and it is not. (Later this will be seen to be most interesting when considering another aspect of the inter-subjective, IDEOLOGY). In the real world there is much more necessity than this permission for contradiction <sup>CAN</sup> and permit.

Let us end here, and in the next chapter I shall try to show how we might be related to the world as subject to the world, as persons and not as organic machines.

---

For those who take Mr. Wittgenstein seriously.

As this I fear, will not satisfy all concerning the matter, some more will be written on the futility of the conventionalism of language, as appealed to by some of the modern 'philosophers' of repute. The often accepted theory is that language can be understood by looking at how it is used. e.g. If you wanted to know the meaning of the word 'cat' you take hundreds of statements with the 'cat' word in them, and by looking at the similarities and reiterations in these sentences we can find the meaning of 'cat'. No we don't, all we still have is a pile of words, anyway the choice of features thought to be relevant to cats must depend on assumptions about cats in the first place; and this becomes even more marked when we consider the statements as they are used involving pointing etc. Then again there is another complaint, how are we to choose who should make these

statements and who not, without presuming the meaning of the word we are trying to investigate? If I asked 100 workmen the meaning of a 'recursive function', the result by such a method would be fantastic - yet they all speak English. This method is so riddled with holes I could continue for pages; let it be sufficient to say that the word 'convention' or appeals to usage get us nowhere on two most obvious counts: i) A pile of words is not a meaning, ii) The above method assumes always some knowledge of the meaning of words which need not be found by convention or usage, for if this were not so meaning could never be reached as each successive pile of words would be in need of investigation by convention yet again.

I thought this would have been enough, but Mr. Wittgenstein changed in his outlook so here have I to make a second refutation. This would take some time, so as this is a note then I shall assume reference to The "Philosophical Investigations" Paragraph 257 onwards.

i) If my thoughts depend in some way on public affairs - this is cause - NOT effect, i.e. this does not preclude my thoughts being mine and no others.

ii) The paragraph 257 made empty by "If", i.e. if children could not be taught the use of words (because they were not what they are), then as we were all once children those uses would not be there to be taught!

iii) from ii) we also notice a favourite device of modern 'philosophy', to hypothesise something which is not the case to show that something must be the case. This need not always lead to bad results unless the hypothesis is of something which COULD not be the case. Mr. Wittgenstein is a classic example of one who abused this device - it is part of being human to have some perception, he makes humans subject to inhumanity in his investigations.

To those not acquainted with his works all this may seem a trifle, but on such works much of modern 'philosophy' has been based, and refutations I have encountered have been rooted in these two arguments above attacked. No.1) about public affairs reminds me of when I was a little boy, why was it forbidden to enter private property? Signs such as: "Public access forbidden", or "private, keep out", all seemed not to refer to me; why! we had the same sort of signs at home. The point is obvious now, as with any public matter, there must be a large number of private persons, before there can be any public anything.



## Chapter III

# Thoughts

By means of observation and exposition:

1. I am only present.
2. I am outside time.
3. I am a final or proper effect.
4. I am not substance, what?
5. I depend on substance and substance is in/of time.
6. I depend on time.
7. I do not last, I am permanent for I.
8. I am an I, I am some one.
9. (From 7) I has no permanent character as of a thing.

A short note, of use when re-reading.

### ON THE ETHIC

Observing the relation if I to I as always the same I shall assume this applies to all.

i) To be moral to another, that other must be someone, a human; or in other words, an "I".

ii) To remove the need to be moral to someone is impossible, and any destruction of <sup>I</sup>'s without regard to this is therefore immoral.

iii) The demands of morality are not objective and are often unreal in their requests for satisfaction because the nature of morality is unreal. But these demands are permanent in NATURE. (More practical, this might involve food provision and ensuring mental and physical health - but more on this later). Permit me to re-consider the above speculations (Nos. 1 to 9), in greater detail.

- 
1. This chapter may prove too difficult before reading chapter IV. The order of III before IV is arbitrary both would have been better side by side, but that may have sacrificed both to obscurity instead of just one.



The question is: What is essential to a human or a moral being?

- I. I am never in the past.
- II. I am never in the future.
- III. I am present.

It follows I am not of time, but it does not preclude the possibility that I can, or maybe, be effected by time.

- IV. I am not of time.
- V. But I am!

It is observed that people are made of substance, and people need food and water to survive as people. When a person is no more that person, then as an I they are no more for us to tell.

- VI. Why am I?
- VII. I depend on substance and things of the world, things which can both be causes and as effects.
- VIII. But cause and effect are in time, the cause(s) seem to be before the effect; or the NOTION of cause and effect involves some aspect of time, or our notion thereof.

IX. How can I be not of time, yet dependent on substance which is involved with time?

- X. I am not substance.
- XI. If I say, "I am in the past", then for me I am still in the present. If I persist and claim I am in the past and in the present, then I is not one I, but two or several, a manifest absurdity; I am always and only in the present.

XII. What of an object, can it be said to have been?<sup>1</sup> As far

---

Note, there is NO NOTE here - the above is most central to all this before and

1. After Parmenides. Things as they are cannot change. Considering our own present nature it would not be a wild guess that given three dimension geometry is involved with descriptions of shape, that within the scope of these observations there may be found the clue as to why the laws of geometry are timelessly true. What is is, not, what is was or will be!

as I am concerned, NO.<sup>1</sup> Here there is no contradiction or absurdity; "Have I been?" How can I have been if I can only be present?

XIII. Yet how can I be only in the present and still say, "I have lived" though a period of time, as I frequently say? This is the other I. The I of relation and not the I which can be expressed in the permanence of the self referential nature of I (present). The reference of I to I is always the same whenever made. But the same in what way?, and how can there be two Is?

XIV. The I of relation is the cause of that effect. (I present). I is bound to I, as much as effect is bound to be caused.

XV. But how can the effect be out of time when the cause is not?

The effect is proper, formal and final; it cannot be a cause in its turn; it cannot be described from how it effects as it has no effects even though it is an effect itself. I give an exposition and not a description, of effects.<sup>1</sup>

Imagine a piece of wood of a certain shape and a board with a hole in it with the same shape. The wood will pass through the hole as long as there is someone present to do so; by such statements we live, and yet why and how can we make them? Why, because we are of the world and slaves to its laws, but how??

For me, this is a problem. (For I present). How can self-reference have any effect as it is complete, i.e. there are no extra effects left over to describe the effects of self-reference. (Self-reference could be the reference of one thought recurring in a train of thought as the brain is physical a degree of circularity would occur.

Self-reference takes time, for self-reference to be possible time

---

1. As far as I am concerned, what really was the case may be very different.



references must be ignored otherwise no self-reference would occur - but it does - I am I, so the effect of removing the time references causes the formal I. (I present). The final and proper effect of my presence is thus explained. Thus to be aware of thought I must be a final and proper effect of the I of relation; Descartes as I "think therefore I am", Descartes I which subsisted.

Through thought which is denied time reference(s) I arise; as far as I am concerned (I present), I am not the content of thought as this content demands time for its understanding, and my nature is timeless.

XVI. I am a proper, or final, effect. Final effects are not of time, and cannot in their turn be causes and are not of substance.

XVII. A final effect cannot be effected, only caused.

XVIII. As a final effect I must always be caused.

XIX. I do not last as substance.

XX. I am permanent for I.

XXI. I can only know I by searching myself, as nothing can refer to itself without some reference from itself.

XXII. And this relation of I as reflection is permanent as is the relation of all Is to Is.<sup>1</sup>

XXIV. I do NOT think. As I am neither passive nor active, as a final effect is caused but does not cause. It is what it is, and cannot be but what it is, if it could be effected it would not be as it is as long as I (present) am.

XXV. Thinking is of that relation of I to I.

---

XXIII

1. The relation of I to I is permanent, yet the system of relation is not. The method is permanent in one way, but the system is involved with substance as are thoughts. Picture a 'circle' of people sitting on each others laps, the shape may change to become a huge maze of interlinking paths turning in on one another - I will always be as real as the chair. The continuing relation of substance of the brain to other substance therein causes a constant final effect and that is what I (present) am!

XXVI. from XXIV I am innocent.<sup>1</sup>

And from the above also comes:-

- i) Thought is of and in time,
- ii) It can cause,
- iii) For us, it is caused by our bodies.

There are two Is, so close in necessary relation that for 1000s of years people have struggled with this most strange of problems. I think, is the I of relation, of time of substance, it is a reference to the causes of what I is all about, the I of the present eternal.

This is all getting rather confusing, let me finish with number 27, and an observation before, in the next chapter, we look at some new problems with a fresh easier approach.

XXVII. The two Is

- i) I (present) (as a proper and final effect).
- ii) I (time) (as the means or cause(s) of I present, e.g. my body).

Another peculiarity which arises out of an examination of ones own thoughts is that, on this level, less the assumptions of the real or of the inter-subjective, is that we are motionless; this is shown in a later exposition.<sup>2</sup> Masters of time even as we are outside its reach, masters of the world as the world moves to us and not us to the world. The laws of the real bind us, but with these powers we find freedom in determination.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. Cross reference Page 80 NOTE<sup>4</sup>

1. Some say the punishment fits the crime. Take two possibilities. After one year and two crimes someone is caught and sentenced. After five years someone is caught having had time to comit more crime. Surely it would be perverse to increase the sum sentence just because this person was not, or could not be caught in time!

2. See writing on causality Page 46 NOTE<sup>2</sup>

2. See note 2 on page 28. Both paragraphs are closely linked.

3. Cross-reference. See page 78, Note<sup>2</sup>. Beyond syntax, on causality. (cf. The Railway carriage example).